The North Korean Nuclear Issue - University of...
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The North Korean Nuclear Issue North Korean Society March 5, 2019 Clark W. Sorensen
Transcript of The North Korean Nuclear Issue - University of...
TheNorthKoreanNuclearIssueNorthKoreanSociety
March5,2019ClarkW.Sorensen
BeginningofNorthKorea’sNuclearAmbitionsl NuclearambitionsgobacktoearlyDPRKhistory
l DPRKaskedforandgotassistanceinnucleartechnologyfromtheSovietUnionstartingin1956,buttheSovietUnion(whofirstdetonatedanuclearbombin1949)wascarefultokeepweaponstechnologyoutofDPRKhands
l SovietUnionwasalsohelpingChina,butby1959KhrushchevrenegedongivingChinaaccesstonuclearweapons,yetheneverthelessagreedtoestablishaNorthKorean(civilian)nuclearprogram
l By1963theEastGermanswereawarethattheNorthKoreanswereinterestedinprocessingNorthKorean(lowgrade)uranium
l In1961theSovietUnionsignedamutualdefensetreatywithDPRK,buttheywerewaryofbeingdrawnintoanunwantedwarbyDPRK(astheUSwaswithROK)l DPRKmilitarybuildupbeginsin1962implyingtheyfelttheSovietcommitmentwaslessthaniron-
clad
Sino-SovietSplit l AlongwithDestalinization,NikitaKhrushchevhadinauguratedin1956aforeignpolicyof
“peacefulcoexistence”withcapitalism(inlightofthepossibilityofnuclearwar)l BeforethatLeninandtheBolsheviksadvocatedworldrevolutionthroughworkers’“internal
revolutions”withintheirownnationsl Chinahadamixedpolicy—peacefulcoexistenceandnon-supportforlocalrevolutionsinAsia
(ZhouEnlai),butMaoZedongbelievedintheinevitableconflictofcapitalismandcommunism(asdidCuba)andfelttheKoreanWarprovedhispoint
l TheSovietUnionrenegingonitsnuclearweaponsaidtoChinacombinedwithitssigningoftheLimitedTestBanTreatywiththeUSin1963inthewakeofthe1962Cubanmissilecrisiswasthestrawthebrokethecamel’sbackandsplittheSovietUnionandChinal AtthispointNorthKoreawasmoresympathetictoChinasinceitneversignedontothedoctrineof
peacefulcoexistence(orDestalinization)l DesiretoacquirenuclearweaponswasunderstoodthenasanaspectofJuchedefense
China’sNuclearPrograml Chinarejectedthelimitedtestbantreatyandcontinuedtoworkonanucleardeterrentl FirstweaponstextOctober16,1964
l FirstH-bombtestJune17,1967l LastnucleartestJuly29,1996
l RecognizedasoneoffivenuclearstatesintheNuclearNon-ProliferationTreatythatChinaratifiedin1992l However,ChinaisthoughttohaveaidedPakistanwithitsnuclearprograminthe1980s
l SignedComprehensiveTestBanTreatyin1996
DPRKfirstnuclearstepsl 1965gotasmallgraphitemoderatedreactorfromtheSovietUnionthatwasupandrunningfrom1967l SovietUnionwasnotwillingtodomore,sotheDPRKmadeinquiriesaboutnucleartechnologywithothercommuniststateswithoutsuccess
l The1970soilshocksmadetheDPRKevenmoreinterestedinnuclearpowerl In1974Indiaexplodeditsfirstbomb(andbecameadefactonuclearstate)
l TheSovietUnioninsistedthattheDPRKsigntheNPTbeforetheywouldgivetheDPRKmorenuclearaid
l DPRKheldoffuntil1985,butwhentheysignedtheNPTtheydidn’tputasafeguardsprograminplacewiththeIAEAuntil1992whenIAEAinspectionsfirstbegan
PreludetoAccelerationofDPRKNuclearProgram(Armstrong’sInterpretation)l July1986Gorbachev’sVladivostakspeech(“NewThinking”)
l Whilereiteratingtraditionalpolicy,healsonotedeconomicgrowthinJapanandelsewhere,withdrawaloftroopsfromMongolia,expandingtieswithASEAN,peacefulrelationswithEastAsianneighborsandUS
l 1988SovietUnionrenouncedBrezhnevDoctrine(useofforcetoretainsocialisminsatellites)andbeganwithdrawingtroopsfromAfghanistanl HadbeenreducingmilitaryaidtoNorthKoreawithlastdeliveryin1989
l June1990,USSecretaryofStateJamesBakerarrangesforSouthKoreanPresidentRhoTaewootomeetMikhailGorbachovinSanFranciscowherehewasmeetingPresidentReaganinthelaststopofhisAmericantour
l September1990SovietForeignMinisterEduardShevardnadzevisitedDPRKtoreassurethemafterGorbachev-Rohmeetingl KimJongIlrefusedtoseehim,andKimYŏngnamgavehimadiatribethreateningnucleardevelopmentsincethe
SovietUnionwasnotlivinguptoitstreatyof1961(thatpromisedaidincaseofmutualattack)
Lankov’sInterpretationofNukesas“SurvivalDiplomacy”(chapter5)l Seenukesasadeterrenttoattack
l Canusenukesfordiplomaticblackmail(interpretationoftheAgreedFramework)l USdiplomacyl 386generationinSouthKoreaàSunshinepolicy
l By2008l MyungbakLeeelectedinSouth(conservative)l DisillusionwithSunshinepolicyafter2006DPRKnucleartest
l Noticenoclearchronologyorcausalchain,normentionofDPRKinterestinnuclearenergy
By 1990s US was Concerned about the DPRK program l 1993—IAEA inspection revealed diversion of fuel from DPRK’s reactors
l This was reported to the UN Security Council, and the DPRK threatened to withdraw from the NPT
l US was preparing for evacuation of US civilians and a preemptive airstrike when former President Carter personally visited Kim Il Sung in P’yŏngyang in 1994 and announced a nuclear agreement
l Kim Il Sung was supposed to subsequently meet with the South Korean President, but he died suddenly shortly after Carter’s visit (Carter June 15th, KIS dies July 7th)
l Agreed Framework of 1994 negotiated to keep DPRK in NPT l DPRK fully in compliance with NPT with IAEA inspecting DPRK nuclear reactors 24-7 to make
