The New Structure of Policing - National Criminal Justice … · 2005-02-11 · andResearch Agenda...

Description,

Conceptualization,

and Research Agenda

r e s e a r c h r e p o r t

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

David H. Bayley and Cl i f ford D. Shear ing

The New Structure of Policing

01-PolicingCovers 6/25/01 10:19 AM

U.S. Department of JusticeOffice of Justice Programs810 Seventh Street N.W.Washington, DC 20531

John AshcroftAttorney General

Office of Justice Programs National Institute of JusticeWorld Wide Web Site World Wide Web Site http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij

01-PolicingCovers 6/25/01 10:19 AM

The New Structure of Policing:Description, Conceptualization,

and Research Agenda

David H. Bayley and Clifford D. Shearing

July 2001NCJ 187083

Eric JefferisProgram Monitor

National Institute of Justice

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes theBureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and DelinquencyPrevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

Prepared for the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, under award number98–IJ–CX–0017 to David Bayley, State University of New York at Albany, and Clifford Shearing,University of Toronto. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

iii

Acknowledgments

The research for this report was made possible bythe National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department

of Justice, under grant number 98–IJ–CX–0017. We aregrateful for NIJ’s support and encouragement through-out this project.

We were assisted by three diligent and hardworkingresearch assistants at the Centre of Criminology,

University of Toronto: Michael Kempa, RyanCarrier, and Janesse Leung. We are also grateful toRita Donelan, Centre of Criminology, and ArlenedeGonzague, Hindelang Criminal Justice ResearchCenter, State University of New York at Albany,for their painstaking efforts in administering thisresearch program.

v

ContentsAcknowledgments ...................................................................................................................................................iii

Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................................vii

Chapter 1: Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................1

Chapter 2: Auspices..................................................................................................................................................5

Chapter 3: Providers ...............................................................................................................................................13

Chapter 4: Mentalities............................................................................................................................................17

Chapter 5: Explanations .........................................................................................................................................21

Chapter 6: The Role of Government.....................................................................................................................29

Chapter 7: Research Agenda..................................................................................................................................35

Chapter 8: Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................................39

Bibliography............................................................................................................................................................41

vii

Accepting evidence from many sources thatpolicing is undergoing a historic restructuring,

this report describes the forms this restructuring istaking, the reasons for it, and the issues that it raisesfor governance, especially with respect to the issuesof justice, equality of protection, and quality of serv-ice. We believe that the current restructuring isworldwide, although information for the report isdrawn more extensively from democratic countries,both developed and developing. The report does notundertake original research but, rather, explores howthe topic should be studied. The report concludeswith a discussion of the topics that most urgentlyneed to be studied if contemporary developments inpolicing are to be understood and made responsiveto public policy.

The major findings of the study are:

1. Policing is being reconstructed worldwide. Itsdistinguishing features are (a) the separation ofthose who authorize policing from those who doit and (b) the transference of both functionsaway from government.

2. The change in policing cannot be understoodin customary terms. It is often mischaracterized,for example, as “privatization.” Because the dis-tinction between public and private domainsbecomes problematic in the new policing, themore appropriate description for what is occur-ring is “multilateralization.”

3. To understand what is happening to policing,it is essential to distinguish the way in whichpolicing is authorized from the way in which itis provided. In other words, those who authorizepolicing may differ from those who provide it.

4. Policing is authorized currently under five aus-pices: economic interests, both legal and illegal;residential communities; cultural communities;individuals; and governments.

5. Policing is provided by commercial companies,nongovernmental authorizers of policing, indi-viduals, and governments.

6. Many nongovernmental providers now performthe same tasks as the public police.

7. Although public and private providers performthe same tasks, they employ distinctive practices.Specifically, governmental providers tend to pre-vent crime through punishing; nongovernmentalproviders do so through exclusion and the regu-lation of access.

8. In response to the restructuring of policing,the role of the public police may be changingsignificantly. In particular, its agenda is becom-ing increasingly that of government rather thanindividuals; it is specializing in criminal investi-gation and undercover surveillance; its operationsare undertaken in groups; and it is increasinglymilitarized in equipment and outlook.

9. The explanations for the current restructuringof policing involve shortcomings of the publicpolice; increases in crime; the nature of eco-nomic systems; the character of government;and the social structure, ideas, and culture. Themost popular explanations fall under the firstthree categories.

10. These explanations are largely hypotheses. Verylittle empirical research has been done to test orconfirm them.

Executive Summary

viii

Executive Summary

11. It is important for governments to continue tosafeguard justice, equity, and quality of service inthe current restructuring of policing.

12. To safeguard the public interest in policing, gov-ernments must develop the capacity to regulate,audit, and facilitate the restructuring of policing.

13. Research on the structure of policing has beenfragmentary and uneven. The extent and char-acter of the changes in the structure of policing,

their impact on society, the role and responsi-bilities of government, and the causes of thechanges must be studied.

14. Policing is being restructured through the devel-opment of new auspices and providers withinnations and by the transference of police func-tions to transnational and international agen-cies. In other words, policing is being challengedby forces inside and outside contemporarynation-states.

1

Introduction

Chapter 1

Policing is being transformed and restructuredin the modern world. This involves much more

than reforming the institution regarded as the police,although that is occurring as well. The key to thetransformation is that policing, meaning the activityof making societies safe, is no longer carried outexclusively by governments. Indeed, it is an openquestion as to whether governments are even theprimary providers. Gradually, almost imperceptibly,policing has been “multilateralized”: a host of non-governmental groups have assumed responsibilityfor their own protection, and a hostof nongovernmental agencies haveundertaken to provide securityservices. Policing has entered anew era, an era characterized by atransformation in the governanceof security.

Although a number of studies haveattempted to document in parti-cular countries the rise of what isloosely referred to as “private secu-rity,” the extent of the transfor-mation of policing has yet to bedetermined (Johnston 1999, 1994,1992; Shearing and Stenning 1981,1980; Nalla and Newman 1991; Cunningham andTaylor 1985). We believe, however, that the follow-ing statements about the current restructuring aretrue and amply justify our effort to understand whatis happening:

1. In most countries, certainly in the democraticworld, private police outnumber public police.

2. In these same countries, people spend moretime in their daily lives in places where visiblecrime prevention and control are provided by

nongovernmental groups rather than by govern-mental police agencies.

3. The reconstruction of policing is occurring worldwide despite differences in wealth and economic systems.

Viewed historically, what is happening to policingis not unprecedented. It could be argued that themonopolization of policing by government is an aber-ration. It is only in the last 100 to 200 years thatpolicing has been effectively monopolized by govern-

ment, and even that was not uni-form across countries (Spitzer andScull 1977b; Shearing and Stenning1981; Blair 1998). In Europe, forexample, France led the way in thesystematic nationalization of polic-ing in the 17th century (Bayley1975). Nationalization followed fit-fully throughout the rest of conti-nental Europe, concentrated largelyin towns and often deferring to theprivate authority of the landowningaristocracy. Prussia permitted thelandowning Junker aristocracy topolice their large estates up to the

unification of Germany in 1871. Russia, too, allowedpolicing to be shared between government and thelanded gentry until the early 20th century. In England,policing remained largely in private hands until wellinto the 19th century. In the United States, wherepolicing was gradually governmentalized by citiesin the middle of the 19th century, private policingnever really died (Walker 1977; Monkkonen 1981).The constituent States did not begin to developorganized police forces until the early 20th century,and the national government did not do so until adecade or so later (Smith 1925).

Is the current restructuring

of policing, then, simply a

return to the past, another

cycle in the historical ebb

and flow of policing power

between governmental and

nongovernmental agencies?

Yes and no.

Chapter 1: Introduction

2

Is the current restructuring ofpolicing, then, simply a return tothe past, another cycle in the his-torical ebb and flow of policingpower between governmental andnongovernmental agencies? Yesand no. Clearly governmentshave shared, even conceded, thepower of policing to nongovern-mental groups before (Bayley1985a). Sometimes security hasbeen so precarious that govern-ment could scarcely be said toexist at all in many parts of theworld. At the same time, therestructuring that is taking placetoday is taking a different formthan in the past because contem-porary societies are organizeddifferently than previous ones.Indeed, the concepts and termi-nology inherited from the past areinadequate for understanding what is happeningtoday. For policymakers to comprehend, and possiblydeal effectively with, the current transformation inpolicing, it will be necessary to examine contempo-rary developments with a fresh intellectual eye.

Our knowledge of what is occurring is based largelyon studies from democratic countries. These, afterall, are where information about policing can bemost freely obtained. The character of government,then, affects what is known about policing and, aswe shall discuss, probably the extent of restructuringas well. Although we believe the restructuring isworldwide, it remains for new research to documentits extent across the globe. We do know that thechange in policing is occurring across the divide ofeconomic development, with developing democra-cies participating along with developed ones.

When the term “policing” is used in this report,it does not refer to all the means by which humanbeings provide safety for themselves—policing is not

synonymous with social control.Societies create order, and hopefullythereby safety, through processesof socialization and informal disci-pline. Everyone plays a role in theseprocesses—parents, siblings, peers,friends, acquaintances, colleagues,and a host of authority figures. Thisreport will not reinvent social con-trol theory. Its focus is on intentionalattempts to regulate the distribution ofphysical security produced by actualor potential use of force.1 The reportdeals with the governance of securi-ty in the modern world. Emphasis isplaced on physical security becausethat is what people want foremostfrom police, despite the fact thattechnology has produced new formsof insecurity in relation to informa-tion, nonreal property, and cyber-processes.

The purpose of this report is threefold:

1. To review systematically what is known aboutthe contemporary restructuring of policing.

2. To reflect about the meaning and significance ofwhat is occurring and to develop concepts andterminology that do justice to the phenomenon.

3. To specify a prioritized research agenda forunderstanding the restructuring of policing andfor supporting the development of policy to dealwith it.

This report is derivative—that is, based on whatothers have found and documented. Our contribu-tion is in outlining what is known, suggesting whatneeds to be found, and showing how these mattersshould be thought about. This is not the last wordon the restructuring of policing. It is an invitation toothers to join in studying one of the most momen-tous but, so far, understudied topics of our time.

This report’s contribution is

in outlining what is known,

suggesting what needs to be

found, and showing how

these matters should be

thought about. This is not

the last word on the restruc-

turing of policing. It is an

invitation to others to join in

studying one of the most

momentous but, so far,

understudied topics of

our time.

Chapter 1: Introduction

3

The report covers four topics. The first and longestpart describes the new forms that policing has takenin the late 20th century (chapters 2, 3, and 4). Inso doing, a crucial distinction is made between theauspices and the providers of policing. Auspices aregroups (and sometimes individuals) that explicitly andself-consciously take upon themselves the responsi-bility for organizing their own protection (chapter 2).Providers are the groups that actually do the policingasked for (chapter 3). Sometimes auspices and pro-viders coincide. A defining characteristic of the newparadigm of policing, however, is that auspices andproviders may not be the same. In the old paradigm,governments had responsibility for articulating secu-rity needs and for developing institutions to meet them.

Distinguishing between auspices and providersallows an escape from the oversimplification ofdescribing policing as being either public or private.Auspices may be either public (governmental) orprivate (nongovernmental); so, too, may providers.Furthermore, they may be combined in four ways—public/public, public/private, private/public, and private/private. The current restructuring of policinginvolves more, then, than privatization. It involvesthe multilateralization of the sources of both demandand supply of policing. As will be shown, distin-guishing public from private auspices conceptually isnot easy.

To describe what is happening today, it is importantto determine whether there are characteristic differ-ences in the practices of the new policing. Do thesenew combinations of auspices and providers carry outpolicing in new and different ways compared withthe governmental, or public, police? We refer to theseas “the mentalities of policing” because they reflectdifferent practices in the way in which security isprovided (chapter 4).

The second major topic of this report is a discussionof the reasons that have produced the current restruc-turing of policing (chapter 5). Here, all the explana-

tions for the current restructuring that have beensuggested by observers, scholars, and practitionersare reviewed.

