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Transcript of The National Taxpayer Advocate of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service is convening the Inaugural...
The National Taxpayer Advocate of the
U.S. Internal Revenue Service is convening the Inaugural
International Conference on Taxpayer Rights
in Washington, D.C
Erich KirchlerUniversity of Vienna, Austria
2015
Slippery Slope Framework: The Impact of Power and Trust on
Taxpayer Compliance Behavior
1
ThanksTeam (actual)• Barbara Hartl• Christoph Kogler• Eva Hofmann• Janina Enachescu• Jennifer Stark• Linda Dezsö• Jerome Olsen• Matthias Kasper• Sebastian Beer
Team (past members)• Barbara Kastlunger• Stephan Muehlbacher• Boris Maciejovsky• Erik Hoelzl• Herbert Schwarzenberger• Katharina Gangl• Ingrid Wahl
• Master and PhD students
Guests• Anca Nichita• Larissa Batrancea• József Pántya
International cooperation• Henk Elffers (baptized: Slippery Slope
Framework) • James Alm• Jane Frecknall-Hughes• Veronika Grimm• Claus Lamm• Lucia Mannetti• Luigi Mittone• Aloys Prinz• Michael Wenzel• Paul Webley• Brian Erard• Valerie Braithwaite (Sabbatical)• Cooperation with colleagues in 44 countries• …
2
Overview
Social representations & attitudes towards taxes
Determinants of compliance and research paradigms Decisions under risk Understanding, services, norms and
fairness Interaction climate
Slippery Slope Framework Behavioral Insight
3
Taxes
Fundamental activities of the state are,
… collecting revenues to fund public activities, and
… using taxes, charges and levies to influence and regulate markets as well as the behavior of citizens and organizations.
… (Progressive) taxes are also an instrument to re-distribute excessive differences in wealth.
Imposts can be used as an instrument to indirectly shape human behavior. Providing incentives and disincentives by decreasing or increasing costs enables the state to exert control over undesirable but legal behavior such as smoking, drinking alcohol, and eating unhealthy foods, or to discourage objectionable business activities (Freiberg, 2010, p. 122).
4
Oishi, S., Schimmack, U. & Diener, E.(2011). Progressive taxation and the subjective well-being of nations. Psychological Science, 23, 86-92. Fig. 1. Scatter plot (with best-fitting regression line) showing mean global-life-evaluation rating as a function of progressive taxation (calculated as the difference between the highest and lowest tax rate; N = 54 nations).
Copyright © by Association for Psychological
Science5
Most citizens appreciate public goods and agree with policy regulations,
but many perceive their own contributions too high relative to what they get back.
Giving and Receiving
6
Average perceived public expenditures and desired expenditures for various public goods, and perceived subjective utility and desired utility of public goods (Kirchler, 1997; 1 = very low, 5 = very high)
Public goodsPerceived amount of public expenditures
Education 2.99 1.10 4.16 0.77 2.62 1.31 3.54 1.36
Science and research 2.38 1.03 3.87 1.00 2.08 1.16 3.27 1.18
Pubic health 3.74 1.25 4.08 0.89 3.17 1.24 3.99 0.92
Economic development 3.21 1.07 2.89 0.99 2.11 1.13 2.75 1.20
Art and culture 3.37 1.12 2.67 0.94 2.47 1.25 3.10 1.18
Agriculture 2.85 1.04 3.23 0.99 2.12 1.12 2.61 1.32
Military defense 3.26 1.43 2.42 1.15 1.74 1.00 2.23 1.25
Social security 3.90 1.10 3.67 0.93 2.31 1.14 3.29 1.10
Public security 3.06 0.90 3.65 0.89 2.81 1.07 3.53 1.03
Construction of streets 3.46 1.27 3.13 0.96 3.17 1.14 3.33 1.04
Public transport 3.14 1.04 3.38 0.90 2.72 1.14 3.35 1.09
Housing construction 3.20 1.10 3.68 1.10 2.05 1.27 3.26 1.32
M SD
Total 3.21 0.38 3.43 0.41 2.45 0.65 3.19 0.63
Desired amount of public expenditures
Perceived individual utility of public goods
Desired individual utility of public expenditures
M SD M SD M SD
7
Overview
Social representations & attitudes towards taxes
Determinants of compliance and research paradigms Decisions under risk Understanding, services, norms and
fairness Interaction climate
Slippery Slope Framework Behavioral Insight
8
Fynantzer = Landbetrieger, der die Leute umbs Geld bescheisset
Basilius Faber, 1680Thesaurus editionis scholasticae
Tax inspector = Impostor who screws people for their money
Representations of taxes
9
