The Logic of Pyongyang’s Foreign Policy:

North Korean Nuclear Weapon Ambitions

from a Constructivist Perspective

By Mark Stokreef

S1466496

Ma. Laura Janssen and Prof. Dr. Jaap H. de Wilde

January 11, 2011.

Power Configurations in World Politics

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Contents

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 3

Conventional Constructivism as an Analytical Framework .................................................................... 4

A Constructivist Analysis of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapon Ambitions .............................................. 7

§ 3.1. The Wendtian system-level analysis of North Korean nuclear ambitions ................................ 7

§3.2. Unit-level constructivism: Considering the domestic ideational forces and the identity of North

Korea ................................................................................................................................................... 9

§ 3.3. A unit-level approach of North Korea with perceptions of the Other ..................................... 14

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 16

Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 18

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Introduction

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, hereafter referred to as North Korea) has been

involved in several incidents in the arena of international politics since it was founded in 1948. After

its inception, North Korea developed itself as a state with serious political clout, seeking for ways to

survive in the international theatre. Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, neighboring South Korea

and the West continued to perceive the hermit kingdom as a grave security threat to peace and stability

in the East Asian region. One of the main reasons for this perception was North Korea’s pursuit for

nuclear weapons. On several occasions, North Korea showed its determination to obtain nuclear power

by conducting tests of nuclear blasts. It was on October 9, 2006, that North Korea for the first time

successfully conducted a nuclear test. The South Korean Ministry of Defense and the National

Intelligence Service recorded a 3.58 to 3.7 magnitude explosion in northeastern North Korea.1 Shortly

after the test, on October 14, 2006, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted

Resolution 1718, which demanded North Korea to “refrain from further tests, abandon its ballistic

missile programs, and terminate its nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible

manner.”2 This showed broad international security concerns over the North Korean nuclear weapon

policy.

This research paper expects to show the added value of a constructivist approach to explain

North Korea’s nuclear policy ambitions. Therefore, this study is guided by the following research

question: How can North Korea’s nuclear weapon ambitions – in the period of 1991 until 2010 – be

explained from a constructivist point of view? To answer that question, the paper is divided into three

parts. The first part approaches North Korean behavior from a Wendtian system-level of analysis by

“focusing solely on interactions between unitary state actors”3 and how the systematic structure

enables and constrains the North Korean nuclear ambitions. Secondly, unit-level constructivism will

deal with North Korean nuclear weapon ambitions by looking at the domestic ideational forces. As

part of the domestic ideational forces the role of the Juche ideology of self-reliance and independence

will be considered. And thirdly, the influence of the social construction of enemy states will be

considered. Here the role of the Self and the Other serves as centre of analysis. These three aspects of

constructivism cannot be seen separately and often interact with each other. The goal of this paper is

1 Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, (Washington: The Brookings

Institution Press, 2007), 463. 2 Ibid., 464.

3 Christian Reus-Smit, (2005), “Constructivism”, Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, et al., Theories of International Relations,

Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 223.

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eventually to offer the reader a more comprehensive analysis of North Korean decision-making

regarding its nuclear weapon policy than realist theory gives.

Conventional Constructivism as an Analytical Framework

In this study, conventional constructivism serves as an academic approach to analyze North Korean

nuclear weapon ambitions. Constructivism can be divided into the strands of, on the one hand,

conventional constructivism, and, on the other hand, critical constructivism. Whereas critical

constructivism has a post-positivist ontology, the conventional strand remains predominantly

positivist. Here constructivism mainly serves as a supplement to realism. While realism predominantly

focuses on material factors for explaining states’ behavior, constructivism adds ideational factors as

influential factors. Traditionally mainstream theories like realism and liberalism lack explanatory

capability regarding the issue of North Korean foreign policy behavior, because those theories cannot

account for the different perceived threats that China and the United States pose to North Korea.

Realism approaches a state’s identity and its interests as fixed and exogenously given, whereas

constructivism focuses on the endogenous relationship between material capabilities and surrounding

ideational structure. Therefore, constructivism is a useful contribution in order to illuminate the

motivations of North Korean nuclear policy. Variables to be examined are the identities and interests

of the North Korean state. In this work, to conduct the research, primary sources like treaties and

existing literature will be taken into consideration.

