The Limits of Britishness

The Limits of BritishnessAuthor(s): Jennifer ToddSource: The Irish Review (1986-), No. 5 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 11-16Published by: Cork University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/29735376 .

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The Limits of

Britishness

JENNIFER TODD

Since the New Ireland Forum, constitutional nationalists have emphasised unonists' right to institutional expression of and respect for their British identi?

ty. This is a radical revision of traditional nationalism both in its recognition of

unionists' Britishness, and in its acceptance of the legitimacy of this identity. It is

based on the principle that Northern unionists, as much as Irish nationalists, have the right to institutional expression of their cultural and national identity. But can this be an unqualified right? Are all aspects of unionists' British identity to be guaranteed institutional expression? Are all aspects of this identity equally

legitimate and valid? Nationalism has been subjected to much critical question?

ing in the last decades. Unionism has not, as Arthur Green has pointed out in his

article in Irish Review No. 4. As a result, the different components of unionists'

sense of British identity have not been closely examined or criticised. Yet such

critical examination is necessary if we are to assess the nature and limits of the

right in question. There are three aspects to unionists' British identity: the first, a set of cultural

characteristics; the second, an identification with British state institutions; the

third, a national identity constituted in opposition to Irish identity. Individual unionists differ in the emphasis they give to each of these aspects of British

identity. There are also Ulster, Irish and Protestant aspects of unionist identity. In this

article I consider only unionists' British identity and the rights associated with it. However, there are elements which, although not specifically British, are

sometimes said to be central to British identity; a brief consideration of them is

necessary. Unionists share with Irish nationalists those institutions and practices of English origin which have become an integral part oflrish life, for example the

English language, parts of common law and the parliamentary tradition. These

are now as much parts oflrish as of British identity. They can unproblematically be affirmed as a common cultural starting point on this island.

The first aspect of unionists5 British identity is a set of culturally central

historical memories and experiences which they share with the peoples of Great

Britain. These do not themselves constitute a British identity but they form the

cultural basis on which an imagined British community has been created. The

11



12 ToM

fully formed British identity ? created in large part by state structures, narratives

and rituals ? includes much more than these cultural characteristics.

The culturally important memories and experiences focus around historical, social and cultural affinities with Great Britain ? the deep historical linkages

with Scotland, the Protestant heritage and experience of a Protestant state, the

common experience of a nineteenth century industrial revolution and of heavy

industry, the participation in wars. These historical experiences have led Nor?

thern unionist culture to resemble other regional British cultures. There are the

almost Scottish accents of Antrim and Down and the interconnected Scottish,

English and Ulster Protestant religious traditions. There is the heritage of the in?

dustrial revolution ? the old linen mills and factory houses, the buildings, in?

dustrial architecture and working class traditions of Belfast, and its peoples'

pride in and identification with the ships built at Harland and Wolff. There are the war memorials and remembrance day services in every town. There is the ex?

perience of living in a culturally Protestant state which leads not just to obvious

differences between the North and South of Ireland in such areas as divorce and

abortion legislation, but also to more deep and subtle differences in the cultural

definition of public and private spheres. These features of Northern unionist

cultural identity and heritage are shared by some Northern Catholics.

The second aspea involves an identification with British social and political institutions. This sense of British identity is essentially bound up with being a

British subject. Northern Ireland is included within the British political system, national health service, educational and examination structures, legal system,

system of labour relations, media, communications and information networks, and the financial, industrial and regional economic structures. These institu?

tional networks define career paths, networks of contacts and political and

economic linkages covering the United Kingdom and centring on London.

They produce in many unionists a sense of the naturalness and benignness of

British institutions, British symbols, British citizenship, British material culture ? road systems, sports centres ? and British standards of living. Robin Boyd, the Presbyterian ecumenist, describes this feeling of'at homeness': 'as I drive

ashore at Holyhead or step off a plane at Heathrow: This too belongs to me and

no one can take it from me' (Irish Times^ 20.3.86). Unionists think in terms of

rights and obligations defined by these British state structures and look to Lon?

don as the centre of power in all spheres ?

educational, media, financial as well as

political. They tend to think of themselves as provincial unless they know of and

are involved in events in London; hence Arthur Green's concern to read the

Guardian and the Observer. While there is a sense of dependency on London's

decisions, goodwill and particularly on London's economic subsidies, this is ac?

cepted as a necessary part of being a

peripheral and poor region in a large

coun?

try. The second aspect of unionists' British identity is, then, a sense of British



Limits of Britishness 13

citizenship with all it entails for unionists5 material welfare, life paths and socio?

political expectations. The third aspect of British identity represents a qualitatively different existen?

tial stance which unionists may take towards their identity and cultural heritage. It involves an essentially relational mode of being British in which British identi?

ty is constituted only in opposition to an Other identity ? for unionists, the op?

position is to Irish identity?and in which the positive qualities of the British are defined in terms of the negative qualities of the Other ? the Irish.

