The Level of Analysis Problem in International Politics

5/14/2018 The Level of Analysis Problem in International Politics - slidepdf.com

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-level-of-analysis-problem-in-international-politics

The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations

J. David Singer

World Politics, Vol. 14, No. 1, The International System: Theoretical Essays. (Oct., 1961), pp.77-92.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043-8871%28196110%2914%3A1%3C77%3ATLPIIR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T

World Politics is currently published by The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/journals/jhup.html.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. Formore information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

http://www.jstor.orgWed May 30 12:59:14 2007


http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html

http://www.jstor.org/journals/jhup.html

http://www.jstor.org/journals/jhup.html

http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html




T H E LEVEL-OF-ANALYSIS PROBLEM

IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By J. DAVID SINGER

INny area of scholarly inquiry , there are always several ways in

which the phenomena un der study may be sorted and arranged forpurposes of systemic analysis. W he ther in the physical or social sciences,

the observer may choose to focus upon the parts or upon the whole,upon the components or upon the system. H e may, for example, choosebetween the flowers or the garden, the rocks or the quarry, the trees or

the forest, the houses or the neighborhood, the cars or the traffic jam,

the delinquents or the gang , the legislators or the legislative, and so on.'Whether he selects the micro- or macro-level of analysis is ostensiblya mere matter of methodological or conceptual convenience. Yet the

choice often turns out to be quite difficult, and may well become acentral issue within the discipline concerned. The complexity andsignificance of these level-of-analysis decisions are readily suggestedby the long-standing controversies between social psychology andsociology, personality-oriented and culture-oriented anthropology, or

micro- and macro-economics, to mention but a few. In the vernacular

of general systems theory, the observer is always confronted w ith asystem, its sub-systems, and their respective environments, and whilehe may choose as his system any cluster of phenomena from the mostminute organism to the universe itself, such choice cannot be merely a

function of whim or caprice, habit or familiar it^.^ The responsible

scholar must be prepared to evaluate the relative utility-conceptual

and methodological-of the various alternatives open to him , and to

appraise the manifold im plications of the level of analysis finally

selected. So it is with international relations.

But whereas the pros and cons of the various possible levels of

analysis have been debated exhaustively in m any of the social sciences,

the issue has scarcely been raised among students of our em erging

1As Kurt Lewin observed in his classic contribution to the social sciences: "The firstprerequisite of a successful observation in an y science is a definite unde rstan ding aboutwhat size of unit one is going to observe at a given time." Field Theory in SocialScience, Ne w Y ork, 1951, p. 157.

For a useful introductory statement on the definitional and taxonomic problemsin a general systems approach, see the papers by Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "GeneralSystem Theory," and Ke nne th Boulding, "General System The ory: T h e Skeleton of

Science," in Society for the Advancement of General Systems Theory, GeneralSystems, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1956, I, part I.



78 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

discipline.' Such tranquillity may be seen by some as a reassuring indi-cation that the issue is not germane to our field, and by others as evi-dence that it has already been resolved, but this writer perceives thequietude with a measure of concern. H e is quite persuaded of its

relevance and certain that it has yet to be resolved. Rather, it is con-tended that the issue has been ignored by scholars still steeped in th eintuitive and artistic tradition of the humanities o r enmeshed in the

web of "practical" policy. W e have, in our texts and elsewhere, roam edup and dow n the ladder of o rganizational complexity with remarkableabandon, focusing upon the total system, international organizations,regions, coalitions, extra-national associations, nations, domestic pressure

groups, social classes, elites, and individuals as the needs of the m om ent

required. And though most of us have tended to settle upon th e nation

as our most comfortable resting place, we have retained our propensityfor vertical drift, failing to appreciate the value of a stable point of

focus." W hether this lack of concern is a function of the relative infancy

of the discipline or the natu re of the intellectual traditions f rom whenceit springs, it nevertheless remains a significant variable in the general

sluggishness which characterizes the development of theory in the studyof relations among nations . It is the purpose of this paper to raise theissue, articulate the alternatives, and examine the theoretical implica-

tions and consequences of two of the more widely employed levels ofanalysis: the international system and the national sub-systems.

Prior to an exam ination of the theoretical implications of the levelof analysis or orientation employed in our model, it migh t be worth-

while to discuss the uses to which any such model might be put, and

the requirem ents which such uses migh t expect of it.

Obviously, we would demand that it offer a highly accurate desmip-

tion of the phenomena under consideration. Therefore the scheme mustpresent as complete and undistorted a picture of these phenomena as ispossible; it must correlate with objective reality and coincide with ourempirical referents to the highest possible degree. Yet we know that

An imp ortan t pioneering attem pt to deal with some of the implications of one's levelof analysis, however, is Kenneth N. Waltz, Ma n, the State, and Wa r, New York, 1959.But W altz restricts himself to a consideration of these implications as they imp inge onthe qu estion of the causes of w ar. See also this writer's review of Waltz , "InternationalConflict: Three Levels of Analysis," Wor ld Politics, XI I (April 1960), pp. 453-61.