In order to review what is happening to policingand why, a team of librarians and research assistantssearched for all the written material that might con-ceivably touch on contemporary policing and domesticsecurity. The review was limited to materials writtenin English. From this voluminous and diverse writ-ing, the team compiled lists of all auspices, providers,mentalities, and explanations that were mentioned.

Chapter 6 raises a third topic; namely, the role thatgovernment is playing and should be playing in theformation of the new policing paradigm. Relativelylittle has been written about this because the extentof the transformation has not been recognized byeither intellectuals or policymakers. Reality has out-run efforts to understand what is happening or toshape it to appropriate civic ends.

Finally, building upon what was found to be knownabout the restructuring of policing and the problemsof governance that are thereby generated, a researchagenda reflecting we believe to be the most impor-tant topics requiring study is presented (chapter 7).Ways to go about this research also are suggested.

In a short conclusion (chapter 8), we reflect uponthe meaning of what is occurring and the prospectsfor policing in the future.

Note1. People familiar with writing about the police willrecognize that this is not a complete definition ofthe police. It is an approximation, indicating whatpeople commonly expect of the police. For a discus-sion of the concept of “police” and one attempt ata definition that can be applied comparatively bothhistorically and geographically, see Bayley’s Patternsof Policing (1985a).

5

Auspices

Chapter 2

Until recently, governments assumed primaryresponsibility for providing security. “Providing”

has a double meaning: Governments determinedwhat sort of security was needed and provided themeans to achieve it. Governments were the organiza-tional auspices for formulating demand for policing,and they were the providers whosupplied it. In the current restructur-ing of policing, these two functionshave become separate. Furthermore,it has become acceptable for groupsother than governments both totake control of their own policingand to select the providers of it. Inshort, the responsibility for author-izing policing and for providing itinstrumentally has been multilater-alized and denationalized.

This restructuring of policing isoften referred to as “privatization.”This is an oversimplification, atthe heart of which is a significantconceptual problem. The functionof policing—providing securitythrough physical constraint—is a quintessential func-tion of government. Many theorists have followedMax Weber’s lead in defining states, which have beenthe most inclusive and powerful level of governmentin history, in terms of the possession of a “monopolyof force” (Weber 1968). In this formulation, govern-ment is recognized in part by the control of policing.This implies that the capacity to authorize policingindicates the existence of government. It would fol-low, then, that policing can never be privatized. Butthis defies our common understanding.

The contemporary restructuring of policing separatesboth the authorization of security and the activity ofpolicing from what is recognized as formal govern-ment. In so doing, the distinction between “public”and “private” itself becomes problematic. This con-fusion also afflicts judgments about the public/pri-

vate character of policing beforethe rise of states (Bayley 1985a).The problem becomes even moreacute today when the auspicesand providers of policing becomemixed in terms of being public orprivate, as shall be seen. For thesereasons, it is more accurate tocharacterize what is happening asmultilateralization in the gover-nance of security rather than theprivatization of policing.

In this chapter, we will examinethe sorts of people, for the mostpart groups, that undertake toauthorize policing. They are calledthe auspices of security, as opposedto the providers of security, who

actually do the work of policing. This review showsthat control of policing today is exercised under fiveauspices: (1) economic interests, (2) residential com-munities, (3) cultural communities, (4) individuals,and (5) governments. Each category contains a vari-ety of auspices (see table 1).

Economic InterestsThe most familiar subset of economic interests con-sists of businesses, which may act individually orcooperatively to organize security. Businesses create

The contemporary restruc-

turing of policing separates

both the authorization of

security and the activity of

policing from what is recog-

nized as formal government.

In so doing, the distinction

between “public” and

“private” itself becomes

problematic.

Chapter 2: Auspices

6

their own in-house security forces or hire othersto police for them (Shearing and Stenning 1981;Johnston 1992). They also band together to protectthemselves on the basis of both geography and func-tion. In the United States, the best example of theformer are business improvement districts (BIDs),which tax members to support police patrols, trashcollection, or physical improvements to the environ-ment (New York Times 1994; Greene, Seamon, andLevy 1995; Murphy 1997). In New York City, BIDshave been established for Times Square, GrandCentral Terminal, Bryant Park, 34th Street mid-town, and other areas. Businesses that provide acommon service, such as banks, bars, and taxi com-panies, also collaborate to enhance mutual security.These functional economic interests are less likely

than geographically based ones to hire and sharepolice. Instead, they work cooperatively to minimizethreats to their common enterprise by warning oneanother about potential threats, sharing ideas aboutimproving security, and supporting one another intime of need.

Unfortunately, the economic interests active in con-structing security are not always legal. In many partsof the world, criminal enterprises, such as crime syn-dicates and juvenile gangs, play a significant role inorganizing security. They do so in their own inter-ests, of course, and usually in direct opposition togovernment. But in so doing they govern securityfor the people among whom they live, becomingin some places the only effective police that exist.Such illegal but parallel security regimes that createorder benefiting others exist and have existed inMafia-dominated neighborhoods in New York City,the favellas of Latin America, the barrios of LosAngeles, and the major cities of Russia (Leeds 1996;Shlapentokh 1995). Violent revolutionary groups, aswell, often try to establish parallel governments inthe geographical areas they dominate, serving bothas the local police and the military.

Governments may be complicit in these parallel butillegal security activities. The public police some-times turn a blind eye to the illegal activities ofcrime groups in exchange for information that helpsthem solve crimes, especially if those crimes threatenthe government. The Royal Ulster Constabulary(RUC), for example, depended upon warnings bythe Irish Republican Army (IRA) about impendingbombings to protect the general population. TheRUC, in turn, allowed the IRA to become the effec-tive police for several Catholic “no-go” areas ofBelfast (Hillyard 1993). In some areas, the IRAestablished “Provo Police Stations” to address com-munity problems as well as to document abuses bythe RUC. Similarly, Japan’s organized crime—theYakuza—performs the useful function of enlistingand disciplining unemployed and potentially delin-quent young men (“chimpera”) who would otherwise

TABLE 1:Nonstate Auspices of Security

Economic Interests1. Legal: Businesses

• Singly• Cooperatively

2. Illegal: Criminal gangs

Residential Communities1. Gated communities: Horizontal and vertical

• By real estate company• By cooperatives

2. Voluntary capitation3. Local utilization of in-kind resources

• By local initiative• By government initiative

Cultural CommunitiesIndividualsGovernments

1. Permitting2. Encouraging

• By sponsoring• By requiring• By delegating• By collaborating

Chapter 2: Auspices

7

gravitate toward predatory crime. Although theJapanese police periodically crack down against theYakuza, there seems to be an informal understandingthat the rigor of enforcement will be influenced bythe Yakuza’s adherence to certain rules, specificallywhether they victimize the public directly (Bayley1991; Szymkowak and Steinhoff 1995). Violenceamong the Yakuza themselves is tolerable, providedit is kept out of public view; violence against thepublic is not. As a final example, the conduct of theso-called “good Donos” (drug lords) of Brazil is oftentacitly tolerated by the public police because theyhelp to maintain order (Leeds 1996). Tolerance runsout, however, when drug-trade violence is turned onthe public.

Furthermore, corrupt governments may actively fos-ter parallel but illegal security activities. In Russia,for instance, members of the government have beenobserved to provide and solicit illegitimate krysha(roofs) of security for themselves and favored mem-bers of the private sector (Shlapentokh 1995).

The general point is that criminal enterprises may be“cut some slack” by governments provided they con-tribute to public safety in ways the public police can-not. They may even be actively courted by corruptstate agencies in service to their own interests.

ResidentialCommunitiesResidential communities exist in many forms. First,gated communities may be created where policing isconstructed either by realty companies or by thehomeowners themselves operating as a cooperative.Our impression is that the former is more commonin private housing estates (horizontal gated commu-nities), and the latter is more common in condo-minium apartments (vertical gated communities).In gated communities, policing involves regulatingaccess, surveillance, and patrolling. Gated communi-ties are especially popular in the United States,where they have been the fastest growing segment

of the housing market (Egan 1995; Kennedy 1995;Blakely and Snyder 1997; Garreau 1991; Jones andNewburn 1999; Owens 1997).

It is worth noting that creating gates for communi-ties does not happen exclusively under private aus-pices. When the public police barricade streets tocreate cul-de-sacs that impede driveby criminalactivity, as in Houston and Los Angeles in the1980s, they are creating gated communities, andoften for the poor (Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy1990).

Second, residents of neighborhoods may agree to pay asmall per capita fee to support private security services.This happened recently in parts of Glasgow, Scotland,London, England, and Melbourne, Australia. Such apractice demonstrates again the problem with describ-ing security auspices as being either public or private.The financial levies agreed to could be regarded as aform of local government or as nongovernmental self-help. In cases like these, cooperative activity looksvery much like self-government.

Third, residential neighborhoods may form ad hocadvisory councils to mobilize in-kind communityresources that address security needs (Blakely andSnyder 1997; Baron 1998). Residents may undertaketo watch one another’s houses, alert police to suspi-cious strangers, patrol the streets at certain times ofthe day, improve dangerous physical conditions,mediate neighborhood disputes, and organize restora-tive justice conferences (Braithwaite 1989; Bayley1994; Shearing 1995). Rachel Neild, writing aboutLatin America, calls this the “informalization” ofsecurity (1997). In the United States, the FederalGovernment has given some communities grants tosupport the security plans they have developed(Sheppard 1998). Similar initiatives have beenundertaken in South Africa and Ireland (Shearing1997; Independent Commission on Policing forNorthern Ireland 1999).

In traditional societies, whole villages may organizeto take responsibility for security, supplementing

Chapter 2: Auspices

8

what is regarded as inadequate protection by thepublic police. As in developed settings, it is difficultto know whether such activity should be regarded aspublic or private. In India, for example, the govern-ment passed legislation authorizing villages to create“village defense forces” and paying some of theircosts. In Tanzania the government sponsored vigi-lante groups (“sungusungu”) to protect cattle fromrustlers. In addition, various nongovernmentalgroups have sponsored localsecurity initiatives facilitated bymicrolending and technologytransfer (Cassani 1995; Conger1997). Should these be regarded asdevolution to private auspices ordecentralization to local govern-ment auspices? On the other hand,if villages take advantage of oppor-tunities within the law to organizetheir own self-defense, eventhough not explicitly authorized todo so, is this local government orprivate policing? We submit thatthis sort of argument can be avoid-ed altogether by not using the“public/private” terminology whendescribing the current restructuringof policing, except where suchapplication is unambiguous.

The concept of centralization/decentralization alsobecomes difficult to apply in this context. The newparadigm of policing represents more than decentral-ization within existing governmental institutions.Governments are not just devolving power on subor-dinate levels of government—they are acceptingnew bases of legitimate government. And they aredoing more than acquiescing; sometimes they areactively promoting the sharing of responsibility forpolicing with new institutions, as shall be seen.

Cultural CommunitiesCultural communities may be ascriptive groupswhere membership is a matter of inheritance or

voluntary associations that people join by choice.In either case, groups with which people identifybecause of shared cultural beliefs and practices occa-sionally serve as auspices for the construction ofpolicing (Stenson 1999; Stenson and Factor 1994).In the United States, for example, the Nation ofIslam, often called the Black Muslims, has organizeda group of young men known as the Fruit of Islam toprotect members and their businesses. The Rashtriya

Swayamsezak Sangh (RSS) inIndia is a militant band primarilyconsisting of young men whoseavowed purpose is the physicaldefense of Hindus.

