THE NARRATIVE OF VIETCONG PROPAGANDA

Douglas Wilbur, The University of Texas at San Antonio, Texas, USA

ABSTRACT

This study analyzes the Vietnamese Communist Party’s verbal propaganda during the Vietnam War, 1954-1975, employing the narrative paradigm theory. The study found that the main specified hero character in the narrative is the Vietnamese worker-peasant class. At the same time, the villains had the dominant role and were discussed more than the hero. The narrative had moderate coherency internally, but had less coherency externally when compared to reality. This study contributes to the literature on historical studies of narrative as rhetoric. It has realistic implications for analysis of the political rhetoric in the post-September 11 world.

1. THE NARRATIVE OF VIET CONG PROPAGANDA DURING THE VIETNAM WAR 1954-1975

“Political activities were more important than military activities, and fighting less important than propaganda.” Vo Nguyen Giap in his book, People’s War People’s Army.

The Vietnam War, from 1954-1975, was the climax of the Cold War’s ideological struggle. As we approach the 50th anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which ushered the active commitment of U.S. and allied combat forces, we still have much to learn from the conflict. The perennial question of the Vietnam War is, how and why did the communists prevail over the U.S. and its allies despite having lost nearly every battle? How were they able to command tremendous loyalty from their followers despite nearly 3 million deaths? (Rummel, 1997). Why did they win despite the exorbitant expenditure of material and human resources by the Republic of South Vietnam (Republic) and the U.S. (Latimer, 1973)? This study assumes that communists succeeded because of their skillful use of communication to dominate the conflict’s narrative.

The purpose of this study is to explore how the Vietnamese Communists dominated the war’s narrative through propaganda. This study is important because parallels exist between the Vietnam War and America’s more recent conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. As with South Vietnam, the U.S. is supporting fragile governments against indigenous insurgents aided by foreign powers. Like the Viet Cong, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda rely on propaganda to subvert the local government and win popular support. Thus, a comprehensive understanding about why Viet Cong propaganda was so successful may provide insights applicable to understanding the causes of warfare and insurgency -counter-insurgency conflicts in particular. Nearly all research on Vietnam War rhetoric focuses on the U.S. Government or the anti-war movement. Very few address how the Vietnamese communicated to create their desired reality. The current study is an attempt to fill a void of scholarly analysis.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Vietnamese Communist had a unique propaganda system, but they adopted strategies and tactics from the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. The concept of propaganda has multiple and conflicting definitions, but it is a form of persuasive communication (Cunningham, 2002). It employs the manipulation of symbols and symbolic action through every form of media and all channels of communication (Smith, 1989; Aronson and Pratkanis, 2001). Value judgments about propaganda are beyond the scope of this study. Thus, I will adopt the value neutral definition developed by the late Philip Taylor, Ph.D. from the University of Leeds. It states, “Propaganda is a process of persuasion which utilizes any available means (media) to persuade people (target audiences) to think and/or behave in a manner desired by the source in order to benefit the interests of that source, either directly or indirectly.” (Taylor, 2011).

3. PROPAGANDA IN THE MARXIST TRADITION

Marxism is essentially a materialist world-view that encompasses all aspects of human life. Marxism demands a revolutionary struggle in which communism gains ascendency over a capitalist system. Marxists view history as an evolutionary process where societies inevitably start at tribalism and evolve from feudalism to capitalism, culminating in communism. Conflict is created by a socio-economic class struggle between the upper-class bourgeoisies and the proletariat lower classes (Meyer, 1970). Marxists need propaganda to raise class-consciousness amongst the proletariat in order to incite them to revolution (Flasker, 1971). The Soviet Union was the first state to actualize Marxist theory and develop institutions dedicated to propaganda.

The Soviets conceptually divided propaganda into two categories, agitation and propaganda known as Agit-Prop (Lilly, 1994). Agitation is considered to be a form of propaganda for this study. Agitation provokes the target audience into a specific action by manipulating their emotions (Ellul, 1965). Agitation is an essential activity during a revolutionary struggle and has primacy during the early stages of a conflict (Clews, 1964). To indoctrinate the masses, the Soviets used a long-term approach they referred to as propaganda. Jacques Ellul and other scholars have described this as integrative propaganda (Ellul, 1965). Integrative propaganda sought to erase old values and beliefs and replace them with new communists ones. Propaganda was essential for sustaining a difficult revolutionary struggle and for manufacturing the population’s compliance with the communist lifestyle (Lilly, 1994).