" Even during the debate between "realism" and "idealism" the analytical implica-tions of the variou s levels of analysis received only the scantiest attent ion ; rath er theemphasis seems to have been at the two extremes of pragmatic policy and speculativemetaphysics.



79H E LEVEL-OF-ANALYSIS PROBLEM

such accurate representation of a complex and wide-ranging body ofphenomena is extremely difficult. Perhaps a useful illustration may beborrowed from cartography; the oblate spheroid which the planet earthmost closely represents is not transferable to the two-d imensional surfaceof a map without some distortion. Thus, the Mercator projectionexaggerates distance and distorts direction at an increasing rate as wemove north or south from the equator, while the polar gnomonic pro-jection suffers fro m these same debilities as we move toward the equator.Neither offers therefore a wh olly accurate presentation, yet each is trueenough to reality to be quite useful for certain specific purposes. Thesame sort of tolerance is necessary in evaluating any analytical modelfor the study of in ternational relations; if we must sacrifice total repre-

sentational accuracy, the problem is to decide where distortion is leastdysfunctional and where such accuracy is absolutely essential.

These decisions are, in tu rn, a fun ction of the second requirem ent ofany such model-a capacity to explain the relationships among thephenomena under investigation. Here our concern is not so much with

accuracy of description as with validity of explanation. Our model musthave such analytical capabilities as to treat the causal relationships in

a fashion which is not only valid and thorough, but parsimonious; this

latter requirement is often overlooked, yet its implications for research

strategy are not inc~nsequential.~t should be asserted here that theprimary purpose of theory is to explain, and when descriptive and

explanatory requirements are in conflict, the latter ought to be given

priority, even at the cost of some representational inaccuracy.

Finally, we may legitimately demand that any analytical model

offer the promise of reliable prediction. In mentioning this requirement

last, there is no implication that it is the most demanding or difficult

of the three. Despite the popular belief to the con trary, prediction de-

mands less of one's model than does explanation or even description.

For example, any informed layman can predict that pressure on the5 F o r example, one critic of the decision -making model for mu lated by Richard C.

Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, in Decision-Making as an Approach to theStudy of International Politics (Princeton, N.J., 1954)~points out that no single re-searcher could deal with all the variables in that model and expect to complete morethan a very few comparative studies in his lifetime. See Herbert McClosky, "ConcerningStrategies for a Science of Inte rnati ona l Politics," Wo rld Politics, ~ I I I(Janua ry 1956),pp. 281-95. In defense, however, one might call attention to the relative ease withwhich many of Snyder's categories could be collapsed into more inclusive ones, as wasapparently done in the subsequent case study (see note 11 below). Perhaps a moretelling criticism of the mono graph is McClosky's comm ent th at "Until a greater measureof theory is introduced into the proposal and the relations among variables are specified

more concretely, it is likely to remain little more than a setting-out of categories and,like any taxonomy, fairly limited in its utility" (p. 291).



80 TH E INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

accelerator of a slowly moving car will increase its speed; that more orless of the moon will be visible tonight than last night; or that thenormal human will flinch when confronted with an impending blow.These predictions do not require a particularly elegant or sophisticated

model of the universe, but their explanation demands far more thanmost of us carry around in our minds. Likewise, we can pred ict with

impressive reliability that any nation will respond to military attack inkind, but a description and understanding of the processes and factorsleading to such a response are considerably more elusive, despite thegross simplicity of the acts themselves.

Having articulated rather briefly the requirements of an adequateanalytical model, we might tu rn now to a consideration of the ways inwhich one's choice of analytical focus impinges upon such a model and

affects its descriptive, explanatory, and predictive adequacy.

Beginning with the systemic level of analysis, we find in the total

international system a partially familiar and highly promising pointof focus. First of all, it is the most comprehensive of the levels available,encompassing the totality of interactions which take place with in thesystem and its environment. By focusing on the system, we are enabledto study the patterns of interaction which the system reveals, and to

generalize about such phenomena as the creation and dissolution ofcoalitions, the frequency and duration of specific power configurations,modifications in its stability, its responsiveness to changes in formalpolitical institutions, and the norms and folklore which it manifests asa societal system. In other words, the systemic level of analysis, and onlythis level, permits us to examine international relations in the whole,

with a comprehensiveness tha t is of necessity lost when our focus is

shifted to a lower, and more partial, level. For descriptive purposes,

then, it offers both advantages and disadvantages; the former flow fromits comprehensiveness, and the latter f rom the necessary dear th of detail.

