THE MADHYAMAKA CONTRIBUTION TO SKEPTICISM Georges … · The Madhyamaka school was founded by...
Transcript of THE MADHYAMAKA CONTRIBUTION TO SKEPTICISM Georges … · The Madhyamaka school was founded by...
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THEMADHYAMAKACONTRIBUTIONTOSKEPTICISMGeorgesDreyfusWilliamsCollege
andJayLGarfieldSmithCollege
HarvardDivinitySchoolCentralUniversityofTibetanStudies
UniversityofMelbourne
Introduction
SkepticismisoftenseenasaspecificallyWesterndevelopment.Inthisessay,we
willshowthatthisethnocentricattitudeisseriouslymistaken.Skepticismwasaliveand
wellinancientIndiaaswell.Infact,itisquitepossiblethatPyrrhoofElisdevelopedhis
skepticisminconversationwithphilosophersinIndia,andhencethatitisthatcountrythat
shouldbecreditedasthefountainheadoftheskepticaltradition,anditssourcemay
perhapsbeintheearlyBuddhistideasthatgaverisetoMadhyamaka.Thesayings
attributedtoPyrrhobyDiogenesLaertiusareredolentofPrajñāparamitālanguage,andat
leastraisethispossibility.1Inthisessay,wearguenotsimplythatskepticismispartofthe
Indiantradition,butthatMadhyamakaskepticismoffersimportantresourcesfor
interpretingskepticismandforbringingitintomeaningfuldialoguewithother
philosophicalpositions.
TheMadhyamakaschoolwasfoundedbyNāgārjuna,anIndianphilosopher(c2ndC
CE)whosemasterwork,theMulamādhyamikakārikā(FundamentalVersesontheMiddle
Way,henceforthMMK),revolutionizedIndianBuddhistphilosophy.Itscentralclaimisthat
allphenomenaareempty(śunya),thatis,lacksvabhāva.Thistermhasbeentranslatedinto
Englishinanumberofways:own-being,essence,inherentexistence,intrinsicnature,true
nature,realexistence,substance,thing-in-itself,etc.Althoughsomeofuspreferintrinsic
nature,therangeofoptionsindicatesitscomplexsemanticrange.ThecentralMadhyamaka
insightisthatallthingslackintrinsicnature:nothinghasanessentialcharacteristicin
virtueofwhichitiswhatitis;nothingexistsindependentlyofamanifoldofcausalrelations
1SeeC.Beckwith(2015),McEvilly(2012),Kuzminsky(2008)andGarfield(1990).
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andpart-wholerelations;nothinghasanykindofrealitythatdoesnotinsomewaydepend
onconventions.
Thisisbothanontologicalandanepistemologicalclaim.Ontologically,itisthe
claimthatnothinghasintrinsicnature;epistemologicallyitmeansthatwhenweanalyse
phenomenatodeterminewhattheyare,wefindnothing;wecomeupempty.Thislackof
findabilityconcernsthewaythingsare(or,rather,howtheyarenot)butalsoinvolvesour
waysofunderstandingtheworld.Thisepistemicsenseisallthemoreimportantgiventhat
itsrefutationisnotmeanttobejustatheoreticalenterprisebuttoentailacognitive
transformationofthewaysweconceiveofandexperienceourselvesandtheworld,aswe
willseelater.
Nāgārjunaarguesthatitnothinghassvabhāva.Thatis,everythingisemptyof
intrinsicnature.Butwhataboutthelackofsvabhāvaitself,thefactthatphenomenadon’t
haveatruenature?Isthislackoftruenaturetheirtruenature?Isthishowthingsarein
reality,namelythattheylackanytruenature?Andifthisisso,isn’tthistheirtruenature?
Indeed,theΑṣtahaśrika-prajñāparammīta-sūtrasaysthat“allthingshaveonenature—that
is,nonature.”Thisisobviouslyparadoxical.Thisparadox(whichGarfieldandPriest
(2003)call“Nāgārjuna’sParadox”isneitheraccidentaltoNāgārjuna’sphilosophynor
unnoticedintheMadhyamakatradition—ancientandmodern.
Therearemanyresponsestothisparadox,reflectingavarietyofinterpretive
choicesmadebycommentatorsandthecomplexityandambiguitiesofNāgārjuna’scorpus.
Somecommentatorschoosetoembracethemoreparadoxicalandradicallyskeptical
passagesinNāgārjuna’sworks,particularlytheonesconcerningthesislessnessandthe
repudiationofallviews.Othersattempttodefusetheparadoxesandtofindconsistent
readings.Thisistruebothofcanonicalandcontemporarycommentators.(See,
Tsongkhapa(2006),Garfield(2015),GarfieldandPriest(2010),DeguchiGarfieldand
Priest(2008;2013).
Tsongkhapa(1357-1419)presentsanimportantcanonicalnon-skeptical
interpretationofNāgārjuna.Hearguesthattheassertionthatthingslackintrinsicnatureis
meantsimplytounderminethetendencytoreifyrealityandtopresentapositivetheoryof
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thenatureofthings,viz.,thattheylackintrinsicexistence;thattheyexistaselementsinthe
webofinterconnectedcausesandeffects.(Tsongkhapa2002&2006).Onthis
understanding,theclaimthatemptinessistheultimatetruthisnotmerelytherefusalto
acceptanyintrinsicnature;itisalsotheassertionthatthingsexistinaparticularway.
(Whetheritispossibletoevadeparadoxthiswayisanothermatter,oneaddressedby
DeguchiGarfieldandPriest(2003)andbyGarfieldandPriest(2003)).Thisinterpretation
hastobetakenseriously,for,whileNāgārjuna—atleastaccordingtohisinterpreterswho
followCandarakīrti—usesreductioargumentstodemonstratethathisopponents’
positionsareincoherentbytheirownlights,thisdoesnotprecludehisarguingforhisown
position,namely,thatthingslacksvabhāva.
Ontheotherhand,onamoreskepticalinterpretation,wemightthinkthatthis
realizationcanneverbecashedoutasadefinitiveunderstandingofhowthingsreallyare.
Whenwelookforhowthingsare,wealwayscomeupempty.Wecanneverreachtheir
truenature.Allwhatwecandoistousevariousformulationsthatwillhelpusto
relinquishtheinstinctivecommitmenttotheideathattheremustbeawaythatthings
reallyare,andthisisthefreedomfromviewsrecommendedbytheearlycanon(Majjhima
Nikāya,Sutta72).ThismaybewhatNāgārjunameanswhenhesaysthatemptinessisthe
rejectionofallviews,andthatoneforwhomemptinessbecomesaviewisincurable.(MMK
Xiii.8)Candrakīrtiputsthispointnicelyinhiscommentary,whenhecomparessomeone
accordingtowhomemptinessisthefinalnatureofthingstosomeonewho,whentoldthat
ashopkeeperhasnothingtosell,askstobuysomeofthatnothing.(Prasannapadā83b,
quotedinTsongkhapa2006,p.299)
Whenviewedinthisperspective,webelievethatMadhyamakaisbestunderstood
assimilartoPyrrhonianskepticismratherthanmodernepistemologicalskepticismof
Descartes.(SeeGarfield1990andCowherds2005,chs6and7forasustaineddefenseof
thisposition.)HereweexplorethewaysinwhichtheMadhyamakadoctrineofthetwo
truthscanprovideresourcesforrespondingtosomechallengesthatskepticismfaces.We
thenaskwhichofthetwoprincipalinterpretationsofMadhyamaka—Prāsaṅgikaand
Svātantrika—providesthebestresourcesfortheexplanationoftheutilityofpractical
knowledgewithintheskepticalperspective.Wehopethatthisexplorationgives
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philosophersinterestedinskepticismareasontolookbeyondGreeceandtoopentheir
eyestotheresourcesprovidedbyMadhyamakafortheskepticaltradition.
