The MAGTF in Sustained Operations Ashore · proposal, debate, and experimentation which will...

Department of the NavyHEADQUARTERS U. S. MARINE CORPS

Washington, DC

4 January 1996

The MAGTF in SustainedOperations Ashore

Operational Maneuver from the Sea and Ship to ObjectiveManeuver describe Marine Corps participation in futuremilitary operations ranging from “humanitarian relief to ahigh stakes struggle against a rising superpower.” The tenetsof these concepts are universally applicable because they arefirmly rooted in the fundamental belief Marines share in thephilosophy of maneuver warfare. The MAGTF in SustainedOperations Ashore is no different. It acknowledges thatsustained land combat is nothing new to Marines, butrecognizes that future battlespaces may well differsignificantly from their 20th Century predecessors. Navalforces will capitalize on the maneuverability and protectionthe sea affords to conduct the decisive actions envisioned byOperational Maneuver from the Sea. They will do sowithout reliance on tenuous overseas bases or vulnerableshore based facilities, making them even more the force ofchoice for warfighting commanders-in-chief and joint forcecommanders than they already are today. The MAGTF inSustained Operations Ashore continues the process ofproposal, debate, and experimentation which will transformour warfighting concepts into operational realities.

C.C. KRULAKGeneral, U.S. Marine Corps

31st Commandant of the Marine Corps

United States Marine Corps Emerging Operational Concepts

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Sustained Operations Ashore

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The Marine Air Ground Task Forcein Sustained Operations Ashore

INTRODUCTION

The traditional role of amphibious forces in sustained joint campaignshas been one of enabler for the introduction of follow-on forces, fol-lowed by transition to conventional joint operations ashore. In mostcases, such operations entailed the establishment of a lodgment in orderto facilitate the safe introduction and accumulation of the manpower andmateriel required for command and control, execution, and sustainment.The Allied invasion of France during the Second World War is an ex-cellent example, although the Marine Corps’ amphibious landings on thelarger Pacific islands also apply. Since that time and throughout thiscentury, Marine forces have been called upon to operate alongside Armyand allied forces in sustained joint campaigns. The Marine air groundtask force’s (MAGTF) participation in Sustained Operations Ashore(SOA) will be every bit as likely in the 21st Century; however, the na-ture of such participation will be different. This concept envisions theMAGTF remaining a general purpose force, but one capable of exe-cuting a series of precise, focused combat actions rather than primarilyparticipating in continuous, methodical ground operations. By capitaliz-ing on its unique seabased character, the MAGTF not only remains thenation’s premier forcible entry force, but establishes itself as the force ofchoice for decisive operations, as well.

The battlespace of the future will scarcely resemble its 20th Centurypredecessor. While the nature of combat will undergo little fundamentalchange for the individual participant, the way land combat takes placewill be dramatically different. The battlespace will often be nonlinearand lack large, easily targeted enemy formations. Critical vulnerabilitieswill be difficult to discern and centers of gravity dispersed, well de-fended and difficult to engage. Physical occupation of large terrain seg-ments will be less important than focused attacks aimed at reducing theenemy’s ability and even will to fight. This lack of preoccupation withoccupying terrain will give maneuver commanders vastly improved op-


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erational and tactical freedom of action. It will also, however, eliminatethe heretofore “secure” rear area from which commanders have tradi-tionally conducted combat support and combat service support opera-tions. Marines must view this fundamental change in future sustainedland combat as less a challenge than opportunity.

THE MAGTF AS ANOPERATIONAL MANEUVER ELEMENT

The inherent flexibility of the MAGTF and its incorporation of emergingtechnologies will permit an expanded role for the Marine Corps in futuresustained joint campaigns. The MAGTF, as a seabased operationalmaneuver element (OME), will enhance its forcible entry capability andability to participate in sustained land campaigns through exploitation ofthe tenets of Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM). The MAGTF will provide warfightingcommanders in chief (CINC) and joint force commanders (JFC) with anagile, versatile, and responsive force which identifies and attacks enemycritical vulnerabilities to reduce his centers of gravity as part of the jointcampaign.