As to explanatory capability, the system-oriented model poses some

genuine difficulties. In the first place, it tends to lead the observerinto a position which exaggerates the impact of the system upon the

national actors and, conversely, discounts the impact of the ac tors onthe system. This is, of course, by no means inevitable; one could con-ceivably look upon the system as a rather passive environment in which

dynamic states act out their relationships rather than as a socio-politicalentity with a dynamic of its ow n. But there is a natural tendency toendow that upon which we focus our attention with somewhat greater




potential than it might normally be expected to have. Thus, we tendto move, in a system-oriented model, away from notions implyingmuch national autonomy and independence of choice and toward amore deterministic orientation.

Secondly, this particular level of analysis almost inev itably requires

that we postulate a high degree of uniformity in the foreign policyoperational codes of our national actors. By definition, we allow little

room for divergence in the behavior of our parts w hen w e focus upon

the whole. It is no coincidence that our most prominent theoretician-

and one of the very few text writers focusing upon the international

system-should "assume tha t [all] statesmen think and act in termsof interest defined as p ~ w e r . " ~f this single-m inded behavior be inter-

preted literally and narrowly, we have a simplistic image comparable

to economic man or sexual man, and if it be defined broadly, we areno better off than the psychologist whose hum an model pursues "self-

realization" or "maximization of gain"; all such gross models suffer

from the same fatal weakness as the utilitarian's "pleasure-pain" prin-

ciple. Just as individuals differ widely in what they deem to be pleasureand pain, or gain and loss, nations may differ widely in what they

consider to be the national interest, and we end up having to break

down and refine the larger category. Moreover, Professor Morgenthau

finds himself compelled to go still further and disavow the relevance

of bo th motives an d ideological preferences in na tional behavior, an d

these represent two of the more useful dimensions in differentiating

among the several nations in our international system. By eschewing

any empirical concern with the domestic and internal variations within

thd separate nations, the system-oriented approach tends to produce a

sort of "black box" or "billiard ball" concept of the national actor^.^

By discounting-or denying-the differences am ong nations , or by

Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd ed., New York, 1960, pp. 5-7.Obviously, his model does not preclude the use of power as a dimension for thedifferentiation of nations.

7 The "black box" figure com es fro m some of the sim pler version s of S-R psychology,in which the observer more or less ignores what goes on within the individual andconcentrates upon the correlation between stimulus and response; these are viewedas empirically verifiable, whereas cognition, perception, an d oth er mental processes haveto be imputed to the individual with a heavy reliance on these assumed "interveningvariables." Th e "billiard ball" figu re seems to carry the sam e sort of c onnotation, andis best employed by Arnold Wolfers in "The Actors in International Politics" in WilliamT. R. Fox, ed., Theoretical Aspects of International Relations, Notre Dame, Ind.,1959, pp. 83-106. See also, in this context, Richard C. Snyder, "International RelationsTheory--Continued," World Politics, XIII (January 1961), pp. 300-12; and J. DavidSinger, "Theorizing A bout Theo ry in Interna tional Politics," Iou rna l of Conflict Resolu-

tion, IV (December 1960), pp. 431-42. Both are review articles dealing with the FOXanthology.



82 T HE INT E RNAT IONAL SYST E M

positing the near-impossibility of observing many of these differences

at work w ithin them,' one concludes with a highly hom ogenized image

of our nations in the international system. And though this may be aninadequate fou nda tion upon which to base any causal statements, it

offers a reasonably adequate basis for correlative statements. Morespecifically, it permits us to observe and measure correlations between

certain forces or stimuli which seem to impinge upon the nation and

the behavior patterns which are the apparent consequence of thesestimuli. But one must stress the limitations implied in the word

"apparent"; what is thought to be the consequence of a given stimulus

may only be a coincidence or artifact, and until one investigates the

major elements in the causal link-no matter how persuasive the

deductive logic-one may speak only of corre lation, not of consequence.

Moreover, by avoiding the multitud inous pitfalls of intra-nationobservation, one emerges with a singularly manageable model, requir-

in g as it does little of the m ethodological sophistication or onerous em-

piricism called for when one probes beneath the behavioral externalities

of the actor. Finally, as has already been suggested in the introduction,

the systemic orientation should prove to be reasonably satisfactory as

a basis for prediction , even if such prediction is to extend beyond the

characteristics of the system and attem pt anticipatory statements regard-

ing the actors themselves; this assumes, of course, that the actors are

characterized and their behavior predicted in relatively gross and

general terms.

These, then, are some of the m ore significant implications of a model

which focuses upon the international system as a whole. Let us turn

now to the more familiar of our two orientations, the national state

itself.