sure no plutonium diverted—special inspections of non-declared sites l In exchange the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Corporation would build LWR in North
Korea (financed mostly by Japan and South Korea) l Assumption—diversion of fuel from LWRs is more difficult than from conventional reactors and
they are more suitable for electricity generation l US would provide fuel oil to help power generation while LWR being built
SouthKorea“SunshinePolicy”l 1998announcedbyPresidentKimDae-jung
l NamecomesfromAesop’sfable“TheNorthWindandtheSun”l KimDaeJungfeltconfidentthatSouthKorea’spoliticalstabilityduetodemocratizationanditseconomic
superiorityallowedittomagnanimoustoNK
l PeaceandCooperationwiththeNorth(대북화해협력정책)l NoarmedprovocationbytheNorthwillbetoleratedl TheSouthwithnotattempttoabsorbtheNorthinanywayl TheSouthactivelyseekscooperationandpromotesreconciliation
l KimDae-jungvisitsP’yŏngyangJune13-15,2000afterwhichaNorthSouthJointDeclarationl KimDae-jungwonNobelPeacePrizein2000for“hisworkfordemocracyandhumanrightsinSouth
KoreaandinEastAsiaingeneral,andforpeaceandreconciliationwithNorthKoreainparticular”l Itlatercameoutthatthisvisitwas“facilitated”withpaymentsofseveralhundredmilliondollarstoNorth
Korea
NorthSouthCooperationunderSunshinel 1998MountKumgangTouristRegioninNorthKoreaopenedtoSouthKoreanandinternationaltourists
l InitialtravelNorth/Southwasbyboat,butby2002landtravelwasarranged
l 2003tworaillines(oneinwest,oneineast)thathadbeenseveredduringtheKoreanWarwerereconnected(aspartof2000agreement)NorthSouth
l Seriesofnorth-southfamilyreunionsinSeoul,P’yŏngyang,andKŭmgang
l 2003-4KaesŏngIndustrialParkopenedjustNorthoftheDMZontheWestCoastl 50yearlease,buildings,equipmentandpowersuppliedbySouthKoreal ManufacturingwithNorthKoreanlaborunderSouthKoreanmanagement,with
laborpaidindollarsthroughDPRKgovernment
KaesŏngIndustrialZone
BreakdownofAgreedFrameworkl BushAdministrationwasverysuspiciousoftheAgreedFrameworknegotiatedunderthe
Clintonadministrationl KimDae-jungvisitedtheWhiteHouseinMarch2001andsomefeltBushslightedKim’srealismabout
NorthKoreal SomeofClinton’snegotiatorshadassumedthatDPRKwouldcollapse,butithadn’tl By2002UShadintelligencethatDPRKhadasecondsecretHEUprogram
l IntelligencefoundDPRKcontactswithPakistanhadtransferrednucleartechnology1990-96l probablyinexchangeformissiletechnology
l (Pakistanhadexplodeditsowndevicein1998ledbyA.Q.Khanmakingan8thdefactonuclearstate)
l AfterUSaccusedDPRKofcheatingin2002DPRKejectedIAEAinspectors,andthefollowingyearwithdrewfromtheNPTl TheUScouldhavetreatedthesecretprogramundertheAgreedFrameworkasan“undeclarednuclear
site”andnegotiatedforinspections,buttheBushadministrationdidnotwanttosuccumbtowhatitconsidered“nuclearblackmail”
NoControlsl WiththebreakdownoftheAgreedFrameworkandDPRK’swithdrawalfromtheNPTin2003IAEAinspectorswerekickedoutandtherewerenocontrolsontheDPRKnuclearprogramatalll DPRK“refueled”theirreactor(whichinvolvedextractingthespentnuclearrods,andpresumablyextractingplutoniumforfurtherprocessing)
l Bushadministrationmadestrongstatements,butnowhadlittleleveragel ChinabecameconcernedthattheUSwouldactunilaterallyinNorthKoreal China’ssloganatthetimewas“peacefulrise”andtheywantedstabilityinEastAsiasotheycouldconcentrateoneconomicgrowth
SixPartyTalksl began in 2003 hosted by China
l No progress in first three rounds (Aug 2003-June 2004 with James Kelly) l More progress in next three rounds (July 2005-Sept 2007) l Proliferation Security Initiative
l bilateral Mutual Ship-boarding Pacts allowing mutual expedition of ship-boarding requests for ships under those national flags—designed to fight proliferation
l October 18, 2004 North Korean Human Rights Act l October 9, 2006 first DPRK nuclear test l UNSC 1718 l Joint Statement of goals February 2007 l DPRK issues nuclear inventory November 2007 l US calls inventory incomplete and suspends aid pending a complete inventory
ProblemswithSixPartyTalksl China,Russia,Japan,SouthKorea,andtheUSallagreedthattheydidn’twantNorth
Koreatogonuclear,butbeyondthattherewereseriousdifferencesl USwouldjustassoonDPRKwouldcollapseandwantedtoapplymaximumpressurel JapaninsistedthequestionofcitizenskidnappedtotheDPRKbepartofthetalksl Russiamostlyonthesidelinesl SouthKoreahadleft-winggovernmentwith“SunshinePolicy”thatsoughttoreducetensions
throughcontactandaidl Chinasoughta“softlanding”forNorthKoreathatwoulddenuclearizeitwithoutforcingcollapse,
sotheydidnotfullycooperationwithUSsanctionsdesires
l WithintheBushadministrationtherewasconstantinfightingbetweenthehardlinersintheNSC(Cheney,Rumsfeld,Bolton),andthosewhowantedanegotiatedsettlement(mostlyintheStateDepartment)l JamesKelly1stthreerounds,ChristopherHillnextthree
North Korean Human Rights Act l Signed by President Bush October 18, 2004
l Provides humanitarian assistance to North Koreans inside North Korea [mostly food and medicine]
l Provide grants to private, non-profit organizations to promote human rights, and development of market economy in North Korea
