Geoforum 42 (2011) 51–60

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Geoforum

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The neoliberal elephant: Exploring the impacts of the trade ban in ivoryon the commodification and neoliberalisation of elephants

Lorraine Moore ⇑Department of Politics and IR, Lancaster University, Lancaster LAI 4YD, UK

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 4 February 2009Received in revised form 28 July 2010

Keywords:CommodificationNeoliberalismIvory tradeElephant conservationNamibia

0016-7185/$ - see front matter � 2010 Elsevier Ltd. Adoi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2010.09.002

⇑ Address: Socio-Spatial Analysis Chair Group, WBuilding, ESP P.O. Box 47, 6700 AA Wageningen, The

E-mail address: moore.rainy@googlemail.com

a b s t r a c t

This paper uses a case study that explores the impacts of the ivory trade ban on elephant management inNamibia to illuminate the processes and complexities associated with the commodification and neolib-eralisation of nature. The paper demonstrates that the ivory trade ban neither prevents the commodifi-cation of elephants, nor hampers the neoliberalisation of nature. By tracing Namibia’s experienceassociated with applying market based approaches to elephant conservation, this paper highlights thatthe ivory trade ban is only one obstacle among many which prevent the commodification of the ‘living’elephant. Analysing Namibia’s experiences alongside the wider debates informing elephant conservationreveals that actors of preservation and sustainable utilisation produce elephants. In particular, during theevents leading up to the 1989 ivory trade ban, advocates of preservation produced a very lucrative rep-resentation of the elephant that relies on market mechanisms. This image has become a powerful com-modity that competes with parts of the biophysical elephant (particularly its ivory) and therefore createsnew and contesting ways in which elephants can be commodified.

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1. Introduction

European explorers and colonisers have valued elephants fortheir ivory ever since they came into contact with them. This isdemonstrated through hunters’ accounts of their adventures (see,for example, Roualeyn Gordon Cumming and Cuthbert Christy),and the number and variety of commodities that began to be madeout of ivory (Feinberg and Johnson, 1982). Between the end of theslave trade and the First World War, trade in ivory peaked. How-ever, the War slowed down the trade until the 1950s when itrecovered and continued to proliferate. By the 1980s it becameclear that more needed to be done to protect Africa’s elephantsfrom poaching. Jackson (2003) writes that in 1973, trade in ivoryrocketed to 1236 tonnes, which had a dramatic impact on Africa’selephants. This resulted in the Convention on the InternationalTrade of Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES)implementing weak regulatory measures governing trade in ivoryin 1986. Up until this point, ivory had been a commodity of the freemarket. However, these regulatory measures proved insufficientand therefore CITES banned international trade in ivory in 1989.The ivory trade ban was an important event in the world ofelephant conservation and sparked fierce debate. Essentially, this

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debate focused on whether elephants would be best served if theywere regulated through neoclassical economics and market basedapproaches to conservation (as argued by the utilisationists), orwhether conservation policy should be informed by preservationand non-use (as advocated by preservationists).

This paper investigates the impacts of the ivory trade ban onelephant management in Namibia to illuminate the processesand complexities associated with the commodification and neolib-eralisation of nature. The ivory trade ban was implemented duringa time when market based approaches to conservation becamevery popular among international institutions such as the WorldBank. The notion of natural resources, including wildlife, payingfor their conservation gained popularity in the 1980s. This modelof conservation, also known as ‘sustainable utilisation’ or ‘marketbased approaches to conservation’ is informed by the need for peo-ple to understand the value of their environment in order for themto conserve it (Pearce, 1999b; Barnes et al., 2002; McAfee, 1999).The approach is dependent on markets, either real or proxy, actingas the mechanism through which natural resources are valued andexchanged as commodities. The market, particularly the free mar-ket, is preferred by the advocates of sustainable utilisation, neolib-eral theorists and neoclassical economists to distribute resourcesbecause they are believed to be neutral and impersonal (Anderson,1993; Carrier, 2010).

The popularity of market based approaches to conservation, orsustainable utilisation, is associated with two trends that aroseduring the 1980s. The first of these trends was the belief that

52 L. Moore / Geoforum 42 (2011) 51–60

people have to benefit from natural resources in order to conservethem (Adams, 2001; Ghirimie and Pimbert, 1997). The second,more significant, of these trends is associated with the shift inauthority at the international level where the end of the ColdWar saw renewed faith in (neo)liberal policies and their applica-tion to governance (Selby, 2003; Gill, 1998; McCarthy and Prud-ham, 2004). Neoliberalism is a very difficult concept to define asit has a tendency to unfold differently at different spatial scales(Jessop, 2002; McCarthy and Prudham, 2004; Peck and Tickell,2002), however there is consensus that the state came to be seenas an obstacle to development, which resulted in the preferencefor decentralisation and greater participation across society. Thisis because ideologically, neoliberalism has economic and politicalimplications, advocating market expansion and elevating the roleof ‘rational actors’ (Jessop, 2002). With regard to the environment,a neoliberal approach results in cost benefit analysis (CBA) andmarkets being used to reconfigure and re-regulate people’s interac-tions with the environment through the commodification of nature(Brockington et al., 2008; McAfee, 1999). Anderson (1993) arguesthat a good becomes a commodity ‘if it is valued as an exclusivelyappropriated object of use and if market norms and relations gov-ern its production, exchange and distribution’ (p. 193). As such, thecommodification of nature gives nature the opportunity to pay itsway (McAfee, 1999), and also allows human interactions with theenvironment to be reconfigured, or re-regulated through marketsand other neoliberal policies (Castree, 2008; Brockington et al.,2008). Sustainable utilisation can be seen as one of the manyguises of neoliberal approaches to conservation.

Given the popularity of neoliberal policies to manage globalproblems, combined with the renewed faith in market mecha-nisms to address environmental issues, it appears (at surface level)that CITES’ implementation of a trade ban in ivory was out of syncwith the rest of international thinking. A trade ban in ivory inter-feres with market mechanisms and prevents elephants being val-ued for their ivory, which may result in elephants being under-valued. This is problematic from a neoliberal perspective becauseelephants would no longer be able to pay their way, which couldhave significant consequences for the long-term survival of ele-phants. Indeed, McCarthy and Prudham (2004) argue that ‘environ-mental concerns also represent the most powerful source ofpolitical opposition to neoliberalism’ (p. 274). However, by tracingthe impacts of the advocates of utilisation and preservation on ele-phant conservation, this article will demonstrate that the ivorytrade ban is not necessarily out of step with neoliberal thinking.In particular, the article will highlight that both CITES and theadvocates of an ivory trade ban have created new forms of regula-tory neoliberalism (Brockington et al., 2008; Bakker, 2003, 2007;Heynen et al., 2007; Castree, 2008), which has widened the scopethrough which elephants can be commodified. The article willachieve this by first exploring the different values stakeholders in-volved in elephant conservation ascribe to the elephant and howthese stakeholders then use their values to ‘produce’ the elephant.The paper will then reflect on the neoliberalisation of nature liter-ature to demonstrate that although the elephant is only partiallycommodified, elephant conservation is still compatible with neo-liberalism: the elephant is still able to pay its way in both its phys-ical and constructed form.