Five distinct sets of claims underlie this way of being British:

(i) Being British is progressive in virtue of Britain's status as a world power, a

status now expressed in NATO. To be British is to have access to an international arena. In contrast a small independent neutral nation like the Republic is

backward, insular and laughable. Irish nationalism turns away from the modern

international world and thus it is essentially reactionary. As St John Ervine states

in Craigavon: Ulsterman: 'The Ulster people were not, and are not, willing to

turn away from a prominent partnership in a galaxy of nations to an introspec?

tive obscurantist, Gaelic-speaking agricultural republic' (1949, p. 526).

(ii) English culture is the perfect embodiment of culture. Knowledge of

English literature, history and public affairs is essential for a civilised person for, as Arthur Green points out, 'we metaphorically live in Hampstead even if our

actual address is in Dalkey'. In contrast, the Irish language and Irish literature are

obscurantist and Irish history is insular ? no modern society could introduce

them into its public life ? and any 'educated Dubliner' who fails to read English newspapers 'is creating

a barrier between himself and the world in which we live'

and is subject to a 'cultural lag5.

(iii) Protestant culture is more civilised than Catholic culture. Protestant

societies are tolerant, liberal and modernising. Catholic societies are

superstitious, authoritarian and reactionary. The Catholic Church imposes 'a

certain kind of authority on a whole population from childhood5 which makes 'citizens of the Irish Republic unhappy and inadequate5 and creates 'a very sick

society5 (Martin Smyth, 1974, pp 31-2). However, many would agree that 'if you treat Roman Catholics with due consideration and kindness they will Uve like

Protestants in spite of the authoritarian nature of their church5 (Terence

O'Neill, 1969). (iv) British institutions embody freedom, individual liberties, democracy and

justice. In Robert McCartney's view: 'The true and essential Union is not an ex?

clusive union of loyalists or protestants, but a union between peoples who

believe in liberal democracy and civil and religious liberty for all in the fullest sense of a pluralist society' (1985, pp. 25-6). The Irish state and the Irish nation?

alist movement deny each of these values in their 'narrow seeking for unifor?

mity' (Smyth, 1974, p.30). Opposition to the union with Britain is opposition



14 Toad

to democracy, freedom and individual rights.

(v) British political institutions have proven their worth through their

centuries-long continuous history. Anything short of unreserved, wholehearted acceptance of them is incomprehensible. Nationalists' opposition to them is taken as a sullen intransigence which shows their lack of moral

character. While constitutional nationalism is morally suspect, armed rebellion

is seen as an absolute evil. Republicans and their supporters are outside the

boundaries of humanity; to attempt to understand their motives or to engage in

political dialogue with them is to deny their evil. A prominent Englishman echoed the feelings of many unionists when he wrote: 'As far as the public are

concerned, IRA terrorists who have taken up arms against the British state and

killed innocent people deserve to be shot down like dogs5 (Peregrine Worsthorne, Sunday Telqjraph^ 8.5.88).

These attitudes are not peculiar to Northern Irish unionists. They are a part of

British political culture, expressed in the counterposition of the 'progressive5 values of Britain and her allies to the comical and/or dangerous 'inefficiency5 and

'backwardness5 of other nations. This aspect of British identity derives from the

imperialist past. Edward Said has shown that imperialist ideology is defined by a

binary opposition between the imperialist nation ? modernising, civilising,

free, democratic, cultured, manly ? and the colonized people

? backward, bar?

barous, enslaved by superstition, liable to follow authoritarian leaders, lacking in culture, childlike or effeminate. The imperialist is the subject of history,

discourse and thought who constitutes the native's characteristics in opposition to his idea of his own character. The imperialist is not open to the native's

culture; instead the 'native' is the passive produce of imperialist ideology. Such a

negative view of the Irish is deeply entrenched in British culture.

The effects of these attitudes are seen in Great Britain in such phenomena as

the Falklands war and British racism. They are seen even more clearly in Nor?

thern Ireland where the presence of Irish nationalists is a constant challenge to

these British cultural and political assumptions. In Great Britain, the negative

image of the Irish may remain latent for long periods. In Northern Ireland, it can

immediately affect unionists' actions and reactions to nationalists; it has en?

couraged unionists to exclude nationalists from power and to deny the

legitimacy of nationalist identity and aspirations. As Frank Wright has argued, the hidden violence of metropolitan political culture is acted out on the 'ethnic

frontier'.