Havingnotedthattherearenon-skepticalreadingsofNāgārjuna’sMadhyamaka,we
nowsetthemasidetoexplorewhatwecanlearnfromreadingNāgārjunaasaskeptic.But
weadvisethereadertokeepinmindthatthisisonlyonlyonestrandofMadhyamaka
interpretation.Ontheotherhanditisaveryimportantone,probablyeventhemainone
followedbythemajorityoftraditionalIndianandTibetancommentators,andsoour
attentiontoitisjustified,notonlybyitsphilosophicalimportance,butalsobyits
prominenceintheBuddhisttradition.
1.MadhyamakaandSkepticism
Manycontemporaryphilosophersunderstandbyskepticismthemodernskepticism
introducedbyDescartes:theviewthatweshouldrefusetoassenttoanyclaimofwhichwe
cannotbecertain,andwherecertaintyentailstheeliminationofallpossibilityoferror.This
isverydifferentfromanyformofclassicalskepticism,whetherAcademicorPyrrhonian.It
isbothmorelimitedinitsscope,andmoremethodologicalandtheoretical;Pyrrhonian
skepticismisuniversalinitsreach,andhasprofoundimplicationsforhowweunderstand
ourcognitiverelationtotheworld,includingtoourselves.
Pyrrhonianskepticismhasaverydistinctivestructure,includingbothanegative
andapositivephase.Pyrrhonianskepticismalwayssituatesitselfasakindofmiddlepath
inasubstantivephilosophicaldebate,butamiddlepathofaveryparticularkind,
essentiallyinvolvingthedialecticaldeviceofepochē.Theskeptic,whensheencountersa
debatebetweentwodogmaticextremes—areificationistandanihilistposition—identifies
thesharedpresuppositionatthecoreofthedebate,andrejectsit,suspendingtheentire
debateassenseless.Thissuspensiondoesnotconsistinsaying“maybethissideisright;
maybethatside”;nordoesitinvolvetakingsomekindofcompromiseposition.Instead,it
rejectsbothpositionsnotasfalse,butassenseless,andtheentiredebateasmeaningless,to
besuspended.
Forexample,onemightimagineadebateregardingtheexistenceoftheexternal
world.Thereificationistarguesthatourwaysoftalkingabouttheexternalworld
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(includingtheassertionoftheexistenceoftheobjectsofperception)arejustifiedbecause
wehavedirectperceptualevidencethatitexists;thenihilistarguesthatnoneofour
evidenceisdirectandallweperceiveareoursensations,andsoourdiscourseaboutthe
externalworldisentirelyunjustified.ThePyrrhonianskepticarguesthatnoneofthis
makesanysense.Shearguesthatdespitethefactthatthereificationistandthenihilist
appeartodisagreecompletely,theyagreeabouttheonlythingthatmatters—thatour
conventionsarejustifiedif,andonlyif,wehavedirectaccesstoanindependentexternal
world.Instead,inamovethatGarfield(1990)hascalledthe“skepticalinversion,”the
skepticarguesthatnothingindependentofourconventionscouldeverjustifythose
conventions,andthatourconventionsthemselvesconstitutetheexternalworldforus;that
thereisnobedrockthatcouldgroundourepistemic,oranyotherpractices.
ThisistightlyboundupwithwhatSextusEmpiricuscalled“theproblemofthe
criterion.”Hearguedthatanyattempttogroundconventioninanindependentreality—
anysearchforepistemicfoundations,foundersontheimpossibilityofsecuringacriterion
forvalidity:ifacriterionisneeded,thenacriterionisneededforthevalidationofthe
criterion,leadingtoacircleortoaregress.
Skepticismsofarseemsentirelynegative,tobethepositionthatwecanneverhave
justificationforwhatwesay,whatwedo,orhowweleadourlives;thatnothingwesayhas
anyground.ThepositivesideofskepticismemergesfromwhatSextuscalled“thefourfold
prescription.”Sextusurgedthattheskepticleadslifeinaccordancewithournatural
instincts;thewaythingsappeartooursenses;thecustomsofourculture;andthe
instructionoftheartsandcrafts.
Holdingtoappearances,then,welivewithoutbeliefsbutinaccordancewiththeordinaryregimenoflife,sincewecannotbewhollyinactive.Andthisordinaryregimenoflifeseemstobefourfold:oneparthastodowiththeguidanceofnature,anotherwiththecompulsionsofthepathé,anotherwiththehandingdownoflawsandcustoms,andafourthwiththeinstructioninartsandcrafts.Nature’sguidanceisthatbywhichwearenaturallycapableofsensationandthought;compulsionofthepathéisthatbywhichhungerdrivesustofoodandthirstmakesusdrink;thehandingdownofcustomsandlawsisthatbywhichweacceptthatpietyintheconductoflifeisgoodandimpietybad;andinstructioninarts
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andcraftsisthatbywhichwearenotinactiveinwhicheverweacquire.Andwesayallthesethingswithoutbelief(I:23-24).
Thesefourdeterminantsofpracticegiveusallofthejustificationweeverneedor
couldeverhaveforourordinarypractices,includingmoralandscientificdiscourse.The
skepticthinkswegowrongnotwhenwetalk,notwhenweassenttothings,butrather
whenwethinkthatthattalkorassentisgroundedoutsideofhumanconvention.(See
Mates1996,Hallie1985,Garfield1990formoredetailonthestructureofPyrrhonian
skepticism.)
ThereisonelastpointweshouldmakeabouttheclassicalGreekskepticaltradition
beforewereturntoMadhyamaka,andthatisthedistinctionbetweenAcademicand
Pyrrhonianskepticism.ThesewerethetwoskepticalschoolsactiveintheHellenistic
period,andSextus,forgoodreason,defendsthePyrrhonianapproach.Thedifferenceis
this.TheAcademicskeptictakestheargumentsforskepticismitselftobecompelling,and
henceforskepticismtobeclearlywarrantedasanepistemologicalposition.Thismight
appeartobeasradicalasonecouldgetintherefutationofdogmatism.Butitisnot,andit
isanunstablestoppingpoint.ThePyrrhoniangoesonestepfarther,applyingskeptical
argumentsreflexivelytoskepticismitself,andarguingthatskepticalcritiqueandpractice
itselfcanneverbeanymorethanonemorecustom.Ifitdoesbecomemorethanthis,it
becomesonemoredogma.SextususesthemetaphorofalaxativeinOutlinesof
Pyrrhonism:ifthelaxativedoesnotpurgeitselfaswellasthematerialinthebowel,it
becomesonemoredisease.Interestingly,Candrakīrtiquotesexactlythesamemetaphorin
hiscommentaryonxiii.8ofMūlamadhyamakakārikā.Thepassageisdrawnoriginallyfrom
theKaśyapa-parivarta-sūtra.(SeeTsongkhapa2006,p.300.)
