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Transcript of The Middle Kingdom's Lighter Touch: Chinese Soft Power In Africa
Constantine J Petallides Govt-‐498: Contemporary Chinese Military Thought
The Middle Kingdom’s Lighter Touch: Chinese Soft-‐Power in Africa
Petallides 2
Table of Contents
I. Introduction…………………………………..……………………..……………………..…………………….3
II. An Offer they Can’t Refuse: The History of Chinese Aid in Africa……..……..…………...5
III. A History of Sino-‐African Military Development…....…………………..……………………...9
IV. Implications of Chinese Influence.……………………..…………………….……………………..15
Attachés, Arms, and Aid….Oh My!……………..…………………….………………………...15
Influence in Action……………..…………………….……………………………………………...19
V. Conclusion – Implications for the US…………….….…………………………………………...…22
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………………25
Petallides 3
I. Introduction
Today, China finds itself in a uniquely difficult, yet opportune position. As a
rising economic and military power at a time when the status quo is slowly shifting
in their favor, China can offer a great deal of aid and assistance, both economic and
military, to developing countries; thus buying favor and extending Chinese influence
far beyond the confines of Asia. On the other hand, traditional powers like the
United States and European Union along with regional actors like India view each
Chinese move with suspicion and have been working to combat Chinese influence
and compete with their own aid packages.
Nowhere is this tension more apparent than on the African continent. China
has a long history of involvement with Africa, and Chinese investment on the
continent has been steadily growing over the last decades. Modern political and
economic relations commenced in the era of Mao Zedong. Sino-‐African relations are
embedded in the long history of interchange. The founding of the People's Republic
of China and the independence of African countries ushered in a new era in China-‐
Africa relations. For over half a century, the two sides have enjoyed close political
ties and frequent exchange of high-‐level visits and contacts.1 Starting in the
beginning of the 21st century, the People's Republic of China built increasingly
stronger economic ties with African nations; and as of August 2007, there are more
than 750,000 Chinese nationals working in different African countries.2 Trade
1 China's African Policy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. January 2006 <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm> 2 French, Howard W.; Polgreen, Lydia (2007-‐08-‐18). "Entrepreneurs From China Flourish in Africa". The New York Times.
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between China and Africa increased 700% during the 1990s.3 China is currently
Africa's largest trading partner before the EU and the United States.4 This continued
growth of development aid to Africa has been coupled with an increased Chinese
military presence. While China has no bases in Africa, there has been a marked
increase in Chinese arms sales, training exercises, military attachés, and
peacekeeping forces in Africa.
This paper will explore the history that led to these developments and how
aid and military involvement have affected China’s relationship with Africa. These
developments allow China to increase its economic ties to resource-‐rich African
nations, pressure African nations to support the “One China Policy”, and bolster its
own economy through trade deals and arms sales.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/18/world/africa/18malawi.html?_r=1&em&ex=1187582400&en=7b8806ea0f69e210&ei=5087%0A> 3 Servant, Jean-‐Christophe “China’s trade safari in Africa” Le Monde Diplomatique, May 2005 <http://mondediplo.com/2005/05/11chinafrica> 4 "China boosts African economies, offering a 'second opportunity’". Christian Science Monitor. <http://www.csmonitor.com/centennial/timeline/2008/07/china-‐boosts-‐african-‐economies-‐offering-‐a-‐second-‐opportunity>
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II. An Offer they Can’t Refuse: The History of Chinese Aid in Africa
China has had a growing hand in African affairs since the Communist Party
threw its support behind the anti-‐colonialist liberation movements that swept
across the continent throughout the 20th Century. While China is not a new player in
Africa, its economic and political presence on the continent and its impact on Africa
have grown exponentially in the last few years.5 Li Xiaoyun at the College of
Humanities and Development in Beijing categorizes Chinese aid policy in Africa can
into three phases.