l Increase availability of information in North Korea (i.e. broadcasts into North Korea, providing transistor radios, etc.)
l Provide humanitarian assistance to North Korean refugees, and allowing them to come to the US more easily
l Controversial because the avowed aim of the law is to cause North Korea to collapse because of an outflow of refugees as in East Germany, and because many of the organizations that might be aided are religious or highly political
UNSC 1718 (10/06 following first DPRK nuclear test) l North Korea must "not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile", "suspend all activities related
to its ballistic missile programme" and "abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner".
l The DPRK must also "return immediately to the six-party talks without precondition".
l Shipments of cargo going to and from North Korea may be stopped and inspected for weapons of mass destruction or associated items (however, there is no obligation placed on member states to perform such inspections).
l A ban is placed on imports and exports of "battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems", "related materiel including spare parts" and any other items identified by the sanctions committee.
l UN member states must freeze the overseas assets of individuals and companies involved with the DPRK's weapons programmes. An international travel ban is also placed on programme employees and their families.
l UN members are banned from exporting luxury goods to North Korea.
February 13, 2007Joint Statement l North Korea will shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing
facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications
l In return, the other five parties in the six-party talks will provide emergency energy assistance to North Korea in the initial phase of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, to commence within 60 days.
l All six parties agree to take positive steps to increase mutual trust, and make joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.
l All six parties agree on establishing five working groups - on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations, normalization of North Korea-Japan relations, economy and energy cooperation, as well as a joint Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism.
February 2007 Joint Statement (2) l TheworkinggroupswillformspecificplansforimplementingtheSeptember19statementintheir
respectiveareas.
l Allpartiesagreethatallworkinggroupswillmeetwithinthenext30days
l Detailsofassistancewillbedeterminedthroughconsultationsandappropriateassessmentsintheworkinggrouponeconomicandenergycooperation.
l Oncetheinitialactionsareimplemented,thesixpartieswillpromptlyholdaministerialmeetingtoconfirmimplementationofthejointdocumentandexplorewaysandmeansforpromotingsecuritycooperationinNortheastAsia.
l Thesixthroundofsix-partytalkswilltakeplaceonMarch19,2007.Thiswillbetohearreportsoftheworkinggroupsanddiscussactionsforthenextphase.[33]
Discontinuationoftalksl DPRKissuesreportofinventorytoUSinNovember2007
l DPRKsaidtheyhadcompliedwiththetalksanddemandedaresumptionoffuelaid
l USrespondedthattheinventorywasincomplete,anduntilsuchtimeasacompleteinventorywasforwardeditwouldsuspendaid
l AlthoughnumerousmeetingswereheldbetweenUSandDPRKinBeijingthisimpassewasneverovercome
SouthKoreanPresidentialElection2008l July2008SouthKoreantouristParkWang-ja(53)shottodeathafterwanderingoutoftherestrictedzone,andbyAugust2008afterinconclusivenegotiationsaboutherdeathNorthKoreaexpelledSouthKoreansfromtheresortthathasnotreopenedtoSouthKoreanssincethen
l ConservativeMyung-bakLeewonl NorthKoreawasanissueinthiselection,asmanySouthKoreansfeltbetrayedbyNorthKorea’s2006nucleartestafterSouthKoreagavetheNorthaid
l LeelinkedfurthercooperationwithNorthKoreatoprogressonthenuclearissue,endingtheSunshinePolicy
ContinuedDevelopmentinTransitiontoObamaAdministration
l October 2008 DPRK orders IAEA inspectors away from site l Note timing just before November Presidential election
l April 5, 2009 Satellite launch (probably test of Taep’odong multi-stage rocket, though the test failed)
l US responded with new UN Sanctions April 13th l DPRK called sanctions “unbearable” and on April 25th announced reactivation of
their nuclear sites l May 25, 2009 second nuclear test
l UNSC Resolution 1874 (authorizes inspection of DPRK ships, prevents financial services)
l November 2010 Siegfried Hecker (of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation) visits North Korea and is shown an operational HEU plant
UNSC1874 l Authorizing member states to inspect, "in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law,"
North Korean cargo on land, sea, and air, and to destroy any goods suspected of being connected to the DPRK's nuclear programme.[2]
l Requiring the North Korean government to return immediately to the six-party talks and renounce its announcement of withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.[3]
