THE LOW COUNTRIES HISTORY YEARBOOK

ACTA HISTORIAE NEERLANDICAE

EDITORIAL BOARD:

I. Schaffer (Leiden); Johanna A. Kossmann (Groningen); J.R. Bruijn (Leiden); J.H. van Stuijvenberg (Amsterdam); R. Van Uytven (Antwerp); EJs Witte (Brussels).

EDITORIAL ADDRESS:

Nederlands Historisch Genootschap Postbox 90406 2509 LK The Hague, The Netherlands.

THE LOW COUNTRIES A~ta . HISTORY Histonae YEARBOOK Neerlandicae

1982 XV

MARTINUS NIJHOFF - 1982

ISBN-13: 978-94-009-6936-0 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-6934-6 DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-6934-6

© 1982 Uilgeverij Mar/inus Nijhoff, Lange Voorhout 9, Den Haag

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1982

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface VII 1. DE BELDER, Changes in the socio-economic status of the Belgian nobility in

the nineteenth century R.W.l.M. Bos, Industrialization and economic growth in the Netherlands

during the nineteenth century: an integration of recent studies 21 G. TEITLER, A 'New' and an 'Old Trend'. Military thinking in the Netherlands

and the Dutch East around the turn of the century 59 C.B. WELS, Van Karnebeek's break with tradition 78 C. F ASSEUR, A cheque drawn on a failing bank: the address delivered by Queen

Wilhelmina on 6thj7th December 1942 102 A. MEYNEN, The Great Strike of 1960-61: its economic and socio-political

background 117 C.R. EMERY AND 1.A. KOSSMANN, editors, Survey of recent historical works on

Belgium and the Netherlands published in Dutch 137 Authors and translators 205

Preface

The present volume, number 15 of the Acta Historiae Neerlandicae - which have been appearing since 1978 under the title The Low Countries History Yearbook - is the last of the series. Economic reasons force the publishers to discontinue it. This is a matter for regret. Both the editors of the Yearbook and the board of the Nederlands Historisch Genootschap, under the auspices of which it has been published, are con­vinced that the books serve a useful purpose. We hope that in the future more favour­able circumstances will enable Dutch and Flemish historians to start a second series.

We feel, however, that the Yearbook should not be allowed to disappear com­pletely. In our opinion, one of its most attractive features has been the 'Survey of recent historical works on Belgium and the Netherlands published in Dutch.' It is the intention of the Nederlands Historisch Genootschal'. to seek means to continue this in another form, probably in that of pamphlets appearing every two years and written by the same, or a similar, group of experts. In that way we may be able to provide a useful service to our colleagues abroad.

It is with regret and a certain sadness that we, the editors, stop our work. Before taking leave, however, we wish to thank all contributors and translators - they make an impressive list - for the helpfulness and kindness which have enabled us to build up what we consider, with some satisfaction, to have been a distinguished and well­known series of books.

J.R. Bruijn Johanna A. Kossmann

I. SchOffer J .H. van Stuijvenberg

R. Van Uytven Els Witte

Changes in the socio-economic status of the Belgian nobility in the nineteenth century * J.DEBELDER

During the night which preceded 10th June 1884, when half of the members of the Chamber faced re-election, the Liberal Party in Brussels and the surrounding areas distributed posters with the following message:

Bourgeois de Bruxelles et des Faubourgs. La noblesse releve la tete. Les comtes et les barons rentrent dans la politique. Les oims demandent:l representer les travaill~urs. Bourgeois, prenez garde :l vous. J usqu':l present vous vous etes occupes vous-memes de la gestion de vos interets. Les barons et les comtes veulent nous chasser de la Chambre et s'y installer. Bourgeois, debout! La noblesse ne connait rien aux interets du commerce et de l'industrie. Elle n'aspire qu':l defendre les interets des couvents et des fabriques d'eglise, que les clericaux veulent enrichir de votre argent. Bourgeois au scrutin! Nous ne voulons pas de nobles, nous voulons des bourgeois comme nous. A bas les comtes! A bas les barons!.'

Does this imply that the nobility was still so strong as to constitute real opposition to the Liberal Party? Or was Its identification with the Catholic Party still regarded as sufficiently important to serve as an electoral platform, even though it no longer accorded with reality?2 Were the economic interests of the two parties similar to the point where the actual contest revolved not around fundamental differences, but others of a secondary nature? Did the liberals, in their electoral campaign in 1884, continue to hammer away at the old, familiar issues because, following the passing of their Education Act in 1879, an attack on the policies of the catholics held little promise of being successful or effective?

In this article we shall attempt to answer these questions from a socio-economic standpoint. In particular, we shall examine the changes in the role of large-scale land ownership, the evolution of the share of the nobility in this, and fmally the gradual and partial inmtration by the nobility of the sectors of economy to which the middle classes owed their advance. The changes in the political power of the nobility in the nineteenth century, and the dissemination and the subsequent corruption of the noble

* This article is a translation of 'Veranderingen in de sociaal-economische positie van de Belgische adel in de 1ge eeuw', Tijdschri!t voor geschiedenis, XCIII (Groningen, 1980) 483-501. 1. H. Ryckmans, 1884 ou la nouvelle annee des merveilles (Brussels, 1909) 234-5. 2. This propaganda was matched to the political situation in Brussels, where a ne\\< party emerged

which became a focal point for all who were dissatisfied with the Liberal supremacy in the capital and 'the surrounding parishes. They numbered noblemen among their ranks: L. Wils 'De politieke ontwikkeling in Belgie 1870-1894', in: Algemene·Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, XIII (Bu8Sum, 1978) 183-5. This identification of the right wing was apparently the sole catalyst for the recon­ciliation of the sharp contrast between doctrinaire radical elements in the Liberal Party.

J. DE BELDER

mentality will not be dealt with here: the former because the abundance of information which is scattered throughout the very extensive, contemporary literature and the numerous historical interpretations warrants a separate contribution; the latter be­cause too little research has been carried out to justify an attempt at interpretation.

THE POSITION OF THE BELGIAN NOBILITY

The Belgian nobility comprised two groups: individuals or families who were recognized as such, or who had received letters patent, perhaps conferring a title, from William I in the period 1815-1830; and those who had been accorded recognition, or ennobled, by one of the Belgian kings after 20th September 1830. In strictly legal terms, the ancient and imperial noble classes no longer existed. There was no auto­matic reconfirmation of these privileged ranks of society which dated from the ancien regime; and, in contrast to France, no law existed to restore the letters patent, titles and majorats of the imperial elite. The elevation of persons to the peerage was a royal prerogative. William I used this fact to maintain control over the nobility, which had again become a fundamental element of the representative organs in the political sphere. In Belgium, this form of privilege was dispensed with after 1830, but the rules of recognition, confirmation, promotion and elevation to the peerage remained in­tact. 3

A list published as a supplement to the Government Gazette of 19th October 1892 contains the names of 1,812 persons or families who at the time of the reunification were recognized as nobility. Further research will be necessary in order to establish which of them had already been ennobled during the ancien regime or the French occupation, which during the Dutch occupation, and what was the share of the Belgian nobility in the tota1.4 A further supplement lists all persons or families who, prior to 31st December 1881, during the reigns of Leopold I and Leopold II, had been en­nobled, with or without a title, accorded recognition, or promoted in rank. Of the 785 deeds, 345, or 44 per cent, related to promotion in rank. The following titles, in as­cending order of rank, could be acquired: knight, baron, viscount, count, marquis, duke and prince. In 309 cases, 39 per cent of the total, the deed was a mark of re­cognition. This did not necessarily imply appreciation of a long period of noble living, yet it was regarded as more important than the normal elevation to the peerage, and was interpreted as an attempt by the government to speed up the inclusion of certain people in the aristocratic elite. The remaining 131 cases, 17 per cent, were concerned with elevation to the peerage. The procedure and, more specifically, the motives for recognition and elevation, have not yet been fully investigated. Cursory inspection of the second supplement, however, leads one to the assumption that the policy towards

3. Ch. Braas, La Legislation nobiliaire en Belgique (Brussels, 1960). 4. 'Etat nominatif et alphabtltique des familles qui font partie de 1a noblesse du Royaume au

31 decembre 1881', Moniteur beige, CCXCII (Brussels, 1882).

2

THE BELGIAN NOBILITY IN THE 19TH CENTURY

ennoblement in the early decades of the Kingdom of Belgium was primarily directed towards the protection and expansion of 'past glories.' From the 1870s onwards, industrialists, bankers and those who controlled and implemented the fmancial and colonial policies of the king increasingly came to be among those chosen for a higher position in society.

This limited, deliberate advancement of the upper middle class to the realm of the

titled elite served to maintain the level of the nineteenth-century aristocracy. With the close control of their numbers in that century (the recognition of nobles was sub­ject to stringent rules and regulations), it soon became clear that this section of the population would rapidly disappear. 5 Amid consternation, the compilers of the Annuaire de la Noblesse in 1847 concluded that many famous aristocratic families had died out. They were of the opinion that the Belgian nobility already possessed the necessary means to ensure its continued existence, namely wealth, education and refined morals. But in spite of this favourable situation, no less than 134 noble families vanished in the 23 years between 1825 and 1847.

In 1840 the aristocracy consisted of 1,041 persons or families, of whom fifty per cent were without title. By 1914 the number had risen to 1,885, of whom fifty-seven per cent had no title. But no relative increase took place in this period: in 1840 and in 1914 there were 2.5 noble families per 10,000 inhabitants. The pattern varied from one province to another, however. One is struck by the steep rise in Brabant and the manifest decline in Hainault and Luxembourg, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the total population (in Brabant from 3.7 families per 10,000 inhabitants to 4.6; in Hainault from 2.1 to l.2; and in Luxembourg from 2.1 to 0.9). In all probability these changes were related to the powerful attraction of the major cities.6

LAND OWNERSHIP, A CHANGE OF ROLE

The development of large-scale land ownership has not so far been studied in depth. In spite of the stimulating nature of E. Vandervelde's book, written in 1900,7 no further research has been undertaken in this area. Historians were carried away by the dynamic expansion of industry, the towns and the proletariat in the factories. Of the losers, the rural areas, the small tenant farmers and those who worked in the country­side, they make scarcely any mention, except in great moments of crisis. A thorough study of the subject, from various angles, is a prerequisite for a sound understanding of the winning sectors. This applies especially to the evolution oflarge-scale land ownership.

5. C. Vandenbroeke, 'Karakteristieken van het huwelijks- en voortplantingspatroon. Vlaanderen en Brabant, 17e-1ge eeuw', Ti;dschrift voor sociale geschiedenis, V (Amsterdam, 1976) 128. In the late eighteenth century and the early part of the nineteenth, family planning was already well­established among the nobility: J. De Belder, 'Adel en burgerij 1840-1914', in: Algemene Geschie­den is der Nederlanden, XII (Bussum, 1977) 78-80.

6. Ibidem, 82-3. 7. E. Vandervelde, La propriete fonciere en Belgique (Paris, 1900).

3

J.DEBELDER

An analysis of this factor is necessary in order to arrive at a deeper insight into the relationship between the owners of large estates and their tens of thousands of tenants. Moreover, the pattern of land ownership affords the clearest scale by which to measure the takeover of power by the upper middle class.

The power and prestige of the nobility in the nineteenth century doubtless rested on the ownership of land, and therefore on income derived from agriculture. The evolution of the primary sector of the economy is thus of the greatest importance in determining the true significance of this social group. In comparison with industry, agriculture made only slow progress in terms of output and structure in the nine­teenth century. 8 The principal cause of this lay in the fact that ground rents, insofar as these were not completely swallowed up in meeting the cost of the dolce far niente of the recipients, were invested in the highly promising industrial sector.9 In spite of the siphoning-off of these funds (and at the expense of much hardship and a doubling of effort), agricultural output rose by an average of 0.59 per cent per annum in the period 1849-1910. But industrial production increased by 3.1 per cent per annum in this period. lO With this discrepancy in growth rates, agriculture soon forfeited its position as the most important sector of the economy: the share of agriculture in the total physical output (industry and farming together) fell from 70 per cent in 1846 to 50 per cent in 1875 and to a mere 32 per cent in 1913.11 On this basis alone, it is ob­vious that incomes from the ownership of land gradually declined. By the beginning of the final quarter of the nineteenth century, the pendulum had swung in favour of the upper middle class.

The consequences of this development were fatal only for that section of the aristocracy which depended upon a fixed, regular income from large and mainly inter­connected estates which had remained in the family for generations. Although this group continued to play an important role on a local level for a long time, they gradually lost every vestige of real power to the group which was made up of industrialists, wholesalers, financiers, managers and speculators. There is even some doubt whether the nobility succeeded in any way in enlarging their traditional estates at the expense of public land and the property of the church. Until 1880 they certainly did not do so at the expense of the land-owning farmers either, for the latter's share remained at about 33 per cent of the total cultivated acreage.12 Not until the period 1880-1910 did the figure fall, by nine per cent or thereabouts, as a result of the severe recession in agriculture; but it is very questionable whether the nobility constituted the buyers. Vandervelde suggested that in Flanders, at least, the land was purchased by upper middle-class industrialistsP Although this assumption has yet to be proven by con-

8. J. Gadisseur, 'Contribution a l'etude de la production agricole en Belgique de 1846 a 1913', Belgisch tijdschrift vaor nieuwste geschiedenis, N (Antwerp, 1973) 4.

9. Ibidem, 32. 10. Ibidem, 19. 11. Ibidem, 48, Table VII: 'Indice du produit physique et parts relatives des secteurs'. 12. J. Craeybeckx, 'De agrarische depressie van het einde der XlXe eeuw en de politieke strijd om de boeren', Belgisch tijdschrift voor nieuwste geschiedenis, N, 199-200. 13. Vandervelde,Proprietefonciere, 87.

4

THE BELGIAN NOBILITY IN THE 19TH CENTURY

crete evidence, B. Verhaegen has allied himself with it. He argues that more and more industrial capital found its way into land, leading by the end of the nineteenth century to a single, more uniform and coherent class, and thus to the disappearance of the traditional distinction between agricultural wealth and that of industrial/commercial origin.14

The role of land ownership did indeed change, among the nobility as elsewhere. As early as the sixteenth century, and probably even before that, the upper middle class had a significant share. They did not buy land with the aim of abandoning the profes­sions which had made them rich, and becoming large landowners as quickly as possible in the hope that the prestige which went with a manor would be crowned with a title during their lifetime or that of their descendants. To them, land was a safe investment for part of their fortune, a source of a fixed and regular income, a means of obtaining credit easily and a way to achieve speculative profits.IS To the nobility, on the other hand, land did not represent an instrument of credit, with which to fmance commercial undertakings at a suitable moment, let alone an object of speculation, but the basis for a regular income supplemented by the revenue accruing from manorial rights. The link between the ownership of land and manorial privilege was to be severed in certain areas in the course of the eighteenth century, and this contributed to a change of attitude in some aristocratic circles towards the exploitation of estates.

By the end of the nineteenth century there nevertheless remained a number of noble owners of old manorial estates. These had survived the French Revolution, division under the terms of wills, and shortage of money. Many had remained in the hands of the family which had owned them from the outset; the rest had passed to other noble families through marriage, legacy or purchase. Among the most striking examples were: in Antwerp province, the estate at Bomem owned by Count Ferdinand 1.M. Mamix van Sint-Aldegonde and one at Westerlo owned by Count Charles A.G. De Merode; in Limburg, the Duras estate of Count Octave C.L. D'Oultremont; in Brabant, 13 estates together covering 700 ha owned by the D'Oultremont family, 20 aggregatihg 1,243 ha belonging to the Viscounts De Spoelberch De Lovenjoul, 16 totalling 1,593 ha owned by the De Merode family, 31 aggregating 6,333 ha belonging to the D'Aren­berg family, the Leefdaal estate owned by Count Arthur A.M. De Liedekerke, Dilbeek owned by Baron Theodore C.M. de Viron, the Meise and Loupoigne estates belonging to Count Leopold M.G. De Beaufort, Melin owned by Count Maurice J .M. De Robiano, Ceroux-Mousty belonging to Count Antoine V.C. Van Der Dilft De Borgvliet, and Braine-Ie-Chateau owned by Count Leon 1.M. De Robiano; in Hainault province, the Lomboise estate, which had been in the possession of the counts De Thiennes fOr more than five centuries, Havre anj Roeulx, which had been owned by the princes of Croy since the fifteenth century, and Ghlin, which they acquired in the early seventeenth century, the Beloeil estate, which had been in the possession of the princes of Ligne

14. B. Verhaegen, Contribution a l'histoire economique delI FlandrelI (2 vols .• Louvain. 1961) I. 15. H. Soly. 'The Betrayal of the Sixteenth-century Bourgeoisie: a Myth? Some considerations of the behaviour Pattern of the merchants of Antwerp in the Sixteenth century', Acta hilItoriae neerlandicae. VIII (The Hague, 1975) 35-8.

5

J. DEBELDER

since 1~11, and Enghien, which belonged to the Arenberg family; in the province of Liege, Argenteau and Remersdaal; in Namur province, the Mielmont estate (131 ha) in the parishes of Onoz and Le Mazy, which belonged to Marquis Albert M.G. De Beaufort, Corroy-Ie-Chateau (which covered 489 ha in 1834, and 206 ha in 1898), owned by Marquis Edouard G.G. De Trazegnies D'Ittre, the Chateau Franc-Waret (404 ha at Franc-Waret and a further 125 ha at Gelbressee) belonging to Count d'Andigne De Croix, and CeUes castle (in 1834, 1, 354 ha; in 1898, 1,676 ha and providing an income ofBFr. 62,025) owned by Count Hadelin S.H. De Liedekerke-Beaufort.16

In Flanders, by contrast, the long-established manorial estates were extremely rare, except in the polder areas. Scarcely any estates of this nature were still owned by the nobility. The one at Oostkamp (339 ha) belonging to Count Charles M.L. D'Ursel, which, together with lands in the adjoining villages of Wingene and Ursel, formerly constituted the manorial estate of that name, and the Buggenhout estate (516 ha) owned by the De Merode family, may be cited as examples. 17 Yet there were very many large landowners in East and West Flanders, the majority of whom were of noble birth. Out of a total of 1,192 persons who, on the basis of the fully-paid impost of 1,000 guilders (BFr. 2,116.40), were eligible for election to the Senate between 1831 and 1893, 206 were from East Flanders and 138 from West Flanders, and to­gether they represented nearly 30 per cent.1S As membership of the group was de­pendent upon an exceptionally high land tax, every one of these persons was a land­owner on a large scale.19 Their estates must therefore have been spread over a number of parishes.

In Flanders, landowners with 30, 40 or even 50 land tax demands were no ex­ception. Each parish maintained a land register in which were entered details of estates and their owners. An individual owner's estates might be situated in various parts of the parish. In 1893, the list of persons eligible for election to the senate in West Flanders contained 112 candidates with a total of 1,730 tax demands, giving an average of 14 per candidate.20 Many of those concerned owned land in more than 20 parishes, four had possessions in more than 40 parishes, and one in more than 50. The situation can best be illustrated by a concrete example. This concerns the estate of Baron Eugene Jean Auguste Dons De Lovendeghem.21 He died in 1865, bequeathing to his widow the usufruct of Lovendeghem castle and the surrounding land, with a total area of 19 ha and an estimated value of BFr. 218,700, an oilseed crushing mill and other property in the parish amounting to 171 ha, and possessions in 30 other

16. For identification, see in particular the excellent work by J. Stengers et al., Index des eligibles au Senat (Brussels, 1975). For the manorial estates, see E. Vandervelde, Propriete fonciere, 135, 155,186-7,217,238-9. 17. Ibidem, 107,110-11. 18. See Appendix I (a). 19. Stengers, Index, (36)-(39). J. De Belder, 'De sociale oorsprong van de Brusselse gegoede bur­gerij van 1914', Belgisch tijdschrift voor nieuwste geschiedenis, III (1972) 406-10. 20. Vandervelde:Propriete fonciere, 269. 21. L. De Ruyck, 'De adel in het kanton Zomergem en het IVde kanton van Gent gedurende de XlXde eeuw' (unpublished thesis in three parts, Ghent, 1978/79) 1,97-100.

6

THE BELGIAN NOBILITY IN THE 19TH CENTURY

parishes in East Flanders, in 14 in West Flanders and one in Antwerp province.22 These comprised 33 farmsteads with a total area of 424 ha, other land aggregating 242 ha, and 17 houses. The value of all this property was put at BFr. 3,194,288. This huge fortune, (which represented 1.90 per cent of the total taxable income from all land, built upon or otherwise, registered in Belgium) was therefore made up of widely distributed holdings.23 Another landowner had estates in 44 Belgian and Dutch

parishes, together amounting to 1,196 ha; these included 28 of less than 5 ha and five which exceeded 50 ha.24

It is clear from this that noble estates had evolved which were totally different in terms of structure from the classic manorial estate. This process reached its peak during the eighteenth century?S The spectacular growth of small farms in Flanders resulted not so much from demographic pressures as from the sharp rises in farm rents.26 These increased fivefold in the course of the century. The systematic in­crease in ground rents was made possible by the enormous expansion of cottage in­dustry in the rural areas. It is conceivable, even probable, that the commercial middle class, in the shape of merchant-entrepreneurs in the linen industry, commenced and developed the policy of buying land in the countryside. However, the aristocratic landowners, following the example set by urban buyers, systematically split up the farms. The further rise in income from farm rents which resulted from this destroyed one of the foundations of the feudal system, namely the unity and continuity of large manorial estates. This affected the exercise of manorial rights; and in those regions where the disintegration of such rights had assumed serious proportions, their dis­appearance with the French Revolution was a logical culmination.

The interests of these noble landlords, therefore, ran completely parallel with those

22. East Flanders: Ghent, Evergem, Sleidinge, Kluizen, Lokeren, Daknam, Eksaarde, Zeveneken, Zele, Waasmunster, St.-Gillis-Waas, Melle, Gentbrugge, Merelbeke, Zwijnaarde, Wontergem, Poeke, Kanegem, Zomergem, Ronsele, Oostwinkel, Merendree, Vinkt, Drongen, Waarschoot, Vinder­houtem, Wortegem, Ooike, Huize, Beeriegem. West Flanders: Ruiselede, Egem, Pitt em, Anzegem, Wortegem, Ingooigem, Otegem, Meulebeke, Ingelmunster, Kooigem, Beveren, Hoogstede, Gijver­inkhove, Beerlare. Antwerp: Bornem. 23. In 1865 the total taxable income arising from land with buildings amounted to BFr. 57,313,720, and that from land not built upon to BFr. 110,699,019. Expose de la situation du royaume, 1860-1875, 1,260. 24. Vandervelde,Propriete fonciere, 270. 25. C. Vandenbroeke, 'Landbouw in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden 1650-1815', in Algemene Ge· schiedenis der Nederlanden, VIII (Bussum, 1979) 76-8. In comparison with the possessions of the church, the lands owned by the nobility were small and more scattered; in some cases they had been reduced to smallholdings. A typical example is the estate of about 35 hectares at Sint-Korne­lis-Horebeke, which had nineteen tenant farmers. At the same time, the author points out that the operation of farms by freeholders was a characteristic feature of most parts of Flanders. As a rule, between one-half and three-quarters of the land was owned by local inhabitants. By the end of the nineteenth century, the situation had been completely reversed; in 18,80 and 1895, between 74.0 and 77.8 per cent of the cultivable land in East Flanders was worked by tenant farmers; in West Flanders the figure was between 85.3 and 88.4 per cent. Cf. agricultural censuses. We assume that this process commenced with the expansion of cottage industries. Asno fundamental changes are discernible in the ownership ratios between 1846 and 1895, the reversal must have taken effect before 1846. 26. C. Lis and H. Soly, Poverty and capitalism in pre· industrial Europe (Brighton, 1979) 141-2.

7

J. DE BELDER

of the middle-class merchants. However, the manner in which the class barriers were broken down differed from that in England, where the major landowners entered into

alliances with rich farmers.27 Nor was that method of production adopted in Belgian agriculture after the severe crisis of the 1840s. The disintegration of farms continued, not only in Flanders but in most other regions also: between 1846 and 1880, farms of between 0.5 and 4 ha, as a proportion of the total (excluding those of less than half a hectare), rose by approximately 7 per cent.28 Even in 1886, by which time the opposite trend had commenced to manifest itself, a question in the Enquete Agricole, which sought to establish what the landowners were doing to improve the material situation of their tenants, evoked a crushing response:

Tous, ou preque tous, y vivent dans un "dolce far niente", ignorant la plupart des premieres notions de l'agronomie, ne s'occupant guere du point de savoir si leurs proprietes sont cultivees au mieux de leurs interets; s'ils touchent regulierement leurs loyers, tout est bien. 29

Fragmentation and the proportional increase in farm rents were not the only sources of additional income for the landowners~ others existed also. The spectacular growth of industrial centres and urban agglomerations served to make land on the edge of the towns a target for large speculative companies. In these areas stood numerous country seats owned by the aristocracy; all that remains of them today is the name, commemorated in suburban streets and districts. They were divided up to make room for port facilities, factories, residential areas, glasshouses to meet the needs of the urban market, and numerous allotments to provide factory workers with a supple­mentary income':u Nor must the importance of a complex railway network be under­estimated. At Genval and Terhulpen, the price of land in 1895 averaged some BFr. 2,000 per hectare.32 With the corning of the railway, building plots along the road from the station to the centre of the village fetched between 8,000 and 15,000 francs per hectare,33 while in Terhulpen land in the vicinity of the station was sold for 25-30,000 francs per hectare.34

This upward spiral in incomes from land ownership was also manifested in the geographical shift of private estates of mote than 100 hectares. These virtually dis­appeared from the outskirts of the towns and centres of industrial activity, increased in number in the surrounding, easily accessible areas, and partly disappeared from the

27. Ibidem, 131. 28. Gadisseur, 'Contribution', 47, Table VI: 'Taille des exploitations agricoles'. 29. Enquete Agricole de 1886. Reponses au questionnaire (Brussels, 1890) 65. 30. G. BubIot, La production agricole beige. Etude economique secultzire 1846-1955 (Louvain, 1957), 180; G. Braive, 'Le monde paysan beige de 1830 Ii 1870', Belgisch tijdschrift voor nieuwste geschiedeni$, IV, 175. . 31. Little concrete research has yet been done on these speculative companies. Their importance as a pressure group is highlighted by E. Witte in 'De Societe Generale a1s drukkingsgroep. De grondspeculaties rondom het Brusselse Justitiepaleis (1838-1840), Belgisch tijdschrift voor nieuw­ste geschiedenis, I (1969) 6-47. 32. E. Vandervelde,Propriete fonciere, 57. 33. Ibidem, 58. 34. Ibidem, 33.

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THE BELGIAN NOBILITY IN THE 19TH CENTURY

distant and inaccessible regions?S Even in the province of East Flanders, where fragmentation assumed extreme proportions, the number of large integral estates within the second circle increased between 1834 and 1898; this was particularly true

of areas where the fragmentation was not an insurmountable obstacle to their in­tegration?6

MOVEMENTS IN THE ARISTOCRACY'S SHARE OF LAND

The upper middle class played a major role in both the fragmentation of estates and the geographical shifts in large-scale ownership. It is of crucial importance to us to know how the share of the upper middle class developed. Did it increase to the point where it outstripped that of the nobility? The precise answer to this question is not known. Apparently it was judged a posteriori to be irrelevant. At any rate, there has been no systematic investigation of the period and the circumstances in which this process took place. Yet the problem is sufficiently important to warrant research: did not the gradual integration of the nobility into the ranks of the upper middle class - a result of its elimination in the tough struggle with its opponent - largely govern the formation of a dual societe d'ordres within the Belgian middle class? I am referring to that obscurative, fictional contrast which played such a dominant part in the evolution of the society in the closing decades of the nineteenth century and has continued to do so for a good part of the twentieth!

With the qualitative information which is available, historians can arrive at anyone of a number of conclusions. On the one hand, one may conclude that the upper middle class came to be an increasingly powerful competitor of the aristocracy by acquiring property on a substantial scale. They bought confiscated ecclesiastical property, as in the case of the wealthy Brussels bankers and trustees Jonathan and Ferdinand Bischoffsheim and the Cul-des-Sarts estate, which had once been jointly owned by a number of abbeys and covered 1,200 hectares; or they acquired domanial lands, as was the case with the banker Joseph LJ. Matthieu and the long-established Wijnendale estate (I75 ha) at Torhout. In isolated instances, property confiscated from noblemen who had emigrated was sold and passed into the hands of the middle class. An example in this category is the Tilly estate, which had belonged to the De 'tSerclaes family since the fifteenth century and in 1898 became part of the estates owned by Gustave A. BotH. In other cases, parcels of land of differing origins were merged. Estates which were built up in this manner included Mariemont, which belonged to the De Warocques.

In 1834 this family of merchants, later industrialists, owned 144 ha; by 1898 their estates had grown to 505 ha, spread over the parishes of Morlanwelz, Houdeng, Belle­court and La Hestre. Even more significant was the transfer of nobiliary estates to

35. Ibidem, 78. 36. Ibidem, 88.

9

J. DEBELDER

middle· class owners during the nineteenth century. In 1817 the De Montmorency family sold the Modave estate, which during the French Revolution had sheltered the members of the French royal family, to the tobacco merchant Gillis Antoine La· marche. It is known that such sales were in some cases enforced, and the Foret de Soignes estate, which William I had given to the Societe Generale, is a case in point. Marquis Auguste M.G. De Bethune purchased a substantial portion of the estate (344 hectares), on which he built a castle in 1847. He was subsequently obliged to dispose of the land, which came into the hands of Ernest GJ. Solvay, an industrialist. A similar fate befell Eugene Fr. J. de Meel1s, who owned Argenteuil castle in Ohain. To this he added a 265·hectare estate which was situated in the adjoining parish of Terhulpen. In 1977 the estate covered an area of 265 ha, but by 1882 this had de· clined to 149 ha; and in 1891 only 56 ares remained. Other noble estates became greatly diminished in the course of the nineteenth century. They included Chimay, the property of Fran~ois De Riquet, count De Caraman, which in 1834 covered 10,000 ha, but shrank to a mere 627 ha by 1898. His brother's share of the estate was similarly decimated. Corroy·le-Chateau, owned by Marquis De Trazegnies, which in 1834 covered an area of 489 ha, declined to only 206 ha by the end of the century.37

On the other hand, one can interpret the qualitative information as indicating that the nobility improved, or at least maintained, its position. Like the upper middle class, the aristocrats came into the possession of confiscated ecclesiastical property, among them the Du Val De Beaulieu family, which acquired a portion of the cistercian abbey at Cambron-Casteau. Or they enlarged their possesions by empoldering mud­flats - a method which added 458 ha to the D'Arenbergs' estate in Kieldrecl1t. Estates put up for sale by the nobility also found their way into the hands of others of the same class - for example, Braine-le-Chateau (480 ha), which passed from the De Tour et Taxis family to Count Leon J.M. De Robiano.38

Vandervelde postulated that the balance had shifted in favour of the upper middle class, although the quantitative date which he provided pointed in the opposite direc­tion. He established that the estate of more than 100 hectares in Belgium tended to increase in size: in 1834-45 there were 1,187 with a total area of 392,353 ha; in 1898-99 they numbered 1,749 together covering 397,130 ha.39 For a number of provinces, he provided information showing changes in the ratio between the aristoc­racy and the upper middle class. Of 205 landowners in Hainault in 1834, ten could not be classified, 108 were nobles and 86 of middle-class origin; in 1898, seven out of 166 could not be classified, 106 were noblemen and 53 middle-class.40 Thus the middle class for supremacy in land ownership. They started from a very strong posi­ber and 11 per cent. For the province of Liege, he reached a similar, though somewhat less pronounced, conclusion: no change in absolute terms, but a relative decline of

37. Ibidem, 17-18,107,153-4,183-5,188-91,217-8,236-7. Other persons, not named by Van­dervelde, were identified with the aid of the Index des eligibles. 38. Ibidem, 99-100, 154, 185-6. 39. Ibidem, 297-8. 40. Ibidem, 182.

10

THE BELGIAN NOBILITY IN THE 19TH CENTURY

the nobility from 58 to 54 per cent.41 However, Vandervelde deduced that the share of the middle class in the acquisition of land on a large scale increased as a result of the accumulation of profits from industry, financial dealings and wholesaling. This assumption is indeed correct. It cannot yet be proven on the basis of the relevant material, though indirect evidence can be obtained by analysing the evolution of those who were eligible for election to the senate.

THE TURNING-POINT

Those who could afford the full impost of 1,000 guilders, or BFr. 2,116,40, in order to be eligible for election to the senate will certainly have paid an exceptionally high sum in land tax.42 The other relevant taxes, i.e. personal tax and, to an even greater extent, licence and mining taxes, seldom represented the greater part of the required amount. In the case of personal tax, this is explained by the relatively low rate at which it was applied, and in the case of the others by their limited nature.43 There can thus be no doubt whatsoever that those who paid the full impost were owners of large estates. Between 1831 and 1893, 2,277 candidates appeared on the lists, and of these 1,148, or just over half, were noblemen. The number of eligible candidates, how­ever, was insufficient to meet the statutory requirement of one to every 6,000 in­h.abitants in each province. In the period referred to, the lists were never more than 50 per cent full,44 and this gives a good indication of the exclusive character of the ~roup. The lists must have been filled up with persons who paid the next highest llTIounts in taxes after those who met the full impost, until the ratio of one per 6,000 inhabitants was achieved. These supplementary candidates were to a lesser extent najor landowners: more than half of them paid less than BFr. 1,501.45 In their case, the other taxes assumed a far greater significance. Between 1831 and 1893, this group lUmbered 1,906, of whom 392, or 20.5 per cent, were noblemen. The aristocracy 'epresented 37 per cent of all eligible persons, and were thus in the minority; but they Lccounted for the majority of the members of the upper echelon. It was at this level hat the real political power lay. Conclusive proof of this lies in the fact that in 1870, 'or example, the 62-man senate contained 51 members who had paid the full impost, md of these no less than 34, an absolute majority, were noblemen.46

The aristocracy displayed great powers of resistance in the struggle against the niddle class for supremacy in land ownetship. They started from a very strong posi­ion. This is most evident from the difference between the average ages at which the wo groups attained eligibility for election - 48 for the aristocracy and 51 for the niddle class - and the duration of their eligibility - 24 years for the former and 19

11. Ibidem, 203. 12. See above, Note 19. 13. Stengers, Index, (21)-(28). 14. J. De Belder, 'Adel en burgerij', 87, Table 4. 15. J. Stengers,lndex, (33)-(35).

11

J. DEBELDER

years for the latter.47 In relative terms, therefore, the aristocracy came into the possession of extensive estates at a much lower age. This phenomenon, of course, is related to the differing nature of the income enjoyed by each of the groups; but it has two implications: firstly, that the aristocracy owned sufficient land to become eligible for election at an earlier age, and secondly that the power which it wielded in the senate was far greater than the fifty-fifty ratio (1,148 to 1,129) suggests. Indeed, in the period 1831-1893, the members of the nobility who paid the full impost were eligible for a total of 27,391 years (1,148 X 23.86), or 55.83 per cent, compared with 21,627 years (I,127 X 19.19), or 44.17 per cent, for the middle class.

The aristocracy's strong starting position can also be deduced from the ratio of families with two or more members on the electoral lists: there were 55 noble families with at least five members who had paid the full impost, compared with a mere 10 among the upper middle class.48 The cause can be traced to the difference in the area of land held by the two groups at the commencement of Belgium's independence. If this was very large, several heirs could become major landowners. The estates of seventeen families ultimately enabled 185 descendants to obtain a place on the lists of those who had paid the full impost. The most striking example is the family of Jean D'Oultremont (I715-1782), which had no less than 15 eligible candidates.49

According to information extracted from the lists, one of his descendants paid BFr. 9,830 in tax in 1832, the highest sum levied at that time. The vast estate to which this pertained provided income and a basis for eligibility for succeeding generations. The division of the estate was inevitable, because the country's independence was ac­companied by the abolition of majorats and the fideicommissary system.so For several decades this produced a fairly substantial increase in the number of noblemen who paid the full impost: the generation born between 1770 and 1790 contained 245, and the one born between 1790 and 1810 produced 298.51 Later, the limit was reached and further fragmentation of inherited estates led to the loss of eligible candidates.

This drawback of the partition of estates, however, could be offset by marrying within one's own, aristocratic class, or into an upper middle-class family which had invested part of its mercantile or industrial profit in land. For example, the three daughters of Eugene Joseph De Naeyer Van Caneghem, a noblemen, each inherited 1,000 hectares from their grandfather, Jacques Van Caneghem, whose cotton mills

46. Ibidem, 35. 47. See Appendix II. The figures represent the middle generation and were used because those relating to the first generation lacked a group of (relatively) young persons, and those for the last generation a group of elderly persons. 48. Stengers, Index, (115)-(117). 49. Ibidem. 50. Fideicommisum: a gift of property stipulated by the donor to be transferred by the donee at a given time or upon a stated condition to a third person. During the first ten years of Belgian independence, this was the subject of a great many lawsuits. Cf. C. Douxchamps-Lef~vre,Inventaire des archives de la famille de Jacquier de Rosee (Brussels, 1962) 10, and many other family in­ventories. 51. See Appendix I (a).

12

THE BELGIAN NOBILITY IN THE 19TH CENTURY

had brought him an immense fortune.52 But during the final quarter of the nine­teenth century, the upper middle class overtook the aristocracy in terms of the owner­ship of large estates. The process had commenced under the ancien regime and took a decisive turn at the end of the eighteenth century, not only with the abolition of manorial rights but also, indeed primarily, with the ending of the role of the church as a major landowner and the further disintegration of common land. The power of the nobility stemmed from the close connection between these elements. For a time the nobility, thanks to the sheer size of their estates, to marriages and to legacies, succeeded in maintaining their position; but with the generation of payers of the full impost which was born in the period 1790-1810, it was clear that saturation point had been reached. The next generation, born between 1810 and 1830, was marked by decline, as is clear from a comparison of two annual cross-sections of the aristocratic and upper middle-class elites. In 1842, 237, or 57.5 per cent, of eligible candidates who paid the full impost were of noble descent, while 175, or 42.5 per cent, came from the middle class. In 1892, the figures were 275 and 276 respectively.53 If, moreover, we deduct all those aristocrats with middle-class origins, namely those who had been raised to the nobility during that 50-year period, we fmd that the 'upper crust' of the nobility increased in number from 237 to 246, which implies a decline, relative to the upper middle class, from 57.5 per cent to 45 per cenL54 This comparison, while indicating the direction in which the development proceeded, does not provide an insight into the actual pattern. The accompanying graph was compiled on the basis of data con­cerning eligibility, Although this relates only to eligible persons who had paid the full impost, the period of their supplementary candidacy was also taken into account. This affords a more exact picture of the true power ratios.

In 1881, which saw the commencement of the great crisis in agriculture, the upper middle class overtook the aristocracy. The conjunction of these two events was per­haps more than fortuitous. Originally, that is to say from 1836 to 1846, the gap between the two classes had widened under the influence of two factors: the steady growth of the aristocracy and the stagnation, followed by an actual decline, of the middle class. For the next five years the two groups increased at an equal pace. From 1851 onwards the upper middle class forged ahead. In 1886 the process was speeded up by the stagnation, even a slight decline, of the aristocratic elite. This was even noticed by those who in the period 1860-1875 made up the 'Etat d'Aisance.'55 On the basis of a number of variable factors, they concluded that general living standards had improved, but that this had been accompanied by a decline in large fortunes. Their conclusion resulted from an error in analysing the figures relating to those who paid the full impost: they took 464 in 1860,481 in 1870 and 468 in 1875, whereas this should have risen, in proportion to the growth of the population, from 464 to 492 and thence to 529. They were undoubtedly correct in regard to the aristocracy, but

52. De Ruyck,Adel, 1,104, Note 46. 53. Stengers,lndex, (112). 54. Ibidem, (112)-(113). 55. Expose de la situation du royaume de 1861 it 1875, 11,397.

13

J DEBELDER

Persons who, having paid the full impost, were eligible for election to the senate, 1830-1895

eligible candidates

60

50

40

30

20

1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890

A = aristocracy B = upper middle class

not to the upper middle class. In this period, we can observe a very sharp increase in the number of middle-class supplementary candidates who were later to become fully eligible on the basis of the impost. It is here that the importance of the curve relating to the duration of candidacy lies.

The evolution of the premature termination of eligibility also confirms this. S6

While one continued to meet the census requirements, one remained eligible for election. It may be assumed that where a person ceased to be eligible a year or two before his death, the reason in most cases lay in a substantial reduction of his property. To determine the pattern of uncompleted termes of eligibility, we took the entire group of aristocratic candidates who had paid the full impost and grouped them according to their year of birth. Of the generation born between 1750 and 1770, seven (6.4 per cent) did not complete their term; among the generation born between 1770 and 1790 the number was 30 (12.2 per cent); in the generation of 1790·1810,

56. See Appendix I (c).

14

THE BELGIAN NOBILITY IN THE 19TH CENTURY

twenty-nine (7 per cent); among the generation of 1810-30, 38 (13.3 per cent), and of those born in 1830 or later, 65 (25.4 per cent). These figures undeniably point to a substantial increase in the premature termination of candicacy.

This does not completely accord with reality, however. The percentage relating to the first generation cannot be compared with those of the other generations. As the first list of candidates eligible for election to the senate was drawn up in 1831, the generation born between 1750 and 1770 could only provide candidates of 61 years of age or more, but none of forty or fifty. The percentage of uncompleted candidacies among this generation must have been higher than 6.4. Moreover, it may be assumed that the figure was higher than those of the succeeding generations; it must, therefore, have been between 6 and 12 per cent.

Added to this, there are three sound reasons for assuming that the percentage for the last generation must have been much higher than 24.5 per cent. Firstly, eligible candidates of advanced age are not included. As the sum of BFr. 2,116 pertaining to the census remained in force until 1893, the candidates provided by the generations of 1830 and later years could not have been less than 63 years of age. Secondly, the figure does not take account of a number of persons who, in spite of serious depletion of their property, remained eligible. This was possible because, from 1894 onwards, they benefited from a reduction of the impost from BFr. 2,116 to BFr. 1,000. Third­ly, the percentage of uncompleted candidacies among the last generation must have been higher. The candidacy system, and with this the eligibility of all those concerned, was terminated in 1914. All noblemen who were eligible until 1914 were regarded by us as persons who remained so up to the time of their death. The number of uncom­pleted candidacies in the last generation must therefore have been far greater than the figure of 25.4 per cent suggests. This sharp rise in the premature termination of candidacies affords further proof that the aristocratic class, as major landowners, suffered serious losses in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

INTEGRATION

In the twelfth volume of the new Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden it is postulated that the aristocracy, as this was conceived in the constitution, and the upper middle-class elite drifted farther and farther apart.57 This is only partly true. The constitution of 1830 stipulated that there should be no class distinction in the new state. The king might grant noble titles, but this might not imply privilege in any shape or form. In that situation, the old and new elites might be expected to become intertwined. The Constitutional Assembly encouraged such integration. There had to be provision for the monarch to reward services to the country. Letters patent were the most appropriate instrument for keeping valued achievements alive for future generations. Old-style nobility was the symbol of services rendered in the past; new-

57. De Belder, 'Adelenburgerij',95.

15

J. DEBELDER

style nobility was the evidence of recent achievements. But a relatively large number of wealthy citizens, all of whom had controlled ten or more limited companies prior to 1894, thereby largely monopolizing the area of economic decisionmaking, were not raised to the peerage. To this extent, the postulation referred to is correct. On the other hand, however, the new aristocracy was supplemented by a relatively large group of noblemen. Their role was primarily one of providing capital for new enterprises; and they shared the power of economic decisionmaking with the nouveaux riches. The

magnitude and significance of this movement from middle-class to aristocratic elite, and vice versa - which in all probability increased steadily during the course of the nineteenth century, and was accompanied by wider contacts in social circles - awaits closer examination.

The movement from middle-class to aristocratic elite is probably as old as the aristocracy itself. Under the ancien regime, just as during the nineteenth century, it was the sole means of keeping the nobility up to strength. The Desmanet de Biesmes, a wealthy family of maftres de forges, played an early and important part in the growth of industry in Namur.58 They were raised to the nobility in 1660. A de­scendant, Pierre Charles Joseph, who was born on 27th January 1793, was a majorland­owner and industrialist, and in particular owned a number of coal mines. In 1826, by Royal Decree, he was granted a concession to mine coal at a 540-hectare site at Marcinelle-Nord. In the following year he received a second concession, this time for the Bray, Maurage and Boussoit mines, which covered an area of 1,400 hectares. Another notable example of this process of integration is provided by the De J acquier De Rosee family, which was involved in the metal industry as long ago as the sixteenth century .59 They were elevated to the peerage in 1705. With Antoine Laurent, the family reached the zenith of its power in the late eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. Antoine Laurent was baron of Rosee and seigneur of Anthee, Cochenee, Fontaine and Flavion. He was a true industrialist who established new factories and had connections with business houses in France, Germany, Holland, Russia and Sweden. But after his death the firm, which was then controlled by his eldest son, suffered the same fate as many others in the Entre-Sambre-et-Meuse region which had failed to adapt to the industrial revolution. However, a younger son, Baron Alphonse Marie Eugene, established an iron- and bell-foundry and other metal works at Moulins in 1826, and the latter remained in operation until the twentieth century. These are not the only examples of circulation. The process of integration was intensified during the nineteenth century, as is abundantly clear from a census of electorally eligible persons between 1831 and 1893 who had been raised to the nobility and had paid the full impost. During the reign of Leopold I, there were forty-five in this category, of whom eight (18 per cent) were actively engaged in industry, whole­saling or banking, or furnished capital for limited companies, whose number was in­creasing rapidly. Under Leopold II (1865-1908), there were 34 out of a total of 63 (54

58. H. Coppejans-Desmedt, InJl.entaris van het archiefvan de familie de Biesme en van de aanver­wante families (Brussels, 1965) 6-7. 59. Douxchamps-Lefevre,lnventaire des archives, 5-14.

16

THE BELGIAN NOBILITY IN THE 19TH CENTURY

per cent).60 But there was also a fairly substantial movement in the other direction. Many 'old' noblemen displayed a growing interest in profitable commercial activities during the nineteenth century. Indeed, the initial investments in the cotton industry in Ghent were financed not only by the extremely high profits of the calico printing mills, but in part by funds provided by the majormine-owners.61 These 'old' aristocrats also became mine-owners, and a good example is to be found in the very wealthy Count Emile D'Oultremont De Wegimont, who operated a mine near his castle at Warfusee.62 Frederic Louis Behr, born in 1803, was among the principal founders,

directors and shareholders of S.A. Metallurgique d'Esperance-Longdoz.63 A descen­

dant of the German nobility, he invested his legacy in the flourishing coal and metallurgical industries. But it was as directors and fmanciers of limited companies that these nobles played their most important role. Of the 81 leading subscribers to the capital of the Societe Generale in 1822, 9 were institutions and 72 private in­dividuals; and of the latter, 31 (43 per cent) were noblemen.64 The aristocracy was even better represented in the other bank which played a strategic role in the in­dustrial development of Belgium, the Banque de Belgique.65 By infiltrating the bank­ing world in Brussels, the aristocracy became involved in every facet of the industrial revolution. Its role was not so much of an industrial nature, but rather political and financial.66 On a more quantitative level, we may mention that there were about 150 noblemen, each of whom held at least five directorships of limited companies operating in the industrial sector in Belgium between 1819 and 1857.67 In the same period, members of the nobility were to be found on the managing boards of at least half of the Belgian coal mines.68 To conclude this review of the movement between the 'old' aristocratic elite and the new-style aristocracy, we would cite the relatively strong presence of electorally eligible figures of noble descent in those modern com­panies. Between 1831 and 1893, there were 1,053 eligible aristocrats who belonged to the 'old' nobility and paid the full impost. Of these, 112 held an average of two directorships of limited companies.69 The remainder of the 276 electorally eligible directors consisted of 21 members of the 'new' aristocracy and 143 persons from the upper middle class.

60. See Appendix I (b); here, however, the levies were aggregated for each generation. 61. P. Lebrun et al., Essai sur la revolution industrielle en Belgique 1770-1847 (Brussels, 1979) 135. 62. Ibidem, 328. 63. M. Colle-Michel, Les archives de fa S.A. Metallurgique d'Esperance-Longdoz des origines a nosjours, I.C.H.G., Bijdragen 24 (Louvain, 1962) 6-14. 64. Lebrun, Essai sur fa revolution industrielle, 498. 65. Ibidem, 559. 66. Ibidem, 571-3. 67. J. Laureyssens, Industriele Naamloze Vennootschappen in Belgie 1819-1857, I.C.H.G., Bij­dragen 78 (Louvain, 1975). 68. Ibidem. 69. See Appendix I (d) and (e).

17

J.DEBELDER

CONCLUSION

With the relative decline of the agricultural share of total production, the changing role of large-scale land ownership, the fragmentation of estates in order to force up land prices and farm rents, and the increasing importance of land from the speculative

point of view in the face of industrialization and urbanization, the barriers between the aristocracy and the other classes in society commenced to crumble. The process was set in train under the ancien regime but reached its climax during the nineteenth century, when the aristocracy lost its lead in land ownership to the upper middle class. A significant proportion of the nobility changed over to middle-class activities, but this was not sufficient to halt the process. In all probability this was due in part to the relatively limited opportunities for recruitment. The intermingling of the aristo­cratic and upper middle-class elites came about in two ways: by increase in the num­ber of middle-class citizens absorbed into the nobility, which was still recognized; and by the alliance of the nobility with the new aristocracy. The nobility therefore, in greater or lesser degree, came to playa part in the ideologies, political parties, social circles and other facets which characterized this section of society. The nobility were traditionally catholic, supported the unionist, catholic or conservative parties and married within their own class; but some among them held liberal views, engaged in freemasonry, preferred the orangist, liberal or democratic parties and married into upper middle-class families. 70 At any given moment in the nineteenth century they reflected, to some extent, the power ratios in Belgian society. Thus did they assist in obscuring the objective contrasts. Their historical Significance in the nineteenth century, therefore, does not lie solely in the fact that they were slowly and partially dissolved in the middle class, but also - indeed primarily - in the legacy of subjective values which, as a class, they bequeathed to all the important groups in the society. But that is another story.

70. For the orangist and/or liberal sympathies on the part of the nobility, see, in particular, E. Witte, Politieke machtsstrijd in en om de voomaamste Belgische steden. 1830-1848 (2 vols., Brus­sels, 1973), in which numerous examples are given.

18

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J. DEBELDER

APPENDIX II

Average age of eligibility and average duration of candidacy

Period of candidacy or maximum duration of candidacy

1831-1851 1852-1872 1873-1893 1831-1893

1831-1851 1852-1872 1873-1893 1831-1893

20

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14 12 11 10

Industrialization and economic growth in the Netherlands during the nineteenth century: an integration of recent studies *

R.W.J.M. BOS

INTRODUCTION

In 1968, I.A. de longe published an important study concerning industrialization in the Netherlands between 1850 and 19l4.t This was the first step towards an analysis based on the theory of economic growth. The purpose of the present article is to draw up a balance sheet of the methodical updating of the research into industrialization and economic growth in the Netherlands in the nineteenth century, which commenced with the work of De longe, has been taken over by other authors and is still con­tinuing.

Economic growth may be viewed as an enlargement of economic dimensions. Industrialization is its modem form. In a study concerning industrialization and economic growth in a (liberal) capitalist economy, prices occupy a central position among the rules of conduct which govern economic actions. Individuals - and groups -are obliged by scarcity to choose between actions. In doing so, their aim is to achieve the best possible result. They are mainly concerned with relative prices, for choice is not manifested in absolute prices? (see appendix 1) An entrepreneur opts for a mechanized form of production if the costs of the (additional) consumption of coal and other factors of production involved in mechanization are less than the saving which results from the reduction of labour. But whichever technique may be the most advantageous, it is a precondition that the cost price must be less than, or at most equal to, the market price. Such considerations apply to all who are obliged to make economic choices.

Although price is the guiding principle for economic actions, it is not the sole principle employed by those who participate in the economic process. This implies that their behaviour does not always accord with economic rationality. The classic price theory is based on the postulate of the completely transparent market. This

* Not previously published. 1. J.A. de Jonge, De industrialisatie in Nederland tussen 1850 en 1914 (Amsterdam, 1968); a long synopsis by the author in Acta historiae neerlandica, V (Leiden, 1971) 159-212. 2. Cf. R.W.J.M. Bos, 'Factorprijzen. technologie en marktstructuur: de groei van de Nederlandse volkshuisvesting 1815-1914', A.A.G. Bijdragen, XXII (Wageningen, 1979) 109-37. See also the single-factor analysis in: J. Mokyr, Industrialization in the Low Countries, 1795-1850 (New Haven, 1976) ch. iv and my criticism of this: R.W.J.M. Bos, 'Van periferie naar centrum; enige kantteke­ningen bij de Nederlandse industrii!le ontwikkeling in de negentiende eeuw', Maandschrift Econo­mie, XL (Tllburg, 1976);

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R.W.J.M. BOS

makes it possible to achieve equilibrium. However, in history this proposition will

not always be met. A less than complete insight into the market, the inertia which is inherent in human reaction, delaying mechanisms such as structural characteristics of an economic system; these and many other factors result in imbalances. Moreover, those who participate in the economy base their choice of action on their experience and the situation at the time. But their interpretation of past and present is not necessarily the right one. Their behaviour may thus differ from what, according to the classic price theory, would be called economico-rational.

If one defines economic equilibrium as the balanced use of available resources on the basis of the prevailing level of prices and their anticipated development in the period for which the resources are employed, equilibrium will be found only in ex­ceptional cases. The degree of imbalance, however, can vary from one period to another. After some time, processes of adaptation will come about on the path to equilibrium, but under their influence the equilibrium itself will shift. Structural price analysis makes it possible to follow the process in which a given economy moved to­wards its (shifting) equilibrium, to observe how industrialization and economic growth resulted from this, and to identify the new imbalances which occurred. We have chosen to approach the question of industrialization and economic growth on the basis of the theory of price and eqUilibrium because the economic theory of disequilibrium, 3

while closest to historical reality, is as yet insufficiently developed to serve as the starting point for an analysis. At some time in the future it will doubtless provide a deeper insight into, and an explanation of, economic processes. In disequilibrium lies the ~ynamism of economic life: in the necessity or desirability of adapting to changed (and changing) circumstances lies the mechanism which can elevate an economy to a higher level.

Economic success and economic failure are manifested in the market. It is there that the willingness of the potential customers to accept what is offered and to pay a price for it becomes evident. To establish the causes of industrialization and economic growth, and the circumstances under which these came about, it is necessary to obtain a thorough insight into the operation of the market. In doing so, attention will be paid to the economic circumstances in which the producers operated, for it is they who brought about the innovations in the production process. This they could not do independently of others. If an entrepreneurial initiative which in itself is rational in economic terms is to succeed, two conditions must be fulfilled: the factors of produc­tion must be placed at the disposal of the entrepreneurs and the consumers must be prepared to buy the products. The central theme of this article, however, is concerned with the more specific question, when and why industrial production in the Nether­lands became competitive, and how this led to economic growth. There are three factors of production, i.e. labour, capital and basic and ancillary materials.

3. Cf. F. Haslinger, 'Equilibrium versus disequilibrium theory: two paradigms in economics', paper prepared for presentation at the congress on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Catholic University of Tilburg, April 5-7 ,1978.

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INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 19TH CENTURY

A V AILABILITY, PRICE AND QUALITY OF LABOUR

In the second half of the eighteenth century, when modern industrial technology was developing, the Netherlands was known as a country with high wages.4 This had

been the case since the seventeenth century. In 1819 the provinces of Hoiland, Zee­land, Utrecht, Friesland and Groningen headed the list in this respect.s They were followed by Drenthe, Gelderland, Overijssel and North Brabant. The regional differences were great. In the eastern and southern provinces with predominantly sandy soils, wages were as much as fifty per cent below those in the western and northern provinces, with their clay soil, favourable infrastructure, commerce and shipping. Beyond the provinces of the Northern Netherlands, too, wages were high. In Hainault and Namur, in Bel­gium, they were comparable with the levels in Groningen and Friesland, while in the Liege region they were on a par with those in Gelderland. But despite regional differ­ences - which were substantially greater in the Netherlands than in Belgium - the overall level in the Netherlands, according to an industrial survey made in 1819, was about fifty per cent higher than in Belgium.

High wages, notably in the western provinces, had already led industry to move to rural areas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.6 In shipbuilding, originally an urban craft, the centre of gravity had shifted to the rural areas of Holland. The Zaan region merits reference in this context. Later, the province of Groningen became an important shipbuilding centre. The process of rural relocation had also extended to the textile sector. The towns of Holland, in which textile manufacturing was established, lost ground to the rural areas in the eastern and southern provinces. This may be seen as an example of pre-modern deindustrialization, for in the new centres textile manufacture became a cottage industry.7 During the whole of the nineteenth century, too, a wide margin continued to exist between wage levels in the alluvial western and northern provinces and the mainly diluvial eastern and southern regions.

What was the source of the relatively high wages in the Netherlands, and what was their significance? Economic growth during the closing decades of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth had caused a high demand for labour.

4. J.G. van Dillen, 'De economische ontwikkeling van Nederland', in: J.S. Bartstra and W. Banning, ed., Nederland tussen de natien (Amsterdam, 1948) II, 96; Joh. de Vries, De economi­sche achteruitgang der Republiek in de achttiende eeuw (Amsterdam, 1959) 107. Cf. C. Wilson, 'Taxation and the Decline of Empires, an unfashionable Theme', in: Economic History and the Historian. Collected Essays (London, 1969) 114-27; Jan de Vries, 'An Inquiry into the Behaviour of Wages in the Dutch Republic and the Southern Netherlands, 1580-1800', Acta historiae neer­landicae, X (The Hague, 1978) 79-97; J. Mokyr, Industrialization, 168-89 and R.T. Griffiths, Industrial Retardation in the Netherlands 1830-1850 (The Hague, 1979) 55-65. 5. Mokyr,lndustrialization, 177. 6. Z.W. Sneller, 'De opkomst van de plattelandsnijverheid in Nederland in de 17e en 18e eeuw', Economisch-historische herdrukken (The Hague, 1964) 117-27; R.W. Unger, Dutch Shipbuilding before 1800. Ships and Guilds (Assen, 1978) 84 ff. 7. Cf. L. Noordegraaf, 'Nijverheid in de N:oordelijke Nederlanden 1580-1650', Algemene Ge­schiedenis der Nederlanden, VII (new edition, Haarlem, 1980) 66-84; P.c. Jansen, 'Nijverheid in de Noordelijke Nederlanden 1650-1780', ibidem, VIII (1979) 102-23.

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The demand was highest in the western provirices, but was also substantial in the

north. It would be true to say that the west and north, by reason of shipping routes and trade relations, formed a single region, albeit the centre of gravity indisputably lay in the west.8 The high demand for labour there exerted pressure on the labour market. This was relieved by population growth and by immigration from the sur­rounding provinces and from abroad. The rapid rise in wages paved the way for this influx. To cite an example, a bricklayer's mate in Antwerp or Leiden in 1590 earned 14 stuivers per day. This rate remained constant in Antwerp, at least until 1790; but in Leiden the rate had risen to 21 stuivers by 1640 or thereabouts. There, too, a long period of overall stability ensued.9

What made it possible for high wages to be paid in the western and northern provin­ces without immediately affecting their competitive position? The answer is as simple as it is significant. Broadly speaking, more efficient use was made of labour in that area than elsewhere. lO Jan de Vries has pointed out that the per capita energy supply available to workers in Holland was unmatched until the arrival of the steam engine. This situation obviously affected the level of productivity.11 This was particularly true of manufacturing. Nor must we ignore the geographical position of this area, which owed its importance to the growing trade between northern and southern Europe. A rapid expanding market enabled the existing advantages of specialization to be ex­ploited and further developed. Specialization meant greater efficiency on the part of the trader, in shipment and in the operation of the market as a whole,12 while the low cost of transporting domestic and foreign raw materials served to widen the range of manufactured products. The advantages of specialization and economies of scale were greater than ever before, and existing and new technologies were utilized to the fullest possible extent. This applied not only in trade and industry, but also in the agricultural sector. Supplies of cheap grain from the Baltic enabled farmers to con­centrate on cattle-breeding for dairy production and meat. l3

But the difference between wage levels in the western and northern provinces and those in the east and south was attributable to a number of other factors as well. The migration from the east and south to the west failed to bring the diluvial areas adequate relief from population pressure. Large urban centres of trade and industry such as existed in the west, and which made specialization possible, were lacking in the eastern

8. Jan de Vries, 'Barges and Capitalism. Passenger Transportation in the Dutch economy, 1632-1839', A.A. G. Bijdragen, XXI (1978) 33-398. 9. Cited in De Vries, 'Wages', 81-5, which contains a number of other examples. Cf. Jansen, 'Nijverheid', 114-6. 10. Cf. Wilson, 'Taxation', 116. 11. De Vries, 'Wages', 86; J.W. de Zeeuw, 'Peat and,the Dutch Golden Age. The historical meaning of energy -attainab ility' , A.A. G. Bijdragen, XXI, 3-31. 12. J.G. van Dillen, Van rijkdom en regenten (The Hague, 1970) ch. iii, iv; T.P. van der Kooy, Hollands stapelmarkt en hoar verval (Amsterdam, 1931); P.W. Klein, 'Handel, geld- en bankwezen in de Noordelijke Nederlanden 1650-1795', Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, VIII, 168-81. 13. Jan de Vries, 'Landbouw in de Noordelijke Nederlanden 1490-1650', ibidem, VII, 20-4; idem, The Dutch Rural Economy in the Golden Age, 1500-1700 (New Haven, 1974) 119-73.

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INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 19TH CENTURY

and southern regions.14 Nor were there any similar forces acting as a stimulus to specialization in farming. Although grain prices were influenced by shipments from the Baltic, as was the case in the west, natural circumstances which predisposed to high wages and specialization were largely absent. In the west, rising wages stimulated the search for, and implementation of, measures to increase efficiency. Improved control of the water level and the relatively low grain prices contributed to a situation in which the solution was sought in dairy farming. The low"lying sandy areas of the eastern provinces, however, were in many cases rather wet, and the more elevated of them rather dry. The well-organized water control system, necessitated by the earlier winning of peat, gave the western provinces an advantage. In the sandy regions, by contrast, poor water management, plus the fact that many of the dry areas lay waste, obliged farmers to adopt a multiple path, combining arable and dairy farming.1s

They owed their livelihood to this symbiosis, and although it was conducive to the provision of employment, the low natural fertility of the soil resulted in relatively low per capita production and a small income. Thus the conditions under which wages were fIXed in the sandy regions of the country differed fundamentally from those in the western and northern provinces.

The middle of the seventeenth century saw the beginning of a period of secular decline. In qualitative terms, other countries adopted techniques and organizational patterns similar to those in Holland. Under the prevailing circumstances in the Dutch Republic, further specialization and improvement of production techniques were no longer possible. At the existing wage level, the efforts made in other countries to close the technological and organizational gap inevitably led to a relative loss of economic importance. This loss was, of course, greater in the west than in the east and south.16

In the foregoing we have examined the origin of high wages, notably in the western and northern parts of the Republic, and the consequences of these when the Republic's lead in terms of productivity diminished. The continuation of the high level of wages in the period in which the economic and technological lead declined, and in some branches of industry and trade turned into a backlog, is quite another matter. Charles Wilson is among those who consider that high wages were a significant factor in the rapid decline which occurred in the eighteenth century, and he attributes them to the

14. A.M. van der Woude, 'De demografische ontwikkeling van de Noordelijke Nederlanden 1500-1800', Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, V (1980) 134-9. 15. Cf. De Vries, 'Landbouw', 37-9. Also H.K. Roessingh, 'Landbouw in de Noordelijke Neder­Ianden 1650-1815',Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, VIII, 16-72. 16. In the coastal provinces, the population declined between 1680 and 1750, probably by 10 per cent. The fall" was most pronounced in the industrial centres and in the most northerly part of North Holland. In contrast to this, the population of the eastern provinces increased substantially. J .A. Faber, H.K. Roessingh et al., 'Population changes and economic developments in the Nether­lands: a historical survey', A.A.G. Bijdragen, XII (l965) 47-113. Cf. A.M. van der Woude, 'Het Noorderkwartier', A.A. G. Bijdragen, XVI (1972); De Vries, Dutch Rural Economy, ch. iii; Van der Woude, 'Demografische ontwikkeling', 128-34. For a more comprehensive explanation of the process of decline, see A.M. van der Woude, 'De 'Nieuwe Geschiedenis' in een nieuwe gedaante', Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, V, 9-35.

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high rate of taxation, particularly to the heavy duties on consumer goods. I7 The burden of taxation per capita in the Netherlands was indeed substantially greater than in other countries.

Mokyr, however, calculated, on the basis of a broad estimate, that duties on the necessities of life represented some ten per cent or less of the total expenditure of working-class families in the first half of the nineteenth century.IS But even if these indirect taxes had been passed on in full in prices, and prices passed on in full in wages, this would still not account for the substantial difference between wage levels in the Netherlands and those abroad.

In attempting to explain the high wages, Griffiths, too, devoted attention to the issue of taxation. He calculated that the sum of the indirect taxes, i.e. those levied by the government and those imposed by local authorities, about the middle of the nine­teenth century accounted for 9.1 per cent of the average working-class budget in the country as a whole, 13.4 per cent in the coastal provinces, 18.2 per cent in North Holland and 21.6 in Amsterdam. Griffiths regards the total burden of indirect taxation as a crucial factor in the level of wages in the western provinces in comparison with those abroad, and also in the differences existing between the various regions of the country .19 When he attributes regional differences in wages to regional variations in indirect taxation, Griffiths bases his argument on weak evidence. He calculates the regional tax burden on the basis of an estimated national average working-class budget. Wages, however, often differed by fifty per cent between one region and another.20 If one recalculates the share of taxation on the basis of the regional family budget, the difference between the interior and the coastal provinces in terms of tax burden is eliminated?'

Causes other than taxation have been ex~ned in an effort to explain the con­tinuation of the high level of wages. Mokyr points out that wages will be higher in a country having an extensive system for caring for the poor than in a country which has none.22 And charity and poor relief were indeed of a high order in the Netherlands, at least until the middle of the nineteenth century. The large number of unemployed in the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth may therefore have con­sisted largely of people who, at the level of poor relief available, were unwilling to work for the wages then being offered. Or, to paraphrase Mokyr's opinion, wages were too high to produce a situation approaching full employment.

17. Wilson, 'Taxation', 118 ff. 18. Mokyr, Industrialization, 193. Jan de Vries adds that in the first half of the 17th century, when wages reached their highest point, the burden of taxation was still considerably smaller. 'This chronological discrepancy must cast further doubt on the significance of taxes as a major cause of-high wages in the Dutch Republic': De Vries, 'Wages', 38. 19. Grifflths,Retardation, 60. 20. Mokyr,Industriaiization, 177. 21. In a recent article J.M.M. De Meere, in trying to account for regional differences in nominal wages; opts for an explanation on the basis of differences in the costs of living. In his opinion, the regional differences in real wages were small: 'Daglonen in Belgie en Nederland in 1819 - een aan· vuUing -', Tiidschrift voor sociale geschiedenis, XX (dec. 1980) 357-84. 22. Mokyr ,Industrialization, 193-7.

