THE MOMBASSA ATTACKS OF NOVEMBER 28, 2002

THE MOMBASSA ATTACKS OF NOVEMBER 28, 2002JONATHAN FIGHELANA IBORRA VEGANATALIA LPEZ MERINOTable of contentsFACTSACTORS INVOLVEDMOTIVATIONSTRONG AND WEAK ARGUMENTSFACTSNovember 28, 2002Two coordinated attacks:Paradise Hotel explosive vehicle + suicide bomber15 people were killedIsraeli passenger jet two SA-7 surface-to-air missilesInvolved al-Qaeda operatives supported by a local infrastructure

3Facts: the attackInnovative: Multidimensional synchronized operation3 types of operational planning

Two years earlier gathering in Mogadishu by al-Qaeda attack team to plan the attacksLand-based suicide operationAviation attack (surface missiles)Sea-borne dhows for infiltration and scapeTargets reconnaissance in KenyaShort listMeetings in Mogadishu for indoctrination and weapons trainingTeam relocated to MombassaFACTS: the attackTwo independent synchronized attacksCreate mass casualtiesOne suicide bomber blow himself up in the entranceThe other crashed a vehicle loaded with explosivesA rifle and a pistol in possessionFired 2 shoulder-mounted anti-aircraft missiles from Mombassa International Airport runawayFACTS: the attackMANPADS (Man-portable air-defense system)Al-Qaeda demonstrated for the first time its operational strategy and ability to target a civilian plane from the ground

FAILED, but marked a turning point in future al-Qaeda operational threatsFacts: the EscapeSaleh Ali Nabhan joined al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen. Killed in September 2009Issa Oman Issa in contact with al-Shabaab al-MujahideenAbdul Malik apprehended February 2007Fazul Abdullah Mohammad (Abdul Karim) still at large?

Regrouped in Lamu Island harbourIsolated, largely Muslim coastal regionEasy to escape by boat towards Persian Gulf or Somalia November 29

ACTORS INVOLVED: THE NETWORKFAZUL ABDULLAHLeader and AQs mastermindFumo Muhammad Fumo

Harun Abdisheikh BamusaPARADISE HOTELISRAELI PLANEIssa Osman Issa

Saleh Ali Nabhan

Abdul MalikATTACKERS

8 LOCAL COLLABORATORSACTORS INVOLVED: THE NETWORKFAZUL ABDULLAH Representative of AQPreparation phaseBefore the attackPersonal commitment and bonds: motivational factorsSurveillance data and operational instructionsACTORS INVOLVED: THE NETWORKFAZUL ABDULLAHLeader and AQs mastermindFumo Muhammad Fumo

Harun Abdisheikh BamusaPARADISE HOTELISRAELI PLANEIssa Osman Issa

Saleh Ali Nabhan

Abdul MalikATTACKERS

8 LOCAL COLLABORATORSKNOWLEDGE HUBAQs accumulated ideological and operational knowledgeMOTIVATION: AQ OPERATIONAL FINGERPRINTSTOP DOWN al-Qaeda-led operationMOTIVATION: selection of targetsLegitimation of the attackDeclaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places 1996World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders 1998AQ post-9/11 evolving estrategysoft targets with high potential for economic disruptionEconomic instabilitySuicide attacksMass casualtiesDirect confrontation with Israel12MOTIVATION: al-qaeda claims responsibilityFalse statement by Army of PalestineDecember 2, 2002 AQ claims responsibilityTanzim Qaedat al-Jihad

More attacksOperatives as agents of the Muslim umma against the Jews and CrusadersJewish-Crusader AllianceMuslim interests, Palestinian causeHoly places occupationBefore the Mombassa attack, Israel and the international iltelligence community were unaware of al-Qaedas strategic decision to attack Israeli/Jewish targes, which was made in early 2001 and before the 9/11 attacks.

p. 416 The Israeli ReactionSTRONG ARGUMENT #1

Confession by KSM

18. I was responsible for surveying and financing for the destruction of the Israeli embassy in India, Azerbaijan, the Philippines, and Australia.

19. I was responsible for surveying and financing for the destruction of an Israeli El-Al Airlines flight on Thailand soil departing from Bangkok Airport.

20. I was responsible for sending several Mujahedeen into Israel to conduct surveillance to hit several strategic targets deep in Israel.

21. I was responsible for the bombing of the hotel in Mombasa that is frequented by Jewish travelers via El-Al airlines.

22. I was responsible for launching a Russian-made SA-7 surface-to-air missile on El-Al or other Jewish airliner departing from Mombasa.STRONG ARGUMENT #1

STRONG ARGUMENT #2AQs return to Kenya, where the organization had already carried out a terrorist attack, stemmed from its assessment of the weakness of the local security forces[] Kenya, given its lax security, was also convenient as a staging point for the operation because of the presence of a local, supportive, radical Islamic infrastructure.

p. 429 Strategic Insights and Implications: Terrorists Save Havens

SOMALIA: Failed state. Mainly for training, money and material.Non-permissive environment KENYA: Weak state.

States poor governance+Relative stability and basic infrastructure

POTENTIAL BASE AREASTRONG ARGUMENT #2KENIAN PARADOXKenya is the most stable, most effective, and most democratic government in the Horn of Africa, BUT, has also experienced the most terrorist attacks against Western targets and has been the most useful operational base for al-Qaeda

WEAK ARGUMENT #1

Al-Shababs capabilities Post-Westgate, Ken Menkhaus

Fazul Abdullah al-Qaedas mastermind- is still at large.

p. 423, The escape

Somali officials confirmed today that Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, AQs leader in East Africa, was killed at a Somali military checkpoint in Mogadishu. 11 June 2011AQs East Africa chief Fazul Mohammed killed in Somalia, Bill RoggioWAS FAZUL ABDULLAHS DEATH AN ACCIDENT?WEAK ARGUMENT #2Of course the attack [launch of missiles against the Arkia plane] could also have failed because of operator ineptitude or inexperience.p. 424, The attack

The Mombasa attack was planned and executed as a top-down AQ-led operation developed by a core of senior professionals and experienced operatives who had been involved in past terror attacks. (p. 426, AQ operational fingerprints)The attackers, mostly local Kenyan collaborators, were already involved in the 1998 US embassy bombing in Nairobi, motivated by AQ ideology, and had professional terrorist operational experience. (p. 426, AQ operational fingerprints)

WEAK ARGUMENT #2Al Qaeda leaders play significant role in Shabaab, Bil Roggio. 1 August 2010

ISSA OSMAN ISSA

SALEH ALI NABHAN

Highlights in terrorist activity february 13, 2008 to march 14, 2008