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With Quarterly Executive Letter

Volume 1, Issue 6

June 2012

© 2012 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.

ii

June 11, 2012

Are we there yet?

That’s the question that has confounded the housing market for the last four years. Has the market

bottomed? Should I buy now? Or will prices go even lower?

In 2010, price gains were primarily due to demand created by the homebuyer tax credit program. When

the program expired, so did the gains, and our monthly Home Price Index (HPI) finished the year in the

negative. Over the course of 2011 we saw four months of gains, but again finished down by 4.5 percent

overall. This year, as was the case the previous two years, spring brought an upward movement in our HPI.

So the question on many peoples’ minds is will this year’s end result be any different than the recent past?

One indication of where we may be heading is the upward trend in the HPI itself. In March, and again in April,

the month-over-month HPI increase was up 1.1 percent and 2.2 percent, respectively. Prices of non-distressed

properties jumped 1.8 percent and 2.6 percent, respectively. Additionally, our newly introduced Pending HPI,

an augmentation of our HPI based on Multiple Listing Service data, indicates house prices rose again from

April to May by 2 percent. While this trend is subject to the uncertainty introduced by other macro-economic

conditions such as domestic jobs growth or the ongoing financial struggles of some European countries, I am

hopeful that the current level of momentum can be sustained in the coming months.

Another illuminating factor is the available supply of homes for sale. Nationally, inventory levels have

trended down to a 6.5 month supply—a reasonably healthy level. Unfortunately, there are also significantly

fewer buyers. Historically, current homeowners trading up represent the biggest segment of the purchase

market. But with more than 20 percent of homeowners underwater, another 25 percent of all homeowners

possessing less than 20 percent equity in their homes, and tightened underwriting requirements, this

potential pool of buyers has effectively been eliminated. On the bright side, in some markets, like Phoenix,

San Diego, and even Las Vegas, there is more demand than inventory, which of course is pushing prices up.

Current industry forecasts for mortgage originations are trending up toward $1.3 trillion as we approach

the halfway point of 2012, fueled by strong refinancing activity. But at a time when it appears our leaner,

smaller industry may again be facing capacity challenges and with interest rates at all-time lows, how

sustainable are volumes? Forecasting mortgage origination volume and purchase-to-refinance share used

to be relatively straightforward. Purchase volume could be calculated using pending sales figures and

modeled for refinance volume based on interest rate trends. Today, refinances are running at more than

70 percent of the market with 60- to 90-day timelines for closings. In addition, there are structural shifts,

such as an increased share of cash buyers, the high share of policy-stimulated high LTV refinance activity,

From the CEO


iii

and the increased share of low down-payment FHA and VA lending. In addition, minimum standards for

credit are higher and debt-to-income ratios lower than in the past, squeezing credit eligibility for consumers

who are “in-the-money” on rates. Those who are “in-the-money,” with good credit and positive equity, have

already financed in many cases, sometimes more than once in the past two years.

While a broad spectrum of government lending channel support is providing some additional momentum,

negative equity (and damaged credit from the Great Recession) is keeping a significant number of “in-the-

money” prospects out of the traditional refi market. And even if those prospects could refinance, that can

only help so much. Though refinances do stimulate our industry, improve household balance sheets and

lower default risks for the GSEs, they don’t contribute to the long-term recovery of the real estate market.

Alright, enough walking the tightrope by pointing to more data and statistics without giving a straight

yes or no answer to the question, "are we there yet?" The mortgage industry has done a great job of rising

to the challenges in years past. There is a definite sense of solid fundamentals laying the groundwork for

sustainable improvements. How robust the improvements will be is the big question.

There are green shoots that indicate the market has turned for good. HPI and home sales are up. Inventory

is trending down. Of course for every green shoot there is a caveat—the credit markets remain tight, the

purchase-to-refinance market ratio is upside down and much of the positive news is still regional in nature.

Ultimately only time, jobs growth and buyers born from the mending of consumer credit will return the

housing sector of the economy to a clean bill of health.

Sincerely,

Anand Nallathambi

President and Chief Executive Officer


iv

The MarketPulse - Volume 1, Issue 6

The Authors

Anand K. NallathambiPresident and Chief Executive Officer

Anand K. Nallathambi is the president and chief executive officer of CoreLogic, a leading provider of consumer, financial and property information, analytics and services to business and government. Nallathambi is responsible for all aspects of the CoreLogic business.

Dr. Mark Fleming Chief Economist

Dr. Mark Fleming is the chief economist for CoreLogic. He leads the mortgage analytics and economics team responsible for developing property risk and valuation models, home price indices and forecasts and real estate trends reports, as well as for providing analysis and commentary on the current real estate and mortgage markets.

Sam KhaterSenior Economist

Sam Khater is a senior economist for CoreLogic with the mortgage analytics and economics team. He is responsible for real estate market analysis and collateral model development within the CoreLogic Data & Analytics group.

Thomas M. VitloResearch Analyst

Thomas M. Vitlo is a research analyst for CoreLogic with the mortgage analytics and economics team. Thomas utilizes statistical software to analyze the real estate market and uses data visualization techniques to illustrate trends.

Table of ContentsFrom the CEO ............................................................... ii

The Authors ................................................................... iv

Media Contacts ........................................................... iv

The MarketPulse™ .......................................................1

How Robust Is the Housing Recovery? .................1

The Impact of Negative Equity on the Supply of Unsold Homes .....................................2

Liberal Collateral Credit Standards Concentrate Risk ..........................................................3

Defining Normal .....................................................3

Trends in Collateral Credit Standards ............4

Holding the Risk of Liberalized Collateral Credit Standards Today ........................................5

Rental Price Divergence ...........................................6

In the News .....................................................................6

National Summary April 2012 ............................7

Top 25 CBSA Summary April 2012 ..................7

State Summary April 2012 ..................................8

Prices ..........................................................................9

Performance ........................................................... 10

Sales ........................................................................... 11

Variable Descriptions .......................................... 12

Media ContactsFor real estate industry and trade media:

Bill Campbell [email protected] (212) 995.8057 (office) (917) 328.6539 (mobile)

For general news media:

Lori Guyton [email protected] (901) 277.6066

mailto:bill%40campbelllewis.com?subject=

mailto:lguyton%40crosbyvolmer.com?subject=

The MarketPulse™

1© 2012 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.

espite declining economic

growth and increasing European

headline risk, the real estate

market is striding into June on an

upswing. This month, all eyes will be on

the European Union as it struggles with

both a recession and the challenge of

an orderly resolution to the economic

issues in Greece and Spain, which have

the potential to cause spillover distress

in other countries. Ironically, these same

concerns could also benefit the U.S. real

estate market because a flight to quality

investment assets, particularly fixed

income assets, will result in continued low

U.S. interest rates.

