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The metasemantics of memoryAuthor(s): Sanford C. GoldbergSource: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
, Vol. 153, No. 1, SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION,PACIFIC DIVISION, 2012 MEETING (March 2011), pp. 95-107Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41487618Accessed: 12-11-2015 21:36 UTC
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7/23/2019 The Metasemantics of Memory
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Philos
tud
2011)
53:95-107
DOI
1
.
1
07/s
98-0
-9642-9
The
metasemantics of
memory
Sanford .
Goldberg
Publishednline:November010
Springer
cience+Business
edia .V.
010
Abstract
In
Sven Bernecker'
excellentnew
book,
Memory
he
proposes
n
account f what
we
might
all the
metasemantics"f
memory:
he
onditions
hat
determinehe contents f the mental
epresentationsmployed
n
memory.
er-
necker ndorses
"pastist
xternalist"
iew,
ccording
o which he
content
f
a
memory-constitutingepresentation
s
fixed,
n
part,
y
the
"external" onditions
prevalenttthe past)time f thetokeningf theoriginal epresentationtheone
from hich he
memory-constituting
ne s
causally
erived).
ernecker
rgues
hat
thebestversion f a
pastist
xternalismbout
memory
ontents ill
have theresult
that here an be
semantically-inducedemory
osses
n
cases
involving nwitting
"world-switching".
he burden f this
paper
s to
show
hat
ernecker'
argument
for his
onclusion oes not ucceed.
My arguments
n this core
have
mplications
for ur
picture
f mind- orld
elations,
s these
re reflected
n
a
subject's ttempts
to recallher
past
thoughts.
Keywords
Semantics Metasemantics
Memory
Externalism
World-switching
1
The
metasemantics
f
memory
Bernecker'book imsto
present
nd defend
broadly
ausal
theory
f
memory.
n
the ourse f
doing
o he has
occasion o address he
semantics f
memory,"
r the
contents f those
representations
hat re
deemed
to
constitutememories.
he
question
ernecker
ursues
s not
so much his s what
we
might
all themeta-
semantics f
memory:
e aims
to
dentify
he
ypes
f
fact hat
ix
he ontent f a
given
memory-constitutingepresentation.
n this core
Bernecker
dopts
what
he
callsa "pastistxternalism."ormulatednterms fmemorytates atherhan he
S.
C.
Goldberg
El)
Department
f
hilosophy,
orthwestern
niversity,
880
ampus
rive,
vanston,
L
60208,
SA
e-mail:
Springer
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7/23/2019 The Metasemantics of Memory
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96
S. C.
Goldberg
representation
hose
tokening
onstituteshe
memory
tself,
hisview amounts o
the laim that
...thecontentf a memorytate s fixed,nceandfor ll,bythe nvironment
the
ubject
was n at
the imehe
had
the
riginal
hought.
hen ome ontent
is stored
n
memory
t
is inert o all
subsequent
nvironmental
hanges.
(Bernecker
009,
p.
168).
Thisclaim s a version fex
ernalism,
n that t
regards
he
ubject's
nvironments
relevantothe ndividuationfthe ontentsfhermental tates
enerally;
nd t s a
pastist
xternalism,
n
that,
when t
comes
to
thosemental tates hat onstitute
memories,
he
ontent
f
the
tate s
"fixed,
nce
and for
ll,
by
the
nvironment
he
subject
was
n
at the
ime
e had
the
riginal hought
" As a
version
f
externalism,
Bernecker'view ontrasts ithnternalistccountsfthe onditionshat etermine
content. ut even
among
xternalistiews of
content,
ernecker' view contrasts
with
wo
other xternalist
ccounts
f the onditionshat
etermine
he
ontents
f
memory.
One of these is
a
view Bernecker abels
"presentist
xternalism,"
according
o which
"memory
ontents re determined
y
past
and
by present
environmental
onditions";
nd
with
"futurist
xternalism,"
ccording
o
which
"memory
ontents
epend
not
only
on the
past
and
present
ut also on future
environmentalonditions."
p.
168).
I
agree
with erneckerhat ne
ought
o
prefer
xternalisto nternalistccounts
of the contents f
thought
enerally,
ncludingmemoryGoldberg
007a);
and
1 also agreewithBerneckerhat,f we weregivena forced hoice amongthe
externalistccounts f the emantics
f
memory,
hemost
referable
ne wouldbe
pastist
xternalism
Goldberg
007b,
c).
But within heclass of
pastist
xternalist
accounts
f
the semantics
f
memory,
think ernecker
avors
version
hat s
suboptimal.
t is the im of this
paper
o
explain
nd defend his ontention.
2
Versions f
pastist
xternalism
Given the
commitments
f
externalismnd
the
possibility
f certain
ypes
of
("world-switching")
ases,
we must
istinguish
etween everal ifferentersions
of
pastist
xternalism. ssume
the externalisthesis hat ome contents
o not
supervene
n "what's in the
head,"
with the resultthat
therecan be two
dopplegngers,
s alike
on
the
nside
including
heir
espective
istories f their
insides)
s
any
two distinctndividuals an
be,
yet
who differ
n
the
propositional
attitudes
hey
nstantiate
n
virtue f differences
n their xternal
nvironment.