l Preventing financial services that could contribute to the nuclear or ballistic missile related programmes.[4]
l Instructing member states not to provide financial assistance to the DPRK nuclear programme, or enter into loans with the country, except for humanitarian or developmental reasons.[4]
l Extending the arms embargo on North Korea by banning all weapons exports from the country and most imports, with an exception to small arms, light weapons and related material – though member states must notify the Security Council five days prior to selling the weapons.[5][6]
l Demanding that North Korea halt its nuclear weapons program and conduct no further nuclear or missile tests.[5]
l Asking member states to notify the Council of steps they are taking to implement the sanctions within 45 days.[7]
l Affirming the Security Council's commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic resolution to the situation.[7]
SubsequentTestsl ThirdNuclearTestFebruary12,2013
l 2015KimJong-unannouncescapacityforH-bomb
l FourthNuclearTestJanuary6,2016l AnnouncedasH-bomb(butnotcorroborated,andconsideredunlikelybecauseofthesmallsizeoftheexplosion)
l DPRKhasmadeprogressinweapanization,thoughre-entrymechanismsarenotyetthoughttobedeveloped
l FifthNuclearTestSeptember9,2016(claimedtestofnuclearwarhead)
NorthKoreaMissilePrograml Early1990s—NorthKoreareverseengineeredScud-BdesignedfromEgyptand/orChina
l NodongMissilewithrangeof1000-1500miles(canreachSouthKoreaandJapan)l Difficulttocounter
l T’aepongdong1&2l T’aep’odong1—3stagerockettested1998tolaunchKwangmyŏngsŏngsatellite(failed)l T’aep’ogdong2—2/3stages,tested2006andfailed
l Ŭnharocketl 2009testfailed,butin2012abletolaunchasatellite,2016successfullaunch
l Hwasŏng(intercontinental)l August&September2017multistagerocketpassingoverHokkaido
InViolationofUNSC1718?l UNSC1718prohibitsballisticmissiletests
l DPRKclaimsŬnhatestsaresatellitelaunchesthatareallowed
l ProblemforUS,Japan,andSouthKoreaisthatthisis“dualuse”technologyl PossiblesubmarinelaunchofmissileinApril2016
What’stheProblem?l “SurgicalStrike”notfullypossible,andwouldlikelyleadtofull-scalewarwithcasualtiescomparabletotheKoreanWarl Seoul—25millionpeople—withinrangeofNorthKoreanartilleryandmissilessoDPRK
couldkilltensofthousandsinminutes(alsochemicalweapons)
l USleverageislimitedbecauseDPRKhaslimitedcontactswiththerestoftheworldl SanctionshurttheDPRK,buttheyarehardtoadministeroverthelongrunbecause
DPRKisalwayscomingupwithnewwaystogetaroundthem,andbecausemaintaininginternationalcoalitionsoverthelonghaulisdifficult
l ForgingaforeignpolicyconsensusovertheDPRKhasbeendifficultintheUSl Nonegotiationhasconsideredconcludingatreatybecausepassingatreatythrough
theUSSenateisconsideredimpossible
NorthKoreanMissileRangesl Red=Nodong
l Blue=Musudan
l Green=T’aep’odong
l Brown=Hwasŏng
LatestSanctionsl UNSCR2270&2321
l 2016after4thand5thnucleartestsbannedDPRKexportofpreciousmetals,coalandiron(exceptforsubsistence)
l UNSCR2371&2375l 2017aftermissiletestsand20176thnucleartestbannedallexportofcoal,iron,leadandseafood,jointventures,textileexports,andNorthKoreannationalsworkingoverseas
l USPresidentialExecutiveOrders2017l CutsDPRKfromUSfinancialsystem,aswellasanyfirmsthattradewithNorthKoreafromthissystem
WillSanctionswork?l Quidproquosanctions—Igiveyouthisandyougivemethat(AgreedFramework)
l Positivesanctions—aimedatinducingbroadchangesinsocietythatempowerthoseforceswithinthecountrywhowanttradeandpeace(SunshinePolicy)
l Threatsanctions—I’mgoingtomakeyouhurtunlessyoudowhatIwant(present?)willonlyworkundercertainconditions
l Iftherulingclassisdirectlyhurtbythesanctions,theymightchangepolicyl Or,ifthepeoplewhoarehurtbysanctionscanpressurethegovernmentto
respondl Or,ifthepoliticalordertrulycollapses
OttoWarmbierJune2017l CollegestudentfromOhiowhovisitedNorthKoreaonapackagetourinwasarrestedonJanuary2,2016l Madeapublicconfessionofattemptingtostealapropagandaposterl BillRichardsonmetwiththeNorthKoreansinNewYorktonegotiateWarmbier’s
release,butthenextdayhewasconvictedof“anti-stateactivity”andsentencedto15yearshardlabor
l DiplomaticattemptstofreeWarmbierundertheObamaadministrationwerenotsuccessful
l OnJune2,2017SecretaryofStateRexTillersonannouncedWarmbier’sreleasenegotiatedbytheStateDepartmentatPresidentTrump’sbehestl WarmbierarrivedintheUSinacoma(thatNorthKoreaclaimedhehadbeeninfor17
months),andhediedshortlyafterarrivingintheUS
NorthKoreaTestsin2017l July4,2017testofHwasŏng14missile
l Two-stagemobileintercontinentalmissile2,800mileswithRussian-styleengine
l July28,2017testofHwasŏng14missilel 2341milerangebutdifferenttrajectorymightgo10,000milesputtingmostofUSin
range
l September3,2017SixthNuclearTestl 4to16timesmorepowerfulthanprevioustestsl USwarnsof“massivemilitaryresponse”
l November28,2017Hwasŏng15capableofreachingallofUS
Fall2017TalkonNorthKoreaOptionsl McMaster
l Mattis
l Tillerson
KimJongUn’s2018NewYear’sAddressl “LastyearthemovesoftheUnitedStatesanditsvassalforcestoisolateandstifleourcountrywenttoextremes,andourrevolutionfacedtheharshesteverchallenges.”