In the U.S., consumer confidence

fell in May for the third consecutive

month as consumer evaluations of

the economy remained cautious. Soft

consumer sentiment reflects the weak

labor markets which have deteriorated

somewhat over the last few months and

into late May. On the manufacturing

front, May’s industrial production and

manufacturer survey data suggests

a reversal of the spring bump in

manufacturing activity. More worrisome

is that new durable goods orders,

typically a leading indicator, continue

their general slowdown that began in

late 2010. Overall, the economy grew

only 1.9 percent in Q1 2012, down from

3.0 percent last quarter. The weaker

economic activity has helped ease

inflation, which peaked at 3.9 percent

in September of last year, but has since

declined seven out of the last 10 months.

The softening economy hasn’t slowed the

nascent revival of residential construction,

however. Single-family construction

activity increased 2.3 percent in April, but

more importantly is up 25 percent over

the last six months. This improved activity

is a reflection of the record low supply of

unsold new homes and improving builder

How Robust Is the Housing Recovery?By Sam Khater

Housing Statistics (Apr 2012)

HPI YOY Chg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.1%

HPI YOY Chg XD . . . . . . . . . . .1.9%

NegEq Share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0.0%

Shadow Inventory (01/2012) . . .1.6m

Distressd Clearing Ratio. . . . . 0.80

Distressd Discount. . . . . . . . .31.8%

New Sales (ths) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Existing Sales (ths) . . . . . . . . . . . 256

Mean Actv List Price . . . . . 280,148

Active DOM Mean . . . . . . . . . . . 172

Months' Supply Listings . . . . . 6.54

Closed-to-List Price %Chg . . .-5.1%

Volume 1, Issue 6

June 11th, 2012

Data as of March/April 2012

D

Cont...

FIgURE 1. NEgATIVE EQUITy IS RESTRICTINg THE SUPPLy OF HOMES FOR SALEMonths' Supply

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

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9

< 10% 10% to 20% 20% to 40% 40% to 50% > 50 Negative Equity

Front pagehow robust is recovery 060112 2.3186x4.9375

Source: CoreLogic Mar 2012


2


sentiment. The rise in single-family

construction is particularly welcome

news because new sales have higher

economic multiplier effects than re-

sales, and the construction segment has

one of the highest unemployment

rates among all industries.

Home prices are quickly

rebounding thanks to a drop in

the share of real estate owned

(REO) properties and the decline

in months’ supply of unsold inventory.

Overall, home prices increased

1.1 percent year-over-year in April, up

from a 0.2 percent increase in March.

Excluding distressed sales, home

prices increased 1.9 percent year-over-

year in April compared to no change in

March. Interestingly, when distressed

sales are excluded, home prices in

March and April are improving at

the best rate since late 2006/early

2007 and are even appreciating at a

faster rate than during the tax-credit

“boomlet” in 2010.

The Impact of Negative Equity on the Supply of Unsold Homes

The months’ supply of unsold homes fell to 6.5 months in April, down from nine months just last June and it is

currently at the lowest level in more than five years. While the rapid decline in months’ supply is typically good news because it indicates a better balance between demand and supply, this decline is occurring less because of an increase in sales and more because of a drop in unsold inventory as a result of negative equity. Negative equity is typically a demand-side obstacle to sales and refinances, but currently is also restricting the supply of homes for sale. Analysis of the 50 largest markets reveals the metropolitan areas with the lowest levels of months’ supply

also have the higher shares of negative

equity (Figure 1). Markets with negative

equity share of 50 percent or more

have an average months’ supply of

4.7 months, compared to 8.3 months’

supply for markets with less than a

10 percent negative equity share.

The presence of negative equity

not only drives foreclosures,

reduces the availability of

purchase down payments and

impedes refinances, but also

restricts the ability of owners to list

their homes for sale as the demand side

of the market improves.

Paradoxically, as the flow of REOs

has slowed over the last 18 months,

negative equity has become a

positive force in real estate markets

by restricting supply in the face of

increasing demand. The impact is

more significant on home prices

at the lower end of the price

distribution where supply is tighter

because negative equity is higher.

Over the last two months, the prices

of less expensive properties are up

an average of 4.5 percent from a year

ago, compared to 0.6 percent for

higher-priced homes (Figure 2).

Though increasing prices are a

welcome sign to the housing market,

particularly in many of the hardest

hit markets, the high share of

underwater borrowers is part of the

reason why. We have transitioned

from pricing dynamics driven by

economic weakness and high shares

of distressed sales to one of restricted

supply, which will likely exist for some

time to come—a reason for optimism

in many hard-hit markets.

“The softening economy hasn’t

slowed the nascent revival of

residential construction.”

End.

FIgURE 2. LOWER PRICED HOMES APPRECIATINg RAPIDLySFC HPI yOy Chg

-25%

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-15%

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-5%

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Lower Priced Homes Higher Priced Homes

Fig 2 lower priced homes appreciating rapidly060112 2.7261x4.6667 frame

Note: Lower priced homes are less than 75% of the median and higher priced homes are >125% of the median price. Source: CoreLogic April 2012


3


Liberal Collateral Credit Standards Concentrate RiskBy Mark Fleming

Cont...

FIgURE 1. COLLATERAL CREDIT STANDARDS UNDERSTATED RISK IN THE HOUSINg BUBBLEAverage Purchase LTV and CLTV

78

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LTV CLTV 1990's Average CLTV

Fleming fig 1 collateral underwriting understated 060112


onventional wisdom states that

the increasing conservatism

in mortgage credit standards

may be unduly constraining the

mortgage market. While it is true that

after a period of liberalization during the

last housing boom, minimum qualifying

credit scores are higher today than in

the past and the meaningfulness of

payment sustainability, or capacity, has

been rediscovered, the credit standard

for collateral, as measured by the

combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV),

remains as liberal as ever. To put a finer

point on it, CoreLogic has confirmed

that credit standards for collateral now

are more liberal than at any time in the

past two decades when measured by

the average CLTV ratios over time for

purchase mortgage loans including first

and junior liens. This article focuses on

the implications of these findings to

risk management.

Arguably, it was the unforeseen decline

in house prices that caused much of

the financial distress at the end of the

last decade. If prices were to decline

again, the severity risk posed by today’s

liberal collateral credit standards will

be held primarily by mortgage insurers,

some private but mostly public. In light

of this, understanding the trend in

collateral credit standards is important.

The protection that equity provides to

the mortgage lien holder in the event

of a delinquency is one of the major

policy debates on the loan-to-value

(LTV) requirement for a qualified

residential mortgage (QRM). While

more conservative credit standards on

borrower credit scores and capacity

reduce the incidence of default risk,

they become less important once a

delinquency occurs. At that point,

the collateral equity is the primary

determinant of whether a delinquent

loan can be cured by prepayment,

refinance or sale of the home.

Otherwise it must be resolved through

some sort of loss mitigation such as a

short sale, modification or foreclosure.

Defining Normal

Based on CoreLogic loan-level data

covering all loan products (prime

conventional, prime jumbo, subprime

and Alt-A) which currently represents

more than 80 percent of all active

mortgages in the United States, it is

possible to track the characteristics

of originations from 1990 forward.

