CRM 89-201 /July 1989

!JTIC FiL; U.Apr

RESEARCH MEMORANDUM

THE OFFENSIVE NAVYSINCE WORLD WAR II:

HOW BIG AND WHYCIA A Brief Summary

(1. Michael M. McCreaKaren N. Domabyl

Alexander F. Parker

DTICPjELECT E 0

A Division of Hudson Institute

CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES4401 Ford Avenue • Post Office Box 16268 • Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268

0 N f Sf hR U T 1 3 R 5 T 0 1 A

to 04 30 O.,

public repor"So burden for this collection of infornation is estunated to average I hour per response, tncluding the tiote for teviewitng intisructionts, searching exsting data sources gatheritg andor.innug the data needed, an reviewinog the collection of iforrutton. Send continents regarditg this burden estitnurte or amy other aspect of this collection of joforination, including suggestionsfor reducing this burden, to Washitngton 11eadquarter Services, Directorate for Inforrttatioti Operations and Reponts, 1215 Jefferson Davis Hlighiway. Suite 1204, Arlittton, VA 22202-4302, and tothe Office of Inforstistion and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Managetment and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

1AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave Blank) Z 2 REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED

I July 1989 Final

4. TITLE AND SUBTITI_1E 5. FUNDING NUMBERSThe Offensive Navy Since World War H1: Hlow Big anti Why - A Brief Summary

C -N00014-87-C-0001

______________________________________________________________ PE -65154N

6- ALT1IOR(S)

Michael M. McCrea, Karen N. Domabyl, Alexander F Parker P 04

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADD)RESS(ES) 8. PERFORi[NG ORGANIZATIONREPORT NUMBER

Center for Naval Analyses CRM 89-2014401 Ford AvenueAlexandria, Virginia 22302-0268

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORINGIMONITORING AGENCYREPORT NUMBER

11. SUI tPLENiEN TARY NOTES

13. ABSTRACT' (Maximum 200 words)

This research memorandum considers the foundation of post-World War 11 force levels of the Navy's offensive components: fleet carriers, amphibiouslift, and attack submarines. It compares the forces planned versus the actual forces of the postwar era. The force levels of the three components arecompared with each other and their time variations examined. The report isolates those factors that influenced postwar force levels. Changes in anyof these factors could mean changes in future force levels.

14. St;BJEC-r' TERMS 15. NUMBE~R OF PAGESAircraft earrners, Amphibious ships, Attack submarines, Fleets (shtps), Inventory, lxevel (quantity), Military for-e 28levels, Naval operations, Naval planning, Naval vessels (combatant), Navy, Post war operations, Mtlitary 16. RIE~ COD,,requirements

7. ST ~ L Z~ [ EUI8 5ti-j-f 1o 1920%UITATION Of: ABSTRACT.,N~4 0 _ 85500 StanJard I orm 29.(Rev. 2-81

Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18299-01

ED CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSESA Dmwson of Husort inswt 4401 Ford Avenue * Post Office Box 16268 - Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268 - (703) 824-2000

30 August 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION LIST

Subj: Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum 89-201

Encl: (1) CNA Research Memorandum 89-201, The Offensive Navy SinceWorld War II: How Big and Why, A Brief Summary, byMichael M. McCrea, Karen N. Domabyl, Alexander F. Parker,July 1989

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded as a mattor of possible interest.

2. This research memorandum considers the foundation of post-WorldWar II force levels if the Navy's offensive components: fleet carriers,amphibious lift, and attack submarines. It compares the forces plannedversus the actual forces of the postwar era. The force levels of thethree components are compared with each other and their time variationsexamined. The report isolates those factors that influenced postwarforce levels. Changes in any of these factors could mean changes infuture force levels.

Christoph r JeVice President

Navy-Marine Corps Planning

and Manpower

Subj: Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum 89-201Distribution ListSNDL21A1 CINCLANTFLT 28L1 COMPHIBRON 621A2 CINCPACFLT 28L1 COMPHIBRON821A3 CINCUSNAVEUR 28L1 COMP-TIBRON 1022A1 COMSECONDFLT 28L1 COMPHIBRON 1222A2 COMTHIRDFLT 281,2 COMPHIBRON 122A2 COMSEVENTHFLT 28L2 COMPHIBRON 322A3 COMSIXTHFLT 28L2 COMPHIBRON 524A1 COMNAVAIRLANT 28L2 COMPHIBRON 724A2 COMNAVAIRPAC 28L2 COMPHIBRON 924G1 COMSUBLANT 42B1 COMFITMATAEWWINGSLANT24G2 COMSUBPAC 42B2 COMASWWINGPAC24HI COMTRALANT 42B2 COMFITAEWWINGPAC

COMTRAPAC ,2B2 COMLATWINGPAC24J1 CG FMFLANT 42B2 COMMATVAQWINGPAC24J2 CG FMFPAC 42E1 COMCAEWWING TWELVE26F3 COMOPTEVFOR 42E1 COMFITWING ONE26KKK1 TACTRAGRULANT 42E1 COMMATWING ONE26KKK2 TACTRAGRUPAC 42E1 COMSEASTRIKE WINGS ONE28A1 COMCARGRU 2 421 COMCARAIRWING 128A1 COMCARGRU 4 4211 COMCARAIRWING 328A1 COMCARGRU 6 42.1 COMCARAIRWING 628A1 COMCARGRU 8 421 COMCARAIRWING 728A2 COMCARGRU I 42J31 COMCARAIRWING 828A2 COMCARGRU 3 42.11 COMCARAIRWING 1328A2 COMCARGRU 5 421 COMCARAIRWING 1728A2 COMCARGRU 7 42J2 COMCARAIRWING 228K1 COMSUBDEVRON 12 4212 COMCARAIRWING 528K1 COMSUBGRU 2 42J2 COMCARAIRWING 928K1 COMSUBGRU 6 42J2 COMCARAIRWING 1128KI COMSUBGRU 8 4232 COMCARAIRWING 1428K1 COMSUBRON 2 4232 COMCARAIRWING 1528K1 COMSUBRON 4 45A2 CG I MEF28K1 COMSUBRON 6 45A2 CG II MEF28K1 COMSUBRON 8 45A2 CG III MEF28K1 COMSUBRON 10 45B CG FIRST MARDIV28K1 COMSUBRON 14 45B CG SECOND MARDIV28K1 COMSUBRON 16 45B CG THIRD MARDIV28K1 COMSUBRON 18 45B CG FOURTH MARDIV28K1 COMSUBRON 20 45Q CG FIRST FSSG28K1 COMSUBRON 22 45Q CG SECOND FSSG28K2 COMSUBDEVGRU ONE 45Q CG THIRD FSSG28K2 COMSUBDEVGRU ONE DET 45Q CG FOURTH FSSG

ALAMEDA 45V 11 MEU28K2 COMSUBDEVGRU ONE DET 45V 15 MEU

MARE ISLAND 45V 22 MEU28K2 COMSUBGRU 5 45V 24 MEU28K2 COMSUBGRU 7 45V 26 MEU28K2 COMSUBGRU 9 45V 31 MEU28K2 COMSUBRON 1 45V CG FIRST MEB28K2 COMSUBRON 3 45V CG FOURTH MEB28K2 COMSUBRON 7 45V CG FIFTH MEB28K2 COMSUBRON 11 45V CG SIXTH MEB28K2 COMSUBRON 17 45V CG SEVENTH MEB28L1 COMPHIBRON 2 45V CG NINTH MEB28L1 COMPHIBRON 4 45B CG FIRST MAW

