THE MARKETISATION OF EDUCATION IN SINGAPORE:POLICIES AND IMPLICATIONS

JASON TAN

Abstract – This article focuses on the marketisation of education in Singapore sincethe mid-1980s. It describes and analyses two major manifestations of this phenom-enon: the encouragement of greater school autonomy and the fostering of competi-tion among schools. The article argues that the Singapore case does not involve afree market, but rather a regulated market. The promotion of such a quasi-marketthreatens to exacerbate not only the disparities between schools in terms of educa-tional outcomes but also social inequalities. At the same time, it is not entirely clearwhether the desired policy goals will be successfully attained. The discussion adds tothe existing literature on the marketisation of education and its accompanying policyimplications.

Zusammenfassung – Der Artikel befasst sich schwerpunktmässig mit der Ver-marktung der Bildung in Singapur seit den 80er Jahren. Er beschreibt und analysiertzwei wesentliche Grundzüge dieses Phänomens: die Ermutigung zu grössererSchulautonomie und die Förderung des Wettbewerbs zwischen den Schulen. DerArtikel legt dar, dass Singapur keinen freien Markt, sondern eher einen reguliertenMarkt aufweist. Die Förderung eines solchen Scheinmarktes birgt die Gefahr, nichtnur die Ungleichheiten zwischen Schulen hinsichtlich schulischer Ergebnisse zu ver-tiefen, sondern auch soziale Ungleichheiten zu fördern. Ausserdem ist nicht ganz klar,ob die angestrebten politischen Ziele erreicht werden können. Diese Diskussion isteine Ergänzung zu bestehender Literatur über die Vermarktung der Bildung und beglei-tende politische Massnahmen.

Résume – Cet article traite de la privatisation de l’éducation qui a lieu à Singapourdepuis le milieu des années 1980. Il décrit et analyse deux conséquences majeures dece phénomène: l’incitation à une plus grande autonomie des établissements scolaires,et le développement de la concurrence entre les écoles. L’auteur constate que le termede marché libre ne s’applique pas à la situation de Singapour, mais qu’il s’agit davan-tage d’un marché réglementé. La consolidation de ce marché quasi-libre menace cepen-dant d’exacerber non seulement les disparités entre les écoles en termes de résultatséducatifs, mais aussi les inégalités sociales. En outre, il est encore incertain si lesobjectifs visés par cette politique pourront être atteints avec succès. Cette analysecomplète la bibliographie existante sur la privatisation de l’éducation et les con-séquences politiques en résultant.

Resumen – El artículo se concentra en el paso de la educación hacía un sistema demercado que está experimentando la educación en Singapur desde mediados de losochenta. Describe y analiza dos grandes manifestaciones de este fenómeno: el refuerzode una mayor autonomía escolar y el fomento de la competencia entre las escuelas.El artículo argumenta que el caso Singapur no entraña un mercado libre, sino más bienun mercado regulado. El fomento de tal casi-mercado de enseñanza conlleva el peligrode realzar no solamente las disparidades entre las escuelas en cuanto a resultados deenseñanza, sino también las desigualdades sociales. Al mismo tiempo, no está del todo

International Review of Education – Internationale Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft –Revue Internationale de l’Education 44(1): 47–63, 1998. 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

claro si los objetivos políticos deseados se cumplirán con éxito. La discusión estableceun nexo con la literatura ya existente sobre el paso de la educación a un sistema demercado y las consecuencias políticas que lo acompañan.

This article examines the marketisation of education in Singapore since themid-1980s. First, the issue of the marketisation of education is viewed in aninternational comparative perspective. Next, two major manifestations of themarketisation of education are described and analysed. These are the encour-agement of school autonomy and the fostering of competition among schools.The main official justifications for such policies have been couched in termsof such concepts as choice, diversity and the improvement of overall educa-tional standards.