WearenotthefirsttolinkMadhyamakaandGreekskepticism.B.K.Matilal,for
example,understandsNāgārjunaasofferingaskepticalargumentagainsthisHindurealist
adversariesandtheirepistemology(Matilal1986:46-68).Matilalarguesthatskeptical
argumentrestsontheproblemofthecriterion.Ourepistemicpracticesarebasedon
criteriarespondingtostandardsofproof.Wedonotjusthaveimpressionsaboutreality
butholdtheseimpressionstobetrueinrelationtosomecriteria,whichinturncanbe
assessedinrelationtosomestandardsofproof.Butthesecriteriabothdemand
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justificationandcannotbejustifiedindependently;theyhenceshouldberejectedbythe
rationalperson.
IntheIndiancontext,MatilalfindssuchepistemologicalskepticisminNāgārjuna’s
Vigrahavyāvartanī,asustainedcritiqueoftheHindurealist(theNyāya)epistemology
accordingtowhichourepistemicpracticesrequirethesupportofwarrantingepistemic
instruments(pramāṇa).2ForNāgārjuna,thisisimpossiblesinceiteitherbegsthequestion
(presupposingtheverystandardsthatitseekstoestablish)oritleadstoanunacceptable
infiniteregressinwhicheveryappealtosomestandardpresupposesanotherstandardof
justification.ThisispreciselySextus’critiqueofthecriterion.Matilalunderstands
Nāgārjunatoconcludethatitisincoherenttorequireeveryepistemicepisodetobe
supportedbysomewell-establishedmeansofreliablecognition.Weshoulddispensefrom
thisrequirementandrealizethatwedonothavehardcriteriatodistinguishveridicalfrom
non-veridicalcognitions.Nāgārjuna,onthisview,isaskepticalcoherentist.
Nāgārjuna’srefutationraisesanimmediateobjectionfromhisrealistopponent
(Matilal1986,64).Iftherearenowell-establishedmeanstodistinguishreliablefrom
unreliablecognitions,whatisthentheepistemicstatusofthisrefutation?Isititself
reliable?Ifitis,itshouldbesupportedbysomewell-establishedmeansofreliable
cognitioninflagrantcontradictiontotheskepticalthesis.Ifitisnotreliable,whyshould
wegiveitanycredence?Againstthisaccusationthathisrefutationisself-stultifying,
Nāgārjunagivesthisfamousanswer:
IfIhadanyposition,Itherebywouldbeatfault.ButsinceIhavenoposition,Iamnotatfaultatall.3
2Pramāṇaisoftentranslatedas“validcognition,”“epistemicwarrant,”“epistemicinstrument,”“meansofreliablecognition”orsimplyas“reliablecognition.”Wewillusetheterm“epistemicinstrument”whenreferringtopramāṇaasameansofacquiringknowledge,and“epistemicwarrant”totranslatethetermwhenitreferstoavalidatororknowlege.Thesetranslationshavetheadvantageofavoidingjargonwhileatthesametimecapturingthereliabilistviewofknowledge,orrather,itsroughIndianequivalentpramāṇa,thatBuddhistthinkersshare.ForatranslationofNāgārjuna’swork,seeBattacharya(1978,1986).ForadiscussionoftheNyāyaepistemology,seeMatilal(1971)&(1985).SeealsoCowherds(2005)andGarfield(2015).3Någårjuna,VV29quotedbyPatshab(2006):49.Forathoroughexaminationofthisstatement,see.D.Ruegg(2000).AsimilarpointismadeinYSV50-51.SeeScherrer-Schaub(1991):294-296.
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Atfirstssight,thisparadoxicalanswercanseemaglibwayforNāgārjunatogetout
ofatrickysituation.Thisisinfacthowmanyauthors,traditionalandmodern,have
understoodthisstatement,whichtheyseeasanillustrationofthesophistry(vitanda)that
theyseeasbeingattheheartofhisphilosophy(Robinson1972&Hayes1994).Butthis
dismissalmissesthekeypointmadebyNāgārjuna,forthisispreciselywhereNāgārjunais
clearlyalignedneitherwithmodernnorwithAcademic,butwithPyrrhonianskepticism.
NāgārjunaisnotjustquestioningtheNyāyaclaimsinrelationtowell-establishedstandards
ofproof;heisreflexivelyapplyingtheskepticalargumenttohisownposition,affirming
thatthereisnoconvention-independentArchimedeanepistemicfulcrum,andthathe
claimsnoneforhimself.
Nāgārjuna,thatis,rejectstheveryideaofappealingtoindependentstandardsof
prooftoestablishanything,includingthat.(SeeGarfield1996,2010)Accordingto
Nāgārjuna,Mādhyamikasarenotinthebusinessofdefendingtruepositionsaboutthe
natureofreality.Thisiswhyhesays(MMKXXII:11)
Wedonotassert“Empty.”Nordoweassert“Non-empty.”Weneitherassertbothnorneither.Theyareassertedonlyforthepurposeofdesignation.
Inthispassage,Nāgārjunaisexplicitabouthisskepticism.This“thesislessness,”i.e.,
ofcompletesuspensionofassertionwasalsoclaimedbyPyrrhoinhisremarks,“Iassert
nothing”(I:192-194)“Ihavenoposition”(I:197).
Nāgārjuna’smethodis,however,differentfromthatofPyrrhonism,whichseeksto
reachasuspensionofbeliefbyoutliningtheargumentsforandagainstathesis.The
Madhyamakamethoddoesnotusethismethodofequipollence,butinsteadapplies
reductioargumentstoeachdogmaticposition.Hence,insomeways,itsargumentform
goesfurthertheGreekmethodofequipollence,andwecouldsaythattheMadhyamaka
reductiomethodisagreatcontributiontotheskepticaltradition.Despitethese
differences,itisclearthatPyrrhonianskepticismandMadhyamikadobelongtothesame
skepticalfamily.
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2.MadhyamakaandtheTwoTruths
IfitistruethattheMādhyamikaskepticaimstorejectallviews(anyoneforwhom
emptinessbecomesaviewisincurable;IprostratetoGautama,thebestofallteachers,who
taughtthesupremeDharmathatleadstotherelinquishingofallviews…)andnotjust
questionthereliabilityofourknowledge,shouldn’tsherejectallviews,eventhose
concerningtransactionalreality,andevenherown?Thisobjectioniswell-knownandhas
beenraisedagainstPyrrhonismanditsfounder,PyrrhoofElis.Thisobjectionraisesan
importantquestion:cantheskeptics’commitmenttothesuspensionofbeliefsavoid
includingthatofbeliefsconcerningeverydaylife?OurthesisisthattheMadhyamaka
schemaofthetwotruthscanexplainhowtheskepticcanrespondtothischallenge.