Subj: Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum 89-201Distribution ListSNDL45B CG SECOND MAW FKA1G COMNAVSEASYSCOM45B CG THIRD MAW FKQ6A NAVAIRDEVCEN45B CG FOURTH MAW FKQ6B NAVCOASTSYSCENAl SECNAV FKQ6C NAVOCEANSYSCENAl UNSECNAV FKQ6E DTRCEN BETHESDA

Al ASSTSECNAV RES FKQ6F NAVSWC DAHLGREN

A6 HQMC AVN FKQ6G NUSC

A6 HQMC C4 FKQ6H NAVWPNCENA6 HQMC CMC FKR3C NAVAIRTESTCENA6 HQMC OLA FT1 CNET

A6 HQMC PP&O FT2 CNATRA

A6 HQMC R&P FT35 NAVPHIBSCOL CORONADOA6 MC HISTCEN FT35 NAVPHIBSCOL LITTLE CREEK

C201 NAVSWC WHITE OAK FT54 NAVSUBSCOL

C20J NUSC DET NEW LONDON LAB V12 CG MARINE AIR-GROUND

C20J NUSC DET NEWPORT LAB TRAINING AND EDUCATIONFF38 USNA V12 CG MCCDC

FF42 NAVPGSCOL Atm: Studies and Analyses Branch

FF44 NAVWARCOL Attn: Warfighting CenterFF67 NAVFITWEPSCOL Attn: Wargaming CenterFKAIA COMNAVAIRSYSCOM V12 CO MCRDACFKA1B COMSPAWARSYSCOM

OPNAVNAVY LIBRARY OP-07XOP-OOE OP-70OP-OOK OP-70BOP-11 OP-701OP-02 OP-702OP-22 OP-71OP-22B OP-733OP-03 OP-74OP-05 OP-08OP-05W/50W OP-08GOP-50 OP-80OP-50W1 OP-801OP-50W5 OP-806OP-502 OP-81BOP-55 OP-815OP-06 OP-816OP-60 OP-980OP-602 OP-981OP-603 OP-982OP-605 OP-983OP-652 OP-986OP-07

...6m i III Ia

CRM 89-201 /July 1989

THE OFFENSIVE NAVY SINCEWORLD WAR I1: HOW BIG AND WHY

A Brief Summary

Michael M. McCreaKaren N. Domabyl

Alexander F. Parker

A Divison of = Hudson Institute

CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES4401 Ford Avenue • Post Office Box 16268 • Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268

ABSTRACT

This research memorandum considers

the foundation of post-World War II

force levels of the Navy's offensive

components: fleet carriers, amphibious

lift, and attack submarines. It

compares the forces planned versus the

actual forces of the postwar era. The

force levels of the three components are

compared with each other and their time

variations examined. The report

isolates those factors that influenced

postwar force levels. Changes in any of

these factors could mean changes in

future force levels.

Acoession For

NTIS GRA&IDTIC TAB ElUnannounced [Justlflcotion . .

A" per Paid Muirray Av_._Jus----c t--Cnter for Nn-aval Analyses, 4401 Ford Ave.,

Alexandria, VA 22302-0268

'I[CO\ 5/I/(} Vc IAvallpability Codes

t pocial

I~ -iii-

CONTENTS

Page

Introduction.....................................................1I

Foundation of Postwar Force Levels.............................. 1Postwar Planning Precepts............................. ..... 2Gold War.................................................... 4NSC-68 and the Korean War.................................. 5NSC-68 Objectives for M4ilitary Forces...................... 6Defense Consensus........................................... 6

Planned Versus Actual Force Levels................................8

Force Levels for Attack Carriers................................. 11Reasons for Carriers....................................... 11Attack Carrier Force Levels Over Time....................... 12Rationale for the Size of the Carrier Force.................14Summary.................................................... 15

Force Levels for Amphibious Lift................................. 16Reasons for Amphibious Lift................................. 16Force Levels for Amphibious Lift Over Time..................17Rationale for the Size of Amphibious Lift...................19Summary.................................................... 20

Force Levels for the Attack Submarine Force......................20Attack Submarine Force Levels Over Time.....................20Rationale for the Size of the Submarine Force...............22Summary.................................................... 23

Force-Level Summary............................................. 24

Postwar Constants and Potential Changes.......................... 25

*6V

INTRODUCTION

This research memorandum is a condensation of the summpary report on

a project on Naval force levels and strategy. This paper examines pastforce levels and their rationales in order to gain insight for force

levels of the future.

0 The project focused on the Navy's offensive components: fleet (orattack) carriers, amphibious lift, and attack submarines. This summaryaddresses the justification for having each component and the reasonsfor the various force levels of each component since the end of World

War II.

The purpose of this project was to provide answers or insights to

the following questions about Naval force levels:

" What were force levels in the past and why?

" Will future force levels be different from the past?

" What factors might change future force levels?

No references are included in this brief summary. The sources ofinformation for the postwar and early cold war were the originaldocuments, many of which have been declassified. References to theseand other sources are contained in the forthcoming project summary andthe reports covering each component.

This paper first considers the foundation of post-World War IIforce !ve-q of - Navy's offensive pmronents. It oompares the forces

planned versus the forces actually available during the postwar era.The force levels of the three components are then compared with eachother and their time variations examined. The report then isolatesthose factors that influenced postwar force levels and considers theirimplication for changes in future force levels.

FOUNDATION OF POSTWAR FORCE LEVELS

The size and nature of the postwar Navy was determined by two

factors: the composition and experience of the Navy in World War II andits immediate aftermath; and the beginning of the cold war which, in1950, resulted in the drafting of National Security CouncilMemorandum 68 (NSC-68) and the start of the Korean war.

In the Pacific, World War II was a maritime war, and the Navy's

role was offensive, both strategically and tactically. The carriers and

the amphibious forces were used for the projection of power onto the

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Japanese empire. In the central Pacific the Navy and the Marines were

the spearheads of the amphibious assaults. The attack submarine forcewas used in a campaign of strategic interdiction, strangling Japan'smeans of existence.

In the Atlantic, the Navy's role in the campaign against Germanywas primarily a logistic one, and hence had a tactically defensivecast. The concern was with resupply of the forces in Europe, and the

threat to successful resupply was the German submarine. Hence,antisubmarine warfare (ASW) was a primary Navy mission in theAtlantic. The amphibious assaults in the European theater were thelargest in history, but they were operations of the Navy and the Army,not the Navy and the Marines. Few Marines were killed in the Europeantheater.

Planning for the postwar Navy began in late 1943, before the warwas even over. It was completed in December 1945, having had the directinvolvement of both Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal and Chiefof Naval Operations Ernest King. Additionally, the Pacific fleetaviators and submariners who figured so critically in the victory hadparticipated in the planning.

The second set of events that shaped postwar force levels was thedrafting of National Security Council Memorandum 68 (NSC-68) and thestart of the Korean war, both in 1950. NSC-68 defined the cold warthreat as the Soviet Union, and the invasion of South Korea confirmedthe threat and its nature. NSC-68 also defined the U.S. response to thethreat.

As with planning for the postwar Navy, plans were made for a Navysuitable to the needs of the cold war. The precepts used in suchplanLxing are considered next.

Postwar Planning Precepts

At the end-of World War II, th U.S. Navv enjoyed absolute navalsupremacy. No other nation had a navy that could seriously challengeit, and no other nation had a navy even close to it in size. The U.S.Navy had over 28 fleet carriers, enough imphibious lift for over 400,000troops, and over 250 submarines, plus a host of other combatants and

craft.