It is argued that the Singapore case does not involve a free market, butrather a controlled, or quasi-market. The promotion of such a quasi-marketthreatens to exacerbate not only the disparities between schools in terms ofeducational outcomes but also the existing social inequalities. At the sametime, it is not entirely clear whether the desired policy goals will be suc-cessfully attained. The discussion adds to the existing literature on the mar-ketisation of education and its accompanying policy implications. Speciallyinteresting in the Singapore case is that while the marketisation of educationin such countries as the USA and the UK has been largely motivated byeconomic recession, similar efforts in Singapore are taking place against thebackdrop of steady government surpluses and heavy government investmentin education.

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The marketisation of education – an international comparative perspective

There is a growing international literature on the increasing use of the languageof market economics in education. Such terms as competition, choice, diver-sity, accountability and consumer responsiveness are being championed byvarious governments. A key motivating factor in the drive towards greatermarketisation of education is the belief that academic standards in public edu-cation have declined. It has been argued that this decline can be attributeddirectly to the increasing centralisation and bureaucratisation of education.These bureaucracies are seen as having a captive market and hence havinglittle motivation to improve themselves (Fitz, Halpin and Power 1993).Bureaucratic methods of decision-making and resource allocation have beenattacked as being inefficient (Plank and Boyd 1994).

Consequently, there is a global movement towards the devolution ofautonomy to individual school sites. Schools are allowed greater autonomyin such matters as budgeting and staff recruitment. Guthrie (1991) identifiesthe main impetus of the reform movement as the desire to enhance educa-tional effectiveness by allowing management decisions to be made by thosewith a more intimate knowledge of specific local conditions. It is alsohoped that school principals will be more accountable, not only to govern-ment, but to other parties such as parents (Brown 1990; Secretaries of Statefor Education and Employment and for Wales 1996). Principals will also needto be responsive to parents’ and students’ needs and will therefore strive toimprove the quality of their school programmes and academic results.

It is further argued that control of education should be returned to parents,who should be free to choose schools for their children and to withdraw theirchildren from unsatisfactory schools. Education should be run along freemarket principles, so that schools compete with one another. Thus, onlyschools that satisfy their clients will survive (Chubb and Moe 1990). Variousmeasures such as the publication of annual performance league tables for allschools have been implemented to try to foster greater competition amongschools (Rogers 1992). Education is described as a consumer product, withparents being encouraged to shop around for the best schools. Policy-makersargue that such measures will eventually lead to improved standards in allschools, increased choice for parents and students, greater accountability onthe part of school authorities and a greater diversity of school programmes.

Another form of marketisation is the growing involvement of the privatesector in the provision of public education. This involvement may come aboutthrough such means as increased private financing and control of government-owned schools or greater government funding and support for privately ownedschools (Bray 1996). A major impetus for this trend has been adverseeconomic conditions and cutbacks in educational funding by governments.Thus, for instance, the British government has invited private business and

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industry to make substantial contributions to both capital and current expen-diture in City Technology Colleges (Walford 1990).

Two other features of the growing marketisation of education are the pro-motion of entrepreneurial activities among schools and the involvement ofschools in marketing activities. Bowe and Ball (1992: 66) describe the currentsituation in England and Wales as one in which the predominant model beingpromoted is that of the “school as enterprise”. An increasing number ofschools are advertising themselves and are undertaking marketing and pro-motional activities in order to attract parents and potential students (Barnes1993).

Various observers have pointed out that talk of an education market oftendisguises the fact that what is being promoted is far from being a free market(Deem, Brehony and New 1993; Macbeth, McCreath and Aitchison 1995). Itis important to bear in mind that what is being promoted in education systemsis often a regulated market. For instance, schools are unable to move to moreprofitable locations and are not entirely free to select their own students. Atthe same time, moves to grant greater autonomy to school administrators interms of organisation and management are occurring alongside moves toincrease central government authority in macro-policy areas such as cur-riculum and assessment. What is being devolved to schools is the authorityand capacity to determine the way in which schools will attain state-deter-mined outcomes. Le Grand, Propper and Robinson (1992) have suggestedthe idea of a quasi-market. In this quasi-market, the government remains asubsidiser of social services such as education but ceases to provide them.Instead, it finances independent suppliers to provide these services andengages in regulatory activities to monitor and regulate these suppliers.