Employed as an OME, the MAGTF constitutes a unique seabased op-erational capability for the JFC, maintained in immediate readiness tocreate its own opportunities or exploit those resulting from the activitiesof other components of the joint force. In this role, MAGTFs will beassigned operational-level missions which have decisive impact on theoutcome of the overall campaign. The actions of the OME must be coor-dinated with those of other joint and coalition components in order toretain the flexibility and responsiveness required to exploit opportunitiesas they arise. The MAGTF will normally be employed as an independentformation, relying on its organic capabilities and exploiting connectivitythroughout the joint force to acquire and extend external support asrequired. As a self-contained, self-sustaining combined arms force withintegrated air, ground, command and control, and logistics capabilities,the MAGTF is ideally suited to function as an enabling force, decisiveforce, or exploitation force. These functions are not mutually exclusive.


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ENABLING FORCE

The MAGTF will conduct enabling operations to set the stage forfollow-on operations by other elements of the joint task force. Whileclosely related to the traditional MAGTF role of initial forcible entry,enabling actions are not limited to the opening phases of a campaign, norare they necessarily restricted to the securing of lodgments for theintroduction of follow-on forces. Enabling attacks may also beconducted to divert the enemy commander’s attention from the maineffort, or even cause him to reorient forces engaged in a successfuldefense to an attack from an unexpected quarter.

In today’s context, an enabling force can exploit its ability to maneuverat sea to conduct amphibious attacks, even demonstrations, along largesegments of coastline to “enable”planned or ongoing joint forceactions, including the introductionof additional forces. Alternatively,enabling operations may be asrudimentary as establishing thecornerstone of a command andcontrol system that the assemblingjoint or coalition force “plugsinto,” or as complex as physicallyseizing forward operating basesfor ground, naval, and aviationforces.

In late April 1945, Generals Alex-ander Vandegrift and Roy Geigerproposed just such an amphibious“end run” during the Okinawa Cam-paign, as an alternative to direct at-tacks on the heavily defended ShuriLine. Unfortunately, their recom-mendation was not accepted and thecostly battle of attrition in southernOkinawa continued for two additionalmonths.


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DECISIVE FORCE

The MAGTF will exploit its advanced command and control system toidentify the gaps necessary to conduct decisive operations and reduceenemy centers of gravity. Improvements in command and control, mo-bility, and lethality will give the MAGTF a greatly enhanced capabilityto execute decisive actions. Decisive actions run the gamut from de-struction of enemy military units to interdiction of critical lines of com-munication to the evacuation of American and third country nationalsfrom untenable urban areas. The 21st Century MAGTF will retain theability to conduct such operations, across the width and depth of the areaof operations at a tempo that will quickly overwhelm the enemy com-mander’s ability to react effectively.

EXPLOITATION FORCE

The MAGTF will also be used as an exploitation force. In this capacity,the OME takes advantage of opportunities created by the activity ofother components of the joint force. During the early phases of a cam-paign, it may be difficult to identify an adversary’s critical vulnerabilitiesand centers of gravity. As the campaign progresses, however, actions byelements of the joint force will result in enemy reactions. The JFC willexploit these reactions through rapid and focused seabased operations bythe MAGTF which capitalize on the results of ongoing engagements toachieve decisive results. For example, a MAGTF functioning as OME in

The 1950 landing of the 1st MarineDivision at Inchon was such a decisiveblow. By landing in an unexpectedplace and quickly moving inland tosever North Korean lines of commu-nication, the Marine “air-ground” teameffectively halted the North Koreanadvance and turned the tide of the Ko-rean War.


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a future conflict may exploit a joint force breakthrough by striking at en-emy units attempting to retrograde from the engagement.

ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT

The employment of the MAGTF as an OME exploits its inherent expe-ditionary nature, naval character, combined-arms orientation, flexibility,adaptability, and sustainability. The MAGTF organizes for combat basedon the mission. While its particular composition will vary with eachsituation, its basic organizational design (Command Element, GroundCombat Element, Aviation Combat Element, and Combat ServiceSupport Element) will remain. As each OME mission will be unique, theMAGTF commander must be prepared to rapidly build tailored, com-bined arms teams appropriate to the mission. The MAGTF will be sea-based. Ground maneuver elements, however, will frequently beemployed ashore and may remain there for prolonged periods. Combatsupport and combat service support to such units will remain seabased,recognizing that operational requirements may necessitate some posi-tioning ashore to enhance effectiveness or increase operational range anddecrease turnaround time, particularly in the case of aviation combatelement operations.