Phase I (1950-‐1974) was the phase of political aid and ideology exportation.6
During this period, aid as a portion of GNP steadily rose, and large projects were
undertaken. The total amount of foreign aid increased to 337 million RMB in 1959
from the average annual amount of 76 million RMB during the period of 1950 to
1952, which covered 0.23 % the GNP at that time and 0.62% of financial
expenditures. In 1973, the total amount of China’s foreign aid rose up to 5.584
billion RMB, which shared 2.05% of the GNP at that time and 6.9% of the financial
expenditure.7 Examples of such projects include China’s support of the Egyptian
government in 1956 during the Suez Canal crises; China’s 1961 agricultural
initiatives in Mali; and the 1965 plan to build a Tanzania-‐Zimbabwe railroad.8
5 Wild, Leni The New Sinosphere: China in Africa Institute for Public Policy Research 11/1/2006 Pg. 1 <http://www.ippr.org/images/media/files/publication/2012/03/The%20New%20Sinosphere%20-‐%20China%20in%20Africa_1539.pdf> 6 Li Xiaoyun “China’s Foreign Aid and Aid to Africa: Overview” College of Humanities and Development, China Agricultural University. 2004 7 Ibid 8 Ibid
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Phase II (1974-‐1990) was the adjustment and transformation phase.9 Both
the total amount of the foreign aid and its proportion to GNP and the financial
expenditure were all presenting a descending curve.10 These figures decreased from
the total amount of 4.771 billion RMB, covering 1.71% of the GNP and 6.0% of the
financial expenditure in 1974 down to 1.562 billion RMB of the total amount in
foreign aid, covering 0.08% of GNP and 0.51% of the financial expenditure in
1990.11 This decrease was due to a shift in Chinese domestic priorities. After the
opening reforms in 1978, China made adjustment in its diplomatic policies, and
emphasized that external relations should serve domestic modernization projects.12
Finally they entered Phase III (1991-‐Present Day), which is the phase of
financial aid and technical assistance with integrated-‐objectives.13 China’s foreign
aid entered a new period, which emphasized reciprocity and mutual goals;
economic benefits; the integration of the political interest and the obligations of a
“big country”.14 Since the 1990s, China has been shopping around for recipient
countries that can best support Chinese interests. This can come in the form of trade
deals, new markets for Chinese goods, energy resources and raw materials, and
even political support. With all this in mind, China has chosen Africa as the main
recipient area of its foreign aid. Over the past 50 years, China’s foreign aid to Africa
has amounted to 44.4 billion RMB covering 30% of the total amount of 120.773
9 Ibid 10 Ibid 11 Ibid 12 Ibid 13 Ibid 14 Ibid
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billion RMB.15 This foreign aid to Africa has sponsored about 900 infrastructure and
social development projects.16
The figure below represents China’s aid expenditures in Africa:
Source: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/7/40378067.pdf
The pink dataset represents African aid as a percentage of total expenditures; the
blue dataset represents African aid as a percentage of GNP; and the yellow dataset
represents total aid expenditures. What is most striking about this graph is that
while aid expenditures are going up, aid to Africa is a less significant percentage of
the total than in years past. While this does not mean that the Chinese are spending
15 Ibid 16 Alden, Chris. China in Africa. London: Zed, 2007. Print.
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less on Africa, it does mean that they are spending smarter. Clearly, with China
reaching its goal of $100 billion in trade by 2010, Africa is still a priority for China.
Rather than the large blanket amounts that categorized Phases I and II, China has
focused on delivering aid in a way that furthers its interests. The implications of this
shift will be explored in a later section.
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III. A History of Sino-African Military Development
China’s military relations with Africa stretch back to 1950s when China gave
its support to for revolutionary and independence movements.17 The roots of this
relationship can be found in the 1955 Asian-‐African Conference held in Bandung
Indonesia. With 29 countries participating representing 1.5 billion people, the
Bandung Conference was a major turning point for Sino-‐African relations.18 On the
agenda was the promotion of Afro-‐Asian economic interests, cultural cooperation,
and the opposition of any Cold War colonialism on the parts of the US or USSR.19
What the participating nations had in common was their shared history and
perception of white dominance by the West.20
The conference served to cement China’s interest in the region’s economics
and geopolitics. Shortly after its conclusion, China began gradually increasing its
military involvement on the African continent. On top of any aid being distributed to
the region, China began directly involving itself in African conflicts. From 1957 until
Algerian independence, China supplied the Algeria’s National Liberation Front, FLN,
with military weapons and training in the first fights against French colonial
17 Enuka, Chuka “China’s military presence in Africa: Implications for Africa’s wobbling peace” Journal of Political Studies Vol. 18 Issue 1 pg 16 18 Larkin, B. (1971). China in Africa 1946-1970: The Foreign Policy of the Peoples Republic of China. Berkeley: University of California Press. 19 Ibid 20 Foster, V., Butterfield, W., Chen, C., & Pushak, N. (2009). Building Bridges: China’s Growing Roles As Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington: World Bank.