There is growing concern over the consequences of marketisation in edu-cation. A major objection centres around the exacerbation of existing socialinequalities (Ball 1994). It is feared that schools will become increasinglyselective in their student intakes in order to improve academic outcomes inthe face of growing inter-school competition (Astin 1992). Another objec-tion is that increased competition need not necessarily result in improvededucational standards for all students. This is because some schools are simplynot in a position to compete on equal terms with others. Furthermore, an insis-tence on national curricula and assessment criteria limits the scope for inno-vation in curriculum and teaching methods. Thus, neither diversity of provisionnor parental choice are necessarily promoted (Fitz, Halpin and Power 1994).Lastly, the links between school autonomy and school effectiveness are stilltenuous (Bush 1994).

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The marketisation of education in Singapore

Increased autonomy for schools

The 1957 Education Ordinance included provisions for the registration ofschools, managers and teachers, and provisions governing the role and respon-sibilities of school management committees. The Ordinance was followedby regulations that gave government and government-aided schools equalfunding, and that stated that staff qualifications and salaries and fees shouldbe the same in both types of school. In addition, the Director of Educationwas given control over staff recruitment and dismissal in all schools. Thismarked the beginning of moves towards a highly centralised system of edu-cation. Over the next decade further steps included the standardisation ofsubject syllabuses and educational structures across the various languagestreams, and the institution of common terminal examinations.

A major boost to the idea of freeing schools from centralised control wasgiven by the then First Deputy Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, in 1985. Hespoke of the need to allow more autonomy within schools, and of giving theright to appoint staff, devise school curricula and choose textbooks, while con-forming to national education policies such as bilingualism and commonexaminations. Goh asserted that prestigious schools had lost some of theirindividuality and special character through centralised control.

In 1986, 12 school principals were invited to accompany the EducationMinister to study the management of 25 “acknowledged successful schools”in the UK and USA, and see what lessons could be learned for Singapore. Theprincipals’ report recommended greater autonomy for selected schools in orderto “stimulate educational innovation” and “to enable schools to respond morepromptly to the needs and aspirations of pupils and parents” (Ministry ofEducation 1987: ix).

Accepting the recommendations, Education Minister Tony Tan citedapprovingly the findings of Chubb and Moe (1990), who had concluded thatU.S. public schools performed less well than private schools because theywere sheltered from market forces. Tan stated that several well-establishedschools would be allowed to become independent schools. They would begiven autonomy and flexibility in staff deployment and salaries, finance, man-agement, and the curriculum. These schools were to serve as role models forother schools in improving the quality of education. They would also help toset the market value for good principals and teachers by recruiting staff in acompetitive market. Parents, teachers, and students would enjoy a widervariety of schools to choose from.

In 1987, three well-established boys’ secondary schools announced theirintention to go independent in 1988. Their applications for independent statuswere approved by the Ministry of Education. They were followed a year laterby two prestigious government-aided girls’ secondary schools. To date, a total

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of eight secondary schools, all of which are well-established and prestigious,have become independent.

All of the independent schools are academically selective. This setting asideof high-performing students in a few selected schools is consistent with thewell-entrenched elitist philosophy of the Singapore government (Milne andMauzy 1990). The independent schools scheme is also part of an attempt todecentralise the management of social services (Low 1994). The governmenthas stated its intention to move “closer to market in various social andeconomic policies, in order to keep waste, inefficiency, and the burden onthe state to a minimum” (Lee 1994: 17).

What is interesting in the Singapore case is that these moves come evenas the government continues to enjoy heavy budgetary surpluses and to investheavily in education. These subsidies amount to 98 per cent of recurrentexpenditure in non-independent secondary schools (Ministry of Trade andIndustry 1993). In fact, the independent schools are by no means financiallyindependent of the government. On the contrary, they remain heavily depen-dent financially on government subsidies. For instance, the governmentprovides these schools with annual per capita grants equivalent to the averagecost of educating secondary students. The Singapore case thus provides acontrast with other countries where the championing of marketisation hasresulted from financial stringency on the part of governments.