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INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 19TH CENTURY

In addition to institutional factors such as taxes and poor relief, the agricultural sector has been examined as a possible source of the difference between wages in the Netherlands and Belgium in 1819. Domestic industry in the rural areas was markedly less prevalent in the Netherlands than in Belgium, but no objective reasons can be given for this. Mokyr considers it to be a plausible hypothesis that, in terms of per capita output, agriculture was more productive in the Netherlands than in Belgium, so that the farmers had no need of additional income from domestic industry. All the labour available within the family could be productively employed in agricultural activity. Although no precise data are available, Mokyr establishes that the per capita wealth of those engaged in agriculture and the area of cultivated land per head of the rural population were indeed greater in the Netherlands than in Belgium.23 Jan de Vries was the first to place emphasis on the operation of the labour market as the cause of the high level of wages. Although his investigation is concerned with the period prior to 1800, no fundamental change such as industrialization occurred in the Dutch economy before the middle of the nineteenth century, and thus his ob­servations also apply to the period after 1800. He points out that the level of wages did not playa constructive role in restoring the balance on the labour market, which had been deteriorating since 1675. In the western part of the country, the necessary change was brought about not by lowering the level of wages, but by a decline of population. De Vries then points to unemployment among the working popUlation in the inland regions. The labour market was characterized by high unemployment in a limited number of sectors, an acute shortage of labour in others and an inflow of foreign workers who were accustomed to a low standard of living.24 The author cites the phenomena of a poorly functioning labour market, but does not discuss possible causes. One is left to conclude that the level of wages apparently assumed an increas­ingly historical character and became less and less a reflection of a balanced economic situation.

In the discussion concerning the level of wages, the use of terms is not always correct. Mokyr, Griffiths and Jan de Vries employ the daily wage (= income!) to explain economic stagnation. This in itself is correct provided they limit themselves to individual professional groups and, with these as a basis, attempt to form an image of the whole. But it ceases to be correct as soon as they employ national or regional wage averages. Mokyr calculates these averages with the aid of the industrial survey of 1819. National and regional wage averages, however, are based not only on the wages paid for similar work, but also on the manner in which labour is employed in the various branches of industry. This can vary from one region to another. Wages in one branch of industry differ from those in another. Regional and international differ­ences in the average wage per worker thus do not necessarily stem from different rates of pay for the same job. They can also emanate from differences in industrial structure (see Appendix 11).

23. Ibidem, 197-201. For the regional variations in the area of land cultivated per head of the rural population, see Van der Woude, 'Demografische ontwikkeling', 126-8. 24. De Vries, 'Wages', 89-90.

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In 1819 the average industrial daily wage level in the Netherlands was more than 50 per cent higher than in Belgium,> but the mean difference in the price of labour was less than ten per cent. (see Appendix III) The balance stemmed from a difference in industrial structure: the branches of industry in which high wages were paid were more strongly represented in the Netherlands than in Belgium. It is a plausible as­sumption that there was a causal connection between the level of labour costs (price of labour) and the rate of taxation.2s Mokyr's estimate of the burden of taxation (ten per cent or less) and the recalculated estimate of Griffiths are so closely in agreement with our estimate of the cost of labour that we can accept the first-named factor as the principal cause of the difference between labour costs in the Netherlands and in Belgium. This view is in part based on the assumption that the burden of indirect taxes in Belgium was light in comparison with the Netherlands. It was the industrial structure which made wages appear high, but from the point of view of the cost price of goods, the cost of labour is the relevant factor.

Reverting to the question of the cost price of goods, it may be concluded that in the Netherlands the high level of labour costs in itself prompted the use of techniques with a low labour intensity. Whether or not the existing technical possibilities offered adequate compensation for the high level of wages is a question which cannot yet be answered definitively. This depends upon the technical possibilities for replacing labour by other factors of production, and also upon the question whether there was any pOint in doing so. It is conceivable that not only labour, but also the remaining factors of production were more costly in the Netherlands than elsewhere. In that case, Dutch manufacturers, irrespective of the technique employed, would not have been competitive.

Even if only the cost of labour had been higher in the Netherlands than elsewhere, other circumstances being equal, Dutch manufacturers would have had to employ more capital-intensive techniques than their foreign rivals in order to be competitive. This was clearly not the case, in industry at least.26 The first half of the nineteenth century was a period of technological stagnation. There were isolated moves towards a modem-industrial development, but these were of modest significance and, moreover, were influenced by specific favourable factors. In terms of economic growth, the effects of these traces of industrialization were nullified by the decline of other branches of industry. Although we have concluded that the difference in wages which is relevant from the point of cost price, i.e. the cost per unit of labour, between the Netherlands and Belgium was less than ten per cent - a substantially lower figure than that calculated by Mokyr - it is necessary to examine the remainder of the wage differential.

The industrial structure, which was favourable from the point of view of the average wage level, stemmed from the period of prosperity in the Republic. The

25. Mokyr,lndustrialization, 192. 26. Griffiths, Retardation, ch. iv, v, vi. 27. A.M. van der Woude, 'Alfabetisering', Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, VII, 257-64.

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high standard of living and the existing level of specialization were conducive to the production of quality goods. The high standard of education among the Dutch pop­ulation, which was reflected in a low level of illiteracy,27 was an added factor. This situation was probably intensified in the eighteenth century. The branches of industry in which wages were high in the Republic as well as in other countries, and in which a high degree of intelligence was demanded on the part of workers, were better able to meet foreign competition than those in which lower wages were paid and the required standard of education was low. But from the second half of the seventeenth century the quality of labour available became less and less commensurate with the needs of a competitive industry. Wages in the Republic became too high. As a consequence of stagnating productivity at home and rising productivity abroad, wages were evolving from a factor based on economic reality into a factor determined by tradition. In this context, the fossilizing influence exerted on the labour market by the guilds must be borne in mind.28 At the end of the eighteenth century the problem was exacerbated by the development of modem technology, which demanded a fundamental change in the labour market.

Von Laer has shown that in some sections of modem industry in Germany in the nineteenth century (he cites the textile industry as an example) a low standard of education on the part of workers was no barrier to the achievement of satisfactory results. Wages in these branches of industry were low, and working conditions bad. Female and child labour were very much the rule rather than the exception. The greater proportion of the workers originally hailed from the rural areas. The situation in the engineering industry contrasted strongly with that in textiles. Here, the degree of knowledge and physical strength required was relatively high, the period of training long and the wages high. The majority of all employed (senior management, middle management and workers) were recruited from the middle class. In this branch of industry, people could move up, or down, the social ladder, and in this sense, too, it contrasted strongly with textiles. There, the company hierarchy reflected the way in which the society was sub-divided: the entrepreneurs came mainly from the upper crust, the workers exclusively from the lower strata?9

It is a condition of economic development that the level of education of workers and their aspirations in regard to income should be matched to the needs of industry. Every type of activity, old or new, imposes its particular demands. Unless supply and demand are matched in the labour market, economic development is slowed down. That is what happened in the Netherlands in the first half of the nineteenth century. At the time of the establishment and early development of the metalworking industry in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, hardly any complaints were heard concerning the level of education of the workers and the wages which they expected. Although technical knowledge was imported from other countries, the qualifications of the great majority of the workers were commensurate with the requirements. But the attempts to establish

28. Van Dillen, Rijkdom. 290-4,298-300; Unger, Shipbuilding, ch. vi. 29. H. von Laer, Industrialisierung und QualWit der Arbeit. Eine bildungs-okonomische Unter­suchung fUr das 19. lahrhundert (New York, 1977).

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a modern textile industry in Haarlem led to numerous complaints, and these attempts largely failed. Similar initiatives in North Brabant and Twente, however, succeeded, albeit there, partly owing to dissimilar circumstances, non-mechanical techniques were employed at the outset.30 The explanation lies in the fact that in comparison with North Holland, the industrial price of labour was some 14 per cent lower in Overijssel (.of which Twente forms a part) and some 20 per cent lower in North Bra­bant. Even more importantly, the historical burden which had made people accustomed to a high income was lacking. In N.orth Holland, the high wages had arisen from the early orientation towards highly specialized craft trades. As a result of the structure of industry there, the average daily wage for industrial workers was 14.6 per cent above the national average, whereas in Overijssel and North Brabant the figures were below the national average by 17.1 and 13.9 per cent respectively.31 Consequently, the workers in the southern and eastern parts of the country were more willing to accept a low-paid job in industry than were their counterparts in the west. And for many of the jobs in industry, a low standard of education - and accordingly a low wage - was adequate. The situation in Maastricht confirms this view. In the crystal, glass and pottery industry which arose there, low educational qualifications were acceptable for most jobs. The wages were therefore low, and large numbers of women and children were employed in the factories.32

In the western part of the country, where lay the focus of the domestic market, and which was itself favourably situated for the export trade, the desired wage was in many cases out of step with the demand for labour on the part of existing or potential industrial employers. The lack of flexibility in the labour market significantly limited the opportunities open to Dutch industry. With the absence of iron ore and of stocks of coal which could be mined by modern industrial methods, the potential base for industry was already smaller than in other countries. There are common character­istics between the provincial differences in desired income and the degree ofliteracy.33 To meet the needs of commerce, shipping and industry, the levels.of popular education and literacy in the Republic were already high in the seventeenth century. Despite regional differences, the effect of this was still discernible in the nineteenth century. In Belgium, 51 per cent of the military recruits in 1843 were illiterate; in 1850 the figure was still 44 per cent. In the Netherlands, the level in the period 1846-1849 was only 26 per cent. 34

Industrialization in the Netherlands commenced prior to the middle of the century and was manifested in a number of scattered initiatives. The general economic climate, however, cannot be said to have been favourable. From 1850 onwards the importance of industry gradually increased, but it was not until after 1890 that industrial develop·

30. Griffiths, Retardation, ch. vi. 31. Cf. appendix III. 32. A.J.Fr. Maenen, Petrus Regout (1801·1878); een bijdrage tot de sociaal-economische ge­schiedenis van Maastricht (Tilburg, 1959). 33. Cf. Mokyr, Industrialization, 177; Van der Woude, 'Alfabetisering', 260. 34. Van der Woude, 'Alfabetisering', 258.

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INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 19TH CENTURY

ment became genera1.35 Its geographical pattern revealed similarities to the situation in the labour market and the regional differences in education and craft structure. By the end of the century the western part of the country had become the centre for in­dustrial undertakings which paid high wages and employed highly qualified workers, while in the eastern and southern parts low wages were still being paid and work needing only a comparatively low standard of education was the rule rather than the exception.

The general impoverishment of workers, so manifest in other countries in the ear­ly stages of industrialization,36 was less pronounced in the Netherlands. The relative­ly early pre-modern and craft-based development of industries and the average level of education of the workers acted as a brake. At the same time, we have to conclude that the poorly functioning labour market, which prevented the impoverishment of the working class, was among the factors which led to a very modest rate of economic growth in the first half of the century. Moreover, the situation on the labour market was the principal cause of the· high and permanent unemployment. The rather high price of labour was no moTe than a secondary factor in the slow rate of industrial development.

Until the 1850s, the level of wages, the price of labour scarcely rose. Although the guilds had been abolished in 1798,37 and the decree proclaimed anew in 1818, the labour market did not lose its rigidity. It is probable that the ratios between the wages for different groups of workers remained constant; but as no time series are as yet available, it is difficult to make any definitive statements. I. J. Brugmans takes the view that wages rose by about 10 per cent between 1819 and 1853. He states that carpenters' wages increased by just over 30 per cent in the period 1818-48. The regional differences in the percentage increase, however, range between just over 13 per cent and 80 per cent.38 It is our impression that the data employed by Brugmans are not comparable. Those for the year 1819 apply to the wages paid to all carpenters working in one province; those for 1848 to the remuneration claimed for special work. Our distrust on this point is based on our.own research, which lead us to conclude that, apart from the period of occupation by the French - when wages were some­times considerably elevated - and the sharp decline which followed this, the wages paid to craftsmen between the 1820s and 1850 remained virtually constant.

In the middle of the century, the rigid situation on the labour market came to a sudden end. The wage level and occupational pattern of labour started to move to­wards a new equilibrium. As Table I shows, the situation changed during the second half of the century, industry and the services sector gaining in importance at the ex­pense of agriculture.

35. De Jonge,lndustrialisatie, 236. 36. See, for example, Mokyr, Industrialization, 237 ff. 37. 1.1. Brugmans,Paardenkracht en mensenmocht (2nd ed., The Hague, 1969) 3. 38. Idem, De arbeidende klasse in Nederland in de 1ge eeuw, 1813-1870 (l1th ed., Utrecht, 1978) 12&, 132. Cf. De Jonge, Industrialisatie, 287-8, which also deals with the rigid situation on the labour market.

31

R.W.J.M. BOS

Table 1. Bran ch wise distribution of working population, as percentage of to tal employed

Agriculture, fisheries and hunting Industry, manufacturing Services Other sectors Total

Source: De Jonge, Industrialisatie, 296.

1849

44 24 29

3 100

1889

33 29 36

2 100

1909

28 32 38

2 100

Initially, however, the developments which took place in the labour market produc­ed only limited improvements in wages. The reason lay in the continuing high level of unemployment. But in this area, too, the 1850s indisputably produced a turning point:

the peak of structural unemployment was passed. By about 1870 the phenomenon had disappeared.39 A new equilibrium, in which fuller use was made of the economic potential, was reached. The government's unequivocal choice of a liberal economy was the expression of a change of mentality and one which also broke through the rigid situation on the labour market.

There is little precise information concerning the regional distribution of the in­crease in wages which came about after 1850. Our own provisional estimate shows that the increase for craftsmen between 1853 and 1868 was at most 10-15 per cent.40 It is probable that the price of industrial labour rose by a similar margin. Brugmans, how­

ever, states that average daily wages in the textile industry in Twente rose by 30 per cent between 1841 and 1860, and that the increase was smaller in the weaving mills than in the spinning mills. The latter he attributes to the fact that weaving was more of a cottage industry than spinning and was therefore less well paid.41 The magnitude of the increase calculated by Brugmans, however, probably reflects the influence of specific factors, the most important of which was growing mechanization, particularly in the spinning mills,42 and the accompanying changes in the distribution of workers over the various wage groups. Secondly, there was the continuing shift from cottage industry to factory production; and fmally the fact that round about 1840 wages were extremely low. A comparison shows that the developments in Twente were in­deed influenced by special factors. In Brabant, where mechanization took longer to get into its stride, the increase in wages was markedly smaller, being about 6 per cent for adult males, while for women there was no improvement at all.43

Not until about 1868 did wages rise by a significant margin in comparison with the

39. De Jonge, lndustrialisatie, 288. 40. Estimate based on the author's researches in a number of local archives. 41. Brugrnans,Arbeidende klasse, 129. 42. A.P.G. Boot, De Twentsche katoennijverheid 1830-1873 (Amsterdam, 1935) 107, 125. cr. De Jonge,lndustrialisatie, 97-102. 43. Brugmans,Arbeidende klasse, 130-1.

32

INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 19TH CENTUR Y

gradual improvement of the preceding 15 years.44 The phenomenon was the product of the emergence of modern economic growth. For the first time, there was a clear upward trend, and this continued until the second half of the 1870s. The increase ranged from 20 to 40 per cent, depending upon trade and region.4s It is probable that the average daily wage rose further by reason of the fact that industry required more highly qualified workers.46 The end of the 1870s was followed by a period of stagnation: There were instances of wages actually declining, but the margins were small in comparison with the preceding increase.47 However, the composition of the working population changed somewhat under the influence of growing competition in industry and greater use was made of female and child labour. It was not until the end of the century that wages again showed a small rise. The cyclical recoveries which occurred round about 1880 and 1890 had not produced a lasting improvement in wages. The increase which took place in the closing years of the century was of a hesitant nature and modest proportions; it was certainly not a general increase. The tempo of wage rises did not increase until after the turn of the century.

De Jonge has calculated that the daily wage in industry rose by 75 per cent between 1850 and 1914.48 This figure, however, includes the increase which accompanied changes in the structure of the group employed in industry. As Table II shows, it was preCisely those industries, where numerous relatively well-paid craftsmen were em­ployed, that displayed the greatest increase in employment. This was automatically accompanied by an increase in the average daily wage. As examples, De Jonge cites the metalworking industry - notably the machinery sector - the heavy electrical in­dustry and shipbuilding, and also the gas and electricity supply sectors. These branches experienced strong growth, particularly from the 1890s onwards. From a tentative calculation, De J onge obtained the impression that about 10 per cent of the increase in wages between 1850 and 1914 is attributable to that growth.

After the middle of the nineteenth century, scarcely any complaints were heard about the unsuitability of Dutch workers or high wages. Foreign workers continued to be employed in Dutch industry, but most of them were skilled foremen and their number represented only a small fraction of the total. There are indications that the wage in­creases which took place after the end of the 1860s were allied to a shortage oflabour. They certainly cannot be attributed solely to the rise in the cost of living.

Aided by developments in the labour market, one may draw a number of con­clusions concerning the role played by the factor of labour in the modernization of

44. Brugmans reports a 'not inconsiderable increase' in wages in Tilburg: Arbeidende kiasse, 131. According to De Jonge, the level of wages rose sharply between 1869 and 1879: Industrialisatie, 289 ff. 45. Provisional estimate based on data concerning building and carpentry. The more highly skilled workers received a larger increase than the less skilled, producing a shift in the wage ratios. 46. De Jonge,lndustrialisatie, 289. 47. Ibidem, 290. 48. Ibidem. 287.

33

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Table II. Numbers employed in certain industries, as percentage oftotalindustrial workforce

1849 1859 1889 1899 1909

Food and beverage 10.7 11.5 15.0 16.3 16.2 Textiles, clothing, footwear and

leather 42.2 38.5 29.1 26.8 24.7 Household effects, jewellery, wood

products and paper 10.0 11.4 12.9 11.4 11.4 Graphic industry, chemicals, public

utilities 2.1 2.2 3.5 4.5 5.8 Metalworking 11.1 12.4 11.8 13.8 15.1 Building and building materials 21.7 22.6 26.7 25.9 25.2 Unclassified 2.2 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.6

Source: De Jonge,Industrialisatie, 228 and 229.

the Dutch economy. Prior to 1850 the labour market was characterized by an under­employment equilibrium. This resulted primarily from two factors:

Firstly, and most importantly, relatively high aspirations on the part of the workers in the matter of wages; these stemmed from a high level of education and an inclina­tion towards craft skills. There were, however, marked regional differences in these respects.

Secondly, a high price of labour, which was an obstacle to competing with other countries.

The virtual absence in the Netherlands of industrial raw materials meant that the potential basis for Dutch industry was smaller than elsewhere; and this was rendered smaller still by the rigid situation on the labour market.49

In the Netherlands, as in other countries, the need to break with traditional patterns in order to achieve maximum growth gave rise to liberalism. The liberal trend of the 1850s also left its mark on the Dutch labour market. There was a movement towards a new equilibrium and one which was more in harmony with the economic opportu-

nities. Permanent unemployment disappeared - or at least was forced down to a more acceptable level - and a new wages structure emerged. It is not yet fully clear how this process took place. However, we do know that the modernization of the labour market manifested itself in a lasting process of adaptation and greater flexibility. This was brought about by a change of mentality and by the improvement of commu­nications, especially from the 1860s onwards. By 1870, perhaps even a little earlier, a new, evolving, structural balance had been achieved. Cyclical influences then pre­dominated.

Although many people continued to live in needy circumstances until the be­ginning of the twentieth century, poverty among working-class families was not on

49. Cf. also De Jonge,Industrialisatie, 286-90.

34

INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 19TH CENTURY

the scale which accompanied the early phases of industrialization in other countries. A positive effect of the poor functioning of the labour market was that, until 1850 at least, the tendencies towards reducing wages - which stemmed from a high level of unemployment - had no influence on wages as a whole. This was feasible owing to the excellence of the system of charity and poor-relief. Moreover, the nature of the modernization and the period in which this took place prevented serious pauper­ization. Between 1850 and 1870, substantial modernization was achieved in the agri­cultural sector. It developed into a powerful industry in which the emphasis lay on the export of dairy produce. Because of this expansion and the favourable natural cir­cumstances, the decline of the agricultural share of total employment remained less than in other countries when industrialization assumed greater Significance. But by the end of the 1870s, increasing international competition gave rise to difficulties which could be solved only by structural adaptation. These involved shedding labour at an increased rate, but agriculture continued to provide employment for a relatively large share of the working population. Other factors to which the comparatively low

degree of pauperization can be attributed are the important role played by the services sector; the nature of Dutch industry, in which the emphasis clearly lay on the lighter industries, notably the food and beverage sector; and the small average size of the factories. These factors, together with the standard of education of the workers and the virtual absence of geographical concentrations of industry, prevented the Dutch industrial scene of assuming the drab features to which people in many other countries had become accustomed.

THE MARKET FOR INDUSTRIAL RAW MATERIALS

The question of the feasibility of industrial development can be replaced by one concerning the applicability of labour-saving technologies, or the applicability of technologies which are intensive in terms of capital and/or basic and ancillary mate­rials. These are two sides of the same coin. As explained earlier, the applicability of modern technologies is governed by their profitability. Leaving aside the question of the need for investment, and thus the availability and the cost of capital, it can be said that the industrial era heralded the era of coal and iron. In terms of these commodities, the Netherlands was in a poor position.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century there were a number of coalmines in South Limburg. In general, the companies which operated them were small and their methods were not of a modern-industrial nature. so As a result of the eccentric loca­tion of these mines with respect to the remainder of the country, and their low out­put, sales were limited to the immediate neighbourhood in Limburg and the adjacent regions of Germany and Belgium. Only two of the mines were of any importance. The

50. C.E.P.M. Raedts, De opkomst, de ontwikkeling en de neergang van de steenkolenmiinbouw in Limburg (Assen, 1974) passim.

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remainder were operated by small, poorly equipped companies which, during the period of French occupation, were confronted with declining profitability as com­petition from larger foreign mines increased. But in the second half of the 1830s there emerged a trend towards the pooling of concessions as a means of achieving profitable operations. This phase lasted until the 1850s, when two former rivals, both of whom were financed with foreign capital, merged.

By 1850 the economic situation in the mining industry had improved. Large-scale drilling was carried out in Limburg with the aim of acquiring greater knowledge of subterranean conditions and thus discovering where commercially viable deposits of coal lay. These operations, which were nearly all backed by foreign companies, con­tinued until 1872. Thirty concessions were applied for, but technical problems and lack of funds delayed the sinking of the shafts. The Netherlands government ultimate­ly issued thirteen permits, but during 1890 and 1891 ten of these were revoked be­cause the required sureties had not been forthcoming. A company in which two foreign groups co-operated thereupon submitted an application for the lapsed con­cessions1 and' when this was accepted the company commenced to exploit the de­posits. This success, coming just before the end of the nineteenth century, also heralded the birth of modern coal mining in the Netherlands.

During the whole of the century, the majority of the Dutch mines were in foreign hands. Output was small in comparison with domestic consumption,S! and moreover, the greater part of the coal mined went abroad.52 Dutch consumers were dependent upon imported coal, the price of which was fixed in the international market - and to which transport charges were added. During the first half of the century, political con­flicts and measures in the area of trade policy repeatedly de-stabilized trade relations with the foreign coal suppliers. The share of separated supply areas of foreign coal in the total sales on the Dutch market fluctuated strongly.53 Added to this, foreign producers preferred to sell in their own markets, where they met the least competition. There they felt protected by the fact that competition from other countries was hampered by transport costs - and sometimes also by measures emanating from trade policy. As a result of this, the Dutch coal market was greatly influenced by develop­ments abroad. That market, moreover, lay at the periphery of the foreign centres of production, a fact which was reflected in high prices.54 Britain, with its low-priced coal, dominated the world market. But to transport coal to the Netherlands from Bri­tain was more expensive than from other supply areas. Although, besides the British and the Belgians, German producers appeared on the Dutch market, a permanent supply of cheap German coal only became a fact with the rapid development of mining

51. Even on the eve of the First World War, by which time coal mining had become a modern industry, less than 7 per cent of the coal consumed in the Netherlands came from the pits in Limburg. Cf. I.C.A. Everwijn, Beschrijving van handel en nijverheid in Nederland (The Hague, 1912) 1,87. 52. Raedts,Opkomst, 152; Everwijn, Beschrijving, 1,7. 53. H.P.H. Nusteling, De Rijnvaart in het tijdperk van stoom en steenkoo11831-1914 (Amster­dam, 1974) 171-5. 54. Cf. Bos, 'Periferie', 83-92.

36

INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 19TH CENTURY

in the Ruhr area and the improvement of the Dutch railway system. The influence of these developments was felt from the 1860s onwards.55

Although we lack a dynamic comparison of Dutch and foreign coal prices over a period of years, the scanty data available provide an insight into the situation on the Dutch coal market. In 1829 the price of Ghent coal was 17.4 per cent higher in Rotterdam than at the pithead, and in 1830 16.3 per cent. The difference is attribut­able to transport costs. British coal bore not only transport costs, but also export duty, and in addition there were differential tariffs for shipment from Britain to the Netherlands. Although Llangenneck coal, at the pithead price, was considerably

cheaper than Ghent coal, the additional costs made it twice or three times as expensive in Rotterdam. In April 1831, British coal in Rotterdam cost 5.38 guilders per ton, to which were added 3.40 guilders for export duty and 5.74 guilders for freight charges. And then to think that Rotterdam was best placed in terms of sea links with Britain, -and was also well supplied with waterways leading from the Belgian coal­fields.56 Griffiths, from whose researches these data were obtained, concludes that in 1830 the Netherlands lagged well behind Britain and Belgium in the matter of coal supplies. In his view, this situation had slightly changed by about 1850. He ascribes the improvement to the abolition of export duty when Britain accepted the principle of free trade and to the fact that the price of coal had meanwhile fallen substantially. Although, on these grounds, he rightly concludes that the situation on the Dutch coal marked improved to some extent, there is another, negative, aspect: transport costs were not reduced in step with the decline in coal prices and so their influence on the ultimate price became relatively greater.

Even the coastal towns were at a disadvantage from the point of view of buying coal, while in the majority of the eastern and southern provinces the situation was far worse. In 1843 the price of coal in Rotterdam was down to 11 guilders per ton, but in North Brabant this still averaged between 14.33 and 16.50 guilders per ton. This contrasted strongly with the situation in the nearby province of Limburg. In September 1844, while the price in Brabant was 14.10 guilders, it was only 7.08 guilders in Limburg. In 1845 the average in Brabant was 15.24 guilders, and in 1846 15.98 guilders, while in those years the monthly averages in Limburg ranged from 7.40 to 7.91 and 7.91 to 9.08 guilders respectively. The explanation lay in the fact that Limburg was in the immediate vicinity of Belgian coalfields and enjoyed lower prices than any other Dutch province.57 This was an important factor in the early development of Maas­tricht as an industrial town. In 1855, the cost of a ton of coal was 17.62 guilders in Enschede, 11.30 in Leiden and 4.50 in Manchester.58 Griffiths warns against under­estimating the significance of distances which seem small by modern standards but

55. P. Wiel, Wirtscha!tsgeschichte des .Ruhrgebietes (Essen, 1970) 385 ff.; Nusteling, Ri;nvaart, 103-11,274-90. Cf. also R.W.I.M. Bos, Brits-Nederlandse handel en scheepvaart, 1870-1914. Een analyse-van machtsafbrokkelingop een markt (thesis, Tilburg, 1978) 111-46. 56. Griffiths, Retardation, 75 ff. 57. Ibidem, 76 ff. 58. Ibidem, 77.

37

R.W.J.M. BOS

which, because the transport network was underdeveloped, exerted a major influence on the freight charge for voluminous commodities. In 1853 the Chamber of Commerce in Enschede reported that: 'The high cost of coal in Enschede can only be reduced by the construction of a railway from Rheine to Enschede, enabling coal to be brought from the mines to the factories without transshipment and reducing the cost by 30

to 40 per cent.S9 But it was to be the second half of the 1860s before the building of railways made a major impact on the price of coal in Twente.

In 1832, a British expert who was consulted about the desirability of mechan­izing production in Twente, advised against the establishment of steam-powered weaving milTs because, having cheap labour available, there would be no benefit in terms of results.60 With its base in an area of cheap labour by Dutch standards, the cotton industry had good prospects for development; but its very location was an obstacle to mechanization and prevented the industry from growing into a pillar of modem industrial development in the first half of the nineteenth century.

Griffiths is therefore correct in stating that: 'The inland provinces were at an even greater disadvantage in terms of coal but far less so in terms of wage level. The balance of comparative advantages in these areas would appear to give the edge to labour in­tensive techniques of production if industry were to meet international competition.'61 Transport costs also influenced the birth and growth of mechanized production from a dynamic point ofview.62 Passchier and Knippenberg show that the infrastructure in North Brabant had a real influence on this process. In the period 1859-1889 the rail­ways, alongside and as an adjunct to waterborne transport, played a part in the devel­opment and geographical expansion of modem industry. Towns and villages which were served by the railway were more likely to attract industry than those which were not. This is also clear from the development of the textile industry in Twente, where

the pace of mechanization increased when a line was laid to bring coal from the German hinterland.63

The situation in regard to supplies of iron was similar to that affecting coal. During the first half of the century, limited quantities of iron ore were mined on river banks in the Veluwe and Achterhoek regions, both of which are in the province of Gelder­land. Although the small companies which mined and processed this ore were of sig­nificance for the establishment of a modem metal industry, notably by reason of the technical knowledge which they acquired, their importance in terms of the supply of iron to· the domestic market had been lost by the middle of the century. 64 Thus in this respect, too, the Netherlands was completely dependent on imports; and trans­port charges and the international market situation exerted a major influence on prices.

59. Boot, Twentsche katoennijverheid, 179. Cf. Bos, 'Periferie', 80. 60. Boot, Twentsche katoennijverheid, 42. 61. Griffiths, Retardation, 77; Cf. Bos, 'Periferie', 81 ff. 62. N. Passchier and H. Knippenberg, 'Spoorwegen en industrialisatie in Nederland', Geografisch Tijdschrift, Nieuwe Reeks, XII (Amsterdam, 1978) 381-95. 63. De Jonge,lndustrialisatie, 99. 64. Ibidem, 162.

38

INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 19TH CENTURY

There are indications which point to Dutch businessmen having changed their purchasing habits in an attempt to deal with the unfavourable situation on the market for industrial raw materials. Instead of importing pigiron and other metals in the crude state, they imported semi-manufactured products. This had two advantages. Firstly, the transport costs were reduced in relative terms, since semi-manufactures possessed a higher value in relation to their weight than did pigiron. Secondly, it reduced the direct consumption of coal, which was excessively costly for Dutch industry.65 How­ever, the advantages of scale were probably the most important. It was in many cases

advantageous to process imported semi-manufactures which were produced on a larger scale than was feasible in the Netherlands. This is seen to have been the case in the cotton industry. There, imported yams continued to be an important element in raw material sJlpplies even after 1900.66 The trade statistics show that up to 1914, semi­manufactures constituted a significant part of Dutch imports.67

The situation in the Netherlands did not, however, lend itself to indiscriminate emulation of patterns of industrialization in other countries. Dutch industrialists displayed great ingenuity in utilizing their comparative advantages to the full, while as far as possible avoiding the disadvantages. But there was little they could do about the basically unfavourable raw material situation. Although the Netherlands was rich in waterways, it had no integrated network of canals. The major navigable rivers did not extend to all parts of the country. Many canals were mainly for drainage purposes and were seldom used for the movement of goods.68 An extensive network of barge­canals covered the western and northern regions, but the east and south had no such facilities.69 Despite improvements, the road network was underdeveloped.70 Numer­ous canals had been dug during the 1820s, but not every improvement led to a better situation from the point of view of establishing industries. 71 These canals mainly served the interests of trade, providing easier access to the docks in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, and to the German hinterland. Only in two cases did the cutting of a new canal afford access to a previously inaccessible area. No attempt was made to really open up the diluvial regions.

In Britain, canals had been cut for the benefit of industry in the eighteenth century, but by the first half of the nineteenth they could no longer cope with the volume of industrial traffic.72 When the railways offered a new method of transport, the op-

65. Griffiths, Retardation, 132 ff. 66. Bos, Brits-Nederlandse handel, 166 ff. 67. De longe, Industrialisatie, 32 ff., 348 ff. 68. H.C. Kuiler, Verkeer en vervoer in Nederland. Schets eener ontwikkeling sinds 1815 (Utrecht, 1949) 2-4. Cf. Griffiths, Retardation, 66; J.A. de longe, 'The role of the Outer Provinces in the Process of Dutch Economic Growth in the Nineteenth Century', in: 1.S. Bromley and E.H. Koss­mann,ed., Britain and the Netherlands, IV (The Hague, 1971) 210, 214-7. Cf. also Bos, 'Periferie', 72 (f. 69. De Vries, 'Barges'. 70. Griffiths, Retardation, 69-71. 71. Bos, 'Factorprijzen', 124 ff. 72. P. Mathias, The first industrial nation (London, 1969) 107-13, 116,275-88.

39

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portunity was quickly grasped. The situation in the Netherlands, however, differed significantly from that in Britain. The economic centre of gravity in the Netherlands lay in the west, where there was a satisfactory transport system serving the area itself and for transport to the principal centres in the surrounding countries. This fact delayed the building of railways.73 It is probable that the opportunities for the devel­opment of the sandy regions were underestimated. As links existed with the major trading partners, the improvement of communications with regions which provis­ionally had little to offer was felt to be of secondary importance. Agriculture in the eastern and southern provinces was largely self-sufficient - at least it made no vital contribution to exports - and in view of the low incomes in those provinces, they did not constitute markets of any importance. With the notable exception of the Neder­landsche' Handel-Maatschappij, firms and organizations in the west showed little interest in aSSisting these areas towards industrial development.74

The principal reason for the delay in constructing the railways, however, lay else­where, namely in the sphere of cost. 75 The weakness of the soil necessitated extensive foundations, and a large number of rivers and canals had to be crossed. Furthermore, there was no legal body competent to deal with the acquisition of land. Whenever the construction of a line was mooted, the price of land owned by local authorities and private individuals rocketed, as did the ancillary conditions. The high initial investment in railways was also reflected in rail share dividends and prices. The low yield from, and speculative value of, these shares following the construction of the early railways acted as a disiI1centive to expansion of the network. The legal cadre was not improved until 1851. By then only the lines between Amsterdam and Arnhem, and between Amsterdam and Rotterdam, had been built. Powerful financial stimuli on the part of the government, in the shape of direct investment or dividend guarantees, which were common practice in other countries, were not forthcoming owing to the state of the public fmances.

Following the consolidation of the national debt in 1844,76 and aided by the growth of revenues from the Compulsory Crop System in the Dutch East Indies, which accrued to the government,77 the state's fmances improved. Funds were then available for improving the infrastructure. It was decided to construct the North Sea Canal and the New Waterway. In 1860 a plan was drawn up for a railway network which would provide all the regions with the lines which they desired. The state would finance the cost of the network, but the lines would be operated by private companies. With this, the improvement of communications was tackled energetically, and by the 1880s an

73. De Vries, 'Barges', 233-5; cr. Bos; 'Factorprijzen', 125. 74. R.T. Griffiths, 'Eyewitnesses at the birth or the Dutch cotton industry 1832-1839', Econa­misch- en sociaal-historisch jaarboek, XL (The Hague, 1977) 113-81. 75. Griffiths, Retardation, 71-4. 76. 1.1. Brugmans, 'De fmanciele crisis van 1844', in: Welvaart en historie. Tien studii!n (The Hague, 1950) 69-75. cr. Griffiths, Retardation, 44-7. 77. C. Fasseur, Kultuurstelsel en koloniale bafen. De Nederlandse exploitatie van Java 1840-1860 (Leiden, 1975). cr. J. Teijl, 'Nationaal inkomen van Nederland in de periode 1850-1900. Tasten en testen', Economisch- en sociaal-historisch jaarboek, XXXIV (1971) 249-52.

40

INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 19TH CENTURY

integrated network of railways and waterways had been completed.78 The infra­structure was further improved at a later date, but those works may be seen as putting the finishing touches to a plan which had already been approved.

The infrllstructurru. investments constituted 11 sepllrllte element of the change in relative factor prices, which assisted industrial investment. Moreover, the existing pattern with respect to the location of industries was broken. In the absence of de­posits at home, the raw materials for industry had to be imported; and because, with a sound infrastructure, inland transport costs had only a minor influence on regional differences in material costs, the significance of this factor in deciding on a location declined. The growth of industrial activity after 1860 was thus not accompanied by marked geographical concentration. Admittedly, the various branches of industry tended to be concentrated in geographical terms,79 but this was due to specific rather than general factors. These were allied to the degree of labour-intensivity of, and regional familiarity with, the production process. The general importance of regional differences in prices of imported raw materials decreased, but was replaced by other factors concerned with the specific branch of industry.

More important than the improvement of the infrastructure was the growth of industrial activity in the German hinterland.80 The two developments were, however, compatible and mutually beneficial. Broadly speaking, raw materials, semi-manufac­tures and capital goods from Britain were cheaper than those from other countries in the first half of the nineteenth century - and for some time after that. On the other hand, transport and other supply costs were higher, with the result that Britain's advantage was to some extent whittled away. This situation, which was unfavourable from the Dutch point of view, improved from the 1860s onwards as German industry underwent rapid development and proceeded to concentrate on the export of the goods which could be used in Dutch industry. Within a short space of time German suppliers, aided by the building of railways, succeeded in capturing a large slice of the Dutch market. Although the Germans were not cheaper in all cases, the railway net­work gave them a competitive edge over the British, whose exports had to be trans­ported by sea and, in most cases, transshipped in Dutch ports. The British had al­ways had to face competition from Belgium, but in the second half of the century they steadily lost their command of the market. The dominant shift towards new market shares and competitive positions which occurred after 1870 had its roots in the period round about 1850. But from 1870 onwards, Britain's role in the trade with the Netherlands rapidly diminished.81 Depending on the nature of the goods, this decline was on the whole relative, hut in some cases absolute. The rapid rise of German

7S. De Jonge, 'Role of the Outer Provinces', 214-7.. 79. Examples of this are the potato starch and strawboard industries in Groningen, the cotton industry in Twente, the footwear, leather and woolen industries in North Brabant, the ceramics industry in Maastricht and the food and beverage- industry in the Zaan region. Cf. Bos, 'Periferie', S7. SO. Bos, Brits-Nederlandse handel. passim. Cf. Nusteling, Rijnvaart. passim. S1. Bos, Brits-Nederlandse handel. 223.

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industry was to lead to a geographical redistribution of markets on an international scale, but first and foremost in the Netherlands. The loss to Britain of her share of the Dutch market was greatest in the area of homogeneous products of heavy industry, such as coal and crude metal. But sales of rails also fell sharply. If we limit ourselves to those products which were of importance as inputs for Dutch industry, we find that with semi-manufactures such as yams, and specialized products such as machines, the loss was considerably smaller.

In time of recession, in particular, Britain had difficulty in defending her share of the Dutch market against foreign competitors.82 But here again a distinction must be made between various types of goods. Where price was of less importance than quality, as was the case with machinery, for example, the quantities imported from Britain, Germany and Belgium developed comparatively uniformly. But in addition to the quality aspect, it must be borne in mind that price discrimination and the formation of cartels are often more difficult to achieve in the machinery market than in the market for homogeneous raw materials and ·semi-manufactures. A factor of secondary importance in regard to the rapid growth of German sales in the Netherlands was then the modem manner in which trade was organized in Germany. British industrialists had concentrated on the technical aspects of production, to the detriment of the scientific and commercial facets of business. This had been a rational attitude at a time when there was little competition from other countries and when the strength of British industry lay in the techniques which it employed. But when competition from other nations increased, this relative lack of attention to matters in the market-place, including competition, threatened Britain's industrial hegemony. The effective manip­ulation of the market by her German rivals hastened and intensified her loss of ground in the Netherlands. This manipulation consisted of the formation of cartels and price discrimination, assisted by a protectionist system.

The intensification of competition in the .markets for industrial input had a twofold effect. Where industrial production had earlier been hampered by the high cost of im­ported raw materials, semi-manufactures and machinery, the relative fall in the prices of these was a stimulus to the mechanization of the processes. Where mechanized production had already proved more efficient in terms of costs than traditional tech­niques, yet the cost price of the goods was higher than the market price as determined by international competition, the relatively sharp faU in the price of industrial inputs in the Netherlands contributed to an improvement of the country's competitive position. Finally, where German prices for industrial inputs in time of recession fell more steeply than the world market price, which was controlled by Britain, the effect

82. Ibidem, 224. 83. The capital costs embodied in the cost price can be computed on the basis of the amount of capital required per unit of production (k) multiplied by the desired yield (Pr). The amount of capital required per unit of production resolves itself into the quantity of capital goods required for a production process (k) divided by the extent of the production resulting from this investment (c), multiplied by the price of the capital goods (Pk)' As k and c are determined by the technique employed, we shall concern ourselves in the following paragraphs with the desired yield (Pr) and, above all, with the price of capital goods (Pk)' Cf. Bos, 'Factorprijzen', 128.

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INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 19TH CENTURY

was to create a more stable economic situation from the point of view of Dutch

indust'}'. The importance of this factor durinB the phil~~ Qf ~QmpilfahYely hesitant growth - which for most branches of industry lasted until the end of the century _ must not be underestimated.

THE AVAILABILITY AND PRICE OF CAPITAL 83

In the older literature, one frequently comes across the view that Dutch investors and bimking houses lacked an 'industrial mentality.' Their reticence to participate in the process of industrial innovation, it is suggested, was among the factors which con­tributed to the delay in industrialization.84 Not untill the early decades ofthe twentieth century was there a change of attitude among the public and the banks towards in­vestment in industry.85 It is alleged that for a long time they preferred to invest their money in government securities, notably those of foreign origin.86 In the light of the foregoing, one may wonder whether this view is correct, or whether the attitude of those with funds to invest was not in fact based on sound considerations with respect to profitability?

Little is known concerning the magnitude and direction of the flow of capital in the first half of the nineteenth century. In view of the economic situation, however, it may be assumed that the accumulation of capital was relatively small, though this does not alter the fact that a great deal of capital wealth existed.87 The government was probably the largest single borrower. From its inception, the United Kingdom of the Netherlands was saddled with a heavy burden of debt - a legacy from the eighteenth century and the period of French occupation. Although the government took steps to relieve the pressure exerted by this burden, it could not prevent the national debt rising further as a result of budget deficits. The situation was exacerbated by th~ Belgian Revolution of 1830, which reduced the government's revenues and increased its outgoings. In 1842 interest charges and repayments of prinCipal against the national debt represented 47.1 per cent of government expenditure.88 Not until 1844 were measures taken to balance the budget. For the first time in many years, the escalation of the national debt was halted, and measures, of a very long term nature, were in­troduced with the aim of reducing the debt.

In 1795 the national debt amounted to 787 million guilders; by 1844 this had risen

84. Cf. inter alia H. Riemens, De jinanciele ontwikkeling van Nederland (Amsterdam, 1949) 64; H.M. Hirschfeld, Het onWaan van het moderne bankwezen in Nederland (Rotterdam, 1922) 104; K.D. Bosch, De Nederlandse beleggingen in de Verenigde Staten (Amsterdam, 1968) 9 and H.F.J .M. van den Eerenbeemt, 'Bedriifskapitaal en ondernemerschap in Nederland 1800-1850' in: P.A.M. Geurts and F.A.M. Messing, ed., Economische ontwikkelingen sociale emancipatie, II (The Hague, 1977) 10. 85. F. de Roos and W.J. Wieringa,Een halve eeuw rente in Nederland (Schiedam, 1953) 39. 86. Cf. inter alia Brugmans, Paardenkracht, 88. 87. A.M. de J ong, Geschiedenis van De Nederlandsche Bank (Haarlem, 1967) II, 126. 88. Brugmans, 'Financiele crisis', 68. Cf Griffiths, Retardation, 46.

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to 2,322 million. It may safely be assumed that a large part of the capital accumulation was invested in the national debt. With the low level of interest rates in the Nether­lands, it is unlikely that capital imports played a role of any significance: with the political problems during the French occupation and those associated with the Belgian Revolution, on the one hand, and the magnitude of the national debt on the other, Dutch government stocks will not have held any great attraction for foreign investors.89

On the contrary, the low interest rates led to the export of capital, though the mag­nitude of this is not known.

On the basis of what has been said in the preceding paragraphs concerning the circumstances of investment in industry, it would seem that the preference on the part of Dutch investors for government securities, and the export of capital, were based on sound considerations. Foreign interest in channelling new issues through the Amsterdam Stock Exchange was maintained throughout the nineteenth century by the interest rates in the Netherlands, which were the lowest in any European country with the exception of Brltain.90 The keenness of Dutch investors to take up foreign securities lay in the fact that, apart from Dutch government stocks, there were no domestic issues which afforded comparable yields and certainty.91

The first half of the century can best be characterized as a period of modest growth, albeit this varied from one sector of the economy to another. The capital requirements on the part of industry were small, partly because the traditional branches of industry generated the capital which they needed. The commercial sector granted credit but did not borrow, operating almost exclusively with its own funds. Where this did not meet the requirements of individual firms, they could supplement their means by extending their periods of settlement. Alternatively they could raise money on commercial documents, or discount bilIs.92 In agriculture, the principal method of fmance, apart from owner's capital, was a mortgage obtained from relatives or through the local notary. In such cases the liquidity was limited.

It was no coincidence that the interest which King William I showed in industry was principally directed towards Belgium,93 and that during the first half of the century British businessmen were more interested in the industrial scene in Belgium than that in the Netherlands.94 To those with a keen appreciation of the economic circumstances described in the preceding paragraphs, it will not appear as any coin-

89. Griffiths, Retardation, 45, 47. 90. S.Ho.mer, A hi&tory of interest rates (New Brunswick, 1963); De Roos and Wieringa, Halve eeuw rente, 252. 91. As far as this argument is concerned, the situation in the Netherlands was sinti1ar to that which existed in Britain later in the 19th century. Cf. M. Edelstein, 'Rigidity and bias in the British capital market, 1870-1913', in: D.N. McCloskey, ed., Essay on a mature economy: Britain after 1840 (Princeton, 1971) 95-103. 92. Brugman!, Paardenkracht, 173. 93. Cf. inter alia W.M. Zappey, 'De negentiende eeuw 1813-1914. deell - De periode 1813-1848' in: J.H. van Stuijvenberg, ed., De economische geschiedenis van Nederland (Groningen, 1977) 203 ff. 94. W.O. Henderson, Britain and industrial Europe, 1750-1870 (2nd ed., Leicester, 1972) 102 ff., 198 ff.

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INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 19TH CENTURY

cidence that the majority of industrial undertakings in the Netherlands got off the ground only with difficulty and, having done so, achieved only relatively slow growth. Nor was it a coincidence that the industrialists who settled in the northern part of the country after the Belgian Revolution had a hard struggle to survive, or failed to do so, in spite of government aid.95 There are no grounds for referring to a capital problem in connection with industrial investment. The lack of willingness to make capital available to industrial finns cannot be counted as one of the causes of the low degree of industrialization; this must be seen as a consequence of low profit expectations.

The fact that Dutch capital exports mainly found their way into government stocks and railways cannot be attributed to a lack of interest in industry on the part of the capital owners. In foreign countries, too, industrial securities, with the excep­tion of railways, were not traded. In the Netherlands there were no financial inter­mediaries specializing in industrial investments; but the situation abroad was in many cases the same. Their absence need not necessarily have stemmed from a dearth of interest in 'industrials' in the realms of haute finance or among the investing public. It could have been allied to a plentiful supply of funds and an efficient, though in­fonnal, credit system - a situation in which industrially-oriented intennediaries are unnecessary.96 Britain provides an example. The similarity in magnitude and con­centration of capital suggests that the supply of funds took the same path in the Netherlands as in Britain.

In all branches of industry, the primary source was owner's capital. The second channel consisted of loans from relatives and business associates, mortgages and commercial loans. There are no grounds for the conviction that a commercio-capitalist mentality was more to blame for the problems of industrial investment in the Nether­lands than elsewhere. The investment of large sums in manufacturing and commerce occurred earlier and on a larger scale in the Netherlands than in other countries. The capital accumulated in the Netherlands arose as a result of activities which differed in degree, more than in their essence, from those abroad. The differences principally concerned the magnitude of the national wealth and the extent to which this was con­centrated in industry and commerce. Moreover, experience of huge fmancial trans­actions was greater in the Netherlands than in many other countries. All considered, we may conclude that throughout the nineteenth century, Dutch capitalists were guided by self-interest as might be expected in an era of rising liberalism.

As has already been demonstrated, in the Netherlands the situation in regard to the availability and the price of labour and basic and ancillary materials was less conducive to industrial investment than in some countries abroad. Moreover, the amount of fmance required for the same industrial investment was in the Netherlands greater than

95. R. Th. Griffiths, 'lets meer over de Haarlemse katoenfabrieken', Textiel-higtorigche bijdragen, XV (Hengelo, 1974) 38 ff. Cf. R.W.J .M. Bos, 'Kapitaal en industrialisatie in Nederland tijdens de negentiende eeuw',A.A.G. Bijdragen, XXII (1979) 91. 96. Cf. Bos, 'Kapitaal', 97ff., 105. Also P.W. Klein, 'Het bankwezen en de modernisering van de Nederlandse volkshuishouding tijdens de tweede helft van de 1ge eeuw', Economigch- en IlOciaal­historisch iaarboek, XXXVI. (1973) 143 ff. and Van den Eerenbeemt, 'Bedrijfskapitaal', 12-6.

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in Britajn, because of the necessity to import most capital goods. To justify its exis­tence a national capital goods industry must meet three conditions. Firstly, the prices of the factors of production must be such that the industry is competitive. Secondly, the requisite technical knowledge must be available. Once the industry begins to develop, economies of specialization will play a role, and thus the third condition can be said to be a market of sufficient size. In the Netherlands, these conditions were not met, resulting in a high dependence upon imported machinery. The consequences are clear from some examples cited by Griffiths. In 1839 the cost of installing a steam engine was 6,000 guilders in Leeds and 9,000 in Nijverdal. The machines required for spinning flax cost 25,000 guilders in Leeds, 44,160 guilders in Nijverda1.97 The dis­crepancy in both cases was largely attributable to transport charges.

With the low rate of interest in the Netherlands, one might assume that the re­quired yield on industrial investments was lower than in most other countries. How­ever, this is not known with certainty, since the desired premium for investments with a higher risk could have varied from one country to another. But if we assume that the desired yield in the Netherlands was indeed lower than elsewhere, it is un­likely that it was adequate to make up for the greater amount of capital needed. By opting for government securities and the export of capital, Dutch investors acted in an economically sound manner.

Statistics are available concerning the growth of the Dutch securities portfolio in the period immediately following 1850. As Table III shows, this amounted to some 1,800 million guilders in the late 1850s, of which about one- third consisted of foreign shares and bonds, and a little less than two-thirds of domestic securities.

Table III. The Netherlands securities portfolio (in millions of guilders)

Total Domestic Foreign securities securities

1854-1857 1,765 1,122 643 1872 3,000 900 2,100 1879-1882 3,300 1,100 2,200 1888-1890 3,580 1,220 2,360 1913-1915 6,000 3,100 2,900

Source: De Jong, Nederlandsche Bank, II, 205ff, and 478; III, 139 and 296.

The portfolio did not then contain any domestic industrial shares. The fall of 200 million guilders in the value of the portfolio of domestic securities between the mid-1850s and 1870 was principally attributable to a rise in the rate of redemption of government 10ans.98 The sharp increase in foreign securities was allied to capital creation due to the growth of agriculture and the improvement in trade. Investors

97. Griffiths, Retardation, 179. 98. De)ong, Geschiedenis Nederlandsche Bank, 11,206 ff.

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INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 19TH CENTURY

were forced to look abroad because there were no opportunities at home which offered a comparable return. It is probable that those which did exist in the industrial sector in the Netherlands were fully utilized. There was some capital import, but this found its way not into industry, but into public utilities and banks99 - sectors in which foreign investors had greater experience.

Despite the mild improvement in the investment situation, the industrial sector remained small. The establishment in 1856 of a banking system on the lines of the Credit Mobilier, with the task of providing fmance for new industrial undertakings, was made impossible by an adverse report from De Nederlandsche Bank to the govern­m~t, which thereupon refused to approve the articles of incorporation of such banks.'oo During the first half of the 1860s, however - with the help of foreign capital - a number of banks whose form and objectives reflected features of the Credit Mobi­lier concept came into existence. Experience had been obtained with institutions of this nature abroad, and clearly it was assumed that there was 'a gap in the market' in the Netherlands. These banks, however, made no real contribution to the long-term financing of industry. Klein describes their fate succinctly: 'The first was established in 1860, but disappeared in 1871. Three large new banks followed in 1863. The first of these lasted for less than a year, the second remained inactive untillI872, when it was merged with the Banque de Paris. The third, the Rotterdamsche Bank, concen­trated on colonial and commercial business.'lol

The failure of the attempts to establish investment banks in the Netherlands shows that there was no demand for them. Even by 1890 the banking sector was still making no independent contribution to the industrialization process. In this context, one can point out that the investment banks abroad principally concerned themselves with heavy industry, for which the prospects were substantially less in the Netherlands. In France and Germany, the innovation of banking was an aid to the elimination of an economic backlog, namely the backlog in the area of finance. It was exported to the Netherlands because it was felt that a gap existed there which required to be filled. This explains why capital from those countries - but not from Britain - was em­ployed in the attempts at modernization. I02 The supposed vacuum did not exist, how­ever.

The turning point in the development of the Dutch banking industry came in the period of concentration which commenced in the second decade of the twentieth century. There was then a growing interest in industry, notably for the issue of bonds and shares, and through this the banks attempted to ally themselves with a pattern of need which had started to emerge twenty years previously.103 The tempo of industrial­ization had increased, and its nature had changed. In 1889 only 23.5 per cent of the

99. Bos, 'Kapitaal', 91. 100. De Jong, Geschiedenis Nederlandsche Bank, 1,450 ff.; Hirschfeld, Ontstaan, 31 ff. 101. Klein, 'Bankwezen', 141. 102. 1.1. Brugmans, Begin van twee banken (no place, 1963) 58 ff.; Riemens, Financiele ontwik­keUng, 66. 103. Klein, 'Bankwezen', 44.

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working industrial population were employed in medium-sized or large firms; by 1909 this had risen to 44.5 per cent. For the large companies alone the percentages were 15.2 and 29.2 respectively!04 The change of attitude on the part of the banks stemmed from the enlargement of scale in industry and, allied to this, the rising need for finance, a need which could no longer be met from traditional sources. 105

The changes in the Netherlands in the area of industrial fmancing coincided with the changes which took place in Britain.106 The differences in the degree of industrial­ization were apparently subjugated to the agreements in the area of fmance. Untill the 1850s, the formal institutions of an impersonal capital market in Britain did not make any real contribution to industrial financing. lo7 In spite of the introduction of limited liability, the growth of a new institutional nucleus for the long-term financing of domestic industry was an extremely slow process.108 In Britain, too, haute finance in the second half of the century concerned itself almost exclusively with the foreign demand for capital. With the exception of the railways, industry there scarcely had a chance, depending mainly on internal financing for its funds.lU~ As in the Netherlands, this situation changed from the 1890s onwards;1l0 but until 1914 no more than about 10 per cent of industrial investment was fmanced by new issues on the London Stock Exchange. Although the volume of British capital exports could suggest otherwise, there was no discriminatory preference for foreign issues; the capital flows were principally governed by the yield-risk ratio of the various invest­ments.1l1 With all these similarities, it is not surprising that in 1876 a reorganization of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange was carried out on the lines adopted in Britain.1l2 The fact that the two reorganizations took place within a relatively short space of timell3 affords further proof that the Netherlands did not really lag behind in the area of financial innovation.

Until the early 1870s the Netherlands was an exporter of capital on a scale which, for the time, was exceptionally large.114 The period 1875-1889 saw a further in­crease in Dutch investment in foreign securities, albeit the rate of growth was less than in the years 1855-1872;115 the level of holdings in domestic shares also rose in this

104. De Jonge,lndustrialisatie, 232. 105. W.M. Westerman, De concentratie in het bankwezen (The Hague, 1919) 119 ff. Cf. Klein, 'Bankwezen', 142-5. 106. Bos, 'Kapitaal', 99 ff. 107. W. Ashworth,An economic history of England 1870-1939 (London, 1972) 179_ 108. J. Saville, 'Some retarding factors in the British economy before 1914', Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic and Social Research, XIII (Hull, 1961) 57. 109. A.K. Cairncross, Home and foreign investment 1870-1913 (Cambridge, 1953) 95 ff. Cf. S.G. Checkland, The rise of industrial society in England 1815-1885 (London, 1964) 203. 110. De Jonge,lndustrialisatie, 303. Cf. Brugmans,Paardenkracht, 394. 111. Edelstein, 'Rigidity', 95-103. 112. Joh; de Vries, Een eeuw vol effecten. Historische schets van de Vereniging voor de Effecten­handel en de Amsterdamse effectenbeurs 1876-1976 (no place, 1976) 50 ff. 113. Cf. E.V. Morgan and W.A. Thomas, The Stock Exchange. Its history and ftmctions (London, 1962) 132. 114. De Jong, Geschiedenis Nederlandsche Bank, II, 126,205 ff. 115. Ibidem, 478 ff.

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period. The government again appeared as a borrower in the capital market,1l6 and the economic circumstances underwent a fundamental change. The population increased by 12.2 per cent in the 1870s and by a further 12.4 per cent in the 1880s, both sub­stantially higher rates of growth than in the 1860s (8.2 per cent).117 The late 1870s brought an end to the period of prosperity in agriculture, and this acted as a stimulus to economic reorientation. The rate of population growth in the cities and towns -which in the '50s and '60s had been somewhat greater than in the smaller municipal­ities - increased significantly.l18 Industrial raw materials were among the goods which declined most sharply in price as a result of overproduction and international com­petition. The continuous improvement of the infrastructure also helped to widen the opportunities for modem industrial investment. In spite of the serious effect which international competition exerted on the market, the comparative advantages of modem industries over the traditional craft industries - and also to some extent over agriculture - increased. The depressed state of the market in the 1880s was an ob­stacle to the rapid expension of industrial output as a whole, but it did not halt the replacement of traditional production methods by those of a modern nature.1l9

The financing of industrial undertakings via the capital market did not commence until the end of the century.120 Prior to this, however, relatively large-scale enter­prises had been established, for which finance from this source would have been an obvious solution.l2l These were found mainly in the medium and heavy sectors of industry. There is no doubt that for a long time the economic circumstances were against these very companies. They were admittedly in need of substantial sums of capital, but there was little or no certainty that they could achieve an adequate level of sales and profit. Nor, in the absence of technical experience, was there any proof that they could supply products of sufficiently high quality. The history of these enterprises reveals that in many cases they staggered from crisis to crisis, and that the risks were great and the dividends small. There was little consolation in the fact that firms which had clearly demonstrated their viability were able to obtain capital from business associates.122 Others which, by reason of the nature of their production processes, the magnitude of their losses in the starting-up phase and the great risks inherent in their operations, were most in need of adequate capital, had difficulty in attracting funds. In many instances a portion of the existing capital was held by the initiators of the enterprise, who were not anxious for participation by outsiders. The view that there was a shortage of finance for Dutch industry would seem to apply particularly to this sector, which, however, was not representative. The representative

116. Th. A. Stevers, 'Begrotingsnormering 1814-1939', Economisch· en sociaal·historisch jaar­boek, XXXIX (1976) 112. 117. De Jonge,lndustrialisatie, 430. 118. Ibidem, 427. Cf. J. Postmus, Een onderzoek naar omvang en aard van de bevolkingsconcen· tratie in Nederland sedert 1830 (Amsterdam, 1928) 54. 119. Cf. De Jonge,lndustrialisatie, 174 ff. 120 Ibidem, 303. Cf. Brugmans, Paardenkracht, 394. 12l. Cf. Bos, 'Kapitaal', 96. 122. De Jonge, Industrialisatie, 301.

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portion mainly comprised quite small family businesses, the proprietors of which succeeded in assembling sufficient capital from private sources, mortgage loans and other loans from relatives and business associates. If there was a capital problem in the Netherlands, and if this was more serious than in other countries, it was primarily a yield problem.

SOME OTHER FACTORS IN MODERNIZATION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

Up to now we have devoted little attention to the role of technology. Yet this was as fundamental as the role of factor prices. The technical coefficients are ftxed at any given moment, but they do not remain constant over a long period. A production technique can essentially remain unchanged and yet, under the influence of further technical developments, become more efficient in terms of the amount of one or more production factors employed. Economists describe this as a shift of the production function.1'Z3 The changes in relative factor prices referred to in the earlier sections of this article have, as stated, influenced the effciency of techniques in terms of costs, and in doing so have brought about shifts along the production function. In the latter case, what is involved is not the development of new techniques, but the introduction of new techniques into the production process. As soon as completely new potential factor combinations are arrived at for the production of an existing product, however, we can again refer to the development of a new technique. This is also the case where a technique becomes available for producing a product which did not previously exist. All these developments will occur simultaneously, but differences of emphasis will arise in the course of time.

The start of an industrialization process is governed by the economic circumstances and the level of technical knowledge. Wrigley has drawn attention to the speciftc nature of the commencement of the industrial revolution in Britain in terms of the prevailing economic conditions and the technical developments employed in the light of these. He refers particularly to the availability of raw materialsl24 and to the fact that the link between modernization and industrialization was more a question of a fortunate coincidence than of an unavoidable necessity.125 The author regards modern­ization as a changing distribution of the factors of production for the beneftt of the industrial and service sectors, and industrialization as the increasing use of modem, mechanized production techniques.

Britain was the birthplace of modem technology. Initially, the number of tech­niques and applications within this technology was small. This implies that efforts to-

123. In essence this boils down to a decrease in the share of one or more factors (a, k, q). A uniform decline in the use of all factors of production is described as neutral technical progress. 124. E.A. Wrigley, 'The supply of raw materials in the industrial revolution', Economic History Review, 2nd series, XV (London, 1962) 1-16. 125. Idem, 'The process of modernization and the industrial revolution in England', Journal of Interdisciplinary History III (Cambridge Mass., 1972-3) 225-59.

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waras industrial development could only succeed in regions having similar economic circumstances and in which the remaining conditions for the application of modern technology - of which the quality of labour and the place occupied by the entre­preneur in the society are examples - had been met. The pattern of industrialization in Europe - strongly regional at the outset, followed by a gradual spread in the manner of an oil slick126 accords with this view. For the whole of the nineteenth century the Netherlands was a country of technical diffusion, although there are indications that a number of technical innovations of domestic origin came about in the closing de­cades.127 These innovations were undoubtedly allied to the growing importance of Dutch industry and, in particular, to the birth of a capital goods sector.128 The central problem, however, lay in the fact that the earliest techniques developed-abroad were scarcely applicable under the economic and natural circumstances in the Netherlands. Rosenberg points out that the making of discoveries can best be described as 'a gradual process of accretion, a cumulation of events where, in general, continuities are much more important than discontinuities.' Even if one can identify important discoveries -completely new concepts which appear to represent unalloyed discontinuities - there are usually decisive technological and economic forces at work which tend to slow down such discoveries and diminish their contribution to the rise in productivity. The period which many tend to think of as one of diffusion was also a period of further innovation and of vital improvement and adaptation of designs. There is a tendency to regard this later work as being of far less importance than the initial technological breakthrough. But there are no sound economic reasons for this view. It is precisely this later work which, according to Rosenberg, 'first establishes commercial feasibility and therefore shapes the possibilities for diffusion.'129

This interpretation appears to be particularly important for a sound understanding of the industrialization process in the Netherlands. There is scarcely any point in studying the diffusion of modern technology unless one pays attention to individual branches of industry and the techniques which they employed. Although these pro­cesses display common characteristics, due regard must be paid to the fact that not every innovation lends itself to diffusion and that the tempo of diffusion may vary from one branch of industry or region to another. In the Netherlands, the modern industrial mining of coal and iron ore, and the processing of these in blast furnaces, were not viable activities before the end of the nineteenth century. Moreover, the remaining modern-industrial branches of industry developed abroad were not matched to the specifically Dutch circumstances. In Britain and Belgium, a relatively large amount of attention was given to the technical aspect of production, but little to the efficient use of coal. Not until the end of the century, when competition between the

126. S. Pollard, 'Industrialization and the European economy', Economic Hinory Review, 2nd series, XXVI (1973) 636-48. 127. Cf. R.W.J.M. Bos, 'Techniek en industrialisatie: Nederland in de negentiende eeuw" A.A.G. Bijdragen, XXII (1979) 62. 128. Ibidem, 66-72. 129. N. Rosenberg, Perspectives on technology (Cambridge, 1976) 192 ff.

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foreign industrial regions increased sharply, was this situation improved. These ad­ditional improvements to what was initially a fundamental innovation served to widen the opportunities for industrialization in the Netherlands.!30 The importance of this factor in comparison with the fall in transport costs and the rise of Germany as a supplier of raw materials, semi-manufacturers and machinery is, however, difficult to assess. In the last quarter of the century, when industrialization in the Netherlands assumed greater importance, and in the closing years of the century, when it became general, the emphasis was not on the branches of industry which, in comparison with other countries, occupied a prominent position by reason of the advanced techniques employed. Besides the substitution of industrial imports, one can point to the growth of the food and beverage sector and that of specialized activities, some of which formed part of heavy industry. These activities were matched to the specific natural circumstances in the Netherlands and lay principally in the area of hydraulic engineer­ing. The manufacture of earthmoving equipment, bucket elevators, suction reclamation and hopper types, cranes and winches!3! was allied to the major expansion in shipping and the birth of the modern shipbuilding and machinery industries. The experience gained in the design and construction of plant for Dutch principals gave rise to new industries, a relatively large part of whose output was exported over a wide area.

In so far as it may be described as industrial, the technology employed in the food and beverage industry was comparatively simple. While it is difficult to place this under a single heading owing to the heterogeneous nature of the products, its diffusion on the whole progressed rapidly. In fact, little technology was involved: in the majority of cases it amounted to production on a large scale. The production process was pre­determined and as far as possible embodied modern technical discoveries. It amounted to a wider application of existing technical possibilities rather than the use of new technical discoveries. As a traditional exporter of food products, and being sand­wiched between industrial nations, the Netherlands was in a pOSition to benefit from the expansion of the range of food products and beverages that could be produced on an industrial scale. It was unnecessary to spend time on further technical develop­ment or, more importanttly, to adapt the methods to Dutch circumstancesY2

When, towards the end of the century, industrial growth really got into its stride, it was balanced growth, occurring more or less simultaneously over a wide range of industries.133 Balanced growth requires that technical development be at the point where an industrial technology can be employed in a wide range of industries. As further technical d~velopment, after an initial invention tends to proceed in fits and starts, and in several directions, a more or less sudden breakthrough in the application of new techniques - as occurred in the Netherlands in the 1890s - must be attributed to factors which had a general effect and which arose after the creation of a reservoir

130. Bos, 'Techniek', 67-9. 131. De J onge,Industrialisatie, 167 ff., 172-81; Everwijn, Beschrijving, I, 68 ff. 132. Bos, 'Techniek', 69. 133. Joh. de Vries, 'Economische groei en industrialisatie in Nederland, 1810-1914', Maand­schrift Economie, XXXIII (1968) 127.

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INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 19TH CENTURY

of discoveries which before that time were feasible technically, but not economically. The 'balanced growth' nature of industrialization in the Netherlands was allied to

the late date at which the process assumed significance and the country's virtual lack of exceptional suitability for specific types of industrial activity. Two external factors of general significance imparted a balanced character to the growth of Dutch in­dustry. One of these was the changed competitive situation on the Dutch market for industrial inputs; the other. was the international economic climate. The first was manifested shortly after the midpoint of the century, but did not assume fundamental importance until the 1870s and 1880s. From about 1855 to 1870 the labour market struggled to find a new evolutive equilibrium, and in the ensuing two decades the Netherlands was definitively prepared for industrialization. Industrial growth was relatively modest, but this was due to unfavourable economic circumstances, notably in the l880s and early l890s. The moment at which the breakthrough in industrial­ization was achieve<J was thus determined by the recovery of economic activity during the l890s.