Because there is a long history of

mortgage data, there were many

choices for a reference period for this

analysis. The reference period is used

to define a normal collateral credit

standard so that a determination

can be made about the more liberal

or more conservative nature of more

current periods. Rather than defining

a single year as the reference point,

we chose the 1990 to 1999 average

because it is a period over which real

estate and housing finance markets

were stable and, in hindsight, had

no significant deviations from the

fundamental economic conditions

that support them. Although a

number of policy changes occurred

during this period, including the

establishment of the National

Homeownership Strategy of 1994, the

Federal Housing Enterprises Financial

Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 that

created OFHEO (the predecessor to

the Federal Housing Finance Agency),

HUD’s creation of GSE underserved

C


4


and low- to moderate-income housing goals, and the 1997 tax law change pertaining to capital gains on home sales, we believe, despite the debate on the extent of their impact, the effects from these changes did not begin until late in the decade.

Trends in Collateral Credit Standards

Collateral credit standards, and their implied risk exposure, are measured by the amount of equity a borrower has at the time the loan is originated. The borrower is the effective first-loss position holder in the event of a decline in collateral value. This decline could be due to property-specific issues, such as deterioration in condition due to deferred maintenance or damage not covered by insurance. It could also be due to market force effects on house prices in the area. The more equity in the collateral at origination, the safer the loan and the lower the severity risk in the event of a delinquency. The availability of equity, or more specifically the lack thereof, can be measured by the CLTV at origination

which includes the first lien, or

primary mortgage, as well as any

simultaneous second, or junior liens.

During the 1990s, CLTVs for

purchase origination averaged

82 percent (Figure 1). Junior liens

represented only a very small share

of purchase origination activity as

the first lien average LTV over the

same time period was 81 percent.

During the height of the housing

boom between 2004 and 2006,

average originated LTVs declined

into the high 70s, while average

CLTVs rose to a peak of 88 percent

in late 2006. The popularity of

simultaneous seconds (silent or

observed) and liberalization of

collateral credit standards over

this time period increased severity risk, and by the financing structure, circumvented the severity loss protection that mortgage insurance

ordinarily provides. This was certainly a contributing factor to the continued rise in house prices by extending the borrower’s leverage.

The rise in popularity of junior liens used to structure high LTV financing without mortgage insurance can be seen in the

share of mortgages where the first lien LTV at origination is exactly 80 percent (Figure 2). This share increased dramatically during the housing boom from an average of less than 10 percent during the 1990s to above 35 percent in 2005 and 2006. By 2006, the share of first lien loans with exactly 80 percent LTV was six times the share of the early 1990s. By the spring of 2009, the share dropped to less than 15 percent of all purchase originations. This was evidence of a sharp and definitive change in collateral credit standards directly related to the use of junior liens to circumvent mortgage insurance. As junior liens quickly fell out of favor, the gap between average LTVs and CLTVs quickly closed (Figure 1).

In the spring of 2007, average first lien LTVs began to increase even as credit standards for borrower credit scores and capacity were tightening. Everyone recognized the importance of managing severity risk, especially when it began rising as house prices were falling. Yet collateral credit standards have steadily liberalized by this measure. Even in light of more

Cont...

FIgURE 2. 80 IS THE MAgIC NUMBER THAT AVOIDS MORTgAgE INSURANCEShare of Purchase First Liens Originated at Exactly 80% LTV

0%

5%

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Fleming 060112 fig 2 80 is the magic number

Source: CoreLogic Jan 2012

“Collateral credit standards are

particularly important today because

over 40 percent of current borrowers

have insufficient equity to purchase a

home given standard 80 percent LTV

collateral credit standards.”


5


conservative credit standards for

junior liens, overall collateral credit

standards remain liberal compared to

the housing boom years. The average

CLTV for newly originated purchase

loans was in the low 80s throughout

the 1990s. The average origination

CLTV for purchase loans over the last

three years is more than 88 percent.

Holding the Risk of Liberalized Collateral Credit Standards Today

The credit standards for borrower

credit scores and capacity are indeed

more conservative today. This has led to

a significant reduction in the incidence

risk of delinquency on the part of new

mortgage borrowers. The share of new

mortgages with borrowers who possess

less than a 620 FICO score dropped

sharply between late 2008 and early

2010 to a current share of less than

2 percent. Average front end debt to

income ratios (DTIs), which is the most

common measure of capacity, declined

from a high of 28 percent in late 2007

to less than 24 percent today. But while

borrower credit scores and capacity are

clearly more conservative, the ongoing liberalization of collateral credit standards presents a future severity risk in the event of rising delinquencies.

The rise in average CLTVs, which are currently about seven percentage points higher than the average in the 1990s, is being driven by an increase in the of high LTV share of lending, defined as 95 to 99 percent LTV. The current market share of high LTV purchase lending is 38 percent, more than twice the 1990s average of 17 percent. Clearly, as soon as the 80-percent-only-LTV channel (with either silent or observed second liens) disappeared, more leveraged borrowing moved into government channels, FHA and VA (Figure 3).

The government share of purchase originations reached a trough of 10 percent at the peak of the housing boom, and then soared to a peak of almost 60 percent in 2010. Currently, government-guaranteed mortgages account for almost half of originated purchase mortgages. Without the high LTV lending government-

insured channel, collateral credit

standards would be significantly more

conservative than during the housing

boom and possibly even more

conservative than during the 1990s in

some channels.

Collateral credit standards are

particularly important today because

over 40 percent of current borrowers

have insufficient equity to purchase a

home given standard 80 percent LTV

collateral credit standards. Without

access to low down-payment lending

a large share of existing homeowners

would be ineligible for mortgage

credit. Mortgage insurance, some

private but mostly public, has returned

to the market, allowing borrowers to

purchase homes with less equity. High

LTV loans with mortgage insurance

carry additional expense, in the form

of the mortgage insurance premiums,

paid by the borrower. This contrasts

with the high CLTV originations

during the housing boom that did

not possess the severity protection of

mortgage insurance.

While it is often said that some of the

highest quality loans are originated

coming out of a recession, and we

know that the borrower credit quality

and capacity standards are more

conservative, FHA, VA and behind

them, the U.S. taxpayer—now have

significant severity exposure. House

prices have declined by more than

35 percent from the peak of the

financial crisis and this is, arguably,

the 100-year storm. Let’s hope we

don’t have another 100-year storm

any time soon.

End.

FIgURE 3. PUBLICLy FINANCINg THE DREAM OF A HOMEFHA and VA Share of Purchase Mortgage Originations

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Fleming 060112 fig 3 govt financing



6


Rental Price Divergence By Thomas Vitlo

Recent CoreLogic analysis revealed that Phoenix was the most improved for-sale market

and Chicago was the least improved, but given the shift in overall market sentiment towards rentals, what are trends in the rental market? Between January 2006 to early 2009, Chicago and Phoenix rental demands increased 9.2 percent and 13.6 percent respectively as house prices fell and the for-sale market became distressed in both areas.