The problem facing the planners of the postwar Navy, therefore, wasnot buying or building a Navy, but deciding what forces to keep; inparticular, what ships to keep on active duty, what to put in reserve,and what to mothball as a mobilization base. In deciding what forces to

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keep on active duty, the Navy planners were guided by three self-imposedprecepts: they wanted a balanced navy, a forward navy, and a navysecond to none.

The planners used the term "balance" in a variety of ways, without

seeming to have had an explicit definition. They knew what they meantby balance, though, and it was apparently understood among them in acollegial sense. In one statement of "balance" used in the planningdocuments by then-Vice Admiral Harry W. Hill and in Congressionaltestimony bv the then-CNO, Admiral Ernest King, balance meant that someof each type of ship and weapon that had proved useful during the warwould be kept on active duty until it was clear it would not be usefulin the postwar Navy. The ratio of carriers to surface combatants to bekept on active duty would be determined by the relative number usedduring the war. For example, the Commander of Naval Air Foices,Pacific, calculated the ratio of carriers to surface combatants in eachof the major engagements in the Pacific as a basis for planning thepostwar balance.

The active postwar Navy was to be a forward navy, operating not inwaters contiguous to the United States, but instead, overseas. The U.S.Navy assumed responsibility for the entire Pacific and the westernAtlantic, and the approaches thereto. The idea behind a forward navyand its concomitant overseas base structure and protected lines ofcommunication was for the Navy to be in a position to preclude any"disturbances to the peace of the world"--to have forces on or near thescene of any troubles so that any small disturbance could be quicklyquelled before it grew into a more serious disturbance. Although themodels for these "disturbances" were Germany and Japan and the eventsleading up to the war, the experience of the war was such that theplanners determined "never again."

Additionally, the postwar planners wanted a navy second to none.Given the size and composition of the other navies of the world at thattime, this was not terribly difficult. (The British navy by itself waslarger than all the other navies combined, except that of the UnitedStates.) Initially, the precept of a navy second to none was to beaccomplished on a type-by-type basis, e.g., number of submarines versusnumber of submarines, battleships versus battleships, etc. Ultimatelyhowever, a navy second to none was taken to mean that the U.S. Navyshould have superiority in each ship type compared to the next largestnavy.

Using these precepts, the planners of the postwar Navy determined* that an active-duty navy should have about 320 combatants, plus

amphibious and support ships. As will soon be discussed, the postwarNavy envisioned in these plans did not come to fruition, howpver, untilwell after the planned period. Immediate postwar budgets precluded much

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of what the Navy planners had desired; declining budgets for the Navy

led to declining force levels.

Cold War 0

Before World War II, most Americans did not believe in becomingentangled in European affairs; they were content to leave Europe to theEuropeans, together with all their feuds and internecine conflicts.Immediately after the war, this attitude reappeared, with troops over-seas rioting to come home and to be relieved of their service obli-gations. They had fought the war and won, and they were ready to bedone with it. In less than a year after the end of the war, the size ofthe Army and Navy dropped from over 12 million men to less than3 million. The armed services were demobilized, precipitously.

At the end of the war, there were very few, in government or out,who realized that the Soviet Union would turn from a wartime ally to apeacetime threat. The realization was slow in coming, but there weremany indications of future enmity. Just after the war, the Sovietsinitially refused to take their troops out of Iran and seemed intent onannexing some of its northern provinces (1946). They wanted territorialrights in the Sudan and control over the Bosporus and the Dardanelles(1946-48), and they began to assert control over eastern Europe (1946-49). Their supporters attempted to take control of the Italiangovernment (1946-47), and that of the Greeks as well (1947-48); theywere instrumental in fomenting the Greek civil war and the atrocitiesassociated with it. They blocked Allied access to Berlin (1948-49).These events, as well as many others, led to the eventual realizationthat the Soviet government was and would be inimical to the UnitedStates and any interest it represented.

In 1947, President Truman had declared the so-called Truman Doc-trine, which declared that the United States would "help free peoples tomaintain... their national integrity against aggressive movements thatseek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes." Although not men-tioning them by name, the doctrine was directed at the Soviet Union andits activities in Greece and Turkey. In 1948, Truman signed andpromulgated National Security Council Memorandum 20, which was concernedwith the U.S. objectives with respect to the USSR, to counter Sovietthreats to U.S. security. It labeled the USSR as the "gravest threatto... the United States" and called for greater military readiness. TheMarshall Plan, designed to restore economic vitality to the westernEuropean nations, was started in 1948. In 1949, in spite of over 150years of history, the United States joined with European nations to formthe NATO Alliance.

The final step on the path to realization was the drafting ofNSC-68, and the Korean war.

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NSC-68 and the Korean War

The Korean war and the drafting of NSC-68 were coincident in thatthe Korean war started after the basic draft of NSC-68 was completed butbefore the policy was approved by the President and promulgated.President Truman had initiated the drafting of NSC-68 (by the Departmentof State) in January 1950 and had seen the basic document in earlyApril. He sent the draft to the National Security Council for adetermination of the military forces and costs implied by the policy.The first estimates of the military forces and the costs were due inearly July, with a final determination due in early September. On 25June 1950, the North Koreans invaded South Korea; hence, at the start ofthe Korean war, the basic policy had been determined but the associatedmilitary forces and total costs of the policy had not. President Trumanapproved the conclusions of the policy in September and approved themilitary forces and costs in mid-December, followed shortly by adeclaration of a national emergency.

NSC-68, as a matter of national policy, identified the governmentof the Soviet Union as hostile to the very idea of freedom and as adirect threat to the United States. The Soviet Union was declared to beexpansionist in nature and an "aspirant to hegemony," by which thedrafters meant world hegemony. The policy called for the "containment"of the Soviet Union, as a response by the United States to the perceivedthreat. Containment was to be a policy of blunting or denying anyfurther Soviet expansion, together with an effort to isolate the SovietUnion until its behavior changed to conform to generally acceptedinternational standards.

Because it made explicit reference to the maintenance of a strongmilitary posture as essential for the policy of containment, NSC-68added a sense of urgency to the general rearmament started in 1948. Thecontainment policy called for not only a strong military posture butmade explicit the notion that such a posture would need to be maintainedfor an indefinite period of time. The military forces required by thepolicy were originally intended to be achieved by 30 June 1954. Eventsin Korea led many to believe that war with the Soviet Union was muchcloser than had previously been believed, and the date for achieving therequired military forces was advanced to 30 June 1952.

The Korean war was a surprise to the policy-makers and posed animmediate military problem. Although NSC-68 called for greater militarystrength, such strength was meant to be directed at the Soviet Union andnot a country like North Korea. Moreover, NSC-68 had initially

*envisioned a four-year period to build up the requisite militaryforce. Unfortunately, at the time of the invasion of South Korea, theforce levels of the United States were at a postwar low; hence, not onlydid the United States need to rearm to satisfy the policy dictates of

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NSC-68, but forces also had to be raised to fight the war. Although theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) believed that the Korean warwas "the wrong war, at the wrong time, in the wrong place, with thewrong enemy," the war was viewed as an effort to block Soviet expan- gsionism, i.e., part of the effort to "contain" the Soviet Union.

Additionally, while it is not clear that the drafters of NSC-68initially envisioned the use of surrogates on the part of the Soviet

Union, the notion of surrogate wars had been considered by the timePresident Truman signed the document for promulgation in December 1950.U.S. participation in surrogate wars would henceforth be viewed by manyas part of the policy of containment.