Suppose
ne
environment
ontains
ater,
he ther
water
a
clear,
hirst-quenching,
transparentiquid
otherwise
uperficially
ike
waterbut whose chemical
ompo-
sition s
fundamentally
ifferent
let us
say,
t
is
composed
f
XYZ rather han
H20). Now imaginethe following low-switchingossibility: he earth-bound
subject
s
switched,
ithout er
knowledge,
o
Twin
Earth,
where he resides
or
long
time,
o
that,
y
the
ights
f our externalist
ccount,
he
has interacted
ong
enough
with
water,
nd
with win-Earth
peakers,
hat he
can use theword-form
'water,'
s
they
o,
to refer o
twater.
resumably
his
means
hat,
s
it
currently
^
Springer
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Themetasemantics
f
memory
97
figures
n our
ubject's
exicon,
water'now can be
used to
express concept
ther
thanWATER.
Let us
use
'CNew'
to
designate
his
oncept.
There re several uestionshatwe can nowask.
First,
what
concept
s
CNEW?
There would
appear
to be at
least two main
candidate nswers. he firsts that
t
is
simply
WATER,
the
concept
hat ther
(life-long)
win
Earthlingsxpress
with heir
ses of water'.The
second s that t s
some
amalgam
made
out of the two
concepts
WATER
and TWATER
perhaps
WATER-OR-TWATER,
r
maybe
ven
WET,
THIRST-QUENCHING
LIQUID.
I will
call answers f
the
former
ort
non-amalgam
nswers and
those
f
the atter
sort
malgam
nswers.
Second,
oes
Cnew
replace
he
oncept
ur
ubject xpressed
ith
water'
while
she was
living
n
earth
WATER),
or
merely
upplement
hat
oncept?
Call
the
former iew thereplacementiew and the atter he upplementiew.
We now have a matrix f
two
dimensions,
dentifying
our
ossible
views one
can take
regarding
he "semantics
f
switching."
hese
views can be considered
against
ne another hen t
comes to
assessing
he
emantics f
memory.
ake a
subject
call him
Oscar who
grew p
on
earth,
nd
whoformed
thought
before
ever
having
eft
earth)
which he
expressed
with
"Water s
my
grandmother's
favorite rink."We can assume
hat,
iven
xternalism,
his
hought
nvolved
he
concept
WATER. But what
happens
when
Oscar,
fter
aving pentyears
n Twin
Earth
without
nowing
bout
the
switch),
nd
having cquired
Cnew
aims to
rememberhe
thought
e had
years
go?
He
might
laim:
"Oh
yes,
remember:
waterwasmygrandmother'savorite rink "What oncepts expressed yhis use
of water' n
this
xpression
f
his would-be
memory?
s it
Cnew?
s itWATER?
Or
what?
Andwe
might
onsider variants well: what
would
happen
o
the
ontentf
his would-be
memory
f he
came to
realize
hat
e has beenthevictim
f a world-
switching peration,
ithout
oming
o
learn the details
of
his
world-switching
regimen?
nd
what
happens
when
he learns hosedetails?
Regarding
he
emantics f
switching,
ernecker imself
avors
replacement
view.
Since
I
wasn't
entirely
lear
whether e favored
he
amalgam
view or the
non-amalgam
iew,
my
riticisms
on't urn n
assuming
ither
ne.)
The result f
this s that erneckerccepts hatfa subject cquires new water'concept,hen
she is
prevented
rom
ecalling
houghtsnvolving
er
prior
water'
concept
as
that
oncept
s no
onger
vailable o
her.Bernecker
ecognizes
hat his iew
omes
at
a
cost,
but
he
thinks,
ll
things
onsidered,
he costs are
outweighed y
the
benefits
or
at
least
by
the
higher
ostsof the
ompeting
astist
xternalist
iews).
I
disagree
withhim
bout
his.
Most of what want
o
say
n
the
remainderf this
paper
will
be
directed
gainst
itherwhathe
has to
say
n
favor f
the
replacement
view,
r whathe
has to
say
against
he
upplement
iew.
3 Bernecker gainstthesupplemental ccountof thesemantics fswitching
3.1
Bernecker's
irst
rgument
gainst
he
supplemental
iew of the
semantics f
switching
s that t
best t works
nly
for ases
of
preservative emory,
ot for
Springer
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1
This
ccount
s
developed
n
Brge
1993).
Springer
98
S. C.
Goldberg
cases
in which "the
subjectrepresents
ome
past
content, vent,
r
image..."
(Bernecker
009,
p.
193).
Against
his,
submit hat here
s
at least
one
popular)
account fpreservative emoryhat an be extendedo cover ases inwhich the
subject epresents
ome
past
ontent,vent,
r
mage..."1
f this s
so,
then ven f
Berneckers
right
hat
he
upplemental
iew
only
works or ases of
preservative
memory,
e is
wrong
o think
hat his s an
important
imitationf the ccount.
On the
preservative
ccount
n
question,
he 'mechanism'
hat underwrites
preservative
emory
s the same mechanism
hat
underwriteshe
possibility
f
reference-preservation
n
the use of
pronouns
n a
given
text:
naphora.
onsider
how in an extended
assage
a
subsequent
se
(or uses)
of
'he' can
preserve
he
referencef
a
prior
se of he'
(or
some other
eferring
erm):
he
ubsequent
ses
do so
in
virtue f
being
anaphorically
onnected
o those earlier
uses.