Christian Reus-Smit describes constructivists as having “sought to articulate and explore three

core ontological propositions about social life, propositions which they claim illuminate more about

world politics than rationalist assumptions.”4 The first of these ontological propositions holds that

normative structures exercise the same significance as material structures do. Secondly,

“constructivists argue that understanding how non-material structures condition actors’ identities is

important because identities form interests and, in turn, actions.”5 And the third constructivist

proposition is that agents and structures are mutually constituted.6 In his article The Promise of

Constructivism, Ted Hopf shows that constructivism offers alternative understandings of themes like

“the meaning of anarchy and balance of power, the relationship between state identity and interest,

4 Christian Reus-Smit, (2005), “Constructivism”, Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, et al., Theories of International Relations,

Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 220. 5 Ibid., 221.

6 Ibid., 221.

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[and] an elaboration of power.”7 Centrally in this paper is to what extent structures constrain and

enable the nuclear weapon policy of North Korea, and how much the state is able to deviate from the

constraints of structure. The constraints can be constituted as systems of material incentives and

disincentives, such as a balance of power, but also important is how an action reproduces both the

state and the structure.8

Furthermore, meaningful behavior is only possible within an intersubjective social context.

States develop their relations with others and understanding of others through the means of norms and

practices. As explained in the essay Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security by Peter J.

Katzenstein, constitutive norms define identities by specifying the actions that will cause the Other to

recognize that identity and respond to it appropriately, so norms in this way establish expectations

about who the state as actor will be in a certain environment and how these states will behave.9 For

constructivists, identities, norms, culture, and institutions are undeniably part of international politics

and domestic politics as well. Identities have the function of “ensuring at least some minimal level of

predictability and order.”10

Durable expectations between states call for intersubjective identities that

are sufficiently stable to guarantee predictable patterns of behavior. Identities carry out three

functions: the function of telling others who you are, telling yourself who you are, and lastly,

identities tell you who others are.11

Identities of states are variables which often depend on the

historical, cultural, political, and social context. By making interests a main variable, constructivism

explores how certain interests come into existence, but also why many interests are not adopted.12

In

contrast to realist theory, constructivism claims that interests and identities function in a way that

states are expected to have a more complete series of potential choices of action, and these choices

will be constrained by social structures which are mutually constituted by states and structures through

social practice.

Power is a principal theoretical aspect for both realism and constructivism. However, the

concepts of power are understood in different ways. Whereas realism predominantly focuses on

material economic and military power as the most significant source of influence in international

politics, besides material power, constructivism also emphasizes the influence of discursive power in

order to understand international political behavior. By taking discursive power into consideration

7 Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1

(Summer, 1998), 172. 8 Yosef Lapid and Kratochwil, Friedrich, The Return of Culture and Identity, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers (1996), 211.

9 Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University

Press, 1996), 54. 10

Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer, 1998), 174. 11

Henri Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology , Cambridge: Cambrigde University Press, (1981), p. 255. 12

Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer, 1998), 176.

6

here, this paper scrutinizes the power of knowledge, ideas, culture, ideology, and language. An

analysis of the discursive power of nuclear weapons is very interesting for the case of North Korea.

The power of social practices is vested “in their capacity to reproduce the intersubjective meanings

that constitute social structures and actors alike.”13

For example, the North Korean withdrawal from

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 was consistent with identities of North Korea as

seen by other states, since it confirmed the identity of North Korea being an irrational and

unpredictable rogue state. Others observing North Korea deduced North Korean identity from its

actions, but also reproduced the intersubjective web of meaning about what exactly comprised that

identity. Thus, “the power of practice is the power to produce intersubjective meaning within a social

structure.”14

In this way, the meanings of actions of states and Others become fixed through practices.

And the fundamental power of practice is to reproduce and guard an intersubjective reality.15

Constructivists argue that identity shaped North Korean preferences and actions. The roles of

rules and norms are important in understanding identity. For a state, every action or interaction has to

be meaningful. Therefore, states continuously construct or reconstruct their identities, interests and

interactions. Wendt distinguishes three state identities: corporate identity, which refers to a state’s

intrinsic qualities such as norms, beliefs and resources; social identity (or roles), which consists of a

set of meanings that a state attributes to itself; and a state’s collective identity, which is established

when a social identity generates collective interests.16

Constructivism mainly directs its attention on

the power of ideas in defining ranges of actions and interactions. Ideas are enclosed in norms, values,

rules and principles. Constructivists see the “facts of international politics not as reflection of an

objective, material reality but rather as an inter-subjective social reality.”17

Ideas and identity play a

stronger role in defining interests than material forces.18

Furthermore, one of the contributions of

constructivism is also to explain continuities and discontinuities in international relations. The

conventional constructivist explanatory causal processes in international security are summarized in

the figure below.