NSC-68 Objectives for Military Forces

As with planning the postwar Navy, there were precepts for planningthe forces associated with NSC-68. The military forces were sized tomeet two objectives. The first was to "protect against disaster," i.e.,to ensure that in a war against the Soviet Union the U.S. forces wouldbe large enough to give the country time to mobilize but not so largethat they would prevail without mobilization. This set both a lower andupper limit on the force levels.

The second objective in sizing the military forces was that theyshould be large enough to support the foreign policy goals of con-tainment. This set an additional lower limit, and the limits from thesetwo objectives were used as guides to force levels.

Defense Consensus

The events of 1950 led to the reforging of the defense consensus ofWorld War II. There was general agreement among the President, theCongress, and the American people on the need for rearmament and thedefense of freedom. NSC-68 was deliberate in saying that the Sovietgovernment was anathema to the very notion of freedom and a free peopleand that Soviet enmity towards the U.S. stemmed from this rather thanold-style power politics. There was a general acceptance by thecitizenry that the U.S. must defend the cause of freedom, not solelybecause it could but because it was their duty as a free people.

Even with this consensus, President Truman was fearful of theeconomic impact of a trebled defense budget. In his declaration of anational emergency in December, he said he would ask Congress toreimpose some of the recently lifted economic controls. Reservists,many of whom were veterans of World War II, had already been called backto duty, and some National Guard units were activated.

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Despite the general reluctance to return to war, with the necessityfor the callup of the Reserves and the imposition of economic controls,President Truman, the Congress, and the American people acted inconcert. This defense consensus and the economic underpinnings of ithave essentially lasted throughout the postwar period.

Since World War II, the Presidents, the Congress, and the Americanpeople (via the ballot box) have had a chance to consider how muchshould be spent on defense and the context for this expenditure, such asfor strategic arms, to support alliances such as NATO, and for generaldefense.

Since 1950, each President has chosen relatively high levels ofdefense spending. However, all of them have explicitly recognized thatAmerican strength was ultimately measured by the health of its economy,and that if the U.S. were to prevail against the Soviet Union, theeconomy would be the reason. Every President (but Reagan) expressedconcern about the impact of defense spending upon the economy as awhole. Yet, each still spent, although Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford,and Carter were perhaps more frugal than Kennedy, Johnson, or Reagan.There were real force reductions under Nixon, Ford, and Carter, but thedefense posture was only marginally changed.

Regardless of what the President requests, the Congress must decideon the total defense appropriation and its parts. Since 1950, theCongress has largely agreed with the President, appropriating roughlywhat he has desired. Congress has provided no redirection of U.S.defense policy; it has authored no radical shifts in the defense postureof the U.S.; nor has it prevented any shifts suggested by thePresident. Historically, if the President wants to spend less ondefense, Congress agrees; if the President wants to spend more, Congresswill appropriate more.

Opinion polls have shown that most U.S. citizens have agreed withdefense spending and general defense measures since 1950. Moreover, ifthey disapprove, the voters can always register desired change every twoyears when they elect their Representatives. As noted, the Congress asa whole has gone along with the President. In a functioning democracy,agreement on defense among the President, the Congress, and the peopleshould perhaps not be surprising. What is surprising, however, is itsstability over a period of more than 40 years--historically, democracieshave not been known for their ability to forge long-term consensus.

One of the reasons for the defense consensus is that the American* people have believed that they were the defenders of freedom and demo-

cracy--that if they did not act, no one would. The postwar Presidentshave each evoked this notion, generally linking it to defense. There isthe "bear any burden, pay any price... to assure the success of liberty"

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from Kennedy, with the notion that "...any hope the world has.. .forfreedom will be determined by... the American people" from Nixon, tobeing "...by destiny...the watchmen on the walls of world freedom" fromReagan. All the other postwar Presidents have made similar statements,equally dramatic.

Another reason for defense consensus .. that defense spending hasbeen affordable. The ability of the U.S. economy to sustain the defenseexpenditures requested by the President has been a concern of both thePresident and the Congress. However, each time there has been asignificant increase in defense spending (such as that under Truman andEisenhower, when the defense budget tripled, or the increase underKennedy), the economy has not suffered, nor have the lives of thegeneral populace been adversely and noticeabl! affected. In a sense,the U.S. could bear the mantle of defender of freedom because it couldafford to economically.

PLANNED VERSUS ACTUAL FORCE LEVELS

Table 1 shows a comparison between the results of the planning forthe postwar Navy, the cold war Navy, and the reality of the past44 years, on average. The first column shows the force levelsrecommended to the President by Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestalin his annual report on 1 December 1945. As mentioned earlier, theseforce levels were not adopted in the immediate postwar period. Thesecond column shows the naval forces called for by NSC-68 and approvedby the President in December 1950. The last column shows the actualpostwar average from 1946 through 1989.

The similarity of these three sets of numbers is striking. Onemight believe that such a similarity is largely accidental and that theforce levels varied much more widely over the 44-year period. Such isnot the case. Force levels remained at about these levels throughoutthe period.

Figure 1 shows the force levels from 1946 through 1989 for the Navycomponents of interest here: attack carriers, amphibious lift, andattack submarines. The force levels of the three components areconsistent among themselves, that is, each shows the same pattern overtime. Each is characterized by a steep drop from 1946 to 1950, followedby a sharp increase, and is then roughly constant thereafter, with a dipin the late 1960s and early 1970s.

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Table 1. Planned versus actual force levels

Navy planning NSC planning Actual

Dec 1945 Dec 1950 1946-89

Attack carriers 13 12 13-2/3

Attack submarines 90 100 92

Amphibious lift 4 5 ,0 0 0 a 3 9 ,00 0 b 48,000(troops)

a. Assumes a division size of 18,000 and lift for 2-1/2 divisions.b. Assumes a division size of 19,500 and lift for 2 divisions.

The steep drop of 1945-50 is due to the very stringent budgets ofPresident Truman. It was widely believed then that a Defense Departmentbudget of much more than $13 billion would ruin the economy of theUnited States. There was also a widespread belief that the nation couldsimply not afford to maintain large military forces in peacetime. Therewas virtual unanimity that the forces needed to prevail in war could notbe maintained during peace.

The Air Force believed (and convinced many others) that it was thepremier service and that the atomic bomb had made the Navy and Armyobsolete. War in the future would be conducted by the Air Forcedropping atomic bombs. Acceptance of such arguments was reflected inthe proportion of the defense budget devoted to each of the services.During this period, the force levels of the Navy declined and those ofthe Air Force grew. When the size of the overall Navy had to be cutback, each component had to cut back as well, to maintain a balancedNavy.

The steep drop of 1945-50 was followed by a steep increase in1950-51. The defense budget increased threefold from 1949 to 1951. Theincreased budget was due to the cost of the containment policy ofNSC-68, as well as the exigencies of the Korean war. NSC-68 called forrelatively large military forces for the foreseeable future. In fact,

the force levels of the policy alone implied about a threefold increasein the budget of the Department of Defense.

4

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Attack carriers1946 -1989

16

14

12

10

Number 8

6

4

2

047 50 53 56 59 62 65 68 71 74 77 80 83 86 89

Fiscal year

Assault lift capability100,000 1946-1989

90,000

80,000

70,000

60,000

Personnel 5o,ooo

40,000

30.000

20.000

10,000

047 50 53 56 59 62 65 68 71 74 77 80 83 86 89

Fiscal year

Attack submarines1946 - 1989

120

80

60

Number

40

20

p0

47 50 53 56 59 62 65 68 71 74 77 80 83 86 89

Year

Figure 1. Consistent force levels, 1946-198910-

After the (naval) force-level goals of NSC-68 had been reached (bymid-1952), the force levels remained relatively flat. Each of thecomponents had a common dip in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The dipwas caused by the mass retirement of ships of the World War II era.