On
the
accountof preservativememory am identifyingere,the same holds for
preservative
emory:
present
epresentation
f "some
past
content, vent,
r
image"
can have ts ontent
etermined
ybeing anaphorically
inked'
o
the
tate
fromwhich he
memory
tate
ausally
derives.
This idea can be clarified
y example.
n the
passage
"Sam
is a nice
man;
he
often
ives
money
o
charity,"
he
peaker
ntends he
use of he' to
pick up
the
reference
f Sam.' It is the
peaker's
ntention
hat nderwrites
he
naphoric
ink.
(Of
course,
he
peaker's
ntentionan
only
o
so
much;
t
an'toverride
onstraints
that re writtennto he emantics
r the haracters
f therelevanterms
tc.)
Now
(to
turn o a
memory xample)
magine
hat ur
subject
Oscar
is
trying
o recall
"somepast ontent,vent, r mage,"under onditionsn whichhehas been low-
switched,
nd
so
under
onditions
n which
he
possesses
the
concept
CNEw-
n
particular,
et us
suppose
he is
trying
o recall
ome distant
mental
mage,
tored
from
hildhood,
egarding
is
grandmother.
nd hen
he
magepops
nto
mind: he
was
standing
t that ld faucet
n her ncient
ouse
one
evening, ouring
erself
tall
glass
of
water,
hen he
dropped
he
glass
andthe
water
went ll over he
lace,
making veryone
augh.
The
image
s
vivid n Oscar's
mind
now.The
proposal
n
offers
that,
nsofar s we
are
assuming
he
upplemental
iew
and the
naphoric
account f
preservative
emory,
scar's
attempt
t recall an be
seen
s an nstance
ofpreservative emory.scar'switnessinghe riginalcenemade n impression
on him the
mage
was
immediately
tored
n his
memory
we
can
assume)
and
the ontent
fthe
mage
the act hat
t s an
mage
f
water,
ather
han water
is
preserved
n
memory.
ere,
what
makes t
the ase
that herecalled
mage
nherits
its ontent rom he
riginal
mage
s notOscar's
ntentions,
ut
rather
hefact
hat
the recalled
mage
s
just
that
a recalled
mage,
ne
causally
derived
rom he
earlier
mage.
t is in the
nature f this
ortof
memory
o
preserve
imagistic)
content.
Still,
ne
might
wonder:
f asked to
report
n this
mage,
nd
on
whathe was
thinking
t the
ime t which e
experienced
his
cene,
would
Oscar's
verbal
eport
express he onceptWATERor the oncept new?Thisquestion cquires point
insofars we are
assuming
he
upplement
iew,
ince,
given
hat
iew,
he
word-
form
water' s itoccurs
n his exicon
t
the ime f
recollection
s
associated
with
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Themetasemantics
f
memory
99
both
WATER and
CNEw-
ut the nswer
s
obvious.
nsofar s themental
mages
presently
eforehis
mind's
eye
are
causally
derivedfrom
perceptual mages
acquired n an occasion nearth,rior
o his
slow-switchingegimen,
hese
mages
are
mages
f water
the
ontent f
the
mages
has been
preserved).
What s
more,
insofar s
his verbalized
houghts
re based on those
mages,
his
use of water'
n
giving
erbal
xpression
o the ecollection
xpresses
WATER,
not
CNEw-
fter
ll,
Oscar
is
aiming
to
capture
he scene he witnessed
hen,
nd so intends o
be
speaking
bout
hat ame tuff
and
to
be
thinking
bout hat tuff
n
the
way
hat e
thought
bout
t
on
earth,
amely, hrough
he
oncept
WATER).
This s the
oint
f
the
appeal
to
anaphora:
Oscar's
present
se of 'water' can inheritts reference
anaphorically,
y way
of
his
intention
o be
picking p
thereference
f the tuff
represented
n his
present
mental
mage
f the cene.Since the
mage
was an
image
ofwater,s I arguedbove, t s notproblematicosuppose hat scar'spresentse
of
'water',
n
reporting
ow what
he then aw and
thought,
efers
o
water,
nd
expresses
WATER.
Now
my present oint
sn't to defend he
foregoing
iew
(although
think
something
ike
this
might
e
right:
oldberg
007b,
).
It is rathero
say
that,
ven
if
Bernecker
s
right
hat
he
supplemental
ccount
an
only
workforcases of
preservative
emory,
e is
wrong
o think
hat
his hows
that he account an't
handle ases
n which the
ubject epresents
ome
past
ontent,vent,
r
mage..."
(p.
193).
3.2 Bernecker'
second
rgumentgainst
he
upplemental
iew s that ts best
incarnationBurge's preservativememoryhypothesis"commits us to the
classical-computational
ccount f
cognitive sychology."
193)
I
don't see this.
Is one committedo the
lassical-computational
ccount f
cognitive sychology
f
one offersn
anaphora-based
ccount f
the
eference
f
pronouns?
don't ee
why
thiswouldbe. And
yet
he
preservative
ccount f
memoryust
described
eally
s
no more ommitted
n this core thanwas the
anaphoric
ccounts f
pronouns.
After
ll,
the
preservative
emory ypothesis
s a version f an
anaphoric
iew,
s
on this
ccount
t s the
naphoric eference-preservation
hatmakes or
reservative
memory.
o
make
out his
case,
Bernecker ould have to
say
whether e would
level the ame
charge gainst
hosewho endorse
naphoric
ccounts f
pronouns,andif
not,
why
not
what
hedifference
s).