Analysing the contesting and competing values ascribed to theelephant by the advocates of utilisation and preservation will allowthe article to contribute to the existing neoliberalisation of natureliterature by making two key arguments. Firstly, the analysis al-lows the paper to present a new dimension to McCarthy and Prud-ham’s (2004) observation that environmental movements maypose one of the most fundamental forms of resistance to neoliber-alism. This is because while social movements resist the neoliber-alisation (or use of markets) to value biophysical elements of the

environment, these social movements often rely on images of theenvironment that are available for sale to do so. This is significantbecause the production of images is a strategy used by powerfulNGOs to develop a particular idea of the elephant, which impactson people’s relationships with elephants (Brockington et al.,2008; see also Carrier, 2010). Therefore, commodifying elephantsthrough imagery deepens the neoliberalisation of nature. Secondly,analysing the competition between the values of stakeholders whoeither construct images of the elephant, or who wish to consumeivory, enables the article to demonstrate that the commodificationof elephants, and nature in general, is a complex and contestedprocess. This is because the discourses that inform the differentways elephants, or nature in general, should be managed are notproduced in a vacuum (see Braun and Wainwright, 2001; Baldwin,2003). As such the advocates of utilisation and preservation gainstrength from their productions of the elephant, and neoliberalgovernance is extended in the process.

Elephant conservation, especially in Namibia, forms an interest-ing case study within which to explore these themes. This is be-cause the elephant is valued for a variety of reasons. While theelephant is a high profile species that attracts a lot of attentionat the international level, it also has a significant impact on thepeople who share its range (primarily through crop-raiding).Therefore, investigating how elephants in Namibia (and indeedacross the globe) are valued will assist in analysing the conflictingways in which elephants can be commodified and regulatedthrough neoliberal principles. This is because the different valuesascribed to elephants across the globe result in conflicting prefer-ences for how their conservation should be achieved. The natureof this conflict can be demonstrated through the Namibian Minis-try of Environment and Tourism’s (MET) responses to CITES traderestrictions of elephant products, and the policies of preservation-ist and animal rights organisations. While CITES is recognised toprovide a conservation role because it prevents the extinction offlora and fauna through commercial exploitation, there is a grow-ing network of states and organisations (utilisation advocates)who argue that elephant conservation would best be securedthrough sustainable utilisation and the use of markets (Barbieret al., 1990; Sugg and Kreuter, 1994; Martin, 2000; Dickson,2003). Namibia is one such state which argues that the most effec-tive way to secure the long-term conservation of the elephant is toensure that the elephant has value to those who share its range.This is because of the elephant’s capacity to be destructive to peo-ple due to the reduction in elephant habitat. This view, however, isstrongly opposed by the preservationist advocates who argue thatany form of trade in ivory will be damaging to elephant conserva-tion (see McGlennon, 1990; Leakey and Morell, 2001; Duffy, 2008).The forthright approach of preservationist advocates has had a sig-nificant impact on the way ivory and other elephant products arethought of in the Global North. It is only 20 years ago that ivorywas still a sought after commodity. However, the preferences ofconsumers in the Global North have shifted: it is no longer sociallyacceptable to purchase ivory in this area of the world. As such, itcan appear that the market associated with ivory and other ele-phant products has been hampered: it is impacted by a complexset of social values that originate in the Global North.

The research that this article is informed by draws from a5 month period of fieldwork undertaken in Namibia. I conducteda total of 110 interviews with Government officials, internationaland national conservation NGOs in Windhoek and Katima Mulilo,plus the people who share elephant range in the Caprivi region.This article directly engages with 20 interviews undertaken withstaff from the MET (drawn from the Directorates of Scientific Ser-vices, DSS; Environmental Affairs, DEA; plus Parks and Wildlife,DPW), as well as national and international conservation NGOs.This data has been supplemented with policy documents and

L. Moore / Geoforum 42 (2011) 51–60 53

statistics provided by the DEA, which are also published in theGovernment of the Republic of Namibia’s Second National Devel-opment Plan. In order to protect people’s identities all intervieweeshave been anonymized. Distinction between interviewees is madethrough a respondent (R) number, details of employment and placeinterviewed are included after the bibliography.

1.1. Sustainable utilisation and elephant conservation in Namibia

Namibia applies conservation policy informed by sustainableutilisation principles to national parks, communal and commercialland. Namibia’s model of Community Based Natural Resource Man-agement (CBNRM; see Jones, 2001) is executed through communalconservancies. A communal conservancy is ‘formed by a commu-nity or group of communities within a defined geographical areawho jointly manage, conserve and utilise the wildlife and othernatural resources within the defined area’ (Jones, 1995, 5). Nami-bia’s policy for communal conservancies was implemented in1996 and allows governmental devolution of ‘conditional con-sumptive and non-consumptive use rights over wildlife’ to regis-tered ‘conservancies’ (Ashley, 1998; Jones, 2001).

Sustainable utilisation is also applied to Namibia’s elephantmanagement strategy where the MET takes the position that in or-der for Namibia to maintain its free ranging elephant population,elephant conservation must be seen as a viable land use optionamongst the people sharing elephant range (R50, 13.02.06; R3,07.04.06; R1, 05.06.06; R8, 10.05.06; R26, 15.02.06). The reasonsfor this are twofold. Firstly, elephants can be both dangerous andcostly to those who share their range (Moore, 2010; Sukumar,2003). In addition to this, maintaining elephant habitat is in com-petition with other land uses that have greater direct value to boththe people sharing their range and other potential land users. Assuch, the MET claim that the ivory trade ban has negative implica-tions for elephant management at both the local and national level.Essentially it is argued that the trade ban reduces the value of theelephant, which denies Namibia a source of income that could havebeen re-invested in elephant conservation. For example, the Direc-tor of Scientific Services (MET) has been quoted as saying: ‘we haveto look at mechanisms to address this problem [of human–wildlifeconflict] and to make it possible for people to live with elephants. Aban will not achieve this in any way’ (Lindeque, 2002, 34).