13

Ibid., 178. 14

Ibid., 179. 15

Richard K. Ashley, Untying the sovereign state: a Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique, Millenium: Journal of

International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer 1988), 243. 16

Alexander Wendt, “Collective identity formation and the international state,” The American Political Science Review, 88 (3), (1994), 384-387. 17

Jo-Ansie Van Wyk, (2007), “The international politics of nuclear weapons: A constructivist analysis,” Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies, 23. 18

Y. Halabi, (2004), “The expansion of global governance into the Third World: Altruism, realism, or constructivism”, International Studies Review, 6 (1), 35.

7

Footnote: 19

This figure refers to the causal pathways with five main types of argument which also summarizes the explanation

of conventional constructivism regarding international security:

1. Effects of norms: Norms (cultural elements of states ‘environment) shape the national security interests or security policies of

states.

2. Effects of norms: Norms (cultural elements of states’ domestic environments) shape state identity.

3. Effects of identity (I): Variation in state identity affect the national security interests or policies of states

4. Effects of identity (II): Configurations of state identity affect interstate normative structures, such as regimes.

5. Recursivity: State policies both reproduce and reconstruct cultural structure.

A Constructivist Analysis of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapon

Ambitions

§ 3.1. The Wendtian system-level analysis of North Korean nuclear ambitions

In Social Theory of International Politics, Alexander Wendt challenges Kenneth Waltz’ theory of

structural realism. Even though Waltz’ goal of formulating a systematic theory of international politics

and his exclusive focus on states as the most significant players, Wendt differs from that theoretical

discussion in two respects. First, Wendt offers critique concerning the materialist assumptions of

realism and liberalism and stresses the importance of immaterial factors. Secondly, concerning the

system-level of analysis, he does not acknowledge the realist assumption that the international

condition of the state of anarchy has a logically-following deterministic influence on the interest and

behavior of states. As a result, state behavior is not determined by the logic of anarchy as such, but

states behave according to social structures. In this way, a Hobbesian “state of war of all against all”20

is not the logical result of anarchy as claimed by Waltz, but that international state of war is a result of

19

Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University

Press, 1996), 53. 20

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1651), 86.

8

a social structure within an anarchic environment that is produced and reproduced by state interaction.

Hence Wendt’s often-quoted argument: “Anarchy is what states make of it.”21

Basically Wendt distinguishes between three possible types of international structures: the

Hobbesian, the Lockean, and the Kantian structures which are formed by the role identities of enemies

(Hobbesian), rivals (Lockean), and friends (Kantian).22

Each of the three role identities indicates “a

distinct posture of orientation of the Self toward the Other with respect to the use of violence.”23

According to the Hobbesian worldview, the use of violence by enemies is then only limited by a lack

of capabilities. Wendt also makes a distinction between micro-structures and macro-structures in

relation to the structure of a social system. Micro-structures are then defined as “structures of

interaction that depict the world from the agents’ point of view.”24

And macro-structures are

“depicting the world from the standpoint of the system.”25

So, following that logic, a state within the

Hobbesian macro-structures is regarded to be an enemy because he is part of the Hobbesian system of

international politics.

A Hobbesian culture functions as a package of norms. According to Björkdahl norms are

“intersubjective understandings that constitute actors’ interests and identities, and create expectations

as well as prescribe what appropriate behavior ought to be.”26

So norms function as structures for

appropriate action and facilitate the expectation of actions by other states. However, Björkdahl also

remarks that “norms do not determine outcomes.”27

For instance, “the institution of sovereignty also

regulates state behavior through norms and practices of mutual recognition, nonintervention, and

(state) self-determination—which in turn help reproduce state identities.”28

For instance, a

Hobbesian culture can operate as a package of norms, because a Hobbesian culture then constitutes the

interests of actors, regulates actor’s behavior and creates expectations of appropriate behavior. States

in a Hobbesian culture have an important interest in empowering their relative military capability

because they expect other states to hold hostile intentions. Therefore, balancing against other states

and anticipatory military strikes are appropriate and expected forms of behavior. However, since a

shared identity or culture like the Hobbesian one is not deterministic, a state also has the freedom to

violate the norms which are part of the Hobbesian culture.