Mao Zedong adapted Marxist theory to conditions in China (Rice, 1972). He believed that propaganda could transform the identity and belief structure of his entire nation (Lu, 1999). Revolutionary China was a feudalistic rural society with less communication infrastructure than the Soviet Union. Thus, he created what Ellul referred to as a horizontal propaganda system. It used specially trained cadres operating in a decentralized manner to disseminate propaganda, using the few media products available as training aides (Jan, 1967). Vertical systems rely more upon centrally controlled media outlets to disseminate propaganda. The Chinese people were immersed into a network of organizations designed to impart Maoist ideology and control their behavior accordingly (Yu, 1970). The Vietnamese borrowed heavily from Mao’s propaganda techniques, because of cultural and ideological similarity (Pike, 1966).

4. VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

The Vietnamese Communists considered propaganda to be an essential and indispensible part of their doctrine and conceived that all military and nonmilitary activities should have propaganda value. The communists employed a unique strategy called Dau Tranh that integrated political and military activities as two interdependent prongs working together to achieve victory. Military actions would seek to support specific political effects, while political efforts could create conditions necessary for military victory. Propaganda was the blood of the Dau Tranh strategy and gave life to both military and political activities (Pike, 1969). The Vietnamese Communists employed the agitation and propaganda model developed by the Soviets and used by the Chinese. (Conley, 1967; Trullinger, 1980). Integration propaganda seems to have been dominant in the Communist controlled north, since they were trying to consolidate power and build a socialist state (Kellen, 1966). Propaganda existed in the South, but it was mostly directed at people actively serving the communist cause and party members in particular.

The Vietnamese Communists employed a horizontal propaganda system that sought to encompass individuals in a vast social network of organizations that controlled their behavior and shaped their attitudes (Pike, 1966). These networks conducted the bulk of propaganda dissemination with few if any media resources to support their efforts (Trullinger, 1980). The hallmark of their horizontal system was the self-criticism session known as Kiem Thao where members criticized each other’s lack of zeal or unrevolutionary behavior. Studies conducted at the time revealed that the self-criticism technique was very effective with maintaining group cohesion and compelling sacrifice (Donnell, Pauker, and Zasloff, 1965; Koch, 1973).

The communists had Armed Propaganda Teams specifically assigned to disseminate propaganda. However, most party and loyal National Liberation Front (NLF) members were actively engaged in disseminating propaganda (Pike, 1966). The communist’s main channel of communication was interpersonal since they had very limited material resources. Logistical difficulties restricted the

acquisition of paper and ink required for print products like newspapers. Radio broadcasts were minimized by a lack of consumer radios and reliable sources of power for them. Radio stations were also susceptible to jamming or destruction by U.S. military forces. The print and radio products were also of generally poor technical quality, which limited their competitiveness against higher quality USG media products (Kodosky, 2006).

5. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE NARRATIVE PARADIGM

The Narrative Paradigm theory will serve as the framework of analysis for this study. A cardinal assumption of the narrative research is that the narrative itself is the unit of analysis (Harding, 2012). Narratives are stories that people use to make meaning of life in a manner that guides actions. Narratives are also used by elites to legitimize and perpetuate existing power structures (Baker, 2006). Narrative theory assumes that most people comprehend life as a series of ongoing and overlapping stories with characters, plots and timelines (Fisher, 1984). Somers and Gibson (1994) have identified four different types of narratives, ontological, public, conceptual, and meta-narrative. Ontological narratives help a person make sense of their lives and offer a guide to action. Personal narratives are stories that we tell to our selves about our role in the world. Public narratives are those that are those developed at cultural and institutional levels. Finally, meta-narratives are master stories that exist at a macro level that codify the major aspects of reality in a given age (Somers & Gibson, 1994; Somers, 1997). All of these different types of narratives are inter-related and inform one another. Propaganda might obviously manifest itself as public or meta-narratives, but would undoubtedly influence ontological and personal narratives as well (Harding, 2012).