ThetwotruthsschemeisarticulatedindifferentwaysinthehistoryofBuddhist
philosophy,butitplaysadistinctiveandcentralroleinMadhyamaka.(SeeSiderits1980,
1981,Garfield1995,2015)Nāgārjuna,forinstancesassertsthat
TheBuddha’steachingoftheDharmaIsbasedontwotruths:Atruthofworldlyconvention,Andanultimatetruth.(xxiv.8)
Candrakīrtri,inglossingthisverse,emphasizesthatthetwotruthsreflecttwo
naturesthateveryentityhas—aconventionalnatureasadependentlyoriginated,
perceptibleobjectandultimatenatureasempty.[Madhyamakāvatāra-bhāṣya253a]But
thesetwonatures—althoughtheyaretwonaturesofanobject,aredefinedwithrespectto
theperspectivesofthesubjecttowhomthoseobjectsappear.Conventionaltruthis
constitutedbyourordinaryperceptualandconceptualprocesses,andbyourlinguistic
conventions.Itisthewaythingsareaccordingtoourordinaryexperienceandasconfirmed
byourconventionalinvestigativetechniques,includingscience.Buteventotheextentthat
wegetitrightontheseterms,conventionaltruthisdeceptive:thethingsthatare
conventionalrealappeartousasthoughtheyhaveagreater,adeeperrealitythanthat—
theyappearasconvention-independentrealities.
Infact,however,theyareemptyofthatkindofexistence,andthisistheirultimate
truth.Thisishowtheywouldappeartoanawakenedconsciousness.Formthisstandpoint,
theyhavenoindependentnature;nothingcanbesaidaboutthemexceptthattheyare
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emptyofanyintrinsicnature,evenofthatemptiness.(SeeGarfield1995,2015,Garfield
andPriest2003.)Thesetwostandpointsenableadistinctionbetweentwosortsof
statements,thosethataretrueconventionallyandthosethatareultimatelytrue.This
distinctioninturnenablesadistinctionbetweentwolevelsofreality:ultimatetruth(the
objectsthatmakeultimatelytruestatementstrue)andconventionaltruth(theobjectsthat
makeconventionallytruestatementsconventionallytrue).
ItmayseemoddinEnglishtocallpotsandpansconventionaltruthsasweareused
tolimittheapplicationoftheconceptoftruthtotruthbearers,entitiessuchas
propositions,statements,sentences,thoughts,etc.TheIndiantraditiondoesnotsharethis
restrictionanduseliberallytheideaoftruth(satya)asreferringtobothstatementandthe
objectsofthestatement.TheSanskritsatmeansrealasmuchasitmeanstrue.So,wecan
thinkofitaspickingupthemeaningoftrueasitoccursinphraseslikeatruefriend,ortrue
coinoftherealm.Itmeanstobenondeceptive(andindeedfalsityisglossedbyNāgārjunain
MMKxiii.2intermsofdeceptiveness).Wecanthusseethecommonuseoftrueasapplying
onlytosentencesorbeliefsasderivativefromthemorebasicuseoftrueascognatewith
trust:thingsaretruetotheextentthatwecantrustthem;totheextentthattheydonot
deceiveus.Ifweunderstandthetermthisway,thereisnothingoddabouttranslatingsatya
astrue.Truesentencesliketruewaterarenon-deceptive;falsesentenceslikethefalse
waterinamiragearedeceptive.
IntheAbhidharma,thedistinctionbetweenthetwotruthsismereological.
Compositephenomenaareconventionaltruths,whereastheirultimatepartless
componentsareultimatetruths.Thisconceptionofthetwotruthsdifferentiatetwoclasses
ofphenomena:thosethathaveacertainamountofsubstantialreality(dravyasat)and
thosethatexistonlyasdesignations(prajñāptisat)orconstructionsonthebasisofreally
existentelements.
TheMadhyamakadoctrineofthetwotruthsisrelatedtothatoftheAbhidharmabut
doesnotinvolveatwo-tierontology.ThedecisivepassageoftheMMKisfoundinthe
XXIVthchapter.NāgārjunarespondstohisAbhidharmaopponent,whoarguesthatifall
thingslacktrueexistenceandeverythingisonlyconventionallyreal,wecannotmake
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ethicaldistinctionsbetweentheobstaclesthatneetobeabandonedandthevirtuesthat
needtobedeveloped.Againstthischargeofrelativism,Nāgārjunarespondsthatthe
opponenthasfailedtounderstandthescopeoftheMadhyamakaapproach.The
thoroughlydeconstructiveapproachadvocatedbyNāgārjunaconcernsonlyontological
notionssuchascausality,movement,fournobletruths,dependent-arising,etc.Itisan
inquiryintohowthingsreallyareanddoesnotaffectsthepragmaticconceptsthatweuse
indailylife.Thoseareconventionalortransactionaltruths,thatis,theyareonly
conventionallyortransactionallyreal.Theydon’thaveanyrealexistenceoutsideoftheir
beingusedinthepracticeswithoutwhichlifeinthisworldwouldbeimpossible.
Buteventhoughthismightappeartobeareaffirmationofthetwo-tieredapproach
tothetwotruthscharacteristicoftheAbhidharma,afewverseslaterNāgārjunapullsthe
rugoutfromunderthatreadingbyaffirmingtheontologicalidentityofthetwotruths:
“Whateverisdependentoriginationweexplaintobeemptiness.That,beingadependent
designationisitselfthemiddleway.”(xxiv.18)AsTsongkhpaputsit,thetwotruthsare
intensionallydistinct,butextensionallyidentical.UltimatetruthonNāgārjuna’sview
consistsnotinintrinsicallyrealpartlessmomentaryparticlesbutinemptiness(śunayatā),
thatis,theabsenceofanyintrinsicreality.Thislackoftruenatureistheultimatetruth,not
inthesensethatitissomekindofsuper-reality,butinthesensethatitiswhatthe
ontologicalanalysiscomesupagainstultimately:nothing.Hence,ultimatetruthshould
notbehypostatizedintoarealentity,forthelackoftruenatureitselflacksitselfanytrue
nature.Emptinessitselfisempty.Statementsabouttheemptinessofthingsshouldnotbe
understoodasrevealingtheirtruenature,but,rather,asstatementsthattheyhaveno
naturetoberevealed.(SeeGarfield2014)
Manyhavenotedthatthisisparadoxical:emptinessistheultimatenatureofthings
anditistheabsenceofanynature.(GarfieldandPriest).Indiancommentatorswrestled
withthisparadox.Bhāvivekaarguesthatsuchastatementshouldbeunderstood
rhetorically.Itislikesomebodywishingtopreventnoisesaying“quiet”.(Katsura&
Siderits,248)Thisisaperformativeutterancethatismeanttointerveneinpracticeand
thisishowMadhyamakastatementsaboutemptinessbeingtheultimatetruthhavetobe
understood.Theyarenotdescriptionsofhowthingsare,nordotheyrefertosomekindof
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mysticalabsolute(asitmaybeforaschoollikeVedānta)orarockbottombasisofreality,
asitisfortheAbhidharma.Candrakīrti,ontheotherhand,isamorePyrrhoniangesture,
usesthesimilesoftheshopkeeperwithemptyshelvesandthelaxativetoarguethatwe
shouldunderstandtheseassertionsreflexively,asapplyingtothemselvesaswellas
anythingelse,followingthePyrrhonianmodelofskepticaldiscourse.