3.3 Bernecker's
hird
rgument
gainst
he
upplemental
ccount
p.
194)
is
that
it must
reject Kripkean
modal intuitionsat
least if
the
proponent
f
the
supplemental
ccount ndorses
he
malgam
iewdescribed bove.
Bernecker ses
the
following
ase to
bring
out his
allegation:
slow-switched
ubject
who
originated
n earth
and
who neverknewthat
water=H20),
ut who
by
now has
livedfor ometime n
Twin
Earth,
s told hat here s another
lanet,
ust
ikethis
one,
xcept
he
wateryiquid
n that
lanet
s
H20
ratherhanXYZ. Berneckersks
us to
magine
hat his
ubject
s
subsequently
skedwhetherhe tuff
hey esignate
on that ther lanetwith water'really s water.Bernecker rites hat,whilethe
Kripkean
modal intuition s
'no',
our
subject
should
answer
'yes'
if
the
supplemental-cum-amalgam
iew s true.
What
grounds
ernecker's ontentionhat
ur
ubject
hould nswer
n
this
way
if the
supplemental-cum-amalgam
iew is
true?
Suppose
thatour
subject,
now
Springer
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100
S. C.
Goldberg
apprized
f her
world-switching,
s
posed
the
question y
way
of
the
following
interrogative
entence:
Q Is the iquidthat eopleonEarth esignates 'water'reallywater?
How should ur
ubject
call
her
Olive'
interpret
he
uestion osedby
Q?
Well,
consider
hat,
n the
upplemental-cum-amalgam
iew,
water'
n
Olive's lexicon
can
express
ither
WATER or
Cnew*
where
he
atters understood
o
express
n
amalgam
oncept.
o
long
s WATER and the
malgam oncept
NEW
re the
nly
two
concepts
ssociatedwith
he water'
entry
n
Olive's
lexicon,
however he
interprets
in
particular,
hetherhe takes he econd
occurrence f water' o
express
WATER
or the
amalgam oncept
CNEW
she will answer
he
question
posed by
Q
in
the ffirmative.
uppose
that he takes his ccurrence
f water' o
expressWATER. nthat ase shewill akeQ to ask whetherarthingsse water' o
designate
he
kind
icked
ut
by
WATER;
and the nswer s that
es, hey
o.
If
on
theother
handOlive takesthe second
occurrence
f
'water'
n
Q
to
express
he
amalgam oncept
new,
then he will
take
Q
to
ask
whether
arthlings
se water'
to
designate
hekind
icked
ut
by
the
malgam oncept;
ndonce
again
he
nswer
is that
es, hey
o. Either
way,
t
appears
hat
live
will nswer n
the ffirmative
precisely
s Bernecker ad advertised.
But
things
re
not o
simple.
On the
ontrary,
he
proponent
f
the
upplemental
view has
very ood
reason o
regard
ernecker'
argument
bove as an
argument
against
he
malgam
view
It is worthwhile
ursuing
his
hought,
ince t s based
on a kindof considerationhaveusedelsewhereGoldberg 007a), in a context
having
othing
o do with
world-switching
onsiderations,
o reach
very
imilar
conclusion.
As
I
noted
bove,
Bernecker
as to assume hat
Olive
will
nterpret
he econd
occurrencef water'
n
Q
as
expressing
itherWATER or the
malgam oncept
Cnew-
n
fact Olive
will
not
interpret
his occurrence f 'water' as
expressing
WATER;
or
rather,
f she
does,
she
wouldhave
misinterpreted
he
purport
f the
question
he was asked.For consider: is uttered
y
a Twin
Earthling,
ne who
speaks
Twin
English.
ut
by
hypothesis
water'
n Twin
English
oes not
xpress
WATER. So were ur
ubject
o
nterpret
he
uestion
n
such
way
hat he econd
occurrencef water'
xpressed
WATER,
hewould e
misinterpreting
he
uestion.
Thus t
seems hat f
Bernecker
s to tell he
tory
o that live does not
misinterpret
the
uestion
hat
s
being
ut
o
her,
ernecker ust ender
live
as
interpreting
he
second occurrence f 'water' as
expressing omething
ther
than WATER.
Assuming
he
upplemental-cum-amalgam
iew,
he
only
other
oncept
ssociated
with water' n her exicon s the
malgam
oncept.
ut and this s
a
point
think
Bernecker
isses
precisely
he amecriticism
ouldhold
f
Olive were o
employ
this
oncept
n
her
omprehension
fthe
uestion
osed
by
the
Twin
Earthling'
use
of
Q.
In
particular,
water'
n Twin
English
oes not
xpress
n
amalgam oncept,
and o does not xpresshe articularmalgam onceptnquestion.o onceagain f
Olive so
interprets
he
uestion osed
by
theTwin
Earthling'
use of
Q,
she would
have
hereby isinterpreted
he
urport
f
the
uestion
he
was asked.This alls
nto
question
whether
ny nteresting
onclusion an be established
y appeal
to this
scenario
o
described.