According to the narrative paradigm theory, an effective narrative requires coherence and fidelity. First, a narrative must be coherent through internal consistency by hanging together from the audience’s perspective (Fisher, 1987). Audiences tend to reject a story that does not flow, present contradictory ideas and is confusing. Coherency is a quality of the entire narrative; most people can recognize and appreciate a good story when they hear one (Griffin, 2009). However, coherency alone does not compel an audience to accept the warrants provided by a story.

A narrative must have fidelity, meaning that there must be congruence between the story and the values and reality of the audience. Ideally, fidelity creates identification between the characters and audience who can imagine them in the story (Fisher, 1987). Fisher offered five issues as tests to assess the fidelity of a narrative, which he referred to as the Logic of Good Reasons. The first asks what are the values embedded in a message. The second asks what the relevance of those values is to the decisions made in the narrative or those that the audience is being called to make. The third asks what are the consequences of adhering to those values for the characters and the audience. The fourth asks how the stories overlap with the world-view of the audience. The final issue explores whether or not the narrative offers an ideal basis of conduct from the audiences perspective (Fisher, 1987). These five issues will be employed here, but the application will be discussed later.

6. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The reason for the obvious success of Vietnamese Communist propaganda is somewhat unclear. How did they use narrative to create the reality that they wanted? The research questions will explore how the communists verbally deployed propaganda and what effects they sought. There are three research questions, the first discussing narrative in general, the second and third deal with Fisher’s theory.

6.1. Research Question One: What was the plot and who the main characters and their means of agency in the narrative of Vietnamese Communist Propaganda?

6.2 Research Question Two: How did the Vietnamese Communists create coherence within the narrative of their propaganda?

6.3 Research Question Three: How did the Vietnamese Communists create fidelity between the audience and the narrative of their propaganda?

7. METHOD

The application of Narrative Paradigm Theory will assess whether the narrative present in the Vietnamese Communist Propaganda artifacts had coherence and fidelity. First, the basic elements of the narrative will be identified and briefly discussed. The plot will be identified and assessed from the perspective of the historical context. Secondly, the various agents and the specific acts they were called upon to do, will be reviewed. Next we will explore the actor’s agency and relevant aspects of the scene (Altman, 2008). The narrative’s coherency will be examined by assessing whether the actors and their acts remain consistent with each other and the plot across the six artifacts. Special attention will be paid to how the narrative coped with threats to its consistency, such as those arising from inherent contradictions between communist doctrine and traditional Vietnamese values.

Narrative fidelity will be assessed using an adapted version of Fisher’s five issues for the logic of good reasons. First we will ask what the values embedded in the narrative were, and if they were communist or more traditional Vietnamese. Secondly, we will explore the relevance of the values espoused in the narrative against the decisions the audience were called to make. Thirdly, we will attempt to identify what the consequences were for the audience members who chose those values. Fourthly, an overlap between the narrative and what the Vietnamese peasant’s world-view would likely have been, will be reviewed. Finally, the congruence between the narrative and the audience’s ideal conduct will be assessed.

Chosen Artifacts

The artifacts chosen for this rhetorical analysis were secret internal communist documents captured during military operations. Six specific documents were randomly chosen for analysis from among a hundred that were assessed. The first document is titled Plan Concerning the Motivation Task in the Immediate Future, written by Chin Vinh on 15 October 1972. The second document, a memoranda titled Problems of Party Leadership in Urban Centers, was printed in North Vietnam by the Tien-Phong Publishing House on 15 January 1965 by the Lao Dong Party’s Training and Education Department.

The third document titled Five Lessons on the Revolution of South Viet-Nam and People’s Revolutionary Party of Vietnam, was written between 1965-1967 by the Propaganda-Training Section from Binh Long. The fourth was a letter written by a person with the initials B.A. to the Saigon Regional Party Committee and Comrade Tu Anh after 1965. The fifth document titled Religion-Proselytizing was written on 27 November 1968 by an unknown author in Binh-Dihn Province. The sixth document was titled Military and Enemy Proselytizing Mission and Activities in Winter and Spring of 67-68, published by Military and Enemy Proselytizing Section 45 on 1 December 1967.

Analysis of Text

Analysis shows that the artifacts did present a consistent narrative view of the war. Texts that appeared to be only for party members were more laden with ideology and were explicit about the role of the party in the conflict. Those for broader NLF audiences were vague about the role of the party and that of communism in postwar Vietnam. Despite this, the plot, the role and identity of the characters, and aspects of the scene present a clear story. Thus, all the artifacts can be viewed as one continuous text for narrative analysis.