In the foregoing we have virtually limited ourselves to the role of the technical factor and the costs of the factors of production in industrialization. This is com­patible with the circumstance that the process was largely concerned with import substitution. But it avoids the difficult question whether the growth of the popUlation and the rise in living standards are in themselves factors which go towards explaining the growth of industry. De Jonge has expressed the view that it is not permissible to conclude common causes on the basis of the more or less simultaneous occurrence of changes in economic and demographic patterns.l34 He states that the growth of the population served to accelerate industrial growth, but was not the initial impulse which gave rise to it. Our observations concerning the circumstances under which in­dustrial production was achieved accord with this view.

This, however, leaves the question about the role of demand less than completely answered. Demand has both endogenous and exogenous components. For our purposes, the endogenous compollent is deemed to comprise all matters pertaining to the pro­duction and market conditions in the Netherlands in the light of international com­petition. The exogenous component is deemed to comprise all elements which, while relatively independent of the circumstances of production, were more or less auto­matically directed towards the Netherlands. It largely boils down to the joint influence of two factors: demand from the Dutch East Indies and demand from Germany.13S Both these sources of demand were influenced by international competition, but not to the same extent as others. Much of Germany's imports and exports were best routed via the Netherlands by reason of the natural and geographical circumstances.l36

This gave rise to a demand for trade and transport activities, which in turn contributed to the specific character of the Dutch economy. The same was true of the demand which existed in the East Indies. As a result of the close ties between the colonies and

134. De Jonge,lndustrialisatie, 274,358. 135. Cf.Ibidem,346-56. 136. Cf. Nusteling, Rijnvaart, passim and Bos, Brits-Nederlandse handel, passim.

S3

R.W.J.M. BOS

the mother country, a comparatively large slice of the East Indian demand for in­dustrial products was directed towards Dutch companies; conversely, much of the produce of the colonies was sold in the Netherlands. The exogenous component exert­ed an influence on the structure of industrial production and on the manner in which the factors of production were distributed over the various branches of industry. To the extent that new and exceptional factors of demand influenced the nature of economic growth, the colonies and the rise of Germany were together the principal cause of a situation in which a portion of Dutch sales reflected developments in the world market to a lesser extent than usual.

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

For the individual entrepreneur, the answer to the question: what to produce and how to produce it, is: the product and the method which afford the best results. Just as a low degree of industrialization is not synonymous with a low degree of economic development, so is a delay in the adoption of modem technology no adequate proof of conservatism. In dealing with the Netherlands in the nineteenth century, the liter­ature all too often takes the modernity of production· techniques as a measure of economic growth.137 David rightly observes that the gradual acceptance and diffusion of innovations must not be seen as a phenomenon of temporary imbalance in which is manifested the varying degrees of willingness (our italics - R.B.) on the part of entrepreneurs to react to the opportunity to increase profits by reducing costs. In his view, diffusion should rather be interpreted as the reflection of a changing but balanced distribution of production over the various techniques. Each of these was chosen by a heterogeneous population of enterprises, for whom it cannot be said that the latest technique to become available was also the most efficient.138

Changes in the use of factors of production, if efficiently applied, can result in economic growth; but this does not necessarily follow. Before economic growth can be said to exist, the contribution which factors of production make to the growth of the national income must be greater than the growth of the popUlation. A number of estimates of the national income in the second half of the nineteenth century are available. The most recent of these was made by Teijl. This shows that the rate of growth increased gradually .and that there was no tru.e turning point.139 The 1880s, however, were a period of restrained growth. There was a substantial improvement in

137. Cf. Bos, 'Techniek', 61. 138. P.A. David, Technical choice, innovation and economic growth. Essays on American and British experience in the nineteenth century (London, 1975) 4 ff. See also the opinion of Mokyr, which is intplicitly based on the pennanent superiority of modem techniques over the traditional: Mokyr, Industrialization, 133 ff., in particular Fig. 4.3, 145. 139. Teijl, 'Nationaal inkomen', 262. Cf. Bos,Brits·Nederlandse handel, 58-68. For the computation of the per capita national product, P. Bairoch, 'Europe's gross national product: 1800-1975', Journal of European Economic History, V (Rome, 1976) 273-340.

54

INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 19TH CENTURY

the circumstances in which industrial production was achieved; but the market was difficult, and this applied to agriculture also. The improvement in efficiency in some branches of industry is seen to have been insufficient to compensate for the adverse market situation in others and thus contribute to economic growth.

Less certainty exists in regard to the nature of economic growth during the first half of the century. The data which are available suggest that it was very slow and reminiscent of the pre-industrial era. The modern-industrial companies contributed only a small portion of total output, probably insufficient to even offset the decline in some traditional branches of industry. The phenomena of growth in the trade, shipping and agricultural sectors are recognized, but the extent to which they con­tributed to the overall economic growth is hot known. This renders the first half of the nineteenth century a fruitful area for further research.

CONCLUSION

The first half of the nineteenth century was a period of technological stagnation, the causes of which lay in higher coal and raw material prices, in comparison with other countries, and a poorly functioning labour market. The latter circumstance im­proved rOllnd about the middle of the century, when the breakthrough to a liberal economy stirred the labour market, causing it to develop from a situation of rigidity acompanied by high wages and high unemployment (an underemployment equilibrium) to a new equilibrium characterized by dynamism and a wage structure which was more in accordance with the economic opportunities. The industrial structure contributed to a better balance between supply and demand in the area of labour. Moreover, the second half of the century brought a change in the relative positions in the market for industrial raw materials, influenced by the rise of Germany. The construction of rail­ways enabled the regions with traditionally low wages, but also an adverse transport Situation, to develop into favourable areas for the establishment of modern industries.

The rapid process of industrialization which commenced in the 1890s was partly influenced by new technical discoveries, and improvements which widened the ap­plications for existing techniques. Particular mention must be made of the gas engine and the electric motor, both of which were better suited to use in the numerous small factories than was the steam engine.l40

APPENDIX I

If we assume that Pm is the market price and Pk the cost price, then in the long term Pm ;;.. Pk' If we also assume that a, " and'Y are, respectively, the amounts of labour, capital and basic and ancillary materials required per unit of production, and

140. De Jonge,lndustrialisatie, 180 ff.

55

R.W.l.M. BOS

PI' P, and Pg the price per unit of labour, capital and basic and ancillary materials, respectively, then: Pk = a; PI + K.py + 1.Pg• The efficiency of production techniques can be measured in terms of the individual factors of production and in terms of costs. The aSSumption of economically rational behaviour implies that entrepreneurs will strive to achieve the lowest possible cost price. Technique I is then more effi­cient than technique 2 if Pk < Pk ,otherwise expressed:

1 2

O:l,PI + K1'P, + 11.Pg < 0:2,PI + K2'P, + 12'Pg , otherwise expressed:

(0:1 - 0:2 )PI < (1'2 - Kdp, + (12 - 1dPg •

It is clear from this that, at given technical coefficients (0:, 1', 1), the efficiency or otherwise of technique I in comparison with technique 2 depends upon the relative factor prices P, and Pg.

PI PI

APPENDIX II

Let us assume that regions l.. .... m and branches of industry 1. ..... n exist, in each of which 1 workers are employed and earn an average day wage w. We can calculate the national average day wage (w) with the aid of the equation:

m,n ~ w I

m,n

w= m,n ~l I

and the average day wage per province (wm) with the equation;

n ~ (/m,n x wm,n)

wm'': ---:n::'-'---""':""-

~ 1m n I '

On grounds of definition, the national average day wage (w) is equivalent to the national average price of labour (PI)' On the other hand, the provincial or regional price of labour (PI ) can be calculated by computing the share of each branch of

m industry in the national employment. By multiplying these shares by the wage in each branch of industry in the province concerned, adding together the results for all branches of industry in that province, and dividing the total by the number of workers in the province, one obtains the 'provincial' price of labour. Alternatively, if we again assume that provinces.1. ..... m and branches of industry 1. ..... n exist, in each of which I workers are employed and earn an average day wage w, and also that e is the share of a certain branch of industry in the national employment and that PI is the price of

m

56

INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 19TH CENTURY

labour, we can calculate this factor cost with the aid of the following equation:

m ~ lm.n I

e = n and m,n ~ lm.n I

n ~ (en x wm•n ) I

Plm = n ~ lm.n 1

See R.W.J.M. Bos, 'Regionale en bedrijfstakgewijze loonverschillen in de Nederlanden, 1819. Loonniveau, prijs van arbeid en industritHe structuur,' A.A.G. Bijdragen, XXIV ( 1982).

57

R.W.I.M. BOS

APPENDIX III

Using the data published by I.J. Brugmans, Statistieken van de Nederlandse izijver­heid uit de eerste helft der 1ge eeuw (The Hague, 1956) 1,248-417, the day wage and the industrial price of labour in 1819 (in cents) can be calculated as follows:

(1) (2) (3) w w PI m m

Grorungen 76.0 76.3 51.0 Friesland 76.5 76.5 55.0 Drenthe 73.4 73.3 42.8 Overijssel 58.2 57.8 50.9 Gelderland 62.7 62.7 47.9 Utrecht 82.0 81.9 62.3 N. Holland 94.2 93.2 67.9 S. Holland 86.0 86.1 68.3 Zeeland 82.5 81.6 67.3 N. Brabant 55.2 55.6 46.8

Total Northern Netherlands 74.8 74.7 57.8

Limburg 52.4 54.5 45.6 Antwerp 48.6 51.0 50.4 E. Flanders 40.3 40.1 55.9 W. Flanders 32.3 32.3 48.0 Hainault 77.1 75.9 64.0 S. Brabant 59.8 59.6 46.5 Namur 70.6 69.1 53.3 Liege 65.6 65.7 51.6 Luxembourg 54.5 53.3 44.5

Total Southern Netherlands 47.8 47.8 52.7 Total 54.1 53.9 53.9

Column 1: day wage calculated after correction of data by Mokyr. See Mokyr ,Industrial­ization, 171 ff and 177. Column 2: day wage calculated without correction. Column 3: price of labour calculated in the manner shown in appendix II and on the basis of the overall industrial structure in the northern and southern provinces.

58

A 'New' and an 'Old Trend'. Military thinking in the Netherlands and the Dutch East around the turn of the century * G. TEITLER

It does not seem far-fetched to speak of a permanent military revolution after 1860. The purpose of the present article is to determine the part played in this revolution by the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies around the tum of the century. As is well known, the Northern Netherlands made a considerable contribution to the military revolution of around 1600.' The second military revolution, on the other hand, seems for a long time to have passed the Netherlands by. While the surrounding countries were arming feverishly and the armed forces enjoyed intense public interest, rigidity and apathy seemed to prevail in the Netherlands. We wish to examine here to what extent this picture accords with reality.

The wars of German reunification had already given a certain stimulus to thinking about military matters in the Netherlands.2 Experts busily tried to derive lessons from them, but - as usually happens - everyone thought he saw in them a confirmation of his own point of view. The Russo-Turkish War added fresh fuel to the fife, but it was not until about 1900 that the military debates were resumed with vigour. This change was brought about by three wars. The first was the Boer War, in which Dutch public opinion of these days was passionately involved. The belief in kinship was professed with considerable emotion, while military interest was shown by the sending of ob­servers to South Africa. Secondly, the Russo-Japanese War offered an opportunity for testing military theories. In this conflict, too, there was much interest in the Netherlands and the East Indies. Japan was a rising sun in the Asiatic firmament, while the Russian Baltic squadron might even involve the Netherlands directly in the conflict on its route?

* This article is a translation of "Een 'nieuwe' en een 'oude' richting. Militair denken in Neder­land en Nederlands-Indie rond de eeuwwisseling". Mededelingen van de Sectie Krijgrgeschiedenis Koninklijke Landmacht, I, ii (The Hague, 1978). The terms 'nieuwe' and 'oude richting' (new and old tendency) are taken from an editorial article in the Militaire Gids XXII (Haarlem, 1903) 61-5, entitled: 'Naar Aanleiding van Onze Richting'. 1. M. Roberts, Es8lZYs in Swedish history (London, 1967) ch. vii, 'The niilitary revolution, 1560-1660'; G. Parker, 'The 'military revolution", 1560-1660, a myth?', Journal o[ Modern History, XLVIII (Chicago, 1976) 195-214. 2. The 'Vereeniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap' derived from this impulse in 1865 and provided the Dutch officers corps and many officers of the Netherlands Indies army who were staying in the Netherlands with a forum for discussion and dehberation. 3. For the repercussions of the movement of this squadron on the international position of the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies, see A.J. Veenendaal, 'De handhaving der neutraliteit in

59

G. TEITLER

The observers sent to South Africa had put new life into the military debate in a spectacular and, according to some, people, intemperate manner. It was perhaps in order to prevent a repetition that no observers were sent to Manchuria.4 If direct ob­servation was lacking here, the war in Achin had made up for much in this respect. In

the discussion which was now reviving, two violently opposed blocks emerged. The two groups, those of the 'Old' and the 'New Trend', were small, buth both claimed to enjoy wide civil and military support.

Among the best known proponents of the New Trend were two of the observers sent to South Africa, Captains Ram and Thomson, and the commandant of the 3rd Corps of mare chaussee (in fact, light infantry) in Achin, Captain Graafland. Politically, they felt at home in the liberal camp. The best known proponents of the Old Trend were the officers Hoogeboom and Pop, authors of much used military handbooks. Instructors at the Royal Military Academy felt more at home in the camp of the 'Mandarins' among the guardians of the old military traditions.s The Army Staff College was more cautious in its approach.6 The conflict reached as far as the profes­sional journals. The Militaire Gids, for example, became the bulwark of the proponents of the New Trend. With a sharp pen and a tendency towards ridicule, they used its columns to attack the venerable Militaire Spectator, the mouthpiece of the Old Trend. The conflict did not go so far, however, as to split the important Vereeniging ter be­oefening van de Krijgswetenschap (Society for the Practice of Military Science).7 It was perhaps precisely because at the meetings debates were so heated that a split was avoided.

Against the background of the First World War this Dutch discussion appears trivial, but the mixture of European and colonial, of military and social ingredients, yielded a remarkable product. This product has been wrongly neglected in the study of the development of military thought and it seems desirable to make good the omission, fIrstly, in order to remove the impression that the Dutch contribution of that time was barren and, secondly, to indicate that nearly all the elements from which later studies

Nederlands-Indie tijdens de Russisch-Japanse Oorlog (1904-1905)', Marineblad, LXXXII (Den Helder, 1972) 127-61. 4. I was unable to fmd a complete confirmation of this suspicion, but see The Hague, Algemeen Rijksarchief, ministerie van kolonien, File 16-2~1904 A4, 22-2-1904 WA and 17-11-1904 F 24. See also for the suggested mistrust: Drie-Ster, 'Dud ert Nieuw. Maar vooral Dud (Nieuwe Infanterie­Reglementen)" Militaire Gids, XXN (1905) 111-2. At this point mention is also made of the keeping back by the minister of War of the official report of the observers who had attended the great Japanese army manoeuvres of 1903. 5. Graafland, for example, who had been invited by the cadets to give a lecture at the Royal Military Academy, was refused entry to this institution: 'S-R', 'Mavors over de Nieuwe Richting en krijgStucht in het Indische leger', [ndisch MiUtair Tijdschrift, XXXIX (Batavia, 1908) 1119-20 and G. Polvliet, 'Legervorming', De Gids, LXXII (Amsterdam, 1908) 224. 6. This appears, for example, from the lecture given by the principal of the Staff College, G.A.A. Alting von Geusau, to the Vereeniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap on 27th October 1905: 'Tactische beschouwingen over Infanteriereglementeri', Orgaan der Vereeniging ter Beoefe­ning van de Krijgswetenschap (The Hague, 1906) 223-305, 357-449. 7. The chairman on this society incidentally recalled in 1902 that 'at its birth and during its early years olir Society was occasionally treated with some distrust by the government', cf. Orgaan Vereeniging Krijgswetenschap (1901-2) 507.

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A 'NEW' AND AN 'OLD TREND'

of military leadership and motivation would spring had already been put forward by the representatives of the New Trend.8

TACTICS

Although there had been no lack ofwarnings9 since the Franco-Prussian War that a series of changes was in progress in the field of tactics, observers in South Africa were astounded by the effect of the Boers' rifle fire. This astonishment derived from a mis­calculation about the power of resistance of the British professional soldiers. Second­ly, many experts had expected results only from 'fire discipline', i.e. from firing by strictly trained soldiers. tO The South African fmdings proved, however, that a well­drilled opponent could be brought to a halt even without this fire discipline. This at least was the conclusion drawn by the Dutch observers.ll Another explanation, how­ever, was that the British had put a degenerate type of soldier into the field. l2 Ac­cording to this somewhat flippant reasoning the British experiences did not necessarily apply to the chances of armies trained on the continent. Moreover, even the observers had to admit that although the Boers could beat off attacks, they had not been able to follow up their successes. The undertaking of a counter-attack lay beyond the reach of their capabilities. A popular army could undoubtedly maintain itself but was unable to destroy an enemy in the field. 13

The following points, however, had struck the adherents of the New Trend: 14

1. As a consequence of the increased fire-power and the use of smokeless gun­powder the battlefield appeared empty and deserted. Attackers and defenders learned

8. cr. especially S.L.A. Marshall, Men against Fire. The Problem of Battle Command in Future War (New York, 1947); M. Janowitz and E.A. Shils, Cohesion and Desintegration in the Wehr­macht in World War II. Public Opinion Quarterly, XII (Princeton', Summer 1949) 280-315; S. Stouffer, et al., The American Soldier (Princeton, 1949); R.K. Merton and P. Lazarsfeld, ed., Continuities in Social Research. Studies in the Scope.and Method of 'The American Soldier' (New York, 1952). 9. These warnings had not escaped some Dutch experts. For assessments see W.L. Petit, 'De oefening en vechtwijze der hedendaagsche infanterie', Orgaan Vereeniging Krijgswetenschap (1872-3) 35-87; W.A.T. de Meester, 'Beschouwingen over de organisatie en de oefening onzer in­fanterie', ibidem, (1884-5) 337-405; W.F. Pop, 'Welken invloed zal het gebruik van repeteerge­weren op de vechtwijze der infant erie kunnen uitoefenen?' ibidem; (1886-7) 455-505; H.L. van Oordt, Scherpe tactiek - beschouwingen over den aanvallenden strijd der infanterie (The Hague, 1896). 10. Cf. above, note 9. 11. A report of the observers' findings is given by J .H. Ram, 'Enkele opmerkingen van krijgs­kundigen aard naar aanleiding van den Zuid-Afrikaanschen oorlog', Orgaan Vereeniging Krijgs­wetenschap (1901-2) 147-227,505-633. 12. This opinion was expressed by Hoogeboom and Pop, among others, in their criticism of Ram's lecture: Orgaan Vereeniging Krijgswetenschap (1901-2) 515, 528-30. 13. See Ram's introduction and also LH. Ram and L.W.J.K. Thomson, 'Lessen uit den Zuid­Afrikaanschen OorIog', Militaire Gids, XXI (1902) 503-16, XXIV (1903) 78-90,405-19. 14. Cf. above, note 12 and 13 and R.L. Scholten, 'Ervaringen uit den Russisch-Japanschen Oor-10g',Orgaan Vereeniging Krijgswetenschap (1906-7) 77-279.

61

G. TEITLER

to use the spade or sought cover in the terrain. Shiny objects, such as sabres, were abandoned and armies sought refugee in field-grey clothing.

2. The role of the cavalry appeared to be played out. Concentrated attacks with this arm were wisely abandoned. Even when it would be used for reconnaissance only,

there might be unpleasant surprises. It became necessary to occupy observation posts in the air with the aid of balloons and to issue telescopes to officers on a large scale.

3. The power of the modern fire-arm resided, in the last resort, in the skill of the individual marksman. Where this factor was assured defenders could spread them­selves over a wide front, compelling the attackers, in their turn, to spread out and place their hopes in an encirclement attempt. The party which had the most battalions available would best be able to spread out on a wide front and successfully attempt a flank attack. Thus the quality of the marksmen led to an increased importance of their numbers. This paradox was already operative in South Africa, but first became really significant in Manchuria. Breakthrough attempts seemed to belong to the past. The future lay in the flank attack, in the single or double encirclement. In addition to skill at shooting what mattered mainly was the marching ability of the soldiers.

4. The factors which doomed the frontal attack to failure also made hand-to­hand fighting less probable. In South Africa the bayonet was hardly used as a weapon. Things were different in Manchuria, but here, too, the bayonet was used increasingly only for capturing isolated farmsteads or sections of a trench. Bayonet fighting seemed to be disappearing in the open field and, even where it was maintaining itself, the hand grenade was gaining ground. Russian statistics, f.i., showed that about 85 per cent of casualties were caused by rifle fue, 8 per cent by artillery fire and 7 per cent by the naked weapon.

According to the adherents of the New Trend, the following lessons could be drawn from the South African and Manchurian wars: 15 as a result of the modern, smokeless firearms defence had gained tremendously in power. A relatively few troops, with machine guns, trenches and barbed wire, could man a very wide front. Secondly, the morale of the troops played a greater part than before. In comparison with the Franco­Prussian War, for example, attacking troops suffered considerably fewer losses. Never­theless they were quite easily brought to a halt. Instead of attributing this to the in­feriority of the soldiers, the adherents of the New Trend pointed to the emptiness of the battlefield, which had a crippling effect on soldiers trained in the classic manner. The soldiers saw how their formations spread out under the fire of the enemy and this

15. For the following three paragraphs cf: 'Bd', 'De aanval der infant erie bij de uitwerking der hedendaagsche vuurwapens', Militaire Gids, XXI, 282-4; I.H. Ram and L.W.l.K. Thomson, 'Moe­ten wij, als gevolg der nieuwere bewapening, grootere front-breedten in het gevecht innemen?', ibidem, XXII (1903) 23-25; A.E. Dudokvan Heel, 'Is het exerceren bij de opleiding tot oorlogs­soldaat uit den booze?', ibidem, 648-58; Editorial, 'Het excerceren als opvoedmiddel', ibidem, 648-58. An interesting reaction to this article is H. Kiersch, 'Een bedenkelijk streven', ibidem, XXIII (1904) 119-25; Kiersch's view was that strict drill had a positive effect on the recruit's self-control so that he was better able to overcome his fears and showed a greater inclination to pay attention to the orders of the NCO's. He therefore did not wish this drill to be abolished, certainly not in the training of short service soldiers.

62

A 'NEW' AND AN 'OLD TREND'

threw them into such confusion, that, even with small losses, the attack often came to a standstill. The aim of the classic training was to lead the soldiers onto the battlefield in fairly compact formations and under the command of a relatively large number of officers and NCO's. Where now both the officers - favourite target of the enemy -and the Close formation had disappeared, the soldiers had to fend for themselves. This sudden change was clearly too much for them.

It had long been inevitable for some spreading out to occur during an assault, even among the best trained and disciplined troops, but now that firearms caused casualties at a constantly growing distance, the adherents of the New Trend considered that spreading should be made a principle of training.16 Under modem conditions officers and N.C.O's suffered heavy losses and thereby threatened to lose their grip on the ranks. Remarkably enough, however, the most obvious counter-measure produced the same effect. Attacking troops could best defend themselves against the fire superiority of a defender by also spreading out. They had to learn to make use of the cover afford­ed by the terrain and to carry out the attack in stagesP This approach meant, how­ever, that the soldiers - even when their commanders did not become casualties - had to fend for themselves. Under these conditions effective action could be expected only from soldiers who had learned to think and act independently. It was therefore es­sential to train them for this self-reliance in peacetime by paying attention to marks­manship (confidence in their weapons) and understanding of tactics.1s All efforts should be directed towards this. Everything which ignored this was unnecessary frills or, worst still, decidedly wrong. It gave the soldiers a false picture of the modem battlefield.

ACHIN

These conclusions were endorsed by few people with such enthusiasm as by Captain Graafland, 3rd commandant of the Corps of marechaussee, at Achin. Established in 1890, as part of the Netherlands Indies army, this corps was at the direct disposal of the governor of the troublesome area. Its tasks included the guarding of roads, bridges and railways, the updating of maps and a kind of register of births, marriages and deaths (including the numbering of houses), the control of marketgoers and the

16. This view was later formulated by Ashby as follows: 'Only variety can destroy variety', Cf. E. Konnen, 'Organischeen bureaukratische organisatietechnologieen', in: L.U. de Sitter, ed., Technoiogie en organisatie (Alphen aId Rijn, 1974) 114. 17. In the discussion following the lecture by Alting von Geusau (cf. above 6) Mr. SchOnstedt (p. 416) pointed out the importance of a passage in Von Lobell's lahre,sberichte uber die Ver­iinderungen und Fortschritte im Militiirwesen, XXXII (Berlin, 1909) 249, about the importance of keeping close to the ground during an attack. 18. Drie-Ster, 'Militaire opvoeding en de moderne oorlog', De Gids LXVIII (1904) 280-323; G. Polvliet, 'De hedendaagsche vuurtechniek en de militaire opleiding', ibidem, LXII,298-312; D.J. Ruitenbach, MiJitaire opvoeding; Gewijzigd systeem van opleiden en vormen van onze weer­macht (The Hague, no date, c 1908) and cf. G.B Honing, 'Opvoedkunde als leervak voor den aan­staanden officier', Vragen des Tijds, XXXVII (Haarlem, 1911) 188-202.

63

G. TEITLER

prevention of arms smuggling. As early as 1839 the corps was granted permission to operate outside the notorious 'concentrated line' (a not very successful attempt to seal off the area controlled by the Achinese guerilla fighters). However, not untill 1896 was this right elevated to a system under Graafland. The war could then at last be carried effectively into enemy territory.19 Moreover, during the course of this process things were learned which did not accord with the letter, but with the spirit of the South African and, later, Manchurian experiences.

The handbooks about tactics which had been written for the Netherlands Indies army had to fill a remarkable gap. The instruction books used for the infantry had partly been copied from instructions current in European armies20 and it was only by means of the handbooks that the officers became informed about the details of their own field of operations.21 This guidance was accompanied by much wrangling about the existence or otherwise of 'Indies tactics,22 Those who were convinced that there were such tactics pointed to the numerical superiority generally enjoyed by the native enemy. The obvious thing was to oppose this with a very dispersed disposition of riflemen and this was made possible by the superior firing ability of the Netherlands Indies army. A line formation was employed only during defensive actions and a column only in the event of assault on kampongs (villages) or the borders of planta­tions. The dispersed formation, in which the soldiers learned to cover each other as they advanced, also gave the lower ranking officers and the NCO's relatively much freedom of action, much more at least than in European armies.

Also typical of the Netherlands East Indies was that particular attention was paid to the marching ability of the soldiers and to the supply columns. The army generally operated far from its supply bases and, although the storming of strongpoints was sometimes unavoidable, it preferred the outflanking movement. Attacking on a narrow

19. Concerning the Achin war: P. van 't Veer, De Atjeh-Oorlog (Amsterdam, 1969). On the corps of the marechaussee: A. Struyvenberg, Korps Marechaussee op Atjeh. Overzicht van de geschiede­nis van de oprichting tot en met 1913 (Koeta Radja, 1930) and H.I. Schmidt, Marechaussee in Atjeh. Herinneringen en ervaringen met den 1-sten luitenant en kapitein van het Korps Marechaus­see van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden van 1902 tot 1918, beschreven door M.H. Ducroo (Maastricht, 1943). 20. Tarchus, 'Indische tactiek', Indisch Militair Tijdschrift, XXVII (1896) 408-22; C., 'RegIe­menten en voorschriften voor den oorlog tegen den inlandschen vijand', ibidem, XXXI (1900, 282-91; F.H. Boogaard, 'De tactiek der marechausseee in Groot-Atjeh in 1896', Militaire Gids, XXI, 2, 7-10. 21. Well-known handbooks were W.A. van Rees, Handleiding tot de kennis der velddienst en vechtwijze van het Nederlandsch OosUndisch leger tegen inlandsche vijanden (Bois-Ie-Duc, 1859); Th. W. Schroder and C.L. SchrOder, Leiddraad voor jonge officieren van het Dost-Indische leger te velde (Rotterdam, 1863); D. BrakeI, De oorlog in Nederlandsch-Indie (Arnhem, 1895). Cf. also R. de Bruijn, Handleiding ten gebruike bij het onderwijs in de tactiek aan cadetten bestemd voor den dienst bij het O.-L leger. I: Tactiek van den inlandschen vijand (Breda, 1903); idem, Dost-1ndische krijgsgeschiedenis. Voorbeelden ten behoeve van het onderwijs in de tactiek tegen den inlandschen vijand (Breda, 1903); G. Nypels, 'Oorlogsgebruiken in onzen strijd met minder be­schaafden',Orgaan Vereeniging Krijgswetenschap·(1904-5) 587-698; M.I.E. Bos, De strijd tegen den inlandschen vijand (Breda, 1913). 22. Lochmann van B., 'Eenige beschouwingen over onze Indische tactiek', Indisch Militair Tijd­schrift (1882) 609-13; Tarchus, 'Indische tactiek'; C., 'Regiementen';E. Sieburgh, 'Indische tac­tiek?' 1ndisch Militair Tijdschrift, XLV (1914) 948-53.

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front could be a bloody business and burdened the troops with a crippling number of wounded. The enemy always made sure to keep his escape route open. He could generally be driven out of his stronghold by an outflanking movement. The marching speed of the Netherlands Indies army was therefore of great importance and it de­manded the lightest possible pack. This in turn increased the importance ofthe baggage train, which, however, with its coolies and forced labourers, required constant sur­veillance.23

It was therefore natural that the army should submit to considerable austerity during campaigns. Its native soldiers in particular, could go relatively far in this derec­tion, certainly if it was possible to live off the land. It was no wonder, moreover, that efforts were made to harry the enemy continually while sparing the local population and always paying for goods that had been obtained. The pursuit of enemy leaders, however, required such a fast marching pace that special patrols were used for the purpose. These patrols were composed mainly of native soldiers who were allowed to exchange the rifle and bayonet for the klewang (short sabre) or kris (dagger).24

Taking all things together, in the Netherlands Indies army of the period before the 'concentrated line' was established, emphasis was placed, therefore, on the need for an offensive mentality, the greatest possible marching ability and the capacity to penetrate deep into enemy territory. In addition, lower ranking officers and NCO's were accorded a great degree of independence. In the course of the Achin war the situation changed, however, and the Netherlands Indies army began to lose its hard won experiences there. These lessons could no longer be passed on to the hastily trained soldiers who were pumped into the area. The men lost their self-confidence, marching ability and mobility in the face of the Achinese and began to show a marked preference for long drawn-out shooting. Now the consequences of the use of European infantry manuals wreaked themselves. In Europe there was growing respect for the firearm, and with good reason. In the East Indies, on the other hand, where both the native enemy and the native soldiers on the government side remained relatively poor marksmen, this respect for firearms led to highly unsatisfactory results. The inex­perienced soldiers encouraged· themselves by shooting away at far too great a distance, unable, of course, to perturb the Achinese enemy. The marching formations became slower and more cumbersome, the concern for cover and a safe retreat greater.

The Netherlands Indies army turned back only slowly from this pernicious path. A first step was taken by the 'Mobile Policing Detachments', used to protect telephone lines, railways, bridges, etc. against plundering and destruction. These detachments did good service, but their role was too passive seriously to disturb the Achinese. Nor did the establishment of the first Corps of marechaussee in 1890 bring about an im­mediate change, but by elaborating on the work of the policing detachments and

23. Cf. also J.F. Breijer, 'De noodzakelijkheid van de organisatie van het transportwezen bij het Nederlandsch-Indisch leger', Orgaan Vereeniging Krijgswetenschap (1892-3) 139-96. 24. For this material use was made particularly of Boogaard, 'Tactiek', 1-15,65-89, continued by G. Graafland, Militaire Gids, XXI, 225-34, 285-324.

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falling back on old practices, it proved possible to bring it outside the 'concentrated line' by as early as 1893. Under Graafland, its third commandant, the corps succeeded in restoring the tactical traditions of the Netherlands Indies army. Characteristic of the corps was the exclusive attention to the attack. The enemy was approached as closely as possible and the klewang and rentjong (a kind of dagger) became the main weapons, while the carbine was secondary only. Further characteristics of the corps were its great mobility, it~ ability to operate deep in enemy territory, the great degree of in­dependence of lower-ranking officers and NCO's and the practice of giving the soldiers as much information as possible about the marching and battle plan. It should occasion no surprise that there were demands to bend the development of the whole army back along these lines.

It appears remarkable at first sight that it should be Graafland who supported the arguments of the observers who had returned from South Africa, since his own ap­proach differed greatly from that of the Boers. He had emphasized the use of the bare weapon and seeking opportunities for hand-to-hand fighting. The Boers, on the other hand, had increased the fighting distance with their fire-power. Graafland, therefore, supported the observers not for tactical, but for organizational reasons related to the training of the soldiers.25 The power of the modem fire-arm as proved in South Africa resulted in dispersal and - certainly for the attacker - often rather untidy formations. The soldiers became spread over the terrain and rapidly found themselves beyond earshot of their superiors' commands. Isolated from each other and from their leaders, they had to fend for themselves. If an attack was not to come to a standstill, the soldier had to continue to move forward without waiting for orders. He had to find the motivation in himself or in the small group of comrades.

According to the observers, command relationships were radically changed on the modem battlefield. The responsibility for the success of an action was spread through the whole unit. The soldier had to learn to make use in an intelligent manner of every opportunity offered to him by the course of the battle. This demanded not only a new kind of relationship between superior and inferior, but also a new kind of training for the recruit. And however different the terrain in Achin was from that in South Africa and Manchuria, and however different the kind of fighting to be carried on there, success would come only to those soldiers who knew how to adapt to the new com­mand relationships. Graafland and the observers were at one in their estimation of the independently and intelligently acting soldier. They shared a common view about a new kind of discipline and new training methods.

25. See Graafland's contribution to the discussion on Ram's lecture to the Vereeniging ter be­oefening van de Krijgswetenschap (cf. above note 11) 593-603. Graafland was interrupted several times by 'laughter' 'signs of agreement' and 'applause'. See also F.e. Hering, 'Vluchtige beschou­wingen over de organisatie en oefening onzer infant erie' lndigch Militair Tijdgchrift, XXXV (1904) 545-52.

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THE OPPOSITION

What traditions were they trying to throw off? They have already been briefly sketched for the Netherlands Indies army. As far as the Dutch army was concerned the end of the nineteenth century was overshadowed by the events of 1866 and 1870. It is not incomprehensible that the Dutch had retained a deep respect for the German army and many were now inclined to see a temple of military wisdom in Germany. What made game of this tendency however, was the German uncertainty about the course to be followed after 1870. In August of that year, while still in the middle of the struggle against regular French troops, the German military leaders had been forced to revise their instructions. Parade-like attacks (at St. Privat and Thionville - Mars la Tour) had resulted in heavy losses and a more dispersed attacking formation was decided upon on the battlefield. How far this dispersal should go, however, when it should be accepted and given up and what its relationship was to the assault remained points of issue in a fierce German debate?6

About 90 per cent of the casualties in the Franco-Prussian War were caused by rifle fire. Research moreover showed that even the best trained soldiers fired un­frequently. Still smaller was the number who aimed before firing and continued to adjust their rifle sights. On the side of the defence, on the other hand, even the poorest marksmen succeeded in taking a heavy toll of an enemy attacking in closed ranks. Modern firearms appeared to make the defence as strong as iron and, while this was noted with satisfaction in the Swiss army, the majority of officers of the other Euro­pean states refused to accept this without demur. The Swiss army contained only a small core of professional soldiers, the mass of the officers and NCO'S being re­cruited from conscripts. A system of military and physical preliminary training and a defensive pose made this system viable. In Germany, however, and in a recovering France the body of professional officers refused to resign themselves to a defensive attitude. For the members of these groups the military life was closely associated with glory and the expansion of the state. They were not three-quarter-civilians like the majority of their Swiss colleagues and a defensive mentality was alien to them. Other than in Switzerland they were busily looking for ways of keeping attacking tactics alive.

The Netherlands stood in a certain sense between the Swiss system and that of the great European powers. The Dutch army did use conscripts, but on the other hand resembled a volunteer army because of the system of substitution and number-switch­ing, which were much used techniques for evading the results of the lottery for military service. Moreover, conscripts could not be compelled to serve as NCO'S. In this respect the Dutch army bore little resemblance to the Swiss army and stood

26. For the attempts to assimilate the German (and French and Swiss) reactions to the wars of Gennan reunification and later tactical developments, cf. the literature referred to in above, note 9.

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G. TEITLER

closer to the British model than to the'Prussian. For two reasons, however, the system did have much in common with the Swiss. The Swiss nation, which was considered to be able to defend itself, could permit itself to accept a short first training period. The Netherlands, which was much less militarily prepared, had a period of national service which was longer than that of the Swiss, but very much shorter than that of the Germans. In its strategic-defensive approach, too, the Netherlands stood closer to Switzerland. It could not lose itself in offensive illusions and knew that it would have to withdraw in the event of an emergency. The role of the civic militia and the con­scripts who were permanently under arms was to delay the enemy advance until the mobilization of the whole army had been completed and the Water Line - a system of forts and inundations around the core of the country - had been garrisoned with troops. The Swiss officers, on the one hand, and the German and French, on the other, were faced with a relatively simple problem. Things were much less clear for the Dutch officers. As professionals they felt an affinity with the Germans and French, who wished to maintain the dash of the tactics of attack. As leaders of an army that trained its recruits for only a short period, however, and as defenders of a country which had recourse to the Water Line for its military protection, they were not insensitive to the advantages to be gained from defensive tactics.

In the debates in the Netherlands arising from the events of 1866 and 1870 the central question was how far to push the dispersal of the troops in face of the in­creasing fire-power. A related question was whether the batallion, the company or the platoon should form the smallest tactical unit in the future. The answer to this question was of great importance. It directly concerned the task and position of the officers, because if increasingly smaller units were permitted to operate independently, would not other ranks also eventually be able to exercise leadership?28 The first problem was whether the NCO's (and perhaps even older private soldiers) would be able to bear this responsibility. The next, whether they might not link this with far-reaching social and political demands.

The fear of such demands shows how difficult it was to limit the discussion to questions of military techniques;29 Those in favour of keeping the soldiers together in relatively large groups - i.e. opponents of the 'swarm attack' by riflemen - were all too often reproached with not basing their case on technical grounds. If they said that NCO's could not replace the officers because of their lack of training and skill, or de­clared that 'swarming' was appropriate for moving forward, but not for firing and certainly not for an assault, their argument met with suspicion. It was seen as proof of

27. Cf. above, note 9. 28. Ther.e was, moreover, a considerable chance of getting into a vicious circle if NCO's took charge independently of small tactical groups, since subalterns would not then gain sufficient tactical experience to assert authority over their subordinates at a later date after promotion to higher rank. 29. The adherents.of the Old Trend had no difficulty with this. They wished to perceive only the technical aspects of the discussion topics and generally refused to take up the social, historical and political arguments of the adherents of the New Tendency.

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A 'NEW' AND AN 'OLD TREND'

their mistrust of the private soldiers and NCO's. Those who did not permit spreading out and 'swarming' and who placed emphasis on the importance of the slow advance and firing discipline, evidently did not wish to give the troops any freedom of action. To the supporters of the New Trend these ideas seemed to be closely related to a preference for drill practices in the manner of Frederick the Great and for a privileged officers corps.

CREATION OF AN ARMY

With the establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands it seemed as if the balance of power in Europe had been guaranteed and the creation of a large conscript army seemed an unnecessary lUxury. The original intention was to keep the volunteers separate from the annual contingents of conscripts, but as early as 1818 they were merged into a single whole, although the civic militia in the cities and towns continued to form a separate organization. In the large cities these militias still had some military value as a result of frequent training and the use of reservists. In the countryside they sometimes existed only on paper. A parliamentary proposal to divide the civic militia into 'mobile' units, consisting of former conscripts and intended to strengthen the army in time of war, and 'resting units' was lost in wrangling about the interpretation of the constitution. In this conception the 'resting' civic guards were intended to main­tain law and order in the large cities. The supporters of this proposal understandably wished to recruit the civic militia exclusively from the enfranchised classes.31

If this proposal amounted to a remarkable social division of burdens, this was still more the case with the official system of substitution. About the middle of the nine­teenth century nearly one fifth of the conscripts consisted of substitutes who, although themselves exempted from service, performed for payment the military service of members of the well-to-do classes who had been selected to serve by ballot. The price paid for such a 'volunteer' then fluctuated between 600 and 700 guilders and, in 1861, the legislator yet eased the obligations of those who appointed a substitute.

This institution was particularly welcome to the circle of denominational politicians, as individual conscription seemed to bring with it the danger of spiritual and social uprooting for youthful believers. Moreover, some poor municipalities in Roman­catholic North Brabant had an economic interest in the system. A viable trade in

30. Cf. above, note 15, especially the articles on the importance of exercising. See al,;) Drie-Ster, 'Oud en Nieuw'; Stein, 'De strijd tegen de Nieuwe Richting'. Militaire Gids, XXIV (1905 157-77; L.W.J .K. Thom';)n, 'De vrees .voor de democratische elementen in ons leger', ibidem, 460-77. 31. A fairly complete picture of the situation sketched here is to be found in the articles of W.l. Knoop, 'De tegenwoordige toestand onzer verdedigingsmiddelen en strijdkrachten', De Gids, XII (1848) i, 551-86; 'Bijdrage tot de kennis vanons krijgswezen te lande', ibidem, XIII (1849) i, 121-71; 'Nog een woord over ons krijgswezen te lande', ibidem, 518-32; 'Nog iets over onze lands­verdediging' ibidem, XIV (1850) i, 59-77; 'lets over het vestingstelsel van ons land', ibidem, XVI (1852) ii, 176-89; 'Een woord over ons krijgswezen', ibidem, XXIII (1859) i, 522-41; 'Een woord over onze schutterijen', ibidem, XXVII (1863) iii, 1-25. Cf. also F.C. Spits, 'Ideology and con­stitution',Acta historiae neerlandicae, VI (The Hague, 1973) 83-111.

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substitutes was conducted from these places. On the other hand, many professional officers were also in favour of substitution. They had not, after 1870, lost their con­fidence in the superiority of volunteers trained for a long period and could not see why the Netherlands needed a large army. At most they approved a limitation of sub­stitution, by granting well-to-do Dutchmen the privilege of a shorter period of military service. This would have to be offset by the obligation to serve as an officer or NCO. They hoped in this way to kill two birds with one stone. The shortage of professional officers and NCO's could be made good cheaply with the aid of this group of con­scripts. The well-to-do members of the nation would be able to reconcile themselves to what was for them a reduced period of national service.32

There was also support for substitution in the circle of conservative politicians. While every Dutchman had the obligation to serve the fatherland, it was an attack on the liberty of the citizen to lay down the form this service should take. While the poor man served in person, the more well-to-do citizen could not be forbidden to buy off his obligation. In this way every citizen performed his duty in a manner most ap­propriate to his circumstances. Moreover, the state, the nation and the army would benefit when the richer people continued to appoint substitutes, since it would be irresponsible to allow the talents of the educated and the well-to-do to go to waste in the barracks. The substitutes made better soldiers and in this way the country would obtain more thoroughly trained troops. On the other hand, abolition of the system of substitution would deprive many families living on the margin of subsistence of a chance of improving their lot. Indeed, many a substitute helped his kin through the winter. It was a way of preventing hunger marches. It would even have been more to the taste of the well-to-do if the government had mediated in the process of sub­stitution. They now had to look themselves for substitutes, for whom moreover they had to stand as surety. But the government did not wish to go so far;33

The French defeat of 1870 placed the defenders of substitution in a predicament. Many people were inclined to attribute the victory of the Prussians to their military organization. Moreover, the mobilization of the army, on which the Netherlands had decided in 1870, had ended in chaos and a change of course was clearly needed.34

32. Cf. Th. J. Stieltjes, 'De militie', Orgaa1l Vereeniging Krijgswetenschap (1866-7) 93-170; J .K.H. de Roo van Alderwerelt, 'Stieltjes en zijne krijgskundige plannen', De Gids, XXX (1866) ii, 423-66; Th. J. Stieltjes, 'Volksbewapening',Orgaan Vereeniging Krijgswetenschap (1869-70) 35-65; F.A.V. W.H. van Turenhout, 'De weg tot versterking van het Nederlandsche officien-corps', Vragen des tijds, III (1877) 231-50; idem, 'De'kaderquestie', ibidem, IV (1878) 67-92; J.T.T.C. van Dam van Isselt, 'Beginselen, gronden en strekking van eenige maatregelen tot vorming van reserve-officieren', Orgaan Vereeniging krijgswetenschap (1886-7) 333-409. 33. J.M. Engelberts, Moef de piaatlfVervanging worden afgeschaft (Nijmegen, 1848); A. Kruseman, Over Nationale Militie en remplac;ement (Amsterdam, 1853); W. Heineken, 'Een niet-militair woord over dienstvervanging' Vragen des tijdsi 1(1876) 341-54; 'Een Oud Tirailleur',Afschaffing der dienstvervanging is niet onmisbaar, zelfs niet noodzakelijk voor Nederland. Een kalm woord aan anti-dienstvervangingsliefhebbers .(The Hague, 1876); C.B. Spruijt, 'Persoonlijke dienstplicht', De Gids, XLV (1881) i/ii, 225-60. 34. LL. Uijterschout, Beknopt overzicht van de belangrijkste gebeurtenissen uit de Nederlandsche krijgsgeschiedenis van 1568 tot heden (The Hague, 1935) 408-22; A. Doedens, Nederland en de Fram-Duitse Oorlog. Enige aspecten van de buitenlandse politiek en de binnenlandse verhou-

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In 1873, however, a proposal to introduce individual conscription was defeated in the Second Chamber.35 What weakened the opponents of substitution was their in­ability to form a closed front. Some wished to copy the Prussian army system, others, on the other hand - including the adherents of the New Tendency - wished to go further. They wanted universal conscription linked with a short primary training period.36 Substitution was not discussed in the Chamber again until 1890. By that time, the minister of War, Bergansius, succeeded in getting the principle of individual conscription accepted, but his plans for reform were not carried out. Some years later, though, it was decided to form a cadre of reservists, but this had no consequences for conscription. Indeed, many professional officers did not wish to have anything to do with this auxiliary force. Not until 1909 was it decided to train officers from among the conscripts, who were then sent on release leave and hadto report only for annual training and in the event of mobilization. Obligation to serve as an NCO did not follow until 1917.37

It was only around the tum of the century that substitution was brought to an end.38 The majority of the Roman-catholic politicians continued to be opposed to in­dividual conscription, but many members of the Calvinist Anti-Revolutionary Party abandoned their opposition, partly under the influence of the Transvaal people's struggle. The railway strike of 1903, which showed that 'popular resistance' was a two­edged sword which could also tum against the lawful authority of the state made them hesitate again, but the tide could no longer be turned. The system of substitution was abolished and the period of service for the 17,500 conscripts was set at eight and a half months. Moreover, those who had enjoyed a period of preliminary training

dingen van ons land omstreeks het jaar 1870 (Zeist, 1973) ch. x: 'De mobilisatie; 's lands defensie in discussie'. 35. Although the defeated minister, General Count of Limburg Stirum continued to fight for the introduction of his plans through his' Antidienstvervangingsbond', the associations for' Afschafflng van de dienstplicht' and 'Bevorderipg van vrijwillige dienstneming bij de militie' did not make way for him. See M.D. graaf van Limburg Stirum, Het zoogenaamde Breken met Partijverleden in Militaire Zaken (The Hague, 1875); idem and A. Ising, ed., Geschriften van den Antidienstver­vangingsbond (The Hague, 1885); F. de Bas, Menno David Graafvan Limburg Stirum (The Hague, 1891). 36. W.J. Knoop, 'Een woord over den militairen toestand van Nederland', De Gids, XXXV (1871) i, 197-238; F.A.V.W.H. van Tuerenhout, 'De invoering van het Pruisische systeem van legervorming in ons land is mogelijk. Zij is het belang en van den Staat en van den burger en van het leger', Orgaan Vereeniging krijgswetenschap, (1870-1) 209-355, (1871-2) 43-88. More literature in Teitler, 'Een Nieuwe en een Oude Richting', 182-3, note 36. 37. cr. F.C. Spits, 'Problems of Defence in a Non-belligerent Society; Military Service in the Netherlands during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century', in: A.C. Duke and C.A. Tamse ed., Britain and the Netherlands, VI, War and Society (The Hague, 1977) 189-202. See also Uijter­schout, Beknopt overzicht and W.M. Engelberts and A.E. Redele, Een defensie-program (Amster­dam, 1901); for the question of the officers' and NCO reserve: J. de Bruine, 'Het kadervraagstuk bij het leger', Vragen des tijds, XXVII (1901 143-68, 38, For the following paragraph cf. H.P. Marchant, 'De StaaJcrisis', Vragen des tijds, XXIII (1907) 367-402; H.P. Staal, 'De wapenen hoog gehouden', De Gids LXXI (1907) iii, . 15-42; idem, 'Speer en schild', ibidem, LXXII, iv, 445-75; idem, 'Het ontwerp-Militiewet', ibidem, LXXV (1911) iii, 450-78 and Uijterschout, Beknopt overzicht, 426-38.

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regulated by law had to serve for only four months.39 In addition to these measures, in 1913 the gradual abolition of the civic militia was decided upon. They were replaced by the territorial army, which consisted of men who had recently been demobilized and were organized on a territorial basis.40 The Militia and Territorial Army Acts of 1912 and 1913 marked the provisional end of the development. The annual con­tingent of conscripts was laid down at 23,000 men and the primary training period was reduced still further. The system of the 'four-monthers' disappeared, because young men who had not done any preliminary training often also took advantage of it. The period of territorial service was moreover cut back and the number of annual training periods reduced. The so called 'Land Storm' (army reserve), set up in 1915-16 and divided into troops who had served and those who had not served (Le. conscripts who had long been demobilized and men who for one reason or another had not done military service), completed the picture. Its function was to form a true army reserve behind the territorial army.

THE DUTCH EAST INDIES

In this way the Dutch army gradually took on the form of a cadre militia. This development also occurred in the Netherlands Indies, although at a slower pace. The Netherlands Indies army was composed traditionally exclusively of professional soldiers, but maintaining its numbers caused growing problems during the course of the nineteenth century. The following solutions, among others, were therefore studied for their practicality.41 Firstly, some people suggested that the Dutch conscripts (and substitutes) should be allowed to serve in the overseas territories,42 but this proposal was lost in the debates about whether or not it was constitutional. There were doubts, moreover, about the usefulness of the recruits in the tropics.43 A second possibility was suggested of combining the East Indian army with the professional soldiers of the Dutch land forces. This armed force, consisting entirely of volunteers, could be used

39. It was the minister, Eland's, intention to let the 'four monthers' serve during the winter in the place of the 'stayers'. These conscripts chosen by lot who formed one seventh of the total, had to occupy the barracks during the winter in case a mobilization should take place. In practice they performed purely fatigues, which caused much dissatisfaction. The minister, Staal, proposed, equally without result, that the territorial army should be used to replace the stayers. 40. This was an aid pian, cf. for example, W. Hoogenboom, 'De 10ca1isering der militie', Orgaan Vereeniging Krijgswetenschap (1876-7) 159-207. 41. More about this is to be found in: G. Teitler, Manpower Problems and Manpower Policy of the Dutch Colonial Army, 1860-1920. Paper prepared for the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (UppsaIa, 1979). 42. Alexander, Neerlands hoogste staatsbelang. Een woord tot de Nederlandsche natie (Kampen, 1868); W;J. Knoop, 'Het Indische krijgsWezen', De Gids. XXV (1861) i, 692-712; idem, 'lets over het verb and van het Indische leger met het leger hier te lande', ibidem. XXVI (1862) i, 365-79. 43. This idea was put' forward again later, cf. G.E. Visscher, 'Het is wenschelijk dat een zoo groot mogelijk aantal Nederlandsche dienstplichtigen den eersten oefeningstijd in Indie vervult, zonder vermindering van het jaarlijks contingent voor het Nederlandsche leger', Orgaan van de Indische krijgskundige vereeniging (Bandung, 1908-9) 1-34.

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both in Europe and overseas. The conscripts would then be kept for service in Europe and could form a kind of reserve and second line.44 A less far-reaching proposal was for a fusion of only the officers' corps of both armies. This suggestion met with

approval in the Netherlands but the East Indies officers did not wish to be outnumbered (and hampered in their careers) by their Dutch colleagues.45 A third suggestion was for the formation of an 'Indies Brigade' in the Netherlands. But during the first half of the nineteenth century experiences with such brigades had not been wholly favourable and there was also doubt about the possibility of transporting the brigade to the East Indies in time of war. In general, the plan was regarded as an attempt by the ministry of War to make up the complement of the Dutch army with money from the budget of the ministry of Colonies.46 The introduction of a 'Colonial Reserve', which was an attempt to form a kind of brigade in the Netherlands, produced hardly any results. The times were no longer favourable for a brigade of volunteers and in the East Indies too, a reserve of purely native soldiers led only a struggling existence.47

Since the supply of volunteers encountered so many problems, a solution was sought in the introduction of conscription in the East Indies.48 This suggestion merits some explanation, because the majority of the conscripts would have to be supplied by the population of Java and not everyone had an equally high opinion of their military capacities. Supporters of the introduction of conscription pointed out, how­ever, that the native volunteers did not generally belong to the flower ofthe population and were therefore not representative. Moreover, they were fighting in an organization which was strange to them, in unaccustomed clothing and with outlandish weapons. The advocates expected different results from the Javanese and Sundanese who were fighting for their own hearth and home and were led by their own, preferably noble, officers, the more so if the conscripts were allowed to decide upon their own uniforms, weapons and mode of fighting. The experience with the corps of marechausse in Achin gave substance to these expectations. The Javanese who were generally regarded

44. Editorial, 'Over de noodzakelijkheid om het Nederlandsche leger in verb and te brengen met het Oost-Indische leger, en een goed staand leger evenals in Engeland te onderhouden', Nieuwe Spectator (Arnhem, 1849) 239-44; P.M. Netcher, 'Over een geheele of gedeeltelijke vereeniging der Nederlandsche en Indische legers', Het Vaandel. (Schiedam, 1868) 60-8; P. van Assen, Is eenig ver­band tusschen het Nederlandsche en Nederlandsch Oost·Indische leger wenschelijk en mogelijk'! (Leeuwarden, 1872). 45. FJ. Haver Droeze, 'Is het wenschelijk en mogelijk om eene vereeniging tot stand te brengen tusschen 'de officienkorpsen van het Nederlandsche en het Nederlalidsch-Indische leger'!', Orgaan Vereeniging krijgswetenschap (1891-2) 385-461; F.A. van Engen, 'Samensmelting van officiers­kaden', De Gids, LXIX (1905) ii, 302-39. 46. 'Monitor', Indische militaire belangen. Vij! adviezen (Batavia, 1875); G.F.W. Borel, 'De Neder­landsch-Indische Brigade. Open brief aan Monitor', Indisch Militair Tijdschrift, X (1879), 52-70; idem, 'De Indische Brigade. Haar samenstelling. Bewapening, bestemming enz.', Orgaan vereeni­ging Krijgswetenschap (1878-9) 213-92. 47. W.A. Penard, 'Werving en legerreserve', Indisch Militair Tijdschrift, XLII (1911) 447-61; X, 'De reserve voor het Nederlandsch-Indisch leger', ibidem, XLIII (1912) 809-51; HJ.D. de Fremery, 'De reserve voor het Indische leger', ibidem, XLV (1913) 19-143. 48.This subject is extensively dealt with in G. Teitler, 'The Dutch Colonial Army in Transition. The Militia Debate, 1900-1921', Miliialre Spectator, CXLIX (1980) 5-20, 70-87.

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as being of little use militarily, had certainly given satisfactory service in this corps. The same results might be hoped for in a popular war against a foreign enemy.49

But not only military problems were attached to the introduction of a native militia and the appointment of native officers. The political attitude of the native popUlation had naturally also to be considered. Could the Javanese be trusted sufficiently to be given weapons? Might it not be better to let the matter rest for the moment and to limit conscription to the European population and a few small native groups who were already considered to be reliable? On this point, however, there was another problem: might not this limited militia come to threaten the ties between the East Indies and the mother country? Was not this the first step towards an independent East Indies, under its own, European-native elite? However, after the victory of the Japanese over the Russians in 1905 Japan seemed to be a growing threat and a militia came to be looked upon as an unavoidable necessity. But to the disappointment of the adherents of the New Trend, it was limited in the first instance to Europeans, educated natives and the (Christian) Menadonese. The combination of preparedness of the whole nation, territorial defence and 'mare chaussee tactics' was therefore not accepted by the government. As far as these tactics were concerned, the attempts to extend them beyond the corps itself were even sharply condemned by one of the adherents of the New Trend. Thomson, a purist who wished to reserve this approach for popular resistance did not think it really suitable for a professional army.51

MILITARISM

The foremost adherents of the New Trend, Ram, Thomson, and Graafland, were not alone in their struggle for a new army system, nor had there been any lack of like­minded spirits before them. They wished, however, to accelerate the tempo of the changes and no longer saw any advantage in compromise. Strength was added to their argument by Graafland's reputation as an army commander and by their first-hand experience as observers in a controversial war. Thomson, who was the most prominent among them, also caused a sensation by what might be called his 'conversion'. Shortly before he was sent out as an observer he had still shown himself to be a conservative soldier and it was precisely because of this that the lessons he drew from the Boer War attracted so much attention.52

49. F.C. Hering, 'Java's weervermogen tegen een buitenlandschen vijand', Indillche Gidll, XXXI (Amsterdam, 1909) 723-40; XXXII (1910) 296-325; 911-25; XXXIII (1911) 192-6; 'Gueriala' 'Voorstel tot eene -reorganisatie van het Nederlandsch-Indische leger', Indillch Militair Tijdllchrift, XXXIX,1131-7. 50. Teitler, 'Dutch Colonial Army'. 51. H.B., 'De Nieuwe Richting' in ons leger door den afgevaardigden Thomsom veroordeeld', Indillch Militair Tijdllchrift, XXXIX, 94-118; M., 'Nog eens 'de Nieuwe Richting" ibidem, 411-8; Drie Ster, 'lets over het tegenwoordige oefeningsstelsel bij het Indische leger', Indillche Gidll, XXX (1908) 877-89. 52. L.W.J.K. Thomson, Zellmaandllche oefentijd 1I00r het wapen der infanteriec; (Haarlem, 1898).

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A 'NEW' AND AN 'OLD TREND'

The adherents of the New Trend developed an army system on the basis of tactical findings and their efforts were subsequently directed to the forming of soldiers capable of independent action. In their view, a long period of military service, accommodation in barracks and the system of a cadre-conscript army were not only interrelated, but also formed so many obstacles to the realization of their ideal. According to them, a cadre conscript army did not exist in fact for the sake of the nation. In such an or­ganization the cadre was not there for the conscripts, but vice-versa. The army then became a goal in itself, and this also applied to the barracks. Thus, external forms came to dominate life in the barracks and preparation for national defence was pushed into second place. The army began to exist in a world of its own, in a militarism turned away from the battlefield as well as from the nation. The conscripts were the first victims of this process. They were indispensable ornaments in the ritual of bar racks and on parade ground, but they were scarcely initiated into the secrets of the modern battlefield. 53

Against this militarism the adherents of the New Trend set the concept of a popular army with a short primary training period. They believed that the longer the period of military service, the more dull-witted the conscript would become. In their view, a long period of military service was not intended to teach the soldier the military craft. On the contrary, it was used to instil in him a strict discipline, and in the course of this process the conscript became completely unfit for modern warfare. A soldier who had to think and act independently should not be made to function as part of a machine. The adherents of the New Trend rejected the idea that strict drill and its accompanying discipline contributed to successes on the battlefield. They considered that these means were only intended to impress further on the conscripts their subservient social posi­tion. The conscripts were above all not to derive any wrong ideas from their military training and had therefore to be brought into a state of utter dependence. Training was consequently sacrificed to mistrust, while the security of the country was thrown into the balance.

The adherents of the New Trend wished to put an end to this situation. The whole of the population should defend the country and a short period of primary training would do no harm to the economic life of the country. The reduction of the period was possible by breaking radically with any kind of show. The soldier had to be trained for the battlefield and only what was essential for this should have a part in the training. There was another reason, however, why a short primary training period was put forward as a possibility. The proponents of these ideas wished to break what was in their eyes the grip of a small social elite on the army. This they wanted to do not so much by broadening the access to the officers' corps, as by depriving the corps of its professional character. Against the exclusiveness which they regarded as a characteristic of the professional officers' corps they set the advantage of the broad social basis of the reserve officer. Without professional officers the emergence of a

53. It is not practicable to give individual references for the views of the adherents of the New Trend summarized in this section. For the literature consulted see: Teitter. 'Een Nieuwe en een Oude Richting', 185, note 53.

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social and organizational gulf between officers and men might be avoided. Moreover, this device facilitated the new relationship between superior and inferior, which was considered to be essential for creating self-reliant soldiers. This relationship was no longer to be based on fear of punishment, but on trust and on differences in military useful knowledge. Officers and NCO's would have to become educators, following the rules of a new system of military training. They had to explain to the recruits, who had preferably received preliminary training, the use of the prescribed actions. This was not only in order to facilitate the learning process, but mainly to help the men to become self-reliant in battle.

The adherents of the New Trend sharply rejected the reproach that this proposal would undermine military discipline. On the contrary, they were, by their own ac­count,in favour of strict discipline, but this had to be 'functional'. It should not be used to shore up the position of the officers, but to give the soldiers a better chance of survival. The officer had to prove his superiority and it was in the interest of the army and the nation that he did not entrench himself behind formal powers. He had to win his authority and the soldiers therefore had a right to put orders to the test. The officer who was unable to qualify in the face of this criticism did not deserve a place in the army; This had nothing to do with the undermining of military discipline. On the contrary, it was precisely the old system, with its non- binding impersonal character, which had made a mockery of this discipline.

Where the armed forces and the nation had previously been separated by a broad gulf, in the popular army they were one. The armed forces and the nation would merge together, making of the Netherlands an impregnable bastion. According to the adherents of the New Trend a professional or cadre-conscript army (with substitution) did not form part of society, but·stood outside it. They contrasted the 'aristocratic' professional army with their 'democratic' fOmi of organization. Society whould fear the 'aristocratic'army as a parasite and threat to its freedom. The 'democratic' form of army organization, on the other hand, would be placed in the middle of society and eveh be able to transfer some of its tasks to civilian institutions. The adherents of the New Trend were thinking in this connection of e.g. the care for disabled soldiers and the prosecution of soldiers who had committed an offence. In their opinion civilian society was adequately equipped to carry out these tasks.54

CONCLUSION.

If the ideas of the adherents of the New Trend are considered in the light of the actual developments in the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies, it has to be ad­mitted that these plans, however many changes there were, came nowhere near to

54. Polvliet, 'Het kazemeleger'; idem, 'Legerhervorming', 78; 'Let the Staff College be moved to one of our university cities, where chairs in military studies are to be established. At this collee:e only those aspects shall be taught for which no seat exists at the university'.

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A 'NEW' AND AN 'OLD TREND'

realization. The military system undoubtedly did develop in the direction proposed

by the adherents of the New Trend, but it remained far removed from their concep­tion. It is incidentally difficult to determine what the influence of the New Trend was on the course of events. They proved themselves to be prolific writers and they were able to dominate the columns of the Militaire Gids. Their voice could not be silenced and, still less, ignored. It was of course also important that from 1905 to 1913, Thom­son was a member of the Second Chamber as a representative of one of the liberal parties.

What ultimately spoiled things politically for the New Trend, however, was the weakening and splintering of the liberals after 1900. Support from the socialists might have saved the plans, but this was not forthcoming. The fate of the minister, Staal, is symptomatic in this respect. This minister of War, who was a member of a cabinet which relied not on a liberal majority, it is true, but at least on an anti-denominational one, had to abandon his proposed reforms because of the failure of the socialist parliamentary party to support him (l906). That this party did in fact sympathize with his proposals appeared from the fact that it abstained from voting in parliament. This was a significant gesture, because it was accustomed simply to vote against any estimates presented by a minister of War. 55

It is not its political failure, however, but the views of the New Trend which deserve our attention here. While it was guilty of gross exaggeration and even of tilting at windmills as far as the danger of militarism was concerned, it demonstrated quite a sharp insight into the future in respect of tactics. Moreover, although its adherents closely followed developments abroad, its principal representatives nevertheless derived their main inspiration from their own war experience, from events where they could rely on their own observation and from the Netherlands Indies military traditions. There was already weighing of pros and cons before the wars in Achin and South Africa; after these events foreign models were approached even more cautiously. The adherents of the New Trend did not follow, but tested. There was no question of their being overwhelmed by foreign impressions.

55. Cf. n. 38, above; N. Japikse, Staatkundige geschiedenis van Nederland van 1897-1917 (Leiden, 1918) II, vii: 'Het ministerie de Meester (1905-1908)'; PJ. Troelstra, Gedenkschriften, III (Am­sterdam, 1929) 56-65; Jean Jaures, L'Armee Nouvelle (1911), later showed how closely social democratic ideas approached those of a Dutch libera11ike Thomson.

77

Van Karnebeek's break with tradition

C.B. WELS

In no other period after the separation from Belgium have the States General and public opinion in the Netherlands been so intensely concerned with foreign policy as in the years 1925-1927. Under consideration was a treaty with Belgium which newly ordered sovereign rights in the ScheIdt estuary and foresaw the construction of a canal joining Antwerp with the Rhine. After rejection of his conduct of policy with regards to the treaty, the minister of foreign affairs, Herman Adriaan van Karnebeek, resigned, the fifth time a man holding that portfolio had done SO.1 Never before, however, had the point at issue been a policy so strongly inspired by the minister personally. Despite the vehement reaction of public opinion and extensive debate in both Chambers, dis­cussion of the treaty took place largely outside party policy lines, so that the resig­nation of the minister had no direct consequences for internal politics. Nor dit re­jection of the treaty result in major changes in the international position of the Nether­lands. In retrospect, especially after the emotions ofthe Second World War, the affair of the treaty came to be viewed as the incidental mistake of an otherwise competent -albeit obstinate - Foreign minister.

In Het onaannemelijk tractaat (The Unacceptable Treaty),2 R.L. Schuursma has dis­cussed the origin and rejection of the treaty. His study focuses on the forces outside parliament and outside the political parties which whipped up public opinion against the treaty. The center of gravity of the opposition lay in the business world of Rot­terdam, Amsterdam, and Zeeland, with experts on the waterstaat (the maintenance of dikes, drainage, and waterways), and in the Greater Netherlands Movement.3 In an epilogue devoted to Van Karnebeek, Schuursma questions whether this minister can be reproached for concluding a treaty so unfavorable to the Netherlands at a moment

1. In 1841, J.G. Verstolk van Soelen resigned as minister of foreign affairs following the refusal of William II to ratify the treaty between Luxemburg and the German Customs Union. In 1852, H.A. van Sonsbeeck took advantage of the rejection by the Second Chamber of a treaty with France on copyright in order to end his ministry. P.T. van der Maesen de Sombreff left in 1863 after the First Chamber rejected his budget on.account of the 'Polish note'. Finally, the Second Chamber in 1868 expressed its displeasure over the policy of 1.P.1.A. van Zuylen van Nijevelt regarding Luxeburg by rejecting the budget of his ministry for a second time, leading to the fall of the whole cabinet. 2. R.L.Schuursma, Het onaannemelijk tractaat. Het verdrag met Belgie van 3 april 1925 in de Nederlandse publieke opinie (thesis, University of Utrecht; Groningen, 1975). Summarized in: C.R. Emery and K.W. Swart, 'Survey of recent historical works on Belgium and the Netherlands', The Low Countries History Yearbook. Acta Historiae Neerlandicae, XI, (The Hague, 1978) 206. 3. Schuur sma, Het onaannemelijk tractaat, 104.

