The Kalon in Aristotles Ethics Louvain Presentation

8/10/2019 The Kalon in Aristotles Ethics Louvain Presentation

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TheKaloninAristotlesEthics

ByMichaelPakaluk

InthistalkIproposetodofourthings:

1. Setupaproblemabouttokalon

2. Establishacontext,bybrieflysketchingsomeofPlatosthoughtsonthekalon,andarguingthat

AristotlemainlysharedPlatosview

3. DiscussafewaspectsofAristotlesviewofthekalon

4. (Iftimeallows)Raisesomequestionsbyputtingbeforeyouthreeperplexingtextsonthekalon

Idealwiththisquestionlargelybygoingthroughtexts,becausethatapproachseemssuitedtoa

workshopsuchasthis,andbecausemyideasareunformed,andIfinditnecessarytospendmoretime

lookingattheevidence.

1. TheProblem

TheproblemisstatedwellbyBostock(pp.9899):[Aristotle]givesusnoanalysisoftheconceptofthe

noble(tokalon),thoughitwouldseemtobeacentrallyimportantconceptforhim. Notonlydoes

Aristotlegivenoanalysis,butalsohiscommentatorsneglectthetopic. Wehaveentirebookson

eudaimonia,tohdu,todikaion,phronsis,akrasia,andphilia,but,exceptforaveryfewarticles(of

JosephOwens,TerryIrwin,andKellyRogers),nothoroughdiscussionoftokalon.Thisseminarinits

meetinglastyearentirelysidesteppeddiscussingit:hencePierreaskedmetogiveapaperonthetopic.

Soitisacompoundproblem.

Itisperhapseasytoexplainwhyrecentcommentatorshaveneglectedthetopic. Tokalonapparentlymeansthefineorthebeautiful;Aristotlesview,then,seemstobethatethicaljudgmentsinvolve

aestheticjudgments;butwetendtoregardaestheticjudgmentsasunanalyzablereactionstoparticular

factsandcircumstances. IfwesupposethatAristotleisaparticularist,wellbemoreinclinedtoregard

judgmentsabouttokaloninthatway. IfwebelievethatanIdealObservertypeanalysisisthebestway

todealwithaestheticjudgments,thenwellbeinclinedtounderstandactionXiskalonalongthelines

ofactionXwillappearadmirabletoawellequippedobserver,thatis,toavirtuouspersonfrom

whichitwouldfollowthattheanalysisoftokalondependsontheanalysisofthevirtues,whichAristotle

gives. Onemightalsosupposethatmanysharethesuspicionthattokalonistobegroupedwithaclass

ofnotionsthatsetGreek,oratleastPlatonic,ethicsapartfromourownsuchastotheion,thesis,to

aidesandonthatbasisconcludethattheprincipleofcharitywouldimplythat,ifwewanttoconstrue

Aristotlesethicssoastomakeitaplausiblepositiontoadopttoday,weneedtoputasideorsomehowrecastthisnotion.

ButwhyAristotleneglectedthetopicismoredifficulttosee. Heseemstohavebeenabletogivean

analysis,ifhehadwanted:theancientlistssaythathewroteabookontokalon,anditishardtothink

thathisfairlyelaboratediscussionofwhatcountsastokalonforpurposesofpersuasion,inRhetoricI.9,

isnotinformedbysomedeeperandmorephilosophicalaccount. Moreover,tokalonisindeed,as

Bostocksays,acentrallyimportantconceptforhim. Consider:

Aristotle Workshop, CUL, Louvain-la-Neuve, December 18-19, 2014

;

;

;

.

DRAFT


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a) Astandarddescriptionof forAristotleis . Amongmanyexamples,1

considerthefollowing:

, , .

' , .NEI.8.1099a2226.

Alltheseattributes[sc.pleasant,kalon,beneficial]belongtothebestactivities,andthese,orthebestamongthem,wesayis

happiness. Butitlooksneverthelessasthoughhappinessrequiresexternalgoodsalso,justaswehavesaid.Afterall,itisimpossible,ornoteasy,todokaladeedsifsomeonelacksresources.