Thenotionofconventionaltruthcanbemuchmorecomplexthanthatofthe
ultimatetruth.(SeeCowherds2005,2010).Candrakīrtidevotesagreatdealofhis
philosophicalefforttoexplicatingthisidea.Thisishowheexplainsthetwotruths:
Allthingsbeartwonaturesthroughcorrectandfalseviews.Theobject(viṣaya)ofthosewhoseecorrectlyissaidtobe“reality”(tattva)andtheobjectsofthosewhoseefalseissaidtobe“conventionalexistence”(saṃvṛtisatya).(fromMadhyamakāvatāra-bhāṣya253a,quotedatCowherds205,p.9)
ForMādhyamikas,theconventionalnatureofobjectsdoesnotconsistjustoftheir
beingtheobjectsoftheconventions(agreementsinpractice)weengageinforthesakeof
convenience,astheyareunderstoodbytheAbhidharma.Theirbeingconventionalalso
entailsthattheyaretheobjectsconstructedbythedistortionscreatedbytheignorance
afflictingsentientbeings.Contrarytowhatthenaïverealistbelieves,wedonotseethe
worldasitis;weengageinaconstantconstructionoftherealitiesweencounter.Indoing
so,wesuperimpose(samāropa)intrinsicidentityinsteadofseeingtheworldasawebof
inter-relations.4Thus,conventionalrealitiesaretobethoughtnotjustastheentitieswe
engagewithinpracticaltransactions,theyarealsotheentitiesthatweconstructusingour
innateperceptualandcognitiveapparatus,modulatedbyourculturallyacquiredconcepts
anddispositions,andmistakenlytakentobeobjectsperceiveddirectly,justastheyare
independentlyoftheirmodeofapprehension.
Candrakīrticapturesthiscomplexitywhenhedistinguishesthreemeaningsofthe
termsaṃvṛti.Thetermcanmeandependentarising(pratityasamutpāda)inthesenseof
4TillemansclaimsthatMādhyamikassimplypostulatethatbeingsreifyrealitywithoutofferinganyproof(Tillemans,33).WhetherornotclassicalIndianBuddhistargumentsfortheomnipresenceofreificationarecompelling,however,contemporarycognitivescienceprovidesampleevidencetofillthegaps.
13
mutualdependenceincludingcausal,mereological,andimputationaldependence..Itcan
alsorefertoexistenceinvirtueoftheordinarymundaneconventions(lokavyavahāra)in
whichweengageindailylife,ormoresimply,ordinariness.Thesemeaningsitshareswith
theEnglishwordconventional,giveortakeabit.Butsamvṛticanalsomeanconcealment,
indicatingthefactthatourhabitsofreificationandoftakingwhatweperceivetobegiven
directlytousthroughtransparentperceptualprocessesconcealtherealwayinwhichthey
exist.(Cowherds2005,13;Garfield2015)
Webeganthissectionbysuggestingthatthedoctrineofthetwotruthscansolvea
problemforskepticism:howcantheskepticrespondtothechallengethatherskepticismis
cripplinginthatitpreventsherfromformulatingaconstructiveaccountoftheordinary
worldthatsupportsthedistinctionsnecessarytoordinarylife?Canthedoctrineofthetwo
truthsprovidesuchaprincipledway?Inparticular,doesthedoctrineallowsfora
sufficientlyrobustaccountofconventionaltruthtogroundtherationalityundergirding
ordinarylife?Itistothatquestionthatwenowturn,andwewillexamineitthrougha
doxographicrubricintroducedbyTibetanphilosopherstosystematizecommentarial
debatesinIndiaregardingtheproperunderstandingofMadhyamaka:thedistinction
betweenrangrgyud(Svātantrika/proponentsofindependentarguments)andthal‘gyur
(Prāsaṅgika/wieldersofreductioarguments).
3.SvātantrikaandPrāsaṅgika
Adifferenceamongcommentatorsemergedduringadisputeontheinterpretation
ofNāgārjuna’sMMK.Bhāvivekaarguedthatanearliercommentarywrittenby
Buddhapālitawasafailedcommentaryinthatitdidnotglossargumentspresentedinthe
textasautonomous(svatantra),thatis,probativearguments(prayoga)establishingthe
emptinessofallphenomena.CandrakīrtirespondedbydefendingBuddhapālita,arguing
thatMādhyamikasshouldnotprovideprobativearguments,andcriticizingBhāvivekafor
doingso.Thisessayisnottheplacetoexplorethisextremelycomplexissue.(SeeDreyfus
andMcClintockfordetails.)Hereweemphasizethatthisdifferencealsoconcernswhether
aMādhyamikacanclaimtohavenoviewwhileformulatinganaccountofconventional
truththatrespondstothechallengefacedbytheskeptic.
14
Bhāvivekatakesamoderateapproach,arguingthattheclaimtopositionlessness
cannotbetakenatfacevalue,thatweneedsomewaytomodify,or,atleast,reducethe
scopeoftheapparentlyparadoxicalclaimsoastomakeMadhyamakasafeforphilosophical
discourse.Andhedoessobyappealingtoastrongdistinctionbetweentheultimateand
conventional.Candrakīrtidisagreesvehementlywiththisstrategyandarguesforamore
radicalstancethattakesNāgārjuna’sstatementofthesislessnessmuchmoreliterally.
Tibetancommentatorsseethisdebateasdefiningtwolinesofinterpretationof
Nāgārjuna.FollowingTsongkhapa,theyarguethatthisdifferencedoesnotconcernjustthe
waysinwhichMādhyamikasdeployargumentstoestablishemptinessbuthasalso
importantimplicationsforhowtounderstandthetwotruths.Hence,theyseethis
differenceasseparatingtwosub-schoolsofMadhyamaka:thosewhofollowBhāviveka
accepttheuseofautonomousargumentsinestablishingemptinesstheycallSvātantrikas;
thosewhofollowCandrakīrti’srejectionofthistypeofargumentandwhoofferonly
reductioarguments(prāsaṅga)theycallPrāsaṅgikas.(Nonetheless,althoughtheyagreeon
theimportanceofthisdistinction,Tibetancommentatorsdisagreeonhowtounderstand
thescopeofthisdifferencebetweenSvātantrikasandPrāsaṅgikas(Dreyfus2003).)
Tsongkhapaarguesthatthisdifferenceconcernsnotjustthewaytounderstand
conventionaltruthbutalsohowtounderstandultimatetruth.Hearguesthatthe
SvātantrikaoffersaninferiorinterpretationofMadhyamakawhichdoesnotgofarenough
initsdeconstructionofoursenseofwhatitmeansforsomethingtobereal.Weshould
note,however,thatTsongkhapa’sinterpretationofthePrāsaṅgikaviewraisesimportant
questionsforsomeofhisothercommitments,andinparticularhisendorsementofthe
rationalanalysisoftheultimate(Dreyfus2003).Hence,Tillemansisquiterightincalling
himan“atypicalPrāsaṅgika”.(Tillemans2016,5)Non-GelukthinkerssuchasMipham,
havenoticedthisambiguityandhaverejectedTsongkhapa‘sinterpretationofthe
difference.Fortheseinterpretersthereisnodifferenceintheviewofemptinessbetween
SvātantrikasandPrāsaṅgikas.Thedifferenceonlyconcernsthewayweshouldapproach
thisviewandtheimplicationsthatthishasasfarashowweunderstandwhatitmeansfor
somethingtobeconventionallyreal.