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power.21 China offered to send 280,000 volunteers to Egypt during the Suez crisis
on top of the generous sums of money it was already sending.22
Because of its tense relationship with the Cold War powers, China saw
disruption and promotion of unrest in Africa as central to China’s policy of
frustrating the ambitions of the United States and the Soviet Union.23 Such examples
include Chinese military instructors making Ghana a base for training guerrilla
fighters in 1964;24 Rhodesian freedom fighters receiving training in China;25 China
supplying the Mozambique Liberation Front, FRELIMO, with free weapons and
education in the tactics of guerrilla warfare;26 and countless other incidents. By the
early 1970s, China had deployed 112 military instructors to Zaire, to train the
FNLA.27 It was notable that China ignored its rhetoric on noninterference, and got
directly militarily involved in Africa.
China’s recent military involvement in Africa takes essentially the forms of
selling Chinese arms, construction of small arms factories in a number of African
states, participation in UN peacekeeping operations, and defense of Chinese oil
investments and Chinese personnel who often come under heavy attacks in Africa’s
21 Taylor, I. (2006). China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise. London: Routledge. 22 Ibid 23 Enuka, Chuka “China’s military presence in Africa: Implications for Africa’s wobbling peace pg 17 24 Chuka, E. (2010). China and Africa’s Bilateral Economic Relation. in the 21st Century” Journal of International Politics and Development. 25 Ibid 26 Taylor, I. (2006). China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise. London: Routledge. 27 Enuka, Chuka “China’s military presence in Africa: Implications for Africa’s wobbling peace pg 17
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conflict zones.28 From direct involvement in African affairs, China has become a
major small arms and light weapons dealer to any and all groups in the market. It
has been noted, “military cooperation and growth of arms sales are major aspects of
relations with African governments, especially those under threat of civil war,
insurgency or even domestic opposition but which are barred from obtaining
weapons from traditional western sources.”29 This policy has led China to engage in
military aid with certain less-‐than-‐democratic regimes including those of Uganda,
Rwanda, Burundi, Chad, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.30
In 2003, China’s arms sales to Africa stood at $1.3 billion,31 and from 2000 to
2003 China delivered about 13% of all arms to sub-‐Saharan Africa, the second
largest provider after Russia.32 From 2004 to 2007, China’s percentage increased to
almost 18%, featuring the delivery of artillery pieces, armored cars, minor surface
combatants, supersonic combat aircraft, and other air assets.33 The classic
contemporary example of China’s weapon-‐exporting policy in Africa is China’s
involvement in the Sudan War; when Beijing pursued a policy that was entirely
based on economic interest, and supplied the Sudanese government with fighter
aircraft and an assortment of weaponry.34 The Chinese have set up three small arms
28 Ibid 18 29 Alden, Chris. China in Africa. London: Zed, 2007. Print. 30 Enuka, Chuka “China’s military presence in Africa: Implications for Africa’s wobbling peace pg 19 31 Alden, Chris. China in Africa. London: Zed, 2007. Print. 32 Ibid 33 Grimmett, R. (2008). Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2000-‐2007. CRS Report (October 23, 2008), pp.50-‐61. 34 Taylor, I. (2006). China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise. London: Routledge.
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factories in Sudan that produce light weapons for use in the region as well as in
Uganda.35
On top of these arms deals, China extends its military presence over the
continent through its defense attachés. Chinese Embassy defense attaché offices
throughout Africa provide the diplomatic foundation for China's military contacts.