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VAN KARNEBEEK'S BREAK WITH TRADITION

when he knew that Belgium was not supported in its claims by the great powers and, further, for holding fast to the original text of the treaty when shown from many

sides Its unacceptable consequences. 9chuursma insight fully answers that if there is any question of guilt then it must be shared by the apparatus of the ministry offoreign affairs, which was patently unequal to the heavy tasks of these years, and by the Second Chamber, which did not attentively follow foreign policy and failed to give timely signals to the minister.4 Besides this monograph, there is now an article on Van Karnebeek at the Washington Conference of 1922,5 and the documents con­cerning foreign policy in 1919 and 1920 have been published.6 Hence, it has become possible to put the conduct of policy by Van Karnebeek and in particular the 'question of guilt' into broader perspective as well as to study his significance for Dutch foreign policy in the decade after the First World War. This period is of particular interest be­cause during these years (besides the treaty with Belgium) the relation of the neutral Netherlands vis-a-vis the victors of 1918, the country's joining the League of Nations, and the naval armaments bill (with its implications for the position of the Dutch East Indies) were also under discussion. There is good reason to put the Foreign minister personally in the foreground in any discussion of these points. Van Karnebeek put such a clear personal stamp on the conduct of policy that it makes sense to ask whether he ought to be reckoned among the small group of outstanding figures on the inter­national stage - Briand, MacDonald, Stresemann, and Wilson - who after the check of World War I sought a new world order but were stymied by the lack of comprehension and the illwill of their own countrymen.

Although Van Karnebeek filled the highest public offices for more than thirty years (mayor of The Hague, Foreign minister, governor of the province of South Holland), little is known of him. His death during World War II, when no memorials of any Significance could be published, is undoubtedly the main cause. 7 After the war, there was no group inclined to recall the life and work of a man who had not only been controversial on account of his policy as Foreign minister but also who had taken a less than proud stance during the Second World War against the Germans as governor of South Holland.8 Finally, and this is a point to which we shall return, it

4. Ibidem, 273. 5. N.A. Bootsma, 'Nederhnd op de conferentie van Wash:ngton', Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden, XCIII (Thtl Hague, 1978), 101-126. 6. J. Woltring, ed., Documenten betreffende de buitenlandse politiek van Nederland 1919-1945. Period A 1919-1930, I, 1 July 1919 - 1 July 1920 and /I, 1 July 1920 - 31 augustus 1921. Rijks geschiedkundige publicatien, Grote Serie, CLVI and CLXII (The Hague, 1976 and 1977). Summar­ized in Emery and Swart, 'Survey', 205. 7. An exception is the in memoriam published in Switzerland: Hans Wehberg, 'lhr. H.A. van Karnebeek', Die Friedens-Warte. Blatter jUr internationale Verstandigung und interstaatliche Organisation, XLII (Berlin, 1942), 105-108. I.A. Nederbragt remembered Van Karnebeek among friends at Voorburg on 16 may, 1942. Nederbragt was associated from 1919 to 1934 with the ministry of foreign affairs and from 1940 to 1945 was mayor of Voorburg. He had knllwn Van Karnebeek first as Foreign minister and later as provincial governor. This in memoriam has been published in 1.A. Nederbragt, Herinneringen. Qud en nieuw uit het boek mijner gedachtenis (The Hague/Rijswijk, no date). 8. L. de Jong, Het koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, IV and V (The Hague, 1972-4).

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C.B. WELS

is remarkable that Van Karnebeek left behind so few personal traces. When con­temporaries characterized him, it was mainly in superficialities: self control, polished use of the language, correct in externals, and great powers of persuasion.9 Heldring, who ruthlessly dissected· the men about him in his Dagboek [Diary], did not go far beneath the surface with Van Karnebeek, whom he knew well and personally, char­acterizing him as ingenuine, idle, persuasive. lO Nederbragt, who thought much of Van Karnebeek, praised his expertise, persuasiveness, and discipline. ll

When Berman Adriaan was born in 1874, his father P.C. van Karnebeek was chief­of-staff onhe minister of foreign affairs and a highly respected officer in the Foreign Service. The family was related to a number of diplomatic families.'2 The elder Van Kamebeek was minister of foreign affairs in 1885-1888 and a liberal member of the Second Chamber in 1880-1913. He had high expectations of international arbitration, about which great interest had arisen in the Netherlands at the end of the century. He was vice-president of the First Peace Conference in The Hague (1899) and took a prominent place among the diplomats who busied themselves with preparations for the following peace conferences and for the International Court of Justice, which would settle in The Hague. He became president of the Carnegie Foundation, which built and managed the Peace Palace.

Even before he finished his studies, Herman Adriaan received (thanks to his father) a post on the secretariat of the First Peace Conference (1899). The following year, he graduated from the University of Utrecht, where he wrote a doctoral dissertation entitled De "Costa Ricka Packet" Arbitrage. It can be presumed that the experience of the elder Van Karnebeek in the course of this famous Anglo-Dutch arbitration problem was put to use by the student.

The concept of arbitration was particularly well received during these years in the Netherlands both within the ministry of foreign affairs and among the practitioners of international law. Given the growing threats from the great powers, a small country such as the Netherlands sought protection through international law. At the end of the century, the emphasis lay above all on international arbitration as the means for dis­posing of differences between states. The Peace conference in The Hague, which reached few conclusions on disarmament but had resolved on the foundation of a court of arbitration, raised the Netherlands' international prestige. Gradually the opinion came to predominate that a small state such as the Netherlands, which stood above power politics and did not strive for expansion of territory either within Europe or without, could play an important role in the realization of the international rule of law. Especially seen in retrospect, this line of thought may have been too idealistic, yet in the circumstances a foreign policy primarily directed towards strengthening the

9. Schuursma's characterization: Het onaannemelijk tractaat, 271-74. 10. Joh. de Vries, ed. Herinneringen en dagboek van Ernst Heldring (1871-1954). Werken Neder­lands Historisch Genootschap, 5th series, II, III, IV (Utrecht, 1970) I, 308, 314, 513, 620, 666, 671,691. 11. Nederbragt, Herinneringen, 46-50. 12. M.W. Jurriaanse, De Nederlandse Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken 1813-1900 (The Hague, 1974) 330-1.

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VAN KARNEBEEK'S BREAK WITH TRADITION

international order was the only real alternative to the isolation of an unguaranteed

neu trality .

This conception of foreign policy from the decade before the First World War found a convinced adherent in C. van Vollenhoven, an expert in international law at Leiden, who sought to found an international court of justice in The Hague. In addition, he argued that the Netherlands ought to obtain a policing function in the maintenance of the international legal order and thus of the peace. The authority which the Nether­lands possessed in the world, its stable internal relations, and the purity of its motives predestined the country for such a role, Van Vollenhoven claimed. 13 These suggestions, though merely a caricature of the ideas current at the ministry and the commission for the preparations for the peace conferences, later gave the impression not only of self satisfaction and hypocrisy but also a total lack of realism to the Netherlands' striving for the establishment of an international legal order.

Given the then current interest in the incorporation of legal principles in foreign policy, a man with the capacities and relations of Van Karnebeek, who already had experience of a peace conference and had written on the subject of arbitration, appear­ed destined for a career in Foreign Affairs. Yet, in 1901 he accepted a pOSition in the Colonial office. His work in this ministry certainly was not outside his metier, how­ever. While in the last decades of the nineteenth century the foreign policy of the Netherlands in Europe was passive and limited in its initiatives to commercial mat­ters and later to a slight extent to arbitration, extra-European colonial interests in contrast necessitated diplomatic activities.14 This concerned the following questions: relations with Venezuela, with which the position of Cura9ao was in dispute; the reduction of the whole of the Indonesian archipelago to colonial status and, as a con­sequence, relations with England; the question of mining and oil concessions in the East Indies, in which the United States above all had interests; intercontinental tele­graph communications; the opening of China; the desire of Germany for bunker coal stations in the Indies; and bunkering of Russian warships in Sabang during the Russo­Japanese War. Policy on these questions was decided in consultation with (though not on the advice of) the Colonial office. Hence, Van Karnebeek remained partially engaged in foreign policy during the ten years which he spent in the Colonial office. He had an important part in the conception of the policy regarding the neutrality of the Dutch East Indies during the Russo-Japanese War15 (and wrote on the Nether-

13. Compare J.C. Boogman, 'The Netherlands in the European Scene', in: G.A.M. Beekelaar e.a., ed., Vaderlands Verleden in Veelvoud (The Hague, 1975) 495; C.A. Tamse, 'Een historisch element in het Nederlandse buiteniands-politieke denken', Intemationale Spectator, XXVIII (The Hague, 1974) 759. 14. In the period around the turn of the century, on occasions nearly a third of the documents which passed throu2h the ministry of foreign affairs dealt with the position of the Netherlands as a colonial power. C.B. Wels, Aloofness and Neutrality. Studies on Dutch Foreign Relations and policy making Institutions (Utrecht, 1982) 97-113. 15. S.L. van de Wal, ed., Herinneringen van lhr. Mr. B.C. de longe met brieven uit zijn nalaten­schap. Werken Nederlands Historisch Genootschap, series, I (Groningen, 1968) 9; Smit,Bescheiden, 1,255.

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c.n. WEtS

lands' policy of neutrality in this war in Onze Eeuw [Our Century] 16 in 1905). Thanks to the influence of his father, Van Karnebeek took part as an adjunct

delegate in the Second Peace Conference (1907). In 1911 he became mayor of The Hague. The major of the residence traditionally was a man of liberal background by position and origin not too far distant from the royal court. Van Karnebeek satisfied these requirements: he belonged to the world of The Hague and was non-partisan though sympathetic to the 'free liberals'. Moreover, at the Colonial office he had proven himself qualified for greater responsibilities. A major consideration in his appointment was the hope of the period that The Hague would expand into an or­ganizational center of international law. The Permanent Court of Arbitration was established there and in 1907 construction on the Peace Palace began, which besides the court would house the various commissions which would be instituted by future peace conferences. It was expected that Van Karnebeek would become an important link between the municipal government and the international circles in and around the Peace Palace. His father, himself closely involved in the construction of the Peace Palace, undoubtedly advanced the interests of his son in this case too. With the out­break of the war, however, the younger Van Karnebeek could contribute little to the extension of the international function of The Hague. He served as a forceful governor and faced the magistrates and councillors with his remarkable powers of persuasion. He devoted more attention to the position of the town as a whole and its functions vis-a-vis Amsterdam and Rotterdam than to the direct interests of its inhabitants (in­cluding housing and social and medical provisions).I?

The reasons are obscure why, at the formation of the rightist (confessional) cabinet of Ruys de Beerenbrouck in the summer of 1918, the name of the non-partisan Van Karnebeek was placed on the list of ministerial candidates. IS It is clear, however, that other names took precedence and that some of the politicians involved in the formation wondered whether Van Karneb~ek, whose pro-German sympathies were known, was the right man for Foreign Affairs under the circumstances.19 It is apparent that he was ponsidered because he was on the scene while all the other potential candidates were diplomats who were at their posts and difficult to reach for consultation.

When Van Karnebeek assumed office in September 1918 at the age of forty-five, he entered a world in which he was fully conversant, both from his family and his other functions. As mayor of the residence he had become acquainted with the diplomatic corps, while departmental surroundings were just as familiar to him. Immediately

16. H.A. van Karnebeek, 'Een brandend neutraliteitsvraagstuk', Onze Eeuw, V (Haarlem, 1905) 458-75. 17. Communication from Dr. W. Drees, who in this period was town councillor, resp. alderman of The Hague. 18. The two authors who have used the archival material relating to this cabinet formation give no definite answer. LA.H. Verhagen, De totstandkoming van het eerste ministerie Ruijs de Beeren­brouck (Bois-Ie-Due, 1952); G. Puehinger, Colijn en het einde van de coalitie. I De geschiedenis van de kabinetsformaties 1918-1924 (Kampen, 1969). 19. De Vries, Herinneringen Heldring, I, 307; Schuursma, Onaannemelijk tractaat, 24.

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VAN KARNEBEEK'S BREAK WITH TRADITION

after his assumption of office, he began the greatly needed reorganization of his

mtfti§try. In Qny Qggeggmllnt of hig adminiUration this is a cardinal point given that, as seen above, one of Schuursma's conclusions is that Van Karnebeek assented to the treaty because intet alia he did not foresee its consequences in time. Schuursma suggests that the bureaucratic apparatus of Foreign Affairs did not warn off the minister because it did not dispense of sufficient knowledge and experience in order to prepare such a complex treaty. Since at issue is not merely an incidental error of the ministry but incompetence of a more structural nature, it makes sense to go into its causes.

The ministry of foreign affairs had been chronically neglected since 1840 as a result of the lack of interest in the Netherlands shown to external relations. The staffing of the ministry had remained at a fairly constant level since the middle of the nineteenth century, the division of labour within the apparatus was no longer in keeping with changing circumstances, and the housing of some sections was lamentable until 1912.20 The slight political weight of the portfolio of Foreign Affairs further resulted in the ministry's being merely the last piece of the puzzle at cabinet formations.21

This reflected in the character of the holders of the office. The choice of the minister was not determined in the first place by his suitability or his political beliefs but by the possibility of gaining vote.s for the cabinet from some particular group.22 In the period 1870-1918, when one nonentity after another succeeded to the ministry,23 only a few ministers had sufficient capacity to lead the ministry and the Foreign service. Generally, they lacked the necessary authority vis-it-vis their colleagues and parliament to plead for the interests of their ministry. Thus, Van Karnebeek's im­mediate predecessor from 1913 to 1918, Dr. 1. Loudon, former minister to Washing­ton, was 'amiable and honorable, but otherwise unqualified and slack', acoording to Heldring?4 This verdict is overly severe. Loudon was a knowledgeable jurist who defended Dutch neutrality during the war with great skill. He was no politician, how­ever. His notes of protest against violations of neutrality, shrewd and correct in inter­national law, sometimes seemed to lose sight of their purpose - keeping the Nether­lands out of war - by allowing no room for compromise?S His accomplishments lay in his personal contribution to the law of neutrality, but in these difficult years he gave scarcely any signs of leadership. Even less was it the case from 1908 to 1913

20. Compare C.B. Wels, 'The foreign policy institutions in the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands', Zara S. Steiner, ed., The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World (London, 1982) 363-89. 21. Jurriaanse,Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, passim. 22. C.B. Wels, 'The Foreign Relations of the Netherlands between 1813 and 1945, in: H.F. van Panhuys et aI., ed., International Law in the Netherlands, I (Alphen aan den Rijn - Dobbs Ferry, NY, 1978) 101-2. 23. H.T. Colenbrander, 'De internationale positie van Nederland tijdens, voor en na de Wereld­oOrlog' in: H. Brugmans, ed., Nederland in den oorlogstijd. De geschiedenis van Nederland en van N ederlandsch-Indie tijdens den oorlog van 1914-1918, voorzover zij met dien oorlog verband houdt (Amsterdam, 1920) 103. 24. De Vries, Herinneringen Heldring, 1,339. 25. C. Smit, Tien Studien betreffende Nederland in de Eeme Wereldoorlog (Groningen, 1975) 69.

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with R. de Marees van Swinderen, a diplomat who had a gift for easily establishing contacts, to which he devoted more time than to the work at the ministry. D.A.W. van Tets van Goudriaan left behind hardly any traces of his administration (1905-1908) in the archives.26 R. Melvil baron van Lynden (1901-1905) was primarily known as a puppet of Prime Minister Abraham Kuyper. During his ministry, the chefs de paste hardly knew to whose competence the Foreign service belonged.27

The neglect of the ministry was in the second place to be ascribed to the econom­izing zeal of the Second Chamber, against which the ministers were generally no match. Since 1830, at the negotiation of the budget, it was regularly argued that significant savings were possible in Foreign Affairs.28 The Netherlands, the liberals in particular stated, did not need representatives living in pomp; charges d'affaires with a good commercial background or consuls general with limited diplomatic status would suffice. That such criticism weakened the position of the whole ministry needs no elaboration.

The reorganization of the ministry in 1918 chiefly advanced foreign economic relations, for which Van Karnebeek founded an independent directory for economic affairs alongside the political and juridical sections. It was to his credit that he actually effectuated this reorganization, the desirability of which nearly all of those con­cerned had previously realized.29 During his tenure, Van Karnebeek succeeded in maintaining in the field of foreign economic policy the primacy of his ministry versus the ministry 0 f trade. 30

When negotiations for the treaty were undertaken with Belgium, these changes within the ministry had already come about, but the new directory had been in existence for too short a time to bring to bear more than the knowledge and ex­percience of its individual personnel. During its first years, the directory of economic affairs concentrated primarily upon what its instructions named as its first task: 'the provision of the material needs of the Netherlands', the making up of arrears sustained in the economic area as a result of the war.31 With the preparations for the nego­tiations with Belgium, the ministry's lack of permanent lines of communication with the commercial world made itself felt, preventing the formation of a clear picture of the wishes and interests of those circles. In 1891, when protectionism won the field, a commission of experts for the interests of trade, industry, and agriculture (the Com-

26. This impression derives from C. Smit, ed., Bescheiden betreffende de buitenlandse politiek van Nederland 1899-1919. Rijks geschiedkundige publicatien, Grote Serie, C, CII, CVI, CIX, CXVII (The Hague, 1957-64) and C. Smit, Nederland in de Eente Wereldoorlog (1899-1919) (3 voh., Groningen. 1971-3). 27 _ A.S. de Leeuw, Nederland in de wereldpolitiek van 1900 tot heden (Zeist, 1936) 31, 45. 28. Compare the criticism on the expenditures of the ministry in 1918: Verslag van de hande­lingen van de Eente Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 1920-1921.119. cols. 1 and 2. 29. Heldring pointed out in his Dagboek the continuing shortcomings in this sector, which were most certainly known to the others involved. Colijn made a point of it at the cabinet formation. Puchinger, Colijn en het einde van de coalitie, 90. 30. Nederbragt, Herinneringen, 53. 31. Wottring, Documenten. I, xxvii.

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mission for trade policy) had been installed. It was an initiative of the ministries of waterstaat, trade and industry, colonies, and fmance, which Foreign Affairs would later join.32 It seems that during the following years Foreign Affairs never bothered to serve on this commission in the formation of foreign economic policy.33 During the

war years, there was an advisory commission which linked the government and the Netherlands Overseas Trust Association, the organization which during the period 1914-1917 transacted the trade of the Netherlands with the outside world.34 Com­plaints were common in these years that the relations of Foreign Affairs with the commercial world left much to be desired; in response, Van Karnebeek vigorously instituted in September 1918 a Council for Assistance in Foreign Economic Policy, which formed the advising complement of the directory of economic affairs. This council took as its task in its early years the ending of the economic aspects of the wartime situation and was not involved in the preparation of the treaty with Belgium. Moreover, the members of the council came from sectors of the commercial world (banking, oil, intercontinental' shipping) which in the first instance had nothing to lose from the Netherlands' accession to Belgium's demands in the areas of economics and public works policy. The task of the Council for Assistance and the role of Foreign Affairs in the area of foreign economic policy remained unclear in the following decades as well.35 Because it had not been established whether Foreign Affairs or Economic Affairs should function as the center of administration in this field, much depended upon the person of the minister and his position within the cabinet.

Besides the previously cited reasons (weak ministers and little interest or even opposition from the Second Chamber), the completely outdated interdepartmental division of responsibilities with respect to foreign economic policy contributed to the ministry's not being up to the task in the economic sector.36 Within the framework of his prosperity policy, William I (1813-1840) had created a ministry of national in­dustry that not only had as its task the encouragement of internal trade and industry but also, in part, foreign economic relations. The critical results of the tariff policies of other countries, the opening of new markets, and consultation with the Chambers of Commerce also belonged to its duties. Dutch tariff policies resorted under the customs and excise division of the ministry of fmance. Foreign economic policy was a task of the ministry of national industry, which also bore a portion of the expenses of the consulary apparat, while the ministry of foreign affairs was the executing organ. In 1834, the minis~ry of national industry was degraded to a division and brought under Foreign Affairs; in 1841 this too was abolished. Its tasks were dispersed among various ministries: Internal Affairs took over the maintenance of contacts with the

32. Woltring, Bescheiden, V, xxxviii, 89. In this volume are also examples of the barely co-ordinated reactions of Foreign Affairs to the protectionism of France, Spain, and Portugal. 33. This, at least, is to be inferred from the Bescheiden selected by Smit. 34. Smit, Tien Studien, VI. 35. See Woltring, Documenten, I, xiv, xv; Nederbragt, Herinneringen, 41 ff., 53 ff. 36. See Van Karnebeek's sketch of the situation when he became Foreign minister: Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1925-1926, 1362, col..1.

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business world. Finance received the care of river traffic, and Foreign Affairs trade statistics.37 Thereafter, this division of responsibility led regularly to disputes. 38 Although an official who had been encharged with trade affairs was often named as secretary general, the reproach was heard that this ministry paid too little attention to the interests of trade and industry. Then, during the 1870's, the ministry was reorganized, whereby separate sections for political and for consular and commercial affairS were brought into being. After this, nothing further changed. In neither the field of foreign policy nor of commercial policy was there any impetus in this period which could transform this static situation. Moreover, the policy of non-involvement encouraged passivity, both within the Foreign service and in the political section of the ministry. When initiatives were taken, they lay primarily in the field of international law. The free trade that had made commercial treaties superfluous meant that the consular service and the trade affairs section of the ministry could limit themselves to seeing that no protective measures were taken elsewhere. Contacts with the business world were therefore not necessary.

During the rise of protectionism in the 1890s, the minister of foreign affairs proposed that official deliberations on foreign commercial policy among the ministries of foreign affairs, finance, colonies, and waterstaat, trade and industry - until then carried out in writing - be institutionalized by the creation of a permanent inter­departmental commission. In 1894, this initiative led to the institution of the 'Official Preparatory Advisory Commission for Negotiation and Commercial Treaties'.39 The ministers of waterstaat, trade and industry, and fmance preferred a broader com­mission than exclusively the preparation of trade agreements, but Foreign Affairs ob­jected. The Official Commission functioned with this strictly delineated competence even after the First World War.40 The criticisms of Colijn and Heldring regarding the lack of co-ordination of foreign economic policy were applicable even before the 1890s, as can be seen in several instances dating from this period in which Foreign Affairs seems to have been lacking in the flexibility and tact necessary for the creation of a good official consultative ambiance as well as lacking in expertise.41

37. Wels, 'Foreign policy institutions'. 38. From the mid nineteenth century on, regularly at budget debates there were complaints in the Chambers about the lack of activity at Foreign Affairs in commercial policy and about the con­suls' being poorly and tardily informed of Dutch trade policy. Van Karnebeek admitted at the debate of his budget in 1922 that the interdepartmental division of responsibility required re­organization in this area. Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1922, 1021, col. 2. During his time in office, Van Karnebeek was at least aware that his ministry was responsible for foreign economic policy. After his departure from office, the competence disputes between Foreign Affairs and Trade and Economic Affairs flaired up again. Nederbragt, Herinneringen, 53 ff. 39. Roell to the regent, 28 Oct. 1894: Woltring, Bescheiden, V, 666-8. 40. Woltring,Documenten, I, xv. 41. The minister of waterstaat, 'trade, and industry, Havelaar, expressed his amazement in 1891 in a letter to his colleague at ,Finance, Godin de Beaufort, that the minister of foreign affairs, Hartsen, was, without consultation with the other ministries, in correspondence with the Cham­bers of Commerce concerning trade policy. 'Such consultation is all the more necessary since it now appears that the minister of foreign affairs seems to have lost sight of the distinction between 'protectionist' and 'defensive' policy and since 'protective' and 'reprisal' measures, which only in

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Finally, in this connection, attention must be given to the central place which in­ternationallaw had captured in conceptions of international relations, and the reaction

to it at the ministry. As seen above; from the middle of the nineteenth century, the Netherlands considered its security best served by a policy of non-involvement and the strengthening of the international order. Respect for the law implied the consolidation of the status quo and thus of the position of the Netherlands. The juridical approach to foreign policy formed a strong stimulus for the exercise of international law . At the universities, international law was in a golden age and the Netherlands in the first quarter of the century could boast of a number of practitioners of international stature, such as T.M.C. Asser, A.A.H. Struycken, B.C,J. Loder, W,J.M. van Eysinga, and C. van V 01lenhoven.42

The jurists trained by this school streamed into the diplomatic service and the ministry, further strengthening the juridical component of policy. The result was that international law sometimes became not the means but the end itself. This develop­ment was reflected organizationally in the establishment in 1918 of a separate Juridical Affairs section. All related questions, released from their political or economic con­text, were assessed by this new section, institutionalizing a usage that had arisen gradually before 1918. The emphasis upon the law diminished interest within the ministry for other aspects of foreign policy, such as economic considerations, national­ism, power politics, and ideological motives.

In conclusion, it can be said that the ministry of foreign affairs was not equipped to bear the responsibility for the economic interests of the Netherlands, which were so strongly allied to foreign commercial relations. The policy of non-involvement of more than a half century and its consequent passivity produced lethargy both in the ministry and in the Foreign service. In its slumber, the ministry was overtaken by the First World War. This inadequate apparatus stood at the disposal of Van Karnebeek when he was confronted by three major tasks in 1918: ending the international isolation in whis.:h the Netherlands was caught by its neutrality during the war; enabling the country as quickly as possible to take part again in international trade; and prepa­ration for negotiations with Belgium for a treaty which would have political, economic, waterstaat, and military aspects and which would touch the vital interests of the nation yet which lay in a sphere laden with nationalistic sentiments, revanchism, and mutual distrust.

Criticism of the treaty with Belgium concentrated in the first instance on its eco­nomic and public works aspects; the political character, to which Van Karnebeek (according to his remarks in the First and Second Chambers) attached the most sig­nificance, in some sense remained in the background. What function did the treaty have in Van Karnebeek's total conception of foreign policy? His ideas can only be

exceptional and accidental instances coincide, seem to be viewed as wholly identical.' Foreign Affairs, which received a copy of this letter, noted in the margin of this passage: 'Both equally wrong'. Woltring, Bescheiden, V, 31-2. See also ibidem, nos 12, 12A, 33,40,60,132. 42. See A.M. Stuyt, 'The Science of Public International Law in the First Century of the King­dom of the Netherlands 1814-1914', Van Panhuys,lnternational Law, I, 168-212.

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learned from his official papers: instructions, letters, and Parliamentary papers from his period as minister, speeches, and occasional pieces from the years when he was president of the Society for the League of Nations and Peace, and a lecture on Dutch foreign policy from 1938.43 In these papers, it is striking that Van Karnebeek's con­ceptions, despite changed circumstances, underwent but few changes in the course of twenty years and were generally expressed in the same words.44

Through the years, geopolitical factors formed one of the starting points of his thought.45 Subsidiary factors, such as the position of the Netherlands as a maritime power, the nature of its economy, and colonial possessions remained in the back­ground. He was little susceptible to sentiment; he never advanced ideological con­siderations. For Van Karnebeek, the geographic position of the Netherlands stood central. As a part of the ScheIdt, Rhine, and Maas estuarine region, the country was the vital connection for the German hinterland with the overseas world, the entry for England to the continent, and a strategically important area for France, covering its northern flank and serving as a bridgehead. As soon as the Netherlands were to ally with one of these powers, then the critical balance of power would be broken and the peace directly endangered. The Netherlands must therefore remain neutral.

This line of thought, which prior to 1914 had held the field and seemed to be solidified by the events of the First World War, was expressed in 1923 as the fun­damental premise of policy by Struycken, an authority on international law with great influence in Foreign Affairs: 'History creates and sustains as a political maxim of the first order that the integrity and independence of our territory is the indispens­able precondition of the political balance of Europe.>46 Van Karnebeek advocated a policy of active neutrality in opposition to the policy of strictly juridical neutrality of the war and non-involvement of the years before.47 During his period as minister, the policy of active neutrality was for Van Karnebeek still the political maxim. On the eve of the Second World War he went even further: in a famous lecture, he posited that 'Our calling is not only that of neutrality in the juridical sense in time of conflict but that of active neutrality in general as a permanent political manifestation.' And that not for the sake of self-interest, but in the interests of Europe.48 These develop-

43. On the occasion of the jubilee of Queen Wilhebnina: 'De internationale positie van Neder­land in de iaatste veertigjaren', in: Veertig jaren (1898-1938) (The Hague, 1938). 44. Geyl's opinion was that van Karnebeek's theses in his lecture of 1938 'must be understood in terms of a line of thought formed in earlier years, from which the speaker, although the whole world lay in ruins all about him, could not yet release himself.' P. Geyl, Nederland en de Oorlog. Beschouwingen naar aanleiding van Prof. Telders' 'Nederlands Onzijdigheid' (Utrecht, 1939). 45. See his remarks at the budget debate (Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1922-1923, 1057, col. 1) and his defense of the naval armaments bill (Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1923-1924,252, cols.1, 2; 253, col. 1; p. 255, col. 1) See also H.A. van Karnebeek, 'Internationale positie', 4. 46. A.A.H. Struycken, De hoofdtrekken van het Nederlandsch buitenlandsch beleid (Arnhem, 1923) 18. 47. Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1922-1923, 1057, col. 1. 48. Van Karnebeek, 'Internationaie positie', 11. Van Karnebeek elaborated upon the premises formulated since the beginning of the century by J.C.C. den Beer Poortugaal, J.A. van Hamel, C. van Vollenhoven and the work cited in note 46. Compare Tamse, 'Historisch element', 759.

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menis in his thought on the international position of the Netherlands are all the more striking in comparison to the relative realism which characterized policy as late as 1907, when, after weighing the advantages and disadvantages of alliances, both for the Netherlands and the colonies, the choice fell to non-involvement.49

A second element in Van Karnebeek's conception of foreign policy was the central place which he allotted the law without falling into the fruitless juridical rigidity of some of his predecessors. He clearly expressed his conceptions of the relation between power and law in parliament during the debates over the League of Nations and later as president of the Society for the League of Nations and Peace. Van Karnebeek ad­vocated the adherence of the Netherlands to the League but evidently saw more clearly than the equally unenthusiastic majority in parliament the dubious aspects of membership. He regretted that the neutrals were under-represented in the Council of the League50 and that the Central Powers with their 200,000,000 inhabitants in Europe were excluded from the organization.51 Though never explicitly stated, it is evident that in the first years of the League of Nations he rightly considered it to be an instrument of the Allies and their associates in the maintenance of the balance of power established by the Treaty of Versailles. While in the Netherlands many pre­ferred to view the League as the continuation of the work done in the field of an international rule of law at the time of the peace conferences in the Hague, Van Karnebeek himself realized that it was an organ in which not law but politics and power stood in the foreground. He also took no special pains to have The Hague be­come the site of the League.52 He preferr~d the town to be the home of the Inter­national Court of Justice instead, expecting that the court, along with the Court of Arbitration which already sat there, 'shall form the chief and most important part of the new international order which the League of Nations will call intobeing.'53

Compulsory arbitration of disputes, as the Netherlands and some other small states wished to see included in the covenant of the League, foundered on the objections of the great powers. Van Karnebeek himself was not surprised. On various occasions he propounded to his countrymen that Geneva was more politicized than it was thought to be in the Netherlands.54 He defended joining the League by pointing out that the Netherlands, if holding aloof at its formation, might later be compelled to submit to the ballot to become a member. The time was right, in his opinion, for some form of international co-operation. Despite the great significance which he attached to the establishment of an international legal order, the judicial system of the League of Nations was not of primary significance.55 Of course, he hoped that the League's

49. C. Smit,Nederland in de Eente Wereldoorlog, 1,2-3. 50. PJ. Dud, Het jongste verleden. Parlementaire geschredenis van Nederland 1918-1940 (Assen, 1948-1951) I, 264. 51. Van Karnebeek to De Stuers, 30 April 1919; Woltring, Documenten, 1,247. 52. De Vries, Herinneringen Heldring, 1,330. 53. Van Karnebeek to Queen Wilhelmina, 28 June 1920: Woltring, Documenten, 1,678. 54. Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1922·1923, 1057. col. 2. 55. H.A. van Karnebeek, 'Wezen van den Vo'lkenbond', in: V.H. Rutgers et aI., ed.,lnternationale vraagstukken van dezen tijd (The Hague, 1934) 16.

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basis in international law would be realized. To those who found this foundation too weak he argued that they must think more of possibilities and less of wishes. One could not allow the League to be checked, for what was the alternative? Above all, he emphasized the direct, practical need for the new organization.56 The co-operation of the representatives of the member states in the permanent organs of the League and the annual collective consultation at Geneva, where the member states met each other on an equal footing, would lead to greater mutual understanding. However, he had warned against the risks of this international sphere at an earlier stage,S7 and ten years later he reiterated: experience taught that a statesman in Geneva had to guard against going further 'than would be tolerated in the eyes of the people who watched him at home, where a variety of influences would be at work.,s8

The question whether the benefits of membership balanced the inroads upon sovereignty was one of the focal points of parliamentary debate on the League of Nations.59 The Foreign minister did not deny that, by joining the League, sovereignty underwent a certain limitation. The Netherlands would be obliged to participate in an economic boycott whenever a state would be branded an aggressor by the League. Military contributions, however, remained voluntary, as did the granting of passage for troops which would be deployed against an aggressor. The Netherlands had worked for the remission of charges of aggression to an international legal college in place of the unanimous judgement of a political college such as the Council of the League of Nations, but despite these objections, Van Karnebeek argued, the Netherlands had more to lose in terms of security by not joining than would be gained by the retention of sovereignty. The consequences of membership in the League for the Netherlands' independence were debated anew in the Second Chamber in 1924 when, as a develop­ment of the still unresolved question of sanctions, the guaranty pact (by which the members of the League obligated themselves to provide military assistance in cases of aggression) was put to the question.60 Also in this matter the counsel of the League, on which the Netherlands was not represented, would have the last word. Countries which sought to defend the post-Versailles status quo, such as France and Belgium, had a strong interest in such a provision. Van Karnebeek agreed with the Chamber that the Netherlands did not benefit by a treaty that would give the League a politico-military function and would further weaken the element of international law to which the Netherlands attached such value. Moreover, the great powers would have no further interest in the functioning of the League as soon as a fully regulated system of military obligations rested on the members, again placing the factor of power in the fore­ground. However, the argument that Dutch neutrality would be compromised by such a treaty made little impression on Van Karnebeek. Through membership inthe League neutrality, as it had functioned before and during the First World War, in his opinion would only be possible in the case of a war condemned according to international law .

56. Handelingen Eente Kamer 1919-1920, 585, col. 2. 57. Ibidem, 357, col. 1. 58. Van Karnebeek, 'Wezen van den Volkenbond', 13. 59. Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1919·1920, 1377, col. 1. 60. Oud, Het jongfte verleden, 11,206.

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That the guaranty pact would impinge upon Dutch independence he considered far more significant.

In the budget debate of 1922,61 Van Karnebeek introduced the concept of the policy of active neutrality: the Netherlands had a calling to be and to remain in­dependent. Consideration of the obligations as a member of the League of Nations necessitated, as traditionally so, maintenance of a certain distance from the great international questions while attempting with his policy of active neutrality to gain international trust. On that last point, Van Karnebeek's policy had already borne fruit. The Netherlands had been isolated immediately after the war as a result of its neutrality, but by the end of 1922 its pre-war prestige and trust had been largely regained: the Permanent Court of International Justice had been established in The Hague with the Netherlander B.C.J. Loder presiding; the Foreign minister himself was president of the Assembly ofthe League of Nations in 1921-1922.

Van Karnebeek deemed the Netherlands' position in the League and above all its role in the international rule of law as a major factor in its security. He had, inter alia, strongly advocated the establishment of the Permanent Court in the Netherlands on the presumption that a certain measure of protection would be the consequence.62 On the eve of the Second World War, however, he stated that the 'work of The Hague' and its resultant prestige was not adequate protection against the risks for the Netherlands deriving from its geographic position.63

Van Karnebeek had an eye for passive as well as for active security. In 1923, during the debate over the strongly contested naval armaments bill, it was propounded to him that naval expansion would be contrary to the spirit of the League of Nations; he de­clared, in response, that national security and armament were essential elements of the charter of the League.64 A state which is a member of the League should also be able to meet its obligations by developing the means to take part in sanctions at some future time. Moreover, the position of the Netherlands and, thus, its security rested on the confidence of other states in the Netherlands' will to remain independent. The policy of active neutrality, however, lost its credibility and effectiveness as soon as the Netherlands was not prepared to pay the price of independence. One could not claim to carry out a policy of neutrality and at the same time not recognize the obligations of neutrality.65 Van Karnebeek felt that remarks made in the Chamber that the Netherlands, given its position, could not take arms against Britain nor accomplish much even with a expanded fleet in the East against Japan and Britain testified to a dangerous opportunism. A policy which put nothing in the way of the wrongdoer was uncongenial and would destroy the country in the end.66 Apparently this re­action was determined in part by Van Karnebeek's· experiences in early 1919 in Paris.

61. Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1922-1923, 1057, col. 1. 62. Van Karnebeek to Queen Wilhelmina, 28 June 1920: Woltring, Documenten, 1,678. 63. Van Karnebeek, 'Intemationale positie', 4. 64. Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1922-1923,1057, col. 2. 65. Ibidem. 66. Oud,Jonggte verleden, 11,129.

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His chilly reception by the Allies doubtlessly taught him that what was considered in the Netherlands as the sanctified virtue of neutrality was sometimes seen by the victors as an abdication of responsibility for international events in order, once re­lieved of the misery of war, to do a thriving business with both parties. His observations on the subject of security ought also to be seen against the background of the Washing­ton conference of 1921-1922. Van Karnebeek took part in this conference, learning that the Dutch East Indies had become more accessible to both ideas and goods by improved techniques of communications and transportation and thereby came within the Far Eastern field of conflict. The age in which the affairs of Asia were disposed in the capitals of Europe was gone. Nor would he have missed that, with the presence of Japan (and perhaps subsequently other states in the Pacific) in the equations of power, the premises of foreign policy in the home country, which were chiefly derived from the European constellation, no longer matched its interests in the Dutch East Indies.67

Above all, thanks to Van Karnebeek's initiatives the Netherlands received at the 1922 Washington conference from the signers of the Four Powers Treaty (by which France, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States guaranteed one another's island territories) a declaration of respect for Dutch possesions in the Far East.68 It seems probable that Van Kamebeek's attention to the security aspects of the colonial possessions in the Far East derived from his experience in his earlier function at the Colonial office when he was engaged in the maintenance of Dutch neutrality in the Far East.69

Van Karnebeek's exposition on Dutch security in 1923-1924 was not only connect­ed with the discussion over the naval armaments bill. During the same period, inter­national tension in western Europe grew after the occupation of the Ruhrgebiet by the French and Belgians. The minister spoke of the latent danger of war: irredentism had risen anew, commercial policy had become more aggressive, national egotism had

not diminished, and the rule of law was giving way again to the rule of the strongest. Defensive measures, he concluded, would not be misplaced.70

The question of national security in general always held Van Karnebeek's attention. Both during his tenure as Foreign minister and later during his presidency of the Society for the League of Nations and Peace, he tried whenever the subject of dis­armament arose to encourage understanding of the interdependence of arbitration, security, and disarmament. One of the most important goals of the League, he argued, was the diminution of armaments and the peaceful resolution of differences through arbitration. This goal, however, could only be attained when the states concerned con­sidered themselves secured not by their own strength but by the sanctions of the League. According to this line of thOUght, strengthening of the international legal order and obligatory arbitration - the lofty goals which at that time were adduced in the Second Chamber - could only be accomplished by resort to stiffer sanctions. But a

67. On this point attention was focused a year later by Struycken, Hoofdtrekken, 36-7. 68. Bootsma, 'Nederland op de conferentie van Washington.' 69. See above, note 14. 70. Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1923-1924.254, col. 2.

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more compelling obligation to participate in sanctions involving more than an economic boycott would mean further infringements of sovereignty and loss of independence for members of the League. Both the Foreign minister and parliament had great difficul­ties with this because it diminished the ability of the Netherlands to maintain its distance from international events.

This inconsistency was quite marked in the Second Chamber but never led to dis­cussions of principle. Van Karnebeek himself was blamed for avoiding a debate on it.71 This ambivalence in policy was certainly not lost on him, but since there was no viable alternative he saw little purpose in a discussion of principle which could solve nothing and could only bring about dissension.

Finally, Van Karnebeek's thoughts on the static function of the League of Nations deserve attention. As already seen, he was thoroughly conscious that the League of Nations was an enterprise of the victors who sought to secure their possessions by engaging the international community in the maintenance of the status quO.72 After his resignation as minister, when he could express himself more freely, his words on this subject were quite clear. As president of the Society for the League of Nations and Peace he warned that the existing territorial disposition, which was stabilized and guaranteed in the framework of the League could, under the influence of the 'eternal passage of history', be superseded, so that its maintenance by the application of sactions would be senseless.73 The tension between the dynamic of world events and the static function of the League, he contended, could only be avoided if the states were prepared to revise their treaties, to which they could be invited pursuant to article 19 of the League's statute.

What place did Belgium take in Van Karnebeek's conception of foreign policy? Little is known regarding his personal disposition towards the neighbouring country, but, in any case, a special affection for the Belgians was not evident, or he would certainly have been accused of the contrary during the press campaign in 1925 and 1926. The less than flattering way in which he expressed himself about Belgians 74

leads to the presumption that he belonged to that large group of Hollanders who despised the country. The position of Belgium after the war and the interests of the government in Brussels with respect to revision of the treaty of 1839 need not be reviewed in detail; mention of the three most important aspects of the Belgian de­mands will suffice.

The international constellation of 1918 offered the Belgians, who were little enamored with the disadvantageous settlement of 1839, opportunities to unleash their dissatisfactions and frustration politically. Review of the treaty with respect to inter alia the border settlement in Limburg, Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, and on the ScheIdt

71. Ibidem, 1922-1923, 1055; ibidem, 1923-1924,296, col. 2. 72. Hanqelingen Tweede Kamer 1925-1926,966, col. 1. 73. He referred here to the Kellog Pact. Van Karnebeek, 'Wezen van den Volkenbond', 10; Van Karnebeek, 'Vertrouwenscrisis', 35. 74. De Vries, Herinneringen Heldring, 1,341.

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had been a latent tendency in Belgian foreign policy since 1839.75 Following the First World War, the circumstances for revision seemed more favourable than ever: Belgium belonged to the victor's camp which redrew the map of Europe, while the Netherlands, because of its neutrality, was not only isolated but here and there had even become an object of rancour because the country, manoeuvring between the parties, had come through the war undamaged and even in some respects had profited.

Alongside these general desires for review of the treaty, the specific military in­terests of the Belgians (which also antedated 1914 but were actualized by the World War) were at issue. Their country had been neutralized and guaranteed by the great powers in 1839 but still not protected from war - becoming, just the opposite, the battleground of Europe. For the sake of their security, the Belgians now desired the end of this imposed neutrality and the abolition of the prohibition to use Antwerp as a naval base. For its defense, moreover, Belgium was strongly dependent upon the position which The Hague would take in any subsequent European conflict. Between the Ruhrgebiet and the Kempen lay the Maas crossings, and these had to be defended by the Netherlands. It was well known in Brussels that Dutch military planning em­phasized the defense of Holland behind the waterlinie (a combination of fortifications and inundations from the Zuiderzee to the great rivers) after yielding the inland provinces. Moreover, the Netherlands controlled the ScheIdt estuary, enabling it to cut off Antwerp as a resupply center from possible help from overseas.

In the third place, commercial circles in Belgium hoped for satisfaction after the war on a number of economic issues: better and shorter links between the ScheIdt basin and the Rhine, both via Limburg and via Zeeland and North Brabant, and greater control over the ScheIdt estuary (among others the Wielingen), so that shipping would no longer be completely dependent on the readiness of the Netherlands to carry out certain provisions in the nautical and public works realms.

Territorial annexations, as a consequence of demands of the first sort, never con­stituted a serious point of negotiation, because Belgium had just as little chance for success as before the talks over revision of the treaty were begun due to the lack of support from the great powers. The firm stance taken by Van Kamebeek towards the great powers in Paris and the timely switch from a passive to an active diplomacy contributed much to this. Belgian annexationism, however, provoked strong animosity in the Netherlands and had great influence on relations between the two countries in the following years.

The second of the Belgian demands, the incorporation of Dutch territory in Bel­gium's defenses, was also initially promoted in Paris, which co-operated closely with Brussels in the years immediately after the war. The Netherlands, however, refused categorically to enter into a military accord for the defense of the Maas crossings with Belgium or to grant rights of passage, for this would have meant the end of the

75. J.C, Boogman, 'Achtergronden en algemene tendenties van het buitenlands beleid van Neder­land en Belgie in het midden van de 1ge eeuw', Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Ge· nootschap, LXXXVI (Utrecht, 1962) 43-73.

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policy of neutrality. Nonetheless, article I of the treaty specified free passage of the

Sch{!ldt for ghipg of all natiom with thQ QxcQption of ~hip~ of waf, a conciliatory mov@ towards Belgium by which, the opposition charged, the N~therlands abandoned its sovereign rights. The memorandum attached to the draft treaty interpreted this article as not applicable to Belgian ships of war, either in time of peace or of war.76 This explication later became one of the pOints on which the opposition concen­trated, because it was interpreted as un unwarranted abdication.

In the third area, that of the economy, the Netherlands made substantial con­cessions which in large measure led to the later rejection of the treaty. It was pre­sumed that Van Karnebeek agreed to these concessions in the hope that the Belgians in tum would abandon their chums with respect to de Wielingen, where Dutch sover­eignty was also in dispute. It has also been suggested that the concessions may have been related to the pressure of the great powers. Schuursma, however, has convincing­ly demonstrated that, during the period in which the concessions were made, the Belgian demands with respect to de Wielingen were not yet at issue and therefore Van Karnebeek had no need 'to buy them off; furthermore, Van Karnebeek knew that he had little to fear from the great powers.77 The motives for his actions must therefore be sought in his personal vision of Dutch-Belgian relations.

In Van Karnebeek's thought, strongly determined by geopolitical factors, the international position of the Netherlands was closely intertwined with that of Belgium. One of the prerequisites of the functioning of the Dutch policy of active neutrality was a good understanding between the two states in the crucial area of the Maas, Rhine, and ScheIdt estuaries. It need not be a friendly relationship, merely one in which the two countries made no further demands upon one another. Belgium had to be as 'satisfied' with the Netherlands as the Netherlands were with the world at large.

Concerning the Belgian demands for some form of co-operation with the Nether­lands on the defense ofthe Maas, Van Karnebeek could well understand their concern, given that (as discussed above) he considered national security an essential pre-con­dition of the functioning of international law and order. When the Belgians brought into discussion in 1919 a military accord with an eye towards the danger of a German invasion via Limburg, he showed himself prepared to give immediate assurances that the Netherlands would consider an invasion of Belgium via Limburg as a casus belli. This declaration was to remain in force until the League of Nation's Pact with its general guaranties came in force. It is not improbable that an understanding of Bel­gium's security requirements likewise led Van Karnebeek to agree to the opening of the ScheIdt for Belgian ships of war. It had little strategic significance, but these con­cessions considerably strengthened Belgian feelings of security. On the other side, however, the room for manoeuvre for the Dutch policy of active neutrality was sig­nificantly limited. Van Karnebeek considered the concessions to Belgium not a very great price to pay to achieve a relationship of trust between the two countries which

76. Schuursma, Onaannemeiijk tractaat, 51. 77. Ibidem, 44 and passim.

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could perhaps evolve into closer economic and even political co-operation in the delta, ending a century of mutual distrust. 78

Van Kamebeek felt that Amsterdam and, above all, Rotterdam (whose competition with Antwerp, in his opinion, threatened to gain all too great an influence on European transport problems) ought to come to an arrangement with the Belgians.79 On the basis of their common importing and exporting functions for the hinterland, the two states would then be able to come more easily to a common policy. Evidently, Van Karnebeek did not foresee all the consequences of the concessions. The causes of this lack of foresight have already been discussed in some detail; in any case, the First Chamber considered the price too high and rejected the treaty. In the political dis­cussions and in the literature, however, proper weight has not been given to the returns to be expected from the concessions: an improved and, perhaps, special relationship with Belgium and all the consequences which that would have entailed for Dutch foreign policy.

Why did the criticism which first surfaced in official circles and then welled up in the country and among popular representatives not lead Van Karnebeek to propose changes in the draft treaty? His obstinance on this point was in the first place the result of his firm belief in fighting for a good cause. By bringing the Netherlands and Belgium closer, he sought to favour the stability of western Europe and, thereby, the security of the Netherlands. His pleas that the timely adaption of treaties to changed circumstances was an important condition for the functioning of the international order were obviously applicable to Dutch-Belgian relations.

Concerning the dispositions of 1839 with respect to the ScheIdt, Van Karnebeek never expressed himself clearly. It was not his practice to make public his thoughts if it served no concrete goal. However, combining his conceptions on international politics with the tenor of the argument with which he defended the concessions, it seems justifiable to conclude that he considered the provisions of 1839 with relation to the sovereignty of the ScheIdt outdated in international law and a legacy of the time when internationalization of rivers and their mouths was considered an in­fringement of sovereignty.80 Provisions with respect to the ScheIdt, after all dated from the same period when the Netherlands had tried every available means to ob­struct the overseas connections of the German hinterland via the Rhine unless re­course was had to Dutch ships, facilities in Dutch harbours, or Dutch middlemen.,81 Van Karnebeek's barely concealed criticism on the role of the 'great trading towns' is highly revealing in this connection.82 It oUght not to be forgotten that he, as mayor of The Hague, had had experience with Amsterdam's and Rottei:dam's successes in

78. Nederbragt (Herinneringen, p. 57) speaks in this connection of sacrifice. 79. Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1926-1927,363, col. 1. 80. Little attention has been given to the theoretical basis of Dutch policy with respect to the Rhine and Scheidt. See B. Vitanyi, De scheepvaart op rivieren in de natuu"echtsleer (Deventer, 1970) and Leo J. Bouchez, 'The Netherlands and the Law of International Rivers' in: Van Pan­huys,lnternational Law, 1,215-88. 81. See C.B. Wels, 'Duitsland, Nederland en de Rijn', Kleio, XVI (The Hague 1975), 1-10. 82. Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1926-1927, 363,.col. 1.

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gaining the attention of the government for their interests.S3 The two ports took particular displeasure with Van Karnebeek because he, in the negotiations on the Dutch-German trade and shipping treaty of 1923, had supported the interests of and had argtled for advantages for agriculture and industry but had accomplished little for the trade of Amsterdam and Rotterdam.84 Through the brilliant defense of the minister, however, the treaty was approved by both Chambers. The bitter recriminations which were directed against Van Karnebeek on this occasion by business circles formed as it were the introduction to the debate over the treaty with Belgium.

In the second place, criticism got through too late to the minister. Schuursma posits cQrrectly that parliament did not send signals to Van Karnebeek in time.S5 This was related to the lack of interest among politicians for foreign policy, previously de­scribed. Despite the important questions at issue after the war, initially there was little change under Van Karnebeek in this situation. Even with the somewhat greater open­ness - a result of the general aversion to secret diplomacy - which was in vogue in the Netherlands with respect to foreign policy, the politicians inspired to no more than superficial debates or incidential questions. Only after the proposed treaty lay on the table and the campaign against it was underway did the politicians too became in­volved. This delayed reaction, however, is not to be ascribed exclusively to their lack of interest.

Van Karnebeek, it is true, had taken greater pains than his predecessors to keep parliament informed,86 but he was determined not to submit his administration to them. The tenor of his speeches in the Chambers even reveals a certain disdain for his audience. This attitude derived not only from his character but was also connected with his status as a non-partisan minister. Van Karnebeek belonged to the fairly large group of administrators - including several other ministers and many mayors, provin­cial governors, and governors general of the East Indies - who in this period may have held clear conceptions on political affairs but did not wish to belong to a party. Generally they were men who came from a liberal and protestant tradition and were averse to political extremism. Promotion of the general good was for them incompatible with party membership, which always entailed a certain bond with a particular in­terest. Until the Second World War, this group dominated the administrative sphere in large measure and the political climate in part. Out of this mentality also came Van Karnebeek's conception that the ministry of foreign affairs ought to remain outside the partisan political sphere. Leading politicians such as Ruysde Beerenbrouck, Heems­kerk, and Idenburg, who were involved in the formation of the cabinet in 1918, shared this point of view.s7 As an outsider to partisanship, however, Van Karnebeek re­mained deprived of timely information on public opinion and on opinion in the aisles

83. Communication from Dr. W. Drees. 84. Nederbragt, Herinneringen, 43. 85. Schuursma, Onaannemelijk tractaat, 55. 86. Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-1919, 51, col. 1; Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1921-1922, 1020, co1s. 1 and 2. 87. Puchinger, Colijn en het einde van de coalitie, 131.

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of parliament. In the opposite direction, too, little officia~ infonnation penetrated to the parliamentary members from the side of the minister over his plans and con­ceptions. Consultations outside the official sphere and personal relations were truly not in his nature.

Through his lack of political connections, no particular grouping in Parliament faced great risks from a repudiation of Van Karnebeek's administration. The par­liamentary factions had no direct political interest in avoiding the fall of the minister. That held for the cabinet, too. The treaty, as agreed at the fonnation of 1926, was not a matter of confidence.88 Neither the cabinet as a whole nor the various ministers had an interest in the political fate of Van Karnebeek.

Van Karnebeek's rigidity was also the result of his ideosyncratic lack of receptivity to criticism, and his successes as Foreign minister had strengthened his already far from small self-confidence. The way in which he had relieved the continuing inter­national isolation of the Netherlands after the war, the energy with which he had parried the far reaching demands of the Belgians in 1919, and his success at the Wash­ington conference in 1922 had found general recognition. The position which the Netherlands assumed at the beginning of the twenties in the League of Nations was viewed as his accomplishment. The moral ascendancy that he had demonstrated opposite parliament during the debates over the League of Nations, the commercial treaty with Gennany, and the naval annaments bill and during discussions on the budget of his ministry had further strengthened his position. Undoubtedly this had contributed to Van Karnebeek's impression that parliament would be no match for his expertise and eloquence in the debate over the treaty with Belgium, too.

The authoritative position which he took in the select international circle of ministers of foreign affairs and diplomats further augmented the rigidity of the minister. In the period between the end Of the negotiations (1920) and the signing of the treaty (1925), he restored the Netherlands' international prestige: the Peace Palace in The Hague was the center of international jurisprudence, the minister himself had chaired the League's secretariat; J .A. van Hamel was head of the juridical section of the work of the League and other international organizations: J. de Louter presided over the Pennanent Court of International Justice; the Netherlands were represented in the League's commissions for mandated territories and prohibition of opium; the mayor of Rotterdam, A.R. Zimmerman, was appointed by the League commissioner general for the reorganization of Austrian finances, assisted by M.M. Rost van Tonningen; J. van Waln~ de Bordes had a central position in the financial and economic section of the League's secretariat; J.A. van Hamel was head of the juridical section of the secretariat and later high commissioner in Danzig (Gdansk). For a country like the Netherlands, which had so high an estimation of the international rule of law, this signified more than merely a contribution to international cooperation. It was the ful­mlment of a duty. By education, familial relations, interest, and daily employment, Van Karnebeek was closely engaged in the work of the Peace Palace in The Hague and

88. Schuursma, Onaannemelijk tractaat, 157.

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the palace of the League of Nations in Geneva. The respect which he enjoyed there he had not only to thank to his expertise and the ease with which he himself moved in this circle but also to the international prestige that the Netherlands had gained during his ministry, in which he had personally participated. It is understandable that Van Karnebeek considered that this respect also placed obligations on him, especially the observation of agreements. In his opinion, reneaguing on pledges which he had given the Belgian minister of foreign affairs would have destroyed not only his credibility but also that of principles for whom he negotiated. Just this international orientation, however, made him little receptive to the nationalistic sentiments which his policy unchained and which formed the binding element among opposition groups. In con­nection with Van Karnebeek's international respect it ought also to be realized that he was the first minister of foreign affairs who regularly journeyed outside the country. This resulted in some consternation at the ministry in the beginning because it was ex­pected that a policymaker would follow world events from his official chambers.

In his defence, Van Karnebeek repeatedly emphasized that the treaty in the first place had a political character. In giving in to the criticism, the Netherlands would sacrifice the higher interests of stability and security and thereby the chances for strengthening of the international order to the economic particularism of the 'great trading towns'. That the mihister allotted the treaty a function in the totality of attempts to achieve a lasting relaxation of tensions in Europe can be seen from the timing of the actual signing of the treaty: early 1925, when the Germans had accept­ed the Dawes plan and the path to Locarno was clear.89 Undoubtedly the optimism that swept Europe after Locarno with its minor relaxation of tensions gave Van Karne­beek the feeling that he was on the right path. After the minister had learned of the negative official advice and after the opposition within the country and in parliament began to show itself, his resignation was the most obvious solution, both politically and constittitionally.90 That he nonetheless remained in the cabinet was in part due to the same motives which had produced his unwillingness to introduce changes into the treaty.

This analysis of Van Karnebeek's administration cannot be considered complete because it has not been possible to reveal the person behind the minister of foreign affairs, something necessary in order to explain his extraordinarily personal policy with respect to the treaty. Attempts to penetrate his motives are blocked by his ret­icence, his formality, and his polished use of language, which left scant room for engagement and through which emotions seldom showed.91 He had many acquaint­ances but seems to have had few friends. Trustworthy reports of conversations, from which we would have been able to learn his motives, his hopes and disappointments, have not been recorded. For his colleagues too he remained opaque, so that he did not

89. Contra Schuursma, Onaannemelijk tractaat, 55. 90. Oud,Jongste verleden, III, 160. 91. See in this connection his diary annotations: Woltring, Documenten, I and II.

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easily win trust. His behaviour and facial expression made a sphinx-like impression upon many. Some of his contemporaries asked themselves what sort of Foreign min­ister, whose competence was not otherwise in doubt, would be so possessed by a treaty which in their opinion was clearly in conflict with the interests of the Nether­lands. There was no answer, allowing the suspicion to arise that he had a personal interest in the treaty.92

Van Karnebeek carried on his long and em\>ittered struggle against the pressure groups, the stokers of national sentiment, a portion of the press, and his opponents in both Chambers without being able to fall back upon confidants or political friends. In his last year in office he was alone. The majority of his advisors in the ministry -the same men with whom he had avoided in 1919 the threatening international isolation of the Netherlands - he found opposed to himself from 1925 on, which hardened even further a man already vain and all too sensitive to criticism.93 With the defence of the treaty, when he fought for his life's work, he took refuge in manipulative exagger­ation of the dangers which the Netherlands would face by rejection of the treaty, in erroneous citations, and in attempts to influence Belgian popular representatives.!I'J He did all this with little subtlety. It was the typical reaction of an isolated, uncertain man of authority.

In the policy of Van Karnebeek, three lines of force are to be distinguished. In the first place, he proceeded from the Dutch tradition which established the law as a basis for relations among states, often bringing to bear a greater sense of reality than many of his countrymen. He saw that the establishment of an international legal order had to be reached not only juridically but also politically and that that political aspect required adaptibility to new situations and attention to security aspects.

Consequently, Van Kamebeek switched over from the passive policy of non­involvement which had dominated prior of 1914 to a more active policy, by which he sought to keep sufficient distance from the turbulent rest of Europe. He grasped that the Netherlands after 1918 had to take on an active role and could no longer afford 'to sit on a velvet cushion ... watching a parade pass by from our windows', as Colijn characterized policy before the First World War.9S This meant in prinCiple a different attitude towards the outside world, but, it appeared from parliamentary debates, many were not yet agreed.

Finally, relations with Belgium: Van Karnebeek intended that the Netherlands had to make some sacrifices to Belgium for the sake of higher, European interests. For this he was prepared, albeit on subsidiary points, to make concessions at the cost

92. See Nederbragt, Herinneringen, 52. 93. De Vries, Herinneringen Heldring, 1.691. 94. Schuursma, Onmmnemelijk tractQllt, 274. 95. Oud, Jongrte verleden, III, 153. Colijn did not have a high opinion of Dutch foreign policy. He noted in a memorandum to P. Geyl: 'Belgian statesmen stand their ground far better than ours, and each promise which the Netherlands gives at one moment is abandoned the next in order to go to our 'uncles'in the end with a series of promises and a series of unfulfilled wishes, always getting something.' P. van Hees and A.W. Willemsen, ed., Geyl en VlQllnderen. Uit het archiefvan P. Geyl I (Antwerp, 1973) 456.

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of the traditional Holland maritime and commercial interests which had prevailed at the peace conference of Munster in 1648 and the negotiations in London in 1839.

The two latter points. the abandonment of non-involvement and, above all, the deflection of the interests of the 'great trading towns', entailed a major change in policy. If a reorientation of foreign policy for the Netherlands in the twenties was desirable, this could only have been brought into being by a Foreign minister who was trusted by Holland's commercial interests and who operated within the frame­work of a political party.

101

A cheque drawn on a failing bank: the address delivered by Queen Wilhelmina on 6th/7th December 1942

C. FASSEUR

On the evening of 6th December 1942, a year after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Queen Wilhelmina broadcast from London an address in which she held out the prospect of a far-reaching reform of the constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands following the end of the Second World War.l The aim of the reform was said to be to meet the desire for greater independence in the Dutch colonies, which was strongest in the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia). Prominent representatives of the Netherlands, the Indies, Surinam and Cura9ao would meet at a round table - a symbol of equality - to draw up proposals for a new structure for the kingdom. Without wishing to anticipate the outcome of this conference, the queen continued, it could be assumed that, after the war, the kingdom would be reconstructed on the solid foundation of complete partnership, with the maintenance of certain commonwealth ties but with each part of the kingdom enjoying self-reliance and freedom of conduct regarding its internal affairs. There would be no room left for discrimination accord­ing to race or nationality.

As is known, this declaration formed the starting point for the Netherlands govern­ment in formulating its policy towards the East Indies in the period immediately following the war. Little-, however, was known about the previous history. How was the declaration arrived at? Why was this far-reaching pledge of constitutional reform given at a moment in the war when there was no prospect of an early liberation of the Dutch East Indies by the Allied forces?

From the beginning of the century, guardianship had been the guiding principle of Dutch colonial policy. The Netherlands, it was felt, had the task of bringing up and developing the East Indies like a child entrusted to its care, until that child was able to stand on its own feet. It was implicitly recognized that the colonial ties could be but temporary and that the interests of the pupil had to be decisive for the duration

* This article is a slightly amended version of 'A bill drawn on the future: the address delivered by Queen Wilhelmina on 6th/7th December 1942,' in F. van Anrooy et al., ed., Between people and statistics. Essays on modem Indonesian history (The Hague, 1979) 267-81. All the documents consulted are in the Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague. 1. The queen's address was broadcast by Radio Orange at 20.45 British Summer Time on 6th December 1942. It was by then 7th December in the Dutch East Indies, and this explains why the latter date is often used in references to the address. It was also embodied in the name of the 7th December Division, which was sent toJndonesia after the war and took part in the struggle aginst the Indonesian Republic which was proclaimed by Sukamo in 1945. For a translation of the queen's address, see P.S. Gerbrandy, Indonesia (London, 1950).

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of the colonial relationship and the content thereof; but this did not imply that the

pre-war Dutch statesmen were prepared to accept the obvious consequences. To be sure, there was understanding and sympathy for the 'indigenous move­

ment.' Governor-General Jonkheer A.C.D. de Graeff had 'respect' for the nationalist ideals, and had said as much when accepting his office in 1926: 'I should not be a right-minded Dutchman if it were otherwise.'2 But the Dutch as a whole were firmly convinced that this nationalism had to be properly channelled and that it would be many years before power could be transferred to the indigenous majority. This attitude lay at the root of the haughty rejection in 1938 of the Soetardjo petition, drawn up by a number of moderate nationalists, which called for the convocation of a conference with the ultimate aim of gradually granting self-government to the Indies within the framework of the kingdom. The minister for the Colonies, Welter, took the view (and this was shared by the government of the East Indies) that the nationalists would do better to co-operate with the Dutch authorities in advancing the spiritual and material development of the Indies; political autonomy must grow as 'the naturally ripening fruit' of the social and economic development of the country. The desire for political autonomy and independence, it was believed, existed only in 'an extremely thin stratum of intellectuals.'3 This response completely ignored inter­national developments, among them the granting by America to the Philippines of self­government in 1935 and the simultaneous promise that the country would become completely independent ten years later. It is conceivable that this development inspired those who were behind the Soetardjo petition.

The German invasion of the Netherlands had the effect of turning the Indies into a colony without a mother country. But this perilous position in no way diminished the self-confidence of the government of the Indies in its attitude towards the nation­alists. The only move in Batavia (which, incidentally, was made without the prior know­ledge of the government-in-exile in London) was the setting up in September 1940 ofa committee to establish the desires and opinions held by the various groups of the population (as if these could not have been surmised!). The Visman Committee, as it was known, published its report on 9th December 1941. Among the conclusions reached by the committee, which turned a deaf ear to the more radical Indonesian nationalists, was that there was no evidence of any desire to break the ties which bound the kin~dom: 'The wish to sever the link which has held the Netherlands and the East Indies to­gether through the centuries was not heard.'4 As we shall see, this statement played

2. R.C. Kwantes, De ontwikkeling van de nationalistische beweging in Nederlands-Indie. Een bronnenpublikatie. Part 2, mid-1923-1928 (Groningen, 1978) 462. 3. Verslag der handelingen der Staten-Generaal. Tweede Kamer. Zitting 1937.19;8 (The Hague, 1938) 1260 (1st March 1938); S.L. van der WaI, ed., De Volksraad en de stOlltkundige ontwikke­ling van Nederlandsch-Indie. Een bronnenpublicatie. Part 2 1927-1942 (Groningen, 1965) 392. 4. For a critical appraisal of the Visman Committee, see W.F. Wertheim,lndonesie: van vorlften­rijk tot neo-kolonie (Amsterdam-Meppel, 1978) 94-7. Wertheim was a member of the committee.

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an important part in the subsequent thinking in London regarding policy on the In­dies.s

To those in London in the summer of 1940, the future seemed far from rosy. The minister for the colonies, Welter (Roman Catholic Party), and his small staff of civil servants had fallen victim to defeatism. It was therefore not so surprising that Welter and his aides appeared more ready to make concessions than was the government in Batavia. The civil servant who, in a long memorandum, defended the need for such a change of course was W.G. Peekema, Head oftlie First (Legal) Section of the ministry, who had escaped to London with Welter. Even before the war, Peekema had urged constitutional reforms, such as transforming the First Chamber of the Dutch par­liament into an imperial senate, in order to meet the desires of the nationalist move­ment.6 In his memorandum of 21st August 1940, he expressed the view that when the war was over, the Netherlands would no longer be able to impose its political will on the Indies and that a reorganization of the kingdom would be possible only on a basis of consultation. A conference of the kingdom, such as had been called for in the Soetardjo petition, appeared to be the most obvious means: 'What in normal times was seen as an insurmountable obstacle ... cannot simply be dismissed as impossible in completely abnormal circumstances such as those which we may anticipate after the war."