21

Wendt, Alexander (1992), “Anarchy is What States Make of It”, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, 395. 22

Ibid., 247. 23

Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 258 24

Ibid.,. 147 25

Ibid., 147. 26

Annika Björkdahl, (2002), “Norms in International Relations: Some conceptual and methodological reflections,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 15 (1), 20 27

Ibid., 22. 28

Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 46.

9

The security dilemma between North Korea and the United States is the result of those states

interacting with each other on the assumption that they exist in a self-help world filled with potential

enemies. In this way, states cause the security dilemma to develop itself into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Take for example the case of the Six Party Talks – between North Korea, the United States, China,

South Korea, Japan and Russia – that were initiated in 2003 after North Korea withdrew from the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Identities of the participating countries shaped the work of

the Six Party Talks. The participating states in the negotiation did not share the same threat perception

of North Korea because identity produces different understandings and different levels of threat on

North Korea. So security policy choices towards North Korea vary on the basis how states perceive

the threat and identify North Korea as a friend, competitor or enemy. Thus, the Hobbesian culture

characterized by the state of anarchy and self-help mechanism in the Northeast Asian politics is

created by the states themselves.

§3.2. Unit-level constructivism: Considering the domestic ideational forces and the

identity of North Korea

To understand Pyongyang’s nuclear weapon ambitions the context in which the North Korean mindset

has developed into what it is now must be comprehended. Objective conditions such as the colonial

experience, partition of the nation, the Korean War, the demise of socialist systems were responded by

North Korea with the creation of subjective conditions that are mainly the product of deliberate policy

choices.29

In Alexander Wendt’s concept of interests, a distinction between objective and subjective

interests is made. Objective interests are described as “functional imperatives which must be

reproduced if an identity is to be reproduced.”30

Objective interests do not directly influence state

behavior, but the subjective interests motivate behavior. Subjective interests are “beliefs that actors

actually have about how to meet their [objective] identity needs.”31

Wendt explains that every state has

to successfully converge with four objective interests in order to be and remain an actual state. Those

four interests are physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem.32

The

actual significance of these objective interests “lies in the fact that they dispose states to try and

understand them, to interpret implications for how subjective security interests should be defined.”33

“State action is taken by those acting in the name of the state. Hence, the state is its decision-makers.

29

Han S. Park, “North Korean Perceptions of Self and Others: Implications for Policy Choices,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4

(Winter, 2000-2001), 503. 30

Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 231. 31

Ibid., 232. 32

Ibid., 235

33 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 237.

10

State X is translated into its decision-makers as actors.”34

How North Korea then conveys the meaning

of the objective interests depends on the identities, values, and world views they have developed in the

Hobbesian system of states. Thus, “the decision-maker enters the government from the larger social

system in which he also retains membership. He comes to decision-making as a ‘culture bearer’.”35

Through the eyes of a realist, the actions of North Korea in the last twenty years are hard to

explain, because North Korea seems to have weakened its security situation in the world by

successfully detonating a nuclear device. Besides the usual adversaries of North Korea, its allies China

and Russia also condemned this action. On July 5, 2006, North Korea had tested a number of ballistic

missiles and this was answered by the United Nations Security Council with the unanimously passing

of Resolution 1695 thereby condemning the multiple of ballistic missiles by the DPRK.36

So the

actions of North Korea alienated its ally China, which was a driving force for the North Korean regime

through economic and political support.37

Therefore, alienating China by the North Korean actions can

be interpreted as irrational. But how can constructivism explain those actions?

Constructivists would argue that North Korea’s international isolation has led to a strikingly

different perception of nuclear weapon technology compared to other states. The perception of nuclear

weapon technology has been constructed in a normative way amongst the majority of the international

states since the end of World War II. Although North Korea had been a signatory state of the NPT

from 1985 until 2003, it has socialized in a different way than other states. The language used in the

discourse surrounding nuclear weapons show the socially constructed meaning of nuclear weapons.