The plot evident in the narrative of Vietcong Propaganda is that of a dualistic struggle between the forces of good and evil where only one side can win. This conflict was referred to as the revolution, and it was not explicitly cast as a communist revolution. The proud and resilient Vietnamese people struggled against the cruel American oppressors to liberate themselves and bring peace and prosperity their nation. This is probably the most classic type of plot and would be familiar in most cultures. In accordance with communist ideology capitalist Americans wanted economic domination through neo-colonialist exploitation of Vietnam (Cohn, 2005). The Vietnamese people wanted to be free of oppression from both the colonialists and their own feudalist exploiters. In many ways this narrative was just a continuation of Vietnam’s grand narrative of perennial struggle against foreign domination through a Marxist lens.

The Narrative’s Hero and His Agency

The main specified hero character in this narrative is the Vietnamese worker-peasant class, also referred to as the masses. This is consistent with communist ideology. In Vietnam the peasant farmer comprised the majority of the population. Industrial workers comprised a minority and lived in cities often firmly under the Republic’s control. The masses constituted most of the communist political and military ranks. In the plot they were the primary subjects of exploitation by the oppressors and had the most to gain by the success of the revolution. The document written by B.A. specifies, “the workers and peasants alliance is the basis of the national unified front, and it is the fundamental principle for the national democratic revolution” (Lester, 1991). Wealthier peasants known as the petit bourgeois were considered potential allies to the revolution, but were still suspect since they were involved in some exploitation and tended to support the Republic.

The Lao-Dong or People’s Revolutionary Party was the implied hero, especially within documents that were apparently written for party members. This character’s role was more ambiguous, especially in those documents intended for a more general audience. The documents make it clear that the party was the leader of the worker-peasant class and of the revolution in general. The document written by the author B.A. states, “… If we do not motivate and rally the masses, we will not be able to tip the balance of forces between us and the enemy in the cities to the advantage of the revolution.” (Lester, 1991).The party was not cast as being the main character, because one did not need to be a member to support the revolution. People serving in the Republic could be a part of the revolution even though they could not be party members. The communists probably wanted to deliberately underplay the party’s role in order to avoid alienating potential non-communist supporters of the NLF.

The Vietnamese Communists had numerous means of agency, but the narrative indicates that their political ideology and the motivation of their fighters were the best. Ideology was a weapon that propaganda dispensed. Great emphasis was placed upon the need to disseminate party or NLF policies and political slogans to the people, especially those predisposed to support the Republic. For instance, disseminating policy to Vietnamese Catholics would convince them about the correctness of the front’s cause and that the communists would protect their freedom of religion. The selection of ideology and wording of the policies were tailored to the audience, as indicated by the artifacts.

The narrative calls for the use of ideology to directly attack the enemy in order to reduce his will to fight and cause dissension in the ranks. This strategy did in fact work and caused tremendous problems for the Republic. Poorly educated and trained conscripts serving in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) were often susceptible to class-warfare themes that caused them to distrust their officers, who were often from higher socio-economic classes. Lao Dong Party’s Training and Education Department’s document repeatedly cites the need for using the proper slogan to convey the right ideological principle to exploit time sensitive opportunities. It often ascribes the urban proletariats’ lack of enthusiasm for the revolution, as being caused by a low-level of ideological awareness. Thus, with enough delivery of ideological messages they could eliminate the political backwardness of people not serving their cause.

An allied atrocity, both real and manufactured aroused powerful emotions. Atrocity propaganda is extremely common in warfare and is often effective (Read, 1972). The communists sought to harness the power of hate to benefit the war effort. For instance, the Religion-Proselytizing text states, “In areas where the enemy has used pagodas, temples and churches as their posts, we must point out to the people the enemy crimes of undermining religion and desecrating the sacred places.” (Lester, 1991). In a collectivist society deeply concerned with the preservation of face, it was easy for culturally ignorant Americans to assault Vietnamese social identity. The communist only had to exploit these incidents in a timely manner to provide evidence that their narrative was correct.