In January 1942, the Japanese 25th Army useda series of amphibious assaults to exploit suc-cessful offensive operations against BritishCommonwealth forces falling back on Singa-pore. As Allied units withdrew southward underheavy pressure, Japanese landing forcesstruck repeatedly at points along Malaya’s westcoast. These landings, conducted in coordina-tion with unrelenting air and ground assaults,prevented retreating Allied units from estab-lishing organized defensive positions, precipi-tating the total collapse of resistance on thepeninsula.


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The MAGTF commander will execute precise, focused combat actionsby using his shared situational awareness and organic planning andintelligence capabilities to anticipate and respond to operational-leveltaskings from the JFC. In addition, the MAGTF must be prepared toreinforce or exploit the efforts of its own committed forces or respond toother JFC requirements. Upon completion of assigned missions, theMAGTF reconstitutes on the seabase and prepares for additional JFCtaskings.

COMPONENT HEADQUARTERS

During a sustained joint campaign, a Marine Corps service componentheadquarters supports the JFC and facilitates the warfighting functionsof the MAGTF. The Marine Corps Component Commander, designatedCommander, Marine Corps Forces (ComMARFOR) advises the JFC onthe status, capabilities, and employment of assigned Marine forces. Inthis capacity, the MARFOR staff participates in joint force planning andcoordination mechanisms in order to ensure effective MAGTFemployment and to assist the MAGTF staff in anticipating futuretaskings. The MARFOR is also responsible for the execution of service-level administrative and logistics functions, relieving the MAGTF ofthese responsibilities so that it may concentrate on warfighting.

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The Marine Corps component commander (or his representative) and asmall nucleus staff will most often be co-located with JFC; however,every effort will be made to limit the personnel and logistics footprint ofthe component headquarters. Enhancements in communications andinformation systems will permit the execution of many servicecomponent responsibilities such as personnel administration andreplacement, detailed intelligence production, and strategic-levellogistics via “reach-back.” Specialized skills such as cultural expertise,knowledge of weapons of mass destruction, or unique target systemanalysis capabilities required to plan or execute a specific mission willbe made available through reach-back rather than physically deployingspecialists into the theater.

THE MAGTF AFLOAT

The MAGTF derives its unique capabilities and a large degree of itsforce protection from its seabased character. In response to tasking fromthe JFC, the MAGTF plans and executes its mission in accordance withthe tenets of OMFTS and STOM. When employed as an OME, theMAGTF exploits the operational mobility inherent in its seabasedcharacter to conduct operations at times and places of its choosing to


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achieve the desired effect or set the stage for follow-on actions by otherelements of the joint force.The MAGTF is prepared to operate as an OME on short notice. TheMAGTF command element (CE), through its robust reach-backcapability, electronic links to the joint force headquarters, Marine Corpscomponent commander, and other elements of the joint force, monitorsthe common operational picture, establishes and maintains situationalawareness, and initiates planning for potential missions. The MAGTFinitiates a rapid-response planning sequence and organizes for combat atthe earliest indication of formal tasking. Command and control duringexecution is seabased. While the scope and duration of certain missionsmay require the establishment of limited command or liaison elementsashore, the MAGTF utilizes the capabilities and collaborative

connectivity afforded by the seabase to minimize its footprint ashore.1

MAGTF SUSTAINMENT

MAGTF sustainment will be seabased, providing a secure, yet accessiblelogistics base. The intent of seabased operations is to rely on theflexibility and protection afforded by the seabase and to minimize theMAGTF's footprint ashore. The manpower and equipment intense natureof command elements, combat service support elements, and fixed airbase facilities makes them large consumers of logistics support, as wellas lucrative targets. Seabasing of these functions will drastically reduceover-the-beach logistics requirements, freeing lift assets for operationalmissions and maneuver commanders from burdensome rear area securitymatters. Seabasing facilitates a rapid and seamless reconstitution uponmission completion, as tactical units return to the seabase using the sameplatforms that initially took them ashore, not having to concernthemselves with “covering” the retrograde of command elements andcombat service support detachments.