Springer
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Themetasemanticsf
memory
101
In
fact,
we
might
ow think hat
he
foregoing
rgument
s in
fact n
argument
against
he
malgam
view
tself. or the esson
ust
learned
s
that,
nsofar s the
supplemental-cum-amalgamiew s assumed,Olive cannotnterprethequestion
posed by
Q
in
themanner hat t
was
intended. ither he
upplemental
iewor
the
amalgam
view
or
both)
must
go.
Below
I will
give
reasons or
hinking
hat
he
pastist
xternalist
houldwant o endorse
he
supplemental
iew.
Here,
restrict
myself
o
claiming
hat nsofar s
the
upplemental
iew
s
assumed,
he
foregoing
argument
an
be seen as an
argument
gainst
he
malgam
view.
And t is worth
noting,
oo,
that
nce the
pastist
xternalist
ives up
on the
malgam
view
while
retaining
he
supplemental
iew),
she has a
perfectly
atural
escription
f
the
scenario. uch a theoristan
now
describe live's
cognitive
ituation,
s she
faces
the
uestion osed
by
Q,
as
follows.
he termwater'
s itoccurs n
Olive's
lexicon
is associates with both WATER and TWATER. What is more (the account
continues),
t
would be natural
or Olive
to
interpret
he
second
occurrence f
'water'
o that t
expresses
WATER. After
ll,
this s what
water'
expresses
n
Twin
English,
nd it
s
a Twin
English peaker
who utters
.
So insofar
s Olive
intendso
grasp
he
uestion
hat
he
peaker
meant
o
pose,
Olive
must
nterpret
he
relevant
ccurrencef water' s
expressing
WATER;
and
nsofar
s Olive aims
o
be
responding
o
that
uestion,
he must
ontinue o
use 'water'
throughout
his
exchange
s
the
xpressing
he ame.
For
t
s
only
f
Olive
continueso
use water'
throughout
his
xchange
s the
uestioner
ad,
hat live can
be seenas
answering
the
uestion
hat
was
posed
to her.
Notice,
inally,
hat f
Olive
nterprets
he
econd
occurrence f 'water'as expressingWATER,then hewillregardQ as asking
whether
peakers
on Earth use
'water'
to
designate
he
liquid picked
out
by
TWATER. And
here he will
answer
his
uestion
n
the
negative precisely
s the
Kripkean
ntuition
ouldhave
t.
In
sum.Bernecker
s
explicit
hat is
target
s the
pastist
xternalist
ho holds
combinationf
two
subsidiary
laims: the
supplemental
iew,
and
the
amalgam
view of
the
emantics f
switching.
ut f
we insist
n this
ombination,
henwe
reduce
Olive
(the
low-switched
ubject
n
our
example)
o
having
o
misinterpret
the
question
osed by
Q
in
which
ase it is
dubious
whether e
can learn
very
much
from he
scenario.
n
thiswaywe see thatBernecker'argumentrom he
Kripkean
ntuitionailson its own
terms. ut
we can
say
more.This
first
esult,
together
ith
hefact hat f
we
give up
on
the
malgam
view
then
Olive can be
represented
s
correctly
nterpreting
nd
responding
o the
uestion
ut
o
her,
an
be
taken s
providing
ndependent
eason o
reject
he
malgam
iew.
This reaction
is
further
upported y
the
fact
hat,
n such an
interpretation,
live will
indeed
have the
Kripkean
ntuition.
3.4
Bernecker' final
argument
gainst
the
supplemental
iew
targets
he
motivation
or
heview.He
argues
hat
he
ppeal
to the
upplemental
ccount
oes
not
save
the
pastist
xternalist
rom
having
to
postulate
emantically-induced
memoryailuresn slow-switchingases. Semantically-inducedemory ailures
are
memory
ailures
rought
bout
y
relevant
hanges
n
environmental
onditions,
where
he
environmental
hange
has
the
effect hat
he content f
the
subject's
recollections
not the
ame as
the
content f
the
original hought
he is
trying
o
recall.
These
failures re
taken
y
many
heorists
o
pose
a
problem
or
xternalist
Springer
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7/23/2019 The Metasemantics of Memory
9/14
102
S. C.
Goldberg
accountsof content
enerally.
he
supplemental
ccount of the
semantics f
switching ight
e
thought
o
enable
he xternalisto avoid
having
o
acknowledge
memoryailuresf this ort.Bernecker'claim, neffect,s that he upplemental
view cannotbe
motivated
n this
way.
In
response
submit hat
Bernecker's
argument
n this score is not
persuasive,
or reasons
having
to do with
the
dialectical ontext f his
argument.
To
make uthiscase for
hinking
hat
emantically-induced
emory
ailures
ill
have to be
acknowledged
ven
by
those
pastist
xternalists ho endorsethe
supplemental
iew of
the semantics f
switching,
ernecker
ppeals
to
John
Gibbons'
1996)
paper.
On Gibbons' emantic
nalysis, oncepts
re individuated
not
only by
their
xtension ut also
by
their
functional
ole."
The burden f
Gibbons'
paper
was to
argue
that such a semantic
nalysis
has
interesting
implicationsor he emanticsfswitching. ore pecifically,ibbons adargued
that f functional
ole
partly
ndividuates
oncepts,
hen,
t least
in
a subset f
switching
ases,
every
xternalist
ill have to
acknowledge
hat.
(+)
There are
slow-switching
ases
involving emantically-induced
emory
failures.
