The Neypes Rule STATEMENT OF THE RULE The "Neypes Rule," otherwise known as the Fresh Period Rule, states that a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. (Domingo Neypes versus Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005) PURPOSE OF THE RULE To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. (supra) The raison dtre for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution. (Judith Yu versus Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 09 Feb. 2011) THE RULE PRIOR TO NEYPES Before the Supreme Court prmulgated Neypes, the rules mandate that the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupts the running of the period to appeal; and that an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. While the period to file an appeal is counted from the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the appellant does not have the full fifteen (15) days. The appellant only has the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. Thus, some rules on appeals are: Sec. 39. [B.P. 129] Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders,

resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x SEC. 3. [Rule 41] Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order. The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. SEC. 6. [Rule 122] When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run. IN WHAT CASES APPLICABLE `Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies31 to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.32 The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. (Neypes, supra) Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. (Neypes, supra) The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party

opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly. (Neypes, supra) APPLICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons: First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that "[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction.17 Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed. Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. x x x x (b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42. x x x x Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently. Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case a situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege.18 (Judith Yu versus Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 09 Feb. 2011) RETROACTIVE EFFECT The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.17 Amendments to

procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.18 Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants that Neypes bears the quested retroactive effect, to wit: Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure. The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending actions, such as the present case. Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later or in the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh period rule" while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not.19 Notably, the subject incidents in Sps. De los Santos occurred in August 2000, at the same month as the relevant incidents at bar. There is no reason to adopt herein a rule that is divergent from that in Sps. De los Santos. (Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. versus Hon. Marietta Homena J. Valencia, G.R. No. 173942, 25 June 2008) NOT INCONSISTENT WITH RULES OF COURT This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the

disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.33 Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. (Neypes, supra)