The Kingpin Fallacy: Targeting Criminal Street Gangs

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http://foreign-intrigue.com/2014/07/the-kingpin-fallacy-targeting-criminal-street-gangs/

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John A. Bertetto July 18, 2014

Organized crime, particularly criminal street gangs, remains a persistent and deadlyproblem that plagues many cities in the United States. In a 21Apr14 article in theAtlantic CitiesCity Lab author Richard Florida uses recent data from theUS Census Bureau to map populationmigration patterns into and out of Americas ten largest cities. The maps elucidate the CensusBureau data: a continuous increase of net migration into the cities. Of the ten largest US cities,eight show populations that continue to rise (Chicago and Philadelphia are the two citiesexperiencing net losses in population).

As our cities continue to grow, residents will find themselves in an escalatingcompetition for scarce local resources, including living space, employment, and access to civicservices like police, fire, sanitation, water and electricity, and health care. Municipal diasporasare likely to remain and grow. Municipal government itself faces resource shortages, as an ever-increasing population places greater demands on its services. This often results in areas thatare significantlyundergoverned,even if local governance is strong. Communities bereft of civicattention and wracked with poverty are breeding grounds for crime especially organizedcrime in the form of local street gangs. It appears, then, that membership within street gangs isnot just likely to remain, but to grow and become more deeply entrenched. To strategicallydisrupt and dismantle gangs, local law enforcement must balance effectiveness with efficiency.This need comes with significant temporal pressure: gangs use violence not only to protect theirclaimed turf and illegal business operations but also to intimidate those who might informagainst them. The use of violence as a tool is further compounded by its employment as ameans of resolution for even the most pedestrian of grievances. The willingness to resort toviolence is increasing at a frightening pace in many areas. When Chicagoans opened theirnewspapers on the morning of 07July14, they were greeted by the staggering results of theIndependence Day holiday weekends total violence: 82 people shot, 14 fatally. Of thosenumbers, 5 were shot by police,two fatally.While many of these shootings were motivated bynon-gang-related matters, the vast majority were the result of gang disputes.
http://www.citylab.com/politics/2014/04/2-very-different-migrations-driving-growth-us-cities/8873/http://www.citylab.com/politics/2014/04/2-very-different-migrations-driving-growth-us-cities/8873/http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/population/cb14-51.htmlhttp://foreign-intrigue.com/2014/06/undergoverned-spaces-strong-states-poor-controlhttp://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chi-fourth-of-july-toll-82-shot-14-of-them-fatally-in-chicago-20140707,0,5439185.storyhttp://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chi-fourth-of-july-toll-82-shot-14-of-them-fatally-in-chicago-20140707,0,5439185.storyhttp://foreign-intrigue.com/2014/06/undergoverned-spaces-strong-states-poor-controlhttp://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/population/cb14-51.htmlhttp://www.citylab.com/politics/2014/04/2-very-different-migrations-driving-growth-us-cities/8873/http://www.citylab.com/politics/2014/04/2-very-different-migrations-driving-growth-us-cities/8873/


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Gangs and Gang Factions

Traditional approaches toward combating organized crime have typically includedidentifying and mapping criminal organizational structure, identifying kingpins and other top-tierleaders, and removing those from power after lengthy, in-depth investigations. Organized crimegroups such as the mafia and narcotics cartels employed traditional hierarchical structures, witha single or very small group at the top and a pyramid-shaped distribution of membership.Within these groups, clear cut chains of command existed, and removing the upper-mostmembers achieved significant effect in dismantling the criminal enterprise. This approach,having been shown effective against these types of groups, was employed against criminalstreet gangs. Perhaps the most notable of these efforts was against the El Rukn/Black P Stonesand their leader Jeff Fort in the late 1980s. Fort was convicted in federal court of domesticterrorism. He is not alone, however. Residing with Fort at the United States Penitentiary,

Administrative Maximum Facility (ADX) prison in Florence, Colorado, is Larry Hoover, who ruleda claimed 30,000-member-strong Gangster Disciples on Chicagos west and south sides. Alengthy RICO investigation of Hoover while incarcerated in the early 1990s resulted in aconviction and his transfer to ADX.

Unfortunately, the convictions of Fort and Hoover did not precipitate the fall of theirrespective street gangs. Instead, with the loss of leadership, many of the gangsmembers whohad been middle-tier managers under the previous leadership became street gangentrepreneurs, retaining their former gang affiliations as surnames while adding new firstnames to denote a separate gang faction. The results of this factionalizing of large street gangshave been near catastrophic for gang crime investigations. Centralized hierarchicalorganizations shattered into dozens of loosely affiliated factions. In the rush to fill the powervacuum left by incarcerated leaders, existing rivalries went hot, while new rivalries created newviolence as gang members who were once united began to compete with one another overterritory they once shared. The trend toward gang factions increases today. In Chicago, a 2003assessment of street gangs indicated 68 gangs with 500 factions. An assessment taken only 9years later shows 59 gangs and 625 factions (http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/August-2012/Garry-McCarthy-Under-the-Gun/?cparticle=4&siarticle=1) .