The
slow-switching
ases
in
question,
n Gibbons'
view,
re thoseon which he
subject
earns
f her
world-switchingegimen.
ibbons'
laimwas that n
learning
of thefact f her
past witching,
hefunctionalole
of her ermwater'will
shift,
and
so
will
be unlikethe functional
oles associated
with
either
WATER or
TWATER the4water'conceptshe hadprior o earningfher witching.nsofar
as a
difference
n
functional
olemakes or difference
n
concept,
he onclusions
that
he
now-knowledgeableubject
has
yet
a third
water'
concept
one
that s
identical
o
neither
WATER norTWATER and
that
his
s
the
concept
hat he
expresses
with eruse of water' fter
aving
earned
f
her
low-switching
istory.
As Bernecker nderstands ibbons'
argument,
he
argument oes
through
whatever ne thinks bout the debate
between he
replacement
iew and the
supplemental
iewof the emantics
f
switching.
ere s Berneckern thematter:
Combining
xternalism
ith
functional
ole
semantics,
ibbons
holds that
sameness fthoughtontents determinedot nlybysameness f relational
properties
ut
also
by
similarity
f functional
ole. Granted that slow
switching
oesn't
entail he oss ofold
concepts,
t
t2
possess
both water
concept
and a twater
oncept.
..
But,
Gibbons
maintains,
he
concept
expressed
y
S's term water'
at
t3
afterhe
finds ut thathe
has been
switched
differs
rom he
oncept xpressed
y
his
term
water' t
tj
and
t2.
The
reason s
that,
fter
S]
is
informed
f the
switch,
is
thoughts
bout
'water'2have a
different
unctionalole
thanbefore.Gibbons
.. concludes
that
ecause
at
t3
S]
employs
oncepts]
distinctrom hose
he]
employ[s]
t
t|,
[he]
cannot
ay
or thinkwhat
he]
was
thinking
hen.
But
if
[he]
cannot
thinkt, he]cannot now t.' (Bernecker009,p. 196;boldadded).
I thinkhat erneckereremeans
obe
peaking,
ot f he
ubject's
houghts
bout
water'
that
s,
her
metalinguistichoughts),
ut atherer
water'
thoughts,
hat
s,
the
houghts
he,
he
ubject,
expressesy sing
he
word-form
water'.
Springer
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7/23/2019 The Metasemantics of Memory
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-
7/23/2019 The Metasemantics of Memory
11/14
104
S.
C.
Goldberg
(assuming
hat ifferencesn
functionalole make
for
differences
n
concept)
t s
neither f
those
wo
oncepts.
ut
again
t s not
lear
why
his
hould e.
Granted
that
functional ole considerationsstablish hat a subjectwho learns of her
switching egimen cquires
third
oncept
one
distinct rom
othWATER
and
TWATER),
t s not lear
why
his hird
oncept
must e the
one
expressed
n
the
subject's
ttempt
o recall
a
past
water'-thought.
ibbons
ppears
o think
hat,
given
herole
of functional
ole considerations
n
concept
ndividuation,
nce the
subject
earns f her
world-switching,
ll of her
ubsequent
ses of
water'
will
be
affected
y
thenew
functionalole water'
has,
and
so all of these
uses shouldbe
renderedn
terms f this hirdwater'
concept
the
one
whosefunctional
ole
s
not
equivalent
o
that f eitherWATER
or
TWATER).
But
once we make
xplicit
hat
we
arenot
denying
he
upplemental
iewof
switching
once
we
"[grant]
hat low
switchingoesn't ntail he oss ofold concepts," s Bernecker asgrantedwe
need n
explanation
or
why
t s that
in
Bernecker'
gloss
on
Gibbons'
onclusion)
"knowledgeablewitching
rings
bout a
conceptual
hift hat
revents
s
from
accessing
ome
of
our
past thoughts
.
(Bernecker
009,
p.
196;
italics
dded).
Since
Bernecker oes not discuss the
matter
t
any
length,
ere
can
only
speculate
bouthis
reasoning
n this core.
In
pursuing
his am less nterestedn
whether
his s what ernecker
ctually
ad
n
mind,
han n whether
his s thebest
facethat
an be
put
n
his
position.) erhaps
he
reasoning
s as follows. nsofar s
the
ubject
as
nowthree istinct
oncepts
ssociated
n
her exiconwith heword-
form
water,'4
nd
nsofar s these re
subjectivelyndistinguishable
o
her,
t can
happen hat hedeploys hewrongne when hinkingboutherpast houghts.hat
is,
it
can
happen
hat,
n a
previous
ccasion he
thought
WATER-thought,
ut
that,
n
thinking
bout t at
some future
ime,
nd
asking
herselfwhat
he was
thinking
bout at
some
prior
ime,
he now
(on
at the
time of
"recollection")
deploys
'water'
concept
ther hanWATER.
True,
his
eading
oes notdeliver
the
trong
onclusion hat
knowledgeablewitchingrings
bout
conceptual
hift
that
revents
s
from ccessing
ome of our
past
houghts."
ut,
gain,
don't ee
how
Bernecker an hold such a
view,
given
that he is
willing
to
grant
he
supplemental
iew;
nd
n
any
ase
I
don't ee
how
else he can reach he onclusion
(+);
and t was to
establish
+)
that ernecker
ppealed
o Gibbons'
nalysis
n the
first
lace.5
Unfortunately,
uch a
position
aces an immediate
hallenge.6 implyput,
a
pastist
xternalist ho
endorses he
upplemental
iew has resources o
resist
his
4
They
re
WATER,
WATER,
nd he
onceptcquired
n
earning
f he
witchingegimen
a
concept
hoseunctionaloles
different
romhatf
oth
WATER
nd
WATER.