Right from the introduction of the independent schools scheme, there wasintense public criticism over its elitist nature and the high fees charged bythe schools. For example, monthly independent school fees ranged between50 and 100 Singapore dollars in 1990, way above the S$10.50 fee in non-independent secondary schools (Tan 1996: 160). In response, the governmentestablished a Financial Assistance Scheme for financially needy studentsattending these schools. It also reaffirmed its commitment to providing largesubsidies for basic education (Parliamentary Debates 54, November 29 1989:680). However, it insisted that parents had to be prepared to pay for highquality education (Parliamentary Debates 54, November 29 1989: 673–674).

In the wake of the 1991 general elections, which saw the governing partyreturned to power with a reduced parliamentary majority, the governmenttook further steps to defuse public criticism of the independent schoolsscheme. First, it limited the number of independent schools, thus reversingits earlier announcement that it wanted to see more schools turn indepen-dent. Secondly, a government-appointed Cost Review Committee expressedconcern over the high fees charged by independent schools and urged theschools to keep their fees affordable (Ministry of Trade and Industry 1993).Thirdly, in 1994 it established a new category of schools called autonomousschools. In the first three years, 18 existing non-independent secondaryschools, all of which had outstanding academic results, were designated asautonomous schools. These schools receive 10 per cent more in annual percapita government grants than non-autonomous schools. They, along withother non-independent schools, have also been given greater flexibility to

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introduce various enrichment programmes for their students. In addition,the autonomous schools have been allowed to charge moderately higher feesthan non-autonomous secondary schools, though not as much as independentschools. The former are supposed to provide a high quality education whilecharging more affordable fees than the latter (Tan 1996). Parents and studentswill thus have a greater range of choices (Goh 1992a).

Another major initiative to foster greater autonomy among all principalsis the Education Endowment Scheme that was launched in 1993. The gov-ernment deposits part of its annual budgetary surpluses into an endowmentfund, which is eventually targeted to reach a total of five billion Singaporedollars. The money from the fund is used in several major ways. One of theseis the provision of annual per capita grants to all schools. These grants maybe used, among other purposes, to introduce enrichment programmes such ascourses in speech training and stress management for students. In addition,each Singaporean student between the ages of six and 16 receives an annualgrant that may be used to pay for enrichment programmes and extra-curric-ular activities organised by schools. The provision of extra funds to bothstudents and schools has meant that schools are increasingly turning to privateindividuals and agencies to conduct enrichment programmes and sportstraining for their students. Some schools have hired sports coaches from othercountries such as China.

The increase in school autonomy is supposed to promote greater flexi-bility in decision-making for the principals. Other goals of greater schoolautonomy include greater diversity in school curricula and a wider range ofchoices for parents and students making decisions about school enrolment.These goals have been attained to some extent. First, a few independentschools have recruited additional full-time administrators such as publicrelations officers, bursars, and estate managers. In contrast, non-independentschool principals may only hire one school administrator. Secondly, unlikenon-independent schools, independent schools are run by governing boardsthat may determine admission policies and conditions for dismissal of students,school fees and major financial policies and budgets. Thirdly, all the eightindependent schools have raised their fees to levels far above those chargedby non-independent schools. Monthly independent school fees ranged betweenS$100 and S$200 in 1996, while those in non-independent secondary schoolsranged between S$12 and S$32 (Tan 1996: 160). Finally, they are able todetermine their own student admission figures, a privilege denied to non-inde-pendent schools.

The independent schools have also exercised greater control in curriculum.For instance, several independent schools have scrapped subjects, such asdesign and technology, that are compulsory in non-independent schools. TheChinese High School, an independent school, has designed and introducedits own Gifted Education Programme without any governmental assistance.Its programme differs from the Ministry of Education’s programme in severalmajor respects. At the same time, this particular school provides educational

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consultancy services to a Singapore international school that was establishedin the Chinese city of Suzhou in 1996. The services provided included cur-riculum design, teacher recruitment, and the establishment of a training infra-structure (Tan 1996). Teacher recruitment is another area in which theindependent schools have taken advantage of their increased autonomy byrecruiting as many teachers as their finances will allow. The schools have thusimproved their teacher-student ratios vis-à-vis non-independent secondaryschools.