15
AccordingtoSvātantrikas,Mādhyamikasmustdrawaprincipleddistinction
betweenultimateandconventionaltruths.Withoutsuchdistinction,theyargue,
Nāgārjuna’sdialecticdescendsintoanincoherentpositioninwhicheverythingcanbe
equallynegatedoraffirmed,whatTillemanshascalled“thedismalslough”ofrelativism.
(Cowherds2005)Toavoidthisdanger,SvātantrikasrecommendthatNāgārjuna’s
positionlessnessbeunderstoodasconcerningonlytheultimate.Mādhyamikas,theyagree,
shouldnotholdanypositionabouthowthingsareinreality,sinceanyattempttohold
Madhyamakastatementsabouttheultimateisboundtoreifyphenomenabyattributing
themapositiveornegativeintrinsicnature.Therefore,theyargue,thebestthat
Mādhyamikascandoistomakestatementsthatapproximatetheultimatewithoutever
claimingtograspitfully.
This,then,iswhatSvātantrikastakeMadhyamakaargumentstobeallabout:using
theconventionaltobringopponentstoprovisionalconclusionsthatwillleadthemto
understandtheultimate.Thisconceptualunderstandingisnot,however,afullyaccurate
realizationoftheultimatebutmerelyanunderstandingoftheultimatethroughconcepts.
Hence,inasmuchasitistakentobetheultimate,theobjectofrealizationcanbeonlythe
represented,orcategorized,ultimate(rnamgrangspa’idondam).Theactual—non-
represented,non-categorized—ultimate(rnamgrangsmayinpa’idondam)isbeyondthe
reachoflanguageandthought,whichimplicatethedualitiesthataretobetranscendedat
theultimatelevel(Eckel1987,71-75).
TheseSvātantrikaargumentsarebasedontheassumptionthatwhilewecannot
findanyultimateintrinsicnature,wecanstillmakeconventionaldistinctions.Ifweanalyze
thingsastheyaretakenconventionally,wewillfind,inourconventions,enoughresources
todelineatesetsofnecessaryandsufficientconditionsfortheiridentities;ifweaskabout
thenatureofourconventions,wewillfindatsomepointdefiniterulesthatdetermineour
practices.Philosophicalanalysesoftheconventionalworld,onthisview,yieldsresults,
albeitprovisionalones.Thereare,forexample,principleddistinctionsthatcanbemade
betweenwhatisconventionallyrealandwhatiscompletelyimaginedandhencehasno
realitywhatsoever(Eckel1987,75-80).
16
AsMādhyamikas,Svātantrikasdenythatanyofwhatthisconventionalphilosophical
analysisyieldssurvivesultimateanalysis.Thecriteriathatwefindinourconventional
analyses,theyconcede,donotapplytoanythingindependentlyofourpracticesand
schemata;instead,theyareusefulonlywithinthecontextofthesepractices.Forinstance,
whenwesaythatthingsareproducedindependenceofcausesandconditions,wearenot
attemptingtocapturehowthingsreallyare,butmerelydescribehowtheyappeartous.We
arethekindofbeingswhocanonlyorganizeourexperiencesthroughaschemasuchas
causality.Hence,wearejustifiedinclaimingthatthingsareproducedconditionally,but
onlyconventionally,thatis,withinthecontextofourownpracticesandschemata.
PrāsaṅgikasvigorouslyrejectthisSvātantrikapositionasareintroductionthrough
thebackdoorofthenotionoftherealintrinsicnaturethatNāgārjunathrewoutofthefront
door.AccordingtothePrāsaṅgikainterpretation,Madhyamakaisincompatiblewithany
commitmenttotheexistenceofindependenttruthmakersforourassertions.Svātantrikas,
theyargue,eventhoughtheytakethetruthmakerstheyposittobemerelyconventionally
existent,insistthatourordinaryconventionspresumethattheseentitieshavethenatures
thattheydoindependentlyofourconventions,andsoconstituteanindependentstandard
oftruthorfalsity.
ThisisthesenseinwhichPrāsaṅgikaschargeSvātantrikaswithpositingintrinsic
natureconventionally,evenifnotultimately.Prāsaṅgikas,ontheotherhand,arguethat
thisamountstothepresuppositionthattheobjectsofsomestatementsconstitute
standardsfortruthandso,atleastconventionally,haveintrinsic,notrelationalor
dependent,identities.Theyclaimthatthisapparentrationalreconstructionordinary
practiceascribestoordinarypeopleametaphysicalcommitmentneitherrequirednor
presentinoureverydayconventions.(CompareWittgenstein’scritiqueoftheideathatour
useofwordspresupposesthatwehavenecessaryandsufficientconditionsfortheircorrect
applicationinmind.)Thisradicalpositionraisesdeepquestionsaboutconventionaltruth.
WhataretheimplicationsofthePrāsaṅgikaembraceofNāgārjuna’sthesislessnessfor
understandingtheconventional?Shouldn’tonebeabletomakedistinctionswithinthe
realmofconventionaltransactionalrealitybetweentrueandfalsestatements?Shouldn’t
weabletosaythattheaffirmationthattheearthisflatissimplyfalse?
17
Itisherethatinterpretationsdiverge.PatsabNyimadrak,the11thcenturyTibetan
translatorofCandrakīrtiandtheintroducerofhisideasinTibet(Dreyfus2003),rejectsthe
veryideaoftruthintheconventionalrealm.HearguesthattheroleofMadhyamaka
argumentsisnottoestablishtruth—orevenfalsity—butrathersimplytodebunkthenaive
viewthatthingsexistthewaytheyappeartous.TheMadhyamakarefutationoftherealist
is,fromthisperspective,notintendedtoprovidesomehighertruth,buttogetusoutofthe
gameofascribingtruthandfalsity,andtodosowithoutcommittingourselvestoany
standpoint,positiveornegative,onthegroundsthatanycommitmenttotruthandfalsity
aspolarsemanticoppositesleadsustocontradiction.Thus,accordingtoPatsab,eventhe
claimthatallphenomenaareemptyisnotaconclusion,evenonederivedfromthe
contradictionsentailedbytheiropponents’viewsthatthingsarenon-empty.