l “Byalsoconductingtestsofvariousmeansofnucleardeliveryofsuper-intensethermonuclearweapons,weattainedourgeneralorientationandstrategicgoalwithsuccess...Outcountry’snuclearforcesarecapableofthwartingandcounteringanynuclearthreatfromtheUnitedStates,andtheyconstituteapowerfulandreliablewardeterrent,whichnoforcecanreverse...Thewholeofits[US]mainlandiswithintherangeofournuclearstrike,andthenuclearbuttonisonmyofficedeskatalltimes”
PresidentTrumpJanuary2Tweetl “NorthKoreanLeaderKimJongUnjuststatedthatthe“NuclearButtonisonhisdeskatalltimes.WillsomeonefromhisdepletedandfoodstarvedregimepleaseinformhimthatItoohaveaNuclearButton,butitisamuchbiggerandmorepowerfulonethanhis,andmyButtonworks!”
2ndPartofKimJungUn’sNewYearSpeechl AfterblamingthepreviousSouthKoreaPresidentforbeingfascistvassalforcesoftheUS
desperatetoignitewarthatcollapsed“thankstothemassiveresistanceoftheenragedpeople”henotedthatnothinghaschangedinNorth-Southrelations
l “Thisyearissignificantbothforthenorthandsouthasinthenorththepeoplewillgreetthe70thfoundinganniversaryoftheirRepublicasagreat,auspiciouseventandinthesouththeWinterOlympicgameswilltakeplace...Weshouldimprovethefrozeninter-Koreanrelationsandglorifytheirmeaningfulyearasaneventulonenoteworthyinthehistoryofthenation.
l TheOlympics“willserveasagoodoccasionfordemonstratingournation’sprestigeandweearnestlywishtheOlympicgamesasuccess.Fromthispointofviewwearewillingtodispatchourdelegationandadoptothernecessarymeasures;withregardtothismatter,theauthoritiesofthenorthandthesouthmaymeettogethersoon.”
SouthKoreanreactionl SouthKoreanPresidentMunJaeIn(electedMay10th2017afterimpeachmentofformerPresidentParkKeunhye)iscenterleftandwishedfornegotiationswiththeNorth,butin2017hadbeenrebuffedbytheNorth
l ChinahadboycottedKoreanculturalexportsinretaliationforSouthKoreainstallationofTHAADmissilebatteriesinApril2017(beforeelectionofMun)
l THAADbatteriesexistinHawaii,WakeandGuambutChinaobjectedtothesel MunnegotiatedwithChinabypromisingnottoinstallanymoreTHAAD
l MunneededNorthKoreancooperationforsuccessfulOlympicsl HethuswelcomedNorthKoreasinitiative,NorthKoreareopenedhotlinewith
Seoul,andtalksforNorthKoreanparticipationintheOlympicswerecompleted
StateoftheUnionSpeechJanuary20,2018l “NoregimehasoppresseditsowncitizensmoretotallyorbrutallythatthecrueldictatorshipinNorthKorea.NorthKorea’srecklesspursuitofnuclearmissilescouldverysoonthreatenourhomeland.
l “Pastexperiencehastaughtusthatcomplacencyandconcessionsonlyinviteaggressionandprovocation.
l InvokingOttoWambierTrumprecognizedWambier’sparentsintheaudienceaswellasNorthKoreanrefugeeJiSeong-ho,andthenendedthespeechinvokingfreedomasanAmericanvalue.
SouthKoreanAmbassadorshipl OneyearintotheTrumpadministrationtherewasstillnoambassadorappointedforSouthKorea
l January30VictorChaOp-edinWashingtonPost“GivingNorthKoreaa‘bloodynose’carriesahugerisktoAmericans”outlinedrisksl VictorCha,aProfessoratGeorgetown,wasformerlyDirectorforAsianAffairsintheBushAdministrationNational
SecurityCouncill HadbeenclosetoappointmentbytheTrumpAdministrationforSouthKoreanAmbassadorbutreportedinlate
Januarytohavebeennixedbecauseheadvisedagainstapreemtivestrikel If“Kimisundeterrablewithoutsuchastrike,howcanwealsobelievethatastrikewilldeterhimfrom
respondinginkind?AndifKimisunpredictable,impulsiveandborderingonirrational,howcanwecontroltheescalationladder,whichispremisedonanadversary’srationalunderstandingofsignalsanddeterrence.”