The non-use of nuclear weapons by states since 1945 implies that it has become a norm that using

nuclear weapons has become a taboo. Within western states, nuclear weapons represent a danger to

humanity and first-strike use is morally wrong. This moral aversion has among western states, inter

alia, been constructed through a global anti-nuclear movement. An example of an anti-nuclear

movement was the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in Great Britain. The societal pressures

that helped to develop the taboo on nuclear weapon technology during the Cold War period have been

absent within North Korea. And the pressure not to develop nuclear weapon technology seems to not

have immersed North Korea sufficiently because of the isolationist posture of the regime. The North

Korean government has thus a lowered socialized belief in the ethically norm of non-use of nuclear

weapons.

The memories of the nuclear non-discriminate devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945

symbolize the darkest side of nuclear weapon capabilities. Nuclear weapons also carry the meaning of

34

Snyder et al., (2002), Foreign Policy Decision-Making, Revisited, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 59. 35

Ibid., 128. 36

UN Resolution 1695, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8778.doc.htm 37

Young Whan Kihl and Honh Nack Kim, North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival, 2006, Published by M.E. Sharpe Inc., 74.

11

being a source of security or insecurity (depending on who has their hands on them), since states

maintain and enhance their security and sovereignty by acquiring weapons for their strategic

importance, as a deterrent and as instruments to win wars.38

For states, nuclear technology remains a

status symbol, which distinguishes states that have nuclear weapons from those that do not have those

weapons. Nuclear technology has become widely available to more actors, and it has become

profitable to sell such technology, expertise or equipment to actors that want to acquire it.39

North

Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT reveals North Korea’s reconstruction of its state identity and

interests and preferred method of interaction with the international community. Yet the North Korean

withdrawal also reveals the shortcomings of the non-proliferation initiatives, and so there is no actual

way to force North Korea to be subject to various inspections.40

Despite of an agreement between the

United States and North Korea in September 2005, in which North Korea promised to yield its nuclear

weapons program and rejoin the NPT in return for energy-related assistance, North Korea continued to

produce and test nuclear technology.41

One of the fundamental norms of International Law is pacta

sunt servanda (“treaties are to be obeyed”).42

However, one of the state identities of North Korea as a

rogue state makes it easier to disobey treaties for North Korea than for other states without an identity

of rogue state.

Korean unification has been regarded as North Korea’s supreme national goal during the

leadership of Kim Il-Sung. However, the achievement of Korean unification by military means was

prevented by the Soviet Union and China, and also by conventional and nuclear American deterrent.

In an alternative attempt to destabilize and overthrow the South Korean government, North Korea

spread cross-border propaganda and executed terrorist attacks. For instance, in 1987, a Korean

Airlines flight was bombed in an effort to destabilize South Korea.43

North and South Korea, which had long been an isolated kingdom, experienced colonial

domination and exploitation after its annexation by Imperial Japan (1910-1945). This image of

foreign, colonial domination has continued to last the period of Kim Jung-Il’s leadership. For instance,

in 1998, a statement of North Korea’s Central News Agency reinforced this image by emphasizing that

“As a result of the U.S. military occupation, South Korea remained a colony and the Korean nation

which has boasted of 5000-year-long history has been forced to suffer from the tragedy of division.

The history of the U.S. occupation of South Korea is a history of the most ferocious and shameless

38

Jo-Ansie Van Wyk, (2007), “The international politics of nuclear weapons: A constructivist analysis,” Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies, 26. 39

Ibid., 27. 40

Jo-Ansie Van Wyk, (2007), “The international politics of nuclear weapons: A constructivist analysis,” Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies, 33. 41

BBC World Online (2005), www.bbc.co.uk, retrieved at January 9, 2011. 42

Abram Chayes and Handler Chayes, Antonia, “The Role of the United Nations in European Peacekeeping", in: Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World. Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations, Washington DC: 1996, 185. 43

Martin Senn, (2008), “Wolves in the Woods: The Rogue State Concept from a Constructivist Perspective,” Barcelona: Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, 11.

12

aggression and conquest.”44

The nationalist struggle against the Japanese colonial power which ended in 1945 has to be

taken into consideration because it became part of the North Koreans belief system and continues

to be so. The North Korean leadership chose to exploit the oppressive history of Korea under Japanese

control to establish Kim Il-Sung’s charisma and militarism. Since the North Korean state ascribes “the

colonial humiliation to a lack of military forces that could have deterred Japanese invasion, the [North

Korean] leadership has been able to use the Anti-Japan sentiment for facilitating military

preparedness.”45

Thus, the Japanese colonial domination over Korea inspired Kim Il-Sung to develop a

strong military with superior weapons.