The idea of a royal proclamation, in which the intention to convene a conference after the war would be intimated, was proposed to the government of the East Indies by Welter in a telegram on 23rd August 1940. This government, it transpired, was not at all keen on the proposal - on which, incidentally, Welter had not sought the views of the council of ministers in London. It was felt in Batavia that the minister was moving very fast indeed. In the view of the governor-general, Jonkheer Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, such a declaration would only cause anxiety among the European section of the population, and would not satisfy the nationalists.8

This misunderstanding was not cleared up until April 1941, when Welter paid a visit to the East Indies. On 16th June of that year, during the opening of the session of the People's Council, the governor-general announced that, immediately after the liberation of the mother country, the supreme government proposed to convene a conference to elaborate proposals to adapt the structure of the kingdom 'to the de­mandsOf the times.'9

The size of the. Indies delegation to this conference and the manner in which the

5. Verslag van de commissie tot bestudeering van staatlIrechtelijke hervormingen (Visman Report), 2 vols. (2nd impression, New York, 1944) II, 36-7. 6. Peekema had elaborated these ideas in a speech delivered to the 'Indie-Nederland' Society on 27th Apri11940, the text of which also appeared as a brochure: W.G. Peekema, Consolidatie van het·koninkrijk (no place, 1940). Concerning the speaker, see also A.E. Kersten, ed., Het dagboek van dr. G.H.c. Hart, Londen mei 1940 -- me; 1941 (The Hague, 1976). 7. Van der Wal, Volksraad, 549. 8. Ibidem, 550, 567; S. Abeyasekere, One hand clapping: Indonesian nationalists and the Dutch 1939-1942 (Monash, 1976) 59. 9. Van der Wal, Volksraad, 688.

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delegates would be chosen were not, however, disclosed. Not until 27th January 1942, by which time Welter had resigned - he did so in November 1941 following a clash with Gerbrandy, the then prime minister (conservative protestant party) -, did the govern­ment in London provide the answer in a communique, and then only after persistent urging by Van Starkenborgh. The selection of the fifteen Indies delegates (the same number as the Netherlands would send to the conference) could commence immediate­ly.1O But now this was purely academic, for the Japanese invasion of the East Indies had already commenced; the capitulation followed on 9th March 1942. To recapture its colonial empire, the Netherlands would have to appeal to the Allies, in particular the United States, for aid. Would that aid be given without conditions?

The rapid Japanese advance and the inglorious fall of Singapore and Java had made a deep impression on public opinion in America. They served to nourish a latent anti­colonialist undercurrent. The British and Dutch colonial empires were apparently giants with feet of clay. They could not rely on the support of the indigenous popUla­tion, which had adopted a completely passive attitude, indeed in some instances -e.g. in Java - had even displayed a degree of enthusiasm for the arrival of the Japanese. This contrasted sharply with the defence of Bataan and Corregidor by an Americo­Philippine force led by MacArthur. The Filipinos clearly had something to fight for! The conclusion was obvious, and it was repeatedly drawn in the columns of the American press: the United States should use its influence to persuade the British Empire and the Netherlands, after the war, to carry out reforms on the Philippine model so that the peoples dominated by them would on a future occasion be prepared to fight against a Japanese or other aggressor. Such reforms, it was opined, would also strengthen the economic ties between America and the nations concerned.l1

The Dutch government in London had overestimated its position, particularly during the early years of the war. Thanks to the Dutch East Indies, it had regarded itself as the government of a middle power and not that of a small powerP This was due in part to a certain provincialism, which the government again demonstrated when the Atlantic Charter was debated in the council of ministers on 26th August 1941. The charter recognized 'the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live.' Twenty-eight of the thirty Indonesian members of the People's Council promptly seized on this declaration afterwards and asked what con­clusions the Dutch government drew from it as far as the Indonesian people were con­cerned. The council of ministers was quite oblivious to the possibility that this question would be raised. According to the minister of Foreign affairs, Van Kleffens (non-party), the Atlantic Charter was inopportune, while the prime minister, Gerbrandy, had dis-

10. Ibidem, 670. 11. J.F. Engers.Indie in de branding. De geallieerde were/d over de toekomst van Nederlllndsch Indie van Pearl Harbor tot Hol/andia (New York, 1945) 28-46; Chr. Thorne,Allies of a kind. The United States, Britain and the war against Japan 1941-1945 (London, 1978) 207-11. 12. A.F. Manning, 'De buitenlandse politiek van de Nederlandse regering in Londen tot 1942', Tijdschrift v()or geschiedenis, XCI (Groningen, 1978) 49-65.

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missed the declaration as 'Wishy-washy.'13 On 10th November 1941, the questioners were at last informed that the Charter did not concern itself with empires 'whose exis­tence has proved itself in history,' but that the Netherlands government had 'long since' adopted its basic tenets which, where applicable, were applied within the framework of the kingdom.14

Van Mook (non-party), a former lieutenant-governor-general with a brilliant record in the colonial civil service, who joined the first Gerbrandy cabinet as minister for the Colonies on 21st May 1942, was much more aware of the balance of power, certainly as far as American influence and the power of American public opinion were concerned. He was not the only refugee from the Indies in the council. On 9th June 1942 the Javanese regent, Raden Adipati Ario Soejono, a former member of the Council of the Indies, was appointed minister without portfolio; he was the first, and last, Javanese to occupy a post in a Dutch cabinet. With the appointment of this 'son of the Indonesian people', as Gerbrandy somewhat paternalistically described him in a speech of welcome in the council of ministers, the Dutch attempted to take the wind out of the sails of American critics of Dutch 'oppression' of the Indies and at the same time forge a link with the moderate nationalists, of which Soejono was regarded as a typical representative and one loyal to the Netherlands. The queen, indeed, had at first objected to Soejono's appointment, arguing that it would alter the character of the cabinet, something which could not be permitted without con­sulting the Dutch parliament.ls Using this somewhat far-fetched argument, she also objected - this time with more success - to Van Mook's suggestion that the word 'colonies' should be deleted from the title of his ministry (Van Mook had wanted to rename it the 'ministry for the Dutch East Indies, Surinam and Cura~ao').16 As an example of persistent colonial folklore (and perhaps also to emphasize the fact that he was 'different'?), Soejono was also given the title Pangeran and with this the right to bear the golden pajong (umbrella).

Soon after taking office, Van Mook faced disturbing news from America. On 30th May 1942, the Under-secretary of State, Sumner Welles, had delivered a speech which had caused a good deal of fuss and which could indicate that his country was opposed to the restoration of colonial powers when the war ended. What he had actually said was: 'Our victory must bring in its train the liberation of all peoples ... The age of imperialism is ended.'17 According to the Netherlands ambassador, A. Loudon, it might be assumed that Welles was referring primarily to Great Britain, which was in no hurry to carry out reforms in India and thus threatened to drive Gandhi into the arms of the Japanese. Moreover, Welles had not been speaking on behalf of the administra-

13. Minutes of the meetings of the council of ministers 1940-45, 26th August 1941. The Volks­raad (People's Council) was mainly an advisory body; its members were partly elected, partly appointed by the Dutch government. The Indonesians had thirty representatives, the Dutch and non-Indonesian Asians together also thirty. 14. Van der Wal, Volksraad, 653. 15. Minutes of the council of ministers, 27th May 1942, p. 54; 2nd June 1942, p. 56; 10th June 1942, p, 71. 16. Ibidem, 27th May, p. 53. 17. Sumner Welles, The world of the Four freedoms (New York, 1943) 75.

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tion. His aim was to curry favour with the anti-colonialist American public in the hope of being elected senator (for Maryland), or even achieving the presidency or vice­presidency of the United States. Nevertheless, Loudon maintained, such utterances and the hostile writings of American intellectuals did the colonial powers a disservice. In the interest of the Netherlands' position in the United States, it was therefore vital that a clearly defined plan for the post-war reconstruction of the kingdom should be published as soon as possible and that this should reveal the acceptance of a large measure of co-detennination by the peoples of the overseas parts of the kingdom. The announcement of a conference, which would have only an advisory role, no longer sufficed. What was needed was 'a positive fonnulation' of the manner in which the relationship of the mother country to the overseas territories, and the fonn of government within those territories, would be built up after the war. The American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, was said to have dropped a hint to this effect.l8

On 18th June 1942, Ambassador Loudon's views were communicated to the queen by Van Mook, Gerbrandy and Van Kleffens. In their report, which was drawn up at Van Mook's ministry, they pointed out that America, to whom the task of liberating the East Indies would fall, could use this fact to demand a voice in the future status of the territory. The Netherlands ought therefore to make its intentions clear. Otherwise, the Americans, who were 'poorly schooled in East Asian affairs,' might well implement ideas drawn from their own fonn of government! A clear statement concerning the future of the East Indies would also hearten the indigenous population and act as a counterweight to Japanese propaganda. After all, according to radio broadcasts which had been picked up, the Japanese were doing their best to arouse anti-Dutch feeling by making promises which had the appearance of meeting the urge for independence among the native inhabitants. If the queen was in agreement, the report concluded, proposals for clarifying the Dutch government's point of view could be worked out. l9

With this plan as the basis, work commenced. Various official memoranda were drawn up and discussed among small groups. Among them was an almost prophetic memoran­dum from Peekema dated 9th September 1942.20 The author took the view that when the war was over, the authorities should proceed from a situation in which, for prac­tical purposes, the Indonesians had become independent following the destruction of the controlling Dutch element, including the corps of colonial civil servants. If the Netherlands still desired to save what little could be saved, it would have to make it as attractive as possible for the Indonesians to vote for co-operation with the Dutch. The policy towards the East Indies should no longer be based on legitimate rights, which were difficult to uphold, but upon the only possible alternative, 'namely that after the war there will be an East Indian land and nation possessing sovereignty and indepen­dence.'

The memorandum which Van Mook sent to the council of ministers on 2nd Octo-

18. A. Loudon, 5th June 1942, Nos. 987-989 (coded telegrams): Archive of the Colonial Office, London (hereafter referred to as LA) XI 11 AXB. portfolio M 73. 19. Report of 18th June 1942, No. 432. Van Mook Collection (private) No.4. 20. LA XI 11 A X B; Van Mook Collection. No.3.

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ber 1942, and which contained a draft government statement, was more optimistic in terms of the continuation of Dutch authority over the Indies after the war.21 With­out Dutch administration, as a binding force, the growth of the Indonesians into free citizens of a commonwealth of nations would be impossible. The nationalists, he maintained, realized this also. The facts, the memorandum continued, had shown 'that stronger ties are possible between Dutch and Indonesians than exist between a ruling power and a subjected people. Racial prejudices play a much smaller role in the mutual relationship than is usually the case in such circumstances.' Together, the Netherlands and the Indies could form a major power, linked by 'the peaceable nature and the tolerance which both peoples possess.'

Although they were not couched in plain terms for reasons of courtesy towards the host country, it was clear that these conclusions on the part of Van Mook were in­tended to show how well the Dutch colonial administration compared with that of the British in India, which the Americans criticized heavily. They had been drawn from the Visman Report. The same was true of the desires which were supposed to exist in the Indies. According to the memorandum, one of the principal desires was for the lifting of the criterion of race in the area of legislation in the East Indies, for which there had been general pressure by the indigenous population (racial prejudice thus evidently played a larger part than had earlier been suggested). The other main desire was said to be greater independence for the Indies, albeit with the maintenance of the links between the various parts of the kingdom. Complete equality between the Indies and the Netherlands could no longer be postponed.

The draft government statement which accompanied the memorandum not only contained a reference to this 'full partnership,' but also indicated in concrete terms the constitutional changes to which acceptance of this principle would lead. A ministry would be created for the whole of the kingdom to look after matters such as foreign affairs and defence. It would be responsible to a parliament in which the four parts of the kingdom - the Netherlands, the Dutch East Indies, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles - would be represented, the number of delegates from each part being pro­portional to its significance. Provision was also made for a council representing the crown and consisting of 'skilled and experienced men,' whose role would be adVisory. For the East Indies, the People's Council would have to develop into a parliament, to which the government, to be formed by the governor-general, would be responsible. In this area Van Mook had allowed himself to be guided by a draft plan drawn up by civil servants and shown to him in Batavia in November 1941, when a small group had met to exchange views on the future.22

Van Mook's plans were thus very ambitious. What they amounted to was that the government-in-exile in London should answer for a far-reaching change in the organ-

21. LA XI 11 A X B. A memorandum dealing at length with the historical background to the problem was appended; this was published under the title 'Nederlandsch-Indie en het koninkrijk' in: W.H. van Helsdingen, De piaatll van Nederlandllch-Indiii in het koninkrijk. Stemmen van overzee (2 vols., Leiden, 1946) II, 49 ff. 22. Van der Wal, Volksraad, 655.

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ization of the state, as a result of which the people of the Netherlands would for practical purposes be placed under the guardianship of a sort of supergovernment. And this merely to meet certain desires in the East Indies - desires which, one might wonder, did not perhaps exist in the circle of European civil servants, to which Van Mook had belonged, rather than among the Indonesian nationalists, who wanted not 'partnership' but independence!

It was therefore no coincidence that the first to raise objections was the minister without portfolio, Soejono. On 5th and 8th October 1942 he sent memoranda to the council of ministers.23 In these he warned against all. manner of wishful thinking (his actual words) as far as the attitude of the Indonesians was concerned. 'All peoples have an innate urge for freedom,' he wrote. The Indonesians were no exception. 'As a whole,' he continued, 'the politically uneducated masses cherish the desire to be free of any foreign intervention or guardianship; in other words, to be master in their own house.' Soejono alleged that the 'free of Holland' idea, which had been given fresh impetus by the ideal of the right of self-determination and the developments else­where, notably in the Philippines and India, was not limited to the group of radical politicians who had ventured to express it publicly, but was shared by a larger section of the Indonesian population. This assertion contrasted strongly with the fmdings of the Visman Committee - of which, incidentally, Soejono had been a member!

Soejono also considered it feasible that the Japanese would strengthen the self­esteem of the Indonesians. If the war went badly for them, the Japanese could decide that it was to their advantage to be more accommodating towards the Indonesians. There was also the question whether American public opinion would welcome a restoration of Dutch authority over the East Indies. In Soejono's view, therefore, a harmonious association in a new constitutional framework was possible only if the Indonesians voluntarily accepted such an arrangement. The right of Indonesia to in­dependence should be recognized in principle. To this end, he maintained, the govern­ment must declare that it was primarily guided by 'the realization that in prinCiple the right of all peoples to determine their own national destiny must be recognized.'

The government statement drawn up by Van Mook and the alternative put forward by Soejono were discussed at an extraordinary meeting of the council of ministers on 13th October 1942.24 Van Mook again stressed the importance of a statement by the Netherlands government, clarifying its post-war plans for the East Indies. If no such clarification were forthcoming, the government would sooner or later be asked for one, perhaps at a less opportune moment, and the request might simultaneously be a demand. Here it must be borne in mind that Van Mook was about to pay a lengthy visit to the United States to discuss all manner of plans for the conquest and recon­struction of the Dutch East Indies. A statement of the Dutch war aims would, of course, be very useful.

The minutes of the ministerial meeting contain an extensive report of the exchange

23. LA XI 11 A X B. 24. For the exchanges of views in the council of ministers on 15th and 22nd October 1942, see Minutes of council of ministers (V) 168-82 and (VI) 2-18, 24-9.

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of views which followed. It was immediately clear that Van Mook's original plan, to lay down there and then the future structure of the kingdom in detail, was doomed to

failure. None of the other ministers would hear of such a 'towering edifice' for fear of being subsequently disowned by the Dutch nation; the social-democratic ,ministers Albarda and Van den Tempel (the only socialists in the cabinet at that time) were particularly sensitive on this point. Van Mook therefore decided not to defend his plans.

There remained the question raised by Soejono, whether a government statement which was limited to a few main issues should recognize the right of the Indonesian people to self-determination. Soejono made an impassioned plea for his point of view: 'If the Netherlands is liberated, the Indies must also be liberated ... The decision on this matter can no longer be made by Dutchmen alone ... What you wish for your­selves, you must also give to others ... The Netherlands will no longer be able to act as guardian of the Indies.' Once again he confronted the council of ministers with some unpalatable truths: The occupation of the Indies would strengthen nationalism. The Netherlands would have to take account of the Atlantic Charter; it would also have to take an example from the developments in India and the Philippines. But his words met with little response. The minister ofJ ustice, Van Angeren (Roman- catholic), took the view that the Indies could not claim the right to self-determination, because this breached Dutch sovereignty. The Interior minister, Van Boeyen (conservative protestant), took an even simpler view: 'The Netherlands has obligations towards the Indies which must be discharged; therefore, it may not release the Indies.' The minister for Trade, industry and shipping, Kerstens (Roman-catholic), a former member of the People's Council, was 'shocked' by the proposed government statement. In the Indies, he said, he had been among the progressives, but now that the kingdom was in such a weak position, statements of principle concerning the future of the territory were in­opportune. The minister for Social affairs, Van den Tempel, also had doubts con­cerning the right of self-determination demanded by Soejono. Were the Indies a unitary state? Van Kleffens took a similar view; 'Indonesia independent? But why not the Javanese, the Bataks and other indigenous peoples?' The Foreign secretary was prepared to recognize that any political entity depended upon the will of the con­stituent parts to remain together, but he was equally convinced that a majority in the Indies favoured co-operation with the Netherlands. The minister added that this could perhaps be incorporated in the proposed statement in order to meet the ob­servations made by Soejono.

Finally, Prime Minister Gerbrandy stressed the importance, but also, in his view, the untimeliness, of the statement. The government, he maintained, lacked the authority to issue such a statement. Everything would fall upon the shoulders of the queen. Moreover, what would be the effect? The American government was busy pursuing its own imperialist policy: 'It desires a major voice all over the world!' At best there was room for an explanation of a few principles, but even these would first have to be examined with a magnifying glass. As far as the shape of the statement was concerned

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- and here Gerbrandy introduced a new element into the discussion - a broadcast by the queen seemed to be the most desirable.

When the debate was resumed on 15th October, Van Mook explained his reasons for feeling that a government statement on the constitutional structure of the kingdom after the war was necessary. The principal motive was not public opinion in the United States. It was simply that a statement was unavoidable. 'When we discuss the recapture of the East Indies with Britain and the United States,' he argued, 'People will im­mediately ask: "What will be the spirit of your new administration there?". There was also the point that such a statement, formulated in positive terms, would, if it reached the Indies, 'help to diminish the anxieties there, to combat the propaganda put out by the invader; one has to give some comfort for the future.' As far as the content of the statement was concerned, Van Mook professed sympathy for the un­easiness felt on the Indonesian side because they were not allowed to say 'No' to an association with the Dutch. He was not, however, prepared to hint at self- determination in the statement. For every right there was a duty: 'The Netherlands cannot divest itself of its responsibility towards the Indies.' For this reason Van Mook dismissed any notion of dominion status, as had been offerend by the British to India in March 1942, to­gether with the right of secession, once the war was over. For the Dutch East Indies, the point of departure had to be an association for as long as possible and not one which, as in the case of a dominion, was directed towards separation. 'The relationship between the Netherlands and the East Indies,' he opined, 'is not the same as that between Britain and India.'

Soejono, too, felt a need to reply to the remarks made earlier in the discussion, some of which had been directed at him. In his view, the recognition that the In­donesian people in principle had the right to independence operated mainly to the benefit of the Netherlands itself. The political outlook for the Indonesians was favourable. They could count upon the sympathy of the United States. With its support for the liberation of the colonial peoples, America would reap a rich moral harvest and also a material harvest, for American economic expansion in the naturally rich Indies would thereby be facilitated. The Dutch, he maintained, should not place too much emphasis on the economic and military weakness of an independent In­donesia, for this could evoke the counter-argument that if the guardianship of, or an association with, a western power continued to be necessary, the Indonesians preferred the mighty United States. 'The example seen in the Philippines is not without attrac­tion for many Indonesians,' he said. In reply to the remark made by Van Kleffens, Soejono stated his willingness to accept all the consequences of the right of self­determination. That right also accrued to smaller population groups - for example, the South Moluccans. He had also become convinced that such minorities would be reasonable and would understand that a separation was not in their interest. The Indonesians, Soejono continued, were not as a whole anti-Dutch; they were just pro­Indonesian. Did not the example of Iceland show that at times a people desired to break away from another nation without hostility being involved? On the other hand, one should not be too optimistic about Indonesian feelings towards the Netherlands.

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Remarks such as the one made by Minister Van Boeyen, that the Indonesian nation was still a child in political terms, could be like a red rag to a bull. Soejono wound up his speech by referring to the section of the SDAP (Dutch Social Democratic Labour Party) programme which dealt with colonial matters. This programme had been published in 1930. Then, the party had unreservedly recognized the right of the Indonesian people to be independent. Were the members of that party not right­minded Dutchmen?, he asked.25 And if they were, how could the prime minister, Gerbrandy, bring himself to say that a member of the Dutch cabinet could not possibly support the implementation of the right of self-determination? Must one conclude that the American government, which had promised independence to the Philipinnes, was un-American?

Understandably, these stinging remarks evoked numerous reactions from Soejono's colleagues. Van Kleffens took the view that if the Indonesian people desired to be independent, nothing could be done to prevent this. But the majority oflevel-headed Indonesians would certainly strive for co-operation with the Netherlands in the early stages. Albarda, the social democrat, recognized that the right of self-determination applied to Indonesia also: 'The Dutch are foreign rulers in the Indies; the Indies accordingly feel themselves to be dominated.' But the recognition of this right need not yet imply implementation of that independence. Could the Indies, once they were standing on their own feet, hold their own in the world of international trade? 'We must show that we understand the desires, but within the framework of a lasting kingdom. For the Indies continue to need the Netherlands.' More tortuous still was the following speech, from Gerbrandy - who still questioned the need for any statement at all. He recognized that, after the war, the Indies must have the right to decide their own fate, 'but not without the Netherlands.'

It was thus clear that the cabinet was deeply divided on the issue. Van Mook and Van Kleffens felt that a 'clarification of war aims' was required. The risk then had to be accepted that such' a declaration would be seen as a shot fired in distress by an emigrant government. Van Mook set out the arguments in favour of this view in a memorandum to the council of ministers dated 21st October 1942.26 There was, he said, an urge, particularly in America, for the formulation of 'positive aims' which could reinforce the war effort, combat enemy propaganda and impart a 'richer con­tent' to the liberation of the occupied areas. That urge would increase as the Allies went over to the offensive and called on the active support of the peoples of the occupied lands. Moreover, the 'emotional' American people needed 'slogans and aims, particularly when their sons were fighting and dying far from home.' If a declaration

25. Cf. Parlement en kiezer, XIII (The Hague, 1932-3) 169-71: 'Proposition X. Social democracy recognizes without qualification the right to national independence.' During the colonial congress of the SDAP in 1930, Albarda stressed the importance of the Indies to the Dutch working class; see E. Hansen, 'The Dutch East Indies and the reorientation of Dutch social democracy 1929-40', Indonesia, XXIII (Cornell, 1977) 59-85. 26. Van Mook to the council of ministers, 21st October 1942, No. 383/J, Van Mook Collection, No.4.

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was delayed for too long, the Dutch might find the initiative taken out of their hands. In conclusion, Van Mook conjured up the bogey of American imperialism: when the war was over, it would be difficult enough to keep interest in the rich and strategically situated Dutch East Indies 'within the confines of allied relationships.' While the Netherlands recognized the right of the Indonesians 'to be themselves and to develop into a cohesive and powerful nation,' this would not be the case in the relationship towards others, notably the United States. For this reason, he was particularly dis­inclined to express even the theoretical possibility that Indonesia would become in­dependent after the war, as Soejono had wished.

Van Mook and Van Kleffens ultimately succeeded in convincing the council of ministers of the necessity for a statement. At a meeting on 22nd October 1942, the council, in accordance with a proposal contained in Van Mook's memorandum of the previous day, approved the broadcasting of a speech by the queen on 6th December 1942. The date was carefully chosen. The speech had to be delivered after the con­gressional elections in the United States, which were due to take place early in Novem­ber, because otherwise it would not attract sufficient attention. The beginning of December would see Van Mook on a visit to the United States, added to which the biennial conference of the influential Institute of Pacific Relations, at which the Netherlands would be represented, would then be taking place in Montreal. The first anniversary of the treacherous Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor thus appeared to be a highly suitable moment.

As far as the content of the speech was concerned, Gerbrandy and a large majority of the council got their way. The statement would be limited to a number of general principles: it would therefore contain no firm details of the future form of government of the kingdom or of the East Indies. Van Mook did, however, get his way on one point, namely that further information should be given to the Press after the broad­cast, though with the proviso, as Gerbrandy phrased it, that the information might not come from any of the ministers, 'as it would then be of a too official nature.m

In the speech, Soejono's strong plea for the recognition, in principle at least, of the right of the Indonesian people to independence was recalled only in a passage inserted at the request of Van Kleffens, which stated that 'no political unity or national co­hesion which does not enjoy the voluntary acceptance and the faith of the great majority of the citizenry can continue to exist.' The compilers of the statement were not willing to go farther than this for fear that even the recognition in principle of a right on the part of the Indonesians to decide their own fate could result in the king­dom being liquidated after the war. Albarda and Van den Tempel expressly pointed to this danger in the event of Minister Soejono's desires, which in themselves were sym­pathetic, being met. 'As a social-democratic minister,' Van den Tempel declared, 'he would never do anything which would harm the status of the kingdom.' Under these circumstances, Soejono had no choice but to resign himself to the draft of the speech and give it his blessing. What would have been the attitude of this moderate nationalist

27. Gerbrandy to Van Mook, 22nd October 1942, Van Mook Collection, No.4.

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to the post-war developments in Indonesia, which in some respects he had so clearly foreseen? This question was never answered. On 5th January 1943, he died suddenly -'this noble Javanese,' as Gerbrandy, clearly moved, described him in an address of remembrance in the council of ministers.2s At a hearing of the Parliamentary Com­mittee of Inquiry which after the war investigated the policy of the Netherlands government-in-exile in London, he added that Soejono had given his 'full' agreement to the queen's speech a month before it was delivered.29

When Van Mook departed for the United States in November 1942, he was able to take with him the 'clarification of war aims' which he had desired. On the eve of the royal broadcast, to Gerbrandy's intense anger, he gave a personal and extremely frank explanation of the matter to a large group of American journalists.3O In dealing with the future constitutional structure of the kingdom and the East Indies, Van Mook drew on the main points of his memorandum of 2nd October 1942, the contents of which the council of ministers had expressly declined to accept.

Partly as a result of the background information which Van Mook had provided, the queen's speech was well received in the United States. In a telegram, the embassy reported that: 'The president said today that he considered the speech very satis­factory and important, and recommended that it be read.'3l The Press in general also welcomed the 'Dutch commonwealth colonial policy' of 'internal independence and external collaboration.' In 1944, even Sumner Welles was favourably impressed, al­ways assuming that the promises made would indeed be honoured.32

Among others who reacted to the queen's broadcast were groups of Indonesian seamen serving in vessels of the Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij which were then in Allied ports. Referring to the promise that in the kingdom of the future there would be no place for differing treatment on grounds of race or nationality, but that only the ability of the individual citizen would be decisive, they asked for the same wages as were paid to Dutch crew members who did the same job. According to a Dutch ob­server, this point in the speech had a greater impact on the Indonesians in the diaspora than any other.33 But although this was the only feature of the colonial programme of 6th December 1942 which could have been put into effect immediately, the Netherlands government took the view that the equality demanded was not feasible. At the end of 1943 it decided merely to increase the pay of Indonesian crew members by 25 guilders per month in order to remove the 'unreasonable ratio' between their wages and those

28. Minutes of the council of ministers, 6th January 1943, 104-5. 29. Enquetecommissie regeringsbeleid 1940-1945, Va (The Hague, 1950) 715. 30. Minutes of the council of ministers, 8th December 1942,70. The extent to which the address was auned at the United States is clear from the fact that it was not considered necessary to provide an 'explanation' for the British Press. For the text of Van Mook's statement, see Van Mook Collection, No.4. 31. Netherlands Embassy in Washington, 9th December 1942: LA XI 11 A X B; Minutes of the council.of ministers, 8th December 1942,69; 22nd December 1942,87. Cf. Chr. Thorne, 'Enge­land, Australie en Nederlands Oost-Indie 1941-1945',Internationale Spectator, XXIX (The Hague, 1975) 494; idem, Allies, 218. 32. S. Welles, The time for decision (New York-London, 1944) 302. 33. G.H.C. Hart to Van Mook, 15th April 1943: Van Mook Collection, No.2.

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of their Dutch counterparts.34 For the time being, the new kingdom was one of promises and not deeds.

In the ninth volume of his major work of reference, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlan­den in de Tweede Were/door/og, which appeared almost simultaneously with the Dutch-language version of this article, L. de Jong also deals with the events leading up to the queen's speech of December 1942.35 His conclusion is that the speech marked a major step towards the further decolonization of the East Indies. He also takes the view that, irrespective of the existing constitutional objections, it was difficult for the Netherlands government to recognize the right of the Indonesian people to indepen­dence, because this would have been akin to stabbing the host country, Britain, and the venerated Churchill in the back. According to De Jong, the urge for independence had

manifested itself much more clearly in India than in the Dutch East Indies; but in spite of this the Churchill government desired to keep Britain's position of power in Asia intact.36

In the face of these statements, one or two question marks may not be amiss. On close examination, the speech of 6th December is found to contain little which was not in the government communique of 27th January 1942. Rather, it breathes an air of smugness, as is evidenced by statements such as 'after an age-old historical solidarity, in which had long since passed the era of colonial relationship.' After the war, nothing angered Gerbrandy so much as the imputation that as early as 1942 the government had made promises which were to lead to the dissolution of the kingdom. According to him, the speech had contained nothing but 'obvious truths.m

The principal aim of the declaration of 1942 was to make propaganda for the Dutch cause in the United States and to convince the American government and people that the Netherlands was well-intentioned. This was certainly true of Queen Wilhelmina, of whom Van Mook once complained at the council of ministers that she saw the whole issue only from that point of view.38 British sensitivities took second place: there were no grounds for anticipating that Britain would liberate the East Indies from the Japanese. It must be said that if those concerned had desired to give the Indonesian nationalists real satisfaction, the Dutch government would have been wise to model its policy on the British example. It would then have had to make firm commitments, including the clear statement which the British made to the Indians, on 30th March 1942, namely that the unity of the empire need not be the final con­sideration. But such a thing was Virtually unthinkable to the Dutch government-in­exile. If Dutch imperialism differed from that in other countries, the cause was rooted

34. Documents concerning this issue in LA S.5.12, portfolio M 19. The wages were raised by a decree issued by the minister for the Colonies dated 21st December 1943; the increase was back­dated to 1st June 1943. 35. 1. de Jong, Het koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, IX (The Hague, 1979) 1094-1112,1177-9. 36. Ibidem, 1179. 37. A. Stempels, De parlementaire geschiedenis van het Indonesische vraagstuk (Amsterdam, 1950) 231. 38. Minutes of the council of ministers, 2nd September 1942, 141.

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C. FASSEUR

in a finn belief in an almost mystical bond between the Netherlands and the Indies. The notion that the three hundred and fifty year old colonial ties could ever be broken was quite inconceivable - and it remained so even when those ties had already been severed! It is not surprising, therefore, that the promises made on 6th December 1942 played no part in the solution of the Indonesian question which arose in 1945. The speech delivered by the queen ended an era; it did not, however, mark the opening of a new chapter.

Nevertheless, a study of the events leading up to the speech of 6th December facilitates a better understanding of Dutch policy after 1945. It reveals some of the outlines of a pattern which is also discernible in the post-war policy towards the East Indies. Among these are the unwillingness and inability to enter into the arguments and motives of the Indonesian nationalists, including the moderate elements among them; the lack of understanding of the urge for freedom on the part of the Indonesian people; the fonnal, legalistic arguments which were advanced against this, and which disguised an absence of realism; the efforts to explain Indonesian nationalism, where this could not be ignored, by a power struggle by the Javanese, against which the other peoples of the Indonesian archipelago had to be protected; the vacillatory attitude of the social-democratic ministers in the cabinet; and, fmally, the 'unreliabil­ity' of Van Mook. All these factors played a part in 1942, and they did so again after the war when, on the day of Japan's capitulation, the era of decolonization dawned.

39. Concerning the subject of this article, see also J.F. Engers, Bet Indonesische vraagstuk en de Amerikaanlle peril (Leiden, 1946); N. Mansergh and E.W.R. Lumby, The tranI/era/power 1942-7, I, The Cripps Mission, January-April 1942 (London, 1970); H.J. van Mook,Indonesie, Nederland en de wereld (Amsterdam, 1949); P. van 't Veer, 'Nederland in Azie', in: A.L. Constandse, J.L. He!­dring, P. van 't Veer, Gelijkhebben en krijgen (Amsterdam, 1962) 87-157.

116

The Great Strike of 1960-61: its economic and socio­political background *

A.MEYNEN

Until now the general strike which broke out in Belgium in 1960 had been the sub­ject of only two monographs and a few articles, concerned mainly with the events, which limited themselves to a chronological narrative of the course of the strike. l In this article we shall try to give a synthesis of the leading factors which can help us to discover the deeper causes. In discussing these factors it is important to look at both the economic background and socio-political developments.

As far as the former is concerned, we need to investigate what were the structural characteristics of the Belgian economy in the fifties, characteristics with enduring consequences for the rhythm of Belgian industrial expansion. We shall also pay the necessary attention to short term economic aspects.

THE STRUCTURAL CRISIS OF THE BELGIAN ECONOMY

After the Second World War, Belgium enjoyed a brief period of economic prosper­ity, partly because of the fact that the country's productive capacity had remained virtually intact in the war, and partly as a result of aid given under the Marshall Plan. In the fifties, however, the structural weaknesses of the economy became increasingly obvious. While in most countries late capitalism distinguished itself by a very rapid rate of growth in industrial production and almost complete employment of the available labour force, the Belgian economy of these years was marked by low growth and high unemployment. (Tabel I)

* This article is a.condensation of an unpublished study, 'De Grote Werkstaking 1960-61', Free University of Brussels, 1976/77 and a revised version of 'De grote werkstaking 1960-1961', Bel­gisch tijdsehrift voor nieuwste geschiedenis, IX (Ghent, 1978) 481-513, prepared when the author was a research fellow of the NFWO (Belgian fund for academic research). 1. V. Feaux, Cinq semaines de lutte sociale, La greve de l'Hiver 1960-61. Editions de l'Institut de Sociologie, Bruxelles (Brussels, 1963) contains a chronological record of the events drawn from newspapers. R. Deprez, La grande greve (decembre 1960-janvier 1961) Ses origines, son deroule­ment, !fes lefQns, (Brussels, 1963) goes into more detail on the share of the political and trade union organizations in the strike, especially that of the communist party (CPB).

117

A.MEYNEN

Table I. Industrial production 1953 = 1002

1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

W. Germany 112 128 138 147 151 163 180 Italy 109 120 128 137 142 158 180 France. 110 120 133 144 150 156 174 Netherlands 110 120 123 126 127 139 157 Luxembourg 103 116 123 126 121 127 139 Belgium 106 116 123 l2~ 115 119 126 Great Britain 106 112 113 115 113 120 128

Unemployed as percentages of the total labour force 3

Belgium Germany Italy Netherlands Switzer!. G. Britain 1953 8.8% 7.5 10 2.8 0.9 1.8 1957 3.7 3.4 9 1.3 0.4 1.6 1958 5.2 3.5 9 2.4 0.5 2.2 1960 4.8 1.3 8.8 1.2 0.2 1.9 (Marchi April)

The most important causes of this sluggish economic growth lay in the 'passive' character of Belgian capitalism and the lack of dynamism in industry and technology. If we examine the division of industry by sectors and by countries, then we find little trace of any progress in 'new sectors', whether or not in compensation for the decline of 'old sectors' in the fifties. (Table II)

Table II. Sectors of industry, 19564

Belgium G. Britain EEC

Mining 15.3% 7.1 6.5 Food industry,

beverages, tobacco 6.9 11.3 12.2 Textiles 13.7 6.4 9.1 Metal manufacturing 15 6.6 8.8 Chemical industry 32 34.6 27.8 Other industrial sectors 8.7 19.8 19.3 Gas, water, electricity 2.5 5.7 4.6

Total industrial production 100 100 100

2. Annuaire des statistiques du travail (Geneva, 1961) 588-9. 3. Figures cited by A. Camu, 'Essaisur revolution economique de la Belgique' La Revue Nouvelle, XVI (Brussels, 1960) 398. They are taken from the UN monthly statistical bulletin for September 1960. These comparisons are however not always exact, since different countries do not all use the same method of calculation, and the data are frequently incomplete. The fIgures cited here merely express ,certain trends of development. 4. Statistiques Industrielles 1900/1957 OECE (OECD) (paris, 1958) 4.

118

THE GREAT STRIKE OF 1960-61

Heavy industry (mining, quarrying, basic metals) and the textile industry represent­ed a much higher percentage of total production in Belgium than in the Benelux countries, Germany and Italy together. Sectors which showed expansion at world level, such as those of chemical products, gas and electricity represented only a small percentage of total Belgian production. If we compare Belgium with Great Britain, the

British industrial structure seems better orientated towards new sectors, even though total production grew no more rapidly. Belgium's relatively weak growth was the fault above all of the dominance of sectors 'in decline' (coal, textiles etc.) but even the dynamic sectors grew more slowly in Belgium than in other countries. That is to be explained by the fact that in Belgium traditional, antiquated or marginal industries were still dominant and the situation reflected the unsystematic allocation and tradi­tional orientation of the total industrial investment. For example, an important part of the chemical industry had remained wedded to traditional chemistry. We see some­thing similar in the metal manufacturing section: rolling stock, bicycles and similar products still made up a high percentage of production. The great inventions of the fifties in the fields of plastics, electronics and consumer durables brought only a slight change to the structure of Belgian industry. Belgium devoted only 0.5 per cent of its national income to scientific research, as against 1.5 per cent in the United States.5

We also see the traditional character of Belgium's industrial structure confirmed in the makeup of its exports. The products of stagnating industries such as steel, and those of industries in decline, e.g. textiles and most of the consumer goods, con­tinued to take the leading place in the total of exports.6 The nature of these exports displayed to a high degree its sensitivity to fluctuations in international demand. Whether export rhythms and the balance of payments develop in a favourable way or not is in any case largely dependent on whether or not demand is favourable in coun­tries which are enjoying a boom.7 Whenever the international economy slows down, it influences foreign trad,e and the entire economy. Belgian exports were thus hit far harder than those of countries with a wider range of export goods for sale, better suited to current economic changes. For that reason too, Belgium and Luxembourg were the only countries of Europe where the recession of 1958-59 had really far reaching consequences.8

In general it is true to say that the 'Law of the Retarding Lead' applied to the 'pro­cess of economic decline and the ageing of industrial structures in Belgium.9 Modern industry had arisen in Belgium at the beginning of the nineteenth century, much earlier than elsewhere on the continent, and after the Second World War it went into

5. Camu, 'Essai',409. 6. I. Svennilson, Growth and stagnation in the European economy (Geneva, 1954) 295 (table). 7. A. Lamfalussy, Investment and growth in mature economies. The case o/Belgium (New York, 1961) 16 ff. . 8. A. Maddison, 'The Postwar business .cycle in western Europe and the role of government poli­cy', Banca Nazionale del Lavore Quarterly Review, LIII (sine loco, 1960) 116. 9. E. Mandel, 'Les greves belges: essai d'explication socio-economique' Les Temps Modemes, XVI (Paris, 1961) 1291-1310, especially 1293 ff; M. Beuthe and E. Leroy, Economie en crois­sance lente: Ie cas de la Belgique (Brussels, 1954) 39-60.

119

A.MEYNEN

decline because it had retained a great deal of its traditional economic structure. It remained essentially based on traditional nineteenth century activities: the iron in­

dustry, mining, the textile industry, production of rolling stock and above all the production of half fmished goods and products which required relatively little labour, such as metal components, cement, glass, artificial fertilizers, woollen and cotton goods. Moreover, these traditional export goods fell into a crisis as a result of com­petition from new products such as aluminium and the light metals, petroleum, plastics and synthetic textiles. The country failed to develop enough new industries and did not exploit any new natural resources. Since this decline in the old sectors was not compensated for by any progress in new sectors, Belgium in the fifties only occupied a marginal place in world markets. The reasons for the traditional character of industry and the lack of dynamism in the field of industry and technology lay mainly in the conservatism of the groups of financiers and the holding trusts. A report by the General Belgian Trade Union (ABW) on 'Holding trusts and economic democracy' (1956) says this of their power:

Under the capitalist regime a group can completely dominate an enterprise from the moment that it belongs to the group in question. The group can decide on the depreciation, modern­ization and expansion of its industries, installations, on the setting up of new branches of activity or affiliated companies, on the transfer of !Klme of the capital abroad, on the method of financing equipment, on the amount and distribution of profits, on possible merger with other firms, on the closure of some fums, on production and wage agreements, on the level of prices and wages and even in some cases whether p-rofits will be made in one enterprise or another. From the moment that a few fmancial groups control the majority of the most im­portant enterprises of a country, they are thus in a position to determine the rhythm of ex­pansionof the country's economy, and are in fact responSlble for its development. I.

From the end of the fifties, the process of unequal economic development of the various regions began to reveal a shift in the relationship between Flanders and Wal­lonia. We can state that in 1959 the gross production per capita in Wallonia taken as a whole was still higher than that of Flanders, while production in Brussels was notably higher than that of the regions referred to, but that the average annual rate of growth in the period 1953-59 in Flanders exceeded that in WalloniaY According to cal­culations made over a longer period, from 1948 to 1959 the total gross product in Brussels rose by an annual average of 4.2 per cent, in Flanders by 3 per cent and in Wallonia by 2.2 per cent.12 Industrialization advanced most rapidly in Flanders, whereby this region made good its previous backwardness, while the Walloon districts threatened to become the great victim of the structural stagnation of their economy. None the less the Flemish part of Belgium, although more favourable perspectives

10. Holdings en Ekonomillche Demokratie (Holdings and Economic Democracy) ABW (liine loco. 1956) 258. Our italics. 11. N. Nabokoff, 'Le developpement de la Flandre et de la Wallonie', Revue Nouvelle. XVIII, (1962) 15 (table). 12. G. Chaput and R. de Falleur, 'La production et l'investissement des regions flamande, wallon­ne et bruxelloise', Cahiers economiquell de Bruxellell. (Brussels, 1961) 186.

120

THE GREAT STRIKE OF 1960-61

were opened to it in the long tenn, still suffered the serious consequences of the national process of delayed economic growth and the accumulation of industrial capital. This was evident from the pennanent structural unemployment and in periods of recession a Flemish industrial 'reserve army' fonned the majority of the Belgian

unemployedP Flanders, and especially the provinces of East and West Flanders. retained the character of an industrially underdeveloped region where structural un­employment was apennanent feature and which was also hit by the decline of one of the traditional industrial sectors, textiles.14

In contrast with Flanders, where with the exception of Ghent and Antwerp there was still industrial underdevelopment, Wallonia was confronted with a sudden threat to the existence of a number of essential sectors of industry. Here then we can speak of a process of de-industrialization making itself felt, and already partly completed. True, the deeper causes of this process lay in the structural weaknesses of the Belgian economy, but the consequences were felt more or less abruptly. The closure of a num­ber of mines at the end of the fifties was the most notable symptom. The Walloon regions, the most industrialized area of Belgium with the oldest strata of the Belgian working class, were hit by economic stagnation, a decline in the number of those employed,. partly caused by the closure of the coal mines and their associated under­takings, and also a demographic stagnation, all symptoms which indicated a process of de-industrialization.

Short term fluctuations in the growth of material production cannot be distin­guished from the general longer term tendency of the rhythm of expansion. In the period we are concerned with this rhythm was not only significantly more sluggish in Belgium than in the other Benelux countries, Gennany, France and Italy, but it was also very unstable. The average length and depth of recessions was greater in Belgium than in other European countries and the expansion phases were shorter and less marked. The recession of 1958-59, combined with the structural crisis there, was more

13. In the recession year 1959 the unemployment figures, expressed in percentages were distrib­uted throughout the country as follows:

Wholly unemployed partially unemployed Flemish district 66% 63% Walloon district 21% 32% Brussels 13% 5% See L. Reneau, 'Beschouwingen over het probleem van de werkloosheid in Belgie', Arbeidlblad (Brussels, 1960) 496. 14. See, inter alia, A. Devreker, Welvaarsproblemen Vlaanderen (Antwerp, 1958): R. De Backer, 'Strukturele werkloosheid in Oost Vlaanderen', Arbeidlblad, LX (l959) 536-57; G. De Backer and <\. Kempeneers, De naoorlogge toeltand van de Belgische textielnijverheid. In het biizonder haar 'inanciele Itruktuur in OOlt Vlaanderen. State University, Ghent (Ghent, 1961). 15. Statiltilch iaarboek voor Belgie en Belgigch Kongo (Brussels, 1959) 211 and (1961) 224. l1le ftgUle for 1953 gives the average for the personnel present, that for 1960 the personnel on the looks at 31 December. Between 1 January 1951 and 1 January 1959 the number of mines active n all the Walloon coalfields put together, fell from 149 to 100, while the number in the Kempen listrict remained the same (7). Cf. L 'ouvrier mineur, organe mensuel de 1a centrale Iyndicale del '1ineurs (line loco; 1959) iv, 2.

121

A.MEYNEN

strongly felt in Belgium than in neighbouring countries. It thus brought the lack of

economic growth clearly to the fore. On the other hand, the immediate cause of the general strike of 1960 was not an

economic one. It fell just after the recession of 1958-59 in a phase of economic re­covery, which in 1961-62 developed into a new phase of high economic activity. Although the general recovery was slower in Belgium than in surrounding countries, from 1959 it was possible to discern an increase in industrial activity in various sectors, and this accelerated into 1960. The index of industrial activity calculated by the National Institute for Statistics was 8.6 per cent higher in 1960 than in 1959. Com­pared with the high point of 1957 the increase was 4.8 per cent despite the fact that coal production had notably declined in the meantime. 16 So the year 1960 was marked, especially in its last quarter, by a more or less uniform industrial advance compared with the previous period of recession, and showed a trend in the direction of a new period of high economic activity. Despite the fact that the increase in em­ployment, still unfavourably influenced by the coal crisis and the increase in produc­tivity, was not yet rising as fast as industrial production, the number of unemployed, especially of part-time and casual unemployed, fell considerably in the course of 1960, so that the available labour reserve gradually declined.17 (Table III) It is true that in

Table III. Daily average number oj registered unemployed (all categoriesl8

1954 1955 1956 1957

224,752 172,398 144,776 116,810

1958 1959 1960

180,893 199,209 158,097

that year the wage earners' share of the national income remained smaller than in 1958 and the structural crisis continued, despite a certain improvement in Flanders, as was evident from the fact that fewer and fewer workers found work in the mines.

The outbreak of the great strike of 1960-61 cannot be explained merely as a conse­quence of the state of the Belgian economy at the end of the fifties. To make clear the background to it we must try to achieve some insight into the ideas on economic and social policy which were held in the trade unions and political parties.

THE EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESSES OF THE GENERAL BELGIAN TRADE UNION

(ABVV) IN 1954 AND 1956

The importance of these congresses lay in the fact that on these occasions a pro-

16. De Belgische ekonomie in 1960 (Brussels, 1961) 33 (table.) 17. Ministerie van Arbeid. Rijksdienst voor arbeidsbemiddeling en werkloosheid. Maandelijks be­richt (Brussels, 1960) 10-1 (trends in the daily average number of registered unemployed.) 18. Arbeidsblad, LXII (Febr. 1961) 190-1 (statistics.)

122

THE GREAT STRIKE OF 1960-61

gramme was adopted which may be regarded as the programme of a large part of the workers who went on strike in 1960-61 and especially of the Walloon working class.

The so-called extraordinary congresses of the ABVV in 1954 and 1956, devoted to social progress and economic democracy, in fact formed an answer to the structural weaknesses of the post war Belgian economy, and their causes especially the grip which the holdings and financial groups had on the Belgian economy.19 The structural shortcomings of Belgian capitalism and the too feeble accumulation of industrial capital, an antiquated allocation of investment, the economic stagnation of some regions and the high rate of unemployment inspired the trade unions to frame long term demands. The extraordinary congresses offered new perspectives for a campaign in the shape of an economic programme which formulated new long term objectives. The trade union movement was no longer willing to confine itself to putting forward elementary short term claims, but was given the task of framing demands which con­cerned the working of the economic system itself. This meant a great step forward by comparison with the period between the two world wars, when the trade union move­ment had limited itself to demanding direct improvements in conditions of labour.

The General Christian Trade Union (ACV) experienced a similar transformation, in a less radical manner, and within the framework of its corporatist ideals. This union too now put forward long term demands. In its economic programme for 1954, published in December 1953, the ACV demanded efficient control of the monopolies, a number of measures against the undesirable policy followed by the banks, holdings etc., and also more planning of the directions in which the economy ought to develop. On 11 September 1956 the executive of the ACV, after an investigation of the in­fluence of fmancial groups on the economy, decided to suggest to the government the setting up of an official committee, to be responsible for investigating the role and working of these groups.20

The most important points in this 'programme for structural reforms' formulated by the extraordinary congresses of the ABVV in 1954 and 1956 came down to the follOWing;

a. In order to do something about the unsatisfactory rhythm of expansion, the ABVV felt that a socialist economic policy must comprise the following goals: the opportunity of work for everyone; a fairer distribution of the national income and an improvement in the general standard of living. The only true possibility of achieVing this was the path of a plaimed economy, as part of democratic socialism. In such a form of democracy, a policy of economic planning could only take the form of a collective social plan, which would not include the nationalization of the means of production.

The necessary action on the economic front would have to be taken by the govern­ment. The state must take new initiatives and itself set up new enterprises. The pre-

19. ABVV Buitengewoon Congres, 30-31 October 1954. Naar sociale vooruitgang door ekono­mische expansie (Antwerp, 1954); Holdings. These reports contain in particular an interesting diagnosis of the post war Belgian economy. 20. P. Joye and R. Lewin, L 'Eglise et Ie mouvement ouvrier en Belgique (Brussels, 1967) 348.

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A.MEYNEN

conditions for flexible planning would have to be realized in Belgium by means of reforms in the organization of politi,::al and economic institutions, amongs others by the establishment of a so-called 'high commission for the plan' and a 'high commission for credit'.21

b. The ABVV considered that nationalization on a limited scale was an important factor in the success of a policy of economic planning. It was, however, only to be carried out when the necessity was proved. According to the ABVV this was the case in the energy sector: coal, gas, electricity. The ABVV rejected the formula of etatisme: a nationalized industry had to enjoy wide industrial, fmancial and administrative auto­nomy. The original shareholders were to be compensated. Power was to be trans­ferred to· an 'administrative council' in which representatives of the trade union move­ment were to sit alongside representatives of other economic and social interests.22

This point of the 1954 report led to the so-called agreements on the 'electricity round table' in which, after discussions between the employers' organizations and the trade unions a measure of state control over the electricity companies was instituted, with­out the sector being nationalized, or the necessary rationalization taking place.

c. The ABVV pointed out that there had to be an end to the dominance of financial groups and holding companies, such as the Societe Generale, Solvay-Boel-Janssen, Empaih, Lambert and Petrofina, if a policy of economic growth and social progress was to be carried out. The prerogatives and privileges of these groups and firms should be transferred to the nation.23 The power of the holding companies should be made over to the state. They also demanded control over the holdings.

It is important to observe, in connection with this proposal for structural reform, that neither in the demand for the control of the holdings, nor in the call for national­ization of the energy companies, did it concern transfer of ownership, but only a re­form of the management, by which power was to be passed to an administrative coun­cil (in the energy sector) or the activities were to be placed under control.24 The de­mand for control over the holdings went back to the axiom that it was not capital which was to be socialized but power over the capital of others. Nationalization, limited to the energy sector,had to be accompanied by compensation. We must con­sider the programme of structural reform put forward by the ABVV as a sort of com­promise between its left and right wings. As a result it was from the start capable of various interpretations as to the path which was to be followed in order to realize it. Nonetheless, a general assumption implicit in the programme was the view that Belgian capitalism was not in a position to bring about rapid economic growth and full em­ployment.25 In the fifties the traumatic crisis period of the inter-war years was still

21. ABVV Buitengewoon Congres, 173-203. 22. Ibidem, 204-35. 23. Holdings, 295 ff. 24. See also 1. Defay, 'Le programme beIge des rMormes de structure de 1954 a l'epreuve de vingt ans de regime neo-capitaliste: strategie ouvriere vers une societe socialiste', Actes du Colloque de Pont .a-Lesse (3-6 Mai 1973) (Liege,1973) 55. 25. G. Martinet, 'La strategie ouvriere des rMormes de structure est-elle une reponse giobale suffisante au neo-.capitalisme international?' ibidem, 316-7.

124

THE GREAT STRIKE OF 1960-61

fresh in the memories of many people. Anxiety was fed by the circumstance that as a result ofthe one-sided attention paid in the early postwar years to the traditional basic industries, and the absence of major changes in the Belgian economy, a severe structural crisis had arisen. The structural changes which the trade union movement demanded in the fifties were to form an answer to certain essential problems of Belgian society at that time, and were in the first place aimed at accelerating economic growth and en­suring full employment.26

When the proposals of the ABVV were formulated in 1954 and 1956, they aroused little response at the time. In those years of relatively favourable economic activity, when politics was dominated by the education question, the programme attracted little attention. The proposals were, however, in marked contrast to the SOCially un­aware policies of the government, which then consisted of a coalition of liberals and socialists. Towards the end of the fifties, however, after the recession of 1958 which exposed the structural weaknesses of the Belgian economy in full daylight, the pro­gramme found a favourable response among a large part of the Belgian working class, and it played an important part during the strike of 1960. As a result of the socialists' propaganda for this programme, it got through to the workers that Belgian capitalism had led the country into an impasse, and that new solutions were necessary to escape from it.

THE GENERAL CHARACfERISTICS OF THE STRIKES BETWEEN 1954 AND 1960

Between 1 January 1954 and 31 December 1960 the trend of days lost by strikes was as follows: 27

1954 612,192 1957 4,092,954 1960 3,336,300 1955 1,340,634 1958 339,566 1956 1,115,505 1959 1,360,300 (the data for the great strike, included in the 1960 figures, naturally run only to 31 December 1960.)

With regard to the period 1954-60 we can distinguish the following character­istics of the strikes: 28 From 1954 to 1957, a period of high economic prosperity,

2b. In this context there was little discussion of questions concerning workers' control of fmns. The ABW programme of 1954-6 made no provision for worker participation in the running of enterprises. Andre Renard was the only one to bring 'workers control' back into the limelight in the union movement, but he considered it as attainable only along the path of broadening the works councils' right to information. 27. We rely here on the corrected statistical material published by R. Gubbels, La greve, phe­rlOmene de civilisation (Brussels, 1962) 306. The discrepancy between the official figures, publish­ed by the National Institute for Statistics (NIS) and the corrected figures based on data from the ministry of Economic affairs and the police is considerable. The latter figures give a total for the period 1954-60 almost double that of the NIS. 28. N1S. Statistischelaarboeken (1956-61).

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A.MEYNEN

social conflicts were mainly concerned with the raising of incomes and their fairer distribution among the various strata of society. The relatively high number of work­ing days lost in 1955 was mainly caused by an unofficial strike which crippled the port of Antwerp for three weeks, and by strikes related to a demand for a reduction in the working week. The high total in 1957 was a result of an important strike in the metal industry in the summer of that year. The year 1958, a period of recession, gave a small total of conflicts and working days lost through strikes, even though the miners' campaign against the closure of their pits w~s already getting under way. In 1959 it was continued in a large scale strike which crippled a large part of the province of Hainault for two weeks. If we investigate how the strikes were distributed among the various sectors of industry in the same period, we can observe that the highest strike rate (i.e. the number of working days lost divided by the total of the active popula­tion working in that sector) was reached in the coal mines (2.42) and in the metal in­dustry (2.07) which together made up about 65 per cent of the total days lost. In the quarries the figure reached 1.48, in the glass industry 1.18 and in gas and electricity 0.37.29 If we study the regional distribution in all sectors, then it appears that the spread of working days lost among the various regions was as follows~O

Flemish arrondissements Walloon arrondissements Brussels arrondissements Total

4,269,618 7,133,549 1,023,593

12,426,760

About 57 per cent of the days lost concerned Wallonia, which can be explained by the fact that heavy industry (metal and coal) which accounted for most of the days lost by strikes, was largely based in that region. We fmd the highest number of days lost, and also the highest regional strike rati03} in the districts where heavy industry, largely established in the nineteenth century, was dominant, and where the workers, belonging to the older sections of the Belgian working class, were mainly organized in the SOCialist trade unions. In the districts where the textile industry had stronger roots, we observe a relatively limited participation in strikes. Unlike the mineworkers who protested more and more vigorously against economic decline and the closure of the mines, the Flemish textile proletariat, with a very few exceptions, did not conduct a strong campaign against the decline of the traditional Flemish industrial sector.

The increasing tension among the workers, from the second half of the fifties, found its expression in the metal workers' strike of 1957 (19 June-15 July) which was a continuation of the social agitation, on the increase since 1956, against the price and wage policy of Van Acker's liberal-socialist coalition. This spontaneous general

29. Gubbels, Greve, 104-5 (table). 30. R .. Gubbels, 'Les greves en Wallonie et en Flandre (1954-60). Revue du. Conseil economique wallon' LX/LXI (Liege, 1963) 39-48. 31. Ibidem, 40 (Table).

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THE GREAT STRIKE OF 1960-61

strike of the metal workers was centred in the Liege region, and had as its immediate aim the payment of full double wages for holidays, but its deeper background was the dissatisfaction of the workers with the results they had achieved in the preceding years. In view of the growth of productivity, the workers demanded their share in the prosperity of their industry. They therefore asked for a 'tax on profits', that is a redistribution of the national income. Another important strike was that in the elec­tricity and gas sector in November 1958. In this case, the demands concerned the adaptation of the wage structure and a productivity bonus. This strike crippled the most important sectors of the economy for a few days. More important was the general strike in Hainault from 13-26 February 1959. The cause was the crisis in the coal industry, already referred to, and which, in particular in the recession of 1958-59, took the form of a continual reduction of employment opportunities in the mines, as a result of which certain districts traditionally associated with mining threatened to relapse into a state of underdevelopment.32 The immediate cause was a plan for the Borinage area, presented by the National Mining Council, which provided for the closure of a number of mines in the course of 1959?3 This strike was of particular importance because it displayed many similarities to the general strike of 1960-61, and in many ways can be regarded as a precursor of it.

1. The strike of 1959 concerned the Walloon coalfields and other sectors of heavy industry. Since the cause lay in the crisis within the coal industry, it was confined mainly to Hainault, especiillly to the sorely hit Borinage.

2. The strike was general among the miners in Wallonia. There was a broad solidar­ity among the industrial workers, the administrative personnel, and the engineers. In the Borinage, the whole population took part in the strike for the survival of the region.34 Workers in other sectors (the metal industry and the public services) joined in the strike or demonstrated their solidarity.

3. The strike broke out spontaneously, i.e. without the trade unions issuing an official strike call, and it reached large proportions in a short time. The Miners' Union, a member of the ABW, and far from being in the most radical wing of the socialist union movement, became rather isolated in the course of 1958-59. It took up a corporatist standpoint with regard to the protection which was demanded for the threatened mines. Its leadership was, it is true, against the plan to close the mines in the Borinage, but the strike broke out without its calling for it. Under pressure from its members it recognized the strike: it formalized and expanded it. At the urging of the ABW the goals of the strike were included within the basic programme of the trade union movement (planning, nationalization, control over the holdings) even though that programme concerned other sectors of the economy as well as coal­mining. The Free Mine Workers' Union, a member of the ACV, had declared itself in

32. See among others, J. Meynaud, J. Ladriere and F. Perin, ed., La decision politique en Belgique. Le pouvoir et les groups (Paris, 1965) 270-2; C. Dejean, 'Les greves de fevrier 1959', Socialisme, XVIII (Brussels, 1961) xliv, 204-9. 33. Gubbels, Greve, 43-4. 34. 1. Dedoyard, 'Un grand combat social', L 'Ouvrier mineur (1959) iii, 1.

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A.MEYNEN

agreement with the government's plan to close a number of mines in the Borinage, but recognized the strike under the pressure of circumstances though setting itself the aim of limiting it. The national executive of the ACV declared itself against the strike weapon a~ a means of solving the miners' problems.3s

4. The strike was aimed above all at the government and its policy in the field of economic expansion and social progress. It ended with an agreement, after dis­cussions between the government, the employers, the trade unions and represen­tatives of the European Coal and Steel Community. The inhabitants of the Borinage were, however, not satisfied with it. The problem of growing unemployment continued to exist for them. The miners went back to work with no clear prospects for the future.36

POLITICAL RADICALIZATION WITHIN THE WORKERS' MOVEMENT

A gradual radicalization within the workers' movement began to be discernible from the end of the fifties, especially within the Belgian Socialist Party. It took two forms:

a. From the end of the fifties, and partly as a result of the radicalization, which was expressed in the strikes and within the Walloon ABVV, there was a tendency to assume a more left wing stance against the 'right wing' reformist leaders, such as the Prime Minister Van Acker. This left wing tendency found its spokesmen in the news­papers La Gauche and Links (The Left) and to a lesser degree in the organization the Socialist Young Guard. The polemical paper, La Gauche, established at the end of 1956, assembled around itself an opposition consisting of Trotskyists, so-called cen­trists and left wing reformists, and strove eagerly for a struggle in support of the pro­gramme of structural reforms, stressing its anti-capitalist aspects.37 Links, its Flemish counterpart, was set up later in 1958, since radicalization had not proceeded as rapidly in Flanders as in Wallonia, and the socialist movement there was still involved in the struggle to regulate public education. Links stressed the need for a socialist economic programme for Flanders, a rapprochement with the christian workers, and the social­economic aspects of the Flemish movement.38

35. XXle Congres van het ACV, Bruggel, 21-23 Oktober 1960, De bedrijvigheid van het ACV, 1958-60, (Brussels, 1960) 53-4. 36. The strike led to the drafting of the expansion laws of 17 and 18 July 1959 and to the setting up of a 'bureau of programming' (26 Oct. 1959) which was to study various points for action in the fields of investment, employment, prices and wages and to make proposals on them to the ministerial committee for economic co-ordination. 37. In 33 of the 50 numbers of La Gauche which appeared in 1960, the editorials on the front page referred to the theme of structural reforms; 148 articles dealt with the economic situation in Belgium, the trusts, holdings etc. See also 'Le bilan de la Gauche en 1960', La Gauche, IV (Brus­sels) 17 Dec. 1960,8. 38. Interview with Marcel Deneckere, the editor in chief of the periodical Links (1975) in: Wat zoudt gij zonder 't werkvolk zijn? Anderhalve eeuw arbeidemtrijd in Belgie, I, 1830-1966, (Lou­vain, 1977) 175.

128

THE GREAT STRIKE OF 1960-61

b. The Belgian Socialist Party as a whole, after a short term orientation toward the liberals, with whom it had formed a government from 1954 to 1958, and carried out a not very popular social policy, found itself in an unfavourable strategic position which for the time being was to the advantage of the left wing groups within the party. The relative leftward movement of the BSP, reflecting its new situation as a party in opposition to the conservative Eyskens government, a coalition of the Christian Peoples Party (cvp) and the liberals, was echoed in the Extraordinary Congress of the BSP in 1959, held according to the decision of the congress of December 1958, and prepared by special committees.39 This new congress accepted the main points of the ABVV's programme of structural reforms, albeit with a few modifications.40 The reforms 'now became the official programme of communal action. Nonetheless there were still conflicts at the congress within the socialist movement. At the end of the congress there was an incident when militant supporters of La Gauche insisted that the resolutions should include a pledge that the party would never take part in govern­ment unless the programme of reforms formed part of the coalition agreement.41

THE UNITY LAW

In order to overcome the structural weaknesses of the Belgian economy, the Eys­kens government (1958-61) attempted to create a number of favourable conditions for the investment climate. A new approach to economic policy was expressed in the law on regional economic growth (1959 et seq.) and the first chapter of the 'unity law' (Eenheidswet, July 1959). The expansion laws of July 1959 laid down that the state could influence the interest rates of investment credit, and take upon itself the role of guarantor of such credits. Loans with a view to setting up new businesses, ex­panding and modernizing old ones, were eligible for these advantages in so far as the investments they financed were in the general economic interest (General Law, 17 July 1959) as were also loans taken out to fmance investments in regions considered for development (Regional Law, 18 July 1959). The criteria for the latter were per­manent large scale unemployment, falling population through emigration, high labour mobility in unfavourable social and economic circumstances, and decline of the leading economic activities. The first chapter of the Unity Law was related to eco­nomic growth and was an expansion of the other laws which made possible a more far reaching financing of the private sector by the state, without however introducing any serious checks on the economic validity of the investments thus brought about.42

39. 'La Greve Generale en Belgique', Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP, CXIII (Brussels) 2 June 1961,7. 40. Le Peuple, quotidien du parti socialiste beige (Brussels) 21 sep. 1959,3. 41. Ibidem, 2-3. 42. For a study of the unity law in the context of long term economic policy as a whole, in relation to Belgian economic expansion after the war, see L. Morissens, La politique economique beige de 1949 a 1961. La politique economique contemporaine (Brussels, 1967) 501 ff. Growing awareness of the regional economic problems must also be regarded as a factor in the evolution of

129

A.MEYNEN

The government's aim in this economic planning was to reduce unemployment and stimulate the growth of the Gross National Product. It intended to draw the necessary financial resources from the increased yield of indirect taxes and from funds which were to be made available as a result of cuts in social services and could thus serve to subsidize private investments. The structural crisis was hand in hand with a serious crisis in the state's finances which considerably increased the national debt, and made the Belgian government increasingly dependent on short term credit advanced by the Belgian banks.43 Moreover, at the end of the fifties, Belgium's colonial empire collapsed. On the other hand, the Congo crisis seems to have belonged to the subjective rather than the objective factors in the drafting of the so-called unity law of 1959, and in the strike of 1960. The attack on colonial profits sharpened the resolve of the Belgian government to carry out a policy of austerity, while in the eyes of many of the work­ing class population, the prestige of the bourgeoisie in the government was weakened by the fall of Belgian power in the Congo.44 It strengthened the impression that the ruling class in Belgium was enfeebled and no longer in a position to bring about the necessary economic renewal. This theme was a permanent feature of the propaganda of the ABVV and BSP from 1959.

The 'unity law' which was supposed to be the answer to the structural and financial crisis was the direct stimulus to the great strike of 1960-61. This 'Draft Law for economic growth, social progress and financial recovery', presented on 4 November 1960, covered an enormous terrain, stretching from measures to encourage economic growth, institutional reforms in the State Employment Service, and changes to the sickness and disability insurance schemes to a revision of the legal status of govern­ment employees and an increase in indirect taxation.45 On top of the harmful conse­quences which the coal crisis had had for the working class, the very unsatisfactory increase in pensions, the changes in the tempo of work, which had much increased in recent years, as the result of the application of technology to productivity, and the fact that in 1960 the share of-the wage earners in the national income was smaller than in 1958, the 'unity law' now seemed to threaten the living standards of the entire working population. The law threatened to cause a general loss of purchasing power as a result of the rise in indirect taxes, the cuts in unemployment benefit, and a more stringent control of payments made as part of the sickness and disability insurance schemes. But above all the law hit the workers in the public services who in the pre-

public opinion in the months before the great strike. In Wallonia, including the Borinage, a large number of special pressure groups were set up in connection with regional problems. 43. Between 1950 and 1957 the national debt rose by an average of BFr. 10 billion per year. Under the Eyskens government this increase accelerated rapidly: in 1958 by about BFr. 22 billion, in 1959 by BFr. 28 billion and in the first quarter of 1960 alone by BFr. 15.5 billion. Deprez, Grande greve, 14. 44. 'Greve generale', 3 ff. 45. Documenten !Ian de Kamer der Volkwertegenwoordigers, zitting 1959-60, no. 649, 'Draft Law for ECQnomic Expansion, social progress and fmancial recovery' (4 November 1960) For those items in the Unity law which had social consequences see also. G. Spitae1s, L ~nnee sociale 1960 (Brussels, 1961) 63-71; R. Evalenko, 'La loi unique et la greve', Socialisme, XX (1961) no. 43, 9-16.