Accredited defense attachés link the PLA to host country militaries.36 Attaché duties
vary, but as a minimum, they report on local matters from a military and/or security
perspective and facilitate contacts with local armed forces. China currently
maintains bilateral diplomatic military relations with at least 25 African countries,
spread across the main regions of the continent.37 In Beijing, 18 African countries
maintain permanent defense attaché offices; six of which are directly reciprocal:
Algeria (which has continuously maintained a defense attaché in Beijing since
January 1971), Egypt, Namibia, Nigeria, Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.38 The 11
remaining countries that do not have known Chinese resident equivalents in Africa
include Burundi, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea,
Guinea-‐Bissau, Kenya, Mali, Niger, South Africa and Tanzania.39 Since 1985, China
has almost doubled the number of defense attaché offices worldwide from 59 to
107. In Africa, however, the number of Chinese defense attaché offices increased
35 Shinn, D. (2009), Chinese Involvement in African Conflict Zones. China Brief. Volume ix, Issue 7, April2, 2009. 36 Puska, Susan “Military backs China's Africa adventure” Asia Times 6/8/2007 <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/china/if08ad02.html> 37 Ibid 38 Ibid 39 Ibid
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quite modestly from only nine to 14, maintaining an average of 15% of all of China's
attaché offices over the past 20 years.
Finally, China has become more involved in UN Peacekeeping missions and
been more strategic with its veto on the UNSC. The 2006 White Paper, China’s
National Defense in 2006, charges the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with
“implementing the military strategy of active defense”—a term that has grown to
provide justification for use of military force outside the PRC’s borders.40 For the
first time, the paper outlines the PLA’s responsibilities to: take the initiative to
prevent and defuse crises and deter conflicts and wars; take part in international
security cooperation; strengthen strategic coordination and consultation with major
powers and neighboring countries; and conduct bilateral or multilateral joint
military exercises and play an active part in maintaining global and regional peace
and stability.41 Bolstered by the change in policy, China began to send troops to UN
peacekeeping operations in Africa. Of roughly 2,000 peacekeepers China has
deployed around the world, on average during the first nine months in 2008, 77
percent were in Africa. China is by far the largest contributor to Africa peacekeeping
among the Security Council’s permanent members, with 63 percent of total P-‐5
contributions to the continent.42
40 Enuka, Chuka “China’s military presence in Africa: Implications for Africa’s wobbling peace pg 19 41 Parenti, J. (2009). China-‐Africa Relations in the 21st Century. JFQ Issue 52,. www.ndupress.ndu.edu. 42 Qiang, S., and Tian, L. (2009). Peacekeeping: A Rising Role for China’s PLA. China Daily, July 24, 2009.
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This type of influence is much harder to quantify because data comes from
recently declassified reports, hearsay, and first-‐hand accounts rather than
numerical evidence. Despite this lack of graphical data, the implications of this aid
will be discussed and explored in the next section.
Petallides 15
IV. Implications of Chinese Influence
Attachés, Arms, and Aid….Oh My!
Aid in Africa can be best explained in an allegory. If, for example, Kenya
wished to build a new highway and requested help from USAID, the Americans
would impose conditions such as: construction must follow fair labor practices;
waste and runoff from the project must be gathered before they can impact the
environment; the highway must be at least 10km from the nearby elephant
preserve; etc. When the frustrated Kenyan ministers present the same application to
China, the only question asked is “where do you want it?”43
Officially, China’s “no-‐conditionality“ aid makes possible self-‐driven
development for African countries;44 however, it really provides China with
opportunities to extort political favors or pursue economic goals. China has sought
from its aid partners such concessions as support of the “One China Policy”, access
to energy resources, access to raw materials, and trade deals.
To support its growing energy needs, China has pursued exploration and
production deals in smaller, low-‐visibility countries, such as Gabon, while also
targeting Africa's largest oil producers-‐-‐with whom the United States and Europe
have longstanding relationships-‐-‐by offering integrated aid packages.45 In Angola,
Africa's largest exporter of oil to China, oil deals "are characterized by loans and
43 Remarks by Fmr Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to her American National Security Toolbox Class. 2/25/2011 44 Li Xiaoyun “China’s Foreign Aid and Aid to Africa: Overview” College of Humanities and Development, China Agricultural University. 2004 45 Alessi, Christopher “Expanding China-‐Africa Oil Ties” Council on Foreign Relations 2/8/2012 <http://www.cfr.org/china/expanding-‐china-‐africa-‐oil-‐ties/p9557?cid=rss-‐energy_environment-‐expanding_china_africa_oil_tie-‐020812>
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credit lines in connection with infrastructure projects," writes Shelly Zhao for China
Briefing magazine.46 In many cases, China also signs aid agreements with countries
rich in raw materials desperately needed by China to maintain its production to
achieve its growth targets. China currently has military alliances with 6 African
states, 4 of which are major oil suppliers: Sudan, Algeria, Nigeria and Egypt.