However, in some other respects the degree of choice and diversity is stillrather limited. The government still exerts a great deal of influence over allthe 149 secondary schools, including independent schools and autonomousschools. In particular, the imposition of national curricular requirements suchas bilingualism and the teaching of moral education, as well as the pressuresimposed by common national examinations, restricts the scope for curricularinnovation. None of the independent schools or autonomous schools hasmoved away from a subject-based curriculum. In addition, the range ofsubjects offered in these schools is largely identical to that in non-indepen-dent, non-autonomous schools. As long as principals are held accountablefor their schools’ performance in national examinations, they cannot affordto stray too far from the mainstream curriculum.

A second major factor inhibiting innovation is conservatism and resistanceto change among some Education Ministry officials. Such attitudes often provefrustrating for school principals who desire greater autonomy from Ministrycontrol, as manifested in this statement by the principal of an independentschool:

So the system on the one hand allows it [autonomy], on the other hand chokes it. . . . There’s a gap here. You’ve got the rules in the middle, on one side, You’vegot the people interpreting them . . . the inspectors. You’ve got the school prin-cipal, who’s got to abide by the rules and be inspected by the inspector who worksfor the rules, because he’s accountable to his bosses. So if this principal doesn’tobserve that rule fully, the inspector’s got to account for that principal and givethe answer up here . . . . And yet the Director on top is saying, “But if you readthe rules, they’ve [referring to school principals] got a lot of freedom” (Tan 1996:218).

There are thus tensions between centralising tendencies in the Ministry onthe one hand, and the desire by some principals to exercise their professionaljudgement on the other hand. The former Director of Education has recog-nised the existence of conservatism and resistance to change within theMinistry: “I suspect that decentralisation efforts may have been resisted bysome Ministry officials who are reluctant to yield authority or share theirpower” (Yip 1982: 6).

The discussion so far has indicated that the situation in Singapore doesnot involve a free market. Instead, there is a government-regulated market.For example, the number of independent schools is determined by the Ministryof Education, as is the choice of schools for the autonomous schools scheme.

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School principals are thus being given greater operating autonomy at the sametime that the government dictates desired policy outcomes to be attained byschools.

Increased competition among schools

A second feature of the growing marketisation of education in Singapore isthe stress on competition among schools:

It is the quality of education which determines a people’s competitiveness . . . . Agood education system depends not only on resources, which the state will provide,but also on the following:• students competing to do well in schools;• schools competing against one another;• good schools emerging to show other schools how they can improve (Goh 1992b:

31).

Besides improving the quality of education, competition is supposed to provideparents and students with a wider range of choices and to improve account-ability by forcing schools to improve their programmes (Goh 1992a).

This competition has been fostered in various ways. First, part of the reasonfor the establishment of autonomous schools was to provide competition forthe independent schools. Second, all secondary schools and junior colleges(which provide sixth and seventh form education) have been publicly rankedon an annual basis since 1992 and the results have been published in thevarious local newspapers. The official justification is that parents and studentsmust be provided with better information in order to make intelligent andinformed choices (Goh 1992a; Parliamentary Debates 64, March 1 1995: 27).Secondary schools are ranked on three main criteria. The first of these is theMean Subject Grade, which is a measure of students’ overall results in nationalexaminations. Next, schools’ value-addedness is evaluated by comparingstudents’ performance in terminal examinations with their examination scoresupon entry to their respective schools. The Ministry of Education has suppliedall secondary schools and junior colleges with a computer program calledPerformance Indicators for School Management that enables them to evaluatetheir own value-addedness for each examination subject on an annual basis.In 1995 the Ministry began giving cash awards to the 40 secondary schoolsthat were most highly ranked in the annual value-added league tables. Thethird criterion is a weighted index that measures a school’s performance inthe National Physical Fitness Test as well as the percentage of overweightstudents in the school.