The Villain’s and His Agency

In this narrative the villains had the dominant role and were discussed more than the hero. The main villain was the U.S. Government, referred to as the imperialist aggressor. The artifacts consistently referred to American imperialism as the source of Vietnam’s problems. The Americans terrorized the Vietnamese through their immense firepower. According to the Military and Enemy Proselytizing Section 45, the USG employs “criminal schemes” and “cunning and underhanded plots” to manipulate the

Vietnamese people (Lester, 1991). Thus, their violent ruthlessness and their cunningness made them a very formidable enemy. Powerful enemies often require greater courage and determination from the hero and the communists did demand great sacrifice from their ranks.

The most interesting aspect of this character is that the USG was seemingly separated from the American people or common soldiers. In warfare it is common to dehumanize one’s enemy (Reeves, 1986). However, Americans were not dehumanized that much in this narrative. Racial slurs and other ethnic insults about Americans were not present in any of the texts. On the contrary these artifacts call for propagandizing amongst American troops and persuade them to adopt anti-war attitudes. The document from the Military and Enemy Proselytizing Section 45 states, “Strive to motivate U.S Negro and young troops to contact us and surrender or accept work as agents for us.” (Lester, 1991).

The artifacts specifically call upon the cadres to cite the activities of the American anti-war movement. The document written by Chin Vihn states, “The U.S. accepts its responsibility in the reconstruction of our country. In truth, it agrees to pay war compensation.” (Lester, 1991). Thus, the narrative’s main villain is not completely evil and worthy of total destruction as in previous wars. This is probably due to the communist ideological belief that most American soldiers were themselves part of the exploited worker- peasant class who needed to be liberated by revolution within their own country.

The South Vietnamese government and its officials were consistently referred to as either American puppets or the bourgeois feudal exploiter class. The Republic’s identity was so thoroughly fused with that of their American sponsors that they were just an extension of the main villain’s character. The Republic was denied any characterization that could be used as a claim to support its legitimacy as a sovereign government. The document from the Binh-Long Propaganda Training Sections states, “Imperialists use feudalist landlords as a support to maintain their yoke of domination. The Feudalist landlord class relies upon the power of the imperialists to increasingly exploit the laboring people.” (Lester, 1991). Even though the national bourgeois were subservient to their U.S. masters, they would have to be overthrown once the Americans had withdrawn. The masses, on the other hand, were just ignorant or unmotivated and required re-education, but not punishment.

The USG had multiple methods of agency, the U.S. military being the most obvious. However, the communists did not necessarily consider military force to always be the most dangerous method of agency. Since the war was ultimately ideological, the narrative required the villain to present dangerous political threats as well. American culture was represented as a method of manipulation and it was portrayed as perverse and corrupting. American culture was a virus that made men to soft and indulgent for the revolution. Pervasive prostitution amongst Vietnamese women and the rise of a consumer culture were specifically cited as threats. The text by the Binh-Long Propaganda Training Section states, “They have been trying to poison the minds of the people, especially youth, living in controlled areas by immoral books, magazines and motion pictures, and they use money to buy off and deceive these people.” (Lester, 1991).

Narrative Coherency

The narrative of Vietnamese Communist Propaganda had moderate coherency internally, but had less coherency externally when compared to reality. The actors and aspects of the scene remained relatively consistent with the plot over time and throughout the artifacts. The actions of the characters were biased and one-sided when compared to reality. The actions of the imperialist villains and their puppets were generally more consistent with the plot than those of the heroes. The communist party was the most problematic character in the narrative and offered the most vulnerabilities for the hero. The role of the North Vietnamese was almost non-existent as a character in the narrative even though they bore the brunt of the fighting after the Tet-Offensive (Moyar, 2006).

Coherency of the Hero

The hero’s actions were generally coherent when viewed against the plot, but less when compared to reality. One of the most interesting findings is that the masses were portrayed as a reluctant hero that did not always respond to the calls of the revolution. Specific combat units were not mentioned even though it was stated that the revolution won many military victories. One would expect the hero to do heroic things

in accordance with the good vs. evil plot. No mentions were made of specific revolutionary heroes as one might find in war propaganda, who would serve as role models to others. In reality, the revolution was replete with heroes who scarified themselves and would have been known within their communities. Vietnamese history has many war heroes, especially those who fought against the Chinese. This doesn’t mean that individual heroes were not used; the individual propagandist probably did cite local heroes. This could be rooted in a desire not to glorify the individual at the expense of the group, or from a fear of creating future rivals of party leaders.