IndividualsIndividuals have always been aus-pices of policing in the sense thatthey worry about security, thinkabout ways to minimize risk,and act to enhance their personalsafety. Self-defense is acceptedeverywhere as a human right,although it may be regulated by thestate. Today people in many coun-tries go to elaborate lengths toprotect themselves—residing inprotected communities, living in

houses designed for security, avoiding dangerousareas, attending self-defense classes, buying securityequipment, and joining crime-prevention organiza-tions. Most important for this analysis, they also hiretheir own human protectors. It stands to reason thatprivate guards are most often hired by people ofwealth, although relatively poor people engaged inunpopular or criminal enterprises hire bodyguards aswell. Our impression is that individual self-defense,especially the hiring of private guards, is much morecommon in less developed countries, where thehomes of well-to-do individuals are frequently sur-rounded by high walls topped with broken glass orbarbed wire. In Latin America, for example, wealthyindividuals have hired private police to protect

The new paradigm of

policing represents more than

decentralization within

existing governmental

institutions. Governments

are not just devolving power

on subordinate levels of

government; they are actively

promoting the sharing of

responsibility for policing

with new institutions.

Chapter 2: Auspices

9

themselves and their families from an epidemic ofkidnaping (Heine 1994). Owing to the turbulence ofpolitical life, politicians in less developed countriesfrequently employ private guards who are sometimesused offensively against their opponents as well asdefensively. This is also true in Russia (Shlapentokh1995).

The StateDuring the past century, govern-ments have been both the primaryauspices and the primary providersof policing. Paradoxically, theyhave also, in their role as autho-rizers of policing, contributedsubstantially to the current multi-lateralization of policing, the veryphenomenon that is underminingtheir monopoly. In recent years,governments have facilitated, encouraged, andrequired nongovernmental groups to become bothauspices for authorizing policing and providers of it.They have done so in two ways—by creating permis-sive environments and by actively encouraging non-state police activity.

Passive encouragement has come primarily throughthe creation of legal space into which nonstateauspices could expand (Hauber et al. 1996). In theUnited States, for example, businesses have defen-sively protected themselves against damaging civilsuits by improving the physical security of theiremployees or customers (Benson 1998). The law alsoallows owners of businesses to regulate the access ofpeople who violate rules of dress and behavior. Thislegal environment, coupled with the expansion ofso-called mass private property—premises privatelyowned but open to the public—has made possible,even necessary, a new territorial division of laborbetween public and private police (Shearing andStenning 1981). Finally, by requiring providers ofcertain public services to be insured, governmenthas created a set of security monitors who can create

financial incentives for businesses to improve theirsecurity performance.

Governments may even enable people to share thecoercive power of the police. They do this whenthey permit private persons to be armed in their own

defense, as in the United States.Ironically, this not only under-mines their monopoly on the useof force but also encourages thenotion that public policing isinadequate.

But governments have not simplyacquiesced in allowing nongovern-mental groups and individuals toauthorize. They have activelyencouraged them in several ways.

First, governments have sponsoredthe growth of private policing. The

best example is the community policing movementof the 1980s and 1990s (Skogan and Hartnett 1997;Skolnick and Bayley 1986, 1988; Greene andMastrofski 1988; Goldstein 1990; Trojanowicz n.d.;Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990; Stenson 1999;Stenson and Factor 1994; Crawford 1995; Crawfordand Jones 1995; Sheppard 1998). Acting on theinsight that crime cannot be prevented or solvedwithout the active assistance of the public, policedepartments have mobilized neighborhoods in theirown defense (Bayley 1994). Members of the publiccollectively consider security needs, advise the policeabout problems requiring attention, give informationto the police about suspicious persons, patrol neigh-borhoods on foot and in cars, fix up the physicalenvironment, mediate disputes and quarrels, installsecurity devices, force businesses that cause disorderto move, and pressure fellow residents to adhere tocommunity norms of propriety. In the language ofthe day, community policing seeks to “empower”neighborhoods to share responsibility for policingwith the state (Crawford 1995; Crawford and Jones1995; Sheppard 1998).

Governments have

contributed to the current

multilateralization of policing

by creating permissive

environments and actively

encouraging nonstate

police activity.

Chapter 2: Auspices

10

Some local governments have directly sponsoredcommercial private policing. For example, severalmunicipalities in Montreal hired private police toaugment the patrols of the metropolitan police. By1998, within the jurisdictions of 18 of Britain’s 43police forces, local governments had hired privatesecurity patrols (Blair 1998).

Private security companies working for the stateshould be distinguished from low-cost quasi-policeagents who work side by side with the public police.In the Netherlands, for example, most towns nowhave “City Guards” (Stadswacht) to patrol high-usepublic areas. Similar agents known as Sicherheitswachenhave emerged in Germany, wherethey perform surveillance functions,including stopping people on thestreet and requesting identity cards(Nogalla and Sack 1998; Lacey andZedner 1998) In Britain, severaltowns have hired long-term unem-ployed people as “City Stewards” or“social caretakers” to patrol publichousing estates (Blair 1998). All ofthese “policing” agents receive min-imal training and pay. Their chieffunction is to be visible and to alertthe public police to real or potentialdangers.

Second, governments have enacted regulationsrequiring private persons to act in ways that enhancepublic safety. For example, they require banks totransport cash in approved ways, hospitals to reportsuspected child abuse, airlines to inspect hand bag-gage, gun owners to register, people in sensitive occu-pations to submit to background checks, sportingevents to be covered by private guards, constructioncompanies to manage traffic around building sites,and ethnic groups to follow stipulated rules forparades and fairs (Grabosky 1995).

Third, governments have delegated activities previ-ously carried out by the public police to private con-tractors. Police in many countries have outsourced

their housing and transport of prisoners, streetpatrolling, guarding of public buildings, investiga-tion of traffic accidents, electronic monitoring ofparolees, provision of security advice to businesses,and conduct of crime-prevention workshops for at-risk populations (Johnston 1994). James Q. Wilsonsuggested 30 years ago that because most calls to thepolice for assistance involved noncriminal matters,governments could save a great deal of money byturning this responsibility over to private firms(1968). Farfetched at the time, a great deal of publicpolicing has since become “commodified” in just theway Wilson suggested (Wood 1999; Spitzer and Scull1977a). According to Peter Manning, the largest

employer of private security inthe United States is the FederalGovernment (Forst and Manningforthcoming).

Fourth, governments invite firms tocollaborate with them in improv-ing public policing. In Durban,South Africa, the public policeshare a communication channeland computer with a private securi-ty company. The private firm oftenresponds first to criminal emergen-cies, preserving the scene until thepublic police arrive. In the UnitedStates, Australia, and Canada, pri-

vate businesses have been solicited to purchase equip-ment such as automobiles for the police and to provideoffices, telephones, and furniture for neighborhoodpolice posts.

In this discussion of the role governments haveplayed in facilitating multilateralization, we are notsuggesting that governments have been the primemovers. For the most part, they have been playing“catchup.” The government’s monopoly on policinghas been eroded because it has not provided the sortof effective consumer-responsive security that pri-vate auspices and suppliers have proved to be capa-ble of giving.

When it comes to policing,

what is governmental or not

governmental, public or

private, depends more on

legal status than on the

nature of the activity

undertaken or the size of the

entity undertaking it.

Chapter 2: Auspices

11

ConclusionThe United States is often criticized by those inother countries for having an ungovernable policesystem composed of more than 17,000 separatepolice forces. Indeed, Bruce Smith, a famous authori-ty on the American police, said that the UnitedStates did not have a police system at all (1949).This radically decentralized system produces forAmericans many of the benefits achieved elsewherethrough community policing because it representsrestructuring on the basis of neighborhoods.

Americans properly describe their system as decen-tralized because it occurs within a constitutional,established system of government. But when thesame functions are authorized by unincorporatedneighborhoods or residential communities that areno larger than the jurisdictions of many local govern-ments, they are seen as being private. The point isthat when it comes to policing, what is governmen-tal or not governmental, public or private, dependsmore on legal status than on the nature of the activi-ty undertaken or the size of the entity undertaking it.

13

Providers

Chapter 3

Security companies such as Burns, Wackenhut,and Pinkerton represent what most people think

of when they hear the phrase “private policing.” Butlarge commercial security companies are only the tipof the iceberg of restructuring. They provide policing,but they do not authorize it. And they are only onesort of nonstate provider among several. In our sur-vey, we found four major groups of policing providersin the late 20th century world: (1) commercial secu-rity companies, (2) nongovernmental auspices actingas their own providers, (3) individuals, and (4) gov-ernments (see table 2). Governments are included,paradoxically, because they contribute police servicesthrough the market to nonstate policing auspices.

Commercial SecurityCompaniesThe archetypical private security company is onethat provides uniformed security personnel to guardand patrol. They are particularly visible in malls,banks, large stores, and sports stadiums—places that

are privately owned but to which the public hasaccess. They also protect private housing and busi-nesses that are not open to the general public, suchas gated communities and factories. But commercialcompanies provide many other sorts of security per-sonnel as well, such as inquiry agents, personal body-guards, security consultants, control room operatorsfor closed-circuit TV and police communications,manufacturers and sellers of security equipment,installers and repairers of security equipment, andtrainers in personal protection (Prenzler and Sarre1998). All these functionally varied companies offerthemselves through the market, filling gaps in polic-ing that governments cannot or will not fill.

NongovernmentalAuspicesPrivate groups as well as individuals may take securityinto their own hands, as we have seen, supplementingor supplanting the protection provided by govern-ments. They may decide to provide protection them-selves, becoming providers, or to hire commercialfirms. Many large businesses, for example, createtheir own in-house police forces. So, too, do devel-opers of some large housing estates. Guards for apart-ment buildings and condominiums may be employeesof outside firms or of the housing complex itself.Neighborhoods provide policing to themselves whenresidents join the Neighborhood Watch or serve infoot patrols or mobile patrols (Johnston 1992).

The Guardian Angels in the United States are aninteresting hybrid of the inside/outside provision ofpolicing. Composed primarily of young men fromminority communities, they provide visible patrol toselected neighborhoods and businesses that request

TABLE 2:Nonstate Providers of Policing

Commercial Security CompaniesNongovernmental Auspices

(for example, industries, real estate developers,apartment and condominium cooperatives, andneighborhoods).

IndividualsGovernments

• Moonlighting

• Fee for service

Chapter 3: Providers

14

their services. They are outsiders in service to localauspices, sometimes working as volunteers, some-times working for a fee.

By protecting themselves, criminal organizationssometimes protect others as well, as in the favellasof Rio, the barrios of Colombia, the bustees of India,and the immigrant neighborhoods of Americancities. In these cases, private auspices operating intheir own illegal interest create apublic good.

IndividualsIndividuals become providers ofpolicing when they undertake pro-tective actions on others’ behalf,for example, as volunteers inneighborhood street patrols,Special Constables in Britain,police cadets and reserves in theUnited States, and Police ExplorerScouts. Individuals also take self-protecting defensive actions, suchas purchasing firearms or takingmartial arts classes. Because we have defined polic-ing as a collective action for collective benefit, self-defense activities do not qualify individuals asproviders of policing. Individuals may be both theauspices and the providers of policing, not neces-sarily at the same time.

GovernmentsOne of the most curious developments of modernpolicing is the public police acting as private suppliersof protection. The assumption behind governmentpolicing is that it is available to everyone equally onthe basis of citizenship. Increasingly, however, thepublic police are offering their services through themarketplace for profit. This takes two forms.

First, some governments allow individual officers towork off duty for private interests in their officialuniforms as visible police. In the United States this

represents the expansion of an older practice ofallowing police officers to “moonlight” as completelyprivate persons for private security companies (Reiss1988; Bayley 1994). For American police officers,the opportunity to work two jobs is a prized benefitof police employment.

Moonlighting may be highly organized. Some Ameri-can police departments sign contracts with private

interests to provide uniformed off-duty police. In Honduras, too, inthe late 1980s, the Public SecurityForce (FUSEP) contracted withbusinesses to provide security guards(Kincaid and Gamarra 1995).

Second, many police forces, espe-cially in North America, nowcharge for services they previouslyprovided free of charge, such asresponding to burglar alarms andregulating traffic around construc-tion sites. They do so on the argu-ment that because these effortsdisproportionately benefit a com-

mercial interest, the general public should not bearthe cost. The same is true for policing rock concerts,sporting events, and special interest parades.