The promotion of inter-school competition and the pressures on schoolsas a result of the ranking of schools have led many principals to engage inmarketing activities. These include recruitment talks, the design and distrib-ution of brochures, the screening of promotional videos, and the courting ofthe press in order to highlight school achievements. Even primary schools

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are engaging in these activities, with principals reaching out to parents ofkindergarten students. Although such activities may provide parents andstudents with more information and enable them to make more informed deci-sions, there are also major problems associated with the system. Because ofthe emphasis on ranking, which is in turn heavily dependent on academicachievement, all schools that engage in marketing activities will of necessityreach out to the “desirable” group of students. This leads to a zero-sum situ-ation in the case of neighbouring schools that are competing for the samelimited pool of students, and may adversely affect collaborative relationshipsbetween schools and principals.

In addition to the marketing activities targeted at students in Singapore,several independent schools have begun promotional activities among thechildren of Singaporeans working in neighbouring countries. The principalsof two of these schools have tried to encourage these children to enrol intheir boarding schools in Singapore. They have used such promotional strate-gies as advertising on the Internet, distributing brochures, and making pro-motional visits overseas. The Education Minister has urged top Singaporeschools to attract academic high achievers from neighbouring countries. Themotive is highly pragmatic: to build up ties of friendship between Singaporeanstudents and their foreign counterparts that may in future lead to “mutuallybeneficial networks between Singapore and the region” (Mathi 1996). Inaddition, the Minister for Communications recently suggested that indepen-dent schools establish regional branches in order to cater to the needs ofSingaporeans working abroad (“Two Schools” 1996).

The introduction of explicit measures to promote competition has arouseda great deal of controversy and criticism, both within and outside the gov-erning party. For instance, the then Senior Minister of State for Education toldParliament in 1992 that public ranking of schools in terms of their academicresults was “undesirable”. It was “absurd” and “nonsense” to say that oneschool was ahead of another because of minuscule differences in their overallacademic results. It would also increase tension and stress among parents whilenot improving education for children at all (Parliamentary Debates 59, March13 1992: 991–992). However, the results of the first annual ranking exercisewere still published five months later.

It is highly debatable whether fostering competition does improve thequality of education for all students and promote greater choice and diversityfor parents and students. This is especially so in the Singapore context for anumber of reasons. First of all, the competition among schools does not takeplace on a level playing field. The terms of competition are to a large extentdictated by the government. For instance, the number of independent schoolsand autonomous schools is determined by the government. Next, unlike inde-pendent schools, non-independent schools may not decide their enrolmentfigures or the number of teachers that they wish to employ. Furthermore, notall schools may offer certain prestigious academic programmes such as theGifted Education Programme or the Art Elective Programme. The government

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only conducts such programmes in selected schools, all of which are eitherindependent or autonomous. The Chinese High School was able to establishits own Gifted Education Programme in competition with that of the Ministryin large part because it was an independent school with ample financialresources. It is questionable to what extent all school principals can engagein activities such as the provision of consultancy services and the establish-ment of branch schools in other countries. Only well-established schools suchas the independent schools will be able to undertake projects that requireautonomy and flexibility in financing and staff deployment in addition toample financial resources.

In other words, non-prestigious, non-academically selective schools aresimple unable to compete effectively with well-established, academicallyselective schools. The former are caught in a vicious cycle: because they areunable to attract high academic achievers, their academic results fall far belowthose of the well-established schools. This in turn means that they remainunable to attract high academic achievers. Analysis of the ranking results forMean Subject Grade scores from 1992 to 1996 reveals that the majority ofthe top 30 secondary schools have remained in this category over the fiveyears. In particular, the top four schools have remained the same over thisperiod. It is therefore questionable to what extent increased competitionactually helps to improve standards in all schools.