T he other level of analysis to be considered in this paper is the

national state-our primary actor in interna tional relations. Th is is

clearly the traditional focus among Western students, and is the one

which dom inates almost all of the texts employed in English-speaking

colleges and universities.

Its most obvious advantage is that it perm its significant differentiation

among our actors in the international system. Because it does not re-

quire the attribution of great similarity to the national actors, it encour-

Mo rgen thau observes, for example, th at it is "futile" to search for mo tives because

they are "the most illusive of psychological data, distorted as they are, frequently beyondrecognition, by the interests and emotions of actor and observer alike" (op.cit., p. 6).



83HE LEVEL-OF-ANALYSIS PROBLEM

ages the observer to examine them in greater detail. The favorableresults of such intensive analysis cannot be overlooked , as it is only

when the actors are studied in some depth that we are able to make

really valid generalizations of a comparative nature. And though the

systemic model does not necessarily preclude comparison and contrastamong the national sub-systems, it usually eventuates in rather gross

comparisons based on relatively crude dimensions and characteristics.

On the other hand, there is no assurance that the nation-oriented ap-

proach will produce a sophisticated model for the comparative study

of foreign policy; with perhaps the exception of the Haa s an d W hit ing

study,' none of our m ajor texts makes a serious and successful effort todescribe and expla in national behavior in terms of m ost of the signifi-

cant variables by which such behavior might be comparatively ana-

lyzed . But this wou ld seem to be a function , not of the level of analysisemployed, but of our general unfamiliarity with the other social

sciences (in which comparison is a major preoccupation) and of the

retarded state of com parative government an d politics, a field in which

most international relations specialists are likely to have had some

experience.

But just as the nation-as-ac tor focus perm its us to avoid the inaccurate

homogenization which often flows from the systemic focus, it also may

lead us into the opposite type of distortion-a marked exaggeration of

the differences among our sub-systemic actors. While it is evident thatneither of these extremes is conducive to the development of a sophisti-

cated comparison of foreign policies, and such comparison requires a

balanced preoccupation with both similarity and difference, the danger

seems to be greatest when we succumb to the tendency to overdifferen-

tiate; comparison and contrast can proceed only from observed uni-

f ~ r m i t i e s . ~ ~

One of the additional liabilities which flow in tu rn from the pressure

to overdifferentiate is that of Ptolemaic parochialism. Thu s, i n over-

emphasizing the differences among the many national states, theobserver is prone to attribu te many of wha t he conceives to be virtues

to his own nation and the vices to others, especially the adversaries of

the moment. That this ethnocentrism is by no means an idle fear is

borne out by perusal of the m ajor in terna tiona l relations texts published

'Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, Dynamics of Inte~nationalRelations, NewYork, 1956.

loA freque nt by-product of this tendency to overd ifferentia te is what W altz calls the"second-image fallacy," in which one explains the peaceful or bellicose nature of anation's foreign policy exclusively in terms of its domestic economic, political, or social

characteristics (op.cit., chs. 4 and 5).



84 TH E INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

in the United States since 1945.Not only is the world often perceived

through the prism of the American national interest, but an inordinate

degree of attention (if not spleen) is directed toward the Soviet Un ion;

it would hardly be amiss to observe that most of these migh t qualify

equally well as studies in American fore ign policy. T h e scientific inade-quacies of this sort of "we-they" orientation hardly require elaboration,

yet they remain a potent danger in any utilization of the national

actor model.

Another significant implication of the sub-systemic orientation is tha t

it is only within its particular framework that we can expect any useful

application of the decision-making approach.'' Not all of us, of course,

will find its inapplicability a major loss; considering the criticism which

has been leveled at the decision-making approach, and the failure of

most of us to attempt its application, one might conclude that it is no

loss at all. But the important thin g to note here is that a system-oriented

model would not offer a hospitable framework for such a detailed and

comparative approach to the study of international relations, no m atter

what our appraisal of the decision-making approach m igh t be.

Another a nd perhaps more subtle implication of selecting the nation

as our focus or level of analysis is that i t raises the entire question of

goals, motivation, and purpose in national policy.'' Though it may well

be a peculiarity of the Western philosophical tradition, we seem toexhibit, when confronted with the need to explain individual or col-

lective behavior, a strong proclivity for a goal-seeking approach. The

question of whether national behavior is purposive or not seems to

require discussion in tw o distinct (b ut nut always exclusive) dimensions.