In this way the profit motive has begun to affect theallocation of public policing. Private interests havetried to do this in less obvious ways for many years.For example, fast-food restaurants and conveniencestores, especially if they operate around the clock,sometimes provide food to police free of charge or atconcessional rates to encourage their patronage and,hence, protection. More overtly, businesses may offerin-kind support, such as equipment or buildings, tothe police in exchange for increased coverage. TheAlliance for Downtown New York, for example,recently offered the police department $5 million toset up a new police substation on Washington Streetif it would assign 40 police officers to patrol the areasouth of Chambers Street (New York Times 1998).Such practices have been an integral part of some

One of the most curious

developments of modern

policing is the public police

acting as private suppliers of

protection. Increasingly, the

public police are offering

their services through the

marketplace for profit.

Chapter 3: Providers

15

community policing programs, as police departmentshave required local communities to provide officespace, furniture, and equipment inorder to obtain a neighborhood(storefront) police station.

In all these examples, public polic-ing is no longer being treated as apublic good, available equally toall and paid for by general tax rev-enues. It has become a publiclycreated service that can be sold asa commodity through markets.

None of this should be confusedwith the civilianization of police,where tasks formerly carried outby sworn officers are performedby civilian employees. Civilians,who make up 30 percent of policeemployees in Australia, Britain,Canada, and the United States,now direct traffic, investigate acci-dents, collect physical evidence,and organize crime preventionactivities. Nonsworn people sometimes work inpolicelike roles, often in uniforms that are very simi-lar to those of sworn officers.

Without close scrutiny, it has become difficult to tellwhether policing is being done by a governmentusing sworn personnel, by a government using a pri-vate security company, by a private security companyusing civilian employees, by a private company usingpublic police, or by a government employing civil-ians. Even carrying firearms does not always distin-guish public from nonpublic providers (Forst andManning forthcoming). Interestingly, a politician inAustralia recommended recently that the private

security guards already deployed by government ontrains should be armed so that they would not be

regarded as “Keystone Cops”(Walker 1999). Guns, he thought,were “an absolute . . . necessity tocope with the job.”

Today, a distinction between pub-lic and private policing is increas-ingly meaningless. The worldhas come a long way since theHallcrest Report (Cunninghamand Taylor 1985) documented thesize of the private security industry.Both public and private entitieshave assumed responsibility forauthorizing policing; both publicand private entities provide polic-ing to these auspices. Even govern-ment’s role is no longer exclusivelypublic. It authorizes policing,encourages nongovernmentalgroups to authorize policing, andprovides policing to specialized

consumers on a fee-for-service basis. Similarly, pri-vate providers are not exclusively private, since theysometimes work under public auspices and are some-times staffed by public police personnel.

Policing today is not just being “privatized.” It isbeing restructured though the development of newgroups as both instigators and providers of policing.The public and the private are being combined innew ways, ways that sometimes make it difficult toseparate public from private. Multilateralization,although an awkward term, is a more accurate way ofdescribing what is happening to policing in the late20th century than privatization.

Without close scrutiny, it

has become difficult to tell

whether policing is being

done by a government using

sworn personnel, by a

government using a private

security company, by a

private security company

using civilian employees, by

a private company using

public police, or by a govern-

ment employing civilians.

17

Mentalities

Chapter 4

The restructuring of policing under way in theworld today involves more than changes in the

types of people who are involved in it. The characterof policing—meaning its practices and activities—isalso changing. We call these elements the “mentali-ties” of policing because how policing is conductedreflects distinctive ways of thinking about it.

It is important to distinguish the tasks that policeundertake from the mentalities they adopt. Whiledifferent auspices may require dif-ferent sorts of services from theirproviders, the functions may beperformed differently by differentproviders. The extent to whichthis is so is an important topic forfuture research. This research willbe complicated because auspicesand providers may independentlyinfluence the way in which similartasks are performed. Furthermore,because state and nonstate auspicesand providers may be combinedin different ways, the relationsbetween auspices/providers, on the one hand, andthe mentalities of policing, on the other hand, maybe very complex.

With respect to the functions of policing, we agreewith Les Johnston that nonstate providers of securitynow perform all the tasks once reserved to the publicpolice (Johnston 1992). They patrol, guard, investi-gate, respond to emergencies, monitor, collect intel-ligence, work undercover, constrain, amelioratecrime-producing conditions, advise about crime pre-vention, and control disorder. The tasks of policingare increasingly being shared between public andprivate providers.

Historically the two core tasks of public policinghave been patrolling and criminal investigation(Bayley 1994). Although investigation has long beena specialty of commercial security companies as wellas in-house security agencies, patrolling has not beenuntil recently. Today the employed and consumingpublic are as likely to see private security personnelguarding and patrolling in the course of a day as theyare to see public police. In addition to providing avisible presence, private police necessarily respond

to emergencies and, when crimesoccur, preserve evidence and holdsuspects until the public policearrive.

In Britain, street patrolling isbeing performed today by thepublic police, private securityprivately employed, private secu-rity employed by municipalities,unsworn but uniformed personnelhired by municipalities, constabu-laries with jurisdiction in particu-lar places such as parks or housing

estates, and community volunteers (Bayley 1994;Johnston 1994). In many places, these varied forceswork side by side, sharing offices, radio frequencies,information, and plans.

Private providers have one major advantage overthe public police with respect to the tasks they per-form—they can pick and choose. The public police,on the other hand, must provide the full range ofpolice services, an obligation they find increasinglyburdensome and have begun to take steps to reduce.

The insight that private policing exhibits a differentmentality from that of public policing was formulated

Today the employed and

consuming public are as

likely to see private security

personnel guarding and

patrolling in the course of a

day as they are to see

public police.

Chapter 4: Mentalities

18

originally by Clifford Shearing and Philip Stenningand has since been elaborated on by others (Shearingand Stenning 1980; Farnell and Shearing 1977;Shearing, Farnell, and Stenning 1980; Prenzler andSarre 1998; Forst and Manning forthcoming). Theconsensus is that private policingis more concerned with preventingthan punishing crime. Rather thandeterring crime through the threatof detection, arrest, and punish-ment, private policing tries to reg-ulate behavior and circumstancesto diminish the possibility thatcrime will occur. In so doing, itfocuses less on people who arebehaving unreasonably and moreon reasonable people who willcomply with crime- and disorder-reducing directives. By emphasiz-ing the responsibilities of all,private security tries to create anenvironment of discipline andorder that limits opportunities for crime, reassureslaw-abiding people, and constrains the deviant few.

The mentality of private policing is similar to thatof self-help by individuals: conciliatory rather thanpenal, emphasizing desistance rather than punish-ment, concerned with outcomes more than rules,and speedy rather than measured (Black andBaumgartner 1980).

The metaphor for private policing’s distinctive men-tality is gates. Private security regulates entry, limitsparticipation, and excludes on the basis of presump-tive signs of bad behavior—membership (residence,employment); dress (T-shirts, bare feet); and behav-ior (obscene language, skateboards, boom boxes). Itcan do what the public police have recently comeunder strong attack for doing—it can profile. It cantake premonitory action on the basis of social crite-ria that do not have to be justified in terms of law.Unlike the public police, private police are not ham-pered in their regulatory actions by probable cause.

The restructuring of policing results in the substitu-tion of banishment for incarceration. Governmentscan banish only by incarcerating, and that can bedone only on the basis of behavior adjudicated to beillegal. Private agents can banish by regulation based

on presumptive signs of deviancyand disorder.

Private security is primarily con-cerned with governing the future:its objective is to prevent crime.Public policing is concerned withgoverning both the future and thepast: preventing crime and render-ing justice with respect to pastcrimes. Its favored strategy isdeterrence based on punishmentbecause punishment promises bothto prevent crime and to exact acost for misdeeds already done.This explains why the mentalityof punishment is so popular with

the public as well. It is an all-purpose solution totwo important concerns. Restructuring has occurredtoday in part because groups within the state, notablybusinesses, realized that they would be better pro-tected if they uncoupled security from justice, whichthe public police cannot do. The new auspices andproviders of security are more interested in reducinglosses than in validating legal norms. Consequently,they also rely less on deterrence and more on pre-monitory prevention. It may also be true that whenprivate police are called upon to do justice, theyact in a less punishment-oriented way. Shearing,Stenning, and Braithwaite have all argued that pri-vate policing is more likely than public policingto act according to principles of restorative justice(Shearing and Stenning 1980; Braithwaite 1989).

We are arguing that changing the governance ofsecurity can affect the way in which justice is done.The converse may also be true: the way in whichjustice is done can affect the achievement of security(Bayley 1999). Restorative justice conferences seek

The mentality of private

policing is similar to that of

self-help by individuals: con-

ciliatory rather than penal,

emphasizing desistance

rather than punishment,

concerned with outcomes

more than rules, and speedy

rather than measured.

Chapter 4: Mentalities

19

to produce undertakings among all parties thatreduce the chances of reoffending. In the search forjustice locally understood and accepted, the confer-ences also engage in policing. The lesson is thatsecurity and justice are intimately, linked but notexclusively through punishment.

Dichotomizing the mentalities of public and privateproviders of policing is, of course, too simplistic. Weare not saying that all nongovernmental providers ofpolicing exhibit one mentality and all governmentalproviders another. Our analysis is heuristic, describ-ing the poles of a continuum along which the men-talities of policing can be arrayed. Private providersof policing are not always “warm and fuzzy” but canbehave punitively, illegally, and brutally. Conversely,governments are learning to incorporate some of thementalities of private policing. In the past 20 years,public police agencies throughout the world haveconsulted with communities about security needs,adapted their tactics to local circumstances, encour-aged neighborhoods to work cooperatively withthem, and proactively changed conditions that breeddanger, violence, and disorder (Bayley 1994; Skoganand Hartnett 1997). Similarly, they have used thecivil law to pressure landlords and other guardiansof private space to control access, evict disruptivepersons, improve physical conditions, and monitorbehavior. Called third-party policing, these practicesconform to a compliance model of policing similarto what private police do (Buerger and Mazerolle1998; Reiss 1987).

The public police have also begun to adopt a famil-iar technological tactic of private police: they areusing closed-circuit television to monitor behaviorin public places. Electronic patrolling has movedfrom banks, stores, and hotel lobbies to streets, parks,and transportation hubs. Television cameras nowmonitor traffic flow and can detect individualviolators of traffic regulations. By the mid-1990s inBritain, 550 closed-circuit television surveillanceprograms, involving more than 5,000 cameras, hadbeen approved by the Home Office (Blair 1998).

It is worth remarking that the mentalities associatedwith private policing may have been operating in onesector of government policing for many years; namely,the policing of military personnel. Military policeoperate in a controlled environment with a populationsubject to a host of disciplinary sanctions not availableto the public police. The study of military policing,long neglected, may provide valuable insights into theconditions required to institutionalize the mentalitiesof private policing in public policing.

Finally, public and private policing may be movingtoward a division of labor where the public policeincreasingly specialize in investigations and coun-terforce operations while private police becomedecentralized, full-service providers of visible crimeprevention. There are signs in Europe and Americathat this is occurring. For all the heartening signsthat public police are adopting community-orientedcrime prevention strategies, there are counterindica-tions that they are focusing more on threats to societyat large, such as drugs and terrorism, than on crimesdirected toward individuals; that law enforcement isthe tool of choice; that proactive undercover opera-tions are gaining in importance; and that militaryequipment and tactics are being used more often(Kraska 1996; Kraska and Cubellis 1997). Privatepolicing, by contrast, specializes in risk reduction,focuses on ordinary crime and disorder, stresses visi-bility and availability, seeks compliance rather thanpunishment, and eschews confrontational tactics. Ifthis division of labor were to become structured byclass, as is likely, with public policing for the poorand private policing for the rich, the consequencesfor social justice, equality before the law, and politi-cal stability would be serious (Bayley and Shearing1996).

Whether we are right or wrong about this trend,the point to underscore is that the connectionsbetween who authorizes policing, who provides it,and how it is done need to be studied. Not only maythey not be independent of one another, but theirdistribution socially has enormous political implica-tions for the future.