While the rental markets in both cities weakened in late 2009 and early 2010, recently the rental markets in the two cities have diverged. In the past 12 months, rentals in Chicago rose 2.5 percent, while rentals in Phoenix fell 7.4 percent. The reason for the divergence is that Phoenix home

prices increased 11.3 percent over a

year ago, helped by REO sales falling

63 percent. As a result, the Phoenix

rental market has weakened somewhat

with rentals beginning to decline as

demand for shelter shifts back to the

for-sale market. In contrast, Chicago

home prices declined 7.3 percent

from a year ago and foreclosure rates

have remained high, so rental demand

remains strong, as reflected by the rise

in rentals.

Forbes, June 63 Debts to Consider Not Paying OffRoughly 11 million homeowners are “underwater” on their mortgage, meaning they owe more than their homes are worth, according to real estate data firm CoreLogic. If you're in this situation — and are having trouble making payments on this and your …

National Mortgage Professional Magazine, June 6April Home Prices See Slight 1.1 Percent Year-Over-Year Rise in AprilCoreLogic has released its April Home Price Index (HPI) report which found that home prices nationwide, including distressed sales, increased on a year-over-year basis by 1.1 percent in April 2012 compared to April 2011. This was the second consecutive …

Wall Street Journal, June 5Home-Price Scorecard: A Turning Market, But Which Way?CoreLogic's index used here includes distressed sales. Radar Logic tracks values for 25 metro areas. The Clear Capital index is derived from nationwide closed transactions. The Zillow Home Value Index is the median Zestimate valuation for an area, …

CNBC.com, June 5Home Prices See Gains, But That's Not the Whole StoryIncluding distressed sales (foreclosures and short sales), prices rose 1.1 percent in April, according to a new report from analytics firm CoreLogic. Excluding distressed sales, prices rose 2.6 percent. Prices have not been up two months in a row since …

Reuters, June 5Home prices gained in April: CoreLogicHome prices climbed in April in a fresh sign of stabilization for the housing market, data analysis firm CoreLogic said on Tuesday. CoreLogic's (CLGX.N) home price index rose 2.2 percent in April from the previous month and gained …

Mortgage News Daily, June 5CoreLogic: Home Prices Increased on Monthly and Annual Basis, Trend to ContinueCoreLogic is reporting that home prices, including sales of distressed homes, increased on both a monthly and annual basis in April. The company's Home Price Index (HPI) increased of 2.2 percent compared to March which marked the second …

In the News

PHOENIx AND CHICAgO RENTAL MARKETSSold Price Means (12-month moving average)

1100

1150

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1760

1780

1800

Jan

-06

Mar

-06

May

-06

Jul-

06

Sep

-06

No

v-0

6

Jan

-07

Mar

-07

May

-07

Jul-

07

Sep

-07

No

v-0

7

Jan

-08

Mar

-08

May

-08

Jul-

08

Sep

-08

No

v-0

8

Jan

-09

Mar

-09

May

-09

Jul-

09

Sep

-09

No

v-0

9

Jan

-10

Mar

-10

May

-10

Jul-

10

Sep

-10

No

v-10

Jan

-11

Mar

-11

May

-11

Jul-

11

Sep

-11

No

v-11

Jan

-12

Mar

-12

Chicago, IL Phoenix, AZ - Right Axis

Vitlo chart of the month 060112

Source: CoreLogic April 2012

End.

http://www.forbes.com/sites/cateyhill/2012/06/06/3-debts-to-consider-not-paying-off/

http://nationalmortgageprofessional.com/news29920/april-home-prices-see-slight-11-percent-year-over-year-rise-april

http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2012/06/04/home-price-scorecard-a-turning-market-but-which-way/

http://www.cnbc.com/id/47689898

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/05/us-usa-housing-corelogic-idUSBRE8540QA20120605

http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/06052012_home_prices.asp


7


NATIONAL SUMMARy APRIL 2012

May 2011

Jun 2011

Jul 2011

Aug 2011

Sep 2011

Oct 2011

Nov 2011

Dec 2011

Jan 2012

Feb 2012

Mar 2012

Apr 2012 2010 2011 2012

Total Sales* 346 381 335 368 325 301 291 320 260 292 343 369 4,069 3,831 1,264

— New Sales* 23 27 23 25 23 21 21 25 17 20 25 24 334 268 86

— Existing Sales* 227 257 228 248 219 199 188 208 164 187 230 256 2,622 2,484 837

— REO Sales* 66 67 57 63 55 53 54 56 52 56 55 53 795 746 216

— Short Sales* 26 28 25 28 26 25 25 29 25 27 31 34 273 300 117

Distressed Sales Share 26.8% 25.0% 24.5% 24.8% 25.0% 26.1% 27.1% 26.6% 29.3% 28.2% 25.1% 23.5% 26.2% 27.3% 26.3%

HPI MoM 1.4% 1.3% 0.8% -0.2% -0.7% -1.2% -1.1% -1.0% -0.9% -0.5% 1.1% 2.2% -0.3% -0.3% 0.5%

HPI yoy -5.7% -5.3% -4.4% -3.8% -3.2% -3.3% -3.6% -3.5% -2.5% -1.4% 0.2% 1.1% -0.2% -4.5% -0.6%

HPI MoM Excluding Distressed 0.8% 0.6% 0.3% -0.4% -0.7% -1.1% -1.0% -0.8% -0.1% 0.1% 1.8% 2.6% -0.3% -0.4% 1.1%

HPI yoy Excluding Distressed -4.3% -4.2% -4.2% -4.3% -4.2% -4.2% -4.4% -4.3% -3.4% -2.3% 0.0% 1.9% -1.7% -4.2% -0.9%

90 Days + DQ Pct 7.3% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.3% 7.2% 7.2% 7.1% 6.9% 6.8% 8.1% 7.4% 7.0%

Foreclosure Pct 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.4% 3.5% 3.5% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.2% 3.5% 3.4%

REO Pct 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5%

Pre-foreclosure Filings* 118 119 111 139 126 129 126 111 122 117 136 125 2,097 1,511 500

Completed Foreclosures* 77 79 68 74 82 67 69 67 67 56 66 66 1,123 894 255

Negative Equity Share 22.6% 22.5% 22.4% 22.2% 22.1% 22.3% 22.6% 22.8% 22.6% 22.7% 22.7% N/A 23.2% 23.1% 22.6%

Negative Equity* 10,885 10,882 10,828 10,774 10,724 10,856 10,986 11,118 10,987 11,030 11,046 N/A 11,009 11,050 11,021

Months Supply SDQ Homes 8.93 8.03 9.09 8.23 9.29 10.05 10.42 9.42 11.59 10.00 8.30 7.57 10.48 9.92 9.37

* Thousands of Units NOTE: Data may be light in some jurisdictions.