As time has passed and older gang members are replaced by younger members manyof whom were not yet born while either Hoover or Fort were free traditional alliances andrivalries shift with profits. Today it is not uncommon to see former or current rivalsreaching a financial agreement that allows them to share prime locations for narcotics sales.The increase in factions over gangs has yet another critical dimension: as the number offactions increase, both the membership of the faction as well as the size of the factionsterritory decrease. The once-30,000-member Gangster Disciples is now a group of allied andwarring factions, each with typically between 50 to 200 members. This has profound

implications on organizational structure and leadership.

First, with territories typically being under a square half-mile in size many oftencomprising just a couple blocks gang factions have become islands in a sea of islands. Inorder to facilitate the continuation of criminal enterprises like narcotics sales factions mustalign themselves with other factions to achieve needed resources. A 30,000-member criminalenterprise can be vertically integrated, facilitating much of its own resources internally, or it canmake the connections necessary with other, often transnational, enterprises to secure its needs.
http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/August-2012/Garry-McCarthy-Under-the-Gun/?cparticle=4&siarticle=1http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/August-2012/Garry-McCarthy-Under-the-Gun/?cparticle=4&siarticle=1http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/August-2012/Garry-McCarthy-Under-the-Gun/?cparticle=4&siarticle=1http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/August-2012/Garry-McCarthy-Under-the-Gun/?cparticle=4&siarticle=1


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A 100-member criminal enterprise surrounded by a dozen other 100-member enterprises doesnot typically have such capability or direct access. Similarly, directly competing for theresourcesterritory, narcotics supply, narcotics sales, etcwith neighboring factions placessuch a strain on the organization that its sole purpose becomes survival. It is a far betterbusiness model to align with others who have those resources and do business with them. Theresult is that each faction exists within anotheror several otherfactions criminal enterprisenetwork.

Second, the combination of decreased membership and territory plus the lessonslearned from previous police operations has changed the organizational structure of manygangs. Instead of a rigid pyramid-shaped hierarchy, many gangs today are much flatter, withredundancies in leadership and management roles. Some simply lack a defined leadershipstructure at all, and exist as a collective group who make decisions as a whole or by simplemajority. Where gangs exist that do employ a single leader organizational structure, theleadership has insulated itself in such a manner as to make them near immune to prosecution,or have made the cost in terms of time, energy, and manpower exceptionally high in aneffort to catch them engaged in criminal activity. While law enforcement is busy with these

investigations, the day-to-day operations of the gang narcotics sales, violence, andintimidation continue.

The Kingpin Fallacy

The Kingpin Fallacy is law enforcements continued insistence that all street gangs areruled by kingpins, that the understanding of the gangsorganization and operations be definedaccording to a traditional pyramid organizational structure, and that targeting such a person willresult in significant degrading of the gang or its collapse.

There are a few reasons why this insistence is so prevalent. Previous investigations withorganized crime have employed the kingpin model with success. Law enforcement itself isdesigned in such a way, with a chief at the top, so that it is agentsdefault understanding oforganizations; we look for this organizational structure even where it may not exist. Lawenforcement struggles too often to fit the square peg of gangs into the round hole of traditionalhierarchical organizational structure. The result is that effective targeting of criminal actorswithin the gang is significantly degraded.

Targeting Considerations for Street Gangs

Understanding Gangs as Flat Networks

To be more effective, law enforcement must first evaluate gangs as relationship-based

networks, then target those persons within the network that facilitate critical networkconnections. A useful analogy can be made using the four corners of a city block. Assume thaton each corner of this block there are a total of ten gang members who are engaged innarcotics sales. Over time, the distribution of connectivity will reveal that the ten people oneach corner tend to associate with each other more than they associate with persons on theother cornersrelationship-based subgroups within the faction. Further analysis is likely toreveal interconnectivity between groups; some persons from each corner are likely to associatewith persons assigned to other corners. Also revealed are relationships that span all, or most, of


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these corners. Particular attention should be paid to individuals whose association with eachsubgroup is shallow (one or two of each group of ten) or temporal (occurring at habitualintervals or within the same time frame). These subjects are most likely key facilitators, andtheir presence within the network act to coordinate and hold the network together.

Identifying distinct relationship-based subgroups within gangs and gang factions alsoallows law enforcement to better address gang violence. By looking at acts of violence, thosewho are committing the violence, and the existing subgroups, law enforcement can oftennarrow down those perpetuating the violence to one or two specific subgroups. This allows lawenforcement to more narrowly focus their efforts on those specific people whom associate mostdirectly with one another, rather than attempting to throw an enforcement blanketover theentire gang. Coupled with a geographic understanding of where particular subgroups tend tocongregate within the claimed gang territory also increases efficiency in resources allocated andtime spent addressing the issue. For example, in a gang of 100 people covering a four-by-fourblock square of territory, law enforcement can focus their attention on ten to fifteen keyindividuals and the one block they most often frequent. Additionally, when key and influentialmembers of the gang or faction are identified, law enforcement can also approach these

individuals regarding violence, attempting to bring pressure on the subgroup by moreestablished members of the gang.