-1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
-1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
-1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
Evaluation
Hard-working (vs. lazy)
Intelligent (vs. stupid)
Honest taxpayers
Typical taxpayers
Tax avoiders
Tax evaders
Honest taxpayers
Typical taxpayers
Tax avoiders
Tax evaders
Honest taxpayers
Typical taxpayers
Tax avoiders
Tax evaders
-1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
-1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
-1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 Stu
dy in
pro
gres
s (K
irchl
er, E
. et a
l., 2
015)
: N =
64
whi
te c
olar
wor
kers
, sel
f-em
ploy
ed, s
tude
nts
Representations of taxes
10
Tax mentality has deteriorated
4 factors• 85% feel high tax pressure• 2/3 claim, the temporal and
financial burden to file taxes is too high
• The tax system is unjust• 95% claim, the government
spends tax money thriftlessly
Germans have a tense relationship with taxes; however, they feel it is important to adhere to tax law
11
Tax morale and shadow economy Bruno Frey & Benno TorglerTax morale = intrinsic motivation to comply
13
□
□
□□□□□
□□□
□ □□
□ □□
Italy
Belgium
PortugalSpain
Sweden
Norway
FinlandNetherlands
IrelandFrance
Switzerland
GermanyDenmark
Great BritainAustria
USA
0
10
20
30
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Degree of Tax Morale
Siz
e of
Sha
dow
Eco
nom
y (in
% o
f the
GD
P)
Social representations and attitudes drive behavior
(Schmölders, 1950s: tax mentality as attitude towards taxation and taxes = tax morale = attitudes = social representations etc.)
Tax morale and size of shadow economy (Alm & Torgler, 2005)
(Tax morale can be defined as a moral obligation to pay taxes, a belief in contributing to society by paying taxes.” (Torgler & Schneider, 2007; retrieved 2015-11-05 from http://ftp.iza.org/dp2541.pdf)
Overview
Social representations & attitudes towards taxes
Determinants of compliance and research paradigms Decisions under risk Understanding, services, norms and
fairness Interaction climate
Slippery Slope Framework Behavioral Insight
14
Tax rateIncomeAudit probabilityFines
Tax compliance 1
Tax evasion
1 - p
p
No audit
Audit
Net income
Net income + evaded amount
Net income - fine
How to increase tax compliance ?Decision under risk
Allingham & Sandmo (1972); Srinivasan (1973)
Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76, 169-217.
Sure option
Risky option
15
The effect of deterrence measures is weak and sometimes oppostite to the intended effect…
Enforcing tax compliance: Command and control
Deterrence matters, but …
Metaanalyses
Andreoni, J., Erard, B., & Feinstein, J. S. (1998). Tax compliance. Journal of Economic Literature, 36(2), 818-860.
Kirchler, E., Muehlbacher, S., Kastlunger, B. & Wahl, I. (2010). Why pay taxes? A review of tax compliance decisions. In J. Alm, J. Martinez-Vazques & B. Torgler (eds.). Developing Alternative Frameworks for Explaining Tax Compliance (pp. 15-31). London: Routledge.
16
17
Command and control …is a simple answer to a complex phenomenon
For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong.
Henry Louis Mencken (12 September 1880-29 January 1956), was a twentieth-century journalist, satirist, social critic, cynic, and freethinker, known as the "Sage of Baltimore" and the "American Nietzsche”.
Enforcing tax complianceAudits and fines are necessary, but there is more…
What effect have fines ?What effect have repeated audits ?
(fine = price; bomb-crater effect; echo effect etc.)
18
Overview
Social representations & attitudes towards taxes
Determinants of compliance and research paradigms Decisions under risk Understanding, services, norms and
fairness Interaction climate
Slippery Slope Framework Behavioral Insight
19
211955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2000
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
Income taxes only
Entire tax code
Thousands of words
Growth in number of words in the IRS Code from 1955 to 2000; adopted from www. taxfoundation/org/compliancetestimony.html; quoted in Owens and Hamilton (2004)
22
Tax law is not always clear…
Moser (1994) undertook a linguistic analysis of tax laws and claims several bad habits which make it difficult for ordinary taxpayers to understand the law.