However, it should also be pointed out that Namibia currentlyhas the greatest concessions regarding trade in ivory and other ele-phants products. Although the international sale of ivory is not per-mitted by states listed on either of the CITES Appendices I or II(where Appendix I is applied to the most endangered species), Na-mibia is one of the few African elephant range states permitted totrade in a limited amount of sustainably harvested elephant tro-phies accrued through trophy hunting.1 In addition to this, Namibiaalso took part in the 1999 and 2008 stockpile sales of ivory (the otherparties permitted to take part in these two stockpile sales were Bots-wana, South Africa and Zimbabwe).2 However, despite these conces-sions, Namibia is actively lobbying at CITES to be permitted to tradein an annual quota of sustainably harvested raw ivory. Namibia’sargument that elephants need to be perceived as a competitive landuse option among the people who share their range aligns with thewider arguments put forward by the advocates of sustainable utilisa-tion (see Barbier et al., 1990; Sugg and Kreuter, 1994; Martin, 2000)who have traditionally perceived CITES to have a negative role inensuring the long-term conservation of elephants (as outlined above).

1 CITES records list nine of the African elephant range states as having sold huntingtrophies in 2006. For further details see http://www.cites.org/eng/resources/spe-cies.html (accessed: 12.03.07).

2 http://www.cites.org/eng/news/press/2007/070614_ivory.shtml (accessed30.08.07).

The importance Namibia attaches to sustainable utilisation canbe demonstrated through the DEA’s use of environmental account-ing to demonstrate the wealth, or income, derived from differentuses of Namibia’s wildlife (see Barnes, 1995, 1998; Barnes et al.,2004). Indeed, some of Namibia’s resource economists are keento demonstrate the value of market based approaches to conserva-tion and their communal conservancies. For example, in an articleoutlining Namibia’s approach to conservation, Use to Conserve, oneof Namibia’s resource economists argues that ‘Namibia’s approachto conservation and sustainable development is firstly to treat nat-ural resources as having significant economic value’ (Brown, 2004/2005, 3). This argument is further developed to demonstrate that amanagement regime allowing the calculation of the full total eco-nomic value (TEV) of Namibia’s natural resources will result in theselection of the most efficient use of that resource. Brown furtherargues that promoting sustainable use of resources, whether con-sumptive or non-consumptive, is the most effective and efficientway to equitably contribute to ‘household livelihoods, economicempowerment, rural and national development and social stabil-ity’ (Brown, 2004/2005, 3). Interviews I undertook in Namibia sug-gest there is unanimous agreement that sustainable utilisation isthe best way to conserve Namibia’s wildlife base, particularly ele-phants. However, the next section of the article will demonstratethat there are many conceptual and methodological complexitiesassociated with calculating the TEV of the elephant.

1.2. Commodifying elephants: total economic value and absentmarkets

Applying conservation models based on sustainable utilisationinvolves the use of economic theory and environmental account-ing. In particular, the concept of environmental capital is employedto demonstrate how the TEV of the environment or a natural re-source can be calculated and transformed into monetary value(Roberston, 2007). The TEV is derived from use value, option value,and existence (or passive-use value). Use values indicate a directuse of environmental resources; option values are used to denotea resource that has future use; and existence values indicate a re-source that is valued because it exists, under conditions where itcannot be used (Pearce, 1999a,b; Barnes, 1996). Table 1 demon-strates how TEV can be applied to the elephant. In theoreticalterms, this calculation will identify the full range of opportunitiesassociated with any resource. Efficient allocation of the resourcecan be achieved by calculating the opportunity cost, or forgoneopportunities incurred in forfeiting uses combined with the dis-count rate of the resource (Pearce, 1999b; Barnes, 1996).

Valuation of the resource is usually achieved through the appli-cation of both existing and hypothetical markets. In the case ofhypothetical markets, ‘the economist is taking what are often,but not always, non-market phenomena and simulating willing-ness to pay for these phenomena’ (Pearce, 1999a, 14). For example,application to elephant conservation may involve asking peoplehow much they are willing to pay to conserve the species, or aninvestigation of donations and membership subscriptions toorganisations that either campaign for, or fund, elephant conserva-tion programmes (Pearce, 1999b). This results in a collection of‘surrogate markets’ which indirectly afford economic value to un-marketed environmental assets. In this way, the economist is ableto build up sets of economic values, based on willingness to pay’(Pearce, 1999a, 15; see also Barnes, 1996). Although this is an ap-proach to environmental management which receives a lot of crit-icism (Kalof and Satterfield, 2005; Spash, 2005), it is informed bythe principle that inefficient resource use is due to the absence ofmarkets, or the result of market failure. The need for surrogatemarkets to complete the valuation process of a natural resourceis the result of that natural resource being partially commodifiable:

Table 1Total economic value of elephants (adapted from Barbier (1998), 313).

Use values Non-use values

Direct value Indirect value Option value Existence value

Sustainably harvested products (ivory/meat/hair/hide)Recreation/tourismEducationBiodiversity (genetic material)Other services (transport etc.)

Ecological functions (diversify ecosystems by workingover the landscape, fertilise seeds, reduce tsetse fly,create paths in dense shrubbery, open-up areas forsettlement/farming)Protective functions

Future use (as perdirect and indirectvalue)

BiodiversityCulture, heritageReligion

3 Due to space restrictions, this paper will focus on the external factors alongsidethe conceptual and methodological issues associated with commodification thataffect how the elephant is valued (internal state-based factors are the subject of aforthcoming article).

4 This interviewee’s ‘R’ number is withheld for the sake of anonymisation.

54 L. Moore / Geoforum 42 (2011) 51–60

aspects of the resource resist complete market commodification,for either material reasons or because markets and pricing basedmechanisms do not exist (see Bakker, 2003, 2007; Radin, 2001).For example, Castree (2003) draws comparison between real andproxy commodification. Proxy commodification requires the useof surrogate markets through contingent valuations to stimulatevaluation, whereas real commodification does not, althoughCastree further highlights that proxy commodification could ‘serveas precursors to the creation of real markets’ (p. 285).

Applying an economic value to the environment through real,but particularly proxy, markets is fraught with ethical debate. Par-ticularly contentious issues include the conceptualisation and pro-cess through which economic values are formed (see Kalof andSatterfield, 2005). As will be drawn out in the analysis of this paper,there are many assumptions underlying this approach to naturalresource management and conservation. These assumptions in-clude the belief that nature and the natural world can be commod-ified. There is also the belief that the TEV of natural resources (plustheir services) can be calculated and that these calculations effec-tively measure the multiple ways through which resources canbe valued (including their ecological function). In addition to this,the approach also assumes that mechanisms exist for these valuesto be captured.