OnPatsab’sview,itismerelyarhetoricalstance,akindofsloganusefulinshowing
opponentsthewaytogetoutofthecontradictionsentailedbytheirowncommitments;the
Mādhyamikadoesn’tevenactuallysaythathehasnoposition,andevenhisprofessionsto
accordwithmundaneconventionaretobedistrusted.Patsabclaimsthatthedoctrineof
thetwotruthsismerelyawaytotakeintoaccountthewaysoftheworldandshouldnot
thoughttohaveanyconstructivephilosophicalvalue.Madhyamakashouldaimfora
completesuspensionoftruthandfalsityandusesconventionsonlyasawaytoleadbeings
outoftheirmiseries.ThisviewisechoedbytheSakyascholarTaktshangLotsawainhis
critiqueofTsongkhapa’suseofreasoningtoinvestigateultimaterealityandof
Tsongkhapa’scommitmenttostandardsoftruthwithinconventionalreality.(SeeGarfield
inpress.)
ButPatsabseemstogetCandrakīrtiwrong(asdoesTaktshang).Candrakīrtidoes
claimthatnoassertionsarepossibleregardingtheintrinsicnatureofthings.Buthedoes
notgoasfarasPatsab:heishappytodistinguishtruthfromfalsitywithinconventional
reality,andinglossingtruthasnondeceptiveness,hearguesthatconventionalphenomena
maydeceiveusregardingtheirultimatenaturewithoutdeceivingusregardingtheir
conventionalnature.(Cowherds2015)Moreimportantly,hedefendsthismethodology
extensivelyandcriticizesBhāvivekaforadvocatingadifferentargumentativemethodology,
theuseofautonomousreasonings(PP12-38)onthegroundsthatBhāviveka’s
18
methodologyreintroducesintrinsicnatureconventionally,andsoseeksastandardoftruth
andfalsitymorerobustthanmereconvention.Hence,hisclaimsandargumentshavetobe
understoodasbeingsomethingmorethanmereslogansorconcessionstotheworld,as
Patsabunderstandthem.
Moreover,Candrakīrtiendorsestheuseofconventionalepistemicinstruments,and
thenormativestatusofconventionalepistemicwarrants.HefaultstheBuddhist
epistemologists,particularlyDignāga,forofferinganoverlypareddownepistemologyand
arguesthatinthesemattersweshouldfollowcommonsenseratherthanarevisionist
epistemologicalprogram.Inthisperspective—onethatechoesSextus’fourfold
prescription—epistemicpracticesarenottoberejected;theyaresimplytobeunderstood
descriptivelyasthewaysweinfactleadourepistemiclives;asconventionstobefollowed,
becausethatishowhumanlifeworks.Onthisview,epistemologyandontologyaremore
anthropologicalthantranscendentalpursuits,revealingourconventionsregardingwhat
wetaketoberealandwhatcountsaswarrant,notanyindependentstandardthatgrounds
orfailstogroundthoseconventions.Hence,CandrakīrtiisquitehappytoaccepttheNyāya
epistemologyasreflectingthewaysinwhichweusetheconceptofknowledgeindailylife.
(SeeCowherds2015andSiderits1980and1981)
Svātantrikasaredistinctivelyunhappywiththisminimalistepistemology.Whileas
Mādhyamikas,theydonotarguethatMadhyamakareasoningscancaptureultimatereality
andprovideatruedepictionofhowthingsreallyare,theydoseektoreininthe
paradoxicalnatureofMadhyamakasoastoresolve,oratleast,attenuatethefundamental
tensionthatisattheheartofthistradition.Theywanttomakesenseofadoctrinethat
claimstoshowthatitmakesnosensetotalkabouthowthingsreallyarepreciselywhile
preservingrobustwaystomaketransactionaldistinctions.AccordingtotheSvātantrikas,
thetensioncanberelievedbyarguingthatMadhyamakareasoningsdonotaimat
providingatruedescriptionofrealitybutasprovidingthemostjustifiablewayofthinking
aboutreality,theonethatisleastmisleadingandmostlikelytofosterahealthyattitude
towardpracticewhilepreservingthepossibilityofprovidingprincipleddistinctions
informingsuchpractice.
19
4.Prasaṅgika,SvātantrikaandSkepticismTheSvātantrikapositionseeksaplaceforconstructivephilosophy,andworriesthat
Prāsaṅgikahaseliminatedanysuchspace.Itdevelopsthisconstructivepositionby
providingarobustdistinctionbetweenthewaysinwhichskepticismoperatesregarding
theultimatetruthandhowitoperatesinthedomainofpracticallife,theconventionaltruth
ortransactionaldomainofobjectsofpracticalinquiry.
IntheIndiancontext,thisrequiresarobustaccountofepistemicwarrantinthe
conventionalrealm.PatsabrejectsthispossibilityentirelybutCandrakīrtidoesnot.The
issuehereconcernswhetheranaccountofconventionaltruthandconventionalepistemic
warrantthatismerelyanthropologicalcanhavesufficientbitetoconstituteandtoexplain
genuinenormativeforce.ForPatsab,noepistemicpracticescansurvivethedeconstructive
Madhyamakaanalysisandhenceitmakesnosensetoattempttodistinguishwarranted
fromunwarrantedepistemicpractices,evenattheconventionallevel.Suchdistinctionis
merelyaconcessiontotheworldwhichtheBuddhistsshouldnotpaytoomuchattention
to.Instead,theyshouldrelyontheonlyvalidsourceofguidance,thewordsofthe
Buddha.CandrakīrtiislessextremeinthatheishappytoaccepttheNyāyacatalog
ofpramāṇasasadescriptionofordinaryepistemicpractices,butherejectstheideathat
this,oranysetofepistemicpracticeshasanythingbeyondcustomtorecommendit.So,he
argues,knowledgeissimplyopinionvalidatedbytheepistemicpracticesacceptedbythe
world.ButaccordingtoSvātantrikas,thisconventionalismdegeneratesintoarelativism
accordingtowhichconventionaltruthiswhatevertheworldaccepts.(SeeCowherds2005,
c.9).Ifthisistobeanadequateepistemology,itmustprovideaprincipledaccountofhow
pragmaticdistinctionscanbepreservedandexplainedthatgoesbeyondmerelysaying
“thisiswhatwedo.”Andindeed,Candrakīrtidoesnotdoso.
Aswenotedabove,Candrakīrti’spositionresemblesthatSextusEmpiricus’account
foundintheFourfoldPrescriptionpresentedinOutlines(hencethekinshiptoskeptical
positionsintheWestadoptedbyHumeandWittgenstein).Sextusaskshowtheskepticisto
livehisskepticism,andrepliesthattheskepticfollowshisappetites,appearances,thelaws
andcustomsofhisculture,andtheinstructionsofthearts.Sextus’deepinsightisthatallof
thisispractice,andnoneofitinvolvescommitmenttodeepthesesaboutthenatureof
20
things.(SeeespeciallyI:18.)Thefourfoldprescription,aswehavenoted,isthepositive
sideofPyrrhonianskepticism,anditisimportanttoSextusthatitispossibletofollowthis
prescriptionwithoutfallingintodogmatism,withoutmakingassertions,intherelevant
sense;withouttakingpositions,intherelevantsense.