As well as being consistent across ship types, the force levels ofeach ship type were roughly constant after the mid-1950s. Also, theforce-level goals for each type were largely constant over the last40 or so years, with the exception of amphibious lift in the period1961-67. This constancy within each ship type is examined next.

FORCE LEVELS FOR ATTACK CARRIERS

Over the years, there have been many types of aircraft carriers:antisubmarine warfare carriers (CVSs), escort carriers (CVEs), and fleetcarriers (CVs). This project considers only those carriers with theattack mission. The carriers of interest here are the CVs of World WarII and their successors, the attack carriers (CVAs), and the successorsof the CVAs, the modern general-purpose carriers, CVs. Even thoughthese carriers are general purpose, their primary mission is attack.This section examines the force levels of attack carriers--why they wereneeded and what numbers were needed.

Reasons for Carriers

At the end of World War II, the planners believed that the Navywould continue to be required to project military power against hostileforces or territories. A balanced Navy would have some carriers in it,because carriers had proven to be the preeminent Naval instrument forprojecting power. This had been the experience in the Pacific.

Another lesson from the Pacific was that aircraft carriers providedan extremely flexible means of employing military force. The Navyplanners explicitly recognized the value of the mobility of the carriersand the fact that a carrier force was inherently modular. One couldtailor the size of the carrier force to the size of the military problemby merely adding or deleting carriers. Moreover, the movement of thecarrier force was subject only to the control of the United States.

The planners recognized that in addition to being flexible in termsof its mobility, modularity, and U.S. control, a carrier force spannedthe complete level of military violence, from merely a show of force upto the delivery of atomic weapons. (The carrier Navy had achieved avery limited capability for delivering atomic bombs by late 1948, havingworked toward this goal since the explosion at Hiroshima.)

It was widely believed at the end of World War II that airpowerwould be the predominant military force of the future; hence, the only

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way for the Navy to remain a viable military entity was to take airpowerto sea, i.e., on aircraft carriers.

A final reason for having aircraft carriers was the exlerienceafter the war, especially in responding to crises requiring a show offorce. The Navy planners had never accepted the Air Force argument thatall future disputes or wars would be settled quickly with atomicweapons, an atomic blitz if need be, and believed instead that a rangeof military force would be required. The immediate postwar experienceseemed to validate Navy beliefs.

The years since World War II have consistently shown the usefulnessof the carrier force. It was useful in the past and will probablycontinue to be so in the future. All the rationales of the planners ofthe postwar Navy remained valid as has been seen repeatedly in the manyhearings and discussions on the need for carriers. A more difficultquestion for planners was how many carriers were needed.

Attack Carrier Force Levels Over Time

Figure 2 shows the number of attack carriers in the force from 1946to the present. The count was taken at the end of each fiscal year(30 June prior to 1977 and 30 September thereafter).

IS

14

12

10Numbef 8

8

2

47 50 53 5 5 6 6 8 1 4 77 80 83 86 88Fscal year

Figure 2. Attack carriers, 1946-1989

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At the end of the war, the Navy had 28 fleet carriers and wanted to

keep 13 on active duty. By 1950, the number of carriers on active dutyhad been reduced to 7. Although this lowered number reflected the

stringent Truman defense budgets, it was also a reflection of a beliefpromulgated by the Air Force that the Navy had no real role to play innational war plans. Although the carriers were included in most ofthese Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) plans, their inclusion was less thanwholehearted.

The jump from 7 operational carriers in 1950 to the 12 carriers

called for by NSC-68 was the largest postwar increase in carrier forcelevels. The NSC-68 goal was supposed to be reached by 30 June 1952; itwas actually reached earlier. Twelve was the Navy's originalrequirement and was the goal ultimately set, but in discussions in theJCS, the number of carriers ranged from a low of 8 to a high of 12.

The next major change was the increase from the NSC-68 goal of 12to the postwar average of 14. In early 1952, President Trumanpersonally authorized the "temporary" operation of 2 additionalcarriers, raising the number of operational carriers from 12 to 14. TheCommander in Chief (CINC) Far East, General Douglas MacArthur, hadrepeatedly requested more airpower for the Far East and had beenrepeatedly told by the JCS that none was immediately available. Afterdiscussions in the JCS about the availability of additional carriers tomeet MacArthur's request, especially taking them from the six in theAtlantic, the JCS decided to ask the President to authorizerecommissioning two additional carriers for deployment to the FarEast. The Navy, Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Secretaryof Defense all favored recommissioning two carriers, while the Air Forcewas against it and in favor of taking two existing carrriers from theAtlantic fleet. At the time, each fleet had six operational carriers.The additional carriers were not intended for Korea and the Korean warbut to provide airpower near Taiwan, Indochina, and other places wherethe Soviets might make a military thrust either directly or through asurrogate such as the Chinese or Vietnamese Communists. Later,President Eisenhower personally had to continue the "temporary"authorization of the two additional carriers, and like Truman, he did sofor the same reason: the need for mobile airpower in the Far East. Inparticular, airpower was needed to protect Taiwan, but Eisenhower did

not want to station any U.S. troops on Taiwanese territory. Thesituation in the Far East was such that carriers were wanted nearIndochina, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan.

Even with the addition of the two "temporarily" authorizedcarriers, there were only eight carriers in the Pacific theater, ofwhich four were continually deployed to the Far East. The Secretary of

Defense asked the Navy, via the JCS, to deploy five carriers to the FarEast. The answer was no, even when the request was repeated. In 1957,

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events in the Far East did not seem to be so menacing, and the Navy wasallowed to reduce the number of carriers deployed in the western Pacificfrom four to three. This level of deployment was maintained until thewar in Vietnam in the 1960s, when the Navy was authorized to operate S15 carriers.

Although the Kennedy administration had wanted the Navy to operatemore carriers in the short term, fewer were desired for the long term.Secretary of Defense MacNamara decided in early 1963 that the carrierforce should be reduced to 13 operational carriers by 1972. Hisdecision was based upon the planned removal of the carriers from thenuclear war plan (the single integrated operational plan, or SlOP), hisview of their vulnerability, and his view that land-based air wascheaper than sea-based air. While he was eventually convinced to retain15 carriers for the future, he planned to reduce the number of airwingsto 13. This led to the reduction of the carrier force in the mid-1970sto a force of 13. It also contributed to a period of indecision aboutwhat type of carrier to procure in the future, with the result that nonewere procured and force levels fell even further.

The reduction of the carrier force in the mid-1970s was furtheredby the Nixon administration, which reduced the number of airwings from12 to 11. The goal was to reduce the carrier force to 12 and cover thesame area by homeporting one carrier in the Mediterranean and one inJapan. Homeporting arrangments with Greece proved too difficult,however, and this, together with the desire for occasional deploymentsto the Indian Ocean, delayed the planned reduction to 12 carriers. Itwas recognized that with a 12-carrier force, even with one homeportedoverseas, previous deployment patterns would not be feasible. Althoughin the past the Navy had deployed two carriers to the Mediterranean andthree to the Pacific, in the future there would be only two deployed inthe Pacific and two in the Mediterranean. Although the deploymentpatterns were adjusted, a force level of 13 carriers was maintained toprovide for a contingency.

Rationale for the Size of the Carrier Force

The size of the carrier force has been driven by two factors:policy and geography--the containment policy of NSC-68 and the Navy'smeans of implementing it, forward deployment.