In Africa, as elsewhere, Chinese aid agreements seem to follow diplomatic
ties; however, China does not seem to distribute aid in larger amounts to resource-‐
rich countries, as can be seen in flows to Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of
Congo. In fact, grants and zero-‐interest loans are distributed fairly evenly around
the continent.47China gives money to almost every single country in Sub-‐Saharan
Africa, excluding only those that don’t acknowledge the One China policy.48 There is
little evidence that China gives more aid to countries with more natural resources or
specifically targets countries with worse governance.49 A mix of political,
commercial, and social/ideological factors motivate aid packages and economic
deals.
Looking to the military side of things, it is once again obvious that China has
been supporting undemocratic, oppressive regimes in exchange for political favors.
Interestingly enough, some military aid and the presence of defense attachés seems
46 Ibid 47 Brautigam, Deborah “Chinese development finance in Africa” East Asia Forum 12/25/2011 <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/12/25/chinese-‐development-‐aid-‐in-‐africa/> 48 Freschi, Laura “China in Africa myths and realities” AID Watch 2/9/2010 <http://aidwatchers.com/2010/02/china-‐in-‐africa-‐myths-‐and-‐realities/> 49 Ibid
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to follow countries that are either most useful to China, or countries with the largest
Chinese diaspora . For example, there are roughly 30,000-‐50,000 Chinese currently
residing in Sudan50 which is the third largest diaspora on the continent. Sudan has
also received a great deal of aid and political protection from China regarding the
Darfur crisis.
Through its peacekeeping involvement, China is able to dispel western
accusations of supporting conflict and human rights violations; but this provides
political cover for further unofficial arms deals that maintain the cycle of conflict,
and ensure that there will always be more customers for Chinese arms. According to
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China, the world’s top
weapons importer for much of the past decade, fell to fourth place on an annual list
as it produces more arms at home.51 In the same vein, China’s arms exports nearly
doubled over the period of 2007 to 2011 from five years earlier, making it the
world’s sixth biggest supplier after the United Kingdom.52 China is able to continue
circumventing US and EU arms embargoes in conflict zones with its growing
domestic small arms industry, and further support any regime or guerilla force it so
chooses.
50 Barmé, Geremie “Strangers at Home” The Wall Street Journal 7/19/2010 <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704682604575369390660095122.html#articleTabs%3Dinteractive> 51 Kate, Daniel Ten “China's Share of Global Arms Imports Falls, Sipri Says” Bloomberg 3/18/2012 <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-‐03-‐18/china-‐buys-‐fewer-‐weapons-‐as-‐local-‐industry-‐expands-‐sipri-‐says.html> 52 Ibid
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Through these processes, China is able to secure the energy resources and
minerals it needs, while providing aid and arms in an economically symbiotic
manner with recipient states. As this trend continues, China’s reach will continue to
extend and its influence in Africa will get stronger. Even countries that have good
relations with the United States, such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Angola, Ghana, and South
Africa, find themselves in a position where they can be much more selective in
taking advice from the United States.53 African countries under pressure from the
United States and the West to improve their human rights and governance practices
are less likely to do so when they know they can rely on China for support.54 While
none of the official aid projects are in conflict with US interests, Chinese aid with its
freedom from conditions may become a more attractive alternative to US offerings.
As more countries follow this line of thinking, China will gain influence over the
continent, many multilateral organizations, and can push for its political goals with
more force. China holds a veto power in the UN Security Council and Africa has three
non-‐permanent seats on the Council. Africa is well represented in organizations of
interest to China such as the UN Human Rights Council and the World Trade
Organization.55 China makes every effort to cultivate support among the maximum
number of African countries on all issues of interest to Beijing that arise in
international forums.56 Increased influence in Africa can directly lead to increased
influence over the entire international system.