21

Explanations

Chapter 5

After a prolonged period in which nation-statesgradually monopolized policing, why have

groups outside the state undertaken to develop iton their own now? The research literature on polic-ing and the evolution of government offers manysuggestions and some agreement on a few majorfactors. We will describe these hypotheses and thenoffer some comments of our own.

Hypotheses The explanations suggested can be grouped intoseven major categories: government performance,crime, economics, political character, social rela-tions, ideas, and culture. These are discussed indeclining order of importance as reflected in theliterature reviewed.

Government PerformanceThe failure of government to provide adequatepolice protection is the reason most commonly citedfor today’s restructuring of policing(Sklansky 1999; Johnston 1992,1999). This explanation seemsintuitively correct but not veryinformative, because it would beirrational for people to concertedlyconstruct new forms of policingunless the existing system wasperceived to be inadequate. Morehelpfully, five hypotheses havebeen suggested about the particu-lar ways in which the actions of government haveled to policing’s reconstruction.

1. Faith in the public criminal justice system hasdeclined because it is perceived to be unableto punish criminals successfully because of a

growing number of procedural rules (Braithwaiteand Pettit 1990; Lunney 1989). Consequently,people doubt that it can be an effective deter-rent to crime (Packer 1968). This has increasedthe attractiveness of more locally focused pre-vention systems based on regulation, whereinformal constraint is more important than for-mal law (Reiss 1984). The ability of the policeto intervene in community life through premon-itory regulation has also been diminished inmany countries by the decriminalization of public-order offenses, such as loitering, panhandling,drinking in public, and lewdness.

2. Governments have become much more cost con-scious due to declining revenue and are thereforemore willing than in the past to share responsi-bility for crime control and other functions withprivate auspices (Shearing and Stenning 1980).For example, local governments in Britain andthe Netherlands have tried to reduce the costof policing by creating city watches and guards

(Blair 1998). The Chief Constableof West Yorkshire even proposedin 1994 to create his own securityforce of Special Constables thatwould compete with private securi-ty companies. In Australia, a com-mittee on workforce reform in NewSouth Wales suggested that thepolice hire “Career Constables” onshort-term contracts at low rates ofpay and minimal training to per-

form general patrolling and emergency response(Anonymous 1998).

Governments around the world have reducedthe functions their police are expected to per-form (load shedding). In Britain, for example,

The failure of government

to provide adequate police

protection is the reason most

commonly cited for today’s

restructuring of policing.

Chapter 5: Explanations

22

there have been several major reviews of policeresponsibilities during the last decade, all rec-ommending a reduction (Home Office 1995;Sheehy Committee 1993; Cassels Committee1996). The Home Office Review of Police Coreand Ancillary Tasks (1995) recommended givingup 26 functions.

Cost-consciousness also accounts for the rapidpace of civilianization over the past few yearsand for the hiring of private contractors (out-sourcing) to perform tasks that were previouslypolice functions, such as prisoner transport andradio dispatch.

3. The development of the professional policemodel in the 20th century narrowed the focusof public policing, disconnected it from commu-nities, and weakened its ability to reduce riskand prevent crime (Kelling and Moore 1988;Kelling and Coles 1996; Goldstein 1990). Ordermaintenance gave way to crimefighting, mean-ing preoccupation with the investigation andpunishment of criminals; deterrence replacedinformal regulation (Kelling and Moore 1988;Monkkonen 1981). The separation betweenpolice and their communities was further inten-sified by the professionalization of social services,notably social work, psychological counseling,and family mediation. Police officers no longerare engaged in community-based crime preven-tion; they became specialists in law enforce-ment. The movement to remake public policingthrough community policing in the past 20 yearsexplicitly recognizes these defects in publicpolicing.

4. The public police are increasingly perceived tobe corrupt, brutal, and unreliable, especially inless developed countries. People would rathertake security into their own hands than trustdiscredited government police. This perceptionhas grown in part as a result of the “democrati-zation” of previously repressive governments

that followed the collapse of the Communistbloc. Stories about official misconduct that wereonce suppressed are now more freely publicized.

5. Businesses, especially in North America, havefelt a growing need to decrease the financial riskof being sued for failing to adequately protecttheir employees or customers. Concerned aboutlegal liability, they created police forces thatwould focus exclusively on reducing risk tothemselves (Sklansky 1999).

CrimeCrime has risen sharply in the past 40 years andwith it the public’s fear of crime (Prenzler and Sarre1998). This fear has been magnified by what are per-ceived to be new criminal threats in some countries,such as kidnaping of businessmen and their familiesin Latin America and international terrorism in theUnited States. The world is in a “moral panic” aboutcrime (Johnston 1992; Caldeira 1996). This moralpanic may be part of the constellation of forces thatare leading to the very police restructuring that it ishelping to bring about.

First, with the growth of market capitalism aroundthe world, the media have become increasinglycommercialized and free of governmental control.Knowing that crime sells, worldwide media conglom-erates exaggerate the threat of crime by highlightingthe most sensational crimes wherever they occur(Chermak 1995).

Second, increasing competition in the policing mar-ket leads all providers, public and private, to exag-gerate the danger from criminal activity. In this waythe restructuring of policing becomes self-reinforcingafter a certain threshold has been reached.

Third, the more people are mobilized to protectthemselves, the greater their fear. Protective activity,such as installing burglar and car alarms, heightensrather than allays fear. In effect, supplying protectionincreases the demand for it (Loader 1997a).


23

For all these reasons, the public’s expectations aboutwhat constitutes reasonable security have risen. Butpeople are also convinced that risk can be reduced.They believe what providers tell them—crime canbe controlled, if only policing is done right, whichmeans by nongovernmental agencies.

EconomicsThree hypotheses have been put forward under thisheading.

Commercialized policing. Policing has becomeincreasingly “commodified,” a service to be boughtand sold, due to the expansion of free-enterpriseeconomic systems internationally (Sklansky 1999;Kaplan 1998; Johnston 1999). It should be notedthat this hypothesis applies to only one sector of therestructuring phenomenon; namely, commercial,for-profit policing. Moreover, it is not clear why theexistence of markets creates the commercializationof policing specifically. To be sure, without marketsthere would be no commodification. But policinghas not always been as commodified as it currentlyis, even in market economies.

Mass private property. A particular form of proper-ty, namely, “mass private property,” that has expand-ed in the past half-century requires a different sort ofpolicing (Shearing and Stenning 1981). When pri-vate entrepreneurs expand facilities to which thepublic has access, such as shopping malls, large retailstores, cinemas, and sports complexes, the responsi-bility of owners to provide security grows, especiallyin an environment of legal liability. In this setting itis more important for policing to manage risk thanto assign blame.

Drawing on the work of Spitzer and Scull, Shearingand Stenning have generated a larger principle:Nongovernmental policing expands regardless of thenature of the economic system as the size of land-holdings in private hands increases, whether it befeudal manors, industrial towns, or mass-publicaccommodations (Spitzer and Scull 1977b; Shearing

and Stenning 1981). Private policing grows as theproportion of private landholdings accessible to thepublic grows. It has been suggested that the mass pri-vate property hypothesis is especially relevant to theNorth American context, where its growth has beenmost extensive. Some think that this account is lessapplicable to Britain and Western Europe wherethere is a greater tradition of public ownership ofspace (Jones and Newburn 1999). At the same time,mass private property continues to expand in tan-dem with new forms of policing in many developedcountries, notably those of Latin America and SouthAsia, suggesting that the explanatory power of themass private property hypothesis extends beyond theNorth American context (Caldeira 1996; Nalla1998).

We will not pass judgment on the validity of thisexplanatory account pending further empiricalresearch into the expansion of mass private propertyglobally. It may be that Britain and WesternEurope—where it has been suggested that the massprivate property principle may not hold—are theaberrations in the broader global context.

Economic development. Economic developmentincreases criminal opportunities with respect toproperty crime, such as theft, robbery, and burglary,because personal property becomes more valuableas well as portable (Clarke 1997; Cohen and Felson1979; Prenzler and Sarre 1998). Furthermore,because economic development distributes thesegoods more widely in the population, the conscious-ness of risk and the need for protection becomesmore generalized.

Although we have not seen this argued as an expla-nation for restructuring, economic development isalso known to raise expectations, which may in turnhave the effect of intensifying dissatisfaction arisingout of inequalities of wealth and opportunity. Aspeople become less content with less, they maybecome less willing to accept the rules of what theyperceive to be an unjust society. Thus economic


24

development increases both the quantity of goodsto be readily stolen and the number of potentialproperty criminals.

Political CharacterThe expansion of democracy globally facilitates restruc-turing (Cerny 1995; Drainville 1995; McMichael 1996;Slaughter 1997). Democratic governments can accom-modate diverse centers of power, whereas authoritarianregimes cannot. Democratization facilitates restructur-ing by providing political space into which it can grow.As political pluralism increases, so too do the auspicesthat want to share responsibility for policing.

Social RelationsWe found three hypotheses that explained therestructuring of policing in terms of changes inlarge-scale features of social organization.

Social complexity. As societiesbecome more complex, so too dothe security needs of their people.Complexity refers to increasedspecialization in the roles peopleplay as well as the spatial disper-sion of these roles (Durkheim1973; Elias and Boulding 1996;Jervis 1997). Social complexityalso multiplies the number ofinterest-based communities, whichthen become potential auspicesfor constructing security on behalfof their members. Furthermore, ifsocial complexity, especially theseparation of work from residence,decreases the willingness of peopleto exert informal social control,what Cohen and Felson refer to as“guardianship,” then crime and disorder increase aswell, outpacing the capacities of the public police(Cohen and Felson 1979; Jacobs 1962). It would benatural in these circumstances for people to use theinterest communities they inhabit to provide security.

Modernization. Modernization of societies leads toa decline in the authority of primary social groupssuch as families, residential communities, and occu-pations (Nisbet 1969, 1975; Tonnies 1957; Wirth1938). This leads to rising crime and disorder(Caldeira 1996; Rodriguez and Winchester 1996). Ifgovernments are unable to meet public expectationsabout protection, people will look for other auspicesto take responsibility. In capitalist societies, marketsprovide one solution by commodifying security.People buy what they need when they can afford todo so. Commodified security replaces what LouisWirth called the “little platoons” of traditional socialcontrol (Wirth 1938).

Social heterogeneity. Social heterogeneity withinnation-states leads to the restructuring of policingwhen constituent groups, both economic and ascrip-tive, lose faith in the willingness or ability of gov-ernment to protect them. This development is

almost inevitable if people believethat they have been denied rights,among them adequate physical pro-tection, because of their communalaffiliation. The restructuring ofpolicing on the basis of identitycan be benign, enhancing safetywhere it was problematic, but it isinherently dangerous. Visible actsof communal self-protection oftenpolarize social relations. Politicalcompromise becomes increasinglydifficult, the ability of governmentto perform declines, and peopletake policing into their own handsfor what they feel are righteous reasons.

In a less dramatic way, restructuringmay also increase when democratic countries val-orize minority norms and practices out of respect for“diversity.” To protect cultural heritages, groups mayclaim from nation-states the ability to determinewhat is enforceable as right and wrong. On one

If governments are unable to

meet public expectations

about protection, people

will look for other auspices

to take responsibility. In

capitalist societies, markets

provide one solution by com-

modifying security. People

buy what they need when

they can afford to do so.


25

hand, they may disagree with the majoritarian moralconsensus about, for example, matters of dress or pre-ventive medicine. In this case, they want govern-ment policing to be looser. On the other hand, theymay define security more narrowly than government,wanting it to embody communal morality, for exam-ple, about contact between the sexes. They may feelthat the criminal law is too permissive; they wantpolicing to be tighter but under their control.

Whether based upon interest or identity, communi-ties are simultaneously sources of social cohesion andfragmentation, of discipline and disruption. The wayin which security is organized is both a reflection ofthe structure of societies and a determinant of it.

Ideas Ideas about government and crime have been citedas contributors to restructuring because circum-stances alone do not determine the nature of polic-ing. How people think about things constrains whatcan be done.