Lewis (1982) reports that the necessary education to understand the law is between 12 and 17 years in USA, UK, and Australia, respectively.
Readability is the ease with which text can be read and understood. Various factors to measure readability have been used, such as "speed of perception," "perceptibility at a distance," "perceptibility in peripheral vision," "visibility," "the reflex blink technique," "rate of work" (e.g., speed of reading), “eye movements” and fatigue in reading.“The Flesch formulas: Flesch-Kincaid readability test
Nina E. Olson
Taxpayers hire preparers because the tax code is hideously complex, return preparation is anything but straightforward, and a lot of money is on the line.
23
More Than a ‘Mere’ Preparer: Loving and Return Preparation By Nina E. Olson Retrieved 2015-11-14 from http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/nta_taxnotes_lovingcase.pdf
Tax laws are not always clear…
Efforts to simplify the law are undertaken in almost all countries.
“I hold in my hand 1,379 pages of tax simplification.” U.S. congressman Delbert L. Latta
4. Mediation analyses:Private taxpayers
Sobel test: z = 2.57, p < .01Sobel test for mediation analyses with control variables (socio-demographic, economic and psychological): z = 2.20, p < .05
Service Tax compliance
Trust
0.74*** 0.13**
(0.22***) 0.12**
27
4. Mediation analyses:Entrepreneurs
Sobel test: z = 3.72, p < .001Sobel test for mediation analyses with control variables (socio-demographic, economic and psychological): z = 1.80, p < .05
Service Tax compliance
Trust
0.73*** 0.14**
(0.22***) 0.11**
28
Bo Rothstein (2000):
Two conditions need to be fulfilled:
taxpayers need to trust that other taxpayers are paying their share, and
rather than filling the pockets of tax
bureaucrats tax authorities have to ensure that the money is invested in public welfare.
Fairness and social norms
29
Fairness – capuchin monkeys
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lKhAd0Tyny0
• Distributive justice refers to the exchange of resources, both
benefits and costs• Horizontal justice (distribution of taxes and resources between taxpayers of
comparable income groups)• Vertical justice (distribution of taxes and resources across income groups)• Exchange justice (fairness of tax payments and governmental provision of public
goods and taxpayers’ participation)
• Procedural justice refers to processes • (Leventhal, 1980: consistent, accurate and free of errors, representative and
ethical, and correctable in case of errors; see Tom Tylor)
• Retributive and restorative justice refer to perceived appropriateness of sanctions in case of norm breaking
Fairness
Diffusion of income tax evasion
Elffers (2000) writes, “[…] the gloomy picture of massive tax evasion is a phantom”.
31
Estimations of shadow economy (% of GDP)
(by Friedrich Schneider - January 2015; proxy for tax evasion)
USA 5.9
Canada 10.3
Australia 10.3
Europe (average 31 countries) 18.0
Retrieved 2015-11-07 from http://www.econ.jku.at/members/Schneider/files/publications/2015/ShadEcEurope31.pdf
Switzerland 6.5Austria 8.2UK 9.4Germany 12.2Italy 20.6Greece 22.4Romania 28.0Bulgaria 30.6
Tax law is not always clear… Complexity and unclear law opened space for interpretations, negotiations etc.The concern of legality grew with growing business globalisation, increasing complexity of business structures, the nature of financing and transactions, and tax flight by establishing businesses off shore, tax heavens, and money laundering (Owens & Hamilton, 2004). Modern organised noncompliant business acts within the law, exploiting the law’s shortcomings and loopholes.
The Problem is: Tax Avoidance
33
Amancio Ortega GaonaInditext (e.g., Zara, Massimo Dutti, Bershka)
Wealth: 70,7 Billion US$ (2015) - Forbes
34
News agency Bloomberg shows effects of profit shifting in 2014: Inditext (e.g., Zara, Massimo Dutti, Bershka) owns a small company located in the Netherlands, employing 173 people who made a profit in 2013 which is larger than the profit of the firms in Italy, France, Germany, GB in the past 5 years. Each employee made a profit of 3.1 Mio Euro. This small company is 7 times as profitable as Apple.
(Source: Die Presse, 18 March 2015)
35
Tim Cook
36
In an exclusive interview with the Financial Times ahead of the report’s
publication, Mr Maestri called the investigation 'very unfortunate.'