A lot of research has been conducted into how natural resourceselude complete commodification for either philosophical, method-ological or material reasons. To begin with the philosophical, Radin(2001), Anderson (1993), Keat (1997) and Spash (2002) highlightthat it is difficult to find accurate values of all natural resources.This is because universal values for many resources do not exist:there are multiple ways in which ‘things’ can be valued for differ-ent reasons. Indeed, the notion of valuing something is very com-plex. This is explained by Foster (1997), who states that value ‘isa word with all the complexity of life itself’ (p. 2), particularly be-cause our values are shaped by cultural norms. In addition to this,many researchers have difficulty in accepting the application ofmarket mechanisms and CBA to resources and services, specificallythose associated with the environment because it can lead to mis-representation of people’s values (Spash, 2002).

Methodological issues, on the other hand, highlight the inabilityof market mechanisms to capture values, particularly those associ-ated with shared resources such as national parks, and commonsresources such as the air we breath (Anderson, 1993; Barnes,n.d., 1996, 2003). The biophysical materiality of resources may alsoprevent the resource from being appropriated to market mecha-nisms as Bakker (2003, 2007) demonstrated through her analysisof the privatisation of the water industry in England and Wales(see also Roberston, 2007; Castree, 2003).

These issues are certainly relevant when applying the conceptof TEV to elephants in Namibia. For example, interviews conductedwith members of staff in the Economics Unit of the DEA, revealedthat the practice of calculating the TEV of the elephant is very com-plex and partial. Interviewees indicated that these complexities arethe cumulative result of internal (state-based) and external factors,plus methodological and conceptual issues associated with eco-nomic valuation. The internal factors refer to issues associated

with property and access: because the elephant is state-owned inNamibia, any value that the people who share elephant range de-rive from elephant presence is dependent on conditions of useand access to elephants as laid down by state legislation. As such,internal factors affect the value of the elephant at the local levelmore than the state level. External factors, on the other hand, referto the implications of international norms and intervention, forexample CITES trade restrictions and concerns of international con-servation organisations. An example of this is the preference of thestate for trade in regulated ivory versus the international norm torestrict trade. This impacts the value of the elephant at the nationallevel and cannot be altered within Namibia itself. Methodologicaland conceptual issues refer to the practical problems associatedwith applying abstract economic theory to natural resources suchas elephants (as highlighted above).3 CITES trade restrictions resultsin the absence of markets through which elephants can be valued.This is compounded by methodological issues associated with mea-suring and capturing value when trying to calculate the TEV of ele-phants. Essentially, because markets do not exist to calculate thetotal economic value of the elephant (for various reasons), attemptsto do so involve the analysis and application of existing markets, orestablishing the willingness of people to pay for the services pro-vided by the elephant. As Barnes (2003) highlights ‘Economic valueis therefore deduced from varying sources which are used to deriveassumptions’ (Barnes, 2003, 1). Legal markets do not exist to valuethe ecological functions of elephants, the socially constructed orexistence value of elephants, or the material aspects of elephantssuch as their ivory due to CITES trade restrictions. This restrictsthe ways in which elephants can be valued through market mecha-nisms and largely results in economists relying on data generatedfrom the tourism industry (particularly safari hunting, and non-con-sumptive wildlife viewing; see Barnes, 2003).

Barnes (2003) argues that hunting activities (consumptive tour-ism) are relatively [emphasis in the original] easy to measure –however complications were alluded to in an interview, in whichhe revealed that it is often difficult to measure the exact value ofthe hunt.4 This is because although the trophy value of the elephantcould be used in addition to the tariff and length of stay associatedwith the hunt (Barnes, 2003, 1), this methodology does excludethe value of the experience of the hunt. The value of non-consump-tive tourism is far more difficult to measure. The method usually em-ployed to determine this value involves the use of touristquestionnaires, which Barnes (2003) argues are usually renderedmeaningless because they are affected by ‘starting point bias’(among many other problems, see Pearce (1999a), Spash (2005)and Kalof and Satterfield (2005), for further details).

However, determining the economic value of the elephant from atourist’s perspective does not represent the entire range of direct-use values that can be derived from elephants, let alone the TEV.

L. Moore / Geoforum 42 (2011) 51–60 55

These complexities do not account for the problems associated withvaluing ecological functions and also existence or passive-use val-ues. Indirect use (environmental services) and existence values arevery difficult to measure due to the absence of existing markets.Therefore, valuation of indirect use-values/option values would re-quire the use of hypothetical markets and proxy commodification.In this sense, elephants are proxy commodities. The process ofapplying monetary values to environmental services attracts a lotof criticism because as highlighted above, they are arbitrary. My re-search demonstrated that existence value, particularly at the locallevel, is also difficult to measure. Interviewees from the conserva-tion policy arena thought it unlikely that people sharing elephanthabitat would be prepared to fund elephant presence, withoutderiving benefit from them (R2, 24.01.06). This assumption is inter-esting because research I conducted in Kasika and Kwando Conser-vancies and three villages in West Caprivi (all located in the CapriviStrip) clearly found that people did value the elephants because theyexist. In addition to this, responses from interviewees also demon-strated that people valued the ecological services that the elephantprovided, for example, clearing pathways in the bush (Moore, 2010).This clearly demonstrates the limitations of measuring social valueswith economic instruments because although people may not nec-essarily be willing to pay cash to live among elephants, they do tol-erate their presence and value their existence in other ways.However, interviewees from the MET and conservation NGOs inNamibia were more concerned with the effects of CITES traderestrictions on the value elephants have. The absence of an existinglegal market for trade in ivory and other elephant products results inno market value to base these estimates on. Therefore, the elephantcannot be valued for its ivory, which the MET (and other utilisationadvocates) argue harms their conservation policy.

Despite the limitations resource economists in Namibia experi-ence in calculating the TEV of elephants, the MET is in the processof establishing preliminary wildlife asset accounts for Namibia,which contain ‘the physical numbers and monetary values of thenational wildlife stocks as capital assets’ (Barnes et al., 2004, 1).This dataset was based on direct use value estimates only, and ex-cludes option, existence and bequest value. The estimates arebased on ‘net price method,’ which ‘measures the annual economicrent which is simply the difference between the market price (orunit of export value) and the cost of extraction or use, includinga normal return to capital’ (Barnes et al., 2004, 1; R2, 24.01.06).As can been seen from Table 2, the value attributed to the elephantis quite low in comparison to other species such as gemsbok,giraffe, common impala, kudu, ostrich, springbok, warthog, bluewildebeest, and Burchell’s and Hartmann’s zebra.