Markets as a cost-effective alternative. During the1980s, the idea became popular, especially in devel-oped democracies, that governments were inherentlyless efficient than private auspices in providing serv-ices. In particular, markets were accepted by manypeople as a cost-effective alternative to government.As a result, public policing’s loss of market sharewas viewed not as a threat to public safety but as asensible response to proven inadequacy. Intellectualsupport for the marketizing of policing came fromseveral sources. The influential economist FrederickHayek argued that government bureaucracies, espe-cially national ones, were less efficient than marketsbecause they could not take advantage of localknowledge (Hayek 1989). Macrosocial policies ofearlier periods, such as the New Deal, were criticizedas being too generic and therefore unable to adapt tovariations in circumstances across countries. Socialproblems were best solved by individuals workingtogether in small arenas (Murray 1988; Osborneand Gaebler 1993). Local knowledge was essentialbecause governing should be done, in Burchell’s fine

phrase, “in accordance with the grain of things”(Burchell 199l).

The communitarian movement also provided anidea that encouraged the restructuring of policing.Communitarians argued, as conservatives did, thatgovernment was too remote and impersonal to meetthe needs of diverse communities (Etzioni 1983,1993, 1996). Their solution, however, did notinvolve economic markets. Instead, they urged gov-ernment to formally devolve responsibilities uponneighborhoods and communities so that its activitiescould be more closely supervised and directed byclients and stakeholders. Government would becomemore effective not by transcending government, butby allowing local communities to assume moreresponsibility for their own well-being.

In sum, powerful intellectual voices, both conserva-tive and liberal, have called for the devolution ofgovernment services to new auspices—markets inone case, local communities in the other. Policing isone of several functions to which these analyses canbe applied.

Recognizing the changed political climate, the pub-lic police responded with well-publicized schemesto demonstrate that they too were responsive tolocal communities and giving “value for money.”Community partnerships became very popular, as didcommunity policing. “Accountability” and “effective-ness” were watchwords, exemplified by performanceaudits in Australia, citizens’ charters in Britain, andCOMPSTAT in the United States.

Local knowledge. Independently of both Hayekiansand communitarians, criminologists and policereformers discovered during the 1970s and 1980sthat local knowledge was a neglected resource inpolicing. It was needed to specify and prioritizesecurity needs (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990;Goldstein 1990), to diagnose problems (Goldstein1990), to implement remedies (Bayley 1994; Goldstein1990), and to render justice in acceptable terms(Braithwaite 1989). Localizing policing is the basis


26

of community- and problem-oriented policing aswell as of restorative justice. They are arguably themost important, certainly the most coherent, reformphilosophies to be developed in policing during thepast half-century.

CultureWhether societies are individualistic or communi-tarian in culture may affect the way they providepolicing (Bayley 1985b). Although both sorts ofcultures may restructure policing,the form that it takes will differ.Individualistic societies are morelikely to restructure through com-mercial markets, communitariansocieties through community-based mobilization (Bayley 1999).

DiscussionReflecting on the range of expla-nations that have been put for-ward to explain the currentrestructuring of policing, it isapparent that there has been moreconjecture than science in theseofferings. Reasoning has generallybeen a priori, although oftengrounded in sound descriptionsof trends. But the connectionsbetween these trends and policinghave been assumed rather thandemonstrated.

We offer three observations aboutthe processes that have broughtabout the current reconstructionof security.

First, it appears to be unlikely that a single explana-tion for the phenomenon will be found. At the sametime, because restructuring seems to be global, theremay be a small number of generic factors contribut-ing to it throughout the world. Three that may be

playing a role almost everywhere are (1) fear ofcrime, (2) marketization of economies, and (3) thepassing of a critical threshold in the creation of com-mercial multinational security companies. The firsttwo points have already been discussed. With respectto the third, we are suggesting that after the com-mercial security industry reaches a certain size, itcreates continuing demand for policing throughenhancement of fear, emulation among consumers,and presumptive protection against liability.

Second, the reconstruction ofpolicing may occur as the result ofsmall changes in many differentsocial arenas. Borrowing fromKuhn and Gould, the restructuringof policing may represent a paradig-matic shift in social organizationthat is not connected to any singlefactor (Kuhn 1962; Gould 1996).Small and essentially fortuitouschanges in many places may haveproduced a qualitative “phase”change in policing that could nothave been predicted from changesin any one of them. In complicatedprocesses of social change, thewhole may be greater than the sumof its parts.

Third, multilateralization evolvesalong different paths using differentinstitutions and displays differentmentalities depending on the rela-tive power of governments, groups,and individuals. Countries willvary in the trajectories they followto restructuring. In the Westerndemocracies, national governments

monopolized policing during the 18th, 19th, and20th centuries at the expense of subordinate groups.Policing was nationalized, increasingly constructedfrom the top down. In the 20th century, these samedemocratic governments made policing available

The restructuring of policing

may represent a paradigmatic

shift in social organization

that is not connected to any

single factor. Small and

essentially fortuitous changes

in many places may have

produced a qualitative

“phase” change in policing

that could not have been

predicted from changes in

any one of them. In compli-

cated processes of social

change, the whole may be

greater than the sum

of its parts.


27

to individuals through the creation of emergency-response systems. Indeed, legitimate self-help waslimited to calling 911 or its equivalent. In this way,democratic governments made the public policeserve the interests of disaggregate individuals. Laterin the century, however, democratic governmentsbecame concerned that the police were not as effec-tive in controlling crime as the public wanted.Acting on the insight that local knowledge andresources were essential to effective crime control,the police encouraged residential and interest groupsto share policing responsibility with them. Thiswas community policing, and it devolved policingauthority from the government to nongovernmentalgroups. At the same time, nongovernmental groupsthemselves in many countries took advantage ofmarket opportunities to hire their own police.This evolutionary trajectory produced policing thatresponded to collective needs represented by non-governmental groups and mediated through eithermarkets or voluntary organizations. In communitari-an countries such as Japan, however, policing hasalways relied more upon nongovernmental struc-tures, such as families, neighborhoods, and work-places, to assist the government in maintainingsocial order (Bayley 1991). At the end of the 20th

century, therefore, they had less need to commer-cialize policing than Western countries, althoughnonstate groups were free to use markets if theychose to do so.

In authoritarian countries, policing is controlled bygovernment and its primary objective is always theprotection of the regime. Authoritarian states tryhard to maintain their monopoly on policing anddiscourage groups from acting as either auspices orproviders of policing. They too, however, recognizethat effective crime control requires assistance fromthe public. They obtain it through mobilizing groups,just as democratic governments do, but not by allow-ing them to participate in markets. They mobilizelocal knowledge and resources through cooptingdirection. This trajectory produces the pretense ofmultilateralization and a style of policing that is pre-occupied with threats to governments rather thanto individuals.

Although we believe that policing is being restruc-tured around the world, the extent and form of therestructuring depend on local history and circum-stances, in particular on the trajectory by whichpolicing is already developing. Locality matters,even to generic trends such as restructuring.

29

The Role of Government

Chapter 6

The contemporary transformation of policing islike Topsy in Uncle Tom’s Cabin—without any-

one paying attention, “it just growed” (Stowe 1852).But Topsy is no longer a beguiling adolescent; she hasbecome a giant that many find menacing (Forst andManning forthcoming; Loader 1997b; Grabosky 1996;Johnston 1992). Peter Manning, for example, says:

[T]he essence of the economic/free marketparadigm, or extracting fees and profit fromhuman misery and commodified needs, isinconsistent with the police mandate, thenature of collective goods and their distribu-tion, and in some sense the moral bases ofcollective solidarity and trust that as yet bindus. (Forst and Manning forthcoming)

Echoing our concern with a growing dualistic divi-sion of labor between the public and private sectors,Rod Morgan observes:

At present there seems to be a danger thatwe may end up with the worst of all possibleworlds: increasingly large and centralized policeservices with ever-growing powers, alongsidethe anarchic emergence of unregulated self-helpand private “police” or “security” services in thehands of sectional local interests. (Morgan 1994)

Among people who have noticed that policing isbeing changed dramatically, questions are beingasked about whether the change is good or bad.And if it is bad, what should be done about it? Forexample, should government supervise what is occur-ring? Should nongovernmental police agencies bemade publicly accountable in the way that publicpolice agencies are? Can government regulate non-governmental policing without stifling its creativity

and efficiency? Can government regulate nongovern-mental policing in the public interest when its ownbureaucracies have a vested interest in preservingtheir monopoly? Should government encourage therestructuring of policing, especially for populationsunderserved by existing security arrangements? Canit do so constructively without losing the very bene-fits that restructuring promises? In short, what is therole of government in a restructuring of policing thatis changing the governance of security?

Not surprisingly, this report does not try to answerthese questions. Too little is known at this timeabout restructuring itself, and still less is knownabout the effect of alternative regulatory regimesupon it. There are many opinions about the role ofgovernment, but they tend, with a few exceptions,to be general and philosophical rather than pointedand programmatic.

What the report can do, however, is explore thekinds of public interests that governments should beconcerned about as the transformation continues.Although we are unsure about the balance thatshould ultimately be struck between governmentaland nongovernmental policing, especially because ofthe hybrid nature of contemporary policing, we willsuggest functions that government should retainwith respect to policing.

The Public Interestsof PolicingThree public interests must continue to be served asthe governance of security is transformed: justice,equality of protection, and quality of service.

Chapter 6: The Role of Government

30

JusticeAs with the public police, nongovernmentalproviders may violate the law and behave in illegalways. For example, private security personnel havedenied access on the basis of race, engaged in indus-trial espionage, and forcibly bro-ken the picket lines of strikingworkers. They have harassedhomeless people in an effort to“clean up” neighborhoods andused excessive force in maintain-ing order in bars and sports ven-ues. They have violated theprivacy of individuals by obtainingand acting on privileged informa-tion obtained from the police.Moreover, it is not just commer-cial security agents that engage insuch practices. Community-basedproviders of policing have discrim-inated against residents or over-reached legally (Owens 1997;Ross, Smith, and Pritt 1996;Smith et al. 1997). One mustnever forget that the substitutionof policing by states for policingby communities was an importantfactor in the liberation of workers,women, and minority groups fromlocal, often customary, tyrannies.

The leverage that governmentshave over such behavior varies from country tocountry. Some countries protect human rights withlaws; others do not. Some countries value humanrights so highly they write them into constitutionsand other fundamental laws, creating judiciallyenforceable standards to which all actions of govern-ment must conform. This is true, for example, in theUnited States where nongovernmental police areviewed as private persons under contract to performa particular service. As such, they may be heldaccountable for wrongful acts under criminal, civil,

and contract law. They enjoy none of the immuni-ties allowed the public police (Sklansky 1999).

Equality of Protection No service of government is more fundamental than

protecting people’s bodies and pos-sessions. Indeed, the relationshipbetween personal security and gov-ernment is tautological: if peopleare not provided with protection atsome minimal level, government isnot considered to exist. Anarchy isthe absence of enforced public safe-ty. Public safety in democracies isconsidered a public good—an obli-gation of government to all.

Restructuring policing throughmarkets distorts the distribution ofsecurity in favor of those who canafford it; restructuring policingthrough voluntary mobilization dis-torts it in favor of those who arecreative and committed enough toorganize it in kind. The formerruns the risk of creating a dualisticsystem of policing where the poorare protected by the public policeoperating with a deterrent, law-enforcement mentality and therich are protected by private policeusing a more consumer-responsive,

regulatory mentality (Bayley and Shearing 1996;Braithwaite forthcoming).

According to Sam Walker, this is not a new problemfor the United States—the rich have always beenprotected better and less punitively than the poor(Walker 1975). In the past several decades, variouslevels of American government have sponsoredvoluntary neighborhood policing precisely to makepolicing more effective and more acceptable to inse-cure inner-city populations. As Patrick V. Murphy,former Commissioner of Police of New York City,

If the distribution of policing

coincides with structural

divisions of race and class,

the legitimacy of government

itself may be jeopardized.

People may be encouraged

not only to take the law into

their own hands for their

private protection but also to

defy law associated with

unresponsive government.