l Advocatesenhancedandsustainedregionalandglobalpressure
l June29,2018HarryB.HarrisformerCommander,USPacificFleet,appointedAmbassadortoSouthKorea
2018WinterOlympicsl KimJungUnNewYearSpeechexpresseddesiretoparticipateinWinterOlympicsandtalkwithSouthKorea
l Hotlinereestablished,talkscommenced,andNorthKoreaagreedtocomel USagreedtopostponeannualUS-SouthKoreajointmilitaryexercisesuntilaftertheOlympicsandParalympics
l Delegationof10athletesandtwohundredcheerleadingbeautiesdispatchedtoP’yŏngch’angl Didn’twinanymedals
CharmOffensive?l KimJongUn’syoungersisterKimYojong(PartyCentralCommitteeViceChair)sentalongwithKimYŏngnam
(ChairofPresidium)toopeningceremonyl HaddinnerwithSouthKoreanPresidentMunJaeInanddeliveredletterinvitingMuntoP’yŏngyang
l VicePresidentMikePencerepresentedtheUSl VisitedPrimeMinisterAbeinJapanandannouncedtoughnewsanctionswhiledenouncingNorthKoreal InSouthKoreaPencemettheSouthKoreanpresidentbutrefusedtoacknowledgeKimYojong,andwas
accompaniedbyOttoWarmbier’sfather
l IninterviewontheflighthomewithJoshRoginofTheWashingtonPostPenceclarifiedthattheUSwillcontinuesanctions,butiswillingtotalkwithNorthKoreaaboutdenuclearizationl SubsequentlyitwasreportedthattheNorthKoreanscancelledaplannedmeetingwiththeUS(thatwas
supposedtobeunpublicized)becauseofPence’sannouncedplantodemandthattheNorthKoreansdenuclearizel ReiteratedsupportfortheBusherapolicyofCVID(Complete,Verifiable,andIrreversibleDenuclearization)and
thatsanctionswouldcontinueduringtalksuntilresultsareobtained
CharmOffensiveII?l IvankaTrumpattendedtheclosingceremonyoftheOlympicgames
l NorthKoreanssentGeneralKimYŏngch’ŏl(CentralCommitteeViceChair,andsince2016ChairofCentralCommittee’sUnitedFrontDepartment)andRiSonGwonChairmanoftheCommitteeforthePeacefulUnificationoftheFatherlandl MetwithSouthKoreanPresidentMun,andconveyeddesirefortalkswiththeUS,andagreedtheinter-KoreanrelationsshouldbedevelopedalongwithrelationswiththeUS
l AsheadoftheReconnaissanceGeneralBureau총찰총국,thebureauresponsibleforoperationsagainstSouthKoreaandJapan,KimYŏngch’ŏlisthoughttoberesponsibleforthesinkingoftheCh’ŏnanandshellingofYŏnp’yŏngIslandin2010
RecentDevelopmentsl PresidentTrumptoldgovernorsonFebruary26,2018heiswillingtotalk“onlyundertherightconditions.Otherwise,we’renottalking.”l However,onthesamedaythesenior-mostexpertintheStateDepartmentonNorthKorea,PeterYun,announcedhisretirementbytheendoftheweekl HehadnegotiatedthereleaseofOttoWarmbrierl HefavorsnegotiationssayingthatwhileCVIDistheultimategoal,talksmightbeginwithafreezeonnuclearandmissiletesting
l MeanwhileSarahHuckabeeSanders,WhiteHousePressSecretary,said,“DenuclearizationmustbetheresultofanydialoguewithNorthKorea.”
KimJungUnBreaksoutl SouthKoreanNationalSecurityAdvisorChungEui-young(국가안보실장 정의용鄭義溶)andDirectorof
NationalIntelligenceSuhHoon(국가정보원 서훈徐薫)visitedP’yŏngyangonMarch3,2018l FirstSouthKoreanenvoysince2007(thelasttimetherewasaKoreanDemocraticPartyPresident)l MetwithKimJongUninKWPheadquarters,andKimalsohostedadinnerfortheml LatervisitWhiteHousecarryinginvitationfromKimJungUnthatPresidentTrumpaccepts
l March26,2018—KimJungUnmeetsXiJinpinginBeijing(aftersixyearsoffrostySino-NorthKoreanrelations)
l April1,2018—SecretaryofStateMikePompeovisitsP’yŏngyangandmeetsKimJungUn
l April27,2018—SouthKoreanPresidentMunJae-inandKimJungUnmeetatP’anmunjŏm
l April/May,2018—ChinesePartyInternationalLiaisonandForeignMinistermakeseparatevisitstoNorthKorea
P’anmunjŏmDeclarationl PromotecommonprosperityandreunificationofKoreathroughdramaticimprovementanddevelopmentofinter-Koreanrelationsl JointLiaisonOfficeinKaesŏngbetweennorthandsouthKoreal Familyreunificationl Connectroadsandrail(TonghaeandKyŏngŭilines)
l Eliminationofmilitarytensionandsubstantialeliminationofwarrisk
l EstablishapermanentandpeacefulKoreanpeninsulal Stepwisedisarmamentl PeacetreatytoendKoreanWarl FinalizecompletedenuclearizationoftheKoreanPeninsula
DualingUS/ChinaVisitsl May7-8XiJinpingandKimJongUnholdtalksinDalian
l KimYŏngch’ŏl,RiSuYong,KimYŏjŏng,andCh’oeSŏnhŭialsopresent
l 4pointXinhuastatement
l Traditionalfriendshipofthecountriesatreasurel Bilateralrelationsareofmajorstrategicsignificance
l Bothsideshouldmaintainfrequentexchanges
l People-to-peoplefriendshipisimportant
l XinhuareportedKim’shopethat“theDPRKandUSwouldbuildmutualtrustthroughdialogueandtherelevantsideswouldtakephasedandsynchronousmeasuresinaresponsiblemanner”