Firstly, there is the m ore obvious issue of whether those who act on

behalf of the nation in formula ting and executing foreign policy con-

sciously pursue ra ther concrete goals. And it would be difficult to deny,

for example, that these role-fulfilling individuals envisage certain spe-

cific outcomes which they hope to realize by pursuing a particular" Its most well-known and successful statement is found in Snyder et al., op.cit.Much of this model is utilized in the text which Snyder wrote with Edgar S. Fur-niss, Jr., American Foreign Policy: Formulation, Principles, and Programs, New York,1954. A more specific application is found in Snyder and Glenn D. Paige, "The UnitedStates Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: T he Application of a n AnalyticalScheme," Administrative Science Quarterly, 111 (December 1958), pp. 341-78. For thoseinterested in this approach, very useful is Paul Wasserman and Fred S. Silander,Decis ion-Making: A n Annotated Bibliography, Ithaca, N.Y., 1958.

l2 An d if the decis ion-m aking version of this mode l is em ployed , the issue is unavo id-able. See the discussion of m otivation in Snyder, Bruc k, and Sapin, op.cit., pp. 92-117;note that 25 of the 49 pages on "The Major Determinants of Action" are devoted to

motives.




strategy. In this sense, then, nations may be said to be goal-seekingorganisms which exhibit purposive behavior.

However, purposiveness may be viewed in a somewhat differentlight, by asking whether it is not merely an intellectual construct that

man imputes to himself by reason of his vain addiction to the free-willdoctrine as he searches for characteristics which distinguish him from

physical matter and the lower animals. And having attributed thisconscious goal-pursuing behavior to himself as an individual, it may be

argued that man then proceeds to project this attribute to the social

organizations of which he is a member. The question would seem todistill dow n to whether man and his societies pursue goals of their ownchoosing or are moved toward those imposed upon them by forceswhich are primarily beyond their control.13 Another way of stating the

dilemma would be to ask whether we are concerned with the endswhich men and nations strive for or the ends toward which they areimpelled by the past and present characteristics of their social andphysical milieu. Obviously, we are using the term s "ends," "goals," and"purpose" in two rather distinct ways; one refers to those which areconsciously envisaged and more or less rationally pursued, and the

other to those of which the actor has little knowledge bu t toward whichhe is nevertheless propelled.

Ta king a middle ground in what is essentially a specific case of the

free will vs. determinism debate, one can agree that nations movetoward outcomes of which they have little knowledge and over whichthey have less control, but that they nevertheless do prefer, and there-

fore select, particular outcomes and attempt to realize them by con-

scious form ula tion of strategies.

Also involved in the goal-seeking problem when we employ the

nation-oriented model is the question of how and why certain nations

pursue specific sorts of goals. While the question may be ignored in

the system-oriented model or resolved by attributing identical goals to

all national actors, the nation-as-actor approach demands that we in-vestigate the processes by which national goals are selected, the internal

and external factors that impinge on those processes, and the institu-

tional framework from w hich they emerge. It is wo rthy of note that

despite the strong predilection for the nation-oriented model in most

l3A highly suggestive, bu t mo re abstract tre atm ent of this teleological question is inTalcott Parsons, T h e Structure o f Social Action, 2nd ed., Glencoe, Ill., 1949, especiallyin his analysis of Durkheim and Weber. It is interesting to note that for Parsons an actimplies, inter alia, "a future state of affairs toward which the process of action isoriented," and he therefore com men ts that "in this sense and th is sense only, the

schema of action is inherently teleological" (p. 44).



86 T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L S Y ST EM

of our texts, empirical or even deductive analyses of these processes areconspicuously few.14 Again, one might attribute these lacunae to themethodological and conceptual inadequacies of the graduate trainingwhich international relations specialists traditionally receive.15 But in

any event, goals and motivations are both dependent and independentvariables, and if we intend to explain a nation's fore ign policy, wecannot settle fo r the mere postulation of these goals; we are compelledto go back a step and inquire into their genesis and the process bywhich they become the crucial variables that they seem to be in thebehavior of nations.

Th ere is still another dilemma involved in our selection of thenation-as-actor model, and that concerns the phenomenological issue:do we exam ine our actor's behavior in terms of the objective factors

which allegedly influence that behavior, or do we d o so in terms of theactor's perception of these "objective factors"? Though these two ap-proaches are not completely exclusive of one another, they proceed fromgreatly d ifferen t and often incompatible assumptions, and producema rked ly d ivergent models of national behavior.16