53 “Africa: China's Growing Role in Africa -‐ Implications for U.S. Policy” All Africa 11/1/2011 <http://allafrica.com/stories/201111021230.html> 54 Ibid 55 Ibid 56 Ibid
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Influence in Action
China’s use of this newfound influence can be seen in several examples. First
let us examine the case of South Africa. With a Chinese population of over 200,000,57
South Africa has the largest Chinese diaspora in Africa. Recently, South Africa sought
to expand its trade ties with the BRIC countries, focusing for the most part on its
relationship with China, which is both an important partner at a political and
economic level for South Africa. Despite the benefits South Africa experiences, this
relationship is equally one which has elicited criticism from some quarters.58 At the
political level, South Africa regards China as a key player in the global debates that
characterize the shift to multipolarity. China’s developing country status, its
identification as a member of the Global South, and the G77 in the UN are elements
that carry significance for South Africa too.59 As the two counties deepened their
economic ties and embarked on projects together, South Africa suddenly declared
its support for the One China policy. The sudden change in foreign policy was
viewed by many as a clear sign of Chinese political pressure. Shortly after the
incident, President Jacob Zuma tried, in vain, to reassure South Africans that “South
African foreign policy is independent and decisions serve no one but South
57 Barmé, Geremie “Strangers at Home” The Wall Street Journal 7/19/2010 58 Alves, Ana Cristina “South Africa-‐China Relations: Getting Beyond the Cross-‐roads?” South African Institute of International Affairs 8/29/2010 <http://www.saiia.org.za/china-‐in-‐africa-‐project-‐opinion/south-‐africa-‐china-‐relations-‐getting-‐beyond-‐the-‐cross-‐roads.html> 59 Ibid
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Africans.”60 Despite these assurances, few domestic or international observers were
convinced.
In Zimbabwe, oppressive rule has been sustained owing to some extent,
China’s substantial military support to president Robert Mugabe.61 Attempts by
human rights activists and the international community to redress and halt this
abuse were frustrated by Chinese continued military support to the dictator.62 With
assured weaponry and military supplies from China, the brutality inflicted by the
supporters of Robert Mugabe and the ZANU-‐PF was to continue.63 To meet its oil
and mineral needs, Beijing has consistently delivered arms to “pariah” states in
Africa especially those like Sudan and Zimbabwe which have come under western
sanctions in the last decade.64 When sanctions were imposed, Mugabe turned to
China for military assistance. Faced with EU and U.S. embargo, Mugabe in 2004
bought fighter aircraft and military vehicles from China.65 According to Peter
Brookes of The Heritage Foundation, China sold Sudan $55 million worth of arms
between 2003 and 2006, flouting UN arms embargoes.66 It was with Chinese
assistance that the Sudanese government recently constructed an arms factory in
60 Rossouw, Mandy “‘Independent SA’ supports One China Policy – Zuma” City Press 10/13/2011 <http://www.citypress.co.za/SouthAfrica/News/Independent-‐SA-‐supports-‐One-‐China-‐Policy-‐Zuma-‐20111013> 61 Enuka, Chuka “China’s military presence in Africa: Implications for Africa’s wobbling peace pg 22 62 Ibid 63 Ibid 23 64 Fowale, Tongkeh Joseph “China's Military Presence in Africa” 5/24/2009 <http://tongkeh-‐joseph-‐fowale.suite101.com/chinas-‐military-‐presence-‐in-‐africa-‐a119916> 65 Ibid 66 Ibid
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Khartoum.67 China’s ability to ignore embargoes and continue fueling conflict and
oppressive regimes in order to maintain access to energy belies Chinese priorities
and China’s clout on the international scene. With such an example, other countries
may be willing to offer China resources or access to markets in exchange for support
and protections.
During the Darfur crisis China played a direct role in selling arms to Sudan
and in developing its weapons industry. Chinese arms sales to Sudan rose twenty-‐
five fold during the crisis in spite of Security Council arms embargoes.68 In spite of
China’s denials, evidence points to the contrary, but with China’s veto in the UNSC,
there was little the rest of the international community could do. China is the
leading developer of the Sudanese oil industry and major purchaser of Sudanese
oil.69 Though Beijing regularly justifies China’s economic involvement in Sudan as
being key to that country’s development, it is obvious that in the context of rising
needs for peace and multilateral efforts to halt the blood-‐thirsty Khartoum regime,
the concentration of wealth and weapons among the Sudan’s ruling elite by Chinese
investment and arms deals, unconditionally feeds conflict.70 In this example, China
demonstrated that it is willing to protect countries under its influence from
everyone, including the combined might of the UNSC. In the future, this may be too
good an offer for other countries to pass up.