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THE GREAT STRIKE OF 1960-61

vious year had already enjoyed little share in social progress and were now confronted with a revision of their legal status, a revision of salary in the case of local council em­ployees, and an increase in their compulsory pension contribution.46 The specific provisions of the unity law therefore aroused bitter opposition from government em­ployees. The law ran into some resistance in right wing circles, over the advances to be (aised on taxes and the tax on profits from shares and bonds. In these circles, there was agreement to the economies in social services. Because the unity law, in the form in which the proposal was cast, could cause divided and fragmented opposition from various milieus and layers of society, the government hoped that these different oppositions would neutralize each other. The opposite was in fact the case. The greater part of the workers' movement appeared to oppose the law as a whole, and the struggle against it led to a trial of strength between the government and the working class.

THE OPPOSITION TO THE UNITY LAW (NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1960)

Immediately after the announcement of the proposed legislation on 4 November 1960, the secretariat of the ABVV proposed to the executive that the law should be fought on every point.47 Even earlier, in various regions including Liege, campaigns had been started against the government's austerity policy, after the prime minister, Eyskens, had defended it on 27 September. Since the proposed law included a range of provisions which threatened to inflict perceptible damage on the working conditions of the employees in government services, the General Union for the Public Services (ACOD) was one of the first which wished to mount a special campaign.48 The most radical decision on the choice of weapons came from the local and proVincial services section within the ACOD, whose national executive announced a general strike on 5

December 1960, to begin on the day on which the debate on the law was to com­mence in the full session of parliament,49 and to be continued to the finish. On 12 December the national committee decided to fight the law with all the means available, including strikes, and it gave the national executive instructions to take measures to co-ordinate the campaign.50 This was also intended to compel the government to in­troduce the refonn programme of the ABVV.

The General Christian Trade Union (ACV) for its part had a number of criticisms of the law, especially on the proposed checks on sickness benefits and unemploy-

46. De Tribune (Brussels) 46. De Tribune (Brussels) January 1961, 1. 47. ABVV Statuair Congres, 15-16-17 en 18 December 1962 (sine loco, sine dato) 757-8, Report on morale and administration for the years 1959-60-61. 48. Motion of the Executive of the Acon of 7 November 1960 in: F. Demany, Beelden van een staking. Een document van de ACOD(Brusse1s, 1962) 123 appendix 1. 49. Demany, Beelden; 19. 50. Motion of the National Committee of the Acon of 12 December 1960 in: ibidem. 123-5 (appendix II)

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A.MEYNEN

ment pay, as well as on the points concerning government personnel.S1 It stressed, however, that the proposed law also had a number of good points and it took the view that there had to be negotiations with the government, a view to which it adhered resolutely. The attitude of the ACV towards the government and especially to the Christian Peoples Party (cvp) was, like the relationship between the ACV and the ABVV, a reflection of the general political situation at that moment. In the period before the strike the relations between the ACV and the CVP had been strengthened, since they had both, starting from a similar outlook on life, adopted the same attitude towards burning political questions such as the monarchy and the struggle over educa­tion. On the other hand, the ABVV and the ACV, as a result of the strong polarization between anti-clericals and clericals over the education question, were diametrically opposed to each other in politics. Besides this, the christian democrat wing of the Roman-catholic movement was partly bound to the government which had promised to remove the count of language use from the decennial census which was to take place in 1960. Nonetheless, both in the period of preparation before the strike and in the first days of the strike itself, a considerable proportion of the members of the ACV joined in the strike movement, in spite of the attitude of their leaders.

Meanwhile, the BSP, which found itself in opposition, and the socialist organiza­tions which co-operated with it, had not failed to make known their reactions to the government's policy. As early as 14 November the executive of the BSP stated its official position against the proposed law, and condemned it.s2 On 30 November the allied socialist organizations confmned their opposition to the 'unity law' and declared themselves in favour of structural reforms.S3 To make the programme more widely known, these organizations launched an important campaign, the so-called 'operation truth'. 54 It comprised an information campaign in· favour of the programme of struc­tural reforms accepted at the extraordinary congress of the BSP in 1959. The cam­paign, in the form of meetings, began on 20 October 1960 at Namur and had a con­siderable success there. After 15 November the meetings held, mostly between a mem­ber of the BSP and the representative of the ABVV, concentrated on the content of the 'unity law'.ss Despite the fact that 'operation truth' had a purely informative aim, and

51. De Volksmacht (Brussels) 17 December 1960,5; XXI/e Congres van het ACV. Brussel 19-21 Oktober 1962. De bedrijvigheid van het ACV 1960-62 (Brussels, 1962) 67-9. 52. 'Resolution of the Bureau of the BSP' of 14 November 1960', Vooruit (Ghent) 15 Nov. 1960,1. 53. Vooruit. 1 Dec. 1960, 1. 54. The wide dissemination of the 'programme of structural reform was helped by the great series of preparatory courses held for active ABVV members in Wallonia and Brussels. 55. From the places where these meetings were held, listed in Feaux, CinQ semaines 50, it appears that of the 70 meetings only 12 took place in Flanders, 9 of them in or near Ghent. We see from this the difference in character between the socialist movements in Flanders and Wallonia. In Flanders socialism was still chiefly concerned with the struggle against the church; they wanted an acceptable standard of living for the workers without attacking the capitalist structure of the economy _ Apart from the weekly Links, which was read by only a small proportion of the left wing intellectuals, no propaganda on behalf of the structural reforms was made in Flanders during the phase of preparation for the strike.

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THE GREAT STRIKE OF 1960-61

that no concrete proposals were made at the meetings, the BSP gave its assistance under pressure from its members and especially from a campaign led by its left wing, to intensify the general state of affairs, especially in Wallonia. in the months before the strike, without regard to its own goals of electoral success. At the outbreak of the strike, however, the struggle passed beyond its control.

The communists too were actively involved in the opposition to the 'unity law', and adopted a programme which was not confined to parliamentary discussion alone. 56

On 21 November a mass demonstration had been held at Liege against the unity law when at the initiative of the regional committee of the collaborating socialist organi­zations 50,000 workers stopped work for two hours. A second demonstration follow­ed in the Liege area and Hainault on 14 December, when about 140,000 workers staged a short strike. On 14 December Andre Renard, the assistant secretary general of the ABVV at Liege, promised an enormous crowd of demonstrators that he would propose to the committee that they should agree to the prinCiple of a general strike, so that such a strike could begin at any suitable moment.57

In the weekend from 16 to 18 December the political parties and the trade unions adopted their defmitive standpoints towards the proposed law. On 20 December the debates on it began in parliament. The CVP was unanimously in favour of the pro­posals, the majority of the liberal party also, while the BSP was unanimously against it. Of the unions, the ACV continued to hold the view that negotiations must be con­tinued. At a meeting of the extended national committee of the ABVV on 16 Decem­ber two motions were put forward, one by Andre Renard on behalf of the Liege area section, in favour of accepting the principle of a general strike and the other by Smets, on behalf of the General Union Council, in favour of organizing a national day of struggle, of which the executive was to fix the day.58 Smets' motion was accepted with 496,487 votes in favour, 473,823 against, and 53,112 abstentions. A cursory study of the result shows that there were notable regional differences between the Wallonia and Flemish provincial sections, differences which reflected the proportions of votes held by each national union. Those unions which drew their membership mainly from Wallonia (the metal, mining and quarry industry) were in principle in favour of a national strike, supported by the ACOD and the Union of Administrative Personnel, Technicians and Supervisors (BBTK). Those unions whose members were drawn largely from Flanders (The General Trade Union Confederation, the textile industry etc.) opposed it.59

At the same moment that the national committee of the ABVV was holding its conference, a congress of the BSP was taking place, concerned with internal matters

56. R. Heelen, '11 ne reste que trois semaines', published in Le Drapeau Rouge, 22 November 1960, reprinted in: Deprez, Grande Greve, 314-5 (appendix II); 'Report drawn up by the Central Com­mittee of the Communist Party, addressed to the National Bureau of the ABW, 26 November 1960', ibidem, 316-9 (appendix III). 57. La Wallonie (Liege) 15 December 1960,5. 58. Demany, Hee1den, 126-7 (appendix V). 59. The result of the vote at the enlarged national committee of the ABW 16 Decembet 1960, in: Gubbels, Greve. 73-4.

A.MEYNEN

(16-18 December). It was mostly concerned with military problems related to Belgian membership of NATO. On its last day Jos. Van Eynde, vice-chairman of the BSP, speaking about internal politics, gave a more or less objective assessment of the po­licies of the government. A militant supporter of La Gauche, which had called for a general strike to the fmish, asked to be heard, and called for solidarity with the public service and council employees who were to go on strike on 20 December. He pointed out that the struggle against the unity law should not be confmed to parliament, and was supported in this by a member of the Jeunes gar des socialistes. As a result of this call, which found a wide response, a heated discussion arose between supporters and opponents of a general strike. Van Eynde broke it off by observing that the congress of the BSP was not a court of appeal against the decisions of the ABW. The congress confmed itself to condemning the unity law, demanding socialist refonns and new elections, and refrained from making any preCise statements as to what should happen and how it was to be brought about.60

Two days later on 20 December a wave of strikes spread like a bush flre across the whole of Belgium, without any call for it being issued by a national political or trade union organization. The ACOD's call for work to be laid down for an indefmite period was not only followed en masse but at the same time thousands of workers in private flrms spontaneously joined the striking state employees. On 23 December the whole of Wallonia was crippled. For flve weeks the Belgian state and the Belgian economy were in crisis.

CONCLUSION

Seen in a broader chronological framework the strike of 1960-61 marked a phase of transition in the postwar development of Belgian society, from a period of sluggish economic growth to one of faster economic growth, combined with the catastrophe which hit the Walloon region. The Belgian economy of the flfties was distinguished by its slow adaptation of the means of production to fundamental changes in industrial technology and the use of energy which had taken place in other countries. As a result no changeover or renewal of industry had taken place in Wallonia, and insuffIcient in­dustrialization in Flanders. From the sixties, on the other hand, Belgium too, as a consequence of a completely revised approach in industry under the influence of a neo-capitalist policy combined with the import of foreign capital, enjoyed a phase of accelerated capital accumulation which, however, was at the expense of an increasing dependence on the world 1llarkets and a growing lack of balance between the various regions and industries. The development of this temporary new dynamism was made possible by restructuring and rationalization of Belgian capitalism by means of system­atic state intervention.

60. Vooruit, 19 December 1960, 1, 3 (report of the congress); 'Les greves contre Ia loi unique' Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP, no. 86. 25 November 1960, F-G (appendix IV).

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THE GREAT STRIKE OF 1960-61

The Eyskens-Lilar government made a start of this new economic policy but not without great social crises. The liberal-christian-democrat government of Eyskens made a first attempt, by means of cautiously undertaken state intervention, to restore the old profitability of Belgian capitalism, albeit at the expense of a series of social privileges won by the workers, but it did not have adequate political means to carry these reforms through. It drove the socialist labour movement into opposition and was confronted by a general strike which itself formed the high point of a gradual radical­ization within the workers' movement, which had begun in the second half of the fifties. While the ACV wished to accept the possibility of a 'social peace' under certain conditions, the ABVV adopted a new programme which included a new economic policy with anti-capitalist aspects.

The strike of 1960 was in the first place a campaign by the working class against the measures in the 'unity law'. True, in the course of 1960, a rather abrupt shift in economic circumstances had taken place, which changed the balance of power in favour of the working class, but the workers now saw themselves confronted with government mea.sures which threatened to attack their general achievements. The strike at first took the form of a demonstration of solidarity by workers in private firms especially in Wallonia, with certain sectors of the public services which threatened to be severely hit by Eyskens' unity law. This Walloon campaign was however more than an elementary demonstration of solidarity. It can be explained by the increasing opposition of the Walloon workers in the face of the threatened collapse of the Walloon economy. The metal workers of Liege and Charleroi, the mine workers from the whole of Wallonia, who formed the vanguard of the Belgian working class, saw in the unity law merely a reflection of an economic system which was incapable of solving its own contradictions. Despite their hard struggle they were living without clear prospects for their future. As a result the strike grew into a mass movement of resistance to a policy which offered no chance of real economic growth keeping intact social achieve­ments of the working class. The great strike of 1960 was an attempt by the socialist workers to extort a new economic policy based on structural economic reforms, which would break the power of the holdings and the fmancial groups over the Belgian economy.

If we investigate the result of this mass phonomenon, we must admit that the political situation did not permit such structural reforms. The unequal development of the strike in Flanders on the one hand, and Wallonia on the other, the attitude of the leadership of the national trade unions, the lack of clarity with regard to the political means to be employed, the collapse of the strike movement, all hindered the realization of a socialist experiment in Belgium, which had seemed possible for a moment. On 13 January 1961 the controversial unity law was accepted by the lower house of parliament. The Ey~kens' government had been merely a caretaker since the March elections and thus could no longer take steps to introduce the law, but this did not prevent the various measures being introduced separately later by the Lefevre­Spaak government (christian democrats and socialists 1961-5). Yet the strike of 1960-61 had a direct influence on the economic and political changes in Belgian society

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A.MEYNEN

in the sixties. In Wallonia, the strike, as soon as it was past its peak, had a political consequence, the establishment of a federalist Walloon plan for structural reforms. This new policy brought about a marked shift in Belgian political relationships in the sixties. In this way, the strike caused a turn round of political alliances. The socialists and the christian democrats relying on their broad support in the trade unions, came to an agreement on a continuing 'capitalist' system of state planning for economic growth. Closely associated with this was their attempt to reach a systematic method to deal with social conflicts by negotiation in appropriate forums. This situation remain­ed characteristic of Belgian society until well into the seventies.

136

Survey of recent historical works on Belgium and the Netherlands published in Dutch

C.R. EMERY AND JOHANNA A. KOSSMANN, EDITORS

GENERAL

This bibliographical article has been produced by members of the Dutch history seminar at the Institute of Historical Research, London University, and a number of Belgian and Dutch historians. A list of the contributors will be found at the end of the article. The majority of books reviewed here appeared in 1980 and early 1981, and cover the history of the Low Countries from the middle ages to the present day.

The retirement of several eminent historians in Belgium and the Netherlands has given rise to an unusually large number of Festschriften in this survey. Three of them have a wide chronological range appropriate to the general section. The first is a special volume of Bijdragen tOl de geschiedenis dedicated to the well-known Flemish historian, Karel Van Isacker SJ., on his retirement from his chair at the University Faculties St. Ignatius in Antwerp.! It contains fourteen articles on Flemish and Brabant history from the late thirteenth to the late nineteenth century. P. de Ridder investigates the use of Latin, Dutch and French in charters issued by dukes John I and John Il of Brabant and discusses the substitution of Latin by the vernacular. He has found that although French was dominant at Court, the dukes addressed their non­noble subjects in Flemish unless they belonged to the 'Roman pays de Brabant'. This contrasts with the practice in Flanders were the count addressed the burghers of his towns in French. E. Aerts reconsiders De Roover's views on banking and especially on exchange, and argues that the eminent American historian failed to appreciate the im­portance of sixteenth-century Antwerp for the development of European banking. Other contributions deal with fortress building in sixteenth-century Brabant (B. Roosens) and with food supplies and payment for the Spanish troops in the Southern Netherlands from 1567-1713; these were admirably organized in theory but lacked the necessary economic and fmancial infrastructure: the imitation of the system in seventeenth-century France was therefore infmitely more successful (E. Rooms). G. Devos' article on the prevention of industrial pollution in Belgium deals with a little-known aspect of nineteenth-century industrial history. Other authors draw attention to some interesting supporters of the Flemish Movement. A complete bibliography of Van Isacker's works is added.

The second Festschrift appeared in honour of Prof. J.L. van der Gouw, formerly

1. Liber Alumnorum Karel Van [sacker S.J. Special issue of Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis, LXIII (Antwerp, 1980) 456 p.

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C.R. EMERY AND I.A. KOSSMANN

Keeper general of the Dutch State Archives, on his retirement from the chair in modern palaeography and archive administration at the University of Amsterdam. 2 It contains 20 mainly very short, highly specialized articles on subjects ranging from

ninth-century royal charters to the government's attitude to state archives in the nineteenth century. Somewhat longer contributions come from P.A. Henderikx on the early medieval course of the rivers Hollandse Usel and the Lek which, from the ninth century onwards, widened to become the main stream of the Lower Rhine beyond Dorestad and C. Dekker, who examines the data concerning the building of a dam across the Rhine at Wijk bij Duurstede in 1122. The dam chanelled the main stream definitively into the Lek and made cultivation of the area along the Kromme Rijn possible. However the construction of a new canal was necessary in order to pre­serve the position of the town of Utrecht as a trading centre on the northward route from the Rhine.

On his retirement as professor in the history of modern institutions at the Catholic University, Louvain, J .B. Buntinx was honoured with a collection of over 30 articles by friends and colleagues written in Dutch, French or German.3 H.C.C. De Schepper has used this opportunity to publish his inaugural lecture (Amsterdam, 1980) on juris­diction and administration in the Low Countries in the sixteenth century. He states that these two elements of government were less clearly distinguished than is com­monly assumed. Conflicts of competence arising between different public authorities and private complaints about tax assessment and other government measures were dealt with by the Grand Council of Mechlin, although in the course of the century the Secret Council became a popular alternative. R. Van Caenegem in a short contribution on the Precepta imposed by Count Philip of the Alsace on the town of Ghent in 1178, supports, with some qualifications, Leon Vanderkinderen's view (against Pirenne) that the main object of the count's policy towards the Flemish towns was to keep his urban subjects well under control. J. Decavele explains the unusual role of Ghent's 'buiten­poorters' (bourgeois [orains), as a valuable instrument until 1540 for extending the town's hegemony over the surrounding countryside. N. Maddens (whose work on the beden (aides) in Flanders in the 'sixteenth century was reviewed in the Low Countries history yearbook 1980 (143-44» adds a contribution on the amount of money which the town of Courtrai had to provide for the central government between 1538 and 1567. Amounting to one-fifth of the town's total expenditure it was the main reason for its fmancial deficits. J. Grauwels deals with the representation of the Dutch­speaking towns in the prince-bischopric of Liege in the Standing Committee of the Estates of Liege from 1608 onwards. From the second half of the seventeenth century the Dutch-speaking towns, like the Walloon towns, nominated two deputies from their part of the country. In the second half of the eighteenth century nomination became

2. Scrinium et scriptura ... aangeboden aan Professor dr. J.L. van der Gouw ... (Groningen: Van der Kamp, 1980, c 300 p., fl. 60). Also: Nederlands archievenblad, LXXXIV (Groningen, 1980) 197-496. With summaries in English. 3. Recht en instellingen in de oude Nederlanden tijdens de middeleeuwen en de nieuwe tijd. Liber amicorum Jan Buntinx (Louvain: Universitaire Pers, 1981,627 p. ISBN 90 6186 114 4).

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a bone of contention between the towns, largely because of the emoluments at stake. L. Duerloo's contribution focusses on the usurpation of rights reserved to the nobility and the courts dealing with such 'heraldic cases' in the Southern Netherlands between 1713 and 1754.

A new series of monographs called 'Diestsche Cronycke' opens with Michel Van der

Eycken's short 'Care for the infirm at Diest, from the twelfth to the eighteenth cen­tury>4 with welcome information based on primary sources. Although the charitable institutions at Diest usually conform to the general pattern in the Southern Nether­lands, they show some interesting features of their own.

MIDDLE AGES

In the field of medieval history some useful source editions have been published. H. van Rij has re-edited and translated Alpertus Mettensis' De diversitate temporum and his biographical fragment on Bishop Theoderic of Metz. In a judicious introduc­tion Van Rij dates the former around 1005, the latter shortly before 1024, and ad­vances the monastery of Honhorst (Amersfoort) as the most likely place for Alpertus to have written his moralizing treatise on contemporary events. The editing is con­scientious, the translation both sensible and readable. Miss Anna Sapit Abulafi has translated and commented the long passage on the conversion to Judaism of the cleric Wecelin and the refutation of Wecelin's attack on christianity by the royal clerc Heinricus.s

The town of Nijmegen is the object of renewed interest from both archeologists and historians who have joined forces to trace the development of the medieval settle­ment adjacent to the Carolingian palatium of Noviomagum and its Ottonian and Staufian successors. In aid of their research P. Leupen and B. Thissen have collected all the passages in which the place is mentioned from every available written source from Roman times until the year of the momentous lease of the castle and district of Nij­megen to the count of Guelder (1247) which led to its permanent attachment to Gelderland. The 190 items form a useful collection.6

The very incomplete accounts of the country of Holland/Zeeland under the house of Hainault were published by I.H.G. Hamaker from 1875 onwards in the series Wer­ken van het Historisch Genootschap. Efforts to prepare a similar edition for the period

4. M. Van der Eycken, Ziekenzorg te Diest lIan de 12e tot de 18e eeuw (Diest: Vrienden van het Stedelijk Museum en Archief Diest, 1979, 61 p.). Figures on the results of the examination of lepers from Diest 1491-1577 in table I, p. 29). 5. H. van Rij, ed. and trans!., A/pertus lIan Metz, Gebeurtenissen lIan deze tijd en Een fragment oller bisschop Diederik I (Amsterdam: Verloren, roB 6157,1980, Ix + 132 p., fl. 40; paperback ed. fl. 25,-). Van Rij's arguments in support of Honhorst as the birth-place of De dillersitate tempo­rum are discussed by R.M. Kemperink, 'Kanttekeningen bij Alpertusvan Metz', F1ehite XIV (Amers­foort, 1982) 8-16, who argues that Tiel is a far more likely place. 6. P. Leupen and B. Thissen, ed., Bronnenboek lIan Nijmegen (eerste eeuw na Chr. - 1247). Nij­meegse studien, X (Nijmegen: Gemeentearchief, 1981,68 p.).

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of the Bavarian counts broke down on the sheer bulk of the available documents. In

1975, however, a group of historians with a special interest in the history of Holland took the laudable initiative of preparing an edition of accounts from a 'cross-section' of years for which the available accounts of the most important officers of the country, the baillis and treasurers, are more or less complete. The first fruit of these endeavours is a small volume containing the accounts from 1393 to 1396 of the baljuws (bail/is) of Rijnland and Woerden, of The Hague and of the later acquired Lands of He us den (1357) and ofVoorne (1372), faithfully edited by De Boer, Faber and Jansen and other mem­bers of the group. An introduction explains the nature of the offices of the respective baljuws, their inc~me and personnel and the currency used in the documents.7

The Keeper of the town archives of Zwolle, F.e. Berkenvelder, has interrupted his useful work as editor of the town's medieval accounts in order to prepare a collection of abstracts from documents concerning Zwolle between 1350 and 1399. During these years, together with Deventer and Kampen, Zwolle played a dominating role in the politics of the province and in the consolidation of the prince-bishop's territory. The abstracts are full of particulars on political, institutional and legal questions as well as on local conditions. A second volume will appear in 1982 and a third is in prepa­ration, to bring the collection up to 1450.8 Another publication of abstracts shows the uncommonly rich collection of original letters addressed to the urban magistrate of Zutphen from c 1350 - 1550.9 They contain interesting information on a variety of subjects, including safety of the roads and war damage in the troubled fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries and such unexpected items as the communication from the burgomasters, aldermen and council of Lochem, regretting that they had been unable to assist Zutphen in a certain matter since they had been relieved of their authority by the town burghers. The retirement ofProfessorJ.G.N. Renaud of Utrecht, well-known for his archaeological research on medieval castles, is the ocassion for a Liber castel­lorum in which moated sites are understandably predominant.1o There are also articles on architects and craftsmen as, for instance, H. Janse's contribution on the counts of Holland as commissioners of public works in the fourteenth century and T.J. Hoekstra and HL. Janssen on Marcelis and Rombout Keldermans respectively as deSigners of fortifications in Utrecht and Gelre. The book is lavishly illustrated and has excellent bibliographies.

7. D.E.H. de Boer, D.J. Faber and H.P.H. Jansen, ed., De rekeningen van de grafelijkheid van Holland uit de Beierse periode, III, De rekeningen van de gerechtelijke ambtenaren, part 1393-1396 (baljuwen en drosgaards). Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatien, Grote serie CLXXIV (The Hague: Nijhoff,.1980, 125 p., ISBN 90 247 90069, fl. 31,50). 8. F.C. Berkenvelder, ed., Zwolse regesten I. 1350-1399 (Zwolle: Waanders, 1980,442 p., ISBN 9070072 62 9, fl. 100,-). 9. M.M. Doornink-Hoogenraad and W. Zondervan, ed., Het Oud-archiefvan de gemeente Zutphen. III, Regestenlijst van brieven (2 vols., Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 1981, 815 p., ISBN 90 6011 019 6, fl. 48.-). 10. T.J. Hoekstra et al., ed., Liber castel/orum, 40 varia ties op het thema kasteel (Zutphen: Wal­burg Pers, 1981, 398 p., ISBN 90 6011 436 1, fl. 59,50). There are six articles in English, three in French; summaries in English.

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W. Vroom's monograph on the financing of medieval cathedrals is an outstanding achievementY He is the first to make systematic use of the near-complete series of accounts from 1395 onwards of the [abrica of the cathedral of Utrecht, the Dom, and of the plentiful additional material in the Dom chapter archives concerning the re­building of the church after the town fire of 1253 destroyed the original Roman cathedral. The chapter's ambitious plans for an entirely new structure required a constant stream of funds and an efficient organization for the exploitation of resour­ces and the compiex administration of revenues. Gifts from the diocese were at all periods the mainstay of the fabrica but they arrived through many channels. Large contributions were required from the numerous parishes of the extensive diocese. During the thirteenth century, the parish priests collected ~pecial gifts for the cathedral at the Holidays of Obligation and delivered the money themselves at synods and other meetings. In the f9urteenth and fifteenth centuries this system was modified and supplemented by another, more successful method: the use of special envoys (quest­ierders), well supplied with relics and letters of indulgence, who induced parishioners to make generous bequests. Their success inevitably diminished the amount of money available for parish funds and unco-operative parish priests had sometimes to be won over by allowing them to lease the collecting rights of the questierders. The chapter held the monopoly of 'quests' in the diocese. Religious orders or charities who wanted to raise money in the bishopric by the way of 'quests' could do so by special permis­sion only. This was granted exceptionally and then only on payment of high admission fees which in turn became an important source of income for the fabrica. The canons of the .chapter themselves made contributions, both in the form of gifts and by a statutory two year grant of prebenda defunctorum. Other ·sources were legacies, gifts, commuted penitentiary sentences from church courts and daily offerings in the church itself which seems to have been used for holy service long before the main body was completed. Vroom has sorted out all these streams of money and has tried to establish their relative importance for the chapter's building budget. Tables and graphs support­ing his calculation of the results are wisely relegated to appendices.

To arrive at a reliable estimate of the real value of the sums which the fabrica was able to spend - and actually spent - the author has commuted the money into wages of unskilled labourers and used the results to give a clear picture of the fluctuations in building activity. How reliable this system is may be a matter for debate but it cer­tainly helps to reduce the problems of monetary evaluation. The sums spent on the cathedral reached a peak between about 1470 and 1525. We are not told how much labour was involved in those years nor how much money went into the purchase of expensive material, but Vroom does claim that the number of craftsmen employed at no time adversely affected the labour market in town or province. Shortly after 1525 the flow of contributions for the fabrica suddenly dried up as letters of indulgence and

11. W.H. Vroom, De jinanciering van de kathedraalbouw in de middeleeuwen (Maarssen: Gary Schwartz, 1981,648 p. + 7 graphs, ill., ISBN 90 6J 790476, fl. 125,-). Also thesis, University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Economies, 1981. Summary in English.

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relics lost their attraction - a phenomenon which the master of the [abrica imputed to the spread of Lutheranism. However, the faithful rallied in the sixties and provided the chapter with sufficient income to pay at least for repairs and some embellishment.

The author also provides his study with a broader perspective, on the one hand by discussing the responsibilities and resources of bishops and chapters engaged in cathedral­building all over Western Europe and on the other, by contrasting the financing of these cathedrals with that of urban parish churches which could rely on active support from the town magistracy. (The Utrecht Buurkerk provides material for this latter point.) The result is a lively and informative work which sheds new light on a wide range of ecclesiastical and religious practices in the later middle ages.

Florence Koorn has written a study of the beguinages in Holland and Zeeland, religious lay communities of unmarried or widowed women, governed by one or two mistresses.12 In the eastern parts of the Netherlands these beguines used to share one large house, but in the provinces studied by Miss Koorn (as also in the town of Utrecht and the Southern Netherlands) they lived on their own or in small groups in houses around a closed court. The author has scrupulously gone through the available archive material which is very sparse for the thirteenth century but becomes more plentiful in the fourteenth after a period of mild persecution following the condemnation of the beguines by the Council of Vienne. She provides a systematic survey of the rules adopted by these communities, the property rights regarding the houses they in­habited (most of which belonged originally to individual well-to-do beguines but by the end of the fourteenth century were more often owned by the community and leased to members for one or two lives), the connections of the women with the town elite and their relations with the authorities. She demonstrates that although the settlements had much iIi common there were striking local differences in the details of their organization. She has also found traces of beguines in the countryside where communities seem to have existed in some larger villages, only to be commuted at an early stage into regular convents of the third rule of St. Francis. She tacitly rejects the possibility that the same development may have taken place in some smaller towns in Holland such as Schoonhoven and Oudewater; and she does not explain why the beguines thrived in some towns like Haarlem, Amsterdam, Leiden, but apparently found no following in others. The book is solid but unimaginative.

A study of Philip of Burgundy, youngest bastard of Philip the Good, army leader, admiral of the Burgundian fleet and from 1520 until his death in 1524 bishop of Utrecht, has been written by an art historian, J. SterkP His interest was aroused by an inventory (1529) of the late bishop's castle of Wijk bij Duurstede, which lists among more practical objects the art treasures collected by Philip. He has edited this

12. Florence W.J. Koorn, Begijnhoven in Holand en Zeeland gedurende de middeleeuwen (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1981,250 p., ISBN 90 232 1863 9, fl. 35,-). Also thesis University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Arts, 1981. Summary in English. 13. I. Sterk, Philips van Bourgondie (1465-1524), bisschop van Utrecht, als protagonist van de renaissance: zijn leven en maecenaat (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 1980, 332 p., ill., ISBN 906011 375 6, fl. 59,50). Also thesis University of Utrecht, Faculty of Arts. Summary in English.

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inventory as an appendix to the book and has added an interesting commentary. This source material naturally led him to a discussion of Philip's role as a maecenas, which forms the central theme of the book. The middle part consists of short separate studies of the artists who were employed either casually or on a permanent basis by Philip and their activities on his behalf. The author claims that Philip differed from other Burgundians and from the Habsburgs in that he personally intervened in the work of the artists in his pay, especially Jan Gossaert of Maubeuge (the first renaissance artist in the Northern Netherlands), not just by showing his marked preference for certain subjects (plump female and herculean male nudes for instance) but by telling them exactly how to paint them. The author's defence of his thesis is not entirely convin­cing. Possibilities end up as certainties, hypotheses as conclusions, without a great deal of evidence being produced, as, for instance, the entirely new 'Italian style' which he believes characterized Philip's 'court' at Souburg (Zeeland). The actual biography which provides the background for the study of Philip's maecenas-role, forms the first part of the book. It is marred by the fact that the author's assessment of his hero relies entirely upon the extremely flattering 'life' of Philip written by his chaplain the well­known humanist Geldenhauer (Gerardus Noviomagus). As a result, the biography is a strongly biased story of a flawless renaissance magnate, excelling in virtues, learning, artistic talent and inspiring force who, in the end, emerges from this treatment as an irritatingly flat character without flesh or bones; which is a pity.

In the half century after Gossaert, an important contribution to renaissance art in the Low Countries was made by Cornelis Floris de Vriendt of Antwerp. The catalogue of an exhibition held in his honour at Antwerp contains articles by L. de Barsee and P. Baudouin, E. Pais-Minne and others on Floris and various aspects of life in sixteenth century Antwerp. There are also useful bibliographical references.

EARLY MODERN PERIOD

Volume Five of the New Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 1s consists of fifteen contributions divided into three almost wholly unrelated sections in keeping with the general approach of the series which invariably involves defying all tradi­tional and conventional notions of periods and periodization in Low Countries History. A.M. van der Woude's introduction to this volume serves also as the general intro­duction for all five volumes (up to vol. IX) covering the early modern period. It is as uncompromising an apology for the 'New History' and the views of Braudel and Le Roy Ladurie, photographs of whom grace the -opening pages, as one can find and con­fidently asserts the primacy of long-term structures and cycles over mere 'historical

14. Bouwen en leven te Antwerpen in de 16de eeuw (Brussels: Gemeentekrediet van Belgie, 1980, 93 p., ill.). 15. Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, V, Sociaal-economische geschiedenis, geografie en demografie 1500-1800; Instellingen 1480·1780; Politieke en religiegeschiedenis na 1480 (Haarlem: Fibula-Van Dishoeck, 1980,552 p., ill., ISBN 90 228 38064, fl. 143,-).

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events'. Accordingly, the first and longest section of the book deals with long-term trends in environment, landscape, demography and class structures over the whole early modern era. The general standard of these contributions is undoubtedly high and some, such as J .A. Faber's discussion of the structure of Dutch society in the period 1480-1780, are really excellent. While not everyone will be happy with the editors' sense of priorities, it is consistent with their approach that the second section, devoted to the political and constitutional structures of the Low Countries in the period 1480-1800 should be relatively brief, comprising only about a quarter of the volume.

In this volume the bizarre disjointed grouping of themes and periods which so mars volumes VI and VII intrudes only with respect to the last section. This, amounting to a mere seventy-five pages, including numerous illustrations, consists of four con­tributions which valiantly strive to cover the whole political and religious history of the Low Countries in the period 1480-1555. Apart from being much too short a space in which to cover this ground in an acceptable and useful manner, this last section is compiled without any reference to or discernible connection with the preceding sections. Needless to say, it is not a little disconcerting to the reader to find that the chronological scope of this last part is totally out of keeping with the perspective of the rest of the volume.

H. Miedema has produced a voluminous though not very professional edition of documents concerning the st. Lucas Company (St. Lucasgilde) at Haarlem/6 which embraced craftsmen producing mainly luxury articles - glaziers, pewterers, gold- and silversmiths and also picture painters, which is why art historians have shown consider­able interest in this and similar companies. The documents (1496-1795) belong to the company's own archive and the town archive of Haarlem. They contain regulations, resolutions, accounts (the latter partly in nineteenth-century abstracts), lists ofmem­bers and governors and, since the company held the monopoly of the sale of pictures within the town, also lists of paintings from inventories drawn up after their owners had died. The introduction is not very helpful. The author pays little attention to the interesting institutional development of the company and what he says on the subject is often unclear, even misleading, and in details refuted by the documents themselves. He is, he says, interested in the history of the social appreciation of art and artist from the late fifteenth to the late eighteenth century, but in this reviewer's opinion the collection is of more importance for urban institutional history.

The legal aspects of the type of agricultural land lease, known as beklemrecht and until recently wide-spread in the province of Groningen, have been frequently dis­cussed but W.J. Formsma is the first to deal with this interesting phenomenon in its social-historical contextP The beklemrecht owes its name to the fact that the farmer

16. H. Miedema, ed., De archiejbescheiden van het St. Lucasgilde te Hoar/em (2 vols., Alphen aid Rijn: Canaletto, 1234 p., ISBN 90 6469 584 9, fl. 300,-). 17. W.l. Formsma, Beklemrecht en landbouw. Een agronomisch-historische studie over het be­klemrecht in Groningen, in vergelijking met ontwikkelingen elders. Historia agriculturae, XIII (Groningen: Nederlands Agronomisch-historisch instituut, 1981, 150 p., fl. 30,-). With a bibliog­raphy by H. van Z~n.

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owns the buildings but rents the land; the buildings and the land are said to be 'clamped' together and the farmer is said to be clamped to the land. At one time on the expiry of a lease it was normal (not only in Groningen) for a farmer who had built his house on rented ground to sell his buildings to the landlord or to the next lease-holder. In Gro­ningen from this simple form a rather complicated system developed. In the sixteenth century, the farmer obtained the right to life-long extension of the lease on condition that every six years he paid a gift to the owner and the amount of rent could be renego­tiated. In the eighteenth century this six-yearly payment was replaced by a gift from the 'clamped' farmer when he married and, after his death, from his heir who would require an extension of the lease. It also became possible to sell the 'clamped' lease to a third party who then paid a gift to the landowner. Also in the eighteenth century, more and more rents became permanently fIxed by agreements called 'letters of clamping'. Al­though beklemrecht still obtains in the province, providing farmers with hereditary rights to the land in perpetuity, many 'clamps' in the course of the twentieth century have been converted into freehold tenures and nowadays rarely comprise more, and usually much less than 40 per cent of farmland held in rural communities. Formsma, who as director of the State archives in Groningen - he retired in 1967 - acquired an intimate knowledge of the history of beklemrecht, explains how economic ups and downs and political interests have influenced the gradually changing position of the 'clamped' farmer (beklemde meier) and the landowner. He also traces the development of comparable agricultural leases in Friesland and German Ost-Friesland.

The last of the works spanning the entire early modern period is a collection of papers presented at the 1980 Leeuweborch conference which set out to explore one of the bulkiest and yet most neglected sets of sources available to historians of the early modern period, namely probate inventories.IS In most European countries, surviving probate inventories begin to become numerous in the sixteenth, seventeenth or eighteenth centuries and generally cease to be so from the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. It is a sobering fact that in the Amsterdam city archives, no less than three thousand inventories have been found for the decade 1700-1709 alone. Probate in­ventories are a source which, if properly exploited, necessarily requires computers and highly sophisticated quantitative techniques. But when and if these are available what results from such research? These contributions by French, German, Swedish and British as well as Low Countries historians show that important progress can be made in several fIelds, notably in the study of popular culture and in the history of agri­cultural and industrial methods and practice. In Golden Age Amsterdam, for instance, it was common among all classes to invest in stocks and shares while few even of the wealthiest inhabitants had many books. In the case of eighteenth-century England, the inventories can be used to illustrate signifIcant changes in farming practice. However, one may reasonably doubt whether probate inventories will ever elicit interest or

18. A. van der Woude and A. Schuurman, ed., Probate inventories. A new source for the historical study of wealth, material culture and agricultural development. Papers presented at the Leeuwen­boreh Conference (Wageningen, 5-7 May 1980). A.A.G. Bijdragen XXIII (Wageningen, 1980). Also: (Utrecht, HES, 1980,320 p., ISBN 90 6194 093 1, fl. 52,-).

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results comparable with that shown in parish registers during the fifties and sixties. The character and significance of the reformation in the German towns has been

keenly debated ever since the publication of Bernd Moeller's now famous essay on the imperial cities and protestantism twenty years ago.19 It is scarcely surprising that German scholars, who have tried to unravel the complex relationship between religion and urban culture, should now take an interest in the towns of the Low Countries. Among these Franz Petri, with his longstanding interest in the ties between the Rhine­land and the Netherlands, was especially well-placed to edit a collection of essays on religion and society in the towns of Germany and the Low Countries in the early­modern period.20 Of the seven contributions three are concerned with aspects of the urban reformation in the Low Countries. The veteran Flemish scholar, Robert Van Roosbroeck, argues that religion, more specifically Calvinism, rather than social distress provoked the crisis in Antwerp in 1566.21 In fact, Van Roosbroeck provides a summary for the German reader of his doctoral thesis, published some fifty years ago. Though his footnotes take some account of research conducted in the inter­vening period, the essay is disappointingly deja vu_ Woltjer's short contribution on the town and the reformation is more illuminating.22 Whereas many historians have argued that the events of 1572 mark a clear break in the political and religious traditions of the towns of Holland, Woltjer prefers to emphasize the remarkable capacity for survival demonstrated by the Erasmian-minded oligarchies in control of the towns and the partial nature of the Calvinist triumph. In conjunction these account for the apparent modernity and bourgeois character of Dutch society in the seventeenth century. In one of the longest essays Dr. Schilling, who is no stranger to the history of the Low Countries, examines whether the relationship which existed between religion and society in the United Provinces may properly be described as modern?3 Modern­ity is defined by reference to certain criteria, including the acceptance of religious pluralism, the withdrawal of the state from spiritual concerns and the retreat of the churches from the supervision of marriage, schooling, and poor relief. Schilling con­cludes that Dutch society was less modern than it might at first seem. For example, though the principle of freedom of conscience was upheld, even by Dutch Calvinists, the state did not relinquish its role as tutor religionis, by which it understood the maintenance of the Reformed Churches. Again, the consistories, though they per­mitted a larger number of people a measure of political influence, did little to prepare Dutch society for political democracy, for the elders did not represent their con­gregations so much as act as God's lieutenants. On the other hand, the public Church and the civil authorities were less closely associated than was then common in Europe.

19. B. Moeller, Reichsstadt und Reformation (Giitersloh, 1962). 20. F. Petri, ed., Kirche und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in deutschen und nieder/ltndischen Stltdten der werdenden Neuzeit (Cologne - Vienna: Bohlau, 1980,304 p., ISBN 3 412050792, DM 94,-). 21. R. Van Roosbroeck, 'Wunderjahr oder Hungerjahr? Antwerpen 1566', ibidem, 169-96. 22. J.J. Woltjer, 'Stadt und Reformation in den Niederlanden', ibidem, 155-67. 23. H. Schilling, 'Religion und Gesellschaft in der calvinistischen Republik der Vereinigten Nieder­lande ~ 'Offentlichkeitskirche' und Sil"kularisation; Ehe und Hebammenwesen; Presbyterien und politische Partizipation', ibidem, 197-250.

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Schilling illustrates this pOint by considering the matter of matrimony and the position of the midwife in the United Provinces. Soon after the Revolt civil marriage was per­mitted in a bid to end the confusion caused by clandestine unions, a problem which elsewhere in Europe was resolved by making marriages in church obligatory. In the case of midwives, the emphasis shifted from concern about the spiritual welfare of the mother and child to their physical well-being. As Schilling makes clear, these shifts were not opposed by the Reformed Churches, which believed that such matters should properly be left to the godly magistrates.

The publication of the acts of the classis of Dordrecht from 1573 to 1600 repre­sents the first fruits of an enterprise begun in 1954, when plans were made to publish the proceedings of all the Holland classes before 1620.24 The value of these records has already been demonstrated by Dr. Tukker in his doctoral dissertation on the classis of Dordrecht.25 IIi the early organization of the Reformed Church in South Holland the classis of Dordrecht played the dominant role: between 1574 and 1616 four new classes were formed out of the original classis of Dordrecht. In the classis matters affecting relations with the civil authorities were discussed, so that you find here a wealth of information about poor relief, matrimonial affairs, church fabric, ministers' stipends and schools. These records also enable us to understand the problems facing the Reformed Churches as they struggled to set a Calvinist stamp on a society which was little attached to any form of discipline. let alone 'the Genevan inquisition'.

The arrival in the Netherlands of the duke of Alva at the head of a large army in the summer of 1567, marked the end of Margaret of Parma's attempt to pacify the country with 'minimum force'. As well as hunting down the rebels, and all concerned with the troubles of the previous year, Alva also saw his responsibilities as including the defence of the country. This was reinforced after Orange's abortive invasion and the seizure of Alva's pay ships by Elizabeth I in 1568. Largely as a response to these developments, Alva despatched a commission in the spring of 1569 to examine the defences of certain key places in the maritime provinces of Holland and Zeeland. The report which the commission produced has been edited, with an introduction, by S. Groenveld and J. Vermaere.26 The commission was headed by one of Alva's most able captains, the Italian Chiappino Vitelli; and included two other Italians - Gabrio Serbeloni, a man with considerable experience in the building of fortifications; and a military engineer, Bartolomeo Campi. The fourth member was a Netherlander, Servaes van Steenland, lord of Wissekerke, who penned the eventual report. The commission spent most of its time in the delta-area of Zeeland and South-Holland, and the smaller towns of the Noorderkwartier, concluding its enquiry in Amsterdam. Not surprisingly,

24. J.P. van Dooren, ed., G1assicale Acta, 1573·1620. Particuliere synode Zuid-Holland, I, Classis Dordrecht 1573·1600. Rijks Geschiedkundige PublicaWln, Kleine serie XLIX (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980, xxxiv + 586 p., ISBN 90 247 9052 2, fl. 110,50). 25. C.A. Tukker, De classis Dordrecht van 1573 tot 1609 (Leiden, 1965). 26. S. Groenveld and J. Vermaere, 'Zeeland en Holland in 1569: een rapport voor de hertog van Alva', in: Nederlandse Historische Bronnen uitgegeven door het Nederlands Historisch Genoot· schap, II (The Hague; Nijhoff, 1980, ISBN 90 247 90212, fl. 65,-) 103-74.

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the commission decided that the approaches to Walcheren and the smaller channels to the north were the most vulnerable to seaborne attack - a conclusion reached by an earlier report compiled by Cornelis de Schepper in 1552, and one which was amply borne out by the Sea-Beggars in 1572. However, Vitelli's commission went further by enquiring into the number of houses in each town, the number of arms-bearing men, sailors and ships, and the availability of food and other supplies. The information ob­tained appears to have been more reliable for the delta-area than for the rest of Hol­land, perhaps reflecting the time spent by the commission in each region. But it seems that most of the commission's findings remained largely unused.

The period 1578-81 witnessed the polarization of the conflict in the Netherlands. During these years, Orange's attempt to maintain a broad opposition front, based on his religious policy, collapsed under the weight of internal dissension and external military pressure. The break with Spain became complete. The driving-force behind the revolt was now the 'left wing, protestant' Union of Utrecht. Many 'moderates' who had supported the wider revolt were now faced with a difficult decision: to swallow their pride and be reconciled with Philip II, or to throw in their lot with the rebel Union. For some, such as Aerschot, the choice was relatively clear cut; for others, such as Rennenberg, it was rather more problematical. Yet there were many others of" less lofty status for whom the decision was a more difficult and lengthy process. One such was the Frisian jurist, Aggeus van Albada. After a career spent mostly in the service of the Empire and the prince-bishop of Wurzburg, Albada re­turned to the Netherlands and sided with the rebels only after the conclusion of the Pacification of Ghent. In 1579 he acted as spokesman of the States General delegation to the Cologne peace-talks; but his support for the revolt waned thereafter. K. van Berkel ascribes this change of heart not to any mundane political considerations but to a crisis of conscience.27 For Albada, 'haec religionis ergo' was the only justification for the revolt. But he was no Calvinist ideologue. As a follower more of Schwenck­feld than Calvin, Albada was an advocate of tolerance and compromise, and had much sympathy for the views of men such as Coornhert. Berkel argues that Albada finally abandoned the revolt because between 1579 and 1584 he saw the religious situation in Holland and the other rebel provinces deteriorate to a point where he felt it was worse than it ever could be under any catholic monarch, and could no longer justify revolt. The author sees Albada's case as evidence of a 'moral' crisis, as well as a political and military one, in the revolt during these years.

A crucial aspect of the break with Spain was Philip II's decision in 1580, at Gran­velIe's instigation, to outlaw William of Orange. Orange made a vigorous defence of his position in his famous 'Apology', which was presented to the States General at the end of the year. J. Verlaan and A. Alberts have produced an abridged version of this document in modem Dutch translation, under the auspices of the 'Orde van den

27. K. van Berkel, 'Aggeus van Albada en de crisis in de Opstand (1579-1587)', Bijdragen en me­dedelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden, XCVI (The Hague, 1981) 1-25.

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Prince' in commemoration of its 25th anniversary?8 A series of short introductory articles by J. Decavele, J.J. Woltjer, H. Brugmans, P. Van Peteghem and R.C. Van Caenegem present brief biographical details on Jacob de Somere and Pierre Loyseleur de Villiers, the latter being the main author of the Apology; the background of reli­gious and political ideas against which the Apology was written; and an assessment of the extent to which the Apology reflected Orange's own views, as far as these are discernable, especially on religion. The book is aimed more at the general reader, and is of limited value to the researcher. The text of the Apology itself is based on the contemporary Dutch translation of the original French, and the work is marred by a number of factual and printing errors.

The polarization of the conflict also had profound consequences for the Reformed Church. The National Synod which met in Middelburg in 1581 - after the three-year interval prescribed by the Synod of Dordt in 1578 - did so under the realization that the Reformed Church was now the only permitted public religion in the rebel territories. The definition of the place of the Reformed Church in these changed circumstan­ces was the main task of the Synod. To mark its quartercentenary, a collection of articles has been published by the Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wet ens chap­pen?9 The most important contribution is that by R.H. Bremmer, who traces the developments leading up to the assembly of the Synod, and analyzes the problems facing it.3o The Synod was a truly 'Nationa1' one, more so than Dordrecht in 1578 or any subsequent Synod, in that it included representatives from the eastern and southern provinces. The driving forces behind the Synod were Arend Cornelisz. and Hendrik van der Corput, president and clerk respectively. The main task was to produce a Reformed Church Order which would be acceptable to the civil power, and thereby confirm the Reformed Church's position in the new order. But the Synod also had to contend with the problem of Orange's breach with Dathenus, and the much publicized unorthodox views of Caspar Coolliaes, minister at Leiden. The Synod had mixed results. The Church Order which it produced went further than that of Dordt, 1578, claiming more influence for the Church in the appointment of ministers and schoolmasters. But the States of Zeeland only confirmed certain recommendations concerning the mainte­nance of law and order,3! while the States of Holland never approved any of it. It

28. J .E. Verlaan and A. Alberts, Apologie van WiIlem van Oranje. Hertaling en evaluatie na vier­honderd jaar (,nelt - Amsterdam: Lannoo, 1980, 160 p., ISBN 90 209 09029, fl. 52,-). By the same authors Apologie of Verantwoording van de prins van Oranje 1581 gevolgd door het Plak· kaat van Verlating 1581 (Nieuwkoop: Heureka, 1980, 159 p., fl. 25,-). A more reliable, com­plete edition with modern Dutch translation of the Edict of the States General by M.E.H.N. Mout, Plakkaat van Verlatinge 1581 (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1979, 129 p., ISBN 90 12027500, fl. 25,-) with a short introduction. 29. J.P. van Dooren, ed., De Nationale Synode te Middelburg in 1581. Calvinisme in opbouw in de Noortielijke en Zuidelijke Nederlanden. Werken uitgegeven door het KoninkliJK Zeeuwsch Ge­nootschap der Wetenschappen, I (Middelburg; Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap, 1981,276 p., fl. 59,50). 30. R.H. Bremmer, 'De nationale synode van Middelburg (1581): politieke achtergronden van kerkelijke besluitvorming', ibidem, 1-63. 31. P. Scherft, 'De generale synode van Middelburg en de Zeeuwse Statenordonnantie van 8 februari 1583', ibidem, 140-43.

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seems to have had a more direct effect in Germany, where it Was adopted by the Synod of Herborn (1586), largely under the influence of Jan van Nassau, for the churches in Nassau, Wittgenstein, Solms and Wied.32

Furthermore, the Synod was unable. to heal the rift between Orange and Dathenus, whom Orange had never forgiven for his part in the coup d'etat in Ghent in 1578 and his subsequent violent denunciation of Orange's 'French policy'. With the threat of prosecution hanging over him if he returned from his haven in the Palatinate, it is not surprising that Dathenus declined to attend the Synod. Although Dathenus was less then co-operative in the search for a solution, the Synod was not prepared to attempt to impose a solution which could lead to further dissension within the church, both at home and abroad.33 Coolhaes, on the other hand, chose to attend, in spite of the attempts of the Leiden city council to prevent him from doing so. As the council feared, Coolhaes compromised himself by accepting most of the Synod's criticisms of his writings and teachings, but then refusing to endorse the Confession of Faith and the Church Order. His eventual excommunication, and dismissal by the Leiden city council, removed a troublesome character; but it was not the solution which Cornelisz. and van der Corput had desired.34

The collection also includes the 'Acta' of the Synod,35 and some interesting details on the members of the Synod and the congregations that they represented.36 Although the Synod was not exclusively a Zeeland event, the collection is rounded offby four short articles which reflect the state of religious life in the surrounding areas: the 'Acta' of the classis of Zuid-Beveland and the consistory of Flushing during the years 1579-81 ;37 the problems confronting the Reformed in the Vrije of Bruges in 1581;38 and an examination of the difficulties confronting the catholic population of Zee­land during the last quarter of the sixteenth century."!! Although rather uneven in length and weight, this is an interesting collection of essays which will repay careful study.

Although officially banned in the rebel territories after the outbreak of the revolt, the Roman-catholic religion did not die out. On the contrary, the last decades of the sixteenth century saw something of a revival. A leading figure in this process was Sasbout Vosmeer, scion of a prominent Delft family. From Sasbout's correspondence

32. W. van 't Spijker, 'De overname van de kerkorde van Middelburg (1581) op de generale synode te Herborn (1586), ibidem, 144-57. 33. W. Punt, 'Mislukte bemiddeling "inder saecken der Excellentie tegens Petrum Dathenum" " ibidem, 158-73. 34. J.P. van DOOlen, 'Caspar Coolhaes: het een en ander uit zijn leven voor en na de synode van Middelburg', ibidem, 174-83. 35. W. van 't Spijker, 'De acta van de synode van Middelburg (1581), ibidem, 64-127. 36. J.P. van Dooren, 'Enige bijzonderheden over de afgevaardigden en over de door hen verte­genwoordigde gemeenten buiten de Noordelijke Nederlanden', ibidem, 128-39. 37. J.P. van DoOlen, 'Acta van de classis Zuid-Beveland 1579-1581', ibidem, 218-35; P. Scherft, 'Acta van de kerkeraad te Vlissingen 1579-1581', ibidem, 236-51. 38. D. Van der Bauwhede, 'De kerkelijke situatie in het Brugse Vrije in 1581', ibidem, 184-201. 39. J.M. Roof, 'De rooms-katholieke Zeeuwen in het laatste kwart van de zestiende eeuw. Van zelfredzaamheid tot late wederopluiking', ibidem, 202-17.

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with his brother, Tilman, B.A. Vermaseren has pieced together Sasbout's attempts to encourage and strengthen the Roman-catholic community in the Northern Nether­lands.40 Names as 'vicar apostolic' for the whole of the Northern Netherlands in 1590 by the papal nuncio, Frangipani, Sasbout was given wider powers for the organization of the catholic revival by pope Clement VIII himself in 1592. Sasbout had been active in his native Delft since his covert return in 1583, and his labours culminated in his rather unreal plan for the appointment of a new bishop - either in Haarlem or Delft, with the remaining brothers of the religious houses of Sion, 's-Gravenzande, Stein, Den Hem and Ten Donck forming a new cathedral chapter. Sasbout clearly saw him­self in the role of bishop, but his grandiose scheme came to nothing. One problem was how to fmance a new chapter when all ecclesiastical properties and revenues had been confiscated; but the main difficulty seems to have been that appointments to bishop­rics were in the gift of Philip II, not the pope, and the king apparently had little en­thusiasm for Sasbout's plans.

The final volume of A.Th. van Deursen's quartet on what he terms the popular culture of Holland during the period of the Eighty Years War is concerned with reli­gion.41 The first chapter attempts to sketch the system of popular beliefs, and the rest of the book considers successively the Calvinists, catholics and baptists. The content of this volume is rather more predictable than that of the preceding ones, partly be­cause the chapter on the Calvinists is very largely based on a previous work by the author,42 while those on the catholics and baptists, as Van Deursen makes clear, are chiefly derived from the writings of Rogier and Kuhler respectively. Nevertheless, even in this well-worked field he is able to make a number of interesting points. For example, he is illuminating on the dilemma posed to the civil authorities by the presence of such a large number of catholics, pointing out that any serious attempt to eradicate cathol­icism through systematic persecution would either have failed or have involved killing on a very large scale (massamoord). On the other hand, the chapter on popular beliefs is really too brief to allow the author to do more than touch the surface of such a complex problem.

An interesting feature of Dutch politics in the course of the war against Spain was the apparent gulf between the academic treatment of political questions in the uni­versities and the practical, even urgent, political and constitutional problems facing the Dutch in the real world. A striking illustration of this is the way that professors con­tinued to teach, and students to accept, the maxim that monarchy was the best form of government throughout a period when the republic was seeking an identity and inter­national recognition. Neither they nor the authorities seemed to feel that this was anomalous or indeed had any bearing on the constitution of the United Provinces.

40. B.A. Vermaseren, 'Sasbout Vosmeer en het voormalige kapittel van Sion in 1592. Delft als bisschopszetel?' Archie! voor de geschiedenis van de katholieke kerk in Nederland, XXIII (Utrecht, 1981) 189-219. 41. A.Th. van Deursen, Bet kopergeJd van de Gouden Eeuw, N, Bel en hemel (Assen: Van Gor­cum, 1980, 148 p., ISBN 90232 17661, fl. 17,90). 42. Idem, Bavianen en slijkgeuzen (Assen, 1974).

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H. Wansink's fascinating study of the teaching of politics at Leiden University from

the time it was founded to the mid-seventeenth century does much to clarify the posi­tion of politics as an academic discipline and its relationship with the contemporary political scene.43 Leiden rapidly became the largest, most cosmopolitan university in Europe in which a strong humanist tradition struck deep roots. Wansink demonstrates convincingly and in detail how this tradition placed a philological-historical stamp on the study of political ideas in which imitation and emulation of the ancients, history as magister vitae and the ethical values of neo-Stoicism were of greater importance than Aristotle or Calvin. Only in the second half of the seventeenth century was there a significant shift of emphasis in political thought under the influence of Cartesianism and Hobbesianism and the resultant philosophia novantiqua. It was the universal and abstract nature of the traditional approach which enabled academics simultaneously to exalt monarchy and accept the existence of the Dutch Republic, and also persuaded the authorities that what was taught in the universities would have no subversive effect upon the United Provinces. By the mid-seventeenth century -traditional politica was beginning to look decidedly old-fashioned and as political speculation started to take account of particular historical circumstances and constitutional traditions it was to the jurists, within the framework of public law and the nation-state, that the future development of political theory was to belong.

The Rotterdam writer and publicist, Pieter Rabus, has already been the subject of a co-operative study of various aspects of his life and work,44 and this is now comple­mented by a book combining an account of his life and literary activities with a detailed examination of his practice as editor of the Boekzaal van Europe. 4s De Vet is particularly interested in the extent to which Rabus can be seen as an important pre­cursor of the enlightenment in the Northern Netherlands. The core of the book is an investigation of the way that the writings of Pierre Bayle, Antonius van Dale and Baltha­sar Bekker were dealt with in Rabus' Boekzaal. The fact that the Boekzaal was written in Dutch made the authorities, and especially the Reformed Church, particularly sensitive to its contents. De Vet makes it clear that Rabus, despite his considerable sympathy with the ideas of these radicals, had to proceed with extreme caution, in particular under pressure from the local church council, and especially in the case of his treatment of Bekker's famous work on witchcraft. This study demonstrates clearly the sort of pressures operating which in practice restricted freedom of publication in the late seventeenth century. Such constraints were more serious for editors of period­icals than for the authors of individual books or pamphlets.

In a prosopographical study of students from North Brabant, a team from the University of Nijmegen have listed, in so far as they were able to trace them, everyone

43. H. Wansink, Politieke wetenschappen aan de Leidse universiteit 1575 - ± 1650 (Utrecht: HFS, 1981, 177 p., ISBN 90 6194 042 7, fl. 75,-). Summary in English. 44. H. Bots, ed., Pieter Rabus en de Boekzaal van Europe 1692-1702 (Amsterdam, 1974). 45. 1.I.M. de Vet, Pieter Rabus (1660-1702). Een wegbereider van de Noordnederlandse verlich­fing. Studies van het instituut voor intellectuele betrekkingen tussen de Westeuropese !anden in de zeventiende eeuw, VI (Amsterdam: APA-Holland University Press, 449 p., ISBN 90 302 10060, fl. 78,-). Summary in English.

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from this province (using the present provincial boundaries) who registered as astudent from the middle of the sixteenth to the middle of the eighteenth century.46 A little under 6,000 persons are listed alphabetically, and basic biographical information accompanies each entry. Students not born in North Brabant but domiciled there at the time of their registration are also included. There is a useful introduction which discusses in particular the social and geographical origins of the students, according to their disciplines and their confessions, and their subsequent careers.

Of all aspects of the Dutch Golden Age, the popular culture and living conditions

of the working classes has been one of the least studied. Aside from N.W. Posthumus' magisterial study of the Leiden work-force, there are strikingly few studies of note. J .R. Bruijn and J. Lucassen have therefore performed a most useful service in making available in one volume and supplementing the five seminal essays on the East India Company's ship crews during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries published by J. de Hullu in 1913-4 in the Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde van Nederlandsch­Indiif. 47 By far the longest and most important of De Hullu's five studies (31 pages) deals with the recruitment of seamen and soldiers for the Company's ships and garri­sons, the other four dealing respectively with sickness and medical care, order and discipline, nutrition, and entertainment.

De Hullu's five essays occupy some seventy-six pages of text. The editors also provide forty pages of introduction, seven pages of statistical annexes and a useful bibliography. The introductory material is of considerable importance as Bruijn and Lucassen provide a cogent analysis of the labour market at the disposal of the Com­pany and examine the general economic background to its recruitment and conditions . of service. It is striking how large a proportion of the Dutch seafaring population the crews of the Company eventually came to represent. The Company's crews were in fact a steadily increasing proportion rising from about one sixteenth of the total (in­cluding the crews of the herring fleets), in 1610, to no less than one quarter by 1770. This valuable compilation also includes a welcome appreciation of De Hullu as a person and as a scholar.

In the same field, Bruijn has also co-edited a collection of essays about conditions on Dutch East India ships and speCifically on the series of mutinies which period­ically broke out on these vessels.48 The publication is particularly welcome as, until recently, remarkably little has been written on this subject. For reasons which are not yet fully explained, there was a marked tendency for conditions on board ship to worsen, the death-rate on outward voyages to increase, and the proportion of crews made up of foreigners (mostly Germans and Scandinavians) to grow after 1740. How-

46. H. Bots, I. Matthey and M. Meyer,Noordbrabantse studenten 1550-1750. Bijdragen tot de ge­schiedenis van het zuiden van Nederland, XLIV (Tilburg: Stichting Zuidelijk Historisch Contact, 1979,819 p., fl. 127,50). 47. J .R. Bruijn and J. Lucassen, ed., Op de schepen der Oost-Indische Compagnie. Vij! artikeien van J. de Hullu ingeieid, bewerkt en voorzien van een studie over de werkgeiegenheid bij de VOC Historische Studies, XLI (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1980, 160 p., ISBN 90 6243 017 1, fl. 32). 48. J .R. Bruijn and E.S. van Eyck van Heslinga, ed., Muiterij, oproer en berechting op schepen van de VOC (Haarlem: De Boer Maritiem, 1980, 182 p., ISBN 90 228 18446, fl. 49,50).

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ever, at least in part, these trends reflect the significant falling off in the availability of hardened, experienced Dutch seamen in the mid-eighteenth century. The essays by ten different authors are both descriptive and analytical and the result is often fasci­nating. While Dutchmen figure prominently in a few of the non-violent mutinies, which may be categorized essentially as strikes or as a refusal to undertake particular work or tolerate particul~r conditions, in the spectacular cases of full-scale mutiny where the insurgents took over the vessel by force, it is striking that few and often hardly any Dutch figured among the leaders and active participants.

A study by R. Dekker and 1. van de Pol of some ninety cases of Dutch women who assumed men's clothing and (in the main) joined the army, navy or an East India Company crew in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is soundly based on archival material, especially from the Amsterdam city archive and the East India Company archive in The Hague.49 In intention it is certainly a serious contribution to women's history, but it remains basically anecdotal and amusing rather than analytical. While it will undoubtedly be seen as a valuable contribution by those who regard women's history as a viable field of study, many others will understandably remain sceptical as to the value of this type of enquiry.

C.J.A. JorgSO has produced an interesting study on the China trade of the Dutch East India Company from 1729 to 1794 and in particular on the trade in chinaware as a profitable by-product of the tea trade. The author describes the organization of the pemlanent V.O.C. factory at Kanton and the relations with Chinese merchants and officials and he· assesses the importance of the porcelain trade. There is also detail about how the delicate merchandise was packed in Kanton. The chine was encased in boxes and formed the bottom layer of the cargo, tea being placed above to keep it dry. The porcelain was bought according to the preCise orders sent by the directors who even s.ent their carga's (merchants) designs of the articles they wanted them to com­mission. A number of these designs have been preserved in the V.O.C. archives and Jorg has used some of these as illustrations in his book. He has also collected details on designs and decorations from the directors' order lists and the cargas' shipping lists. The number of the different items also appear in his tables which can be used to demonstrate the importance to traders of the social aspirations of the upward-striving layers of society below the traditionally wealthy and aristocratic. Why should the amount of Chinese sugar pots sold in the west quadruple between 1736 and 1740, and soup bowls exported from east to west in 1758 be ten times more than a mere five years earlier? Such detailed changes in demand are not easy to come by. The author also provides valuable information on prices paid in Kanton and obtained at sales in

49. R. Dekker and L. van de Pol, Daar was laatllt een meisje 10011. Nederlandse vrouwen als rna· trozen en soldaten: een historisch onderzoek (Baarn: Ambo, 1981, 143 p., ISBN 90 263 0524 9, fl. 19.50). 50. C.J.A. Jorg, Porselein all handeillwaar. De porselein all onderdeel van de Chinahandel van de V.O.c. 1729·1794 (Groningen, 1978). Thesis Leiden University, Faculty of Arts. Now also in English: Porcelain and the Dutch Chinatrade, 1729-1794 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982, 372 p., ill., ISBN 90 247 9091 3, fl. 125,-).

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Amsterdam and Middelburg. Towards the end of the century the variety of articles im­ported was restricted: the chinaware trade - as Jorg shows convincingly - followed the trend of the Dutch China trade as a whole. This book, written by an art historian, is well worth the attention of economic and social historians and specialists in eighteenth­century Chinese products of all kinds. The title does not altogether do justice to the scope and variety of the fascinating contents.

In 1977 Mrs. E.P. de Booy presented her doctoral thesis, a detailed study of rural education in the province of Utrecht in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 51

Her recent book Kweekhoven der wijsheid (Nurseries of Wisdom) appearing only a few years later, can rightly be seen as its logical complement.52 Its central theme is the various forms of education in the Utrecht towns: Utrecht itself, Amersfoort, Rhenen, Wijk bij Duurstede and Montfoort. The author has attempted to sketch the education­al opportunities in the various towns as a whole, and to bring out the relations between them. The University of Utrecht has properly been excluded from her picture. Most attention is paid to the situation in the city of Utrecht, where there were a great many different varieties of school, described with much attention to their characteristic details. Because of this varied provision, the situation differed sharply from the uni­form development of the countryside, where education in the average village school was limited in character and directed above all towards the church and religion. The city bourgeoisie made higher demands and was prepared to pay for education at numerous private schools. The sources, however, for these so-called 'by-schools' are scarce, especially for the catholic schools which had to operate clandestinely after 1619. An important conclusion for the city of Utrecht is that the educational op­portunities for the lowest stratum of the population were greatly extended in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For the children ofless well-off parents, though not for those of beggars and poor catholics, however, opportunities remained limited. The book concludes with chapters on educational reforms in the years after 1795, and on literacy, investigated by means of data from marriage certificates of the period 1811-20. The author shows herself to be well aware of several lacunae in her research. What she has assembled in both her books gives an impressive picture of the educational situa­tion in an interesting region outside the much more strongly urbanized west of the country. The question of how representative it is can naturally only be answered by further research.

Thorough research underpins H. Feenstra's bulky dissertation on the nobility in the Ommelanden, roughly the areas to the west and north of the city of Groningen, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.53 The work falls into two clearly defined sec-

51. Cf. The Low Countries' history yearbook 1979. Acta historiae neerlandicae, XII (The Hague, 1979) 139. 52. E.P. de Booy, Kweekhoven der wijsheid. Basis- en vervolgonderwijs in de steden van de provin­cie Utrecht van 1580 tot het begin der 1ge eeuw. Stichtse historische reeks, V (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 1980,288 p. ISBN 90 6011 325 X, fl. 49,50). 53. H. Feenstra, De bloeitijd en het verval van de Ommelander adel (1600·1800). Thesis Gronin­gen University, Faculty of Arts, 1981,485 p. and separate appendix.