Instead, the masses were often portrayed as victims of oppression who needed to fight their oppressors. This further indicates that the villain is the primary character in the narrative. The relative passivity of the masses did reflect reality to an extent, especially later in the war as the Viet Cong’s strength was severely depleted through attrition warfare and desertion. Passivity may have been a problem for the communists at the particular time and place where the documents were written. However, it is more likely that the communists wanted to shift the narrative’s focus onto the villain and their crimes against the masses. The enemy’s misdeeds provide better material for agitation to arouse the masses for combat. The masses’ passivity and reluctance to make sacrifices for the revolution may also reflect the party and other NLF members’ true opinion of the masses.

The communist party’s actions were more consistent with the actions of a hero in a narrative, in that they were active in their role to defeat the villain. The party’s actions were consistent within the plot in that they led and educated the masses during the revolution. According the document from the Binh-Long Propaganda Training Section, “The Party has been attached to the masses and gained the confidence and love of the masses. The laboring masses readily make sacrifice to fight under the Party’s flag.” (Lester, 1991). The party was mentioned far less frequently than the masses, but almost always in a positive light. The party also accepted responsibility for shortcomings and failures against the villain, which is consistent with their leadership role.

The narrative does not explicitly state what the communist party’s role would be in Vietnam after victory. Two of the six artifacts mentioned the establishment of communism in post-war Vietnam, but these were soft versions that did not characterize the full scope of what really happened after victory. The artifacts actually discuss the establishment of democracy in post-war Vietnam as if it were going to happen. Only one artifact acknowledged that democracy would only be a stepping-stone towards communism. The narrative casts post-war Vietnam society that was closer to European style socialism than Soviet Communism. The narrative heavily stresses agricultural land redistribution and the elimination of capitalism to a lesser extent. Elimination of the bourgeois class, suppression of individual freedoms, and the authoritarian control of the communist party were not mentioned.

The role of the North Vietnamese was conspicuously absent from the artifacts even though they should have been a major hero character. The goal of reunification was clear, but how the South Vietnamese would be represented politically was not. Thus, their narrative absence was not coherent with reality. In summation, this indicates a general communist strategy to ignore or gloss over realities that created vulnerabilities in their communication strategy. High-ranking non-communist members of the NLF truly believed that South Vietnam would not be dominated by the northern party members after the war and some were shocked by what eventually transpired (Troung, 1985).

Coherency of the Villain

The villain characters were the most dominant and coherent in the narrative. The negative actions of the USG, the Republic and other affiliates were consistent with the plot and reality in that they acted in a poor manner. The many indignities that the average Vietnamese suffered as a result of the cultural ignorance or indifference of some Americans created many thousands of personal experiences validating the narrative. The actions of the feudalist exploiter character were also very coherent within the narrative and with reality. The South Vietnamese elites were in fact notoriously corrupt and this was well known by the population and by the American public. Virtually all Vietnamese peasants had to pay rent to a landlord at one time in their life even though their rice crop was often meager. The landlords would often accompany the ARVN troops during their sweeps of hostile villages where they owned land in order to use the troops to compel their tenants to pay (Race, 1972). This action to the Vietnamese peasant would clearly demonstrate the coherency of the narrative since the landlords would act like exploiters.

The narrative role of the Republic was also not coherent with reality. While the government had many flaws, it was not a totalitarian state, and was less authoritarian than other east-Asian nations, like Myanmar. Its citizens did enjoy freedoms that were not available in North Vietnam and tolerated a certain amount of public dissent and criticism of the government (Moyar, 2006). South Vietnam was not a puppet state of the USG, as its leaders often dismissed American advice or implemented American style governance programs half-heartedly. However, ignoring reality and creating an alternative version of it was an effective propaganda strategy to avoid problems inherent to communist ideology.

The essential element in establishing internal coherency within the communist narrative was shifting the focus onto the villain and his evil deeds. The one perennial and pervasive theme within the artifacts was the absolute necessity of expelling the USG and their feudalist supporters from Vietnam. Their actions were so vicious and exploitive of the country that almost any means of expelling them were warranted. They were able to unite many non-communists under the party’s banner because of this need, even if it wasn’t in their long-term best interests to support the party in any way. Keeping the focus on the enemy kept these erstwhile allies from scrutinizing the party’s ideological problems. Furthermore, people suffering from hardship and poverty would have found psychological comfort by having a scapegoat.