Understanding Gangs as Interconnected Networks

Understanding gang factions as networked with one another allows law enforcement toactively search for and identify those persons who serve as the humanbridgesthat facilitatethe connection between cooperating factions and gangs. As previously mentioned, theincreasing move toward smaller gang factions brings with it both the requirement to cooperateand import key resources as well as fierce and often violent competition for resources. A seriesof alliances and conflicts are formed. By focusing not only on the relationships gang memberswithin a gang have with each other but also on their relationships with members from differentgang members, law enforcement can begin to identify not only which specific persons facilitatethese interactions, but the depth of these interactions as well.

Returning to the identification of subgroups within gangs, examination of relationshipsbetween members of gangs can identify if interaction exists across the entire gang or if it islimited to specific people in specific subgroups. Again, this allows law enforcement to not onlygain a better understanding of the interconnectivity, but to better focus its resources wherethey are most needed.

A final note about interconnectivity: It remains a critical function of law enforcementanalysts to determine if interconnectivity is cooperative or competitive. It is just as important to

understand the context of the relationship, particularly if it is violently competitive. Determiningif the violence is due to historical rivalries or more acute variables (personality clashes, personalgrievances) will help law enforcement understand how wide or deep the violence may spreadand to craft more effective responses.


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Understanding the Role of Influential Members within a Gang

Identifying influential members remains mostly within the realm of human intelligence.These are the people most everyone in the gang knows and listens to. Identifying influentialmembers is the first critical point.

Overlaying an analysis of a gang as a relationship-based network with the humanintelligence ascertaining influence will not necessarily show convergence. That is, those peoplewho are identified as key members within the network may not be those persons whom aremost influential. This understanding is the second critical point: removing persons in keypositions within the network may not also remove persons of significant influence. Conversely,removing influential members may not break apart the network.

The third critical point is identifying the nature of influence. While it may seemreasonable from an operations perspective to remove influential members of a gang,understanding the specific type of influence an individual has must drive how these gangmembers are approached. Targeting influential members who drive violence or hold a non-

violent criminal group together is likely a reasonable strategy and, when coupled with targetingand removing persons in key network positions, can have devastating effects on a gang.However, removing an influential member whose influence keeps order within the gang andprevents other members from engaging in violence is likely to create violence. In suchinstances, it is better for law enforcement to directly engage this person with messages ofkeeping violence at bay while simultaneously targeting and removing key network members andfacilitators.

Understanding Gangs as Open, Complex Systems within a Complex Environment

The environment within which gangs and law enforcement operate is an open andcomplex system. Unlike complicated systems, which are composed of multiple, interactingcomponents that can be broken apart into their respective pieces and examined independently,complex systems are dependant and relationship based. When any relationship within thesystem is affected, the whole of the system is affected. Complex systems share the trait ofemergence, which means they can change without any outside influence. Gangs are complexsystems. They display emergence, as competition for power within the gang can change thenature of the gang itself as well as the relationships between its members. It is also an opensystem in that it is affected by outside influence, most notably by conflicts with rival gangs andthrough interactions with law enforcement.

In order for effective targeting and overall counter-gang strategies to be effective,complexity must be understood and managed. Continued reassessment of the gang its key

network members, facilitators, and influentials must be practiced. After significant acts ofgang violence, after law enforcement removes key network members, and after lawenforcement removes connections between cooperating gangs, the gang as a system maychange. The change may be minor or it may be significant, but law enforcement must reassessthe gang and determine the next best course of action. This requires law enforcement to craftstrategies that have a built-in mechanism for reevaluation and adaptation. It also requires lawenforcement to be agile, moving in real-time to new information and analysis.


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John A. Bertetto is a sworn member of the Chicago Police Department.

His current areas of study and work include criminal street gangs, socialnetwork analysis, and asymmetric threat mitigation. He is the author of

Counter-Gang Strategy: Adapted COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs,

Countering Criminal Street Gangs: Lessons from the CounterinsurgentBattlespace, Designing Law Enforcement: Adaptive Strategies for theComplex Environment, and Toward a Police Ethos: Defining Our Values

as a Call to Action. Officer Bertettos most recent research article

ReducingGang Violence through Network Influence Based Targeting ofSocial Programshas been accepted to the Industry & Government Track

of the 2014 Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) annual

conference, a conference with a 20% acceptance rate. Officer Bertetto has

worked street patrol, organized crime, and research and developmentassignments. His applied research projects have led to collaborative

partnerships with students and faculty at USMA West Point, George

Mason University, and the University of Maryland. He is one of theprimary designers and the law enforcement SME behind the GANG social

network analysis software, which has been featured in Popular Science,

Governing, and on MITs technology blog, as well as profiled on ABC

and BBC news. Officer Bertetto holds a Master of Science degree fromWestern Illinois University and a Master of Business Administration

degree from St. Xavier University.

The Kingpin Fallacy: Targeting Criminal Street Gangs

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