TOP 25 CBSA SUMMARy APRIL 2012

Total Sales

REO Sales

Short Sales

Distressed Sale

Shares

Total Sales yoy

Change

Cumulative Dom Mean

yoy Change

Cumulative Sold

Dom Mean yoy

ChangeHPI

MoMHPI yoy

90 Days+ DQ Pct

Pre-Foreclosure

Filings*Completed

Foreclosures*

Negative Equity Share**

Months’ Supply

Distressed Homes

Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL 6,644 1,264 776 30.7% 16.5% 19.6% -12.1% 2.0% -7.3% 10.3% 57,505 15,556 24.9% 18.9

Los Angeles-Long Beach-glendale, CA 7,505 1,901 1036 39.1% 12.8% 6.5% 4.5% 2.4% -0.5% 6.5% 51,232 23,562 23.5% 10.2

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, gA 6,818 1,498 814 33.9% 40.4% 16.8% -7.8% 3.7% -5.3% 8.0% 103,923 39,318 36.9% 11.1

New york-White Plains-Wayne, Ny-NJ 5,299 184 265 8.5% 6.8% 22.7% 33.1% 1.4% 1.3% 8.6% 12,622 855 10.8% 15.2

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV

5,828 573 657 21.1% 16.3% N/A N/A 2.2% 2.8% 5.6% 31,750 7,033 28.0% 7.8

Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, Tx 7,211 766 335 15.3% -8.2% 8.8% -4.6% 1.5% 2.0% 4.6% 14,840 16,904 11.0% 5.1

Phoenix-Mesa-glendale, AZ 10,686 1,532 1949 32.6% 8.5% -4.0% -25.6% 3.5% 11.3% 6.1% 58,978 39,779 52.4% 4.0

Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 6,105 2,054 939 49.0% -5.6% 9.8% -1.4% 1.6% -1.4% 8.8% 44,049 28,315 43.4% 9.7

Dallas-Plano-Irving, Tx 6,226 710 414 18.1% 12.0% -1.7% -9.4% 2.6% 3.5% 4.6% 37,206 11,464 12.1% 4.6

Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 3,865 592 223 21.1% 19.8% 8.0% -0.8% 2.8% -0.1% 4.4% 24,967 11,897 19.2% 6.8

Philadelphia, PA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 10.3% 2.3% 2.3% 1.7% 5.5% 9,029 4,000 8.2% N/A

Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 3,221 489 368 26.6% 20.4% 20.9% -6.5% 2.6% 0.7% 6.4% 10,658 7,527 18.0% 9.9

Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO 4,216 661 395 25.0% 12.7% N/A N/A 2.3% 4.7% 3.8% 24,892 9,844 23.4% 4.3

San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 3,784 683 757 38.0% 15.3% 1.5% -8.2% 2.3% -2.0% 5.3% 17,984 8,840 28.7% 6.5

Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine, CA 3,122 517 549 34.2% 24.1% 5.5% 0.7% 1.8% -1.2% 4.9% 16,498 6,460 47.2% 7.0

Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 5,099 518 763 25.1% 1.5% 25.3% -12.5% 1.3% 4.9% 16.8% 22,850 11,402 18.2% 14.7

Baltimore-Towson, MD 2,647 184 242 16.1% 3.8% N/A N/A 1.0% 1.7% 7.6% 4,570 1,344 19.5% 12.6

St. Louis, MO-IL 3,705 678 192 23.5% 11.6% 19.5% -4.7% 1.9% -2.6% 4.6% 14,588 9,373 18.5% 5.4

Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA 3,390 679 686 40.3% 21.5% N/A N/A 1.6% -3.1% 5.7% 18,891 10,863 5.3% 7.3

Nassau-Suffolk, Ny 1,837 57 45 5.5% 18.4% 35.9% 34.4% 0.6% -0.6% 10.4% 9,300 666 29.7% 24.5

Warren-Troy-Farmington Hills, MI 2,488 784 131 36.8% -28.6% N/A N/A 1.4% 6.8% 5.0% 18,254 14,239 39.8% 8.5

Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA 2,655 484 292 29.2% 12.8% N/A N/A 2.7% 2.1% 5.4% 10,211 5,729 19.2% 7.9

Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA 3,579 962 803 49.3% 19.4% -1.7% -5.0% 2.0% -1.7% 6.7% 21,628 14,331 39.2% 7.1

Edison-New Brunswick, NJ 1,920 61 158 11.4% 9.0% 31.5% 21.3% 1.7% -2.1% 9.0% 3,254 502 14.0% 16.8

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 3,876 569 847 36.5% 1.2% -1.3% -23.5% 3.1% 8.7% 17.4% 17,550 11,222 50.4% 15.9

* 12 month sum **Negative Equity Data as of March 2012 NOTE: Data may be light in some jurisdictions.


8


STATE SUMMARy APRIL 2012

StateTotal Sales

REO Sales

Short Sales

Distressed Sale

Shares

Total Sales yoy

Change

Cumulative Dom Mean

yoy Change

Cumulative Sold

Dom Mean yoy

ChangeHPI

MoMHPI yoy

90 Days+ DQ Pct

Pre-Foreclosure

Filings*Completed

Foreclosures*

Negative Equity Share**

Months’ Supply

Distressed Homes

AK 823 45 32 9.4% -1.2% N/A N/A 0.1% 1.2% 2.2% 1,443 951 7.0% 2.2

AL 2,895 367 101 16.2% -7.2% 21.7% -8.6% 1.9% -6.6% 5.4% 7,655 6,475 11.8% 10.1

AR 3,886 177 201 9.7% 27.4% 8.6% 7.6% 0.6% 2.9% 5.2% 7,461 7,546 10.0% 3.9

AZ 14,625 2,338 2,371 32.2% 12.9% 2.3% -1.0% 3.2% 8.8% 5.8% 79,406 53,059 48.1% 4.1

CA 42,786 10,086 7,414 40.9% 14.2% 7.2% 1.5% 2.6% 0.1% 6.2% 250,012 142,622 29.9% 7.8

CO 8,380 1,356 773 25.4% 14.0% 8.8% -8.1% 2.3% 4.2% 3.6% 47,527 19,488 20.9% 4.0

CT 2,840 293 304 21.0% 17.8% 19.4% 8.9% 3.2% -2.5% 7.2% 1,499 3,081 13.4% 12.2

DC 650 11 15 3.9% 18.5% N/A N/A 1.5% 6.4% 5.6% 611 162 12.7% 7.9

DE 701 135 51 26.6% -8.1% 23.5% -7.3% -0.5% -11.9% 6.6% 1,871 3,221 15.5% 14.6

FL 39,198 4,505 5,341 25.1% 2.6% 17.3% 0.0% 2.6% 5.5% 16.8% 141,247 92,137 44.1% 12.6

gA 11,507 2,340 1,007 29.1% 32.6% 17.9% -5.1% 2.9% -5.6% 7.2% 145,158 56,894 32.5% 9.1

HI 1,277 84 141 17.6% -12.7% 22.5% 3.0% 2.5% 3.5% 6.5% 3,364 601 10.4% 8.7

IA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 9.9% 0.6% 0.7% -0.8% 3.8% 5,970 4,168 9.7% 6.0

ID 3,185 539 224 24.0% 16.1% 21.5% -9.3% 0.6% 5.4% 4.8% 13,729 6,449 24.5% 3.5

IL 11,796 1,864 1,106 25.2% 22.5% 19.7% -3.7% 2.1% -6.8% 8.8% 76,356 22,610 21.7% 13.6

IN N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.0% 0.4% 6.2% 15,352 14,798 10.7% N/A