Should unionists' British identity have institutional expression and recogni? tion? Is the right to such expression unqualified, or is it limited to some aspects of their identity? The cultural characteristics which constitute the first aspect of

unionists' British identity are as authentic and legitimate as is any other culture

and as deeply rooted in the community's experience. Unionists clearly have a



Limits of Britishness 15

right to institutional expression of and respect for this aspect of their identity.

Symbolic recognition of unionists' Protestant and industrial past and of their

participation in the two world wars should be an important part of the public life of any society to which Northern Protestants and unionists belong.

The second aspect of unionists' British identity is given full institutional ex?

pression only through the Union. Whatever the merits of this constitutional ar?

rangement, it is not unionists' right simply by virtue of their sense of British

citizenship or their sense of belonging within existing British institutions: British citizens abroad do not have the right to British rule, nor do those who feel at home in existing structures have the right to prevent their change. This

aspect of unionists' British identity generates some rights. No people deserves to

have its strong feelings of identity treated as of no value or consequence. Some in?

stitutional expression of this aspect of their British identity is surely their right, whether this is, minimally, their right to retain their citizenship of the state

within which they were born and to which they have contributed, or more ex?

tensive institutional expression of their Britishness. But the Union is not their

right by virtue of this aspect of their identity. It is a matter for political discussion what constitutional and political settlement is optimal. It simply confuses this

discussion to assume that unionists have a right to the full institutional expres?

sion of this aspect of their identity. The third aspect of unionists' British identity does not deserve institutional

expression and respect. This way of being British denies the value of the authen?

tically Irish aspects of Northern Irish social structure, culture and practices. It is

inherently supremacist in its conceptual structure; equality between British

identity and Irish identity is not possible because Irishness is constituted as the

opposite of Britishness and a negative image of the Irish is implicit in the positive self-image of the British. To give institutional expression to this aspect of

unionists' British identity would be to deny the value of the Irish nationalist

perspective: it would be to order institutions so that 'rational, cultured, pro?

gressive and liberal' (read: British) points of view were always given precedence over 'insular, backward, reactionary and evil' (read: Irish) viewpoints. This

would institutionalise unionist supremacism. There is no right to the institu?

tional expression of this aspect of unionists' British identity. Indeed respect for

nationalists' fundamental rights requires that this aspect of unionists' British

identity be prevented from institutional expression. The third aspect of unionists5 British identity is restrictive for unionists

themselves. It falsifies parts of their experience and represses parts of their past. For example, it denies the harshness and injustice associated with the British im?

perialist past and unionists5 part in it. It denies the obvious differences between

the fabric of unionist life and experience in Northern Ireland and the English centred self-image which they assume. It denies the Irish aspects of Northern



16 Todd

Protestant culture and surroundings ?

names, placenames, landscape, history, affinities. The assertion of the superiority of a British identity and of the wor thlessness of an Irish identity prevents painful recognition of the depth of the

present conflict and the extent of Unionist responsibility for it, and justifies their political attempts to impose Britishness on nationalists. It also perpetuates the conflict and blinds unionists to the reality of their experience, history and

potential. It does service to no-one on this island to accept the legitimacy of this

aspect of unionists5 British identity.

Contemporary constitutional nationalism holds that unionists have a right to

institutional expression of their British identity. Stated without qualification, this claim is misleading and can only obscure the real issues involved in the con?

flict and impede fruitful dialogue. While there is a cultural aspect of unionists5

Britishness there is also a state-centred aspect and a third, supremacist, aspect. The first aspect deserves full institutional expression and protection for it is cen?

tral to unionists5 authentic cultural identity. The second aspect does not confer

equivalent rights ? indeed to focus on these feelings of identity is to subjectivise

the constitutional issue and obscure the real economic and political reasons for

and against the Union. The third aspect is not legitimate. Rather than allowing its institutional expression, one should call on those unionists who still hold

such attitudes to rid themselves of this restrictive aspect of their identity which

impedes progress and reconciliation.

REFERENCES

St John Ervine, Craigavon: Ulsterman, London, 1949.

Arthur Green, 'Unionist Horizons', Irish Review, no. 4, spring 1988.

Robert L. McCartney, Liberty and Authority in Ireland. Field Day pamphlet no. 9,1985. Terence O'Neill, in A.C. Hepburn, ed., The Conflict of Nationality in Modern Ireland, London

1980, p. 182.

Edward Said, Orientalism, New York, 1978. Rev. W. Martin Smyth, 'A Protestant Looks at the Republic', in Sectarianism: Roads to

Reconciliation, Social Studies Conference, 1974.

Frank Wright, Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis, Dublin, 1987.



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