Maneuver forces operating ashore will have limited organic logisticscapabilities. These capabilities will be tailored to the type and expected

1The “seabase” includes all elements of Navy and Marine units tailored for the execu-

tion of a specific expeditionary mission. In the context of SOA, the seabase would likelyconsist of a MAGTF, amphibious shipping, Maritime Prepositioning Force 2010 ele-ments, and one or more carrier battle groups.


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duration of the mission and replenished directly from the seabase, or insome cases, directly from intermediate staging bases or even CONUS.Operational requirements may, however, require limited logisticcapabilities be temporarily moved ashore. Such support will be providedby small, highly mobile, direct-support elements rather than traditionalfixed logistics sites. These elements will draw their supplies from theseabase and act as a repository for critical supplies required by maneuverforces on those occasions when their direct supply from the seabase isprecluded by weather or is tactically not feasible. Mobile combat servicesupport elements will possess the full range of warfighting functions, betask organized for the mission and, in addition to providing supplysupport, may contain limited maintenance and casualty handlingcapabilities. In order to accomplish their support mission, these elementsmust be fully integrated into the MAGTF command and control system.It is envisioned that maneuver forces will draw on these elements only in“emergency” situations, using direct support from the seabase for routineresupply and maintenance.

MAGTF ELEMENTS ASHORE

The MAGTF remains a seabased operational maneuver elementthroughout the Joint Force Commander’s prosecution of a sustainedcampaign. The inherent flexibility and seabased nature of the MAGTFcreate troublesome dilemmas for the enemy commander as he attemptsto anticipate and counter potential MAGTF actions. Elements of theMAGTF, most commonly the ground combat element (GCE), willfrequently operate ashore in order to accomplish assigned missions,sometimes for sustained periods. The prospect of operating ashore,however, is not limited to the GCE. Pursuant to missionaccomplishment, the MAGTF commander has the responsibility to takethose steps necessary to support his force in the most effective mannerpossible. This idea is particularly relevant as it applies to basing ofaviation combat element (ACE) assets as Marine aviation flows intotheater and potentially exceeds the deck space capacity of the seabase.Aviation is an integral part of the Marine Corps’ combined armsapproach to warfighting; therefore, provision must be made for basingthese assets where they can best function as part of the MAGTFcombined arms team. Easily displaced advanced expeditionary airfieldsand advanced forward arming and refueling points, combined with


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VSTOL and rotary wing aircraft will give the MAGTF commander theunique flexibility to employ his aviation in order to most efficientlyaccomplish the mission.

Marine air will, however, be seabased to the maximum extentpracticable. Maneuver at sea applies to aviation assets as well as toground forces and, properly executed, can reduce flight distances andtime of response. The seabase also provides a relatively secure bed downsite where maintenance can be conducted and crew rest accomplished.Should deck space constraints or operational requirements so dictate,however, selected aviation elements may operate ashore, as describedabove. This is not a preferred course of action, as it subjects personneland equipment to many vulnerabilities and increases strain on thecombat service support system.

KEY CAPABILITIES

Successful implementation of the concept for The MAGTF in SustainedOperations Ashore will require improvements in command and control,planning, intelligence, mobility, firepower, and logistics. Specificenhancements are discussed below. In aggregate, their synergistic effectresults in a MAGTF with not only unmatched operational capabilities,but an equally unmatched level of force protection.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and control provides the mechanism by which a commanderrecognizes what needs to be done and communicates those actionsrequired to ensure mission accomplishment. Command and control in asustained joint campaign requires the ability to coordinate the efforts ofmultiple, widely dispersed elements maneuvering through an extendedand nonlinear battlespace. Key command and control capabilitiesrequired by the MAGTF to function as an OME include the ability to:

• establish and maintain a common operational picture among allelements of the MAGTF, utilizing advanced forward projectionand reach-back technologies