KS 2,927 317 121 15.0% 17.0% N/A N/A 1.3% 0.3% 4.1% 3,716 3,270 10.6% 4.4

Ky 3,133 287 171 14.6% -9.7% N/A N/A 0.1% -1.6% 5.3% 6,383 2,104 8.9% 7.3

LA 5,137 682 162 16.4% 10.1% 19.9% 5.0% 3.2% 2.2% 5.8% 12,966 9,625 14.3% 5.0

MA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.2% -1.4% 5.4% 9,522 8,690 16.0% 5.3

MD 6,178 446 773 19.7% 7.8% 39.3% 0.0% 0.8% 0.8% 7.9% 10,935 3,246 24.1% 12.6

ME 619 44 30 12.0% 15.3% N/A N/A 3.3% 3.5% 6.9% 1,805 704 8.3% 16.6

MI 11,679 2,936 561 29.9% -1.2% 21.9% 17.9% 1.4% 5.1% 5.5% 53,438 60,198 34.7% 6.4

MN 5,641 783 304 19.3% 26.1% 10.8% -1.7% 2.5% -1.2% 4.0% 27,514 13,778 18.0% 6.2

MO 7,737 1,445 325 22.9% 22.0% 16.8% -8.4% 1.9% -1.8% 4.2% 22,445 17,696 17.1% 4.3

MS 507 81 14 18.9% 8.7% N/A N/A 1.6% 3.6% 7.0% 4,435 847 25.4% N/A

MT 1,203 148 50 16.4% 19.8% N/A N/A 1.7% 5.4% 2.9% 3,840 1,726 8.9% 3.1

NC 10,149 810 694 14.8% 15.1% 19.5% 2.5% 1.9% 0.8% 5.5% 47,340 25,639 12.7% 7.1

ND 1,132 16 19 3.1% 26.3% N/A N/A -0.5% 2.3% 1.5% 242 541 6.2% 0.8

NE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.6% 0.6% 2.7% 4,413 2,676 11.2% N/A

NH 1,501 288 141 28.6% 21.1% 19.3% 6.9% 1.8% -1.7% 4.3% 10 2,871 20.8% 5.5

NJ 6,661 237 606 12.7% 10.9% 30.2% 15.0% 1.2% -0.6% 10.8% 16,419 2,088 17.3% 19.8

NM 2,002 200 163 18.2% 15.0% N/A N/A -0.8% -1.5% 5.6% 7,118 1,687 14.5% 7.0

NV 6,659 2,277 1,345 54.4% 11.6% -6.8% -2.2% 1.5% -3.3% 12.1% 10,845 32,142 60.6% 8.3

Ny 13,181 349 400 5.7% 19.4% 28.8% 40.7% 2.3% 2.9% 7.9% 25,336 3,524 6.4% 11.4

OH 12,788 2,103 947 23.8% 7.5% 13.3% 0.0% 3.0% -1.4% 6.6% 56,672 27,299 23.6% 7.4

OK 5,016 391 175 11.3% -4.2% -7.8% 6.1% 0.7% -0.4% 5.0% 17,241 8,535 7.8% 3.8

OR 4,777 954 485 30.1% 16.2% N/A N/A 2.6% 1.3% 5.4% 17,519 9,866 18.4% 7.0

PA 11,671 1,007 425 12.3% 14.9% 10.9% 2.9% 1.7% 1.5% 5.6% 23,682 12,151 8.3% 6.9

RI 978 115 113 23.4% 22.0% 19.1% 11.1% -1.5% -6.2% 7.3% 3,973 3,528 22.5% 9.6

SC 6,031 794 389 19.6% 20.8% 25.3% 3.3% 2.2% 3.7% 6.2% 6,963 9,712 15.7% 6.4

SD N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.5% 4.1% 2.4% N/A N/A N/A N/A

TN 9,828 1,506 473 20.1% 20.8% N/A N/A 1.6% 1.3% 5.7% 24,776 25,806 15.9% 4.4

Tx 33,922 3,366 1,454 14.2% 3.9% 6.3% -6.3% 1.2% 2.4% 4.3% 108,436 57,536 10.1% 3.7

UT 4,542 540 413 21.0% 21.8% N/A N/A 2.6% 5.4% 4.6% 29,790 7,326 20.7% 4.4

VA 8,920 1,263 724 22.3% 13.6% 23.5% 13.3% 2.9% 2.9% 3.8% 70,675 16,295 23.0% 5.3

VT N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 36.3% 10.7% 1.8% -4.7% 4.0% N/A N/A N/A N/A

WA 7,696 1,185 755 25.2% 16.5% 25.4% -5.0% 2.5% -0.5% 6.3% 23,917 18,288 18.8% 9.4

WI 6,565 781 380 17.7% 20.6% 12.6% 7.7% 1.9% -3.3% 4.4% 20,723 13,088 15.5% 5.1

WV N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -1.3% -7.6% 2.6% 5.2% 3.7% 4,447 598 6.6% N/A

Wy 565 52 14 11.7% 16.0% N/A N/A 0.4% 4.6% 2.3% 767 781 13.5% 2.9

* 12 month sum **Negative Equity Data as of March 2012 NOTE: Data may be light in some jurisdictions.


9


Prices ► Prices may have turned the corner in April. The Home Price Index (HPI) including distressed sales posted two consecutive months of year-over-year increases in April, the first such increases since the summer of 2010 when the housing market was benefitting from tax credits. The HPI excluding distressed sales posted the first year-over-year increase since 2007. While Arizona had one of the largest declines in the HPI since the peak (falling 47 percent from June 2006), that state had the highest year-over-year appreciation in house prices, posting a 9 percent increase in April.

► Listing information suggests price appreciation will last in the short term. The asking price of new listings, a leading indicator of HPI, showed strong month-over-month increases through March. In addition, the price of sold listings shows both year-over-year and month-over-month increases since February 2012.