Compared to reality the narrative was not coherent since the actual parties involved were very dynamic and did not act according to the communist script. The peasants in rural areas who lacked awareness about the world outside of the their district would have few informational resources to critically examine the communists narrative. The narrative was probably coherent with reality as they knew it, as their lives were fraught with poverty and hardship. More sophisticated audiences in urban areas would have been better equipped to examine the narrative critically and realize its incoherencies with reality. Because their propaganda worked, we have to assume that more people found the narrative coherent than incoherent.

Narrative Fidelity

The narrative of Vietnamese Communist propaganda had a high degree of fidelity, which was stronger than the narrative’s coherence. The first of Fisher’s questions asks: what values were embedded in the narrative? The primary value is that of liberty and freedom for the nation of Vietnam from foreign rule. The document from Binh-Long specifies this with, “This revolution has two missions: Fighting against the Americans and feudalists, winning independence for the people.” (Lester, 1991). This conception of liberty does not appear to include individual freedoms, like those of speech or the right to vote, that Westerns would assume to be an integral part of democracy. Freedom of religion is specified in the Religion-Proselytizing document, “Propagandize the freedom of worship and other policies…” (Lester, 1991). However, this was as an NLF and not a communist party policy and freedom of religion was severely limited after the war.

Economic self-sufficiency was a key value espoused in the narrative under the guise of “land to the tiller.” Every Vietnamese peasant was to have at least enough agricultural land to feed his family without having to pay expensive rents to a landlord. One document states, “In order to achieve their rights and interests, the workers should over-throw all exploiting classes and establish a society where man does not exploit man.” (Lester, 1991). The propaganda ignored the fact that the state would be the legal land owner and that government bureaucrats would control the farmer’s activities. The next prominent value espoused in the narrative was that of perseverance and faith in the revolution. Revolutionaries needed strong faith and a belief about the inevitability of their cause in order to endure the dangers of war, while resisting the temptations offered by the imperialists. Chin Vinh states, “Promote self-confidence among the people and motivate them to break the enemy’s oppressive control.” (Lester, 1991).

The second question asks: how relevant were the narrative’s values to the audience’s decision making process? The narrative’s values were relevant for the masses, and were generally sufficient to justify the audience’s support for the revolution. The first value of freedom and independence was particularly salient for most of the audience. In this context, freedom meant the absence of foreign powers upon the daily lives of the people. Thus, the relevance of this value would have been undeniable, and justified joining the NLF cause in some manner. The second value of economic self-sufficiency was also relevant for most Vietnamese. To landless peasants, owning farm land actualized self-sufficiency. Urbanites would achieve self-sufficiency through business ownership or a steady well paying job. This value transcends

both communism, and capitalism and would exist in peacetime. The communists seized this opportunity present in the reality of the peasant’s life in order to gain their compliance.

The third value of faith and perseverance would also have relevance to the average Vietnamese person. Vietnamese peasants struggled to survive common misfortunes in peacetime. A single bad harvest or epidemic could place an entire family’s survival in jeopardy. Faith in the revolution was not an empty promise, because the communists had defeated the French. This value was sufficient to help many persist through the war, but was the least able to justify the decision to sustain support to the revolution.

The third question asks; what are the consequences for the audience members who chose to embrace the narrative’s values? The consequences for those Vietnamese who accepted the narrative and joined the revolutionary cause were very frequently severe. The high death rate of Viet-Cong and the lack of medical infrastructure to rehabilitate wounded fighters was evident. Communist propaganda was often compelling enough to attract recruits, but life as a Viet-Cong induced many to desert. Eventually, the communists had to draft or coerced recruits. Only the promise of a better future existed for those who joined the revolution.

The fourth question asks: is there any overlap between the narrative’s values and those inherent within the Vietnamese peasant’s reality? The average Vietnamese peasant would find considerable overlap between the narrative’s values and key aspects of their lives. The advantage of the narrative’s values is that they are not really communist values. Any Vietnamese person could potentially identify with them. Anti-communist Vietnamese wanted economically self-sufficiency and freedom from undo foreign influence. In many ways the narrative was tailored to the peasants. The emphasis on freedom from feudal exploitation and land redistribution tapped into their greatest desires. One artifact states, “After South- Vietnam is liberated, we shall overthrow the entire class of feudalist landlords.” (Lester, 1991). The communists gave peasants a concrete method to actualize their dreams.