Societies that fail to pay

attention to the distribution

of security are playing with

dynamite blindfolded.


31

has observed, “Community policing is private polic-ing for the poor” (private communication).

If the distribution of policing coincides with struc-tural divisions of race and class, the legitimacy ofgovernment itself may be jeopardized. People maybe encouraged not only to take the law into theirown hands for their private protection but also todefy law associated with unresponsive government.Societies that fail to pay attention to the distributionof security are playing with dynamite blindfolded.

With the growth of market-based policing, there isalways the danger that affluent people will becomeless willing to support public policing on the argu-ment that they are paying twice for the same service.Robert Reich refers to this as the “secession of thesuccessful,” which is already occurring in the field ofpublic education (Herrnstein and Murray 1994).

Assuming that multilateralization skews the distribu-tion of security, what can be done about it and bywhom? Even in countries where safety is regarded asa fundamental right, it may not be enforceable inlaw. In the United States, for example, the courtshave determined that minimal levels of security arenot guaranteed under the Constitution (Sklansky1999). Nor is government liable for civil damages ifit neglects to provide adequate protection, except ina few limited circumstances (Sklansky 1999).1

The danger arising out of an unequal distribution ofpublic security has been considered so serious andso imminent that one British chief constable hasproposed that all police providers should be made“police compliant,” meaning that their servicesshould be supervised and coordinated by the publicpolice (Blair 1998). Policing should remain a publicgood whose distribution cannot be distorted by com-modification. The public police, he argues, “shouldput itself forward, first, as the central point forinteragency cooperation designed to strengthencommunities and, secondly, as the center point of acoordinated system of patrol services, carried out bya mixture of police, volunteer, local authority and

private sources” (Blair 1998). In other words, gov-ernment may share policing, but it should not sharethe responsibility for it.

The rationale of devolving the practice of policingto multiple auspices and providers while maintainingultimate responsibility for the equitable distributionof its benefits—safety and security—underlies therecent proposals for the renewal of policing inNorthern Ireland (Independent Commission onPolicing for Northern Ireland 1999). Specifically, theproposals call for the creation of a Policing Boardthat is responsible for regulating the activity of allthe agencies involved in the multilateral process ofgoverning security and not simply the activities ofthe public police.

A question of national sovereignty also arises inconnection with the restructuring of policing.Because commercial security is sometimes providedby multinational corporations, the distribution ofsecurity within countries is shaped partially by deci-sions made abroad (Shearing and Stenning 1981).In some countries, it can fairly be argued that for-eigners working for large multinational corporationsare better protected than locals. It is one thing forgovernment to cede policing control to domesticnongovernmental auspices and quite another tocede it to offshore interests.

Quality of ServiceNongovernmental police agencies may fail to providethe service promised. With commercial providers,competition in the marketplace should be the correc-tive. But this does not always happen. Caveat emptoris an empty admonition if information is not avail-able to consumers about the relative quality of theservice they are receiving. Voluntary neighborhood-based security programs, too, may not work as expect-ed, serving instead the interests of a self-perpetuatingfew (Crawford 1995).

Nongovernment police, like public police, also engagein questionable, even reckless, practices. For example,


32

Braithwaite and Grabosky 1986). Regulation maybe done, for example, through command regulationwith nondiscretionary punishment, command regu-lation with discretionary punishment, enforced self-regulation, and voluntary self-regulation (Ayres andBraithwaite 1992). One size does not fit all regula-tory problems, and both regulatory efficacy and reg-ulatory costs vary with the choices made.

AuditingIf the public interests of justice, equality of protec-tion, and quality of service are to be safeguarded,

government must audit what secu-rity agencies provide and monitorwhat is going on in a systematicway. Government must use thisinformation to evaluate the distri-bution of security provided byvarious combinations of providers.This requires the development of acapacity that governments current-ly do not have, namely the capaci-ty to evaluate the relative qualityof police protection throughout itsterritory and across social classesand divisions. The intellectual aswell as the administrative problems

in doing this are daunting and require the collabora-tive effort of social scientists, lawyers, and specialistsin public administration.

FacilitationProviding equitable security imposes an additionaland very difficult obligation upon governments.They must learn to mix and match policing services,which means they must learn how to facilitate thegrowth of different kinds of policing. As PeterGrabosky has said:

Whether it is the public or private sectorwhich carries law enforcement has become amisplaced question. One must now inquirewhat institutional form, or what blend of

a private security firm in Australia offered a sophis-ticated course in installing burglar alarms that wastaken by known armed robbers wanting to learnhow to bypass electronic systems (Anonymous1998). Private police have endangered the publicin shootouts with would-be kidnapers and hijackers.They have been widely criticized for inadequatelytraining personnel; supervision may also be lax. SomeAmerican companies have hired illegal aliens; othershave failed to discipline employees who drink onduty (New York Times 1995). Finally, security com-panies may misrepresent their services, deliveringmuch less than promised.

The point to this enumeration ofpublic interests that endure in thenew policing—justice, equality ofprotection, and quality of service—is that multilateralization affectsnot only the governance of securi-ty; it also affects the security ofgovernance. Unless these interestsare protected, the legitimacy ofgovernment itself may be affected.Security is both a subject of gover-nance and a requisite for it. Thepublic interest in policing enduresdespite restructuring. The impor-tant question is: How can it be safeguarded?

DiscussionFrom our survey of writing about accountability, weconclude that the public interest in policing can beprotected if government retains three functions—regulating, auditing, and facilitating.

RegulationRegulation comes in many forms. It involves morethan enacting rules and punishing people for failingto abide by them. John Braithwaite and his col-leagues have given a nuanced discussion of regula-tory modalities (Ayers and Braithwaite 1992;

If the public interests of justice,

equality of protection, and

quality of service are to be

safeguarded, government

must audit what security

agencies provide and monitor

what is going on in a

systematic way.


33

institutional forms, is best suited to a given task.The design and guidance of hybrid law enforce-ment systems is an essential task of governmentin the next century. (Grabosky 1996)

Governments have many instru-ments for mixing and matchingforms of policing: subsidies, enti-tlements and incentives (such astax rebates), mandated coordina-tion, cooperative support, con-tracting out, delegation, andabdication of responsibility(Grabosky 1996; Bayley 1999;Prenzler and Sarre 1998). We needto know more about the costs andbenefits of these mechanisms.Governments seem generous andresponsive, for instance, whenthey talk about forming “partner-ships” with nonstate police aus-pices and providers, but theirassistance may be more stultifyingthan encouraging. Partnershipscan be a clever way of staying incharge (Johnston 1999; Crawford1995; Cruikshank 1999; Lacey andZedner 1998; Fu 1993; Hou and Sheu 1994). Forgovernments to become effective at diversifyingpolicing appropriately, police policymakers need tostudy the record of government facilitation in otherarenas, such as education, irrigation, communica-tions, and electrical power (Ostrom 1990).

ConclusionGiven the fragmentary nature of current knowledgeabout the restructuring of policing, we cannot approveor disapprove of it in principle. Its advantages and

disadvantages depend on socialconditions, combinations of aus-pices and providers, the nature ofcriminal threats, and the feasibilityof alternatives. We discount,therefore, the apocalyptic visionsof restructuring, although weacknowledge the dangers to free-dom in any form of policing.Vigilance will be the price of liber-ty, as Thomas Jefferson said, in thefuture as in the past. For this rea-son we also discount the view thatrestructuring will generate newforms of accountability on its own.It may, but governments as weknow them are the only institu-tions that have the authority andcapacity to make this determina-tion and take corrective actionas required.

Note1. The courts have denied tort liability on threegrounds: (1) they do not have the ability to makejudgments about the adequacy of protection; (2) thelaw provides no justiciable standards; and (3) ade-quate redress exists through the political system(Sklansky 1999).

Given the fragmentary

nature of current knowledge

about the restructuring of

policing, we cannot approve

or disapprove of it in prin-

ciple. Its advantages and dis-

advantages depend on social

conditions, combinations of

auspices and providers, the

nature of criminal threats,

and the feasibility of

alternatives.

35

Research Agenda

Chapter 7

The current transformation of policing has notyet attracted the sustained scholarly attention it

deserves. Although researchers have nibbled aroundthe edges of the topic, the extent, nature, andimpact of police restructuring have yet to be deter-mined. Based upon our survey of published researchand thought and our understanding of what is hap-pening, we have constructed the following researchagenda. These are the questions, grouped into fourcategories, that most urgently require study:

1. Foundational description: What is happeningto policing?

2. Social impact: What effect is restructuringhaving on justice, equality of protection, andquality of service?

3. Government policy: What is government doingand with what effect?

4. Causation: What factors are shaping the recon-struction of policing and government’s relationto it?

FoundationalDescription

1. Who is constructing and delivering policingin the modern world? Answering this requiresmore than counting public and private cops. Itrequires determining the people responsible forpublic safety (the auspices of policing). Becausesecurity regimes vary across time and space, theresearch needs to be conducted comparatively,which requires that researchers employ a com-mon format for describing what is happening.

Two approaches might be taken in answering thisquestion. First, people in different places could beasked to identify the entity they expect to pro-vide protection. Who are the frontline providersof policing locally, and who is responsible forthem? Second, maps could be constructed show-ing the amount of time a cross-section of peopleinhabit various locations in the course of a nor-mal day/week/month and what the security aus-pices and providers are in each.

2. How many nongovernmental providers of polic-ing, both voluntary and commercial, are there,what do they do, how much do they cost, andwhom do they serve?

3. How have the public police adapted to restruc-turing? Are the nature and scope of publicpolicing changing? Are its functions increasingor decreasing? Are public police defining theirresponsibilities differently than in the past? Havethey changed their geographical deployment asa result of the growth of private security?

4. How do governmental and nongovernmentalpolicing agents interact in the field? In otherwords, what is the interface between auspicesof both kinds and providers of both kinds? Dothey ignore, hinder, or help one another? Dothey plan together, coordinate operations, orexchange information?

5. To what extent is public policing being com-modified; that is, being made available to privateinterests for money?

6. Do different providers of policing take differentoperational approaches when performing the

Chapter 7: Research Agenda

36

same task? In our terminology, do mentalitiesdiffer among providers of security? An importantsource of information would be public policeofficers who have worked for commercial securi-ty companies. They would be asked what theyfind different in operations and managementbetween public and private police agencies.

7. With respect to the commercial security indus-try, several questions need answering:

a. How many companies are there? How manypeople do they employ? Whom do they workfor? How much does this form of policing cost?

b. What is the degree of industrial concentrationin the private security industry?

c. Do the activities of multinational securitycompanies vary from country to country? Howmuch central direction is exerted by multina-tional companies over the operations of localproviders?

Social Impact1. How effective are the different auspices/providers

of security? Especially, has restructuring producedgreater or less public safety and for whom? Thiscould be studied cross-sectionally, comparingplaces with different mixes of policing, or longitu-dinally, examining changes in criminality and dis-order before and after a major shift in the natureof policing in a particular place. In both cases,great care must be taken in describing the natureof the policing mixes.

In this connection, it is curious that no one, toour knowledge, has suggested that the recent,much-publicized decline in crime in the UnitedStates might be due to the growth of nonstatepolicing, especially in its commercial form.Criminologists have attributed the decrease tochanges in demographics, crime patterns, guncrime, and police numbers and tactics. Thereare four reasons the restructuring of policing mayhave played a role.

a. Multilateralization may have produced a morevisible police presence. Cumulatively, the visi-bility of police has grown dramatically overthe past decade.

b. Crime may be reported less to the publicpolice and more to the private police, reducingits chances of becoming an official statistic.

c. More people may be living, working, buying,and playing in environments regulated bynongovernmental police; hence, the opportu-nities for crime have decreased.

d. Formerly disadvantaged social groups, amongwhom crime is likely to be high, may be moreintensively policed by either voluntary associ-ations or public police redeployed away fromareas covered by commercial security.