Interviews conducted in Namibia revealed that the reason forthe elephant’s low value in comparison to more common speciesof wildlife is due to the figures being based on direct-use value

Table 2Namibia wildlife asset values summary (N$ 2004).

Species Total N$ US$

Springbok 415,366,113 63,902,479Gemsbok 242,796,827 37,353,358Kudu 232,875,150 35,826,946Warthog 98,655,601 15,177,785Zebra, Hartmann’s 54,416,284 8,371,736Ostrich 26,087,106 4,013,401Zebra, Burchell’s 15,017,208 2,310,340Wildebeest, blue 14,887,262 2,290,348Impala, common 9,257,448 1,424,223Giraffe 8,612,152 1,324,946Elephant 7,539,688 1,159,952

Courtesy of the Economics Unit, DEA, MET. See Government of the Republic ofNamibia’s Second National Development Plan for a full version of Namibia’s wildlifeasset values.

only. In addition to this, the figures do not take account of the valueof ivory and other elephant products because CITES trade restric-tions, combined with the international stigma associated withtrade in elephant products, has resulted in the loss of legal marketsto value these products (R2, 24.01.06). One could look at these ta-bles and argue that trade restrictions and international norms haveacted to significantly reduce the value of the elephant, but to do sowould be assuming too much. This is because the article has thusfar demonstrated that it is incredibly difficult to put an economicvalue on the elephant – regardless of whether we are focusing onthe direct-use value or existence value (in addition to this, thesefigures exclude all other values apart from direct-use value). Thisis only partially related to CITES trade restrictions, and is alsoimpacted by the conceptual and methodological problemshighlighted above.

However, the interviewee also pointed out that the viewing va-lue of the elephant should be a lot higher in comparison to gems-bok and other common species of wildlife. The fact that it is not is adirect result of the methodology employed in the analysis. Forexample, it was explained that ‘the approach was an attempt atvaluing the total wildlife stock, but it is not really accurate becauseof course one elephant is not the same as one springbok: the ele-phant has a higher value but the figures do not reflect that’ (R2,24.01.06; R13, 30.03.06). This demonstrates that the concept ofTEV as highlighted in Brown’s Optimal Use Model cannot be com-pletely implemented in Namibia. Although Brown does acknowl-edge internal (property rights) and external (CITES) constraintsthat prevent the optimisation of TEV in Namibia, he does notacknowledge the conceptual and methodological implications de-scribed above. In order to demonstrate the direct impact of CITESand the ivory trade ban on the value of the elephant, the paper willneed to explore the economic value that Namibia can obtain fromelephant presence, as well as the impact of conflicting values asso-ciated with elephants at the international level.

1.3. Commodifying elephants: use value versus existence value

The main way through which Namibia accesses the direct-usevalue from elephants is through safari, or photographic tourismand trophy hunting. Namibia has also been permitted to exportan annual quota of 2000 kg of worked ivory (the ekipa), hair, hideand live capture for sale to game farms (R1, 05.06.06; R7,20.04.06). In addition to this, the MET’s annual game auction hasthe ability to generate a large amount of income through the saleof live game to consumers in both Namibia and neighbouringstates. The June 2006 auction generated almost N$6 million(US$920,000) (Bause, 2006). An interviewee also highlighted thatthere is an existing market for elephant skins, however the marketbase had been considerably reduced and is largely confined toSouthern Africa (which is significant because demand oncestretched to the United States; R15.2, 11.05.06).

Namibia also derives income from the existence value of ele-phants at the international level, which largely consists of fundsfrom the donor community, such as WWF. This has been acknowl-edged as generating a substantial amount of income for Namibia,especially the conservancies (Barnes et al., 2002). However, be-cause these values operate on more than one scale (local, national,regional, and international), they can result in a conflict of interestsbetween the various scales and the favoured market approach oruse. Existence value could exist at all levels (local to international),but in varying degrees, which can put pressure on the nationalgovernment. For instance, employees of the MET and practitionersinvolved in elephant management discussed the implications of aninternational lobby opposed to accessing the use value of ele-phants, such as harvesting ivory. The preservationist movementhas a very strong presence at the international level and the

5 For examples, see Coombe (2000), Furniss (2006) and Travers (2006) who have allpublished articles on this subject in the Geographical Magazine. See also AfricaGeographic’s (2006) special edition entitled: Elephants & Us; The Guardian’s coverageof WWF’s position on culling (26.02.07); and The Times reports on elephant poaching(27.02.07) and contraception versus culling (12.03.07).

56 L. Moore / Geoforum 42 (2011) 51–60

potential to affect policy within Namibia by withholding funds,and campaigning to change Namibia’s CITES Appendix II listingto Appendix I. This threat is taken seriously in Namibia and ithas a significant impact on Namibia’s policy of sustainable-use:only one culling operation has taken place in Namibia (in EtoshaNational Park), which was split over a 2 year period. Intervieweesrevealed that there is reluctance to follow this up due to potentialreprisals from the international community (R14, 24.01.06; R56,26.05.06). Therefore, Namibia’s abundant elephant population isnot managed through culling or harvesting, which some intervie-wees argued is resulting in loss of value, which presents social,economic and environmental consequences.

Lifting the ivory trade ban is unlikely to remedy all of these is-sues. It certainly will not allow the TEV of the elephant to be calcu-lated. As such, it can be seen that this heightened attention onCITES and the ivory trade ban is skewing the focus of the debateregarding how elephants should be managed. Advocates of sus-tainable utilisation focus more on the inability to trade in ivory,and the moral implications of a poor region of the world being de-nied a source of income (due to the social values of people who livein a richer part of the world; see Dickson, 2003) than resolving howmarkets can both measure and capture the very diverse values thatelephants have for different people around the world. The disjunc-ture between the utilisation rhetoric and actual impacts of CITESon elephant range states’ conservation policy is clearly understoodby some people who work in elephant conservation in Africa (R3,07.04.06) and Asia (R119, 30.10.2009).