T he first of these assum ptions concerns the broad question of socialcausation. One view holds that individuals and groups respond in a

quasi-determ inistic fashion to the realities of physical environment,the acts or power of other ind ividuals or groups, and similar "objective"

and "real" forces or stimuli. An opposite view holds that individualsand groups are not influenced in their behavior by such objective forces,but by the fashion in which these forces are perceived and evaluated,however distorted or incom plete such perceptions may be. Fo r adherentsof this position, the only reality is the phenomenal-that which is dis-cerned by the human senses; forces that are not discerned do not exist

l4Among the exceptions are Haas and Whiting, op.cit., chs. 2 and 3; and some ofthe chapters in Roy C. Macridis, ed., Foreign Policy i n W or ld Politics, Englewood Cliffs,N.J., 1958, especially that on W est Ge rman y by Karl Deutsch and Lewis Edinger.l5AS early as 1934, Edith E. Ware noted that ". . . he study of inte rna tiona l relations is

no longer entirely a subject for political science or law, but that economics, history,sociology, geograph y-all the social sciences-are called upo n to con tribu te tow ards theunderstanding . . . of the international system." See T h e Study of International Relationsin the United States , New York, 1934, p. 172. For some contemporary suggestions, seeKarl Deutsch, "The Place of Behavioral Sciences in Graduate Training in InternationalRelations," Behavioral Science, III (July 1958), pp . 278-84; and J. David Singer, "TheRelevance of the Behavioral Sciences to the Study of International Relations," ibid., VI

(October 1961), pp . 324-35.1 6 T h e father of phenomenological philosophy is generally acknowledged t o be

Edmu nd Husserl (1859-1g38), author of Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Pheno men-ology, New York, 1931, trans. by W . R. Boyce Gibson ; the original was published in 1913under the title Ideen z u einer reinen Phanomenologie un d Phiinomenologischen Philo-

sophie. Application of this approach to social psychology has come primarily through thework of Koffka and Lewin.




for that actor, and those that d o exist do so only in the fashion in wh ichthey are perceived. Though it is difficult to accept the position that anindividual, a group , or a nation is affected by such forces as climate,distance, or a neighbor's physical power only insofar as they are recog-

nized and appraised, one must concede that perceptions will certainlyaffect the manner in w hich such forces are responded to. As has oftenbeen pointed out, an individual will fall to the ground when he stepsout of a tenth-story window regardless of his perception of gravitational

forces, but on the other hand such perception is a major factor in

whether or not he steps out of the window in the first place.17 T h e point

here is that if we embrace a phenomenolog ical view of causation, wewill tend to utilize a phenomenological model for explanatory purposes.

The second assumption which bears on one's predilection for the

phenomenological approach is more restricted, and is primarily a

methodological one. Thus, it may be argued that any description of

national behavior in a given international situation would be highly

incomplete were it to ignore the link between the external forces at

work upon the nation and its general foreign policy behavior. Further-

more, if our concern extends beyond the m ere description of "what

happens" to the realm of explanation, it could be contended th at such

omission of th e cognitive and the perceptual linkage would be onto-

logically disastrous. How , it mig ht be asked, can one speak of "causes"

of a nation 's policies when one has ignored the media by which external

conditions and factors are translated into a policy decision? We may

observe correlations between a ll sorts of forces in the international

system and the behavior of nations, but their causal relationship must

remain strictly deductive and hypothetical in the absence of empirical

investigation into the causal chain which allegedly links the two.

Therefore , even if we are satisfied with the less-than-complete descrip-

tive capabilities of a non-phenom enological model, 'we are still drawn

to it if we are to mak e any progress in explanation.The contrary view would hold that the above argument proceeds

from an erroneous comprehension of the nature of explanation in

social science. One is by no means required to trace every perception,

transmission, and receipt between stimulus and response or input and

output in order to explain the behavior of the nation or any other human

group. Furthermore, who is to say that empirical observation-subject

l7Thi s issue has been raised fro m time to time in all of the social sciences, bu t for a nexcellent discussion of it in terms of the present problem , see Har old and Ma rgare tSprout, Man-Milieu Relationship Hypoth eses i n the Con text of International Politics,Princeton University, Cente r of I nte rna tiona l Studies, 1956, pp. 63-71.



88 T H E INT E RNAT IONAL SYSTE M

as it is to a host of errors-is any better a basis of explanation thaninformed deduction, inference, or analogy? Isn't an explanation which

flows logically from a coherent theoretical model just as reliable as

one based upon a misleading and elusive body of data, most of which

is susceptible to analysis only by techniques and concepts foreign topolitical science and history?

This leads, in turn, to the third of the premises relevant to one's

stand on the phenomenological issue: are the dimensions and charac-

teristics of the policy-makers' phenomenal field empirically discernible ?Or, more accurately, even if we are convinced that their perceptions

and beliefs constitute a crucial variable in the ex~lanation f a nation'sforeign policy, can they be observed in an accurate and systematic

fashion?'' Furthermore, are we not required by the phenomenological

model to go beyond a classification and description of such variables,

and be drawn into the tangled web of relationships out of which they

emerge? If we believe that these phenomenal variables are systemati-

cally observable, are explainable, and can be fitted into our explanationof a nation's behavior in the international system, then there is a further

tendency to embrace the phenomenological approach. If not, or if we

are convinced that the gathering of such data is inefficient or uneco-

nomical, we will tend to shy clear of it.