2. Who gains and loses in terms of public safetyas a result of the reconstruction of policing? Inother words, has the distribution of securitychanged as the result of restructuring? For exam-ple, Ian Loader (1997b) has suggested that mul-tilateralization will displace crime from privateto public spaces. This critical question is difficultto answer because it requires the construction ofa test for the quantity of security. Public opinionsurveys as well as official measures of crime anddisorder could be used.

3. Does restructuring cause a decline in support forpublic policing among privileged groups, Reich’s“secession of the successful” (Murray 1988)? Arepeople who are covered by commercial policeprotection less likely to support public expendi-tures for policing?

4. Are the rights of individuals more or less at riskwhen policing is provided by nonstate ratherthan state auspices/providers? Do violations ofrights vary according to the nature of the polic-ing? Generally, do the forms of misbehavior varywith the type of policing?


37

5. Are nonstate providers of policing more or lessaccountable than state police? This question hastwo dimensions. First: How effective is the over-sight of the group that has instigated the non-governmental policing? For example, do theypay close or only episodic attention? Are therewell-understood ways of bringing problems totheir attention? Second: Whose interests are rep-resented in the operations of the new police? Forexample, are some people being policed withoutrepresentation in the accountable body?

6. To what extent do community-based justice sys-tems, such as mediation and restorative-justiceconferences, enhance security through the under-takings they develop among participants?

Government Policy1. What are the variations in legal conditions

within which restructuring occurs from countryto country? What is legally allowed and notallowed?

2. What aspects of nonstate policing are regulatedby governments and in what ways? What aspectsdo governments think require more regulatoryattention?

3. In what ways are nongovernmental providers ofsecurity held accountable for violations of laws,human rights, and contracts?

4. What is the relative effectiveness of differentmechanisms in achieving accountability? InAustralia, for example, Prenzler and Sarre(1998) say, “To date, there have been no con-trolled studies of expanded legislation to test theimpact of new requirements.”

5. How have the public police responded compara-tively across countries to the growth of nonstatepolicing? It seems that some have been indiffer-ent, others hostile, a few cooperative, and someco-opting.

6. What regulations do governments have for man-aging the relationship between public and pri-vate police, for example, with respect to sharinginformation, using facilities, reporting crime,making arrests, submitting cases for prosecution,and employing personnel?

Causation1. What factors account for the growth of nonstate

policing? In addition to the customary approachof correlating changes in policing with othermeasurable social factors, it might be useful toask people what motivated them to create alter-native auspices of policing or to seek other sup-pliers of policing.

Historical research would also be important indetermining the evolutionary paths followed bydifferent countries with respect to the auspicesand providers of policing. Chronological com-parison of the changes in policing among coun-tries will reveal likely determinants.

2. What governmental regulations facilitate orretard the development of nonstate policing?

3. What factors explain differences in the types ofregulations and legal environments countrieshave developed with respect to nonstate policing?

4. If operational mentalities differ among police, aswe believe, what accounts for them? There areseveral possibilities: the nature of the tasks theyare assigned, the conditions in which they work,the directions given by sponsoring auspices, andtheir in-house professional experience.

5. Can governments manipulate the conditionsrequired for the successful development of (a)security markets (commodified security) and (b)cooperative security auspices (community-basedsecurity)? What should government do and notdo? To this end, it would be useful to study


38

government’s experience with restructuring inother dimensions of social policy as well, suchas housing, irrigation, and education.

ConclusionIt may not be easy to marshal the kind of sustainedintellectual attention that current developments inpolicing deserve and that our agenda calls for. Thereare three reasons for this.

First, criminal justice education and scholarshipfocus almost exclusively on institutions of govern-ment. Governments are its main supporters, practi-tioners its primary clientele, and state agencies themain employers of its students. Perhaps this wasinevitable in a field that grew out of the perceptionthat research about the activity and effectiveness ofthe institutions of crime control was being neglectedby traditional criminology. Criminal justice educa-tion and research thereby tied itself to the chariotwheel of the state and it remains so today.

Second, criminal justice scholarship is more con-cerned with institutional effectiveness than with insti-tutional evolution. This, too, reflects its concern withpublic—meaning government—policy. For criminaljustice social scientists, institutional variation is stud-ied to determine the relative effectiveness of different

policies, but not, except for a handful of researchers,to account for the variety itself. American historianshave done better than social scientists in this regard,and for a simple reason. Because they are concernedwith changes over time, their research does not takeinstitutional forms as givens.

Third, American criminal justice scholarship isparochial and not internationally comparative. Inpart, this reflects its preoccupation with efficacy.Americans generally assume that policies that workin one country will not work in another owing todifferences in social setting, culture, and history.They believe that social processes in the UnitedStates are unique. This deeply rooted belief over-looks the fact that the only way it can be tested isthrough comparative research. As a result, becauseAmerican criminal justice scholars focus so exclu-sively on the United States, they fail to see thatinstitutions are artifacts, created out of combinationsof contemporary exigencies and historical traditions.Context for them is a given, much as water is to fish,and just as uninteresting.

For all these reasons, American criminal justicescholarship is not prepared to perceive the signifi-cance of what is occurring in contemporary policing.It is doubtful that it will able to provide the sort ofintellectual support needed to guide public policy.

39

Conclusion

Chapter 8

Policing is changing today as profoundly as whenSir Robert Peel put the first bobby on the streets

of London in 1829. The new model that is beingconstructed consists of two elements. First, the peo-ple who authorize policing have become separatefrom the people who do it. Second, the new playersin policing are not part of formal government. Asa result, governments, especially governments ofnation-states, have lost their monopoly on policing.The change that is occurring is paradigmatic becauseit cannot be understood in customary terms (Kuhn1962). The current restructuring involves more than“privatization.” It involves a blurring of the bound-ary between the public and private. The new para-digm also involves more than decentralization ordevolution because these terms apply to changeswithin a single institutional system. What is takingplace in policing today crosses institutional bound-aries. Because of the unprecedented nature of today’sreconstruction, we have coined the term “multilater-alization” to describe the nature of the restructuring.

What is happening to policing today is also paradig-matic because it is more than an elaboration onwhat has gone before. It is a fundamental transfor-mation in the way security is governed.

In the new paradigm, the very concept of govern-ment, technically the state, becomes problematic.How can government be recognized if policing is nolonger done exclusively by the public police? Howshould people who have been authorized expresslyto police but are not employed by government bereferred to? When people deliberately and legiti-mately construct policing, either through authorizingor providing it, are they not engaged in governance?

Of course, what has been said about the importanceof what is happening depends on current trends

being general and stable. Only time will tell whetherwe have overestimated or underestimated their sig-nificance. For this reason, it is critically importantto study the structure of policing now to establishbenchmarks by which to judge the extent of changein the future. Contemporary changes in policingshould also be studied because policing affectshuman well-being so fundamentally. Failure to pro-vide public safety fairly and equitably can affect thestability of government itself.

Finally, insights into the changing governance ofsecurity have implications for foreign policy. Acountry like the United States that is concernedabout the expansion of democracy abroad must paycareful attention to policing. The governance ofsecurity is both an indicator of the quality of politi-cal life and a major determinant of it.

The restructuring of policing that has been describedrefers to a process of transferring the construction ofsecurity to nongovernmental groups within existingstates. But there is another process going on, onethat constitutes an equally profound challenge tonation-states. At the very moment that policing isbeing distributed to new groups within states, it isalso being developed vigorously at international lev-els. Nation-states are ceding their authority to policeboth upward and downward. This globalization ofpolicing has several dimensions that are not alwaysdistinguished.

First, private multinational corporations now providepolicing on a worldwide basis (Johnston 1999;Patterson 1995; Zarate 1998). They are providersof transnational policing.

Second, transnational cooperation among lawenforcement agencies of nation-states is developing

Chapter 8: Conclusion

40

rapidly (Nadelman 1993; Fijnaut and Hermans 1987;Murphy 1998). National law enforcement agenciescultivate relations with colleagues abroad, undertakejoint operations, exchange information, and sharefacilities. Pooling collective resources in an ad hocway to meet a common threat, they are similar tothe posse in America’s Old West. INTERPOL wasthe earliest transnational institution created by thissort of transnational collaboration. Such actionsencourage the presumption, undoubtedly correct,that effective policing at the turn of the millenniumrequires governance at transnational levels.

Third, policing is being undertaken by genuinelyinternational institutions, such as the UnitedNations, the World Court, and the European Union.Functionally specific agencies, too, such as theWorld Bank and the International Monetary Fund,increasingly require countries to either develop orreform policing in specific ways as conditions forreceiving assistance. The impulses to create suprana-tional auspices for policing are the same as those

that created existing nation-states out of previouslysovereign principalities, estates, kingdoms, cities,and small countries. The common precipitator inboth cases is the need to construct security at moreencompassing levels (Bayley 1975, 1985b). Notethat the organization of policing at internationallevels of government, like restructuring withinnation-states, will cause conceptual confusion. Arearmed forces acting under international directionconsidered to be police or military? What Americanscall the Korean War was technically a “policeaction” carried out by the United Nations.

Policing today is being restructured away fromnation-states by two forces: multilateralization with-in countries and supranationalization among coun-tries. In both cases, policing is no longer beingconstructed and provided exclusively by nation-states. It is quite unclear how these forces will playout in the next few years. The possibilities are wor-thy of a millennium.

41

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About the National Institute of Justice

NIJ is the research and development agency of the U.S. Department of Justice and is the only Federal agency solely dedicatedto researching crime control and justice issues. NIJ provides objective, independent, nonpartisan, evidence-based knowledgeand tools to meet the challenges of crime and justice, particularly at the State and local levels. NIJ’s principal authorities arederived from the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (42 U.S.C. §§ 3721–3722).

NIJ’s Mission

In partnership with others, NIJ’s mission is to prevent and reduce crime, improve law enforcement and the administration ofjustice, and promote public safety. By applying the disciplines of the social and physical sciences, NIJ—

• Researchesthe nature and impact of crime and delinquency.

• Developsapplied technologies, standards, and tools for criminal justice practitioners.

• Evaluatesexisting programs and responses to crime.

• Testsinnovative concepts and program models in the field.

• Assistspolicymakers, program partners, and justice agencies.

• Disseminatesknowledge to many audiences.

NIJ’s Strategic Direction and Program Areas

NIJ is committed to five challenges as part of its strategic plan: 1) rethinking justice and the processes that create just commu-nities; 2) understanding the nexusbetween social conditions and crime; 3) breaking the cycleof crime by testing research-based interventions; 4) creating the toolsand technologies that meet the needs of practitioners; and 5) expanding horizonsthrough interdisciplinary and international perspectives. In addressing these strategic challenges, the Institute is involved in thefollowing program areas: crime control and prevention, drugs and crime, justice systems and offender behavior, violence andvictimization, communications and information technologies, critical incident response, investigative and forensic sciences(including DNA), less-than-lethal technologies, officer protection, education and training technologies, testing and standards,technology assistance to law enforcement and corrections agencies, field testing of promising programs, and international crimecontrol. NIJ communicates its findings through conferences and print and electronic media.

NIJ’s Structure

The NIJ Director is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The NIJ Director establishes the Institute’s objec-tives, guided by the priorities of the Office of Justice Programs, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the needs of the field. NIJactively solicits the views of criminal justice and other professionals and researchers to inform its search for the knowledge andtools to guide policy and practice.

NIJ has three operating units. The Office of Research and Evaluation manages social science research and evaluation and crimemapping research. The Office of Science and Technology manages technology research and development, standards develop-ment, and technology assistance to State and local law enforcement and corrections agencies. The Office of Development andCommunications manages field tests of model programs, international research, and knowledge dissemination programs. NIJ isa component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of JusticeStatistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

To find out more about the National Institute of Justice, please contact:

National Criminal Justice Reference ServiceP.O. Box 6000

Rockville, MD 20849–6000800–851–3420

e-mail: [email protected]

To obtain an electronic version of this document, access the NIJ Web site(http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij).

If you have questions, call or e-mail NCJRS.

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The New Structure of Policing - National Criminal Justice … · 2005-02-11 · andResearch Agenda...

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