The policy of containment ensured the need for military forces andtheir use, while the policy of forward deployments helped dictate theirsize. By 1953, the Navy had realized that forward deployments meantthat if one carrier was to be deployed forward continuously, a total ofthree carriers were needed. The three-to-one ratio was found to providetime for training and maintenance prior to deployment and to providedeployments of reasonable length. There have been periods, however,

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when this three-to-one ratio was violated--usually by extendingdeployments, shortening the time between deployments, and sacrificingship maintenance time.

Geography has driven postwar carrier force levels because, for theUnited States, the areas of interest, of unrest, or response toperceived Soviet thrusts have remained constant. The level of U.S.interest in these areas has been largely constant. The Mediterraneanhas been an area of unrest since the end of the war, and carriers havedeployed there since 1948. The western Pacific (particularly Korea,Taiwan, and Indochina) has also been an area of constant postwarinterest, and the United States has had carriers deployed there since1950, typically two to three of them. One carrier has been homeported inJapan to increase the deployed forces in the western Pacific. While theIndian Ocean has seen more carrier deployments in the past decade, ithas been recognized since the mid-1950s that maintaining a continuouscarrier presence in the Indian Ocean would require an increase in forcelevels or a decrease in other deployments. The Indian Ocean is so farfrom the United States (and U.S. bases abroad) that the transit time toand from there has an impact on the number of carriers needed to keepone deployed. Because the areas of interest to the United States havebeen stable geographically, the areas of deployment have also beenstable.

The actual number of carriers in the postwar years has been largelyconstant, between 13 and 15, because this number provides almost globalcoverage in both time and space. Carriers can be near potential troublespots in the Mediterranean and Pacific because they are (and have been)deployed there. Even with a force of 15 carriers, a carrier deployed tothe Indian Ocean would preclude two deployed in the Mediterannean andtwo or three in the Pacific.

Summary

To summarize, after the war, planners faced the question of howmany carriers to keep on active duty, both in an absolute sense andrelative to the other combatants. Although Navy planners knew how manythey wanted, they could not convince the other services nor the Trumanadministration. With the advent of NSC-68, which called for militarypower, Navy planners at least had a vehicle to carry their argument. By1949, carriers had been committed to the Mediterranean and had proveduseful there. In the early 1950s, the need for airpower in the Far Easthad been met with carriers, and here too the carriers proved useful bothmilitarily and diplomatically (show of force). By the mid-1950s, theNavy and the national authorities had learned (or knew) that at least14 carriers were needed to meet routine deployment schedules.

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Once a force level of 14 carriers was reached, it was maintainedfor several reasons. For example, the policy of containment implicitlycalled for intervention, militarily or otherwise. Such intervention wasto be the response to a Soviet attempt to extend their dominance. WithKorea, the United States learned that such attempts might be made bySoviet surrogates. The areas of interest to the United States have beengeographically stable in the postwar period, and hence the areas towhich carriers deploy have remained stable. The amount of coverageprovided by a carrier, in both time and space, has remained constant aswell. Taken together, these elements imply stable force levels.

FORCE LEVELS FOR AMPHIBIOUS LIFT

An amphibious assault is one of the most complicated types ofmilitary operations and, as such, involves many different operationalaspects. An amphibious assault today could have multiple echelons: anassault echelon, a fly-in echelon, a follow-on echelon, and perhapstroops landed administratively after the assault. The size of theassault echelon is commonly used to measure the amount of amphibiouslift, but the other echelons are also important, perhaps critical.Here, only the assault echelon is considered.

Even an assault echelon has multiple aspects and. hence, multiplemeasures. The most common measures of an assault echelon are the numberof personnel, the number of square feet of stowage available for ve-hicles (such as trucks and tanks), the number of cubic feet of stowagefor general cargo, the number of landing craft stowed for the assault,and the number of helicopters for the assault. Because the point of anamphibious assault is to land men on a (hostile) shore, the number ofpersonnel liftable in the assault echelon is used here as the measure ofamphibious lift.

Reasons for Amphibious Lift

Before the drafting of NSC-68 or the Korean war, the Navy main-tained an amphibious force as part of a balanced navy. Between the endof World War II and the beginning of the Korean war, the Marines (andthe Navy) were under attack as being obsolete or unneeded. Amphibiousassaults were viewed as things of the past, not viable in an atomic agebecause they required concentrating men and equipment in a small area,becoming good targets for atomic weapons. Many military professionalsshared this view, including Chief of Staff of the Army General OmarBradley. Although the Navy viewed the amphibious force as part of abalanced Navy and the Marines continued to try to find a viable way todo amphibious assaults under the threat of atomic weapons, the otherservices and the Office of the Secretary of Defense did not view theamphibious force as part of a balanced military.

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As a result of the successful landing at Inchon, however,amphibious assault regained credibility with the rest of the nationalmilitary establishment. Ironically, the execution of the landing wasapproved by the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General OmarBradley.

The intense scrutiny of the Navy and Marines in the immediate post-World War II period led planners for both to consider a wide range ofquestions regarding the viability and sense of amphibious assaults ofthe future. The Navy and Marine planners knew that many of the areas ofpotential trouble were vulnerable to seaborne approach and assault, atleast in a nonnuclear environment. The value of this vulnerability ofpotential enemies or "disturbers of the peace" was more widelyacknowledged after the Korean war and the adoption of NSC-68.

Additionally, the Marines had always viewed themselves as a readyforce, "the first to fight." Since January 1948, a landing force ofMarines had been attached to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.These forward-deployed Marines, and others like them, were viewed byboth political and military authorities as an on-scene, ready force. Inthe years after the Korean war, Marines in amphibious ships proveduseful to political authorities, either for a show of force or tointervene militarily, such as in Lebanon in the 1950s and in theDominican Republic in the 1960s.

In the post-World War II period, then, amphibious lift has hadcontinuing utility. The lift allows the Marines to be forward deployedat sea, not too far from likely trouble spots, and yet not stationed onanyone else's sovereign territory.

Force Levels for Amphibious Lift Over Time

Figure 3 shows how the size of assault lift has varied in thepostwar period. The figure shows the number of personnel of an assaultechelon that can be placed ashore (or "lifted") from amphibious ships.The measure is taken at the end of each fiscal year.

As noted earlier, the variation of amphibious lift over timelargely parallels that of the carrier force, with the exception of thehump in lift capability in the 1960s. There is a sharp decline between1946 and 1950, followed by a sharp rise in the early 1950s, with aplateau in the late 1960s. The decline between 1946 and 1950 was due tothe Truman budget limitations. This lack of funding mirrored the notionthat there was no national need for amphibious forces, that amphibiouswarfare was obsolete. Of particular note, amphibious lift was notcovered by JCS guidance. In the JCS majority view, amphibious lift waspurely a Navy affair. This attitude changed with the very successfulassault at Inchon.

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100,000

90,000

80.000

7t)000

60.000

Pefsonnel 50000o

40,000 ii30.000

20.000 1 111111110

0 47 50 53 56 5We 6 65 68 71 74 T7 80 83 86 89

Fmcalyear

Figure 3. Assault lift capability, 1946-1989

In figure 3, the steep rise in lift in FY 1951 was the buildup ofamphibious lift needed for the landing at Inchon. A steep drop occurredafter 1954. The reasons for this reduction in lift were as follows.After Korea, amphibious lift was no longer viewed as obsolete, and theMarines continued the development of their solution to the problem ofatomic weapons: vertical assault. The concept of vertical assault ledto the need for ships with flat tops to operate the helicopters carryingthe troops. These ships had to be designed, built, and bought. Themilitary budgets of President Eisenhower, however, were insufficient tomeet even the force-level goals of NSC-68. Because of the limitedbudgets and a cap on enlisted Navy end-strength, the Navy planned inDecember 1953 to reduce amphibious lift from two to one and one-thirddivisions from 1956 on. This accounts for the drop in amphibious liftafter FY 1954. One and one-third divisions of lift were thought by theNavy to at least be in "balance" with the rest of the Navy, consideringthe reduced budget. Although both the Army and Marines were concernedwith the reduction, the JCS as a whole and the Eisenhower administrationsupported it. One division of lift was to be stationed in the Pacific,and one-third division of lift was to be stationed in the Atlantic.