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• integrate the simultaneous actions of numerous maneuver forces• quickly respond to new opportunities or changes in the situation• coordinate and control external fires in support of maneuver

forces ashore• provide mechanisms for the rapid receipt of and response to

requests for intelligence, operational, or logistics support

MAGTF command and control capabilities will be seabased, minimizingthe personnel and logistics footprint of command elements throughreach-back capabilities. “Reach-back” is a broad term and encompassesmore than a unitary link to a single source of information resident inCONUS. It describes a widespread capability to exploit real time sourcesof information worldwide and, particularly, in theater. Additionally, thislinkage must be available to every ship of the amphibious force, in orderto support the multiple and often geographically separate taskingsreceived by the MAGTF commander.

PLANNING

An OME is employed to exploit critical vulnerabilities or newly createdoperational advantages. The successful employment of the MAGTF asan OME depends upon its ability to respond to these situations byrapidly planning complex operations and quickly transitioning toexecution. To do this, the MAGTF must be able to conduct rapid-response planning within severe time constraints. The MEU(SOC)planning process and standards can be used as a model for developmentof a larger MAGTF process. In order to anticipate future taskings, theMAGTF will require full connectivity to the joint force's commonoperational picture and must be able to monitor and participate in theJFC's planning process. In addition, the MAGTF must possess aneffective distributive and collaborative planning system which enableswidely-dispersed elements of the MAGTF to carry out real-time,interactive planning.


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INTELLIGENCE

Timely and focused intelligence support is critical to the conduct ofoperational maneuver. Intelligence identifies opportunities for theemployment of the OME and guides the planning and execution ofactions to exploit those opportunities. In order to achieve and maintainsituational awareness, anticipate taskings, and rapidly respond toassigned missions, the MAGTF must have full connectivity with thejoint intelligence architecture and be able to request, receive, and utilizeintelligence developed by all supporting national, theater, and joint forceintelligence assets. While it is intuitive that the MAGTF maintain arobust organic capability to produce intelligence to satisfy mission-specific requirements of the MAGTF and subordinate elementcommanders, it must also be able to capitalize on equally robust reach-back capabilities to develop the requisite human intelligence and culturalawareness required for success in future chaotic, complex landoperations.

In addition to possessing full connectivity to MAGTF and supportingjoint intelligence assets, maneuver elements ashore must haveresponsive organic or direct-support capabilities in order to develop thesituation, avoid contact with major enemy forces or strong points,identify exploitable opportunities, and aid in the development of rapidresponses to fleeting opportunities. Organic MAGTF intelligencecapabilities are required to provide responsiveness, granularity of detail,and focus on those intangible, human factors necessary for successfulemployment at the tactical level.

MOBILITY

The successful conduct of operational maneuver requires mobility at thestrategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. To function as an OME,the MAGTF must have the strategic mobility to reach the theater, theoperational mobility to strike across the entire area of operations, and thetactical mobility to gain a positional advantage over the enemy onceashore. Strategic mobility is derived from the MAGTF's ability to deployvia a variety of airlift and sealift combinations. Enhancements in theMAGTF's strategic mobility as outlined in MPF 2010 and Beyond willincrease both its flexibility and response time. Operational mobility is


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the key to execution ofoperational maneuver and isprovided by the ships andlanding craft of theamphibious task force, aircraftof the ACE, and high-mobilityvehicles of the GCE.Continued improvements areneeded in these areas toprovide the range and speedrequired by operational

maneuver. Tactical mobility is needed to adapt to changes in thesituation and exploit opportunities as they arise. MAGTF maneuverforces must possess sufficient tactical mobility to gain positionaladvantage, retain the initiative, and avoid engagements when they are ata disadvantage. Aviation combat element aircraft will continue toprovide significant tactical mobility; however, surface mobility via high-speed and protected vehicles will also be needed to support a flexibleOME responsive across the spectrum of conflict.