l May9,MikePompeovisitsP’yŏngyangl MetbyKimYŏngch’ŏl,RiSuYong,andlatermetKimJongUn
l ThreedetaineesamnestiedbyKimandfreedasagoodwillgesture
l KoreanAmericanKimDong-chul,Yanji-basedtraderl TonyKim(KimSangDuk)teachingatPUST
l KimHak-song,Chinese-bornKoreanAmericanteachingatPUST
l Pompeooffered,“alltheopportunitiesyourpeoplesorichlydeserve”inexchangefortheDPRKshuttingdownitsnuclearprogram
l AccompaniedbyAndrewKim,HeadoftheCIAKoreaMissionCenterl KimhasschooltieswithSouthKoreanIntelligenceHead
SŏHunandSouthKoreanSecurityAdvisorChŏngŬi-yong(whoishismother’suncle)
l Saidtobehawkish
l AlsoaccompaniedbyRandalSchriver,AssistantSecretaryofDefenseforAsianandPacificSecurityAffairs
July12,Tump-KimSummitl PresidentTrumpandSecretaryKimmet,shookhands,andhada45minutetalkwithonlyinterpreters
l Laterhadlunchl PresidentTrump,SecretaryPompeo,Chief-of-StaffKellyandNationalSecurityAdvisorJohnBoltonl StateAffairsCommissionChairKimJongUn,ForeignSecretaryRiYŏngho,ViceChairKimYŏngch’ŏl
l Signedjointstatementl ConfirmsP’anmunjŏmdeclarationandaimof”completedenuclearizationoftheKoreanPeninsula”
l CommitstorecoveringPOW/MIAremainsfromtheKoreanWar
l OptimisticNewsConferencel [NorthKorea]“hasthepotentialtobecomeanincredibleplace”
l “IstandbeforeyouasanemissaryoftheAmericanpeopletodeliveramessageofhopeandvisionandamessageofpeace”l Thankedhosts,PresidentMun,PrimeMinisterAbe
l AnnouncedKim“isalreadydestroyingamajormissileenginetestingsite”
l Inanswertoquestiononsecurityassurances,“Wewillbestoppingthewargameswhichwillsaveusatremendousamountofmoney,unlessanduntilweseethefuturenegotiationisnotgoingalonglikeitshould.
SingaporeSummit
Conferencepersonnell RiSuyong,formerForeignMinister
l Interpreter
l KimJongUn,StateAffairsCommissionChair
l KimYŏngch’ŏl,KWPCentralCommitteeViceChairandUnificationBureau
l RiYongho,ForeignMinister
l JohnKelly,ChiefofStaff
l Interpreter
l PresidentTrump
l MikePompeo,SecretaryofState
l JohnR.Bolton,NationalSecurityAdvisor
WhatWarGamesStopped?l KeyResolve
l Descendantof“TeamSpirit”heldbetweenFebruaryandAprilbytheUnitedStatesPacificCommand
l JointexerciseswithSouthKoreainwhichextraUSforcesarebroughtintoKoreafortheexercise
l FoalEaglel JointexerciseswiththeRepublicofKoreaandUSunderauspicesofCombinedForcesCommandl OneofthelargestmilitaryexercisesintheworldmonitoredbytheNeutralNationsSupervisory
CommissionundertheKoreanArmisticeAgreementl CombinedwithKeyResolve,andinvolvedotheralliedforces(Britain),aswelll EndedinJune2018,butresumedonsmallerscaleinNovember
l Replacedwith“Tongmaeng”(alliance)trainingonsmallerscale
MikePompeo’sVisitstoP’yŏngyangl July7,2018delegationledbyMikePompeo
l PompeodidnotmeetKJUbutKimYongCholl Pompeosaidtalkswere“productive”l NorthsaidPompeomade“one-sidedrobber-like”demandsforCVIDratherthanconstructivemeasuresthatwouldbuildtrust
l August24,2018—PresidentTrumpcallsoffPompeovisittoP’yŏngyangforlackofprogress
February28,2019TrumpKimSummitl TrumpandKimmeet
l February27privatedinneratMetropoleHotell February28meetingwithaides
l NoagreementandFebruary28thmeetingbrokeoffearly
l Endamicablyl Whilebothsidesnotednoagreement,therewerenoangrywords,eachsidesaidtalkswouldcontinue
HanoiSummitFebruary28,2019l NickMulvaney(ActingChief-of-Staff)
l YunHyangLee(Interpreter)
l PresidentTrump
l MikePompeo(SecretaryofState)
l JohnBolton(NationalSecurityAdvisor)
l RiYongho(ForeignMinister)
l StateAffairsCommissionChairKimJongUn
l SinHye-yong(Interpreter)
l KimYŏng-ch’ŏl(KWPCentralCommitteeViceChairandUnificationBureau)
AnalysisofPersonnell NickMulvaney,MikePompeo,and
JohnBoltonhavealladvocatedeliminatedsanctionsonlyforCVID,butotherwisebelieveinforcingNorthKoreatocomplyviasanctionsratherthanincentives(InJune2018meetingJohnF.KellywasChief-of-Staff)
l StephenBiegunissaidtobelievethatpositiveincentivescanreduceNorthKoreanbelligerence
l NoticethatStephenBiegunwasnotatthetable
l ForeignMinisterRiYonghovisitedVietnamandChinainlate2018,andin2017gavespeechinUNinsultingTrump
l KWPCentralCommitteeViceChairandUnificationDepartmentChairKimYŏngch’ŏlcomesfromtheReconnaissanceBureau(specialintelligenceoperations),andisthoughttohavearrangedthesinkingoftheCh’ŏnanin2010
USAssessmentofTalksl PresidentTrump—”Theywantedustoliftallthesanctions,andwecouldn’tdothat.”