The North Korean state is based on the Juche ideology. Juche means the state will maintain its

Chajusong (independence) through self-reliance It functioned as an official guideline for independence

in politics, economics, national defense, and foreign policy.46

This corporate identity with a

superimposed social identity of independence and self-reliance continuously constructs its interests

and interactions. Since the Korean War, North Korea has constructed an identity of a “socialist

paradise”, based on “democratic centralism,” and in terms of construction of its interests, on protecting

its citizens against the United States. For instance, the U.S. is viewed as an “imperialist” state

consisting of “western barbarians” on the official website of the North Korean government.47

From

a constructivist point of view, North Korea can be considered to have taken the Juche idea of self-

reliance, and the American enmity, and other intersubjective realities and social facts as the basis for

the development of its nuclear policy. Moreover, by pursuing nuclear technology, North Korea also

gave meaning to the Three Revolutions which refer to the ideological, technical, and cultural

revolutions after 1973. The Three Revolutions Team Movement was inaugurated in February 1973 as

“a powerful revolutionary method of guidance”48

for the Three Revolutions . As part of this

method, the Three Revolutions teams were sent to factories, enterprises, and rural and fishing villages

for local guidance and problem solving in close consultation with local personnel.

The end of the Cold War indicated an enormous disorder for North Korea. The end of the Cold

War restrained economic growth and led to diplomatic isolation. In 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed,

and in 1992 China chose to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea. As a result, North Korea

felt that China betrayed their mutual trust relationship. These events added to the North Korean sense

44

Official website of government of North Korea, “US occupation of S. Korea is source of all misfortunes, pains and disasters,” 1998, www.korea-dpr.com. 45

Han S. Park, “North Korean Perceptions of Self and Others: Implications for Policy Choices,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4 (Winter, 2000-2001), 504. 46

Jo-Ansie Van Wyk, (2007), “The international politics of nuclear weapons: A constructivist analysis,” Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies, 33. 47

Official website of government of North Korea: www.korea-dpr.com, vistited at January 9, 2010. 48

Young Whan Kihl and Honh Nack Kim, North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival, 2006, Published by M.E. Sharpe Inc., 75.

13

of isolation and need to be decisive in protecting its national identity. Pyongyang’s explanation of the

collapse of the Eastern European socialist states further reaffirmed those North Korean interests by

ascribing the breakdown of the socialist systems to three important factors. The first factor was “the

lack of spiritual preparedness to resist material temptations associated with decadent capitalist culture;

second, the inability […] to defend themselves militarily; and third, the inability to cope with

confusion following the succession of political power from a charismatic leader.”49

The North

Korean perception of the breakdown of the Soviet Union and other socialist systems in Europe

rationally led to the country taking measures to protect itself from adversarial forces.

North Korea has never forgotten the grim reality that the Korean War has officially never

ended, but is in a state of temporary truce. “The continuing presence of U.S. forces in South Korea,

including some 35,000 ground-troops, is keenly felt in North Korea as a formidable and direct threat to

the security of the region.”50

The principle of militarism had been sustained by Kim Jung-Il after he

became the new leader in 1994. The Korean War has established an antagonistic identity between

North Korea and the United States which consequently produced severe threat perceptions.

Following the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994, his son Kim Jung Il succeeded and he was

preoccupied with the primary concern of promoting the military in the conviction that defensive

preparedness precedes any other national goal. Kim Jung had given the ultimate and key authority in

decision-making to the military.51

The in September 1998 adopted new Constitution “endorses the

centrality of the military, as evidenced by the ascendance of the Chairman of the Military Commission

as the supreme commander and ultimate reservoir of the state authority.”52

So Juche ideology has

evolved from an abstract worldview in the Cold War years to a concrete nationalist doctrine that uses

militarism as guiding principle.

All factors considered of North Korean identity related to their self-image, it can be concluded

that the absence of the norms of regarding nuclear weapons to be unethical, the Juche ideology, the

socialist, and the militarist identity have primarily shaped North Korean nuclear ambitions.

49

Han S. Park, “North Korean Perceptions of Self and Others: Implications for Policy Choices,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4 (Winter, 2000-2001), 507. 50

Ibid., 507 51

Ibid., 511. 52

Han S. Park, “North Korean Perceptions of Self and Others: Implications for Policy Choices,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4

(Winter, 2000-2001), 511.