yoy HPI gROWTH FOR 25 LOWEST RATE STATES Min, Max, Current since Jan 1976

-40%

-30%

-20%

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

DE IL AL RI

GA VT

NV

WI

CT

MO

NH

KY

NM

MA

OH

MN IA NJ

WA

OK

CA KS IN NE

NC

Current

2.6x3.57 5pt gothamPrices: yoy hpi growth for 25 lowest rate states apr 2012

Source: CoreLogic Apr 2012

HOME PRICE INDExPct Change from year Ago Pct Change from Month Ago

-5%

-4%

-3%

-2%

-1%

0%

1%

2%

3%

-25%

-20%

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

Jan

-02

Jun

-02

No

v-0

2

Ap

r-0

3

Sep

-03

Feb

-04

Jul-

04

Dec

-04

May

-05

Oct

-05

Mar

-06

Aug

-06

Jan

-07

Jun

-07

No

v-0

7

Ap

r-0

8

Sep

-08

Feb

-09

Jul-

09

Dec

-09

May

-10

Oct

-10

Mar

-11

Aug

-11

Jan

-12

All Transactions Excluding Distressed All Transactions - Right Axis

2.75x3.66 5pt gotham bookPrices: home price index apr 2012


NEW LISTINg/SOLD LISTINg PRICE DISCOUNT

-25%

-20%

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

Jan

-07

Ap

r-0

7

Jul-

07

Oct

-07

Jan

-08

Ap

r-0

8

Jul-

08

Oct

-08

Jan

-09

Ap

r-0

9

Jul-

09

Oct

-09

Jan

-10

Ap

r-10

Jul-

10

Oct

-10

Jan

-11

Ap

r-11

Jul-

11

Oct

-11

Jan

-12

Ap

r-12

2.41x3.38Prices: new listing/sold listing price discount apr 2012


NEW LIST PRICE yoy Change

-20%

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

Jan

-08

Mar

-08

May

-08

Jul-

08

Sep

-08

No

v-0

8

Jan

-09

Mar

-09

May

-09

Jul-

09

Sep

-09

No

v-0

9

Jan

-10

Mar

-10

May

-10

Jul-

10

Sep

-10

No

v-10

Jan

-11

Mar

-11

May

-11

Jul-

11

Sep

-11

No

v-11

Jan

-12

Mar

-12

New List Price - YOY Chg HPI YOY %Chg

2.49x3.39Prices: new list price apr 2012


REO DISCOUNT

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Jan

-02

Jun

-02

No

v-0

2

Ap

r-0

3

Sep

-03

Feb

-04

Jul-

04

Dec

-04

May

-05

Oct

-05

Mar

-06

Aug

-06

Jan

-07

Jun

-07

No

v-0

7

Ap

r-0

8

Sep

-08

Feb

-09

Jul-

09

Dec

-09

May

-10

Oct

-10

Mar

-11

Aug

-11

Jan

-12

REO Price Discount Distressed Clearing Ratio - Right Axis

2.52x3.48Prices: REO discount apr 2012



10


Performance ► The number of mortgages seriously delinquent (90 days past due or more) and in foreclosure decreased in April 2012, continuing a trend that started two years ago for serious delinquencies and one year ago for foreclosures. Florida continues to have the highest foreclosure rate of any state at 12 percent of all active mortgages in that state. The combination of a poor housing market and restrictive foreclosure laws keeps the rate high in Florida. In contrast, Arizona, which also experienced significant house price declines, but has less restrictive foreclosure laws, had a foreclosure rate of 2.6 percent in April 2012.

► Completed foreclosures were down 15 percent year-over-year to 66,000 in April—roughly equal to the average monthly level since October 2011. There were more than 830,000 completed foreclosures over the past year, which equates to one completed foreclosure for every 622 mortgaged homes. Nevada has the highest rate of completed foreclosures at one per every 14 mortgaged homes.

CONFORMINg PRIME SERIOUS DELINQUENCy RATEBy Origination year

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

3 m

on

ths

6 m

ont

hs

9 m

ont

hs

12 m

ont

hs

15 m

ont

hs

18 m

on

ths

21 m

ont

hs

24 m

ont

hs

27 m

ont

hs

30 m

ont

hs

33 m

on

ths

36 m

ont

hs

39 m

ont

hs

42

mo

nths

45

mo

nths

48

mo

nths

51 m

ont

hs

54 m

ont

hs

57 m

ont

hs

60

mo

nths

2011 Total 2010 Total 2009 Total


3.08x3.45Performance: conforming prime serious del rate apr 2012


2011 Total 2010 Total 2009 Total 2008 Total 2007 Total 2006 Total

JUMBO PRIME SERIOUS DELINQUENCy RATEBy Origination year

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

3 m

on

ths

6 m

ont

hs

9 m

ont

hs

12 m

ont

hs

15 m

ont

hs

18 m

on

ths

21 m

ont

hs

24 m

ont

hs

27 m

ont

hs

30 m

ont

hs

33 m

on

ths

36 m

ont

hs

39 m

ont

hs

42

mo

nths

45

mo

nths

48

mo

nths

51 m

ont

hs

54 m

ont

hs

57 m

ont

hs

60

mo

nths



3.1x3.42Performance: jumbo prime serious del rate apr 2012


2011 Total 2010 Total 2009 Total 2008 Total 2007 Total 2006 Total

SERIOUS DELINQUENCIES FOR 25 HIgHEST RATE STATES

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

20%F

L

NV NJ IL

MD

NY

GA RI

CT

MS

ME

OH

DE HI

CA SC IN

WA

AZ

LA

TN MI

PA

DC

NC

Current

2.5x3.57Performance: serious del for 25 highest rate states apr 2012


OVERALL MORTgAgE PERFORMANCE

0.0%

0.1%

0.2%

0.3%

0.4%

0.5%

0.6%

0.7%

0.8%

0.9%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

9%

Jan

-02

Jun

-02

No

v-0

2

Ap

r-0

3

Sep

-03

Feb

-04

Jul-

04

Dec

-04

May

-05

Oct

-05

Mar

-06

Aug

-06

Jan

-07

Jun

-07

No

v-0

7

Ap

r-0

8

Sep

-08

Feb

-09

Jul-

09

Dec

-09

May

-10

Oct

-10

Mar

-11

Aug

-11

Jan

-12

90+ Days DQ Pct Foreclosure Pct REO Pct - Right Axis

2.53x3.42Performance: overall mortgage performance apr 2012


PRE-FORECLOSURE FILINgS AND COMPLETED FORECLOSURESIn Thousands (3mma) In Thousands

0

50

100

150

200

250

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Jan

-02

Jun

-02

No

v-0

2

Ap

r-0

3

Sep

-03

Feb

-04

Jul-

04

Dec

-04

May

-05

Oct

-05

Mar

-06

Aug

-06

Jan

-07

Jun

-07

No

v-0

7

Ap

r-0

8

Sep

-08

Feb

-09

Jul-

09

Dec

-09

May

-10

Oct

-10

Mar

-11

Aug

-11

Jan

-12

Completed Foreclosures Pre-Foreclosure Filings - Right Axis

2.69x3.45Performance: pre foreclosure filings and completed

foreclosures apr 2012



11


Sales ► Home sales continue to improve, and were up 13 percent year-over-year in April. Distressed sales make up a large but decreasing share of total home sales, and are now at their lowest level since summer 2010, when the housing market was under the support of the homebuyer tax credit. Improvements in home sales are broad-based, with all but eight states showing year-over-year increases in total home sales.

► While home sales are strong, days on market are being kept high partly by new listings entering the market and partly by homes sitting in the active supply and driving up the overall days on market. The number of days on market for both active and sold listings remains stubbornly high. The days on market for active listings remains stuck at 172 days, and the days on market for sold listings rose to 139 days in April—back to February 2011 levels.