The fourth issue in the phenomenological dispute concerns the very

nature of the nation as an actor in international relations. Who or whatis it that we study? Is it a distinct social entity with well-definedboundaries-a unity unto itself? Or is it an agglomeration of indi-

viduals, institutions, customs, and procedures? It should be quiteevident that those who view the nation or the state as an integral social

unit could not attach much utility to the phenomenological approach,

particularly if they are prone to concretize or reify the abstraction. Such

abstractions are incapable of perception, cognition, or anticipation

(unless, of course, the reification goes so far as to anthropomorphize

and assign to the abstraction such attributes as will, mind, or per-sonality). On the other hand, if the nation or state is seen as a groupof individuals operating within an institutional framework, then it

makes perfect sense to focus on the phenomenal field of those indi-

viduals who participate in the policy-making process. In other words,

people are capable of experiences, images, and expectations, while insti-

18 Th is is ano ther of the criticisms leveled at the decision-m aking approach which,almost by definition, seems comp elled to adopt some form of the phen omen ologicalmod el. Fo r a comp rehensive treatm ent of the eleme nts involved in hu ma n perception,see Karl Zener et al., eds., "Inter-relationships Between Perception and Personality: ASymposium," Iournal of Personality, XVIII (1 94 9) ~ p. 1-266.




tutional abstractions are not, except in the metaphorical sense. Thus, ifour actor cannot even have a phenomenal field, there is little pointin employing a phenomenological approach.lg

These, then, are some of the questions around which the phenomeno-logical issue would seem to revolve. Those of us who think of social

forces as operative regardless of the actor's awareness, who believe that

explanation need not include all of the steps in a causal chain, who

are dubious of the practicality of gathering phenomenal data, or whovisualize the nation as a distinct entity apart from its individual mem-

bers, will tend to reject the phenomenological appr~ach.~'ogically,

only those who disagree with each of the above four assumptions

would be compelled to adopt the approach. Disagreement with any one

would be suficient grounds for so doing.

The above represent some of the more significant implications and

fascinating problems raised by the adoption of our second model. They

seem to indicate that this sub-systemic orientation is likely to produce

richer description and more satisfactory (from the empiricist's point of

view) explanation of international relations, though its predictive powerwould appear no greater than the systemic orientation. But the descrip-

tive and explanatory advantages are achieved only at the price ofconsiderable methodological complexity.

Having discussed some of the descriptive, explanatory, and predictive

capabilities of these two possible levels of analysis, it might now beuseful to assess the relative utility of the two and attempt some general

statement as to their prospective contributions to greater theoretical

growth in the study of international relations.

In terms of description, we find that the systemic level produces a

more comprehensive and total picture of international relations than

does the national or sub-systemic level. On the other hand, the atomized

and less coherent image produced by the lower level of analysis is some-

what balanced by its richer detail, greater depth, and more intensive

p~rtrayal.~'As to explanation, there seems little doubt that the sub-

l9Many of these issues are raised in the o ngoing debate over "methodological indi-vidualism," and are discussed cogently in Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, New

York, 1961, PP 535-46.Parenthe~cally,holders of these specific views shou ld also be less inclined to adopt

the nationa l or sub-systemic mode l in the first place.21 In a review article dealing wit h two of the mo re recent and provocative efforts

toward theory (Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, New

York, 1957, and G eorge Liska, Internation al Equ ilibrium, Cambridge, Mass., 1g57),Charles P. Kindleberger adds a further-if not altogether persuasive-argument in favor



90 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

systemic or actor orientation is considerably more fruitful, perm ittingas it does a more thorough investigation of the processes by whichforeign policies are made. Here we are enabled to go beyond the limita-tions imposed by the systemic level and to replace mere correlation withthe more significant causation. An d in terms of prediction, both orienta-tions seem to offer a similar degree of promise. Here the issue is a

function of what we seek to predict. Thus the policy-maker will tendto prefer predictions about the way in which nation x or y will reactto a contemplated move on his own nation's part, while the scholarwill probably prefer either generalized predictions regarding the be-havior of a given class of nations or those regarding the system itself.