14

§ 3.3. A unit-level approach of North Korea with perceptions of the Other

North Korea’s perceptions of the Other must be considered in the context of their Juche Ideology and

importance of militarism. In this section North Korea’s Self-perception and interaction to Other is

considered. Wendt has developed a description of how Self and Others mutually constitute each other:

“The basic idea is that identities and corresponding interests are learned and then reinforced in

response to how actors are treated by significant Others. This is known as the principle of “reflected

appraisals” or “mirroring.” It hypothesizes that actors come to see themselves as a reflection of how

they think Others see or “appraise” them, in the “mirror” of Others’ representations of the Self. If the

Other treats the Self as though one is an enemy, then by principle of reflected appraisals one is likely

to internalize that belief in her own role identity vis-à-vis the Other.”53

To illustrate the importance of

the factor of significance as product of power and interdependence in social learning, Wendt writes:

“The key is how Alter and Ego represent themselves in the beginning of their encounter, since this will

determine the logic of ensuing interaction. If Ego casts Alter in the role of an object to be manipulated

for the gratification of his own needs […], then he will engage in behavior that does not take Alter’s

security needs into account in anything but purely instrumental sense. If Alter correctly reads Ego’s

perspective he will “reflect” Ego’s “appraisal” back on himself, and conclude that he has no standing

or rights in this relationship. This will threaten Alter’s basic needs, and as such rather than simply

accept this positioning Alter will adopt an egoistic identity himself […], and act accordingly toward

Ego. Eventually, by repeatedly engaging in practices that ignore each other’s needs, or practices of

power politics, Alter and Ego will create and internalize the shared knowledge that they are enemies,

locking theirselves in a Hobbesian structure.”54

Only if Ego has the ability of endangers the interests

of Alter so far that would bring in jeopardy Alter’s survival, then Ego is a Hobbesian state and a lethal

threat. In this situation, it is very likely that Alter follows the Hobbesian logic and attempts to end

Ego’s existence.

Pyongyang’s assessment that the United States poses a lethal danger has been fed by a number

of factors. The constitutive experience of the United States as a merciless enemy in the Korean War

has had a profound impact on North Korean interest formation because of the American contemplation

to use nuclear weapons against North Korea.55

The United States also deployed tactical nuclear

weapons on South Korean territory until 1991, and explicit nuclear threats have carried on the

impression of the U.S. as an enemy with the goal of eliminating the North Korean system.56

North

53

Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 327.

54 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 327.

55 Samuel S. Kim, (2006), The Two Koreas and the Great Powers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 240.

56 Roland Bleiker, (2003), “A Rogue is a rogue is a rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis,” International

Affairs, 79 (4), 726.

15

Korea was designated as a target for nuclear strikes in the 2004 Nuclear Posture Review,57

and reports

that the U.S. government was drafting a new Operations Plan with the goal of overthrowing the North

Korean regime also reaffirmed North Korea’s belief for need of nuclear weapons, since North Korea

had sufficient reason to feel an existential threat from it.58

A statement by the Korean Central News

Agency illustrates the North Korean fear: “The final target of their [i.e. the U.S. government] plan is to

topple the DPRK. In a nutshell, they seek to ‘bring it down’ by war as they did the Saddam Hussein

regime and occupied Iraq by war.”59

Moreover, in 2002 North Korea was designated as part of “axis of

evil” along with Iraq and Iran by former U.S. President George W. Bush.60

Since the United States

indeed initiated an invasion against Iraq in 2003, North Korea had more reason to believe that the

U.S. was serious about tackling what it considered to be rogue states. Thus, the American invasion in

Iraq of 2003 increased the North Korean perception of the United States as a threat to their

security. The North Korean fear of the U.S. as a Hobbesian enemy has also been illustrated by the

North Korean leadership’s lasting calls for recognition of its sovereignty by the United States.61

In

short, the American enmity has served the North Korean regime as a way to justify development of

nuclear weapons. And the emphasis on the danger rising from the American imperialist power has

enabled the North Korean regime to maintain its revolutionary identity. Furthermore, the American

threat suppressed internal resistance and provided explanations for the regime to explain domestic

hunger and economic misery to conceal a lack of good governance.