A second criticism is that competition leads some schools to focus narrowlyon those outcomes that are relevant for public ranking and that may be usefulfor attracting parents and potential students. Such a criticism is especiallyrelevant in a situation such as Singapore where performance in competitiveexaminations is a major determinant of educational and social mobility. Ampleevidence for this criticism was provided during the controversy in 1995 overthe teaching of English literature by some secondary schools. Some presti-gious schools had decided to make the subject optional rather than compul-sory for their graduating students. This was because English literature waswidely perceived to be a subject in which it was difficult to do well duringnational examinations. These schools were wary of the potential consequencesthat students’ less-than-ideal performance in English literature might haveon their positions in the annual ranking exercises (Nirmala and Mathi 1995).Another piece of evidence that points to the adverse effect of ranking schoolsis the tendency on the part of some schools to over-emphasise preparationfor the national physical fitness test at the expense of the acquisition of skillsin sports and games (“Physical Education” 1996). The growing stress onschool accountability and the use of narrowly defined, easily quantifiable per-formance indicators has clearly had a detrimental impact on some schools.Far from promoting choice and diversity, heightened inter-school competi-tion and rivalry may in fact work against these goals.

Another criticism is that the current performance indicators are not in factvery meaningful. The differences in performance between the top-rankedschools are often so minuscule as to be of little use to parents and students

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in helping them choose a particular school. Various observers have suggestedrefinements to the performance indicators in order to provide more informa-tion about the non-academic aspects of school life. However, these invari-ably involve quantifiable measures. Thus, those aims and goals of educationthat are less amenable to quantification, such as moral development, continueto be given less emphasis.

A more serious issue raised by competition is that of a growing hierarchyof schools and social stratification. The intense competition among schoolshas meant that schools that were already academically selective have remainedso. School principals who wish to maintain or improve their ranking positionsneed to keep a constant watch on their student intake. For instance, two boys’schools have tightened their admission criteria since turning independent. Notonly have they raised their minimum admission criteria, they have also stoppedproviding automatic admission for students from affiliated primary schoolswho meet the government’s minimum admission standards. These studentsnow have to compete on equal terms with students from non-affiliated primaryschools. One principal explained the rationale for the decision in the followingway:

. . . if I keep coming down in ranking, I’ll get less of the better kids. Becauseparents’ perception would be, “It’s not a good school.” . . . So you’re on adownward slide. So the only way you can turn it around . . . is . . . to change thecohort . . . (Tan 1996: 200).

Growing inter-school competition and the associated trend of increasedacademic selectiveness by top schools will lead inevitably to a further strat-ification of schools, with the independent schools and autonomous schools atthe top and the rest below. One sees in the official encouragement of mar-keting activities outside Singapore by independent schools further signs ofa stratification of schools, with the top schools being developed as eliteinstitutions. Equally worrying is evidence that students from wealthier familybackgrounds are over-represented in independent schools. For instance, dataobtained from three independent schools in 1992 revealed that about two-thirds of the students in each of the schools had fathers who were profes-sionals, administrators, or managers. In contrast, only about 26 per cent ofthe entire Singapore labour force were classified within these occupationalcategories (Tan 1993). The introduction of marketisation in education hascoincided with, and may have contributed to, the growing concern overincome inequalities. The government is well aware of the potential impact ofsocial stratification on social cohesion as well as on its potential legitimacy.However, it claims that the education system is fair as it is based on merit.Another claim is that it is only right to nurture the more able students as thewhole country will ultimately benefit (Parliamentary Debates 59, January16 1992: 365).

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Conclusion

The last decade has witnessed an increasing use of the language of marketeconomics in the Singapore education system after more than two decades ofsteady government centralisation of control over schools. Terms such aschoice, competition and diversity are now commonplace. This article has dis-cussed and analysed two main policies that illustrate this tendency. These arethe encouragement of greater school autonomy and the fostering of competi-tion among schools.

What has emerged in the Singapore case is not a free market. Instead, thereis a government-regulated or quasi market at work (Low 1994). The Singaporeexperience thus parallels that in other countries such as the UK and NewZealand. On the one hand, elements of greater competition among schools arefostered through such means as performance indicators and published schoolleague tables. School heads have been given greater operating autonomy inthe hope that they will be better able to respond to parents’ and students’needs. On the other hand, the government continues to exert considerableinfluence over all schools. For example, it dictates the terms under whichvarious schools compete. Schools are also bound by nationally prescribedcurricula and examinations. In other words, schools are being given greaterautonomy in order that they might better achieve government-dictated macro-policy objectives and goals.