Buthowisthispossible?ManyfindSextus’ownaccounttooweaktoprovidea
philosophicallysatisfyinganswertothechallengefacingskepticism.Wearenottoldhow
orwhythisprescriptionistooperate,orwhatitsbenefitsare.Wearealsonottoldhowthe
listismade.Isitexhaustive?Onwhichbasisisitmade?Thisispartofthemotivationfor
the17thand18thcenturyattemptsofBacon,Mandeville,Humeandotherstodefendthe
normativeforceofcustom,astrategywhichremainscontroversial.(SeeGarfield20xx).Can
theSvātantrikaapproachdobetterandprovideamoreprincipledaccountofconventional
truth?The8thcenturyphilosopherJñānagarbhaarguesthatMādhyamikascanmeetthe
challengethatitfacesbymakingadistinctionbetweencorrect(satya)andincorrect
(mithyā)conventionaltruths.Hesays:
Amerething(vastu-mātra),whichisnottobeconfusedwithanythingthatisimaginedandarisesdependently,isnotknownascorrectrelative[truth].(Eckel1987,75).
AccordingtoJñānagarbha,thedistinctionthatcansaveMadhyamakafrom
descendingintorelativismistobefoundonthebasicBuddhistdoctrineofdependent
arising(pratityasamutpāda).Whatweneedtodistinguisharetheappearancesthatare
illusoryaccordingtotheworld(likemirages,theobjectsofdreams,etc.)fromtheonesthat
arecorrect(liketheappearancesoftheheatproducedbyfire).Thoseappearancesare
producedindependenceoncausesandconditions,andhencecanbeestablishedas
conventionallyreal.Inthisway,theMādhyamikacanclaimtohaveprovidedaprincipled
waytopreservetheintegrityoftheobjectsthatourpracticespresupposewithoutreifying
themintohypostatizedentities.
ThiswayofarguingforMadhyamakastartsbytakingtheideaofconventionaltruth
veryseriously.Itisnotjustthewaydeludedbeingsconceiveofreality(asPatsabthinks)
or,even,akindofconcessionthattheskepticmakestoparticipateintheconversation
accordingtotheconventionsoftheworld(asCandrakīrtimaythink),butanarticulationof
21
thepresuppositionsofourpractice.Obviously,suchanarticulationdoesnotaimtoprovide
adescriptionperimpossibleofhowthingsreallyarebutjustofhowweassumethemtobe
whenweengagetheminourpractices.Hence,thisarticulationismerelyconventionaland
istobesetasidewhenweattempttothinkhowthingsreallyare.
Nonetheless,suchastrategymuststartfromtheprovisionalknowledgethatwe
haveoftheworldasassumedbyourpractices.Theworldweexperiencedoesnotexist
outsideofourinterestsandconventions,butisalsonotcompletelydeterminedbythese
considerations.Ourassumptionsaboutrealityarealsolargelydeterminedbyour
embodiedcondition.Weseetheworldofexperienceincertainwaysnotjustbecauseofour
interestsandconventionsbutalsobecauseofthekindoftheperceptualapparatusthatwe
have.Itappearstousthatourexperiencesandtheobjectsoftheworldareproducedin
dependenceoncomplexcausalnexes.Whetherornotoriginationisnotbuiltinthefabric
oftheuniverse,itiscertainlyaubiquitousfeatureoftheworldappearance.Thisiswhy
Jñānagarbhaasserts:[T]hisiswhy[theBuddha’s]teachingisbasedonappearances.”
(Eckel1987,89)Andevenifdependenceoncausalityismerelyofthedomainof
appearance,wearenotfreejusttodispensefromitandestablishedsetsofconventionthat
wouldnegatecausaldependence.
Hence,ourembodiedandtheperceptualapparatusthatthisentailssignificantly
constrainthekindofconventionsthatwecancomeup,andthusoffersabasisfora
principledaccountofconventionaltruthbasedontheconceptofdependentarising,
understoodnotasanontologicalconceptbutasprovidinganaccountofthefundamental
perceptualconstraintsofourexperienceandtheobjectsthattheyyield.
Thisissonotbecausetheobjectsgiveninperceptionexistinrealityjustasthey
appear,butbecausetheyreflectourmostfundamentalmodesofinteractionwiththe
world.ItisonthisbasisthatMādhyamikascanthenproceedtoshowtheirfundamental
pointthatitmakesnosensetothinkofrealityinabstractionofourmodesofinteraction
withtheworld,asifwecouldtaketheviewfromnowhere.Thisconclusionmaynotstrictly
correspondtorealitybutisthebestway,themostusefulandleastdeceptive,wayof
thinkingaboutreality.
22
Onceweadoptthishealthyskepticismtowardanyattempttocharacterizehow
thingsreallyareinabstractionfromourinteractionswiththem,wecometorealizethatall
whatwehavearewhatisprovidedbyourinteractionswiththeworld.OnthisSvātantrika
view,thisiswhatconventionalrealityisabout,andweneedtorealizethatthisisallthat
wehave.Thisdoesnotmean,however,thatouraccountofthislevelofrealityisarbitrary.
Therearewaysinwhichourexperiencesaresignificantlyconstrainedbyourembodiment
andbytheworld.
TheSvātantrikapositionsuggeststhatwemaybewisetostartfromthis
conventionalbasistoshowhowwearejustifiedtogofromtheretothefundamental
Madhyamakainsight.Thissuggestionalsoprovidesaresponsetothechallengefacing
skepticism.Althoughinquiriesintohowthingsexistaretobesuspendedastheyleadto
unsolvablecontradictions,theinvestigationsintohowthingsarewithinthecontextofhow
thingsappeartousaretobewelcomed.Itmaybeimpossibletoestablishahardline
dividingwhichkindofinquiryisallowableandwhichisnot,buttherelianceondependent
arisingdoesprovideaguidelinesufficientlyrobusttorespondtothechallengefacing
skepticism.
Inquiriesbasedoncausality(andinamoderncontextonprobability)canbetaken
asprovidingtheprovisionalbedrocksonwhichtobaseourconventionaldistinctions.Ina
moderncontext,thismeansthatwecantakethewell-establishedscientificfindingsas
basestoestablishthekindofdistinctionsthatweneedtosurviveonthisplanet.Hence,we
donotneedtofearthatskepticismmayunderminetherelianceoncausalorprobabilistic
regularitiesestablishedbyscienceaslongasweunderstandthatalthoughthosearenot
arbitrarytheyarealsonothowthingsareinrealitysincetheyareofthedomainofthe
appearances.
Inthisway,Nāgārjuna’sinsightthatitisimpossibletomakesenseofhowthingsare
inrealityispreservedandmadecompatiblewithamoreconstructiveapproachto
knowledgeingeneralandphilosophyinparticular.ThePrāsaṅgikaprojectofgrounding
everythinginconventionmaybepossible;butthisrequiresanaccountofconvention
sufficientlyrobusttoinducethegenuinenormativitypresupposedbyideassuchastruth
23
andknowledge.Alternatively,theSvātantrikaproject,withitscommitmenttoconventional
intrinsicnaturesmaybeabetterarticulationoftheskepticalprogram,Insettingoutthis
dilemma,theMadhyamakatraditionenrichesourunderstandingofskepticism.And
whicheverway,onegoes,theMadhyamakatraditionindicatesawayofresolvingskeptical
problemsnotanticipatedinWesternskepticalthought.Thesearecontributionsthat
Westernphilosophersinterestedinskepticismshouldtakeseriously.
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