'We know that we didn’t do anything that was against the law…'… We simply followed the laws in the country over the 35 years that we have been in Ireland.'
… it is legal !
Apple under InvestigationBusiness Insider UK, September 29, 2014
37
ProblemEnforcement matters,…
thus, audits and fines are at least in part effective,
… but they are not reaching out to legal tax avoidance.
Audits and fines are ineffective in fighting tax planning against the spirit of the law, as long
as tax planning ranges within the brackets of the letter of the law.
38
To effectively combat aggressive tax avoidance and to increase tax justice, Hey, Schreiber, Pönnighaus and Bierbrauer (2013) underline the need for an international consensus how to jointly regulate taxpaying behavior of people and businesses. It is necessary to respond to multinational corporations’ activities by developing rules and instruments to effectively control and influence their behavior to enforce compliance.
It is necessary to establish a sense of wrong-doing in the society, a reflected judgment of unfairness of tax avoidance and evasion, and to effectively regulate taxpaying behavior.
How shall a sense of wrong-doing be established in the society?It is necessary to invest in a climate of cooperation basing on power of authorities and trust in authorities.
Tax avoidance
43
Harsh Criticism
Starbucks paid „voluntarily“ money to HMRC (Volontarily? What? Taxes? Donation ? Charity ?)
Retrieved 2015-11-14 from http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-23019514
44
Change of Perspective
View of humankind: Rational (egoistic) utility maximizers
All pursue the same goals
Education strategies: audits and fines
Change of Perspective
View of humankind: Social beings interacting in a social system
Strategies: positive interaction climate (trust, power)
Co-operative Relationships
OECD: Co-operative Compliance
Revenue bodies and their relationships with taxpayers and tax intermediaries need to be built on the principle of reciprocity. All parties shall be open to enhanced level of dialogue and co-operation.
Co-operative Relationships
Horizontal Monitoring (2005, The Netherlands, Austria-pilot, etc.)
Standard method of customs checking is characterized by “vertical supervision” and distrust.
Horizontal supervision operates on the basis of (reason based) trust.Compliance agreement bases on the key values
mutual trust, understanding and transparency.
Overview
Social representations & attitudes towards taxes
Determinants of compliance and research paradigms Decisions under risk Understanding, services, norms and
fairness Interaction climate
Slippery Slope Framework Behavioral Insight
50
The Slippery Slope Framework
Perception of authoritiesPower of authorities: perceived potential of tax
authorities to detect and to punish evasionTrust in authorities: taxpayers‘ perception of tax
authorities as benevolent and working for the common goodBehaviour of taxpayers
Compliance: degree of cooperation by taxpayersEnforced compliance vs voluntary cooperation
Power of Authorities
Maximum
Minimum Minimum
Trust in Authorities
Maximum
Compliance
Minimum
Maximum
Enforced Tax Compliance
Voluntary Tax Cooperation
Compliance
Minimum
Maximum
Synergistic climate
Subjective complexity of tax lawTax morale and attitudesPersonal, social and societal normsFairness considerationsMotivational postures
Antagonistic climate:Command and controlAuditsFines
Slippery Slope FrameworkKirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl (2008)
Authority’s capacity to detect
and punish taxevaders
Authority’ benevolence and
investment in common
good 52
Experimental testing of the main assumptions of the slippery slope framework in 44 countries on 5 continents
Cross-cultural testing of the SSF 44 countries study
53
Africa Asia Europe North America
Australia South America
EgyptGhana
MoroccoSouth Africa
BhutanChina
Hong KongIndia
IndonesiaIran
IsraelJapan
PakistanRussia
South KoreaThailandTurkey
UAE
AustriaFinlandFrance
GermanyGreece
HungaryIceland
ItalyLithuania
MaltaNorwayPoland
RomaniaSlovenia