CUMULATIVE DAyS ON MARKETMean

110

120

130

140

150

160

170

180

Jan

-07

Ap

r-0

7

Jul-

07

Oct

-07

Jan

-08

Ap

r-0

8

Jul-

08

Oct

-08

Jan

-09

Ap

r-0

9

Jul-

09

Oct

-09

Jan

-10

Ap

r-10

Jul-

10

Oct

-10

Jan

-11

Ap

r-11

Jul-

11

Oct

-11

Jan

-12

Ap

r-12

Active Sold

2.46x3.43Sales: Cumulative days on mkt apr 2012


MONTHS’ SUPPLy

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Jan

-07

Ap

r-0

7

Jul-

07

Oct

-07

Jan

-08

Ap

r-0

8

Jul-

08

Oct

-08

Jan

-09

Ap

r-0

9

Jul-

09

Oct

-09

Jan

-10

Ap

r-10

Jul-

10

Oct

-10

Jan

-11

Ap

r-11

Jul-

11

Oct

-11

Jan

-12

Ap

r-12

Months' Supply Distressed Homes Months' Supply of Active Listings - R. Axis

2.74x3.57Sales: month’s supply apr 2012

Feb

-12


DISTRESSED SALE SHARE FOR 25 HIgHEST RATE STATESMin, Max, Current

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%N

V

CA

AZ

OR MI

GA

NH

DE

CO

WA IL FL ID OH RI

MO

VA CT

UT

TN

MD SC

MN

MS

NM

Current

2.33x3.48Sales: distressed sale share for 25 highest rate states apr 2012


DISTRESSED SALES AS PERCENTAgE OF TOTAL SALES

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Jan

-06

Ap

r-0

6

Jul-

06

Oct

-06

Jan

-07

Ap

r-0

7

Jul-

07

Oct

-07

Jan

-08

Ap

r-0

8

Jul-

08

Oct

-08

Jan

-09

Ap

r-0

9

Jul-

09

Oct

-09

Jan

-10

Ap

r-10

Jul-

10

Oct

-10

Jan

-11

Ap

r-11

Jul-

11

Oct

-11

Jan

-12

Ap

r-12

Short Sales Share REO Sales Share

2.62x3.37Sales: distressed sales as % of total sales apr 2012


SALES By SALE TyPEIn Thousands

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Jan-

06

Ap

r-0

6

Jul-

06

Oct

-06

Jan-

07

Ap

r-0

7

Jul-

07

Oct

-07

Jan-

08

Ap

r-0

8

Jul-

08

Oct

-08

Jan-

09

Ap

r-0

9

Jul-

09

Oct

-09

Jan-

10

Ap

r-10

Jul-

10

Oct

-10

Jan-

11

Ap

r-11

Jul-

11

Oct

-11

Jan-

12

Ap

r-12

Existing Home New Home REO Short

2.65x3.39Sales: sales by sale type apr 2012


corelogic.com

© 2012 CoreLogic, Inc. All rights reserved.

CORELOgIC and the stylized CoreLogic logo are registered trademarks owned by CoreLogic, Inc. and/or its subsidiaries. MARKETPULSE is a common law trademark owned by CoreLogic, Inc. and/or its subsidiaries. No trademark of CoreLogic shall be used without express written consent of CoreLogic. All other trademarks are the property of their respective holders. Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.

17-MKTPLSEQTR-0612-00

VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS

Variable Definition

Total Sales The total number of all home-sale transactions during the month.

New Sales The total number of newly constructed residentail housing units sold during the month.

Existing SalesThe number of previously constructed homes that were sold to an unaffiliated third party. DOES NOT INCLUDE REO AND SHORT SALES.

REO Sales Number of bank owned properties that were sold to an unaffiliated third party.

Short SalesThe number of short sales. A short sale is a sale of real estate in which the sale proceeds fall short of the balance owed on the property's loan.

Distressed Sales Share The percentage of the total sales that were a distressed sale (REO or short sale).

HPI MoM Percent increase in HPI single family combined series over a month ago.

HPI yoy Percent increase in HPI single family combined series over a year ago.

HPI MoM Excluding Distressed Percent increase in HPI single family combined excluding distressed series over a month ago.

HPI yoy Excluding Distressed Percent increase in HPI single family combined excluding distressed series over a year ago.

90 Days + DQ Pct The percentage of the overall loan count that are 90 or more days delinquent as of the reporting period. This percentage includes loans that are in foreclosure or REO.

Foreclosure Pct The percentage of the overall loan count that is currently in foreclosure as of the reporting period.

REO Pct The count of loans in REO as a percentage of the overall count of loans for the reporting period.

Pre-foreclosure FilingsThe number of mortgages where the lender has initiated foreclosure proceedings and it has been made known through public notice (NOD).

Completed ForeclosuresA completed foreclosure occurs when a property is auctioned and results in either the purchase of the home at auction or the property is taken by the lender as part of their Real Estate Owned (REO) inventory.

Negative Equity ShareThe percentage of mortgages in negative equity. The denominator for the negative equity percent is based on the number of mortgages from the public record.

Negative EquityThe number of mortgages in negative equity. Negative equity is calculated as the difference between the current value of the property and the origination value of the mortgage. If the mortgage debt is greater than the current value, the property is considered to be in a negative equity position. We estimate current UPB value, not origination value.

Months Supply Distressed HomesThe months it would take to sell off all homes currently in distress of 90 days delinquency or greater based on the current sales pace.

Total Sales yoy Change Percent increase in total sales over a year ago.

Distressed Clearing Ratio Represents REO sales divided by Completed Foreclosures.

Listing Price Discount Percentage calculated by dividing the mean new listing price by the mean sold listingprice.

Cumulative DOM Mean yoy Change Percent increase in cumulative days on market (DOM) for listing active at the end of the month.

Cumulative Sold DOM Mean yoy Change Percent increase in cumulative days on market (DOM) for listing sold during the month.

Months' Supply of Active Listings Active Listings divided by 12 month average of sold listings for a given month.

Seriously DQ Pct The count of loans in serious delinquency (90 days +) as a percentage of the overall count of loans for the reporting period.

Source: CoreLogicThe data provided is for use only by the primary recipient or the primary recipient's publication or broadcast. This data may not be re-sold, republished or licensed to any other source, including publications and sources owned by the primary recipient's parent company without prior written permission from CoreLogic. Any CoreLogic data used for publication or broadcast, in whole or in part, must be sourced as coming from CoreLogic, a data and analytics company. For use with broadcast or web content, the citation must directly accompany first reference of the data. If the data is illustrated with maps, charts, graphs or other visual elements, the CoreLogic logo must be included on screen or website. For questions, analysis or interpretation of the data, contact CoreLogic at [email protected]. Data provided may not be modified without the prior written permission of CoreLogic. Do not use the data in any unlawful manner. This data is compiled from public records, contributory databases and proprietary analytics, and its accuracy is dependent upon these sources.

FOR MORE INFORMATION PLEASE CALL 1-415-536-3500The MarketPulse™ is a newsletter published by CoreLogic, Inc. ("CoreLogic"). This information is made available for informational purposes only and is not intended to provide specific commercial, financial or investment advice. CoreLogic disclaims all express or implied representations, warranties and guaranties, including implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title, or non-infringement. Neither CoreLogic nor its licensors make any representations, warranties or guaranties as to the quality, reliability, suitability, truth, accuracy, timeliness or completeness of the information contained in this newsletter. CoreLogic shall not be held responsible for any errors, inaccuracies, omissions or losses resulting directly or indirectly from your reliance on the information contained in this newsletter.

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