In view of the central roles which the government has assigned to the edu-cation system in supporting economic development and fostering socialcohesion (Gopinathan 1995; Wilson 1978), it is highly unlikely that centralisedcontrol will ever be relaxed. It may also be argued that there are benefitsto having a certain amount of centralised control of schools. One of these isthe need to ensure that all children enjoy similar access to a basic generaleducation.

However, the imposition of centralised control may conflict with the pro-motion of choice and diversity. Singapore schools, even the independentschools that have been delegated operating autonomy, are unable to stray fromthe nationally prescribed school curricula and examinations. Furthermore,intense inter-school competition has led some school heads to focus narrowlyon the attainment of results that are used in the annual school league tables.

Another concern raised by the marketisation of education in Singapore, andone that is similar to concerns in other countries, is the increase in dispari-ties between schools as well as in social inequalities. The intense inter-schoolcompetition and the introduction of annual school league tables has led schoolsto become increasingly academically selective in a bid to maintain or improvetheir ranking positions. There is a growing stratification of schools, with inde-pendent schools and autonomous schools enjoying not only greater operatingautonomy but also better student intakes and academic results than non-inde-pendent, non-autonomous schools. In view of the fact that students from

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wealthier homes are over-represented in the well-established and prestigiousschools, there is a danger that the marketisation of education will intensifysocial stratification as well.

The government has claimed that the independent schools and autonomousschools will serve as role models for other schools in improving educationalstandards. This of course begs the question of whether what proves effectivein these well-established schools can in fact be transplanted into other schools.The government’s reasoning also ignores the part played by a selective studentintake in schools’ academic success. It is therefore not clear to what extentthe experiences of independent schools and autonomous schools can be validlessons for the bulk of Singapore secondary schools, struggling with less-than-ideal student ability levels.

Although the government is aware of the potential political fallout fromthe public controversy over social inequalities, it shows no signs of reversingthe trend towards the marketisation of education. If anything, it is likelyto further encourage competition among schools. This is part of its urgingof all Singaporeans to constantly “stay ahead of the pack” in terms ofglobal economic competitiveness (Lee 1994). At the same time, it has urgedSingaporeans not to allow “our children to be softened” by the allegeddenigration of academic excellence and the promotion of a “soft approach tolife” by “liberals in the West” (Goh 1992b). Its response to criticisms of theelitist nature of independent schools has been confused at times. For instance,it has tried to dispel the notion that non-independent schools are inferior toindependent schools (Parliamentary Debates 63, August 25 1994: 398). Atthe same time, though, it has stated that the independent schools are to bedeveloped into “outstanding institutions, to give the most promising and ablestudents an education matching their promise” (Parliamentary Debates 59,January 6 1992: 18).

The Singapore experience with marketisation differs substantially from thatin most other countries in one important respect. While financial stringencyis a key motivating factor in many cases, the developments in Singapore aretaking place against the backdrop of healthy budgetary surpluses and increasedgovernment expenditure on education. These spending trends are likely tocontinue for some time, especially since education is viewed as playing akey role in enhancing national economic competitiveness in the globaleconomy.

The Singapore government remains strongly committed, both financiallyand ideologically, to the marketisation of education. This article has raisedseveral interesting policy implications and issues. It is likely that the varioustensions and policy dilemmas, such as the balance between centralisationand autonomy, will continue to be a feature of the Singapore education system.

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Acknowledgement

I wish to thank Professor Mark Bray of the Comparative Education Research Centreat the University of Hong Kong for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of thisarticle.

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The author

Jason Tan is a lecturer in the School of Education at the National Instituteof Education, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He completedhis doctorate at the State University of New York at Buffalo. He has publishedseveral articles on school privatisation initiatives in Singapore and educationalachievement of the Malay minority in Singapore. In addition, he is the co-author (with Philip G. Altbach) of Programs and centers in Comparative andinternational Education: A Global Inventory, Buffalo, NY: State Universityof New York at Buffalo.

Contact address: Dr Jason Tan, Division of Policy & Management Studies,School of Education, National Institute of Education, 469 Bukit Timah Road,Singapore 259756, Singapore.

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