SpainSweden
Switzerland
CanadaMexico
USA
Australia BrazilColombia
54
Research: 44 Countries
Power Low/ Trust Low
Power High/ Trust Low
Power Low/ Trust High
Power High/ Trust High
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9Intended Tax Compliance
Voluntary Tax Compliance
Enforced Tax Compliance
Taxcompliance
Power low / trust low
Power high/ trust low
Power low / trust high
Power high/ trust high
56
57
58
India -1.55 0.000Iran -1.53 0.000Pakistan -1.28 0.000Indonesia -0.82 0.008Egypt -0.55 0.055Mexico -0.52 0.057Ghana -0.35 0.349France -0.34 0.353Romania-0.31 0.323Turkey -0.24 0.488UAE -0.20 0.611Norway -0.18 0.484Bhutan -0.16 0.611Israel -0.10 0.742Lithuania -0.07 0.814Morocco -0.01 0.972South Africa -0.00 0.990Portugal 0.06 0.849Slovenia 0.11 0.763Malta 0.13 0.682Thailand 0.18 0.568USA 0.20 0.617
Ireland 0.23 0.510Colombia 0.30 0.415Russia 0.37 0.248Finland 0.48 0.049China 0.50 0.109Sweden 0.50 0.069Australia 0.52 0.093Spain 0.53 0.086Brazil 0.54 0.066Hungary 0.63 0.074Greece 0.63 0.047UK 0.68 0.081Italy 0.70 0.015Austria 0.80 0.019Canada 0.82 0.028Hong Kong 0.88 0.021Switzerland 0.94 0.001Poland 1.11 0.000Iceland 1.12 0.000Germany 1.27 0.000Japan 1.88 0.000South Korea 1.90 0.000
Country t-value p
OECD
59
Coercive power - harsh power Legitimate power – soft power
(French & Raven, 1959; Raven, 1965, 1992, 1993; Raven, Schwarzwald & Koslowsky, 1998)
Coercive power: Bases of power are force and pressure, either through punishment and withdrawal of rewards
60
Legitimate power: Bases of power are legitimization and expertise
Low legitimate power
Low reason-based trust
Voluntary compliance
targeted
High coercive power
High coercive power
Anger
not targeted
Fear
Rational decision: hiding/
enforced compliance
Enforced compliance
+
not targetedtargeted
Attention/prudence
Low coercive power
Voluntary compliance
Protection/security
High legitimate power
High reason-based trust
-
Low coercive power
Evasion
61
Corruption
Transparency International (2014)
62
Corruption Perception Index
Variable B SE B β
Constan
t
56.80 1.46
Trust 9.56 2.44 .50***
Power 7.87 2.44 .41**
R2 .75
F 62.21***
Note. N = 44
**p < .01. ***p < .001.
Corruption
Trus
t
Power
Cor
rupt
ion
Per
cept
ion
Inde
x
Shadow Economy
Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro (2010)64
Shadow Economy Index
Variable B SE B β
Constan
t
22.98 1.12
Trust -2.51 1.86 -.27
Power -3.55 1.86 -.38
R2 .39
F 12.95***
Note. N = 44
***p < .001.
Shadow economy
Trus
t
Power
Sha
dow
Eco
nom
y In
dex
Happiness
Veenhoven (2009)66
Veenhoven Happiness
Variable B SE B β
Constan
t
6.69 .11
Trust .165 .18 .18
Power .468 .18 .50*
R2 .42
F 14.75***
Note. N = 43
*p < .05. ***p < .001.
National Happiness
Trus
t
Power
Vee
nhov
en H
appi
ness
Overview
Social representations & attitudes towards taxes
Determinants of compliance and research paradigms Decisions under risk Understanding, services, norms and
fairness Interaction climate
Slippery Slope Framework Behavioral Insight
68
Deterrence (audits and fines)
Power (legitimization, professionalism and coercive power)
&
Trust building measures
Power matters!Power must be legitimized: power of authorities is effective if citizens trust the authorities. Trust is the necessary bases of power.Coercive power is effective if it is well targeted to prevent exploitation of cooperative citizens (leading to feelings of protection rather than fear and anger)
From enforced to voluntary compliance
69
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qEa_KnOhY-Y
Wrap up
Change your perspective
70
http://www.irs.com/
71
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-revenue-customs
72
https://www.efd.admin.ch/efd/de/home.html
73
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Web/DE/Home/home.html
74
http://government.ru/en/department/69/events/
75
http://uk.fm.dk/
76
Home page of the Finnish Ministry of Finance
http://www.vero.fi/en-US (retrieved 15-11-2013)
77
http://www.mnec.gr/?q=el
78
Home page of the Austrian Ministry of Finance
https://www.bmf.gv.at (retrieved 15-11-2013)
79
https://www.bmf.gv.at/
80