5
If hiss
whatithererneckerr
Gibbons
ctually
ad nmindand am
y
no
meansertain
f
this then
hey
ave onfusedn
pistemological
ssue ithn ssuen he
metaphysics
fmind.he
epistemological
ssues:
givensubject
ho asmorehan
ne
subjectively-indistinguishable)
water'
concept
ssociated
ith
er erm
water',
ow
an
he
now)
now hichnewas
mployed
n
previous
ccasionnwhichhe ntertained
'water'-thought?
ut venf ur
ubject
oesn't
now)knowhichwater'concepthethen)mployed,t s notheratterntirelyo ayhathe an'tccess
that
oncept
or
he
houghtsnvolving
t).
6
In
dditionowhatwill
rgue
n he ext
bove,
he
osition
sreconstructedere
lso
ppears
o ace
a
question
f
motivation
n
onnectionith
ts
ppeal
o
unctionalole onsiderations.nsofars
slow-
switching
ases
ive
he
ubject
'water'
concept
therhan
he
ne he
riginally
ad,
s externalist
Springer
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7/23/2019 The Metasemantics of Memory
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Themetasemantics
f
memory
105
argument,
nd in so
doing
to resistBernecker' contentionhat here re slow-
switching
ases
regarding
which she
must
acknowledge emantically-induced
memoryailures. o see how Bernecker'contentionan be resisted,uppose hat
our
pastist
externalist
maintains hat
the contentof
a
memory-constituting
representation
s fixed
n
partby
the fact
hat
he
subject
ims to
be
recalling
previously-tokened
epresentation:
his
fact
ensures that the content f that
previously-tokenedepresentation
s
preserved.7
f
so,
such
anaphoric
elations
secure
gainst
he
possibility
f the
ort
f
error
he
bove
position
nvisages.
Now
I
submit hat either ernecker'
argument
s reconstructed
bove,
nor
he
ppeal
o
functionalole
considerations,
ear
against
his
naphoric
ccount.
n
particular,
once
the
upplemental
iew s
granted,
t s hard o
see
why subject's
earning
f
her
past switching
hould
prevent
er
from
ethinking
he
very hought
he
had
earlier; nd f tdoesn't, hen t doesn'tprevent erfrom edeployingherelevant
'water'
concept
n the
way
that he
naphoric
ccount
uggests.
n
sum,
nsofar s
Bernecker
unlikeGibbons)
s
prepared
o
grant
he
supplemental
iew,
onsider-
ations f
functionalole annot e usedto show hat herewillbe cases n which he
pastist
xternalists forced o
postulatememory
ailuresn
world-switching
ases.
4
In favorof
the
supplemental
iew
I
have
ust rgued
hat he onsiderations
ernecker irects
gainst
he
upplemental
view of the emantics fswitchingo not ucceed.Given hat version fpastist
externalism hich ndorses he
upplemental
iew s a
rival o theversion f
pastist
externalism hich ernecker avors n his
book,
heresults
that,
or ll
Bernecker
has
argued
n
his book
against
hat
ival,
t has
notbeenundermined.
till,
t s one
thing
o
argue
hat hevarious
rguments
gainst
his ival re
not
good,
nd
another
to offer
positive
rgument
n favor
f therival. t is to this hat
now turn.
My argument roceedsby way
of
reductio.
uppose
the
replacement
iew
is
correct. ow
imagine
thinkerorwhomTWATER has
replaced
WATER as the
concept
xpressed y
her
urrent se of water'
she's
spent
nough
ime
n Twin
Earth tc.)We will imagine, inally,hat he is ignorantf herworld-switching.
Now
imagine
hat he
thinks he
following.
Footnote
continued
views ave
t,
nd nsofar
s
this
ewwater'
conceptupplements
rather
han
eplaces)
he
ubject's
original
water'
concept,
sthe
upplemental
iew
as
t,
henhe
ubject ight
ake
he ortf rror
n
question:
he
mightriginally
hink
WATER-thought,et
n recollection
after
slow-switching
regimen)
egard
hat
hought
s a
TWATER-thought.
t would
ppear,
hen,
hat unctionalole on-
siderationsre fifth
heel:
hey
re ot
eeded
o
ecurehe
esiredonclusion.
7
Of ourse,s witheference-preservationithnaphoricronouns,otoo ere:he acthatsubject
aims o
e
ecalling
previously-tokened
epresentation
annotverride
onstraints
hat
re uiltntohe
semanticsf
er
xpressions;
ut
nsofars
theseonstraintslone onot ufficeo
eterminehe ontent
of
representation,
nd n
particular
eavet
pen
hether
hatontentnvolves ATERr
TWATER,
the act
hathe
ubject
ims obe
recallingpreviously-tokened
epresentation
an ettlehismatter.
I
discussheseorts
f onsideration
n
Goldberg
2005,
007b,
).