The hump between 1962 and 1969 in figure 3 is not because of thewar in Southeast Asia but because of the policy of President Kennedy andlater President Johnson to increase the general-purpose forces as partof the strategy of "flexible response." The lift goal was changed fromthe one and one-third divisions of the Eisenhower administration to twodivisions. Mothballed amphibious ships were recommissioned to reachthis goal--ships that had been built during World War II. The buildup

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to two divisions was unsustained, however, and the Eisenhower goal oflift for one and one-third divisions was readopted between the waningdays of the Johnson administration and the beginning of the first Nixonadministration. Ultimately, the lift was to be split evenly between theAtlantic and Pacific, with two Marine Expeditionary Brigades' (MEBs)lift in each. A mass retirement of World War Il-era ships led to aprecipitous drop in lift between 1968 and 1970.

As with the drop after FY 1954, the decrease after FY 1968 in boththe actual lift and the lift goal was due to budgetary restrictions.Although the drop after FY 1954 was initiated by the Navy, the dropafter FY 1968 was initiated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense(OSD) and was agreed to only later by the Navy. The decrease in thelift goal also meant a readjustment of the then-current plans for theuse of amphibious lift, the adoption of the so-called "swing strategy"of lift. The swing strategy meant that if the long-standing contingencyplan of a division-sized assault in either ocean were to be realized,the additional amphibious forces needed must come from the other ocean,that is, they would "swing" over to the other ocean.

After tne mass retirement of the World War Il-era ships between1968 and 1972, the average age of the amphibious fleet dropped to onlyseven years. From 1970 to 1988, the force-level goal was one and one-third Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) of lift, except for two yearsof the Carter administration, when the lift goal fell to a single MEF.Throughout this period, the force levels were roughly constant, withsufficient lift for about one MEF or two or three MEBs, depending uponthe definition of MEFs and MEBs and how one counts ships in overhaul orbeing modernized.

Rationale for the Size of Amphibious Lift

The goal of one and one-third divisions of lift has been inconsonance with the needs of policy. The Marines have had, since 1946,a goal of lift for two divisions, split evenly between the two oceans.This was based upon the notion that lift for a division-sized forcemight be needed simultaneously in each ocean. Apparently, a division-sized contingency was the largest contingency for which forces could bemaintained during peacetime.

The Navy, however, has apparently found that one and one-thirddivisions of lift are sufficient. The geography seems to have beencovered, with continuous deployments to both the Mediterranean and thePacific.

At the national level, apparently one and one-third divisions havealso been sufficient. Foreign policy goals seem to have been met. When

4this force-level goal was first set by the Navy in 1953, the Eisenhower

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administration concurred. Moreover, with the exception of the Kennedyadministration, all others adopted this goal. The goal has provensufficient to provide at least two or three MEBs' worth of lift.

Summary

To summarize, the question again for planners after the war was howmuch amphibious lift capability to keep on active duty. The Navybelieved that amphibious forces should be part of a balanced navy, butthe rest of the national military establishment did not. Even in thelean postwar years, the Navy maintained some amphibious lift because ofthis belief. The Korean experience with the successful landing atInchon proved the continuing utility of an amphibious assault, at leastin a nonnuclear environment. Although the Marines had wanted sufficientlift for two divisions (and still do), the Navy reduced the amount oflift after Korea to one and one-third divisions, and the administrationdid not try to change or adjust this choice.

After Korea, the national military establishment agreed thatamphibious lift is part of a balanced military. The policy of NSC-68,calling for the containment of the Soviet Union, implicitly called formilitary intervention. The Marines have continually advertisedthemselves as a ready force (and proven this when called upon) and havebeen forward deployed near sites of potential trouble--in a position tointervene. The means of deploying them has been the amphibious lift.Since the Korean war, the Marines, via their amphibious lift, have beenused in a variety of crises and proven useful to the policy-makers.

FORCE LEVELS FOR THE ATTACK SUBMARINE FORCE

A primary tenet of postwar planning was balance, or the decision tokeep at least some of all of the forces that had contributed to victoryin World War II. The submarine had proven its usefulness for the U.S.in the Pacific, strangling Japanese commerce and sinking many navalvessels as well. Additional evidence of the submarine's worth wasprovided oy the German U-boats, which had come close to shutting downU.S. resupply and reinforcement in the Atlantic. The submarine had alsoproven itsclf versatile. This mission flexibility combined withburgeoning technological advances to ensure that the postwar Navy wouldinclude at least some submarines.

Attack Submarine Force Levels Over Time

The story of the attack submarine force is somewhat different fromthat of carriers and amphibious forces. Its postwar history has beencharacterized by revolutionary advances in capability--due primarily to

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the advent of nuclear propulsion. Today's SSN is a far cry from thediesel-electric fleet boat of 1945. In short, the submersible hasbecome a true submarine.

During the past 40 years, the submarine has also undergone changesin both mission and employment concept, changes made possible by thetechnological advances. Most prominent among these changes was theaddition of ASW to the attack submarine's mission.

In the midst of all these changes, however, attack submarine forcelevels have remained roughly constant, at about 90. Figure 4 shows thevariation of attack submarine force levels with time. The count is as ofI January of each year.

110 -

100

80 -

70

Number 60 -of so /

boats -- SS + SSK -b-Total

30

20

1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990

Year

Figure 4. U.S. attack submarine force, 1946-1989

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The most prominent fact about the postwar submarine force is thetransition to nuclear power, as shown in figure 4, which breaks theforce into diesel and nuclear. While the decline and rise of the twotechnologies are dramatic, overall attack submarine levels remained Afairly constant.

Figure 4 shows two dips and subsequent recoveries. The firstoccurred from 1946 to 1951 and paralleled the decline in the othercomponents brought about by the Truman administration's fiscalstringency. After reaching an all-time postwar low of 69 in January1951, the force was back up to 96 a year later, spurred by NSC-68'ssubmarine goal of 100.

The second decline in the force, caused by the block obsolesence ofWorld War lI-era vessels, again was paralleled in the carrier andamphibious components. In the case of submarines, 67 diesels retired inthe space of eight years, leading to a low of 74 submarines in 1974.This dip was exacerbated and extended by the shipyard delays inconstructing the first of the Los-Angeles class SSNs.

The rest of the period, however, featured remarkable constancy.Force-level goals varied between 90 and 105, and actual force levelsremained within 20 percent of the 90 submarines originally retained atthe end of World War II.

Rationale for the Size of the Submarine Force

Why did the Navy settle on 90 submarines out of the 260 on hand atthe end of the war? Without an enemy dependent on maritime commerce,why did the U.S. Navy want to retain so many submarines?

To answer these questions, there was first the enunciated principleof a navy second to none. In planning documents, the next largest navy,that of the United Kingdom, was listed as having 141 submarines; theU.S. submarine force was sized at only 90, with the notation "typedifferential considered." Perhaps equally important, the Soviets'submarine force was listed as 104, and they were soon to have equalaccess to the latest German submarine technology.