67 Ibid 68 Save Darfur. (2007). “China in Sudan: Having it Both Ways” Briefing Paper, October 18, 2007. 69 Enuka, Chuka “China’s military presence in Africa: Implications for Africa’s wobbling peace pg 22 70 Ibid
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V. Conclusion – Implications for the US
From the early years of contact with Africa, China has pursued military
involvements in Africa. This has been in the areas of military training and assistance,
arms sales, anti-‐piracy efforts, and peacekeeping operations. In as much as the
peacekeeping efforts may have engaged China in a positive way in Africa’s conflict
zones, but continued arm sales in a manner that exacerbate African conflicts, China
certainly cannot be helping the much needed peace in Africa.71 While China’s
growing ties with Africa can be viewed as unsettling, Ambassador Johnnie Carson
believes we should avoid “alarmist or apprehensive”72 responses to China’s moves,
and I am inclined to agree with him. While Chinese influence is growing, it does not
pose the same threat the USSR did during the Cold War; and what little direct
influence China has over Africa is quite limited. However, this does not mean the
United States should sit idly by.
While ideology was the overriding factor that fueled Chinese aid to Africa in
the 1950s and 1960s; today, with China on the verge of surpassing the US economy,
Chinese motives are purely business. China has found that aid can secure access to
energy, markets for Chinese goods, friends on human rights councils, and political
support for “One China” among other policies. Normally this would not be a
problem, but with the recent economic crisis and global downturn, the United States
is less able to compete with Chinese deals. Furthermore, Chinese arms sales go
71 Ibid 26 72 Abry, George “U.S., China, Africa an ‘Expanding Circle’” Virginia Military Institute 11/4/2011 <http://www5.vmi.edu/Content.aspx?id=10737419972>
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toward fueling conflicts that distract the attention of the international community
and drain the military resources of countries like the US, France, UK and
organizations like NATO, the African Union, and the UNSC. This drain on the political
will to fight may cost the United States dearly in a future conflict between China and
a US ally like South Korea, Japan, or Taiwan.
What can the United States do to successfully compete with China’s
combined military-‐economic aid deals? First and foremost, steps must be taken in
the UNGA or UNSC to expose and stop China’s more flagrant violations of human
rights and arms embargoes on the continent. Western powers must also make their
aid deals more attractive to developing countries and reduce the number and nature
of aid conditions in order to compete. In 2007, recognizing the need to curtail
Chinese influence, the president of the European Investment Bank said “in the face
of competition from China – we need to lower our environmental and social
standards.”73
If Chinese influence is not curtailed, it will become much more difficult for
the US to engage with countries like Taiwan or pursue its own strategic interests in
Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. With more and more countries falling under
Chinese influence and voting with China in relevant assemblies, other countries will
be hard-‐pressed to block measures introduced by China that require merely simple
or 2/3 majorities. Also, Chinese military presence in Africa is limited, but if ties and
73 Davies, Penny “China and the End of Poverty in Africa Towards Mutual Benefit” Diakonia <http://oefse.at/Downloads/veranstaltungen/1011/Vienna_Penny%20Davies.pdf>
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relations develop, it is not beyond the realm of possibility to see bases springing up
in the next 10-‐20 years. To combat piracy, China has floated the idea of naval bases
in West Africa with access to the Indian ocean, and as recently as December 2011,
China was considering a naval base agreement with the Seychelles.74 While this idea
was dismissed quickly, Chinese expansion into the Indian Ocean will hinder the US
and other powers’ efforts to contain Chinese ambitions at sea and will offer new
routes into the Pacific Ocean and around the containment fields of the various Island
Chains.
In the end, the US must engage China and the nations of Africa in order to
reassert America’s position as a protector of rights and a supporter of development;
while curtailing China’s growing influence in the region. While the tide is still in
America’s favor, action must be taken now, before it becomes too late.
74 “China Base a Threat to India Navy?” The Diplomat 12/17/2011 <http://the-‐diplomat.com/2011/12/17/china-‐base-‐a-‐threat-‐to-‐india-‐navy/>
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