FIREPOWER

Firepower is essential to achieving decisive effect on the enemy. TheOME must be able to concentrate accurate, lethal and non-lethal fires atthe right time and place. To do this, the MAGTF will draw on a widerange of organic and supporting fires. The majority of these will be pro-vided as long-range precision and accurately delivered non-precisionfires from supporting naval expeditionary forces or other components ofthe joint force. Availability ofexternal fires provides the re-quired lethality while maxi-mizing the mobility ofmaneuver forces ashore andminimizing their logisticalrequirements. To employ thefull range of supporting fires,all maneuver forces must befully integrated into theMAGTF command and con-


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trol system. In addition, maneuver forces must retain sufficient organicfirepower to provide for their own force protection, adapt to unantici-pated situations, or deal with asymmetrical threats which are less vulner-able to long-range, precision fires. Once ashore, maneuver forcespossess the ability to discern and react to local conditions. MAGTF ma-neuver forces must have an appropriate mix of organic weaponry to pro-vide discretionary firepower in response to opportunities or advantagesas they develop.

LOGISTICS

To function effectively in the OME role, the MAGTF must be able tosustain the effort necessary to accomplish the operational mission. While

this concept envisions the fo-cused use of tailored maneuverforces to strike at critical vul-nerabilities and reduce opera-tional centers of gravity in brief,decisive engagements, a numberof scenarios may requireMAGTF elements to remainashore for prolonged periods. Inthese situations, the MAGTFmust be able to support its ma-neuver elements for the duration

of the operation. To do so, the MAGTF must possess the capability toprovide tailored logistics support to widely dispersed maneuver forcesoperating across the breadth and depth of the battlespace. Focused, re-sponsive logistics will be needed to deliver critical support at precisetimes and locations. As with command and control, MAGTF sustain-ment will be seabased, minimizing combat service support elementsashore. Maneuver forces ashore will employ new sustainment method-ologies to sustain themselves without loss of operational tempo. One ofthese methodologies may resemble the current ACE concept of for-ward arming and refueling points (FARP). A FARP in support of anOME, however, would be capable of rearming, refueling, resupplying,and repairing ground maneuver elements as well as aircraft. Anothermethodology involves the use of small, mobile, task-organized CSSelements ashore. Such elements could enhance throughput from the sea-


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base for forces located at great distances inland as well as provide a mo-bile logistic reserve for forces remaining ashore for extended periods.MAGTF logistics capabilities in the areas of requirements processing,asset visibility, selective throughput, and rapid delivery must be en-hanced in order to implement this concept.

FORCE PROTECTION

The underlying premise of The MAGTF in Sustained Operations Ashoreconcept is enhanced Marine Corps utility to the warfighting command-ers-in-chief and joint force commanders. Added to overall operationaleffectiveness, however, is the overriding requirement to protect ourforces from increasingly dangerous enemies whose methods of attackwill become more asymmetrical. One does not have to look back farin time to find instances where shore-based US expeditionary forceshave suffered severe losses, even while participating in “peacekeep-ing” missions. The fact is that fixed installations and facilities aremore vulnerable than those which are seabased. Employment of theMAGTF as a sea-based operational maneuver element optimizes itsunique combined arms character; just as significantly, its overall forceprotection posture.

CONCLUSION

Since the beginning of the 20th Century, the Marine air-ground team hasperformed well in short duration forcible entry operations and sustainedoperations ashore. The 21st Century MAGTF will be no different, butmust align its tactics, techniques and procedures with the tenets ofOperational Maneuver from the Sea, Ship to Objective Maneuver, andMPF 2010 and Beyond. Seabasing is the thread that ties these conceptstogether, describing a capability which capitalizes on the maneuver-ability and protection afforded by the sea. The 21st Century MAGTFcommander will exploit the seabased nature of his force to execute pre-cise, focused combat actions, rather than participate in continuous,drawn-out ground operations.


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The concept of The MAGTF in Sustained Operations Ashore addressesthese very issues and creates the opportunity for a more versatile Marine

Corps role as an enabling, decisive, or exploitation force in future jointand combined operations. Unfettered by the requirement for in-theaterinfrastructure and unconstrained by manpower and equipment intensiverear areas, the MAGTF provides the joint force commander a truly deci-sive weapon with which to fight and win the land campaign.

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