The difference between the rhetoric and reality of sustainableutilisation is significant. This is because it has been acknowledged(even among some pro-utilisation advocates) that since its concep-tion, CITES has increasingly recognised the benefits of utilisation toelephant conservation (Hutton and Dickson, 2000). Indeed, CITESdoes not prevent all trade in ivory. Trophy hunting, which is per-mitted in elephant range states that fulfil CITES regulations, isrecognised as a valuable conservation strategy by CITES (Huxley,2000); Namibia has also been permitted to export an annual quotaof worked ivory. Furthermore, it could be argued that CITES isexperimenting with a new set of procedures to enable regulatedtrade in ivory in the future: the moratorium that was put in placeafter the 2008 stockpile sale of ivory was done so that the impact ofthe stockpile sales on poaching and illegal sales of ivory could beassessed. Indeed, whilst I was conducting fieldwork in Namibia itwas explained that the delay in allowing this stockpile sale of ivory(agreed in principle in 2002) was due to non-fulfilment of MIKE(Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants) obligations from otherelephant range states. Interviewees revealed that conditions of thesale required each individual elephant range state to produce base-line data for the MIKE system, in order to ensure the effective mon-itoring of the elephant population after trade had taken place. Theprovision of base-line data ‘would allow scientists to assesswhether increases in illegal elephant killings were indeed, relatedto CITES decisions’ (Furniss, 2006, 55).

Advocates of utilisation, especially the pro-utilisation rangestates, could be unwilling to acknowledge many of these develop-ments in the rhetoric they produce because there is large-scaleresistance to international trade in ivory. The conflict betweenthe different values associated with the elephant (particularlyuse value versus existence value) run deep and strong. This sug-gests that cultural and political values have a strong role to playin elephant conservation, especially regarding how differentgroups construct their arguments.

1.4. Producing elephants: use value versus existence value

The argument that CITES is undermining the value of theelephant is, to borrow a phrase from Castree (1997), one way that

nature is being produced within the social relations of capitalism(p. 8). Those who argue that permitting sustainable trade in ivorywill result in the TEV of the elephant being calculated, and there-fore allow the most efficient use and conservation policy beingimplemented are doing two things. Firstly, they are ignoring othersignificant issues associated with market based approaches to con-servation, CBA and TEV highlighted above. Secondly, they are pro-ducing a socially constructed nature as elephants become absorbedinto the language of markets and capitalism. To return to the firstof these two issues: lifting the ivory trade ban so that elephantscan be valued for their ivory would not result in the TEV of the ani-mal being calculated. This is because the other issues associatedwith calculating TEV would still exist. However, the argumentadvocating a utilisation informed approach to elephant conserva-tion, as the most efficient method to secure elephants, has evolvedin such a way that it exclusively associates the inability to trade inivory with devaluing elephants. Utilisation advocates also suggestthat allowing trade in ivory will result in elephants being valuedmore highly. There are problems with these assumptions becausethey are dependent on ivory being the most significant way inwhich elephants can be valued. However, the way we value natureis very complex, as Baldwin (2003) highlights, the way we per-ceive, construct and produce nature, whether it is wild animalsor forests, is ‘embedded in complex webs of relations that stringtogether multiple experiences of expertise, myths, ethics, andhistory’ (p. 415; see also Braun and Wainwright, 2001).

The social production of the elephant is strongly related to tradein ivory. As mentioned in the introduction to this article, the ivorytrade ban was a pivotal moment in the history of elephant conser-vation because it resulted in heightening the contested values be-tween the advocates of preservation and utilisation. This contesthas its roots in colonial Africa, where utilisation has particularlystrong roots in Southern Africa (see Schoeman, 1997; Jones andMurphree, 2001; Gibson, 1999). However, the notion of wildernessalso has its roots in colonisation. Essentially, the colonisers re-worked the land to best suit their political and economic needs(see Steinhart, 1989; MacKenzie, 1988; Adams, 2003; Brockingtonand Scholfield, 2009), which involved resettling African popula-tions to protect what the colonisers considered to be wildernessareas through the implementation of national parks and conserva-tion policy. National parks and charismatic wildlife, such as ele-phants, came to symbolise wilderness and an unspoilt Eden.These ‘wilderness’ areas were a vital corrective to the negative ef-fects of industrialisation taking place in the Global North. There-fore, it is apparent that nature is an historic product (Brockingtonand Scholfield, 2009; Baldwin, 2003; Castree, 1997).

However, it was not until events leading up to the ivory tradeban in 1989 that organisations involved in the preservationistmovement created a valuable and powerful image of the elephantin the Global North. This image has not only eclipsed the value ofivory, but has also made the idea of owning ivory socially unac-ceptable. Preservation campaigns, particularly Richard Leakey’spublic burning of Kenya’s stockpiled ivory, successfully re-castthe elephant as a gentle, intelligent animal whose existence wasthreatened by trade in ivory. Preservationists seek to remind theiraudience of this representation of the elephant every 2 years in thelead up to a CITES biennial conference to ensure the ivory trade banis maintained.5

This image of the elephant demonstrates another way in whichnature is produced. Castree (1997) documents a similar situation

L. Moore / Geoforum 42 (2011) 51–60 57

regarding the use of imagery in the case of over-harvesting furseals in the Bering Sea (1870–1911). Just as the representationsof the fur seals persuaded ‘Congressman into supporting a 5 yearclosed season’ (p. 13), re-casting the elephant as a charismatic,gentle and intelligent animal persuaded the Global North into acomplete ivory trade ban. However, there is a key difference be-tween preservationist attempts to protect the fur seals from overexploitation and preventing the ivory trade ban re-opening. Thisis because although preservationist approaches to elephant conser-vation prefer the non-use of nature (Duffy, 2008), effective use ofthe wilderness value of elephants relies on markets and capitalismin a similar way to trade in ivory. This is because although preser-vationist organisations are largely charities and rely on donations,Brockington et al. (2008) highlight that these wildlife organisationsare able to generate large sums of money from the images of ani-mals they produce. The circulation of these images regulates peo-ple’s relationships with nature (see also Brockington andScholfield, 2010). Unlike trophy hunting and trade in ivory, con-sumption of these socially constructed images is visual: ‘It is con-sumed by looking, by tourists’ gazes, and by the work ofphotographers and filmmakers’ (Brockington and Scholfield,2010, 558). Again, this demonstrates how constructions of wildlifehave been drawn into the social relations of capitalism.