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tions. In the first, more general part the emphasis falls on the economic position of the 'jonkers' as a class, while the second part is devoted to the various families or groups of related nobles, and contains a mass of details, which form the basis of the general­izations in the first section. The period studied is from the so-called 'Reduction' of the City of Groningen in 1594, when the city and surrounding Ommelanden were reuI1ited as one province, to the beginning of the nineteenth century. In the relatively quiet period after 1594 the jonker estate acquired its characteristic form and features. Until 1650 the number of noble families remained relatively constant, but thereafter there was a rapid change. In the ye,ars 1650-1700 the relative decline was already 26 per cent, between 1700 and 175042 per cent, and in the period 1750-180047 per cent. These numerical changes fit the general picture, still inadequately supported, of a nobility in decline, but they differ clearly from the development which Faber has sketched for the neighbouring province of Friesland. The gross wealth of the Omme­land jonkers consisted in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries largely (40-70 per cent) of landed property. In connection with the question of its value, the author has also paid some attention to the evolution of rents. The stagnation which set in in the first half of the eighteenth century in conjunction with the rise in prices led to a worsening of the economic position of the jonkers. The sale of the provincial monastic estates (confiscated in the sixteenth century) in the years 1764-74, from which the nobles also profited as purchllsers, could only delay the decline. As well as land, bonds, most of them issued by the province, and the seignories in some cases with their associated feudal rights, made up a part of the gross wealth of the class. Other invest­ments were limited to the reclamation of fenlands for peat, while a few jonkers were owners of brickworks. Incomes remained a long way behind those in the western Netherlands. There seems to have been ,no decline in the eighteenth century even though, the tax registers give some grounds for such an assumption. The author is of the opinion that the registration of taxable property in this respect gives a distorted picture of reality, since evasion of taxes was a general phenomenon. There is no specific information about cultural life in this work on material properity, although something is said from time to time on the composition of libraries. That a few geneal­ogical tables and the index of persons are included as a loosely inserted appendix in another format, is an inconvenient but not too serious shortcoming in a study which deserves to be described as extremely valuable.

A fine study by M. van der Bijl investigates the social, economic and ideological background to the political agitation and disturbances in Zeeland, and especially the situation in Middelburg, during the years 1702-171554 While focusing in detail on this short period,M. van der Bijl nevertheless adopts a long-term view of developments in

54. M. van der Bijl, Idee en interest. Voorgeschiedenis, verloop en achtergronden van de politieke twisten in Zeeland en vooral in Middel~urs tussen 1702 en 1715. Historische studies, Instituut voor geschiedenis, Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, XLII (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1981, xl + 451 p. and appendices, ISBN 90 6243 018 X, fl. 80,-). Also thesis Utrecht, Faculty of Arts. Summary in English.

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Middelburg civic life, constantly referring back into the seventeenth century as well as forward into the eighteenth. The title aptly fits the content. The author extensively examines the role of wealth, interest and marriage connection in the allocation and perpetuation of civic and provincial power and influence. But this is no mere Narnier­ization of the topic. For at the same time, the author brings out the profound sig­nificance of ideology, both political and religious, in defining and intensifying the rivalries and disputes that characterize Zeeland's history under the Republic. For nothing could be more mistaken that to regard the Zeeland regents as a compact and unified social entity displaying solidarity in the preservation of definable class interests.

On the contrary, it is the rivalries and divisions, the constant prevalence of faction, which is the key to matters. While some regents champion war policies, others support peace policies. Some backed the West India Company and adhered to the dogmatic Calvinism of Voetius; others were committed to the East India Company and more

liberal trends within the church. While some regents did switch their role and ideolog­icallabels from time to time, Van der Bijl emphasizes that the continuities are actually more striking. The families Thibaut and Huyssen headed the Orangist cause in Middel­burg for generation after generation. On the other side, the families Veth and Van Reygersberge for many decades dominated the States party.

The importance of this thoroughly researched book which includes a number of statistical tables which serve to defme the financial position and investments of leading Middelburg families, lies not only in the fresh light it throws on the political and social history of Middelburg and Zeeland but in the admirably precise manner in which the author ties economic, financial and religious trends in with his political and social analysis. The work is a telling illustration of the truth that the best contributions to historical studies are the ones that fuse political, economic and religious history to­gether.

Much material is contained in the edition by A.J. Veenendaal Jr. of the correspon­dence of Anthonie Heinsius, of which the latest volumes to appear cover the years 1704 and 1705.55 This important work on the period 1702-20 will certainly help to revive interest in the political events of the first decades of the eighteenth century. Within the framework of a research project on foreign policy, conducted by the history de­partment of the University of Utrecht, J. Aalbers has concerned himself with the developments after the Peace of Utrecht.56 In the first volume to appear, the back­ground and general features of foreign policy are the central themes. The second volume will discuss the policy itself. The emphasis lies on the years between 1720, when it was decided that the Republic should not join the Quadruple Alliance, and

55. AJ. Veenendaal Jr., ed., De briefwisseling van Anthonie Heinsiug 1702·1720, III, 1704, IV: 1705. Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatien, Grote serie, CLXIX, CLXXVII (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980,1981, viii, 537 p. and vii, 525 p., ISBN 9024790085; 9024790611). 56. J. Aalbers, De Republiek en de vrede van Europa. De buitenlandge politiek van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden na de Vrede van Utrecht (1713), voornameli;k gedurende de ;aren 1720-1733, I: Achtergronden en algemene agpecten. Historische studies, Instituut voor geschiede­nis, Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht, XXXIX (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1980,441 p., ISBN 906243 015 5, fl. 65,-). Also thesis Utrecht, Faculty of Arts. Summary in French.

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1733, the year in which the War of the Polish Succession disturbed the balance of Europe. In one of his earlier chapters the author sets two conceptions of foreign policy alongside each other, against the background of the years of struggle against France: the 'neutrality policy' which was in force from 1719 to 1720 with the rise of the Am­

sterdam burgomaster Bambeck, a typical welfare policy, critical of England, in many ways realistic and by no means passive; and the proponents of a 'security policy' (with such prominent defenders as Heinsius, Fagel and Slingelandt) who aimed to make defensive alliances in order to guarantee the peace and equilibrium of Europe. The author sees the two conceptions as 'warp' and 'weft' in the basic pattern of foreign policy. He pays much attention to the successive attempts to redress the public fInances, which had been embarrassed as a result of the wars, and emphasizes the division within the province of Holland as a result of the conflict of interests between Amsterdam and the other cities. Foreign policy was directly concerned in these conflicts. Among the more general aspects of foreign policy, as well as its in­stitutional side, a number of leading fIgures are paraded for our inspection: provincial pensionaries, members of the nobility of Holland, burgomasters of Amsterdam, city pensionaries, and provincial deputies to the States General. All of these are briefly sketched and their place in the system is indicated, their mutual relationships often being revealed in well-chosen quotations. As already stated, the actual policy remains to be discussed in the second volume. That the question of the stadholdership will be raised then, is somewhat surprising, as is the fact that this information is only given in a casual aside in one of the footnotes. It seems to be an omission, that the chronolog­ical table included in this fIrst volume makes no mention of any matters of internal politics. 'Furthermore, a rather more concentrated argument in support of the choice of the period 1713 (1720) to 1733 would have been welcome. It is to be hoped that the second volume of this interesting study, which is wholly in keeping with the tradition of research at Utrecht, will not be long delayed.

P. Lenders discusses the 'national debt' of the Austrian Netherlands, that is the long term debts of the subordinate administrations. 57 They were of two main categories: direct and indirect debts. To the direct debt belonged above all the burden of the out­standing loans which had been raised by the subordinate authorities. The indirect debts were concerned mainly with loans raised for the benefIt of the ruler, the debts of the craft guilds, funds for the poor etc. In the·second half of the eighteenth century, craft guilds were occasionally abolished with the result that the civic authorities not only had to pay compensation to the guild masters (who saw their group monopoly under attack) but also had to take over debts of the former guilds. In the same period the civic authorities also concerned themselves more and more with poor relief, which brought an increase in the 'national debt'.

57. P. Lenders, 'De "nationale schuld" in de Oostenrijkse Nederlanden na 1750. Duidelijke en on­duidelijke verplichtingen der ondergeschikte besturen', in: La dette pub/ique aux XVIJe et XIXe siecles. $on developpement sur la plan local, regional et antional, IXe (olloque international. Actes. Historische uitgaven Pro Civitate, series in 8vo, LVIII (Brussels: Gemeentekrediet van Belgie, 1980) 51-75.

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In an interesting article which had its origin in the study group investigating 'bureau­cratization' at the Historical Institute of the University of Groningen, O. Vries calls our attention to a group of clerks employed in the periode 1710-96 at the Secretariat of the States General at The Hague.58 It is the result of a prosopographical investiga­tion, which in this case has been found suitable for a social group which did not belong to the political or social elite. The choice of this group (68 persons) was made much easier by the existence of the archives of the Fagel family, perhaps the best known of the secretarial dynasties. A few top officials, the clerks employed by the provinces, a few specialized functionaries and the numerous junior clerks have been excluded from the specifically prosopographic enquiry. Nevertheless that does not prevent us from learning something even about these latter groups. After some brief details of the set­up of the Secretariat and the functions of the various departments within it, there follows information on such matters as appointments, dismissals, and the career pattern of the clerks. A considerable number of these clerks seem to have been domestic servants of the two highest officials, the griffier, and the commies upon whom they were entirely dependent. By means of his analysis of the personal data collected, the author sheds some light on their geographical origin (mainly the present-day province of South Holland) with Amsterdam, Haarlem, the Noorderkwartier and Zeeland strikingly absent) their social status and their fortunes. The question of how far the results arrived at in this article are valid for a much broader cross-section of the official world in The Hague or for the development of the earlier nineteenth century, must remain open for the time being.

In contrast to the spectacular maritime trade, river navigation during the Republic has received very scant attention in historiography. W.F. Leemans now turns our attention to the Gelderland tolls in Arnhem and Hsseloord, Nijmegen, Tiel, Zaltbom­mel and Zutphen, to the way in which the collection of tolls on the rivers at those places functioned, and to the persons who were employed as 'toll-collectors' or re­ceivers of the various dues levied.59 He connnes himself to the eighteenth and the early years of the nineteenth centuries. The starting point of his narrative proper, is 1738 when the States of Gelderland as sovereign possessors of the river tolls decided to farm them out no longer, but to restore the situation of before 1677 and take the collection of tolls back into their own hands. The toll officers who were appointed after this decision all came from the circles of shippers and merchants on the Rhine. With the aid of a great many fragmentary genealogies the author shows how over the years there arose typical related families of toll collectors. In a separate chapter he makes soine interesting observations on shipping and commerce on the Rhine. Am-

58. O. Vries, 'Klerken ter Griffie van de Staten-Generaal in de achttiende eeuw. Een prosopo­grafisch onderzoek', Biidragen en mededelingen gegchiedenig der Nederlanden, XCVI (1981) 26-70. 59. W.F. Leernans, De grote Geldene tollen en de tollenaarr in de 18de en het begin der 19de eeuw. Een biidrage tot de gegchiedenig van de Riinhandel. Gelderse historische reeks, XIV (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 1981, 127 p., ISBN 90 6011 3969, fl. 32,-). Also thesis Catholic University Nijrne­gen, Faculty of Arts.

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sterdam seems to have occupied the first place in this trade, a situation which only altered in Rotterdam's favour in the nineteenth century. Only the trade in timber, in the form of steadily expanding timber fleets, moved around 1650, to Dordrecht and to a lesser extent to Rotterdam. In this work, which is only intended as an introduction, and beats all the hallmarks of it, the author has given us a framework within which further research can be carried out. The accounts of the Gelderland tolls have been preserVed and appear to offer interesting possibilities for a specialized study of the riverine trade.

1976 was the 250th anniversary of the birth of the famous art collector and artist Comelis Ploos van Amstel (1726-1798). The desire to commemorate this event led not only to an exhibition in the Rijksmuseum (1976) but also to the publication of two closely related monograph studies. The first to appear was a standard work of art history,60 its subject being the artistic activities of Ploos as collector, artist, designer and publisher of prints. As well as details of Ploos' technical achievements, the work also gives a completely new catalogue of all the prints. It was compiled and written by Th. Laurentius, an expert in the field of graphic techniques, J.E. Niemeijer, a connoisseur of eighteenth-century paintings and drawings, and G. Ploos van Amstel. The latter, a descendant of the artist, and greatly interested in the history of his family, is the author of the second study, mainly devoted to Ploos' social and general cultural activities.61 After a rather overdetailed expose of the family circle, there follow chapters on his business activities, (the timber trade and timber brokerage, fmancial participation in sawmills, art auctions) and his relations with many academies and societies ofartists, including such examples as the Holland Society of the Sciences, of Haarlem. Although the book's rather fragmented approach does not provide a fully rounded picture, we still gain a good impression of the irrepressible energy and activ­ity of a man who took the initiative and managed to stimulate others in a number of fields.

Inspired by such authors as G. Lefebvre, E.P. Thompson and G. Rude, I.J. van Maanen and K. Vermeulen have posed the question, in a wideranging article, which groups of the population of Amsterdam made up the supporters of the Patriots and the Orangists, and what role these supporters played in the political history of Amster­dam in the years 1780-1800.62 Their attention is focussed exclusively on the lower classes, whose social boundaries they have tried to determine by means of mainly fiscal data from the middle and end of the eighteenth century. In the turbulent years between 1780 and 1800, 235 Orangists, and 149 persons of Patriotic convictions were brought before the courts, all of them from the lowest levels of the population.

60. Th. Laurentius, J.W. Niemeijer, G. Ploos van Amstel, Comelis Ploos van Amstel, 1746·1798 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1980,404 p., ill., ISBN 9023217365, fl. 135,-). 61. G. Ploos van Amstel, Ponret van een koopman en uitvinder, Comelis Ploos van Amstel, 1726-1798 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1980,204 p., ISBN 90 232 1756 X, fl. 62,50). Summary in English. 62. 1.1. van Manen and K. Vermeulen, 'Het lagere volk van Amsterdam in de strijd tussen patriot­ten en organjegezinden, 1780-1800', Tijdschrift voor sociale geschiedenis, VI (Amsterdam, 1980) 331-55, VII (1981) 3-42.

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The details on them which are preserved in the judicial archives form the most im­portant source from which such elementary details as age, occupation and address

were used to trace possible differences between the two groups. The social com­position of the representative samples of the Orangist and Patriot support seems to differ hardly at all, a conclusion which is confirmed by a study of their places of

residence. Only on the eastern islands did the Orangists have a clear majority, a con­clusion which is in accord with their predominance in shipbuilding. According to the authors, religious and social or economic motives scarcely played any role in the choice of party. The lower classes made their choice solely on political grounds. In their conclusions on the social composition and motives of the crowd, the authors oppose the views of C.H.E. de Wit, for whom the 'proletariaat' as a result of pauperiza­tion had become a mere instrument in the hands of a small court clique, and let itself be used for Orangist terrorism. By virtue of its method and the nature of its source materiai, the article, despite some queries and some questions which remain open, makes a welcome contribution to a debate which has not yet been concluded.

Two hundred years ago, in the late summer of 1781, appeared the pamphlet Aan het Volk van Nederland (To the people of the Netherlands) though more than a century passed before it became known who the author was. It turned out to be Joan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol, the staunch defender of the Americans in their struggle for freedom from England. In 1966 W.F. Wertheim and A.H. Wertheim­Gijse Weenink published an edition of the text in modern Dutch, with an introduction in which they portrayed the jonker, and member of the States of Overijssel, as a true democrat. In the revised introduction to their recently published new impression,63 Mr. & Mrs. Wertheim take up the cudgels against all those who have cast doubt on or denied Van der Capellen's commitment to democracy. In their opinion, the root of the evil lies in the biography by M. de Jong of 1922, which by its stress on the split and ambivalence in the personality of Joan Derk, has opened the door to entirely mistaken interpretations. They are particularly critical of C.H.E. de Wit, who dared to include the 'leader of the democratic wing of the Patriot movement' among the so­called Old Patriots, the supporters of the state organized in estates. On the other hand, the authors are convinced that De Wit, as 'an historian with great understanding of the democratic tendencies in our country', will confess his error with respect to Van der Capellen if he takes into consideration his total personal and political activity as well as his general political theories. The chance of De Wit's conversion to the view of the Wertheims seems extremely slight to this reviewer.

In search of eighteenth century 'historical personalities and their contribution to the political atmosphere of their time', Eliane van Impe chanced on Marie-Christine

63. W.F. Wertheim and A.H. Wertheim-Gijse Weenink, ed., Aan het volk van Nederland. Het de­mocratisch manifest van Joan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol, 1781 (Weesp: Heureka, 1981, 160 p., ISBN 90 62623611, fl. 25.-).

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of Austria (1742-1798).64 She was the favourite daughter of the empress Maria Theresia, and in 1766 married the man of her choice, Albert Casimir of Saxony-Teschen (1738-1822), with whom during the years 1781-89 and 1790-92 she exercised the governorship of the Southern Netherlands. Although their previous successful governorship in Hungary is referred to, the emphasis is on the turbulent period during which they acted as gov~rnors-general of the Netherlands. The history of their rule is dominated by tragedy. Joseph II forced them into a purely figurehead role, with merely represen­tative duties. Political power was in the hands of a minister plenipotentiary, whose task it was to carry through the planned institutional reforms in a way which was hardly in keeping with the cautious methods of the Theresian period. The Brabant Revolution forced the couple to seek refuge in Koblenz and later in Bonn. Under Emperor Leopold II, with whom Marie-Christine had long carried on an intensive correspondence, she and her husband returned to the Southern Netherlands, and were now placed in a position of real power. In the brief period of the restoration, the policy of the governor-general bore a strongly traditional and conservative stamp, which restrained and limited the emperor's efforts at reform. The book is based largely on published Austrian sources, which limits its approach and its working out. Sometimes the often lengthy French quotations are disturbing: oddly enough, a num­ber have been translated from German into French. In short: a useful and convenient summary of knowledge about a person who should deserve a broader approach and a wider context.

LATER MODERN HISTORY

The classic debate on the nineteenth-century Dutch economy appears to have be­come livelier than ever in recent years. One of the most active and most original participants is R.T. Griffiths, now teaching at the Free University of Amsterdam as the successor of the late l.A. de longe. In the inaugural address which he gave on taking up his chair, under the suggestive title 'Backward, Behind or Different' he made a series of critical observations on economic development in the nineteenth century, and especially the formation of our historical picture of it.65 Thus, he claims that the fixing of attention on the beginnings of the process of industrialization has favoured an unnecessarily negative verdict. That the Netherlands was a relative latecomer in this respect does not mean, according to Griffiths, that the economy as such deserved to be called 'backward'. In a continuation of the research which he undertook for his dissertation, Industrial retardation in the Netherlands 1830-1850, he suggests that the

64. E. Van Impe, Marie-Christine van Oostenrijk, goevernante-generaal van de Zuidelijke Neder­landen 1781-1789; 1790-1792. Standen en Landen, LXXVII (Courtrai-Heule: UGA, 1979,204 p.). 65. R.T. Griffiths, Achterlijk, achter of anders? Aspecten van de economische ontwikkeling van Nederland in de 1ge eeuw. Inaugural lecture Free University Amsterdam, 4th Dec. 1980 (Amster­dam, 1980, ISBN 906256431 3).

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Dutch economy experienced a steady, albeit sometimes 'hidden' growth after 1830. In view of the often problematic character of the available statistical material, Grif­fiths is unwilling to frame his conclusions too dogmatically. That does not detract from the fact that he places an emphatic question mark against the importance of 1850 as the magical year of transformation, and thus also casts doubt on the common­

ly accepted connexion between economic and political revival. In general he asks for an understanding of the peculiar character, the 'difference' of the Dutch economic structure.

The retirement of Professor W.J. Wieringa from the chair of economic and social history at the Free University at Amsterdam in December 1980 was marked by the publication of a Festschrift prepared by a number of his ex-students and colleagues.66

The fact that the editors did not try to impose a unifying theme on the volume and that many of the individual chapters touch areas of only peripheral interest makes this very much a 'lucky-dip' book. The topics considered include the development of wages in the first half of the nineteenth century, the industrial support fund set up by William I in 1821, an analysis of Mokyr's work in the light of various develop­ment models, the South Holland flax industry in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the proposed labour legislation in 1903. Four contributions deal with the period after World War I, an analysis of Colijn's economic thought, the pattern of strikes in the inter-war building industry, industrial research in the interwar period and the attitude of the socialist trade union organization to the development of quasi-autonomous public bodies in the years immediately after the Second World War. Finally, three chapters pick up various aspects of Dutch colonial history - the Cura~ao slave trade in the first half of the nineteenth century, the prohibition of silver export from Suriname in the 1920's and the development of the Indonesian textile industry in the 1930's.

The history of the development of technical instruction for post-primary school children and adults in the first half of the nineteenth century is the subject of a detailed and well-researched study by N.B. Goudswaard.67 It covers the period between the first attempts to abolish the guilds in 1798, which threatened the hitherto primary form of such education, and the establishment by the Thorbecke administra­tion in 1863 of forty-eight secondary and higher institutes of technical education which marked the first comprehensive step of the government to deal with the pro­blem. It was a period characterized by numerous, often far-sighted reports by govern­ment commissions but government action lagged far behind -limited to the encourage­ment of art academies and attempts to provide industrial training for non-students at

66. P. Boomgaard et al., ed., Exercities in ons verleden: twaalf opstellen over de economische en sociale geschiedenis aangeboden aan Prof Dr. W.S. Wieringa ... (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1981,254 p., ISBN 90232 18507, fl. 42,50). 67. N .B. Goudswaard, Vijfenzestig jaren nijverheidsonderwijs (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1981,392 p., ISBN 90 232 1818 3, fl. 49,50).

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universities. The void was partially ftlled by local authorities and by various private

initiatives. The problems confronted by these experiments in terms of rmance, at· tracting students, designing suitable syllabuses etc. as well as an evaluation of their success form the main body of Goudswaard's analysis. However, the essential problem of creating a trained and skilled work·force could not be resolved without statutory measures by the government and even when these came in 1863, those relating to the regulation of these schools remained unexecuted. As a result it was not until the 1890's and 1900's, under pressure of parliamentary and public opinion, that the government began to face up to its responsibilities in this area. Goudswaard's study provides an interesting and thought provoking insight into one of the 'might-have­beens' of Dutch economic history since a forceful implementation of the early re­commendations would have made the country the most progressive nation in Europe in general industrial education. Alas, perhaps, supply tended to follow demand in this respect, as it did almost everywhere else in Europe.

The subject of the factors underlying the late industrialization of the Netherlands has been attracting increased attention lately, partiCUlarly in the wake of the stimul­ating and provocative work of the American historian, Joel Mokyr, whose expla­nation of the delayed industrialization of the Netherlands compared with Belgium centred on the role of differentials in productivity in non-industrial occupations determining differences in levels of industrial wages and, in turn, differences in levels of industrial competitiveness/profttability and the rate of internal capital accumula­tion.68 Two articles, in one way or another, take up Mokyr's themes and add to our understanding of the problem both by the introduction of new data and the reinter­pretation of existing evidence. The article by J .M.M. de Meere provides, on the basis of new data, a far more detailed and sophisticated picture than hitherto available of the provincial pattern of wages in the two countries at the beginning of the nineteenth century .69 Whereas, previously, the evidence had been converted into a single series for adult industrial wages, this has now been broken down into separate series for urban and rural areas (municipalities above and below 5000 inhabitants) and two new series similarly divided have been compiled for agrarian wages. De Meere then uses this data to run correlation tests on possible causative variables which he subdivides into those which serve to raise nominal living costs (the weight of indirect taxation and the cost of housing) and those which reflect real differences in the opportunity cost of labour (levels of poor relief payments and agricultural productivity). For the Nether­lands the results yielded high levels of signiftcance for all four variables but the tests against Belgian wage data of poor relief payments and agricultural productivity yielded results of no statistical significance. The importance of this study for the interpreta-

68. For Mokyr's works see C.R. Emery and K.W. Swart, ed., 'Survey of recent historical works on Belgium and the Netherlands', The Low Countriell' hilltory yearbook 1978. Acta historiae neer­landicae,XI (1979) 215. 69. I.M.M. De Meere, 'Daglonen in Belgie en Nederland in 1819. Een aanvulling', Tijdllchrift voor lIociale gellchiedenill, VI (1980) 357·84.

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tion of wage differences is that on the basis of existing evidence there is little support for Mokyr's interpretation as far as Belgium is concerned. In the Netherlands every­thing is still possible. On the one hand; the weight of differences in levels of agri­cultural wages in explaining industrial wages is far greater than the two cost of living factors combined. However, data for these are derived from the mid-nineteenth century and earlier data may yet change this picture. On the other hand, De Meere demonstrates that differences in the purchasing power of industrial wages are much less than differences in the nominal wages themselves. Something one would not ex­pect if opportunity costs were the major factor involved. The article by P. Kint and R.C.W. van der Voort attacks Mokyr's thesis on a far wider front. 7o The first part of the article is devoted to an analysis of the econometric model employed to explain the relationship between wages, the rate of profit and the choice of production tech­nique. In particular they conclude that using Mokyr's model a low-wage economy was more likely to adopt a labour intensive technique of production which is exactly the opposite of what Mokyr argued actually occurred in Belgium. In the second, and longer, part of the article. the authors demonstrate the differences in aggregating the 1819 wage data if one distinguishes between the price of labour and its cost. In the first case the data is aggregated without making an allowance for different levels of payment for different kinds of labour. If a low-wage sector, as textiles, is overrepre­sented in the occupational structure of a particular province, it will have the effect of depressing the average compared with another in which its occurence is rarer, even if no differences exist in the actual rates of payment for similar work. Similarly, the raw wage data is distorted by different lengths of working day, different lengths of working season etc. After attempting to correct for these various defects, the authors have compiled a new series for the adult industrial wage which reveal that the differ­ence between the Netherlands and Belgium in the cost of labour was 13.7 per cent in place of the 56.5 per cent suggested by Mokyr. The pattern of wage differentials within the Netherlands itself, however, remains fundamentally unchanged. A number of calculations are also made for the development of Belgian wages in the rest of the first half of the nineteenth century which show an upward trend greater than that calculated by Mokyr whilst it is suggested, but not demonstrated, that wages probably rose less quickly in the Netherlands with the result that it is possible that the small differential between the two countries which existed in 1819 may have disappeared altogether by the 1840's.

In addition to the article by Kint and Van der Voort, the latest volume of the Economisch- en Sociaal-Historisch laarboek contains a number of other interesting contributions of importance to historians of the period. Owing to limitations of space it is proposed only to discuss in outline the broad contents of these. In 1777 the Patriotic movement expressed its dissatisfaction with the declining economic fortunes of the Netherlands by setting up the so-called 'economic section' of the Holland

70. P. Kint and R.C.W. van der Voort, 'Economische groei en stagnatie in de Nederlanden', Econo· much· en sociaal·historisch jaarboek, XLIII (The Hague, 1980) 105-53.

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Society for Sciences (Economische Tak van de Hollandsche Maatschappij der Weten­schappen). The fortunes and activities of the branch at Zutphen which was formed a year later, only to collapse again three years afterwards because insufficient members paid their dues, are described in an article by H.FJ.M. van den Eerenbeemt.71 The diligent and painstaking researches of J . MacLean in the national archives have yielded a great deal of factual information on the development of the copper industry in the Netherlands between 1750 and 1850.72 Welcome though this information is, the general reader will be disappointed by the lack of any contextual framework whatso­ever, whilst the interested historian must ask himself whether the provincial and munic­ipal archives are really so utterly barren as to justify the author's having neglected them altogether. In a contribution by A. Stolp a great deal of additional light is shed on the career of Bernardus Koning who began work in 1804 on the invention of a gas­motor and, later on experiments in gas lighing. The advances and set-backs in his activities, the support he received from the government and the parallel developments elsewhere provide a useful insight into the microcosm of early nineteenth-century life and administration.73 The question of the relative importance of internal and external fmancing in industrial expansion, or lack of it, has been a recurrent theme in the Dutch industrialization debate. Through an analysis of the business records of the textile ftrm SJ. Spanjaard established at Borne, EJ. Fischer and R.E.M.A. de Peuter attempt to test some of the hypotheses with a concrete case study.74 Among the more interesting conclusions are that external fmance played only a small role in the ex­pansion of ftxed capital and that although internal accumulation had already yielded sufficient capital for mechanization by 1858, the actual switch over to factory pro­duction was delayed until 1864/5 when infrastructural improvements altered the pattern of factor costs decisively in the firm's favour.

H is a rare but happy occurrence when the loving dedication of an enthusiastic amateur historian produces a valuable insight into the past but this is exactly what GJ. Schulten has accomplished in his attempt to reconstruct the lost world of the local shippers in the east of Overijssel. 75 The title 'sailing where there is no water' sum.s up the essential paradox of water-traffic in an area where in order to navigate some of the rivers in dry summers it was necessary to dam the stream until sufficient waters had accumulated, break down the dam and ride the 'flood' water as far as possible before repeating the process. Despite the dates in the title, most of the work is focussed on the nineteentp century and details on the construction of the ships, the

71. H.F.I.M. van den Eerenbeemt, 'Dominee I.F. Martinet en de Oeconomische Tak Zutphen, 1778-1781', ibidem, 19-38. 72. ]. Mac Lean, 'Koperindustrie in Nederland, 1750-1850)' ,Ibidem, 39-63. 73. A. Stolp, 'Het levenswerk van de uitvinder Ds. Bernardus Koning. Zijn gaslicht en zijn gas­motor-experimenten (1778-1828)', ibidem, 64-104. 74. EJ. Fischer and R.E.M.A. de Peuter, 'Winstontwikkeling en kapitaalvorming in de Twentse katoennijverheid: de firma S.]. Spanjaard, 1833-1900', ibidem, 194-244. 75. G.]. Schutten, Varen waar geen water is. Reconstructie van een verdwenen wereld. Geschiede­nis van de scheepvaart ten oosten van de IJssel van 1300 tot 1930 (Hengelo: Broekhuis, 1981,276 p., ISBN 90 70162121, fl. 62,50).

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organization of the traffic, the work routine of the shippers and the levels of activity through the period. It captures the final prosperous period between the upturn in

activity in the area, especially from the 1830's, and the coming of the railways which sounded the death-knell over this form of transport. Whilst professional historians may bemoan the lack of a theoretical context and the relatively narrow focus of the work, this cannot detract from what is a highly informative and highly enjoyable read.

In 1818 a number of prominent people in the Netherlands founded the Maatschap­pij vaar Weldadigheid (Society for Charity) with the purpose of relieving urban poverty by establishing pauper colonies in the relatively underpopulated east of the country. The idea was that volunteer families in the west would be leased an area of land in the colony (approx. 3 ha.) the income from which would enable them to support themselves, contribute to the social services provided by the colonial administration, payoff the lease and accumulate some savings. Very early in its life this ambitious social experiment was tainted by a series of contracts concluded with the government which had the effect of turning the colonies into a scarcely veiled alternative to prison for convicted beggars. Nevertheless the original aims were never entirely lost from sight. Most of these developments have already been extensively documented but what the momumental study of the late Dr. C.A. Kloosterhuis attempts to do and ac­complishes admirably is to recreate the environment within which the 'free' of volunteer colonists led their lives in these communities.76 Drawing for the first time on the extensive records of the Maatschappij itself she succeeds in producing a detailed reconstruction of the composition of the colonists in terms of province of origin, age distribution, prior occupation, family size etc. as well as the problems of administra­tion and the details of day to day life. Despite their originally shaky start and the strong discipline imposed within the 'free' colonies, Kloosterhuis demonstrates that they evolved into self-supporting communities with a standard of life higher than in the surrounding areas. All in all this work provides a vivid picture of an ambitious and pioneering experiment in social engineering for which students of the social history of the period will owe a debt for many years to come.

A detailed picture of the structure of the plantation economy on the Dutch colony of Cural(ao in the nineteenth century is provided in an extensively researched mono­graph by Dr. W.E. Renkema. 77 Unlike other Caribbean plantation economies, Cural(ao produced little by way of staple export crops, and government-owned experimental stations set up in the 1840's to encourage such developments were closed a deoade later. The plantations were, by and large, integrated mixed-farming units designed to meet the needs of the urban trading community which formed the backbone of the colonial economy. The 5000-6000 slaves, which made up virtually a third of the

76. C.A. Kloosterhuis, De bevolking van de Vriie Kolonien der Maatschappii van Weldadigheid (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 1981,663 p., ISBN 90 6011 0269, fl. 75,-). 77. W.E. Renkema, Het Curafaose plantagebedriif in de negentiende eeuw (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 1981,400 pp., ISBN 90 6011 0285, fl. 49,50).

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colony's population not only provided the main labour force on the plantations but also acted as a safety valve in times of poor harvests; the export of a few slaves pro­vided extra income and ensured that the available food was sufficient to go round the rest. Since failures of the staple sorghum crop were relatively frequent, this helps explain the resistance of plantation owners to measures which would afford slaves in­creased legal protection but which would at the same time reduce their merchan­dizability. When, in 1863, slavery was abolished, the plantation system did not collapse. Indeed the fmancial position of the plantation owners improved since they no longer faced the obligation of feeding slaves at times of poor harvests whilst the tenancy and labour service agreements concluded with the freed slaves tied them to the plantations as effectively as legal arrangements had done before. Nevertheless, the plantations could hardly be described as highly profitable ventures; their attraction being as much the social prestige they conferred upon the owner as the revenue they yielded. In many ways, Renkema concludes, the Cura{:ao plantation system was an exception to the typical Caribbean pattern and fmds its closest counterpart in the hacienda of Latin America.

Turning now to the political and social history of the Netherlands in the nineteenth century, we have under the title 'Authority and Conflict' eleven studies on the history of social protest in the Netherlands, especially in the first half of the century. 78 They are the work of a study group from the Institute for Teacher Training connected with the Free University; Amsterdam, carried out under the leadership of A. Doedens. The research was concerned with collective resistance in various forms. Alongside the protests of the peat-cutters and the polder navvies there appear also a beggars' riot and the militia protest of 1831. The contributions vary widely in quality and approach and this heterogeneity - especially the extent to which they experiment with theoretical concepts - makes it difficult to compare them, and to draw general conclusions. It might have been more sensible to set about the various case studies - for this was a collective research project - according to a fIXed· format, and to emphasize their descriptive character. Despite the criticisms which can be made of method and content on many points, it must be said that a great deal of useful information is gathered, and partly systematized in a detailed list of manifestations of social unrest and social protest - cautiously grouped into various types - in the period 1813-48. This typology is given further content by a detailed supplement which includes a selection of con­temporary source material.

The history of the early socialist movement has received increasing attention in recent years. The International Institute for Social History publishes a series 'The Dutch Workers Movement' in which there has now appeared a monograph by G.

78. A. Doedens, ed., Autoriteit en strijd. Elf bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van collectiefverzet in de Nederlanden, met name in de eerste helft van de negentiende eeuw (Amsterdam: VU Boek­handel, 1981,305 p., ISBN 90 6256 4216, fl. 22,50).

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Bruintjes on the history of socialism in Groningen from 1881-189479 which may be

ieen ii a counterpart to an earlier work in the ~:une ~@ri@~ on Fri@~hmd. Ths !luthor has set himself the task of giving a primarily descriptive survey. He distinguishes four phases in his period. In the first (l881-84) it was the propagandist activities of Dome­la Nieuwenhuis which were most important. In the second phase (1884-91) there was a gradual trend towards organization in various forms (the suffrage movement, trade unions). The third phase (1891-93) was one of a belief in revolution, mass mobi­lization of the workers, confrontation and disappointment. The fourth phase was characterized by the debate on the future of the movement and ended with the schism of 1894. The entire process is clearly and convincingly presented. A supple­ment contains a detailed summary of socialist movements and associations in Gro­ningen in the period covered.

The fifth Jaarboek voor de geschiedenis van socialisme en arbeidersbeweging in Nederlandso (Yearbook for the history of socialism and the workers' movement in the Netherlands) is for the most part devoted to the party political organizations of socialism. It includes, inter alia, an article on the relationship of 'pillarization' (ver­zuiling) and class struggle and an appreciation of W.H. Vliegen, the historian par excellence of the early socialist movement and the SDAP, and one of the co-founders of the party.

The published memoirs of the social democrat W.H. Meijer81 are primarily con­cerned with the life of seamen around the turn of the century and the Seamens' Union. If this can be called a true ego-document, the same cannot be said of the 'Walden diary' which Frederik van Eeden kept, in addition to his personal diary, about the events and fortunes of the colony of Walden which he set up as an idealistic producers co-operative. The edition of this narrative82 also includes reports from the assemblies of the colonists and an introduction on the development of Van Eeden's social ideas.

In 'A gentleman's world dissected'S3 the sociologist K. Bruin gives a preliminary report of an inquiry into the old and new elites of Amsterdam in the latter half of the nineteenth century. His point of departure was a concept of Norbert Elias, concerned with the area of tension between established groups with considerable group cohesion, and new groups which have not yet attained such cohesion. Bruin distinguishes two

79. G. Bruintjes, SociaIisme in Groningen 1881-1894. De Nederlandse Arbeidersbeweging, VI (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1981, 151 p., ISBN 90 6012 438 3, fl. 19,50). 80. laarboek voor de geschiedenis van sociaIisme en arbeidersbeweging in Nederland 1980 (Nij­megen: SUN, 1981,272 p., ISBN 90 6168 157 X, fl. 29,50). 81. W.H. Meijer, Terugblik: herinneringen van een sociaal-democraat. De Nederlandse Arbeiders­beweging, VII (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1981, 357 p., ISBN 90 60123115, fl. 32,50). 82. J.S. de Ley and B. Luger, ed., Walden in droom en daad. Walden-dagboek en notulen van Frederik van Eeden e.a. 1898·1903 (Amsterdam: Huis aan de drie grachten, 1980,298 p., ISBN 906388071 5, fl. 32,50). 83. K. Bruin, Een herenwereld ontleed: over Amsterdamse oude en nieuwe elites in de tweede helft van de negentiende eeuw. Publications of the Sociological institute of the University of Amsterdam, I (Amsterdam: Sociologisch Instituut, 1980,89 p., ISBN 90 9000 1662, fl. 7,50).

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groups of old (Hites: the 'first coterie', members of the former regent patriciate, and the 'second coterie' families from the prosperous bourgeoisie which had come to the force since 1795. As new elites, he opposes to them the 'Haute Juiverie', the Germans and the East Indian fortunes. This makes for an interesting and very readable cross­section of the top layer of Amsterdam society, although there are some question marks over the author's method of selecting and processing his data. He himself ad­mits that the area of tension between old and new elites does not emerge sufficiently clearly.

The development of jurisprudence in the Netherlands from the later eighteenth century until the beginning of the twentieth is the subject of a legal history dissertation from Nijmegen.84 The author attempts to link the changes in the relationship between judge and legislator, to changes in society at large. The main line which he traces is not very surprising. First, a process toward legal unification and codification, result­ing in the appearance of the national codes in 1838. Then followed a period of strict legalism, against which the first criticisms were voiced in the seventies and eighties, a period in which social relationships were growing more complex. Finally in the first decades of the twentieth century, there was a clear breakthrough into a freer system of justice. In giving the socio-economic and political background the author has not been content to repeat the historical syntheses of yesterday, but has made consistent use of the most recent historical literature. Yet many of the nuances go undetected because he squeezes his data into a rather Simplistic, marxist-inspired interpretative scheme. The all too emphatic pre-eminence which he accords to socio-economic development scarcely leaves any room for autonomous influences in the political or juridical sphere. What should in fact have been the central theme of the book, the evolution of the judicial function, is squeezed out by the excessive attention given to socio-historical context. Moreover, the approach of these crucial paragraphs is un­satisfactory. The author falls too readily into long and detailed quotation in reporting legal opinions, without troubling to offer an interpretation or an analysis. His choice of source material is equally open to question, since he has used exclusively juridical literature, and has not included judicial decisions themselves within his purview. From a purely practical standpoint, this decision may at first seem defensible, but from the point of view of the result of the research it would undoubtedly have been desirable to investigate, even if only by samples, the actual conduct of the judges. Finally, when the author presents, as his most important conclusion, the statement that justice operates within society, this is hardly more than a truism.

The historical importance of the well-known Dutch physiologist and radical mater­ialist (,Ohne Phosphor keine Gedanke') Jacques Moleschott, (1822-93) is the central theme of a dissertation by RJ .Ch.V. ter Laage. ffi This is not a biography, more a sort

84. T. Jaspers, Rechtspreken in de mOlltschappij. Rechtshistorische studies, V (The Hague, Leiden University Press, 1980,515 p., ISBN 90 27117381, fl. 75,-). 85. R.J.Ch.V. ter Laage, Jacques Moleschott: een markante persoonlijkheid in de negentiende­eeuwse fysiologie? (De Bilt, 1980, 363 p. ISBN 90 90001581, fl. 40,-). To be obtained from the author: Waterweg 55, De Bilt, Netherlands).

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of preliminary study, which gives an inventory Of Moleschott's life and sets him in the context of nineteenth-century intellectual and scientific history. Moleschott's life was passed largely outside the Netherlands. After a lecturership at Heidelberg he was successively professor in Zurich, Turin and Rome. Although, like other physicians such as Voorhelm Schneevogt and J.P. Heije, he had belonged to the 'Young Hol­land' circle and had carried out scientific work in the stimulating entourage of G.J. Mulder, the Netherlands of the 1840's was too small and too restricted a sphere for him. (In 1848 he was to argue for the inclusion of the Netherlands in the German Confederation). Yet he continued to keep up his contacts with the Netherlands, and that he was appreciated there is plain from the special issue which the freethinkers periodical De Dageraad (The dawn) devoted to him on his seventieth birthday. After such a detailed statement of her position Ter Laage is not very convincing when she concludes that despite Moleschott's deservedly great reputation he probably does not warrant a full-blooded biography.

The monarchy is scarcely a subject of discussion in the Netherlands, and in its ~entury and a half of existence it has managed to defend itself against some heavy ;hocks, as was evident in, for example, the Lockheed affair of some years ago. This tone of national consensus is echoed in a collection of articles on the monarchy,86 in .vhich, however, the institution is otherwise dealt with in a great variety of ways. N. Cramer reconstructs the way in which the son of the last stadholder was entrusted .vith, and assured himself of, the royal dignity. A.P.J. van Osta gives us a typology of :he nineteenth century monarchy. The editor, C.A. Tamse, discusses the functions of William I, William II, and William III, from the point of view of the social importance )f their kingship. In good Calvinist tone, G. Puchinger traces the relationship between he Netherlands and the House of Orange past and present. J. Bank investigates the 'eelings of the catholic population and its leaders towards the House of Orange in this :entury. The former prime minister W. Drees devotes a chapter to the crown and its ninisters, and combines political information with his own observations. A.M. Donner ooks for a historical explanation and a contemporary evaluation of heritable and in­dolable monarchy. Finally, J.L. Heldring philosophizes in a lightly ironic tone about, on he one hand, the unassailability, and on the other the relativities, of contemporary nonarchy.

In September 1980 the Eighteenth century study group in Louvain and Brussels )rganized a symposium on ·'enlightened despotism in the Netherlands', which was :oncemed largely, though not exclusively, with Joseph II and William I. The eight )apers have been assembled, with a synthesizing and evaluating introduction by J.A. ~omewasser, as a double issue of the Documentatieblad werkgroep 18de eeuw. 87

fere, only the four nineteenth-century papers are discussed. Th. Clemens discusses he concentration of power under Louis Napoleon and shows how convinced demo-

:6. C.A. Tamse, ed., De monarchie in Nederland (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1980,240 p., ISBN 9010 134011, fl. 39,50). 7. Documentatieblad werkgroep 18e eeuw (Nijmegen, 1981) 49-50.

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crats and republicans of a few years previously could accept the monarchy without compromising their beliefs, as the best way of realizing their policy objectives. M. Chappin and J.P. de Valk have applied themselves to the classic problem of whether or not William I deserves to be called an enlightened despot. Their argument con­centrates on the king's own view of his position, in which they claim that a develop­ment took place, in the sense that William I placed an increasing emphasis on the historical roots of his sovereignty. They suggest that the concrete form in which his kingship manifested itself, was probably seen by William I himself as a passing phase in a longer term development. N.C.F. van Sas, in his contribution, lays the stress on the over-simplified and thus misleading picture which is normally presented of the structure of authority under William I.: too much attention has been paid to the role of the king, while the forces which constrained the exercise of his power have been insufficiently investigated. By placing the monarchy in the context of con­stitutional prescription and actual power relationships, Van Sas makes the political system under William I appear less of a monarchical monolith, and also softens the often sharply drawn contrast with the later North Netherlands political scene. Luc Fran~ois analyses the in many respects similar political careers of three Belgian politi­cians, Reyphins, Dotrege and Tarte, who began their careers as supporters of the modernist revolutionary Vonck, in the Brabant Revolution, and after a period of opposition to William I, fmally went over to active support for his regime.

In two articles which complement each other,88 C. Mooij reports on his research into the attitude of Friesland at this time of the Belgian Revolution. In the first he is concerned with the reaction of the population and the response of the authorities; in the second with the attitude of the Leeuwarder Courant. Both are placed in the con­text of more general remarks on political life in Friesland. Mooij states that there was a strong opposition in the Provincial Estates at the end of the 1820's. These fmdings accord with the gradual realization that political life in the Northern Netherlands under William I was less dead than is sometimes assumed. With regard to public opin­ion in the first months after the Belgian revolt, Mooij adds some nuances to the current historical cliche of little-Netherlands nationalism and hatred of the Belgians.

In the political system of the nineteenth century, the press played a central role -partly as a result of the prolonged absence of formal political organizations. Perhaps the most important paper in the first half of the century was the Arnhemsche Courant, to which a number of leading figures in the liberal opposition lent their support. A group of doctoraal students at the Catholic University of Nijmegen, under the leader­ship of G.A.M. Beekelaar, have investigated the history of this paper for the period 1830-50.89 Within this framework each of the collaborators has been able to choose

88. C. Mooij, 'Friesland in de jaren 1830-1831', It Beaken, XL (Leeuwarden, 1978) 273-300; XLII (1980) 239-62. 89. Maar wat is het toch voor eene courant? De Amhemsche? Opstellen over de Amhemsche Courant 1830-1850. Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van Arnhem, V (Arnhem: Gemeentearchief, 1981,336 p., ISBN 90 70220121, fl. 48,-).

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a specific field of research, which has led almost inevitably to the result being some­what heterogeneous. The main themes, of which various aspects are illuminated, are the Belgian Revolt, and the political developments of the forties. Among the most worthwhile of the studies are those on Belgium as a political phenomenon, and that on the attitude of the newspaper to the laying of railways and colonial policy. It is also extremely interesting to see the Arnhemsche Courant come forward as a defender of the separatists in order by so doing, to be able to criticise the system of government in general. There are also some less successful contributions, in some ofwhich the authors' knowledge of the literature has fallen short, the questions have not been sufficiently formulated, or, as in one case, a defmite non-problem is discussed. Special mention is also due to the introductory discussion by the editor, in which, basing himself on the tone of the press in the 1840's, and following in the footsteps of an older historio­graphical tradition, he makes a strong attack on the wellknown standpoint of J.G. Boogman, that the constitutional revolution of 1848 must be seen as a relatively fortuitous success for the liberals. The authors of this pleasant and especially well­produced collection do not claim to have written the defmitive history of the Arn­hemsche Courant. Some important aspects have not yet been adequately investigated. For example, it would be desirable to follow the political attitude of the newspaper systematically over a longer period of years, and to use this as s sort of barometer of the political climate in the Netherlands.

It was a good idea of the SUN publishers to bring out a reprint of Thorbecke's Historische schetsen, (Historical Sketches), and C.H.E. de Wit, who has been pro­claiming the importance of Thorbecke as historian for fifteen years, was the obvious choice to write an introduction to this classic text.90 De Wit's comments take up no less than 176 pages, but they do not contain what one might expect from an introduc­tion. A critical evaluation of Thorbecke's historical views is lacking, and there is no systematic attempt to investigate the relationship between Thorbecke as a politician and as an historian. In his preface, De Wit points out that 'the sketches are closely and naturally related to the political life of the author', but he draws almost no con­clusions from this remark. In the middel of some observations on Thorbecke's 'self­awareness' and 'realization' he gives a rather superficial and, considering this is a re­print of them, superfluous summary of the sketches. Anyone who is at all familiar with De Wit's work will not meet any great surprises in reading the introduction. Whether it is a question of historical insight or political deed, Thorbecke is always right. Dutch liberalism is defined in exclusively Thorbeckian terms, and its develop­ment identified solely with Thorbecke's personal political evolution. Whoever dares to adopt reformist views in any but the one true way, is soon suspected of dishonest intentions and branded as an opposition aristocrat or an anti-government conservative. Like De Wit's earlier work, this book swarms with conspiracies and unholy alliances between historians and the political establishment. Furthermore De Wit has a strong

90. Thorbecke en de wording van de Nederlandse natie (C.H. de Wit, 'Thorbecke, staatsman en historicus'; LR. Thorbecke, 'Historische schetsen') (Nijrnegen: SUN, 1980, 373 p., ISBN 90 6168 1537, fl. 32,50).

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tendency to present hypotheses and interpretations as facts. He seems to take the criticism which has befallen him over the years only as proof of the character of the historians of the 'conciliationist' school, in which, as is well known, he has put his opponents. Unfortunately, he makes no real response to their criticisms.

One of the more attractive aspects of 'pillarization' (verzuiling) is the sense of re­sponsibility which the various 'pillars' have developed in respect of their own past. Thus in 1930, the Riveil archives were established, acting on an idea of Gerretson, to preserve the papers of the leading families which had been active in the Riveil, a religious revivalist movement of the previous century. The initiative was a success, and among the collections which have since found a home in the archive are those of Koenen, De Clercq, Da Costa, Van der Brugghen and Heldring. Beside its conser­vationist role, the Reveil Archive Foundation' also had from the start the goal of stimulating historical study of the Reveil. Much has been achieved in this field, not least owing to the expertise of the long-standing secretary M. Elisabeth Kluit, herself the author of several important publications. In the meantime, the Reveil Archive has been able to celebrate its fiftieth anniversary, and two collections of articles have appeared to mark the occasion. One of them, Figuren uit het Riveil (Figures from the Reveil) is a collection of essays from the years 1929-40,91 written by B. de Gaay Fortman, co-founder and for a long time treasurer of the Foundation. The main focus of this symposium is on the antirevolutionary politics of the time of Groen, but there are also contributions on A.M. van Hall who died early after following and defending the schism of the orthodox Calvinists, and on the circle before which Groen gave his famous addresses on 'Unbelief and Revolution'. The fact that they are the work of a single author naturally gives these studies some homogeneity. Much more disparate are the newly written essays in the collection Aspecten van het Reveii (Aspects of the Reveil).92 For example, C.E. van Koetsveld and Hofstede de Groot are discussed, but also the attitude of the Reveil to the questions of vaccination and the place of hymns in church. Worthy of particular mention is the contribution ofW.J.G. Buitendijk who tackles the romanticism of Isaac da Costa, and has a number of acute observations to make on the intellectual climate under William I.

The fifth volume of the correspondence of Groen van Prinsterer has now appeared.93

This is the first part of two supplementary volumes which together will, like the original four volumes, span the whole of Groen's life. Even so, a further supplement to the first supplement is already in prospect. It is also to be expected that once the whole series (correspondence and official reports) is complete, some surprising con­nections will be discovered. A further oddity of the edition is that it includes a volume (Bescheiden I, eerste stuk, RGP 93) which does not exist officially though it does in

91. B. de Gaay Fortman, Figuren uit het Reveil (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1980,469 p., ISBN 90242 09536, fl. 79,-). 92. J. van den Berg, P.L. Schram and S.L. Verheus, ed., Aspecten van het Reveil (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1980,273 p., ISBN 90 24209528, fl. 45,-). 93. J.L. van Essen, ed., Groen van Prinsterer. Schrifteli;ke nalatenschap. Zesde deel: Briefwisse­ling, vijfde deel, 1827-1869 (The Hague; Nijhoff, 1980, 904p., ISBN 90 247 9054 9, fl. 175,-).

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practice. This first supplementary volume contains both letters which were not in­cluded in the original project as well as those which have come to light since. A few general observations may be made on the contents. Within the period concerned (1827-69) the emphasis is quantitively on the latter part. Worthy of special mention is a detailed correspondence on the school question with M.D. van Otterloo, and a long series of letters and notes to Aeneas Mackay. For the connoisseur there is also once more a number of letters in which the Leiden professor Van Assen makes his epigrammatic comments on the political situation.

The 'school question' takes up a central place in the political memory of the pro­testant part of the population. A crucial moment in this struggle was the School Law of 1857, which laid down that there was to be a mixed state school, to educate children in all the Christian and civic virtues. This was in opposition to the view of Groen, the leader of the anti-revolutionaries, who had wished for the separation of the state schools by denomination. In orthodox Groenian historiography the blame for this development has come to fall largely on the head of his kindred spirit the minister Van der Brugghen who is alleged to have 'betrayed' his confessional supporters, and broken his earlier promises. In a Nijmegen dissertation94 J. Brouwer attempts to over­throw this Groenian myth and rehabilitate Van derBrugghen. His point of departure is that the falsification makes the verdict on Van der Brugghen entirely dependent on that one moment in 1857. By putting the 'whole' Van der Brugghen in the centre of the picture, it becomes clear that he always went his own way and remained faithful to his principles. Although the author has succeeded in his aim, and his conclusions are convincing, some comments may be made on the way in which he has gone about his work. For example, his account of Van der Brugghen's intellectual development is excessive, while on the other hand he does not seem to be suffiCiently familiar with the complex political situation of the forties and fifties. Of the book as a whole it may be said that it would undoubtedly have benefited by a much more clearly defined composition. The very fact· that it speaks of a 'rehabilitation' demonstrates that even now it is apparently difficult to approach Van der Brugghen more objectively. The uninitiated reader should realize that it is above all the dying embers of an in­ternal protestant debate: in non-confessional historiography Van der Brugghen is a much less controversial figure.

The difficulties faced by political groups and movements of all complexions in organizing themselves on a nationwide scale in the second half of the nineteenth century had much to do with the constituency system of elections which automatical­ly enhances the importance of local and regional relationships. Hence the importance of research into regional political history during this period in particular. For Fries­land - always a region with. a face of its own, and an awareness of its own historical evolution -, there has now appeared a dissertation from the Calvinist Free University,

94. J. Brouwer, Het binnenste naar buiten: beginselen en activiteiten van Mr J.J.L. van der Brug­ghen (1804·1863). Gelderse Historische reeks, XV (Zutphen: WalburgPers, 1981,343 p., ISBN 90 6011 0307, fl. 57,-).

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Amsterdam, on the beginning of confessional party fonnation (1842-71).95 The author has placed his subject in a broad context, in which developments within the Refonned Church (the influences of the Groningen tendency, modernism, the Friesian Reveil, the 'Secession' of the Calvinists) and the multifarious aspects of the 'school question' are discussed. An objection to this approach is that what was intended as context often takes on a life of its own, so that the link with the fonnation of con­fessional parties is sometimes hard to see. An explanation of this imbalance is per­haps that in fact there was only limited evidence of confessional parties being fonned in this period. One may even wonder whether the author might not have done better to choose the Friesian 'structure of politics' as such, for his theme. This seems, how­ever, to be asking rather a lot, in view of the author's strong personal involvement with his theme. That this involvement stands in the way of a critical verdict is clear. For example, when he repeatedly laments the absence of any fusion in political matters between confessionals and conservatives, he is obviously unaware how important differences of religion and social standing were in this connexion. In short, the book is not easy to summarize and the problems it poses have not been sufficiently thought out. Nevertheless, what it has to offer is a mass of infonnation on local politicians, the sort of people who set up the confessionelorganization, methods of political activity, the regional press, electoral publicity and electoral associations; data which are in­dispensable for the true understanding of political life at the grass roots.

It has frequently been pointed out that there is still no systematic description of Dutch liberalism and its fonns of organization. Van der Mandele's book in 1933 had too many lacunae to be able to fill this function adequately. One of these lacunae has now been filled by an important Groningen dissertation by G. Taal: 96 the period from 1872 to 1901, from the death of Thorbecke to the schism in the Liberal Union. It is also the period in which the Liberals still fonned the largest political bloc. As well as the liberals, Taal also discusses the radicals, the Nieuwe Gids-movement, the 'young Amsterdam' circle of the 1880's, who, with M.W.F. Treub as the leading politician, fmally joined with the left wing of the Liberal Union in 1901 to fonn the Free Democratic Alliance. Only a few lines of Taal's detailed study can be indicated here. The central theme is the liberal organization. In a chronological narrative he describes how conflicts and schisms were an almost chronic affliction of the liberal camp, and a serious threat to group fonnation and organization. He also stresses, how­ever, that the differences which arose were based not so much on matters of principle as on the emphasis given to various policy objectives, and the speed with which it was hoped to achieve them. The most notable stumblingblock was the regulation of the franchise. The problems on this point reached a climax in the epic struggle over the Tak franchise law, which caused great discord both within the liberal ranks and outside

95. G. Abma, Geloof en politiek: confessionele partijvonning in Friesland. Ontstaan en eerste jaren (1852-1871) (Leeuwarden: Friese Pers, 1980,530 p., ISBN 90 33013088, fl. 85,-). 96. G. Taal, Liberalen en radicalen in Nederland, 1872-1901 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980,617 p., BBN 9024723019, fl. 49,50).

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them. This conflict is also the piece de resistance of this study. What seemed to stand in the way of a liberal organization, almost as a matter of principle, were the individ­ualist assumptions and outlook which all liberals shared. Moreover, the constituency system led rather to fragmentation than to organization on a national basis. The Liberal Union which was set up in 1884-85 was a fairly loose federation of electoral associations, and very hesitant whenever it was a question of putting demands to members of parliament once they had been elected. True, groups were formed in the Second Chamber, but they must be seen as a sort of debating club and not as formal parliamentary parties. Internal division sometimes led to three liberal parliamentary clubs existing alongside one another. In the end the strongest bond between the liberals seems to have been negative rather than positive: the formation of a common front against the rise of confessionalism. Just as problematic as their organization was the question of the liberal leadership. While that of Thorbecke had by no means been unquestioned, the man most widely accepted as leader for a while after his death, Kappeyne van de Coppello, often seemed to have difficulty in taking himself seriously in the role. Another leader, Van Houten, was by nature eternally contrary. In a milieu where personal insight and individual responsibility counted for so much, the in­dividual politician also deserves much attention. Taal has therefore enriched his nar­rative with a very successful series of character sketches of well-known and less well­known liberals and radicals.

The chronological arrangement of the book has evident advantages, but also a few important disadvantages. On many themes, data are spread through the book which would be better dealt with systematically; for example the functioning of the monarchy and the relationship between king and ministers, especially under the queen regent. Or, to name another important sub-theme, the conventions of parliamentary life. This problem is only partially solved by the excellent index. Naturally, Taal's book only shows one side of the liberal coin. He concentrates on parliamentary activity and the national organization. Of the other side, the electoral associations which gave shape to liberalism at ground level, he shows us a great deal, but in this field the actual research, local and regional, to a large extent still waits to be carried out. Without doubt, this monumental work will serve, for years to come, as a guide for such re­searches.

Nicolaas Gerard Pierson is usually regarded as the leading Dutch economist of the nineteenth century. He was the author of the influential Leerboek der staathuishoud­kunde (Textbook of Political Economy) and was, amongst other offices, president of the Bank of the Netherlands, minister of finance, and prime minister. J.G.S.J. van Maarseveen's Rotterdam dissertation97 deals only with the first decades of Pierson's life. The often startling variety of activities which the young Pierson engaged in between 1839 and 1877 appear, nevertheless, amply sufficient to fill a book. This book is largely biographical in approach, and makes much profitable use of archival

97. J.G .SJ. van Maarseveen, Nicolaas Gerard Pierson, handelsman, econoom en bankier. Eerste periode 1839-1877. Thesis Erasmus University, Rotterdam (1981, 317 p.).

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material. Pierson grew up in a typical R6veil background. In a relatively short time he developed, mainly by his own efforts, into a noted economist. As a scholar he also won influence in politics. Van Maarseveen sees him in the sixties as an outspoken young liberal who was, however, to make a shift to the right in the following decade. One may wonder whether this move to the right has not been somewhat exaggerated. At any rate the label 'conservative' is applied rather loosely. Van Maarseveen has succeeded in giving substance to the man behind the economist. All of Pierson's social and publicist activities are carefully recorded. It would have been desirable to con­clude with a systematic analysis of his economic and political ideas.

As a young liberal Pierson distinguished himself above all by his contribution to the discussion on the 'Cultivation System'. M. Kuitenbrouwer demonstrates how Pierson's colonial views gradually came to bear the character of an explicit theory of colonial­ism.98 The value of this evolutionist theory was above all in the legitimacy which the liberals could derive from it, after the rejection of the Cultivation Law of Fransen van de Putte for a policy of gradual reform of Javanese society.

Both H. Wesseling and H.W. von der Dunk have concerned themselves with the in­creasing tension which the Netherlands' paradoxical position as a small European power with a great colonial empire brought with it at the end of the nineteenth century. Wesseling analyses the Netherlands' position at the Berlin conference of 1884-1885, which was to solve the problems of West Africa.99 The Netherlands followed a most cautious course, which was intended above all to safeguard Dutch interests in the East Indies, There was a risk that agreements would be made at Berlin which - although formally only referring to Africa - might come to be seen as general rules by which to judge the effectiveness of the exercise of colonial power. To prevent this was the high political goal to which the commercial interests - in themselves not insignificant - which the Netherlands possessed in West Africa, were subordinated. Von der Dunk shows1oo that the traditional Dutch policy of simultaneous friendship with both Germany (for European reasons) and England (for colonial reasons) was to become an ever more urgent necessity towards the end of the century as a result of growing Anglo-German antagonism. At the same time there was also an increasing economic and cultural bond between the Netherlands and Germany, which threatened Dutch neutrality and perhaps even Dutch independence. The counter-pressure which this development provoked was two-fold. On the one hand, the Entente Powers could not possibly permit the Netherlands to fall into the German sphere of influence. On the other hand, the growing dependence on Germany led to an explicit reassertion of Dutch nationality in the Netherlands themselves.

98. M. Kuitenbrouwer, 'N.G. Pierson en de koloniale politiek, 1860-1909', Tijdschrift voor ge­schiedenis, XCIV (1981) 1-28. 99. H.L. Wesseling, 'Nederland en de Conferentie van Berlijn, 1884-1885', ibidem, XCIII (1980) 559-76. 100. H.W. von der Dunk, Die Niederlande im Krltftespiel zwischen Kaiserreich und Entente. In­stitut fiir europaische Geschichte Mainz, Vortrage LXXIV (Wiebaden: Steiner, 1980,44 p., ISBN 3515034250, DM 8,20).

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BELGIUM SINCE 1800

Following its series of dossiers on the Ghent textile workers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the 'Centre for Recent Social History' at the Free University of Brussels has now begun a series of publications on wages and prices in Belgium for the same period. Those responsible for this initiative, Et. Scholliers and J. Hannes, hope by means of the publication of such quantitative data to be able to make a decision contribution to the old debate on the question of living standards during the In­dustrial Revolution. In the series on wages, five volumes have now appeared in 1979-80, and one volume of the series on prices was published during 1979. The first volume of the wage series 101 contains, besides wages for the period 1809-1934 compiled from the accounts of public institutions in Brussels, a bibliographical survey of the history of prices and wages in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, intended as an introduction to the whole series. It includes works in which detailed wage and price series appear, and publications discussing the problems of wages, prices, pur­chasing power and the standard of living. As far as Belgium is concerned, the bibli­ography is virtually exhaustive. The second volume in the wage series gives a selection from the results of a survey made in 1942 by the Statistical Department of the Belgian National Bank into the wages paid in Belgian industry. The data refer to the years 1913-40, and to the following sectors: metals, glass, ceramics, zinc, quarrying, textiles, foodstuffs, chemicals, gas, electricity and building. They are important, as they permit us to follow the evolution of wages in detail: a substantial rise in 1920, a slight fall in 1921-22, a modest rise in 1924 and 1925, a more marked rise from 1926 to 1930, and a constant fall from the latter year to 1935, followed by a renewed rise until the level of 1929-30 was regained immediately before the Second World War. Since this dossier contains not only details on hourly rates of pay, but on weekly rates as well, it is possible to trace the evolution of real wages during the years of economic crisis. Until now researchers have been unable to take sufficient account of the marked rise in partial unemployment in this period, so that it was generally assumed that the pur­chasing power of the working population was increasing during the crisis years 1930-35. The data now published show, however, that purchasing power was falling in this period, in some sectors very considerably.l02 The third wage series contains data from the Labour Exchange in Brussels (,Bourse du Travail') and concern wages in the most important sectors of the Belgian economy in the years 1922-39.103 In dossier four the wage data of the Brussels printing firm of Hayez are published for the period 1865-1934. From its establishment in 1780 the firm speCialized in administrative and scientific printing. Mechanization of the fi,rm began only in the beginning of the twentieth century, with the introduction of electric power. This had the result, that

101. P. Van den Eeckhout, Lonen van Brusselse arbeiders in open bare instellingen (1809-1934): bouwvakarbeiders, ziekenhuis- en stadspersoneel. Loonreeks I (Brussels: Vrije Universiteit Brussel (V.U.B.), 1979, 10 + 50 p.). 102. P. Scholliers, Lonen in de Belgische nijverheid, 1913-1940: de enquete Davin. Loonreeks II (Brussels: V.U.B. 1979, 153 p.). 103. Idem, Loonlijsten van de Brusselse Arbeidsbeurs, 1922-1939. Loonreeks III (Brussels: V.U.B.,

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the productivity of the workers, (compositors, printers, binders) remained unchanged for a very long time. Because of the firm's specialized clientele, and its highly special­ized products, the number employed remained virtually constant. In general the well­educated workforce received relatively good wages. Since there is also information preserved on the hours of work put in by the workers, it is possible to establish the real daily rate of pay. It appears that daily pay in the firm of Hayez fell during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.l04 Scholliers' publication of a wage series for the chocolate firm of Cote d'Or (of Anderlecht, near Brussels) is preceded by a short historical survey, not just of the firm concerned, but of the entire Brussels chocolate industry. Here too, we have data on the hours worked, as well as on the daily and weekly wages paid.IOS In 1962 Et. Scholliers published an extremely important index of Antwerp house rents from 1500 to 1873. Now, under his supervision, a rent index series for Brussels from 1800 to 1940 has been prepared, on the basis of 383 houses and 89 flats. This index is intended to serve as a study of the material living conditions of the lower classes in Brussels in the nineteenth century .106

These lower classes played an important role in the struggle for Belgian indepen­dence in 1830. This was stressed as long as half a century ago by M. Bologne, in a book which has been forgotten since it did not fit into the patriotic bourgeois historio­graphy of the Belgian Revolution. The book has now been translated from French into Dutch, and was published in 1979,1°7 with an addendum which is intended to indicate the changes in historical writing since then resulting from research into the background of the events of 1830. Some interesting themes are mentioned in this appendix: the composition of the Belgian proletariat in 1830, the development of mechanization, and the rise of industrial capitalism, the role of the workers in the armed struggle, the way in which the bourgeoisie appropriated the revolution to themselves, the role of Belgian patriotism as a lightning conductor against a pro­letarian revolt when this revolt threatened to tum against the bourgeoisie as a whole. Both Bologne's text and the supplement make stimulating reading but unfortunately the editors do not seem to be sufficiently familiar with the available historical liter­ature on the subject. The role of the proletariat in the Belgian Revolution is a topic which deserves to be investigated in more depth.