Springer
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7/23/2019 The Metasemantics of Memory
13/14
106
S. C.
Goldberg
I
remember
hat ine
ay,
little
more han hree
ecades
go,
when
jumped
into
he ake
at
my
ummer
ottage
back
n
1978).
remember
ow
freezing
thewaterwas
-
and rememberhinkingtthe ime,I have never elt uch
cold water
n
my
ife '
I
begin
by noting
hat
low-switching
oes
not underminehe
ubject's bility
o
pick
out
via
description)
herelevant
iquid
=water).
f
asked
what
he
meant
y
'water',
he
might eply:
You
know,
he lear
iquid
thatwas
in the ake on that
brisk
ay
back
n
1978.
Ah
yes,
remember
he cene
very
learly..."
What s
more,
if our
subject
s
sophisticated
nough
o know
how to describe
oncepts,
hen he
world-switching
on't
undermine er
ability
o
pick
out
(via
description)
he
relevant
oncept
ither
=WATER).
Thus,
reflecting
n her
use of water'
n her
descriptions
f the
scene,
she
might ay
that
t
"expresses
he
concept hroughwhich
rdinaryeople
hennd there
hought
bout hewet, lear
iquid
n that ake
..." So
the
eplacement
iewhas to hold
he
following
ombination
fclaims:
first,
that he slow-switched
ubject
an
pick
out
the relevant
iquid
and
the
relevant
concept
y description;
ut
econd,
hat
he low-switched
ubject
annot
mploy
the relevant
concept,
it
having
been
replaced
by
TWATER.
This seems
wrongheaded
o me. It
will result
n
a
rather ncharitable
onstrual.
or now
imagine
hat ur
subject,
who
can
pick
out
the relevant
iquid
water)
nd the
relevant
oncept
WATER)
descriptively,
ays
he
following:
In
using
water'
now
to describe hat cene and
to
express
he
oncepts
then
sed,
intend
my
present
usesof water' opickout he tuffjustdescribed,ndtoexpress he oncept just
described."
he
replacement
iewmust
old
hat er ntentions
ill
be
thwartedo
long
s she remains
n
Twin
Earth.
ut this eems
o be
a
decidedly
nnaturalnd
uncharitable
onstrual.
he more
natural
hink o
say
is that
not
only
can
she
describe
he
oncept
n
question,
he can also
re-deploy
t,
ven as she
remains n
Twin Earth.
Here the
speaker's
descriptive
emantic
ntentions
erve to
fixthe
referent,
nd
n this
way
make lear
he
oncept
eing xpressed,
y
the
elevant
se
of
water,'
without
onstituting
ither he
meaning
f or
concept xpressed
y
that
use.
See
Goldberg
2005)
for
fulldefense
f this
Kripke-inspired
iew.)8
5
Conclusion
In
this
aper
have
presented
series f
challenges
o Bernecker's
ccount
f the
metasemanticsf
memory.
n
particular,
nce we
agree
on the
position
ernecker
describes s
pastist
xternalism
there re
still
variety
f different
ositions
ne
can endorse. ernecker
ppears
o favor
particular
ersion
fthe
pastist
xternalist
position
n which
here
will
be cases
involving
memory
ailures
wing
o
semantic
shifts.
However,
have
argued
thathis
case
in favor f
such
a
view,
and
his
8
In hisectionhave laimednlyhatheres strategyvailableo he astistxternalistho imso
avoid
aving
o
postulate
emantically-generated
emory
ailures
n
world-switching
ases. have
argued
hathis
trategy
s
vailable
o
ong
sour
astist
xternalist
ndorses
he
upplemental
iewnd
the
on-amalgam
iew f he semantics
f
witching."
n
particular,
othing
nBernecker's
reatment
f
themetasemantics
f
memory
ddresses
his
trategy.
owever,
he
vailability
f
his
trategy
eed ot
be he inal
ordn he emantics
f
witching:
oldberg
2005,
007b,
).
Springer
This content downloaded from 83.137.211.198 on Thu, 12 Nov 2015 21:36:03 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
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7/23/2019 The Metasemantics of Memory
14/14
Themetasemanticsf
memory
107
corresponding
ase
against
n
opposing
iew,
re
unsuccessful.n
one
sense,
his
ought
o be
good
news
forBernecker:
he number
f
options
vailable to
those
theorists ho
ndorse
pastist
xternalism"
s
greater
han
e
supposed
n
his book.
Acknowledgments
ithhanks
o
ven erneckeror
elpful
omments
n
n arlier
ersionf his
paper.
References
Bernecker,
.
2009).
Memory:
philosophicaltudy.
xford:xford
niversity
ress.
Brge,
.
1993).
ontent
reservation.
hilosophical
eview,
02(4'
57-488.
Gibbons,
1996).
xternalism
nd
nowledge
f
ontent.
hilosophicaleview,05(3).
Goldberg,
.
2005).Non-standard)
essons
rom
orld-switching
ases.
hilosophia,2(1),
5-131.
Goldberg,. 2007a). nti-individualismMindndanguage,nowledgendustification.ambridge:
Cambridgeniversity
ress.
Goldberg,
.
2007b).
emanticxternalism
nd
pistemic
llusion.n
.
Goldberg
Ed.),
nternalism
nd
externalism
n
emanticsnd
pistemologvdd. 35-252).
xford:
xfordniversitvress.
Goldberg,
.
2007c).
nti-individualism,
ontent
reservation,
nd
iscursive
ustification.
ous,
1(2),
178-203.
Springer