The relationship between the commodification of wildlife andcapitalism has lead Brockington et al. (2008) to argue that conser-vation values and capitalist values are united (see also Brockingtonand Scholfield, 2010; Heynen et al., 2007). This is true regardless ofwhether conservation is inspired through the direct use of marketsin utilisation based approaches, or preservation informed ap-proaches to conservation. This is because both approaches to con-servation ultimately rely on the market value of nature, but moreimportantly, ideas and images of nature that are distributedthrough the media (which Brockington et al. (2008) refer to asthe spectacle of nature). In particular, they argue that ‘the politicalinstability that has accompanied the spread of neoliberalism, alongwith ‘nature disasters’, allows corporations like NGOs and govern-ments to pursue new types of revenues and profits’ (p. 192). LikeCastree, they argue that this is allowed to take place due to ‘sophis-ticated and deceptive representations of the world’ which resultsin Baudrillard’s concept of hyperreality or the ‘inability to distin-guish imagination from reality’ (p. 192).

Governments and organisations who wish trade in ivory to re-sume understand the power of the image that preservationistorganisations have created of the elephant. This can be demon-strated by returning to a quotation from interviewee R2 above,who explained that international existence value associated withthe elephant can compete with local and national direct-use value(in other words, international values associated with the elephantcould be enough to prevent trade in ivory). In addition to this,other interviewees in Namibia explained quite plainly that whenLeakey burned Kenya’s stockpiled ivory, he had in actual fact soldit to the wildlife NGOs supporting the ivory trade ban (R6,19.05.06). It can be seen that the commodification of elephants isboth complex and contested. This is due to the competition be-tween the values of different networks of stakeholders either con-structing images of the elephant, or those stakeholders who wishto consume ivory. It certainly appears that there are many differentways that elephants can be commodified – although many of theseways are partial due to the absence of markets.

1.5. The neoliberal elephant: use value versus existence value

It may be that certain sectors of society will resist commodifica-tion of certain parts of the ‘biophysical’ elephant due to bothshared social and ethical values. The image of the elephant pro-duced by the preservationist movement has been created in the

imaginations of people who share the same values: it does not relyon commodifying nature directly (in its ‘biophysical’ form). Thiselephant has only recently become such a valuable commodity be-cause up until the ivory trade ban, the value of ivory existed along-side the wilderness value of elephants. Additionally, this vision ofthe elephant does not have universal appeal: it is the product ofpreservationist discourse and must exist alongside other stake-holders’ vision of the elephant, including those who subscribe toutilisation values. It is not surprising that the actions of preserva-tionists and utilisationists result in different ways in which the ele-phant is commodified and produced. This is because the waynature is produced is influenced by the way nature is perceived(Braun and Wainwright, 2001); our perceptions of nature are influ-enced by cultural values, experience and desires (see also Foster,1997; Baldwin, 2003). As such, the way in which elephants arecommodified is strongly related to preservationist and utilitariansocio-political principles. These principles have an impact on theneutral operation of the market: in some cases they create mar-kets, but in the case of the trade ban in ivory, a free market is pre-vented. However, despite this and the other methodologicalcomplexities that prevent the TEV of elephants being calculated, Iargue that elephant conservation, whether it is informed by pres-ervationist or utilisation principles, is still compatible withneoliberalism.

Neither the preservationist organisations nor the ivory trade banhas prevented the neoliberalisation of the elephant. The relationshipbetween conservation organisations, particularly preservationistorganisations, and capitalism would suggest (as contradictory asthis may sound) that the ivory trade ban does not resist the neolib-eralisation of elephants. This is for two key reasons. First, CITES hasnot prevented all trade in ivory: it allows elephant range states thatmeet the criteria to engage in trophy hunting. In addition to this,CITES is also experimenting with regulatory procedures that havethe potential to allow a standardised and regulated sustainabletrade in ivory. Second, I have demonstrated that the commodifica-tion and neoliberalisation of the elephant does not end with thephysical consumption of elephant parts. Therefore, although thecommodification of elephants is partial and contested, neoliberalgovernance is compatible with both preservation and utilisationinformed approaches to elephant conservation.

It could be considered that CITES’ ivory trade ban is out of stepwith neoliberalism because a free market in ivory is prevented(even if this is a temporary measure). However, there are other as-pects of the institution that clearly align with neoliberal gover-nance and these include ‘universal cures and one-best-way policystrategies’ (Peck and Tickell, 2002). Both the ivory trade ban andtrophy hunting are examples of these policy strategies. In particu-lar, the way CITES regulates trophy hunting can be seen as anexample of how local institutional forms of neoliberalism are pre-scribed and implemented by a global institution. Peck and Tickell(2002) also argue that neoliberal governance has developed so thatit is becoming less concerned with market extension and moreconcerned with ‘new modes of social and penal policy making’(p. 389). Indeed, Brockington et al. (2008) engage with Peck andTickells’s (2002) observations to argue that international institu-tions exist to regulate states’ behaviour: to standardise responsesto issues of international concern (i.e. protecting global commonsresources such as elephants from extinction). With regard to CITES,they argue that ‘the idea of neutral scientific management trans-lates into the use of prohibition, or the threat of prohibition, as anorm – that is, a standard rule to regulate the behaviour of parties’(p. 151). In this sense, the ivory trade ban can be seen as beingcompatible with a form of neoliberalism that seeks to regulatebehaviour of individual states via global standardised norms. Thisis certainly a trend that became important in international politicsduring the 1980s when neoliberalism rose to prominence.

58 L. Moore / Geoforum 42 (2011) 51–60

However, I argue that CITES is doing more than this. I believe thatthe regulatory measures associated with the 1999 and 2008 stock-pile sales, combined with the 9 year moratorium on all future salesof ivory, is an experiment to see if sustainable trade in ivory cantake place in the ‘one-way-best’ fashion. In essence, CITES couldbe rolling-out new forms of institutional hardware, which Peckand Tickell (2002) also highlight is an example of new regulatoryneoliberalism. We will not know whether the ivory trade ban is atemporary measure until the 9 year moratorium on all future salesof ivory is at an end. It may also be the case that the socially pro-duced preservationist elephant is still too powerful to allow tradein ivory to resume.

The socially produced elephant is powerful competition for con-sumption of the biophysical elephant (its teeth, hair and skin).Building on Brockington et al. (2008) and Brockington and Schol-field (2010), this elephant is a powerful construction because it isinstrumental in shaping people’s relationships with the biophysi-cal elephant (especially in rendering ivory a socially unacceptablecommodity to own in the Global North). As such, the influence ofthese images extends beyond capitalist accumulation of wealthand set a standard for how people should engage with nature (theyhave come to define people’s values; Carrier, 2010). This is both aproduct of and driver to neoliberalism. As Brockington andScholfield (2010) point out, neoliberalism has enabled the influ-ence of conservation NGOs to grow in this way. This is due to thevital role NGOs were believed to play in international developmentduring the 1980s, particularly in relation to fostering goodgovernance and democratisation (Harrison, 2005; Jenkins, 2002;Brockington et al., 2008). Therefore, the role NGOs play in theroll-out of neoliberal governance, combined with their power toshape people’s perceptions and use of nature, demonstrates oneway in which the actions of conservation NGOs assist in the neolib-eralisation of nature.