l MikePompeonotedthattheNorthKoreanproposalwouldleavealready-producednuclearweaponsandmissilesinplace,aswellasproductionfacilitiesoutsideoftheYŏngbyŏncomplexthattheUSknowsabout
l MikePompeobriefedtheforeignministersofChina,SouthKorea,andJapanontheHanoisummit(byphone)l ChinaYangJiechil SouthKoreaKangKyun—hwal JapanKonoTarō
NorthKoreanAssessmentsofTalksl RiYongho(ForeignMinister)March11:00amnewsconference:
l “Whatwecallforisnotcompleteremovalofsanctions,butpartialremoval,concretely,firstremovaloffiveoftheelevenitemsinUNsanctionsresolutionsthatwereadoptedin2016and2017,amongthemthosethatblockthecivilianeconomyandpeople’slivelihood.ConsideringthecurrentlevelofNorthKorean-Americantrust,thesearethebroadestdenuclearizationmeasureswecantakeinstrideinthecurrentstage.
l “Forussecurityguaranteesareamoreimportantquestionthanadoptingdenuclearizationmeasures,butweconsideritburdensomethatAmericastilladoptsmilitarymeasuresandsohaveproposedcorrespondingmeasuresofpartiallyliftingsanctions.
l “Inthisroundoftalkswehaveclarifiedourreadinesstopermanentlystopnucleartestsandlong-rangemissileteststhroughpromisesanddocumentsinordertoreduceAmerica’sconcerns“
l “Inthefutureifwereachthestageofbuildingtrustthedenuclearizationprocesswillbeabletoproceedfaster.HoweverasthetalksprogressedAmericainsisteduntiltheendthatwehadtodootherthingsinadditiontomeasurestoclosetheYŏngbyŏndistrictnuclearfacilities,anditaccordinglybecameclearthatAmericawasnotpreparedtoacceptourproposal.
l Ch’oeSŏnhŭi(ViceForeignMinister)—”IgotthefeelingthatgoingforwardourComradeStateAffairsCommissionChairmighthavelostthewillforexchangebetweenChosŏnandAmerica.”(March1,20191:00AMnewsconference)
UNSecurityCouncilSanctionsfrom2016l UNSC22703/2/2016—responseto4thnucleartest1/6/2016
l ProhibitedweaponstradingandcalledforinspectionofDPRKcargos,andbannedexportofgold,vanadium,titanium,rareearths
l UNSC232111/2016—responseto5thnucleartest9/9/2016l Bannedcoalexportsandexportsofcopper,nickel,zinc,andsilver
l UNSC23718/5/17—inresponseto142017missiletestsl Banonexportofcoal,ironandironore,seafoodexports,andleadexportsl Financialsanctions
l UNSC23759/11/2017—inresponseto9/3/20176thnucleartestl BanonsellingnaturalgastoDPRK,strictquotaonoilimports,limitedvisasforoverseasNorthKoreanlaborer,banonjointventures,
textileexports,shipinspections
l UNSC239712/22/2017—inresponsetolaunchingofHwasŏngmissilel Limitsimportsofpetroleum,andexportsoffood,machinery,electricalequipment,earthandstones,woodandvessels,alsoasset
freezesonNorthKoreamilitaryaccountsabroad
StrategicConsiderationsl NorthKoreaproposalwouldliftsanctionsonmostimportsandexportsexceptforweapons
l Pompeoknewworkingleveltalkshadn’treachedanagreementbutgambledthatKimJongUncouldmakeconcessionsl LocationinHanoidesignedtotellNorthKoreans“youcouldbelikethisifyoudenuclearizedandreformed”(Vietnamhasgrowthrate
secondonlytoChina,andPPPpercapitaincometwiceNorthKorea’s)
l TheNorthKoreansknewPompeowouldn’tcompromiseonsanctionsbutgambledthatTrumpcouldmakeconcessions(likeendinglargescalemilitaryexercisesinSingapore)
l KimHyŏkch’ŏl/KimYŏngch’ŏllinel KimHyŏkch’ŏl—SpecialRepresentativeonAmericaoftheStateAffairsCommissionl MoreworkingleveldiscussionswithMikePompeoandSteveBiegun
l RiYongho/Ch’oeSŏnhŭilinel MorepublicdiplomacytofitthestyleofTrumpl InsituationsinwhichtheUShastoberebutteditisbestforspecialists(intheForeignMinistry)todoit