Since K. Van Isacker, S.1., published his study of 'Daensism' in 1959, increasing attention has been paid to this christian democratic movement led by the priest Adolf Daens and his brother Pieter. Separate studies have already appeared on Daens­ism at Alost, Bruges, in the countryside of South Flanders, at Deinze and at Antwerp.

1980,71 p.). 104. Idem, Lonen in de Brusse1se drukkerii Hayez, 1865-1934. Loonreeks IV (Brussels: V.U.B., 1980,261 p.). 105. Idem, Lonen in het chocoladebedriifCote d'Or, 1907-1931. Loonreeks V (Brussels: V.u'B., 169 p.). 106. P. van den Eeckhout and P. Scholliers, De Brusselse huishuren, 1800-1940. Prijzenreeks I (Brusseb: V.U.B., 141 p.). 107. M. Bologne, De proletarische opstand van 1830 in Belgie. With an appendix by G. Gale and G. Vanzieleghem (Louvain: Kritak, 1979, 135 p., ill., ISBN 9063030436).

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Now in F. Vanhemelrijck's studyl08 it is the turn of the arrondissement of Brussels, where the priest A. Daens was elected as a member of parliament in 1902. The author studies the attitude of conselVative catholics, liberals and socialists in the Brussels region to Daensism, and the way in which the Daensist breakthrough in Brabant eventually became possible. He investigates the organization of propaganda and dis­cusses the platform adopted by the christian democrats in the election campaign. The support won by the 'Christian Peoples Party' in Brabant was above all drawn from the workers in the brickworks, the hopgrowing population of the district to the west of Brussels, and the lower middle class of the capital.

Songs played a leading role in socialist propaganda. H. Vandecaveye discusses the rise of popular songs with a clear socio-political contene09 which were aimed ex­clusively at the industrial proletariat. Particularly in the second half of the nineteenth century, these songs had a very important function in the workers' struggle. The author shows this clearly for the Flemish industrial city of Ghent, where songs were used as a means of propaganda, mainly in the socialist movement. Catholics and liberals tried to counter the success of these songs, among other methods by in­timidating their composers and singers. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, when the socialist party was going further along the path of reformism, the crude and often revolutionary proletarian song evolved into the 'culturally educative' workers song.

The views of the Flemish priest-poet Guido Gezelle, as they were expressed in the Bruges weekly, "t Jaer 30', were characteristic of a whole group of Flemings who took up the struggle against the laicized industrial society which was in the ascendant. They were convinced 'ultramontanes' who strove to preserve the threatened age-old bond between the church and the life of the people. In his weekly, Gezelle tried to prove that there was an old inner relationship between the Flemings on the one hand and God and Nature on the other, and that the Flemings must remain true to the old values and traditions which still lived on among the humbler people of the country­side. In the rise of factory life Gezelle saw a great danger for religion and for the customs of his forefathers. J. Geens' explanation of Gezelle's vision of society helps us to understand why the workers' movement found it so difficult to get off the ground in nineteenth-century catholic circlesYo

The Catholic governments which were in power in Belgium from 1884 to 1914 paid a great deal of attention to the rural population. A number of factors contributed to this, the need to maintain national food production; a belief in the value of agri-

108. F. Vanhemelryck, Het Daengj,me in het Arrondillsement Brusllel. Eclectica with a series of monographs, VIII, iii-iv (Brussels: Economische Hogeschool Sint-Aloysius, 1979, 100 p., ill., SF 300) With summary in English. 109. H. Vandecaveye, 'Het proletarierslied: een sociaal-kulturele verschijningsvorm van de socia­listische arbeidersbeweging', Belgillch tijdschrift voor nieuwste geschiedenis, XI (Ghent, 1980) 171-202. With summary in English. 110. J. Geens, 'Omtrent de maatschappijvisie in Guido Gezelles weekblad 't Jaer 30 (1864-1865)" Biekorf, Welltvloams archief voor geschiedenis, archeologie, toal- en volkllkunde, LXXX (Bruges, 1980) 227-53.

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culture as a means of maintaining the physical strength of the country; the conviction that only a highly developed primary sector could build a defence against the social consequences of urbanization and industrialization, which was seen as a danger to belief and morality. Considerations of purely party politics also played a role: the rural people who were protected by the clergy and the great landowners formed the most loyal electoral clientele of the catholic party. A study by L. van Mollell1 demon­strates that this policy bore fruit: the exodus from the country to the towns was slowed down, so that the existing social, religious and political order, despite the economic difficulties which made themselves felt in agriculture, was at any rate never threatened by the countryfolk. On the contrary the farmers contributed much, via the corporatism which was built up in the agricultural sector by the catholic authorities, to a conservative social policy.

The history of the trade union movement in Belgium has up to now, according to F. Lehouck, been written, by catholics and socialists alike, in a rather subjective man­ner, a consequence of the competition between the socialist and catholic trade unions. In a sociological studyll2 Lehouck tries to give a synthesis, based on existing catholic and socialist historiography, but without making use of any new archival material. Against the background of social conditions and political development in Belgium, he investigates the origins and growth of the trade union movement in Belgium in the period from the end of the eighteenth century to 1914 (with the emphasis on the period after 1830). Lehouck deserves much admiration for his attempts to reach a balance in his study, between 'catholic' and 'socialist' material. However, he occasion­ally makes use of sources which are unable to withstand the test of scientific criticism, and is thus not wholly free from inaccuracies and erroneous interpretations. He has also failed to include a number of recent innovative scientific contributions in his study. Nonetheless, his exceptionally stimulating book is an extremely worthwhile contribution to the history of trade unionism in Belgium. In particular, his last chapter, ('some characteristics of the trade union movement before 1914') invites further research into crucial problems of the development of the workers' movement, for example confessionalism among the catholic workers, the relations between trade unions and politics, the anti-syndicalism of the employers, the anti-clericalism of the socialist unions, the anti-socialism of the catholic trade union movement and the role of women in union affairs.

Ecclesiastical archives in Belgium are often inaccessible or open only to a chosen few so editions of texts are more than welcome. L. Gevers ll3 provides an almost

111. L. Van Molle, 'De Belgische katholieke landbouwpolitiek voor de Eerste Wereldoorlog', Belgisch tijdschrift voor nieuwste geschiedenis, X (1979) 417-59. With summary in French and English. 112. F. Lehouck, Van apathie tot strijdbaarheid. Scheu van een geschiedenis van de Belgische vakbeweging, 1830-1914 (Bruges: Orion - Nijmegen: Gottmer, 1980, 529 + 16 p., ill., ISBN 90 264 39547, BF 890). 113. L. Gevers, Kerk, onderwijs en Vlaamse Beweging. Documenten uit kerkelijke archieven over faalregime en Vlaamsgezindheid in het katholieke middelbaar onderwijs (1830-1900). I.e.H.G., LXXXIX (Louvain-Paris: Nauwelaarts, 1980,426 p., BF 750).

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complete sUlvey of what is to be found in the episcopal archives at Malines, Ghent

and Liege, as well as in the archives of those religious orders, especially the Jesuits, who occupied themselves with education, concerning the language of education and family life, the teaching of the vernacular, and Flemish national consciousness. It refers to the catholic boys' schools of the Flemish speaking part of Belgium, including Brussels, in the nineteenth century. Two hundred texts are printed in three chronolog­ical periods divided at 1850 and 1883. Each period is introduced by an explanatory foreword, followed by the texts, arranged according to the archives from which they are drawn and provided with a descriptive title to facilitate their use. The texts which derive from ecclesiastical functionaries, politicians, teachers and pupils, are mostly in French, the language of the elite and the language of instruction in se­condary education. Latin texts are accompanied by a translation. The author has provided a detailed critical apparatus, biographical notes, and references to periodicals and societies. A text-edition of the highest calibre, which not only helps us to gain an insight into the diversified structure and organization of catholic secondary education, but also invites further reflection on the importance for power politics of the linguistic ideology which it reveals, and the Flemish reaction against it.

The reformist policies of Belgian socialism continue to inspire study. A. Mommens' book on the Belgian Workers' Party114 fills a gap between the work of D. De Weerdt (period 1972-1880) and that of M. Claeys van Haegendoren (1914-1940), the crucial period between the forming of an organized party in 1885 and the outbreak of the First World War. The author shows, using newspapers and the reports of party con­gresses, not only how the B.W.P. was a reformist workers' party from the very be­ginning, but also how opportunism and pragmatism came to determine its political practice. Various elements in his analysis help to explain this: the leadership of the skilled craftsmen which was closely associated with the progressive petty bourgeoisie from whom it took its ideology and tactics, the importance of Brussels, the signif­icance of the aristocracy of labour and the creation of a workers' bureaucracy, the key position of the rapidly developing co-operative movement. It was expressed, inter alia, in the policy of alliance with the liberals, and the attitude of the party leaders towards general strikes. The main criticism which can be levelled at this book is that the author has confined his discussion too narrowly to the policy of the leading groups within the party without paying enough attention to other factors.

Despite innumerable publications on the Flemish movement, the lacunae in our historical knowledge remain great. That applies a fortiori to the problems in the capital, Brussels, whose most obvious characteristic is the shift from a mainly Flemish speaking to a predominantly francophone district. This has led to the present-day problem of the status which this agglomeration must be given in a regionalized Belgium. It is a complex matter, influenced by social, economic, demographic and political factors, and as such is more than a purely linguistic question. To investigate this in

114. A. Mommen, De Belgische Werkliedenpartij 1880-1914 (Ghent: Masereelfonds, 1980,260 p., BF 345).

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all its aspects, and to co-ordinate various disciplines, the Centre for Interdisciplinary Research was established in 1977 at the Free University of Brussels. Parts 3 and 4 of its publication 'Language and Social Integration' contain the proceedings of an in­ternational conference which was held in March 1981.11S One of the sections was concerned with the historical aspects, social and political. The results were particularly interesting: the fmdings of small scale investigation into migration; details on the poor population of Brussels, the key function of primary schools in the process of galli­cization, soundings on how this gallicization was deliberately fostered by those in power, the ways in which it came about, who were responsible, and what resistance was met. All this is based on periodic samples from 1830 to 1914. In combination with the results of other sections, more concerned with the present-day state of affairs, it gives us the first insights into the mechanism of gallicization.

Part five of the series is the doctoral thesis of F. Louckx who has integrated the study of linguistic behaviour into the theoretical literature on ethnic and racial rela­tions, in order to be able to apply to the best advantage the achievements of both branches of sociology.116 In the first place he has constructed a differentiated and empirically testable analytical model by studying various linguistic or ethnic confron­tations. He then tests the model against the integration, linguistic and ethnic, of the Flemings in the Brussels region. He investigates first of all the linguistic situation in Brussels itself: the Dutch speakers, their position in the labour market, the Dutch speaking infrastructure. Then follows an analysis of individual linguistic behaviour based on 700 interviews. An indispensible book for those who wish to gain some in­sight into the linguistic and ethnic processes which are active in the Belgian capital.

In this context we may also mention the doctoral thesis of E. Gubin, which was awarded the Pro Civitate Prize in 1977.u 7 In it, she investigates the earliest develop­ment in Brussels of the movement for the protection of Dutch culture, paying much attention to its various levels: the Belgian background, the specific context of the capital, and its peculiar place in the Flemish movement. The book offers a critical dissection of the language censuses from 1846 to 1910, and a minute analysis of the various phases which the Flemish movement in Brussels passed through. Of great importance was its changing relationship with the other emancipation group which emerged from the higher middle class, francophone progressivism, and its resulting originality. The author gives a sketch of the leading militants, so that their group characteristics are well brought out. It is possible to criticize her divisions into periods and her interpretation of Belgian linguistic ideology, but she nevertheless gives a good

115. Onderzoek naar de Brusgeille taaltoestanden. Acta van het Colloquim van 28 en 29 moart 1981. Taal en sociale integratie, III, N (Brussels: Centre for Interdisciplinary research into ling­uistic conditions in Brussels, V.U.B., 1981,323 and 478 p., each vol. BF 450). 116. F. Louckx, Vlamingen tussen Vlaanderen en Wallonie. TaalaanvaardinJ(8- en taalontwikke­lingsprocessen in een meertalige situatie en bekeken vanuit de sociologische literatuur over et­nische en raciale verhoudingen. Taal en sociale integratie, V (ibidem, 1981,348 p., BF 450). 117. E. Gubin, Bruxelles au XIXe siecle; berceau d'un jlamingantisme democratique 1840-1873. Historische Uitgaven Pro Civitate, LVI (Brussels: Gemeentekrediet van Belgie, 1979,552 p., BF 750).

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insight into 'flamingantisme' in Brussels, and deserves to be imitated both for the ensuing periods and for the other Flemish cities.

There are still many unsolved questions about the importance and influence of the political parties, both nationally and regionally. This is certainly true of the liberal party, more partiCUlarly with regard to the struggle for power between the doctrinaire elite and the competing middle class movements. In two articles, P. Lefevre has reveal­ed the process of democratization in the arrondissement of Bruges.118 It appears that in 1911 the leadership of liberalism there passed from the higher bourgeoisie, con­servative and francophone, to the progressive middle class who were well disposed to the Flemish movement. This evolution is well described, with an eye for the shifts in tactics and goals, and their consequences. M. Reynebeau has made a similar analysis for Ghent in the period 1848-69.119 He investigates the political implications of the lowering of the electoral property qualification in 1848, one of the government's measures against the year of revolutions in Europe, by which the electoral qualifi­cation was reduced to the constitutional minimum, almost doubling the number of electors for local councils, although it was still limited to 3.09 per cent. The author describes how the political elite was also able to ward off the danger from the radicals within the middle class, and how the petty bourgeoisie were incorporated into the polarization between liberals and clericals and thus largely integrated into the existing political structure, so that the threat of a third party was averted.

The 150th anniversary of Belgian independence was the occasion for a number of commemorative volumes. Pride of place should be given to the special issue which the Belgisch tijdschrift voor nieuwste geschiedenis (Belgian Journal of later modern history) devoted to the year of revolution - 1830.120 The contributions discuss the correspondence of the papal envoy at Brussels, a profIle of the typical revolutionary in Brussels, the September days at Mons, the reaction of the East Flanders lawyers as a vanguard and in terms of their careers, the composition and importance of the provisional administrative institutions of the new state, the choice of a two-party system as 'la phase transitoire entre l'Ancien Regime et Ie regime nouveau'. The attitude adopted by the Societe generale and the anticipations of the shareholders of this bank on the basis of economic - and to a lesser extent political - motives, as well as the financial strategy which was to lead, as a result of the Rothschild loans, to the dependence of the state finances on European high fmance for the rest of the nine­teenth century.

Also of interest are the proceedings of a conference on Belgian military history

118. P. Lefevre, 'Democratisation du hberalisme beige: l'exemple brugeois 1900-1940', Be/gisch tijdschrift voor nieuwste geschiedenis, VI (1977) 185-205; idem, 'Le mouvement liberal flamand a Bruges (1872-1940)', Be/gisch tijdlJchrift voor fi/%gie en gelJchiedenis (Brussels, 1980) 384-92. 119. M. Reynebeau, 'De kiescijnsverlaging van 1848 en de politieke ontwikkeling te Gent tot 1869', Be/gisch tijdschrift voor nieuwlJte gelJchiedenilJ, XI, 261-306. 120. Be/gisch tijdschrift voor nieuwlJte geschiedenis, XII (1981) iii, special issue 1830 (689 p.).

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1830-1980, held at Brussels on 26-28 March 1980.121 Thirty papers grouped around such themes as the revolution of 1830, Belgian armed forces abroad, the attitude of the monarchy to national defence, the military milieu and the defence of national territory up to the present day. They make a worthwhile contribution to military and general historiography. We should also mention another publication from the same source, an almost exhaustive bibliography of Belgian military history published between 1830 and 1970, from the earliest predecessors on 1830 to 1914, equipped with a number of indexes. I22

The problem of the existence of Belgium as a nation, and a number of themes up to the present time, socio-economic as well as policical and cultural, come to the fore in Bet Boek van Belgiif (The Book of Belgium), a symposium of seventeen very different points of view.123 This is true also of several articles on the theme of 'His­toire et nationalisme' which are supplemented by an historiographical balance sheet of the Belgian political parties, the Flemish and Walloon movements and the workers' movement. I24

We should also mention a special number of Res Publica, dealing with the Belgian parliament, in which the first contribution by E. Witte traces the historical evolution of the role of the parties. I25 Over the years they have come to determine and control the channels through which the parliamentary form of. government works, without being able to make effective decisions about the real exercise of power. This is a striking introduction to a later issue of this journal which was entirely devoted to the study of party rule in Belgium.I26

Of the many great changes affecting the Netherlands in the second half of the nineteenth century, one of the most stI;iking was the improvement in the health of the population. This is especially evident in the sharp fall in the mortality figures which was accompanied by, and indeed partly a result of, the rise of a complex system of medical care and social hygiene. The provision of health care in the province of Lim­burg from 1850-1940 is the theme of a doctoral thesis by R. Philips.127 In it he analys­es the mortality figures, sketches the development of medical knowledge, describes the

121. Akten van het Colloquium over de Belgische Krijgsgeschiedenis (1830-1980). Centre for military history, XVI (Brussels: Koninklijk Legermuseum, 1981,529 p.). 122. Bibliographie de l'histoire militaire beIge des origines au Ier aout 1914 (ibidem, no date, 673 p.). 123. Het boek van Belgie. Een controversieel portret van cultureel Belgie (Hasselt: Heydeland­Orbis, 1980,352 p., ISBN 90 291 5768 2, BF 1360). 124. Revue de I'Universite de Bruxelles (Brussels, 1981), special issue Histoire et historiensdepuis 1830 en Belgique (234 p., BF 395). 125. E. Witte, 'De evolutie van de rol der partijen in het Belgische parlementaire regeringssysteem', Res Publica 1980 (Brussels, 1980): Het Belgische parlement 1830-1980,7 - 33. 126. Res Publica 1981 (1981): Participatie. Studie van de particratie in Belgie voortbouwend op de werkzaamheden van het gelijknamig colloquium georganiseerd door het Politicologisch instituut of 17 okt. 1980 (177 p.). 127. R. Philips, Gezondheidszorg in Limburg. Groei en acceptatie van de gezondheidsvoorzie­ningen 1850-1940 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1980, xxxix + 378 p., ISBN 90 232 17764 (paperback) and 90 232 1777 2 (hardback), fl. 47,50 and fl. 60,- respectively). Also thesis Tilburg.

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number and quality of doctors and reviews the numerous institutions with widely :liffering goals, ranging from curing the sick and caring for infants to the provision of drinking water and workers' housing. Development was chaotic and unplanned. Government institutions and private, especially religious, organizations cooperated well on occasion but at other times found themselves in conflict. The powerful hold of traditional cultur~ attitude over the local population had a dual effect. On the one hand it meant that acceptance of the modem medical approach progressed only gradually. On the other hand, it was eased conSiderably by the support and involve­ment of the Roman-catholic church and its institutions, which thereby acquired a position of great importance alongside the public services.

The establishment in 1880 of the Calvinist Free University at Amsterdam was an important milestone in the process of organizational 'pillarization' (verzuiling) in the Netherlands. On the occasion of its centenary a number of publications appeared among which was a collection of essays edited by W.J. Wieringa.128 In a short in­troduction he describes the principles upon which the Free University (v.u.) was founded and the changes which were introduced in 1971 when the direct link with Calvinism was abandoned for a much broader christian base. Fourteen contributions deal in contrasting ways and with varying success with different areas of scientific and academic work, comparing that done in the Free University with developments out­side. They naturally emphasize the relationship between the pursuit of learning in general and the speCifically Calvinist approach to scholarship. Of special interest is A. van Deursen's critical appreciation of historians who have worked at the university since 1918, in particular A.A. van Schelven, A. Goslinga, H. Smitskamp and J.A. de Jonge.

It was another forty years before a Roman-catholic university came into being, at Nijmegen in 1923. Catholic academieS had long sought closer contact with each other which led in 1904 to the founding of the 'Association for the furthering of scholarship among Dutch catholics', better known as the Thijm Society. Its 75th anniversary was celebrated in 1979 at a conference whose central theme was 'the identity of catholic scholars'. The published conference papers129 comprise a series of historically orientated articles on various fields of scholarship though, unfortunately, there is nothing on the natural sciences. Of particular interest for historians are the contributions of J .A.

128. M. van Os and WJ. Wieringa, ed., Wetenschap en Rekenschap 1880-1980. Hen eeuw weten­schapsbeoefening en wetenschapsbeschouwing aan de Vrije Universiteit (Kampen: Kok, 1980, 593 p., ISBN 90 242 0155 1, fl. 87,50). See also In rapport met de tijd (Kampen: Kok, 1980, 279 p., ISBN 90 242 1077 1, fl. 29,50) on theology at the Free University; D.T. Kuiper and H.E.S. Woldring, Reformatorische Maatschappijkritiek (Kampen: Kok, 1980,467 p., ISBN 90 242 1849 7, fl. 55,-) on social philosophy and sociology; G. Puchinger, Honderd Jaar Vrije Universiteit (Delft: Meinema, 1980, 324 p., ISBN 90 211 3066 1, fl. 27,90) a series of interviews mainly on the recent history of the University; and J. Roelink, Hen blinkend spoor. Beeld van een eeuw geschiedenis der Vereniging voor wetenschappelijk onderwijs op gereformeerde grondslag (Kampen: Kok, 1979, 192 p., ISBN 90 242 6586 X, fl. 44,50) a popular history of the society from which the University arose. 129. De identiteit van katholieke wetenschapsmensen (Baarn: Ambo, 1980,311 p., ISBN 90263 0505 2, fl. 39,50).

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Bornewasser, A.F. Manning and J. Roes. Bornewasser discusses the achievement of catholic historians in the Netherlands. Manning's article on catholic attitudes to social and political problems between 1912 and 1940 shows that they were dominated by ethical values and also that catholic political and social organizations developed strong­ly in this period. Roes provides a useful survey of the struggle to overcome the (assum­ed) academic handicaps suffered by catholics. A period which was strongly apologetic and inward-looking in character was followed by one in which scholarship became more professional and contacts with non-catholics increased. Finally, catholics began openly to question the sense of working exclusively within a closed community.

The socialist 'pillar' has not developed a network of educational institutions com­parable to that of the catholics and orthodox protestants. That does not mean, how­ever, that socialists did not attach any importance to educational development and training. A doctoral thesis by H.C.M. Michielsel30 provides a great deal of useful information about the fomative and educational work of social-democrats in the years 1900-1940, with particular emphasis on the Institute for Workers' Develop­ment (IV AO) which was established in 1924. At the start, the predominant concept was that borrowed from German theorists of socialist development work (cadre training and worker's consciousness). This later gave way to a more generalized view of socialism as a cultural movement which emphasized the fostering of a communal spirit. When neither approach appeared to lead anywhere they were, according to the author, displaced by a bourgeois concept of development work which was directed at creating independent, self-reliant individuals. Although Michielse's account of these changes is convincing enough, it is marred by his obtrusive disapproval of them and his failure to place them satisfactorily within the wider context of social-democratic developments in Dutch society. In spite of much useful information, therefore, the work is rather disappointing.

A. Knotter on the other hand does not make the same mistakes in his study of social-democratic views on wages and wage-conflict between the world wars.l3l In a lucid, informative and exhaustive discussion he concludes that a crisis occurred in the predominantly reformist belief that wage-struggles were something positive. Those like Tinbergen who propagated Plan·socialism were less favourably disposed to wage­conflict. Knotter sees this crisis as part of a more general one facing reformism as an ideological system which was to result in a complete ideological and political re­orientation of the Social-Democratic Workers' Party (SOAP) in the 1930s.

In the early history of Dutch social democracy and the social-democratic workers' party in particular, the most notable figure even if not always the undisputed leader, was PJ. Troelstra. Over the years, Troelstra expressed a number of ideas about what might be called the political system of social democracy: the relationships which

130. H.C.M. Michielse, Socialistische vorming. Het lnstituut voor Arbeidersontwikkeling (1924-1940) en het vormingf' en scholingfwerk van de Nederlaizdse sociaal-demokratie sindll 1900 (Nij­megen: ~UN, 1980, 391 p., ISNN 90 616 8151 0, fl. 29,-). 131. A. Knotter, 'Sociaal-democratische opvattingen van loon en loonstrijd in Nederland (1918-1940)', Tijdschrift voor Sociale Gellchiedenill, XVII (March 1980) 3-44.

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would prevail in the period between the winning of power by social democracy and the full realization of socialism. The problem is that these ideas were not very clear, not fully worked out and were scattered over a long period of time. It was obviously not a matter to which he gave systematic or regular attention. However, in their book Tl-oelstra and the model of the new state,I32 E. Hueting, F. de Jong Edz. and R. Neij have attempted to bring these ideas together systematically. It is a useful work because their research appears to have been exhaustive and all the relevant material has been collected. However, it is also disappointing in that they fail to show any clear line in Troelstra's thinking. This is partly because of Troelstra's own vagueness and incompleteness but also because the authors are very verbose and attempt to extract more from Troelstra's words than they contain. A shorter and more concise book might have provided some clearer insights.

In the somewhat narrower field of parliamentary politics, a very important con­tribution is the second volume of G. Puchinger's history of cabinet formations between 1913 and· 1939.133 It deals with the formation of the first Colijn cabinet of 1925, the arduous deliberations which led to the formation of the first De Geer cabinet and that of 1929. which resulted in the third Ruijs de Beerenbrouck cabinet. Most of the book, however, is devoted to the formation of 1925-26 after the second Vatican crisis. Shortly after the Colijn cabinet took office the Second Chamber passed a motion calling for the abolition of the Dutch embassy to the Vatican. This was unaccept­able to the Roman Catholic Party and the catholic ministers, and the result was a long political crisis. Puchinger's second volume has all the strengths and weaknesses of the first: a tidal wave of minute and unnecessary detail, top. heavy annotation, excessive documentation (which nevertheless lacks the systematic presentation of the true source publication) and the frequent failure to make connections between the events being described and the wider political questions of the period. Its strength lies in the de­tailed reconstruction of events. At times the actions of drama tis personae are follow­ed minute by minute. The fact that quite trivial matters receive such close attention is a salutary counterbalance to the high-flown generalizations so often encountered in respect of cabinet-formation in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the book is a rich source of general information and delightful detail about politics and politicians in the 1920s which no serious student of the period can afford to ignore.

The first volume of correspondence between the historians P.C.A. Geyl and F.C. Gerretson has been followed rapidly by a further four volumes covering the period 1929 to 1958, the year of Gerretson's death.l34 During the 1930s the preoccupation

132. E. Hueting, F. de Jong Edz. and R. Neij, Troelstra en het model van de nieuwe staat (Assen: Van Gorcurn, 1980,288 p., ISBN 90 23217411, fl. 45,-). 133. G. Puchinger, Colijn en het einde van de coalitie, II,De geschiedenis van de kabinets!ormaties 1925-1929 (Kampen: Kok, 1980,922 p., ISBN 902420311 2, fl. 195,-). 134. P. van Hees and G. Puchinger, ed., Briefwisgeling Gerretgon-Geyl, II, 1929-1934 (Baarn: Bosch en Keuning, 1980, 361 p., ISBN 90 246 4317 1, fl. 39,25), lV, 1942-1945 (1981, 380 p., ISBN 90 246 4318 X, fl. 41,25), V, 1946-1958 (1981, 358 p., ISBN 90 246 43198, fl. 41,25).

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with the Flemish cause (which so dominated volume I) declined rapidly. In 1935 Geyl was finally appointed professor at Utrecht after a series of setbacks which dominate the correspondence of the preceding period. For Geyl the appointment provided his big chance to escape from his 'exile' in London, and he continually spurred his friend and supporter to greater efforts on his behalf in a struggle which to him was not just for a position but was also directed against the detested establishment of Dutch historians. After 1935, although they were now almost neighbours, they continued their correspondence. Their friendschip was often severely tested for a variety of reasons among which, as well as academic differences and widely divergent political opinions, contrasts of personality and character played an important role. A striking feature of their correspondence during the occupation (when Geyl spent a consider­able time in a prison camp) is that historical questions continued to receive as much if not more attention than military or political affairs. After the war their mutual differences led to a slowing down and at times a complete break in their exchange of letters. All in all, it is a fascinating correspondence between two fascinating individuals.

Another leading intellectual of the 1930s was the essayist Menno ter Braak. Never easy to categorize, he is the subject of two recent and totally contrasting studies. A. Borsboom in a work based on his dissertation of 1962135 approaches Ter Braak philosophically, paying special attention to his relationship with Nietzsche and nihil­ism, his rejection of all claims to a monopoly of truth and his concern to take up the right personal pOSition vis-a-vis the world. A.F. van Oudvorst's approach to Ter Braakl36

has as its backcloth the debate on the role of the intellectual in society whichexer­cised the student movement of the 1970s. He sees Ter Braak, despite his efforts to escape from his bourgeois nature, as a defender of a constitutional variant of the bourgeois order. Van Oudvorst repeatedly expresses the opinion that the choice between democracy and fascism in the inter-war years was ultimately a choice between different methods of repressing the working class. This seems a highly debatable con­tention.

Among the interesting new organizations which emerged in the Netherlands in the 19308 was one called Landbouw en Maatschappij (L&M: Agriculture and Society). It was a pressure group of farmers which, unlike already existing societies, was also prepared to act politically. I.H. de Ru's sociological dissertation on the organization137

devotes considerable attention to general theories about peasant movements and collective behaviour. Of greater interest for historians, however, is the amount of in­formation about the way L&M was organized. The author demonstrates that the popular belief that L&M was associated with political fascism has very little foundation.

135. A. Borsboom, Menno ter Braak. Onpersoonlijk nihilisme en nihilistische persoonlijkheid (Utrecht: Reflex, 1980, xxiii + 227 p., ISBN 90 632 2045 6, fl. 32,50). 136. A.F. van Oudvorst, Menno Ter Braak als woordvoerder van de intellektuelen. Een literatuur­sociologische benadering. (Amsterdam: Huis aan de drie grachten, 1980,211 p., ISBN 90 6388131 2, fl. 28,-). 137. J .H. de Ru, Landbouw en maatschappij. Analyse van een boerenbeweging in de crisisjaren (Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus, 1980, x & 377 PO, ISBN 90 60015991, fl. 40,75). With English summary.

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Only towards the end of the 1930s did the movement become more radical when its earlier fairly moderate aims and proposals had failed to generate much support. It is a pity that the subject is not placed more clearly in its historical context. De Ru limits himself to a number of remarks about agricultural politics and market trends in the crisis years, while his comments on inter-war society appear to be based on extremely limited .background reading. From the little that he does say on the subject it is clear that a number of insights could be obtained by placing L&M against the growing opposition to 'pillarized' politics in the agricultural sector.

Dutch colonial history before 1942 is the subject of two important publications. A collection of five essays by E. Locher-Scholten138 take as their theme the so-called 'ethical politics' by which colonial administration from about 1900 is often described. Four of them have been published before and are detailed, source-based studies of, respectively, the journalist P. Brooshooft who first introduced the term, J.P. van Limburg Stirum who was governor-general from 1916 to 1921, the journal De Stuw (1930-1934) and the paper Kritiek en Opbouw (1939-1942). New, and of a more general character, is the article 'Ethical Politics: a fragmented image'. The problem is in defining the term which, according to the author, has been used over the years in four broadly distinguishable, if partially overlapping, ways. In the first place it has been used to mean the administration of the Indies on their behalf, in which the colonial relationship passed through the stages of trusteeship, association and eman­cipation. Secondly, it has meant welfare policies for the benefit of Indonesians. Thirdly, support for indigenous nationalism and fourthly, its later use by writers to designate the extension of imperial authority to the territories outside Java in the sense of ethical imperialism. Such multifarious definitions have often hampered the study of ethical politics as a phenomenon and Mrs Locher has tried to resolve the problem not by banning the scholarly use of the term nor by defining it narrowly and precisely, but by adopting a broad definition which encompasses every aspect of the many-sided process to which it refers. In her own words, ethical politics was 'a policy aimed at acquiring de. facto political control of the entire Indonesian archipel­ago and the development of both country and people under Dutch leadership and after Western example' (213). This seems to be a fruitful approach on which more detailed work can build.

P.J. Drooglever has written an extensive dissertation on the Vaderlandsche Club (ve; Fatherland Club),139 a political organization which, as the author puts it, re­flected the reaction of the upper layer of colonial society to the rise of Indonesian nationalism and to a home government which was willing to take account of it. Its aims were to preserve the status quo, not to generate new or original ideas. Droog­lever's treatment goes well beyond a mere description of the party's ups and downs

138. E. Locher-Scholten, Ethiek in [ragmen ten. Vii! studies over koloniaal denken en doen van Nederlanders in de Indonesische archipel 1877-1942 (Utrecht: HES Publishers, 1981, 224 p., ISBN 90 619 4123 7, fl. 45,-). With English summary. 139. PJ. Drooglever, De Vaderlandsche Club (1929-1942). Totoks en de Indische politiek (Frane­ker: Wever, 1980,424 p., ISBN 90 613 53009, f. 75,-). With English summary.

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and its place in colonial society. He analyses in great detail the numerous policy questions with which the VC as a political party was involved and shows himself to be extremely knowledgeable about colonial politics. The book is virtually a re­ference work which, though difficult to read, will be an essential aid for anyone

wishing to understand the politics of the Dutch East Indies in this period. Two source publications deserve to be mentioned briefly. Firstly, the third volume

of sources capably edited by R.C. Kwantes,140 relating to the rise of the nationalist movement in the Dutch East Indies comprises items from Dutch archives and under­standably, therefore, is more informative about the judicial, political and policing as­pects of government policy than the nationalist movement itself. It is nonetheless an important contribution. Secondly, an attractive 'ego-document' which throws some light on the upper reaches of colonial society in the slightly earlier period of 1914-19, comes in the form of a diary written by C.L.M. Bijl de Vroe, adjutant to the governor-general during these years. 141 His observations relate neither to important political matters nor to strictly personal affairs, but mainly to the .social side of his professional and private life: receptions, visits, formal occasions, trips and so on. If not particularly important, it is pleasant and informative.

At the outbreak of the Second World War, the Dutch Foreign minister was E.N. van Kleffens. He held this post throughout the war, including the period of exile in London, until 1946 and continued thereafter to play an important part in foreign affairs. His reputation as a skilled diplomat and politician raised high expectations of his memoirs which are now being published. The first volume,.42 however, is dis­appointing. Born in 1894, his early career was unspectacular as an able career-civil servant in the Foreign Office with an exaggerated sense of status and a limited vision. This was crowned by a ministerial post in 1939. In respect of the important political questions of the time, in particular the policy of neutrality, Van Kleffens limits him­self entirely to long extracts from speeches which he made to parliament. Clearly he still believes the policy to have been correct - and there are good reasons for doing so -but it is nevertheless a pity that he feels there is nothing more to add.

Van Kleffens' role as Foreign minister during the period 1940-45 (presumably to be covered by his second volume of memoirs) is dealt with in an interesting dissertation by A.E. Kersten.143 Despite the title, Foreign Affairs in Exile, the work is not primar­ily concerned with the foreign policy conducted by the London-based govemment although this does receive attention in two case-studies devoted, frrstly, to the deci­sion to nationalize the property of Netherlanders in occupied territory and, secondly,

140. R.C. Kwantes, ed., De ontwikkeling van de nationaJistische beweging in Nederlandsch-Indil!. Bronnenpublikatie, III (Groningen: Wolsters-Noordhoff/Bouwma's Bo.ekhuis, 1981, Iv + 948 p., ISBN 90 624 3019 8, fl. 155,-). With English introduction and survey of the documents. 141. M. Schouten, ed., Rondom de Buitenzorgge Troon. Indisch dagboek van C,L.M. Bijl de Vroe 1914-1919 (Haarlem: Fibula-Van Dishoeck, 1980, 186 p., ISBN 90228 3893 5-510, fl. 36,50). 142. E.N .. van Kleffens, Belevenissen, 1,1894·1940 (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff, 1980,340 p., ISBN 9021826143, fl. 49,90). 143. A. Kersten, Buitenlandse Zaken in Ballingschap. Groei en verandering van een ministerie 1940·1945 (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff, 1981, 468 p., ISBN 90 218 2811 I, fl. 34,50). With English summary. Also thesis Nijmegen.

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to the role of the Netherlands in the instructions given to the allied commander in South East Asia, Wavell. In both cases, a one-sided attachment to principle prevented the Dutch government from accomplishing as much as a more pragmatic policy might have achieved. The main theme of Kersten's book, however, is the organization of the ministry and its various sub-departments. In 1940 it was still organized along old­fashioned nineteenth-century lines and with the move to London this was under­standably left as little changed as possible. But the war-years made heavy demands on the ministry which found itself taking on an increasing number of new tasks and responsibilities with which the old organizational structure was unable to cope. The reorganization which took place during the war gave the ministry a less antiquated air by 1945, but according to Kersten it remained inadequate in many respects. This was owing to insufficiently careful planning on the part of the civil servants on the one hand, and, on the other, to the relative indifference of Van Kleffens who had firm control over policy and a good grasp of what was going on, and was satisfied with that. A clear and lively stile makes this fascinating book a pleasure to read.

Still on the subject of the Dutch government in exile, H.H. Jongbloed provides an interesting and carefully documented account of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and the Soviet Union.144 Despite the German in­vasion of June 1941 which brought the Soviet Union into the allied camp, the Dutch government did not feel initially that this was sufficient reason to recognize it of­ficially, a standpoint which proved difficult to justify or maintain. The chief stumbling block, however, was the personal attitude of Queen Wilhelmina and it was not until July 1942 that the matter was resolved. Some of the documents used by Jongbloed have meanwhile been published in the ongoing series of foreign policy source-publica­tions which have now been brought up to 7 December 1941.145

The most important publication on the Netherlands in the Second World War is the latest volume of L. de Jong's mammoth work.146 In The Final Year a great deal of detailed attention is focussed on military operations, even those far removed from the Netherlands. In this respect perhaps more restraint should have been exercised. The Battle of Arnhem naturally receives extensive coverage, from an extremely per­sonal standpoint. De Jong accepts that the allied attack was indeed betrayed to the Germans by the double-agent King-Kong, but feels that as the Germans did not believe him the betrayal was of little importance. He attributes the allied defeat to their decision to continue even when success seemed unlikely, possibly because of Mont-

144. H.H. Jongbloed, 'Nederlands-Sovjetrussische diplomatieke betrekkingen. De moeizame ge­schiedenis van het akkoord van 10 juli 1942', Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiede­nis der Nederlanden. XCV (1980) 492-515. 145. A.E. Kersten and A.F. Manning, ed., Documenten betreffende de Buitenlandse Politiek van Nederland 1919-1945. Periode C 1940-1945. III, 1 juni-1 december 1941, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatien, Grote Serie CLXXII (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980, xciii & 719 p., ISBN 90 247 9036 0, fl. 100,-) .. 146. L. de Jong. Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, X A, Het laatste jaar, i (2 vols., The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980, viii + vi + 1100 p., ISBN 90 247 9043 3, fl. 185,-).

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gomery's inordinate ambition. From the point of view of Dutch interests, De Jong suggests that the defeat was a blessing in disguise since, at this stage of the war, the Germans would have responded to an allied victory by inflicting irreparable destruc­tion on the western Netherlands. A second important theme in provided by develop­ments in London. The ongoing disagreements between Queen Wilhelmina and Prime­minister Gerbrandy and his colleagues, were fuelled and further complicated by the tendency of the 'military authority' in the liberated areas of the southern Nether­lands to pursue independent policies. De J ong's description and analysis is extensive and, as in previous volumes, he is not reticent about passing judgement. Thirdly, the volume contains a great deal of information about the activities of the resistance, in particular the problem of armed resistance and the shortage of arms, difficulties affecting the mutual contact between the various organizations involved in resistance work, and the tribulations of daily life under the occupation. All in all, it is another tremendous achievement.

From the flood of other works on the war years only a few can be reviewed here. M.G. Buist has contributed the lion's share to a useful collection of articles on Gro­ningen during the occupation.147 The intensity with which the province lived through these years was possibly owing in large measure to the extensive process of nazification which the Beauftragte for Groningen, H. Conring, introduced and the widespread opposition which it aroused. The NSB was also quite strongly represented in the province.

A publication directed at the general public is E. Werkman's attempt to present a picture of daily life during the war years.l48 It is a topic which has not yet been satisfactorily dealt with but Werkman has too little space to do justice to it here. Furthermore, although the illustrations are excellent, the text is too anecdotal. un­

systematic and selective. Two short works look at the position and role of women in the resistance149 and

come to the not altogether surprising conclusion that in terms of social status, educa­tion, political afftliation and role distribution the position of women in the resistance organizations broadly coincided with their position in society at large. Even after 1945 traditional attitudes towards women's social position seem to have been little affected by their active war-time contributions. Some clever detective work by a journalist, J. van Lieshout, into the activities of three connected resistance groups in South lim­burg and Eastern Belgium has resulted in an absorbing book entitled The Hannibal-

147. E.AJ. Boiten et al., Groningen in oorlogstijd. Aspecten van de bezettingsjaren 1940·1945 (Haren: Knoop and Niemeijer, 1980,227 p., ISBN 90 614 88516, fl. 37,50). 148. E. Werkman, M. de Keizer and GJ. van Setten, Dot kan ons niet gebeuren ... Het dagelijks leven in de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 1980,192., ISBN 90 234 5270 4, fl. 34,25). 149. B. de Graaff and L. Marcus, Kinderwagens en korsetten. Een onderzoek naar de sociale ach· tergrrmden de rol van vrouwen in het verzet 1940-1945 (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1980, 159 p., ISBN 90-601 9701 1, fl. 19,50) and M. Schwegman, Het stille verzet. Vrouwen in illegale organi· safies. Nederland 1940-1945 (Amsterdam: SUA, 1980, vii + 120 p., ISBN 9062220592, fl. 8,-).

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spiel. 150 Two conclusions stand out clearly: firstly, that German intelligence was of a very high order and secondly, that many resistance groups were extremely careless in the way they maintained their contacts with each other. References and annotation, however, leave much to be desired.

The psychological aspect of collaboration have as yet received little attention since historians have tended to be more concerned with the question of the political or moral guilt of collaborators. J. Hofman's dissertation on the subject is therefore most welcome. lSi In it he analyses fifty-two cases of collaboration based on the psychiatric reports on political delinquents drawn up by the Utrecht prison authority's Psychiatric Observation Clinic. Although Hofman comes to no firm general conclusions, this new approach is a gratifying step towards a more analytical and less denunciatory per­spective on the phenomenon of collaboration.

Turning now to economic history, the period after 1945 in sharp contrast to the inter-war period,152 has witnessed a veritable explosion of interest. The first work which deserves mention is a new book by F.A.M. Messing which surveys the macro­economic development of the Netherlands between 1945 and 1980.153 An expanded version of a chapter written for the Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden (vol. 15), it is designed to appeal to the general reader as well as to the more specialized student. It provides an admirable and succinct outline of the major economic trends and a useful chapter brings the post-war period right upto-date. However, at this level, Dutch economic history is still more descriptive than analytical and, more parti­cularly, still tends to stress peculiarly Dutch socio-economic institutional innovations at the expense of specific supply and demand factors which might emerge from it more disciplined comparative analysis. It is to be hoped that this neat little book, which claims to be no. more than an introductory survey, will stimulate interest in pro­ducing a more 'weighty' and more definitive assessment of the period.

Two other works concentrate more specifically on the problems surrounding the formation of social and economic policy in the immediate post-war years. Of these the thesis of W.S.P. Fortuijn is narrower in focus, more deeply researched and by far the more satisfactory of the twO.1S4 Fortuijn traces in detail the social and economic

150. J. van Lieshout, Het Hannibalspiel. Het sinistere spel tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog van de contraspionnagedienst der Kriegsmarine, dat leidde tot de ondergang van een Nederlands- Belgische verzetsdrieeenheid (Bussum: Van Holkema and Warendorf, 1980, 335 p., ISBN 90 269 4574 4, fl. 43,95). 151. J. Hofman, De Collaborateur. Een socioal-psychologisch onderzoek naar misdadig gedrag in dienst van de Duitse bezetter (Meppel-Amsterdam: Boom, 1981, 299 p., ISBN 90 600 9468 9, fl. 39,50, with English summary). 152. Virtually the only work on the inter-war economy is J. de Vries and L. Webers, ed., Lim­perg's dagboek van zijn studiereis naar de Verenigde Staten in 1929 (Leiden-Antwerp: H.E. Sten­fert Kroese B.V., 1979, xx + 145 p., ISBN 90 207 0945 3). It is essentially a detailed record of a trip to the United States and, apart from the occasional comparison, has relatively little to offer on the Netherlands itself. 153. F.A.M. Messing, De Nederlandse Economie 1945-1980. Herstei, Groei, Stagnatie (Bussum: Unieboek, 1980, 163 p., ISBN 90 228 3538 3). 154. W.S.P. Fortuijn, Sociaal-economische politiek in Nederland 1945-1949 (Alphen aan den Rijn: Samson, 1981,518 p., ISBN 9014030916).

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policies of the ftrst three Dutch post-war cabinets and the effects on the ideologies of the political parties. The main issues dominating the period were the needs of eco­nomic reconstruction and relationships with Indonesia. He concludes that in a determ­ined effort to remain in government the Dutch Labour Party was forced to become increasingly identifted with policies which were not its own and became increasingly alienated from other progressive forces in society. For the other major coalition party, the catholics, these developments caused fewer ideological adjustments since in both outlook and policy their position reflected the growing conservatism in Dutch society. Nontheless, the period as a whole witnessed not only the success of economic recovery but also the laying of the infrastructural framework upon which the prag­matic welfare policy of the 1950's was based. These developments are placed against a background of the ideological history of the political parties in the inter-war period and the institutional setting of the 1940's. Whilst an attempt is made to evaluate the success of speciftc policies, particularly in the wages area, macro-economic develop­ments are rather summarily described in a short but highly statistical chapter at the end. Moreover, although the main body of the text provides a lucid and stimulating in­sight into policy-formation problems, tracking down the author's sources is made difftcult by the fact that the op. cit's begin from the very ftrst citation of a work, compounded by the total omission of a bibliography - a fault surely unforgiveable in a Ph.D. thesis. The same area as that covered by Fortuijn was the subject of a study group at the University of Amsterdam, the papers of which have been edited and published in book-form.155 More descriptive and less analytical than Fortuijn's, the volume nevertheless provides a useful introduction to the period and two chapters, dealing respectively with attitudes towards women and with industrial training for youth, provide perspectives not touched upon by Fortuijn.

Once Dutch post-war growth had got underway, the economy was characterized by a wave of business mergers. Unusual, in the sense that it anticipated this develop­ment by a number of years, was the merger of the textile ftrms Koninklijke Stoom­weverij te Nijverdal and H ten Cate Hzn. & Co. in 1952. The background to this merger, and, more particularly, the business structure and results of both ftrms before and during the merger are the subject of a thesis by H.H. Vleesenbeek.156 He con­cludes that at a time when the textile industry was experiencing increasing com­petitive difftculties the merger can be interpreted rather as a pre-emptive move to deal more effectively with structural problems in the future, than a defensive measure to get out of current difftculties.

The immediate post-war years were the theme of a conference held in 1980, the

155. H. de Liagre Bohl, 1. Nekkers and L. Slot, ed.,Nederland industrialiseert! Politieke en ideolo­giese strijdrondom het naoorlogse industrialisatiebeleid 1945-1955 (Nijmegen: SUN 1981,376 p., ISBN 9061681650). 156. H.H. Vleesenbeek, De eerste grote industriele Jusie in Nederland na de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Het ontstaan van Nijverdal-ten Cate. Een bedrijfs-historische analyse (thesis Erasmus University, Rotterdam, 1981, 186 p.).

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papers of which have been published under the title Resurgent Netherlands. 157 A.F. Manning surveys the political developments in the liberated south 1944-45 and their impact upon events after the liberation elsewhere in the country. J. Bosmans discusses the catholic-socialist coalition which dominated the political scene in the post-war decade. J. Bank's contribution on decolonization in the Dutch East Indies focusses on the influence of economic and church pressure groups on government policy and produces much new material. P.W. Klein discusses economic recovery and concludes that the number of feasible options, for instance in the role of government, were probably very limited. H.A. Schaper considers foreign policy, in particular from the point of view of security. J.C.H. Blom studies the results of public opinion polls between 1945 and 1950 and characterizes the period as one of discipline and ascet­icism. M.D. Bongaarts, fm ally , describes the expulsion of Germans from the Nether­lands as undesirable aliens. Although the articles do not provide an integrated view of the period, the collection is extremely useful.

Another useful contribution to our knowledge of the post-war years is D. Bosscher's detailed study of the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) from 1945_52158 and its fierce opposition to government policy, especially its policies on Indonesia and the economy. Its attitude placed the ARP in an isolation to which it was not accustomed, since before the war, under Colijn's leadership, the party had played a leading political role and during the occupation had been closely associated with the resistance. Bosscher links this isolation with the fact that after the war, the parties in power distanced them­selves from positions which had held sway in the inter-war years and with which the name of Colijn was closely associated. The ARP on the other hand would not or could not break free from Colijn. It was only in the early 1950s that this began to change and two anti-revolutionaries joined the cabinet. The author has written an attractive, readable book packed with information about the ARP, its leaders and the prevailing ideas within the party.

During the same period, a leading role in the Dutch Labour Party was played by M. van der Goes van Naters, even though he always stood somewhat in the shadow of Drees and J. Vorrink. He was parlirnentary party leader from 1945 to 1951 and his memoirs 'With and against the times'159 provide an interesting account of an interest­ing career. Before the Second World War Van der Goes played an important part in

157. P.W. Klein and G.N. van der Plaat, ed., Herrijzend Nederland. Opstellen over Nederland in de periode 1945-1950 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981, 176 p., ISBN 90 247 9110 3, fl. 34,50). Also Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden, XCVI (1981), ii. 158. D. Bosscher, Om de erfenis van Colijn. De ARP op de grens van twee werelden 1939-1952 (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff, 1980,480 p., ISBN 90 218 2572 4, fl. 34,50). In 1980 the ARP combined with the Roman Catholic Party and the Christian-Historical Union to form a new party, the Christen Democratisch Appel. In connection with that and the ARP's centenary in 1979, a collection of articles was published, edited by C. Bremmer, Personen en momenten uit de ge­schiedenis van de Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (Franeker: Wever, 1980,279 p., ISBN 90 613 5311 4, fl. 18,50). 159. M. Van der Goes van Naters, Met en tegen de tijd. Een tocht door de twintigste eeuw (Am­sterdam: Arbeiderspers, 1980, 324 p., ISBN 90 295 1808 1, fl. 41,50).

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the fonnulation of ideas on restructuring government institutions and clearly saw himself as Troelstra's successor. After 1951 he was active in European politics. His book contains a great deal about his political activities and also provides evidence of a life-long interest in nature conservancy and environmental problems. At the same time, however, his rancour against anyone with whom he ever disagreed such as Drees, the Foreign ministers Stikker and Luns, and others is obtrusive. He gives the impression of someone unable to accept the relative obscurity which befell him after 1950 at the time when Drees's star was in the ascendant. His desire now to appear as a modem progressive avant la lettre is somewhat forced, and arouses the suspicion that he is trying to gloss over his share of responsibility for certain political decisions taken in the past.

Van der Goes is also one of the eight, once prominent figures in the Social Demo­cratic Workers Party and the Labour Party who have written a collection of articles 'From Broad Vision to Narrow Margin,.160 Presented as an autobiographical history of social-democracy in the Netherlands, it is in fact a collection of contrasting re­miniscences and reflections on certain aspects of the Dutch social democratic party since 1930. Since little has been written on the subject the contribution is a welcome one.

The fusion of the socialist and Roman-catholic industrial labour unions which finally came about in 1981 provides the theme of a book by G. Hannsen, J. Perry and F. van Gelder. 161 How was it that seven, later on two, unions after a long period of fierce rivalry and antagonism could merge effectively as a single union? In answering this, the authors emphasize the evolution of social and political ideas in the Nether­lands and the particular historical development of the individual unions. Their ac­count is much fuller for the most recent developments and is strongly moralizing throughout. They seem to feel that praise is due in proportion to the degree of militan­cy shown and by that criterion the social democratic unions receive the most praise! The catholic unions only start to win their approval from the end of the 1960s. It is a one-sided work with useful information about events of the past few decades.

Returning now to the early post-war years, one of the biggest problems with which the Dutch Labour Party had to grapple was the process of decolonization in Indonesia. The way in which it dealt with this question is the subject of a well-documented, in­fonnative article by F.G. van Baardewijk entitled rather oddly 'The Labour Party of the Kingdom 1945-47'.162 The author shows how the party elaborated on proposals

160. J. Bank and S. Temming, ed., Van brede vine tot Ifmolle marge. Acht prominente Ifocialilften over de SDAP en de PIdA (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff, 1981,254 p., ISBN 90 218 2496 5, fl. 22,50). 161. G. Harmsen, J. Perry and F. van Gelder, Mens-en·werk. Industri 161. G. Harmsen, J. Perry and F. van Gelder, Menlf-en-werk. lndulftriele vakbonden op weg naar eenheid (Baarn: AMBO, 1980,280 p., ISBN 9026305141, fl. 35,-). 162. J. Bank, M. Ros and B. Tromp, ed., Het Tweede laarboek voor het democratilfch Ifocialilfme (Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 1980, 266 p., ISBN 90 295 2301 8, fl. 42,50). Van Baardewijk's article is pp. 164-212. Two other contributions to this yearboek deal with the paper De Nieuwe Tijd 1896-1921 and the Delft Polytechnic as a cradle of socialism 1900-25.

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contained in earlier reports and evolved a whole range of new ideas on the future of Indonesia. When it carne to putting them into practice, however, the majority of party members opted for a policy which would not endanger their coalition with the catholics. Together with a general lack of sensitivity towards relationships within Indonesia and a strongly legalistic approach within the party, this contributed to the failure to reach any rapid accomodation with the Indonesian Republic.

Ide Anak Gde Agung has written an account of the negotiations between the In­donesian Republic and the Netherlands in which, as prime minister of East-Indonesia, he himself participated.163 Remarkably little of the work is based on his own re­collections and owing to the lack of Indonesian sources he has had to rely mainly on Dutch sources which give the book, somewhat curiously from the hands of an In­donesian writer, a rather Netherlands-orientated approach. It contains, moreover, no real surprises, though the period between the Renville accord of 18 January 1948 and the so-called Van Royen-Rum agreement of 7 May 1949 is covered in much greater detail on the basis of archival material than ever before. He defends the main propo­sitions: the fIrst is that the Renville accord is the turning-point in the process of inter­nationalization of the conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia_ (However, per­haps a case could equally well be made out for the United Nations intervention after the so-called second police action.) The second is that the Indonesian Republic em­bodied pre-eminently the aspirations of the Indonesian freedom struggle. The greates mistake made by the Dutch was their failure to recognize that fact. This was already Anak Agung's opinion when, as prime-minister of East Indonesia, he went his own way in defIance of the course laid down by the Lieutenant Governor-General Van Mook. Some passages show that Van Mook's opposition to his behaviour still rankles. The sources used by Anak Agung will eventually be published in the Rijksgeschied­kundige Publicatien which continues to make steady progress. Since the previous Survey two new volumes have taken the series on relations with Indonesia up to 20 July 1947.164

A liber amicorum presented to the sociologist F.W. Hofstee contains wide-ranging and interesting studies of the Netherlands since 1945.165 Only a few can be mentioned here. J.E. Ellemers' clear and absorbing study of the development of society adopts the generally accepted division into three phases: reconstruction from 1940 to the end of the 1950s, accelerated change in the 1960s and a slOWing down in the course of the 1970s. G.A. Kooy takes a closer look at the changes which have taken place in the

163. Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, 'Renville' als keerpunt in de Nederlands-Indonesische onderhan­delingen (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff, 1980, 403 p., ISBN 90 218 25627, fl. 39,50). With Eng­lish summary. 164. S.L. van der Wal, ed., Officiele bescheiden betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische betrek­kingen 1945-1950, VIII, 21 maart-20 mei 1947, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicati<!n Kleine serie 48 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1979, xix & 796 p., ISBN 90 247 2238 1, fl. 84,25) and idem et al., IX,21 mei 1947-20 july 1947, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatien, Kleine serie L (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981, xxvi + 815 p., ISBN 90 247 9066 2, fl. 85,-). 165. Nederland na 1945. Beschouwingen over ontwikkeling en beleid (Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus, 1980, 309 p., ISBN 90 600 16580, fl. 48,50).

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more intimate areas of life, like sexuality, marriage and the family, and notes an in­creasing permissiveness which fits the general pattern of development since around 1800. Life came 'increasingly under the impact of the control of nature through science and technology, secularization, socio-cultural differentiation and individual­ism.' (p. 61) H. Daudt, in his contribution on the development of political power relations, considers that the confessional parties after 1945 in fact continued to operate on the principle laid down in the 1920s by the Roman-catholic politician W.H. Nolens that only in cases of extreme necessity could there be co-operation with the social democrats. The reason that the Labour Party was accepted as a co­alition partner for so many years was because it was seen as 'extreme necessity' and not because of any change in attitude on the part of the confessional parties. An in­teresting if debatable point of view.

A striking aspect of this collection is the interest shown by social scientists in historical development. This interest is also apparent in a number of social science journals; not just established journals like Mens en Maatschappij, Sociologische Gids and Acta Politica but also the Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift, the Cahiers voor de Politieke en Sociale Wetenschappen and Symposion. Furthermore, on the bound­aries separating history and the social sciences there are the Jaarboek voor de ge­schiedenis van socialisme en arbeidersbeweging in Nederland, the Jaarboek voor het Demokratisch Socialisme and the Jaarboek van het Katholiek Documentatie Centrum. A recent newcomer is the Jaarboek voor Vrouwengeschiedenis while the Dutch Com­munist Party's irregular Cahiers voor de geschiedenis van de CPN also contains useful contributions. Only exceptionally has it been possible to review articles from these journals in the Survey but their value for historians is often considerable.

Contributors to this article:

Dr. J.C.H. Blom - University of Amsterdam Alice C. Carter - London A.C. Duke - University of Southampton Dr. C.R. Emery - Teesside Polytechnic Dr. R.T. Griffiths - Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam Dr. C.C. Hibben - Bath Dr. J. Israel - University College, University of London J .A.F. de J ongste - University of Leiden Dr. Johanna Kossmann - Groningen Dr. J.1. Price - University of Hull N.C.F. van Sas - University of Utrecht Dr. A.K.1. Thijs - University Faculties St. Ignatius, Antwerp Dr. H. van Veldhoven - Vrije Universiteit, Brussels

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SELECT LIST OF RECENT WORKS ON THE HISTORY OF THE LOW COUNTRIES PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH

P. Leupen, Philip of Leyden: a Fourteenth Century Jurist. A study of his life and treatise 'De cura reipublicae et sorte principantis '. Rechtshistorische studies, VII (The Hague: Leiden U.P'/Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink, 1981, 300 + 104 p., ISBN 90 271 16784, Dfl. 156,-) An erudite study of the life and background of this remarkable jurist and of his De cura reipublicae, a sort of Mirror of Princes and a running commentary on the problems of government and of the limits of princely power confronting the count of Holland in the middle of the fourteenth century.

A.C. Duke and C.A. Tamse, ed., Britain and the Netherlands, VII, Church and State since the Reformation. Papers delivered to the Seventh Anglo. Dutch Historical Conference (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981,249 p., ISBN 90 247 9077 8, Dfl. 57,50). The following papers are of special interest: A.C. Duke, 'Building Heaven in Hell's Despite: The early History of the Reformation in the Towns of the Low Countries'; N. Mout, 'The family of Love (Huis der Liefde) and the Dutch Revolt'; G. Groen· huis, 'Calvinism and National Consciousness: The Dutch Republic as the New Israel'; DJ. Roorda, 'Contrasting and Converging Patterns: Relations between Church and State in Western Europe, 1660-1715'; J.A. Bornewasser, 'The Author· ity of the Dutch State over the Churches, 1795-1853'; J. Blank, , "Verzuiling": A Confessional Road to Secularization. Emancipation and the Decline of Political Catholicism, 1920-1970'.

M.F. Backhouse, 'The official start of armed resistance in the Low Countries: Boe· schepe 12 July 1562', Archiv fUr Reformationsgeschichte, LXXI (1980) 198-226. Shows the depth of Calvinist penetration in the southern Netherlands in the early 1560's, and the crucial role of the refugee churches in England in organizing Calvinist resistance.

Sterling A. Lamet, 'The Vroedschap of Leiden 1550-1600: the impact of tradition and change on the governing elite of a Dutch city', The Sixteenth Century Journal, XII (1981) 15-42. Examines the social composition of the Leiden city council in the immediate pre· and post· Revolt decades; argues that attitudes towards education and occupation began to change, while opposition to religious extremism - whether catholic or protestant - and the strength of family allegiance continued largely unchanged ..

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Sherrin M. Wyntjes, 'Family allegiance and religious persuasion: the lesser nobility and the revolt of the Netherlands', The Sixteenth Century Journal, XII (1981) 43-60. Examines the links between family interests and religion of 186 members of the 'lesser nobility' branded by the authorities as dissidents following the troubles of 1566-67.

A.C. Duke, 'Salvation by coercion: the controversy surrounding the 'Inquisition' in the Low Countries on the eve of the Revolt', Reformation principles and practice: Essays in honour of Arthur Geoffrey Dickens, (London, 1980) 137-56. Examines the role of the Inquisition in the Netherlands, from the earliest day of the Reformation to the outbreak of the Revolt; explains how its effectiveness was blunted by the opposition of provincial and municipal authorities.

W. Nijenhuis, Adrianus Saravia (c. 1532-1613) (Leiden: EJ. Brill, 1980, xxi + 404 p., ISBN 9004061940). First major biography, based on extensive archive research. Traces his life from Franciscan monk to rector magnificus of Leiden University to English pastor and advisor on the compilation of the 'Authorized Version' of the bible; examines the theological, political and other motives which led Saravia to support the Anglican, episcopal church order under Elizabeth I and James I; and includes a selection of Saravia's correspondence, much of it hitherto unpublished.

Myron P. Gutmann, War and rural life in the early modern Low Countries (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1980,321 p., ISBN 90 2321739 X, fl. A well-documented and very readable study on the impact of war on the rural economy, demographic development and daily life in the Lower Meuse valley from c 1620 to c 1750.

F.L. van Holthoon, 'Beggary and social control. Government policy and Beggary, particularly in the province of Groningen between 1823 and 1870', Economisch en sociaal-historischjaarboek XLIII (1980) 155-193. Poverty alone is not a sufficient answer to the question why people were driven to beg. The author shows how government policy had the unintended result of re­ducing beggars to a class of outcasts.

Studia Rosenthaliana. Journal for Jewish Literature and History in the Netherlands and related subjects, XV, i (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1981, fl. 35,-). Contains the proceedings of the first symposium on the history of the Jews in the Netherlands. Eight papers are printed in full, five others are summarized. The most general in character is I. SchOffer, 'The Jews in the Netherlands: the Position of a Minority through three Centuries', 85-100.

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E. Hansen, 'Fascism and Nazism in the Netherlands 1929-1939', European Studies Review XI, iii (1981) 355-85. A useful and clear survey of the literature on the subject. The author also places these political movements in the context of Dutch society in the 1930s.

E. Hansen, 'Depression Decade Crisis: Social Democracy and Planism in Belgium and the Netherlands, 1929-1939', Journal of Contemporary History XVI, ii (1981) 293-322. Literature-based survey of the reactions of the Dutch and Belgian social-demo­cratic parties to the economic crisis of the 1930s, set against the wider historical background of these countries during this period.

G. Hirschfeld, 'Collaboration and attentism in the Netherlands 1940-1941',Journal of Contemporary History XVI, iii (1981) 467-86. Less general than the title perhaps suggests. Mainly about the so-called Netherlands Union, the author's emphasis differs from that of 1. de Jong in his Nederland in de Tweede Wereldoorlog.

W.P. Coolhaas, A critical survey of studies on Dutch colonial history, 2nd ed., rev. by GJ. Schutte (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980,264 p., ISBN 90247 2307 8, fl. 62,40). An extremely useful and full bibliography covering all aspects of Dutch colonial history. The first edition appeared in 1960.

H.1. Wesseling, 'Dutch Historiography on European Expansion since 1945', in: P.C.

Emmer and H.1. Wesseling, ed., Reappraisals in Overseas History. Essays on Post­War Historiography about European Expansion (The Hague: Leiden University Press-Nijhoff, 1979, 248 p., ISBN 90 602 1444 7, hbk. fl. 68,-, ISBN 90 602 14471, pbk. fl. 35,80) 122-39. Very useful historiographical survey ofthe history ofIndonesia and Dutch colonial policies. Also discusses trends in the development of Dutch interest and scholarship in the field of European expansion.

J. Stengers, 'Belgian Historiography since 1945', ibidem, 161-81. A survey which is naturally dominated by the Congo.

F. Tichelman, The Social Evolution of Indonesia. The Asiatic Mode of Production and its Legacy, Studies in Social History issued by the International Institute of Social History Amsterdam, V (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980,301 p., ISBN 90 24723477, Dfl.85,-). A very wide comparative study of long-term social and economic developments in Indonesia. Emphasis is placed on the tension between stagnation on the one hand and forces for change on the other.

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G.D. Homan, 'The United States and the Indonesian Question. December 1941-De­cember 1946', Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis, XCIII (1980) 35-60. Argues that during this period the United States supported a continuation of strong Dutch influence in Indonesia, as advantageous to all parties. However, changes in the relationship were inevitable and the United States altered its position in 1947.

A. Reid, The blood of the people. Revolution and the end of traditional rule in northern Sumatra (Kuala Lumpur etc.: Oxford University Press, 1979, xx + 288 p., ISBN 01 9580399 X). Survey of events in northern Sumatra from 1942 to the emergence of the inde­pendent Indonesian state. Full background history. Main attention for the in­digenous population.

H.L. Wesseling, 'Post-imperial Holland', Journal of Contemporary History, XV, i (1980) 125-42. Global survey of the most important effects of the liquidation of the Dutch empire. As well as attention for the more obvious aspects (e.g. no economic collapse of the Netherlands; large-scale immigration from the former colonies) there are also interesting observations on developments in Dutch society since 1945.

R.T. Griffiths, ed., The economy and politics of the Netherlands since 1945 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980,311 p., ISBN 9024790190, fl. 47,50). A collection of articles dealing in particular with various economic aspects of post­war Dutch society. Very useful, as is also the bibliography since literature covering this period is often hard to find.

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AUTHORS AND TRANSLATORS

Dr. R.W.J.M. Bos is now Managing Director of NY Slavenburg's Bank, Maastricht Branch.

J. DE BELDER is Lecturer in the department of Later Modern History, University of Ghent.

Dr. C.R. EMERY is Senior Lecturer, Teesside Polytechnic.

Dr. C. FASSEUR is Professor in the History of Western European Overseas Expansion, University of Leiden.

Dr. JOHANNA A. KOSSMANN NEE PUTTO, Groningen.

A. MEYNEN is fellow of the National Research Fund (NFWO), Brussels.

Dr. G. TEITLER is Professor of Military History at the Koninklijk Instituut voor de Marine (Royal Navy Institute), Den Helder.

Dr. C.B. WELS is Senior Lecturer in Modern History, University of Utrecht.

Translations by:

J.C. Coonan, Atlanta, GA Dr. C.R. Emery, Darlington (Durham) J.C. Grayson, Liverpool D.S. Jordan, Wingham, Canterbury (Kent) R.R. Symonds, Bromley (Kent)

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