The initial operational impetus for a sizable submarine force wasthe need for submarines to provide training services to air and surfaceASW forces. Soviet naval emphasis on submarines combined with thesubmarine's acquisition of the ASW mission to provide continuingrationale to maintain a large attack submarine force.

Additionally, as the submarine's capabilities increased over time(most dramatically with the addition of nuclear power), it also gainednew missions. Thus, while fewer nuclear submarines were needed to

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accomplish some of the submarines' missions, their improved capabilitiesallowed them to do more things (such as direct support and land attack),thus maintaining the rationale for a sizable force.

But why did the force level stay steady at 90? First, as alreadynoted, the other two components also remained level, with ups and downsfor the most part occurring in concert. No all-out war took place to

*either test or prove the platforms. Therefore, in the absence of anycompelling operational reason to alter the original balance among thecomponents, the ratio among the three has remained fairly constant andthe original balance has been maintained.

Second, the need to incorporate new technology ensured that astream of new acquisition kept flowing. Consequently, shipyards stayedin business, a nucleus of trained designers and builders was maintained,and block obsolescence was for the most part avoided.

For practically the entire 44-year period, the SSN force had apowerful voice in Admiral Hyman Rickover. Whenever the Secretary ofDefense, or even, at times, the Navy, faltered in supporting acontinuing stream of submarine production, Rickover could be foundbefore Congress making the submarine's case.

One final combination of factors was key in maintaining a constantforce. The high cost of the nuclear-powered submarine exerted downwardpressure on the force size. But at the same time the submarine wasgrowing in cost, its lifespan was increasing. High quality meant notonly high cost but longer life as well, from the 13-year statutory lifeof the World War II-era SS to the 30-year life today. Thus, fewer SSNsneeded to be built over time to maintain a constant force level,offsetting the higher unit cost.

The long life and long construction time of the modern warship havean additional, related implication. Once a force of a given size isreached, it is not going to rapidly expand or contract; it is morelikely to remain fairly constant.

Summary

To summarize, the number of submarines has remained in balance withthe other offensive components of the Navy at roughly the ratios set inthe mid-1950s. For the submarine force, those factors arguing for morehave been offset by those arguing for fewer, leading to a state ofequilibrium.

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To illustrate, consider this quotation from the Chief of NavalOperations Admiral Thomas Hayward in testimony before Congress in 1981:

Ninety was a fiscally constrained, arbitrarilyset ceiling, and the 100 is the same, limited tokeeping a balanced force within a 600-ship Navyframework.

This reasoning explains the upping of the attack submarine goal from 90to 100. In essence, adding ten more submarines would maintain thetraditional balance if the Navy grew to 600 ships.

FORCE-LEVEL SUMMARY

Each of the three parts of the Navy's offensive forces has beenconsidered and the ;onsistency among force types noted. Their overallconstancy is now considered.

As noted earlier, the constancy of the carrier force levels was dueto two major factors: policy and geography. Policy was the foreignpolicy of containment (NSC-68) and the manner in which the nation andthe Navy chose to implement the foreign policy--with forwarddeployments. These forward deployments have been geographically stable,i.e., the carriers have deployed to the same areas in the postwar

period.

For amphibious lift, the most important factor just after the warwas the idea of a balanced navy and the Navy's belief that an amphibiousforce was part of that balance. Policy was also important, becauseNSC-68 implicitly calls for intervention, and the Marines, withamphibious lift, have historically been used as an interventionaryforce. The goal of one and one-third "divisions" of lift, firstenunciated in the early 1950s and readopted in the late 1960s, seems tohave provided sufficient lift to meet the demand.

The attack submarine force is the component tailored specificallyto the Soviet threat; thus, its constancy can be traced to the constancyof the foreign policy that identified the Soviet Union as the threat.The notion of balance has contributed to the constancy as well; thequote from Admiral Hayward is quite telling. Finally, forces arguingfor more submarines have been offset by arguments for fewer, leading toa state of equilibrium.

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POSTVAIL CONSTANTS AND POTENTIAL CHANGES

Given the constancy of and consistency among force types in spiteof the many changes in the world since World War II, it is now of value

* to consider the question of future force levels and try to decide whatmight affect them, having seen what affected force levels in the past.

*Before considering potential changes, however, it is worthreiterating the basic factors of the postwar era that led to both theconsistency among and constancy of the Navy's offensive components:

" Defense consensus

" Postwar planning precepts

* NSC-68 policy

M ilitary objectives of NSC-68

* Policy implementation

* Stability of the areas of interest.

Based upon the historical record, one or more of'these factors mustchange if force levels are to change. Each of these has been constantin the postwar world, and taken together they are responsible for theconstancy of the force levels of the Navy's offensive components.

The defense consensus that arose in the early 1950s was based onthe fact that Western Europe, Japan, South Korea, and a host of othercountries could not be expected to defend themselves against the SovietUnion; that the U.S. populace believed that they had a duty to defendthe freedom of others and not merely their own; and that the U.S. couldafford the defense outlays necessary to assume the role. Thesefoundations may not last. Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea haveall become viable economic entities, competing with and at times bestingthe U.S. economically. Some believe that it does not make sense forU.S. to continue defense outlays in their behalf, given their economicstrength. It is not obvious that U.S. citizens still believe that theyhave a general duty to defend the freedom of others. Some believe thatthe current debt burden, both government and individual, together withthe trade deficit, makes defense of others a luxury no longeraffordable, and defense outlays for the U.S. itself must be restrictedfor the health of the economy.

The postwar planning precepts of balance, forward posture, and a

navy second to none are still used today. Congressional testimony, forexample, is filled with statements about the need for a balanced force;

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but while the idea of balance may be immutable, what constitutes balanceis not. A change in the idea of having a Navy second to none could leadto changes in force levels. Does the United States still want or need anavy second to none?

NSC-68 identified the Soviet Union as the threat and also iden-tified the response of the United States to the threat: containment.Force levels might change if either the Soviets are no longer identifiedas a threat or if countries previously viewed as surrogates for theSoviets become a threat to interests of the United States regardless ofthe Soviets. Moreover, even if the Soviets remain a threat, a differentresponse might be identified. If the policy of containment weredropped, it could be argued that the United States would need fewerinterventionary forces such as carriers or amphibious lift.

The existence of a mobilization base, which included stockpiledequipment as well as people, was fundamental to the forces called for byNSC-68. Active-duty forces were only supposed to be large enough toprevent disaster while the mobilization base was activated. Except forthe Naval Reserve Force, the Navy has no mobilization base and has nothad one since the late 1960s; hence, any war must be fought with theforces in being.

The Navy and national authorities have implemented the policy ofcontainment by adopting a forward strategy, with forces deployedforward. Other force postures have been qiigested in the past, however,such as Eisenhower's idea of a central reserve. With the maritimeprepositioned ships (MPS) and other overseas stockpiles, the UnitedStates has moved to a mix of prepositioning plus a forward posture. Achange in force posture would seem to imply a change in force level.

The United States' interests in various areas of the globe couldchange in the future. Will forces be deployed to the Mediterraneanforever? Even after 1992, when the Europeans might be expected to carefor it? Given the continued world dependence upon oil, the UnitedStates may become more concerned about events in the Indian Ocean andmake more frequent deployments there. Because of trade developments,the Southern Hemisphere also might warrant more deployments.

Some or all of these changes may occur or may be occurring now.Based upon the historical record, one might expect force levels of theNavy's offensive components to change as well. Based upon thehistorical record, however, if none of these basic factors change,neither will force levels.

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