In order to understand North Korean nuclear ambitions, a view at South Korea is required “for

whatever characterizes the South is denounced and demonized in the North.”62

Pyongyang has viewed

South Korea as too dependent on the United States and completely lacking self-respect. North Korea

accuses the South of adopting foreign values and life styles uncritically, and being saturated by

materialism and consumerism.63

This legitimacy war with the South and the national division fueled

the nationalist Juche ideology. South Korea’s announcement in 2004 that it had been enriching small

amounts of uranium since 2000 also contributed to the North Korean perception of threats from the

other side of the 38th parallel north.

64 Not surprisingly, the North Korean government stated that its

57

Chalres K. Amstrong (2004), “US-North Korean Relations,” Asian Perspective, 28 (4), 15. 58

Bruce B Auster and Whitelaw, Kevin, (2003), “Upping the Ante for Kim Jong Il: Pentagon Plan 5030, a new blueprint for facing down North Korea,” US News and World Report, July 21, visited at www.usnews.com. 59

Korean Central News Agency, “U.S. War Scenario against DPRK Assailled”, 2003. 60

Robert A. Wampler, “Axis of evil”, National Security Strategy document 2002, visitited at www.gdu.edu. 61

Martin Senn, (2008), “Wolves in the Woods: The Rogue State Concept from a Constructivist Perspective,” Barcelona: Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, p.14. 62

Han S. Park, “North Korean Perceptions of Self and Others: Implications for Policy Choices,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4,

505.

63 Han S. Park, “North Korean Perceptions of Self and Others: Implications for Policy Choices,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4,

505. 64

Jo-Ansie Van Wyk, (2007), “The international politics of nuclear weapons: A constructivist analysis,” Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies,.33.

16

nuclear weapons “serve as a deterrent against increasing US nuclear threats.”65

Thus, Kim Jung-Il

justified the nuclear weapon pursuit as function for “self-defence.”66

Using language discourse to describe the interaction between North Korea and the United

States, Karin Fierke argues that a given game between those states that is characterized by mutual

hostility will continue to be played according to those rules, leading to escalating mutual hostility.67

When states act on those images, they interact with each other using dialogue that implies enmity,

thereby causing those hostile images to become self-perpetuating. The constructivist framework

developed by Fierke is also able to explain how a Hobbesian culture can change into a Lockean culture

between states by changing hostile identities into more peaceful identities. For example, in the case of

the 1994 negotiations between North Korea and the United States, Jimmy Carter shifted the dialogue

to communicate messages of peace instead of hostile messages. This enabled Carter to persuade

Pyongyang to remain within the IAEA’s safeguards regime. Concluding it is evident from a

constructivist perspective that the perceived threat of the American Other has significantly contributed

to the shaping of the North Korean nuclear weapon policy.

Conclusion

All things considered, in addition to the shortcomings that realism has with its focus on material

matters, a constructivist analysis of the North Korean nuclear weapon policy has proved to be

illuminating the motivating factors behind the policy. Firstly, it can be concluded that the northeast

Asian international politics – especially relations between South Korea and North Korea – is

characterized by a state of anarchy in which self-help is the best way to survive for states. But it is

necessary to note that that Hobbesian culture of anarchy has been created by states themselves and

reinforced by structures and norms like sovereignty. Secondly, domestic North Korean factors like the

Juche ideology and the emphasis on militarism were important shaping forces in the forming of North

Korean nuclear weapon ambitions. And the impact of the Other to the North Korean identity as

functioned by the United States shows how important the perception of U.S. as enemy has been in

shaping North Korean nuclear ambitions. As constructivism has showed it is possible to change the

current Hobbesian worldview in the northeast Asian region to a Lockean worldview between state

relations. However, it may take daring leadership to achieve such a development in a short amount of

time. In dealing with North Korean state and its nuclear ambitions, it is vital to keep in mind that

65

Human Rights Watch, 2005, visited at www.hrw.org. 66

Young Whan Kihl and Honh Nack Kim, North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival, 2006, Published by M.E. Sharpe Inc., 81. 67

Karin Fierke, (2007), Critical Approaches to International Security, Cambridge: Polity Press, 84.

17

North Korea in the end is motivated by regime survival. Therefore, the international community led by

the United Nations has to treat recent North Korean assaults with great diligence in order to prevent

the situation from escalating into an active continuance of the Korean War.

18

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