Non-communist South-Vietnamese would still have experienced overlap between their life circumstances and the narrative’s values, albeit less of it. Various groups like merchants, landlords, religious communities, and other more educated groups would be much more resistant to communist appeals. Despite this, they were able to recruit members from every social class; “the petty bourgeois are also oppressed and exploited by imperialists and feudalist.” (Lester, 1991). More importantly, the communists were able to dampen the population’s commitment to the Republic, causing internal dissention. If the NLF could convince them that post-war South Vietnam would be run by a coalition government, which the communists were only a part of, non-communists might support the NLF.

The final question asks: is there congruence between the narrative’s values and what the audience would consider ideal conduct? The answer is yes; considerable congruence existed between the narrative and the what many of the audience, not committed to the Republic, would probably have considered to be ideal conduct. This conclusion is determined from the review of literature and the fact that communist propaganda did in fact work. Many of the heroes were self-less, brave and idealistic in reality, even if the masses were often portrayed as a passive hero in the narrative.

The strength of the communist narrative is that the real life qualities of bravery, sacrifice and perseverance against overwhelming odds, displayed by the Viet-Cong fighter, would be considered admirable qualities and ideal conduct in most cultures. When the hero’s actions are considered against the values of the narrative, its fidelity becomes stronger. The Viet-Cong were dying to free the peasants from foreign domination and war. They would have admired the Viet-Cong’s faith in the ultimate victory for their cause. The average Vietnamese peasant would have found the communist narrative to be mostly in agreement with the circumstances of their life.

The narrative of Vietnamese Communist propaganda had a high degree of fidelity with most of its audience. This is because the values found in the narrative are universal in nature and would find respect amongst most cultures in the world. These values were not specifically communist values as one might expect in communist propaganda. The foremost propaganda slogan was “land to the tillers”, and not collective farms for the peasants. The narrative did not advocate the erosion of the traditional family and the destruction of traditional Confucian values as was done in the People’s Republic of China. The communists latched on to real values that the average person would agree were ideal conduct. The

communists simply ignored presenting values in the narrative that would have been disadvantageous to them. They manufactured a narrative that had a high degree of fidelity.

There were several credible threats to the narrative’s fidelity that should have weakened it considerably. Respect for traditional Vietnamese culture was the one big value that was absent in the narrative, but which should have been present. There was not much textual evidence in the artifacts that indicated traditional Vietnamese culture was ideal and worth protecting. Vietnamese who were not part of the revolution were considered to be politically backward as the following states, “Our inducement efforts are … to be placed on the bulk of backward people.” (Lester, 1991). Conversely, the narrative only lightly discussed the future of post-war Vietnamese society.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study of the narrative of Vietnamese Communist propaganda has revealed some very interesting conclusions. The communists won a tremendous victory through their ability to skillfully communicate with various target audiences. They wrote their narrative to bolster their strengths and exploit enemy weaknesses. Their narrative was always on the offensive, exploiting all possible vulnerabilities and calamities to their advantage.

The narrative of Vietnamese Communist propaganda also provides a method for overcoming the ideological weakness inherent in any authoritarian system: simply ignore them and focus on viciously attacking your enemy. The communists exploited the worst aspects of South Vietnamese society, while simultaneously offering the population a method of achieving their dreams. Only vetted members of the communist party really knew what form post-war South Vietnam would take. They packaged their product perfectly by offering a Vietnam that would be free of foreign domination and landlords, without telling them what life under communist rule really entailed.

The Vietnamese Communists created a brilliant narrative that guided their propaganda, which led them to success. The plot was a classic battle of good versus evil with heroes and villains. The actions of these characters had much congruence with reality in some aspects, but little in other regards. The scene was the actual battlefield of South Vietnam, while other portions of the battlefield like North Vietnam were omitted. The narrative was generally coherent as a story, despite serious vulnerabilities and a lack of correspondence with reality. The narrative had a high degree of fidelity with the audience’s beliefs and values. The fact that this propaganda was predominantly delivered verbally through interpersonal and inter-group discourse renders their accomplishment all the more amazing.

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