It is clear that the advocates of preservation and utilisation in-formed approaches to elephant conservation draw-on the ‘ele-phant commodities’ and discourses they produce to advancetheir aims. By doing this, NGOs also deepen neoliberal forms ofgovernance. As such, this article has demonstrated that even incases where the commodification of nature is partial and con-tested, nature can still be drawn into neoliberal forms of gover-nance. This observation provides a new dimension to McCarthyand Prudham’s (2004) statement that environmental movementsmay pose one of the most fundamental forms of resistance to neo-liberalism. This is because while social movements may resist theneoliberalisation (or use of markets) to value biophysical elementsof the environment, these social movements often rely on imagesof the environment that are available for sale to do so. Therefore,elephant conservation will continue to be funded through marketactivity. People will either continue to consume the preservation-ists’ image of the elephant, or consume parts of the biophysical ele-phant. Either way, the elephant is still paying for its conservation.

2. Conclusion

By exploring Namibia’s experience of implementing an elephantconservation policy based on sustainable utilisation, this article hasdemonstrated that social resistance to marketising natural re-sources need not necessarily prevent the neoliberalisation andcommodification of nature. In particular, the article has highlightedthat the commodification of elephants is both complex and con-tested, as the ways in which elephants can be commodified are re-lated to opposing socio-cultural values: preservation andutilisation. Both preservation and utilisation rhetoric associatedwith the ivory trade ban result in the production of elephants with-in the social relations of capitalism. To focus on utilisation

informed approaches to elephant conservation first, the paperhas highlighted that applying market based approaches to ele-phant conservation, and particularly calculating the TEV of ele-phants, is fraught with many conceptual (conflicting values) andmethodological (absent markets) complexities. These complexitiesprevent the TEV of elephants being calculated. Therefore any calcu-lation of TEV is based on a limited number of existing markets, butmostly surrogate markets. Under a neoclassical economics ap-proach, this would suggest that the elephant is a proxy commodity(see also Bakker, 2003, 2007; Castree, 2003). However, advocates ofutilisation frame the ivory trade ban as the key way in which ele-phants are devalued, to the expense of other important complexi-ties associated with applying a market based approach to elephantconservation. Although it is accepted that preventing trade in ivorydoes not allow the elephants to be valued for their ivory, lifting theivory trade ban would not solve the other problems associatedwith applying a market based approach to conservation associatedwith calculating the TEV of elephants. As such, the article arguedthat the utilisation response is embedded within a cultural argu-ment and a history of utilisation in Southern Africa. This resultsin the social production of an elephant that is under-valued andthreatened with extinction.

Although advocates of preservation are against the use of ele-phants, their efforts to maintain the ivory trade ban have also re-sulted in the social production of a charismatic and vulnerableelephant that is very lucrative. This elephant has wide-spread ap-peal to people in the Global North, who are concerned about thewell being of this gentle and charismatic animal that is threatenedby poachers. As such, people are willing to pay a lot of money toensure its protection. Therefore, the ivory trade ban has becomeassociated with a socially produced elephant that is far more valu-able to people in the Global North than ivory. This has allowed thepreservation movement to open new ways in which elephants canbe commodified. These new ‘elephant commodities’ are in directcompetition with the body parts of the biophysical elephant, tothe extent that resource economists in Namibia recognise thatthe existence value associated with elephants is in direct conflictwith Namibia’s desire to trade in ivory.

By undertaking these analyses, this article has clearly demon-strated that commodification, neoliberalism, and the relationshipbetween the two is incredibly complex and may appear contradic-tory. This complexity is illuminated through the conflicting waysin which the advocates of preservation and utilisation produce,commodify and take part in the neoliberalisation of the elephant.Therefore, exploring the different ways in which stakeholders in-volved in elephant conservation produce nature has allowed thearticle to demonstrate that commodifying nature can deepen theneoliberalisation of nature, even if the extent to which nature iscommodified is partial and contested. In the case of elephant conser-vation, advocates of preservation and utilisation use the commodi-ties they produce to advance their aims and in so doing, deepenneoliberal forms of governance. Whether neoliberal governance isextended through trophy hunting (and other regulatory proceduresassociated with CITES), campaigning for or against regulated tradein ivory, or selling images of elephants that appeal to the values ofthe Global North, each of these approaches impact on people’s rela-tionships with nature. Therefore, it is clear that regardless of thetrade ban in ivory, elephants will continue to pay for their conserva-tion, through trophy hunting or consumption of the preservation-ists’ image of the elephant (in books, television, charitabledonations or photographic safari holidays in Africa or Asia).

Acknowledgments

First, I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and theeditor for their valuable comments on my manuscript. I would also

L. Moore / Geoforum 42 (2011) 51–60 59

like to thank Prof. Rosaleen Duffy and Dr. Daniel Brockington forgiving me the opportunity to present an earlier version of this pa-per at the Manchester University Symposium on Capitalism andConservation, 9th–10th September 2008. Finally, this researchwould not have been possible without funding from the Depart-ment of Politics and IR, Lancaster University.

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Further reading

Interviewees

R1 – MET, Senior Civil Servant, MET, Windhoek, 05.06.06.R2 – Directorate of Environmental Affairs, MET, Windhoek, 24.01.06.R3 – Directorate of Environmental Affairs, MET, Windhoek, 07.04.06.R4 – Department of Parks and Wildlife, MET, Windhoek, 10.05.06.R6 – Directorate of Scientific Services, MET, Windhoek, 19.05.06.R7 – Directorate of Scientific Services, MET, Windhoek, 20.04.06.R8 – Directorate of Scientific Services, MET, Windhoek, 10.05.06.R13 – Former Natural Resource Economist, DEA, MET, Windhoek, 30.03.06.R14 – International Conservation NGO, Windhoek, 31.01.06.R15 – International Conservation NGO, Windhoek, 30.02.06 and 11.05.06.R15.2 – International Conservation NGO, Windhoek, 11.05.06.R26, National Conservation NGO, Windhoek, 15.02.06.R50 – Technical Advisor to Bilateral Donor Organisation, Windhoek,

13.02.06.R56 – Former Employee of Department of Nature Conservation under South African

Administration, Windhoek, 26.05.06.R119 – Expert in Asian Elephant Conservation, Kenya, 30.10.2009.