Does this summary add up to an overriding case for one or another

of the two m odels? I t would seem not. For a staggering variety ofreasons the scholar may be more interested in one level than another at

any given time and will undoubtedly shift his orientation according tohis research needs. So the problem is really not one of deciding whichlevel is most valuable to the discipline as a whole and then dem andingthat it be adhered to fro m now unto eternity." Rather, it is one ofrealizing that there is this preliminary conceptual issue and that it must

be temporarily resolved prior to any given research undertaking. Andit must also be stressed that we have dealt here only with two of the

more common orientations, and that many others are available andperhaps even more fruitfu l potentially than either of those selectedhere. Moreover, the international system gives many indications ofprospective change, and it may well be that existing institutional formswill take on new characteristics or that new ones will appear to taketheir place. As a matter of fact, if incapacity to perform its functions

leads to the transform ation or decay of an institution , we may expect a

steady deterioration and even ultimate disappearance of the national

state as a significant actor in the world political system.

However, even if the case for one or another of the possible levelsof analysis cannot be made with any certainty, one must neverthelessmaintain a continuing awareness as to their use. We may utilize onelevel here and another there, but we cannot afford to shift our orienta-

tion in the midst of a study. An d when we do in fact make an original

of the lower, sub-systemic level of analysis: " Th e total system is infinitely complex wi theverything interacting. One can discuss it intelligently, therefore, only bit by bit.""Scientific International Politics," W or ld Poli tics , XI (October 1958), p. 86.

22 It should also be kept in mind that one could conceivably develop a theoreticalmodel wh ich successfully embraces both of these levels of analysis without sac rificingconceptual clarity and internal consistency. In this writer's view, such has not been done

to date, though Kaplan's Sys tem and Process i n International Polit ics seems to comefairly close.




selection or replace one with another at appropriate times, we must doso with a full awareness of the descriptive, explanatory, and predictiveimplications of such choice.

Afinal point remains to be discussed. Despite this lengthy exegesis,one might still be prone to inquire whether this is not merely a sterile

exercise in verbal gymnastics. What, it might be asked, is the differencebetween the two levels of analysis if the empirical referents remainessentially the same? Or, to put it another way, is there any difference

between international relations and comparative foreign policy? Per-haps a few illustrations will illuminate the subtle but imp ortant differ-ences which emerge when one's level of analysis shifts. One might, forexample, postulate that when the international system is characterized

by political conflict between two of its most powerful actors, there is

a s trong tendency fo r the system to bipolarize. Thi s is a systemic-orientedproposition. A sub-systemic proposition, dealing with the same generalempirical referents, would state that when a powerful actor finds itself

in political conflict with another of approximate parity, it will tend toexert pressure on its weaker neighbors to join its coalition. Each proposi-tion, assuming it is true, is theoretically useful by itself, but each isverified by a different intellectual operation. Moreover-and this isthe crucial thing for theoretical development-one could not add these

two kinds of statements together to achieve a cumulative gro wth ofempirical generalizations.

T o illustrate further, one could, at the systemic level, postulate thatwhen the distribution of power in the international system is highlydiffused, it is more stable than when the discernible clustering of well-defined coalitions occurs. And at the sub-systemic or national level,

the same empirical phenomena would produce this sort of proposition:when a nation's decision-makers find it difficult to categorize other

nations readily as friend or foe, they tend to behave toward all in amore uniform and moderate fashion. Now, taking these two sets of

propositions, how much cumulative usefulness would arise from at-tempting to merge and codify the systemic proposition from the firstillustration with the sub-systemic proposition from the second, or viceversa ? Representing different levels of analysis and couched in differen t

frames of reference, they would defy theoretical integration; one may

well be a corollary of the other, but they are not imm ediately com-binable. A prior translation from one level to another must take place.

This, it is submitted, is quite crucial for the theoretical development

of our discipline. W ith all of the curren t emphasis on the need for m ore

empirical and data-gathering research as a prerequisite to theory-build-



92 T H E INT E RNAT IONAL S YS TE M

ing, one finds little concern with the relationship am ong these separateand discrete data-gathering activities. Even if we were to declare amoratorium on deductive and speculative research for the next decade,

and all of us were to labor diligently in the v ineyards of historical and

contemporary data, the state of international relations theory wouldprobably be no more advanced at that time than it is now, unless such

empirical activity becomes fa r more systematic. And "systematic" is

used here to indicate the cum ulative grow th of inductive and deductive

genera lizations into an impressive array of statements conceptually

related to one another and flowing from some common frame of refer-

ence. W ha t tha t fram e of reference should be, or will be, cannot besaid with much certainty, but it does seem clear that it must exist. As

long as we evade some of these crucial a priori decisions, ou r em piricism

will amount to little more than an ever-growing potpourri of discrete,disparate, non-comparable, and isolated bits of information or extremelylow-level generalizations. And, as such, they will make little contribu-

tion to the growth of a theory of international relations.

The Level of Analysis Problem in International Politics

Documents

Transcript of The Level of Analysis Problem in International Politics