Here isstrikinglynotdescribedasactivityinaccordancewiththevirtuesbut

simplydoingkalaactions,asifthereasonweacquirethevirtuesatallisforreliablydoingkala

actions.2

b)

Tosaythattheactionsofsuchalifearekala,ismeantforAristotletoexplainwhyweare

willinglyethicalatall. Inthisregard,Aristotlestandardlycontraststhekalonwiththeanangkaion.3 Thekalonisattractiveandwillinglysought,theanangkaionisnotsoughtforitself

butsoughtonlybecauseofsomethingelse. ThusthekaloninAristotleprovidestheanswer,for

him,tothekindofchallengewhichGlauconposestoSocratesinRepublicII,ofaccountingfor

whyanyoneiswillinglyvirtuousandjust:forAristotle(asindeedforPlatotoo,inRepublicIV),

wedovirtuousactionswillingly,andindeedwithpleasure,becausetheyarekala,andthekalon

isattractive.

( ),

.NEIII.1.1110b1012.

Ifsomeoneweretosaythatpleasantornobleobjectsarecoercive,astheynecessitateus,sincetheyareexternal,then

everythingwouldbecoerciveforhim,asitforthesakeofthesethateveryonedoeseverythingthattheydo.

1 .NEI.12.1101b3133. ' . NEX.8.1179a46. , ' ,NEIV.1.1120a1113.Owensarguesthat = forAristotleonthebasisofpassagessuchasthefollowingwhichdescribethegoaloflegislators: , , .I.3.1096b1416. . NEI.9.1099b304.2NotethatwhatissaidinNEXaboutthemodestmeansrequiredfor rulesoutthatAristotlerefersinthepresentpassagetokalainordertoemphasizethatthedeedsconstitutiveofhappinesswillbeconspicuous.3 ' ,NEIV.1.1120a21. .NEIX.2.1164b2830. ' , '.Ibid.1165a34. , , ' .NEIX.11.1171a246. ' , ' Pol.1332a1012.


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, .NEX.10.1179b2931.

Acharacterwhichfindsvirtuecongenialmustsomehowbeacquiredfirstonewhichclingstothekalonandrecoilsattheaischron.

ThesecondpassageisalsoagoodstatementofAristotlesmoralpsychologyofthekalon,namely,thateveryonecanrecognizeit,butloveforit(anditislovewhichissuesinactions),is

weakinmostofusbynature,butitcanbestrengthenedbyeducationandcharacterformation.

c) SomecommentatorshavesupposedthatAristotleholdswhatmightbecalledanactualization

modelof,accordingtowhich consistsinanexpansiveandsatisfying

developmentofallofthevariousrationalpowers,orrationallyinformedpowers,thatwehave

orcanpracticallyacquireorperhapsofonesuchpowerwhichisespeciallysatisfying. Whether

Aristotleholdssuchaviewisperhapsdebatable. Inanycase,inmanyplacesheseemstoevince

adifferentview,whatmightbecalledanacquisitivemodeloranachievementmodel,

accordingtowhich consists,rather,ofconsistentlyandoptimallyacquiring

something,orachievingsomething.4Whenhespeaksinthisway,itisclearthattheworthofwhatisacquiredandachievedisaccountedforbysayingtheyarekala.Indeed,whatis

supposedtoexplainwhylivinglikethatcancountas atall,isthatthesethingsare

kala.NEIX.8providesmanyexamplesofthiswayofspeaking,asforexample:

' ' . ' ' ,

Thispresumablyhappenswiththosewhogiveuptheirlivesforothers:theychooseforthemselves,then,somethinggreatandkalon. Theygiveupmoney,too,onconditionthattheirfriendshavemoreofit,sincethefriendhasmoney,butthegiverhas

thekalon.

Andsoon. Therearemanyexamplesofthiswayofspeaking.

d)

Again,tokalonissupposedtobethesolemotiveonwhichonecansucceedinactingvirtuously.

Virtuousactionsarevirtuousbecauasetheyarebothkalonandchosenonaccountoftheirbing

kalon.5

' .NEIV.1.1120a1920.

Thevariousactionswhichspringfromvirtuearebothkalonanddoneforthesakeofthekalon.

4Forexamplenotetheuseof (meaninghereareacquisition): ,' ' , ,', , .NEI.9.1101a913.5 .NEIII.6.1115b23. ,NEIII.12.1119b16. .NEIV.2.1122b67. ' , , , ,NEIX.8.


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Onemightsaythatthemotiveofactingonthecondition,andsolelyonthecondition,thatthe

contemplatedactiskalonisanalogous,foritsimportance,tothemotiveofactingondutyin

Kantsphilosophy. Itisbafflingthatwehavenotgenerallyacceptedaccountofwhatthismeans

forAristotle.

e)

Theprecept,Dowhatiskalon,avoidwhatisaischronseemstoberegardedbyAristotleasthesingle,dominantpreceptsufficientforlivingwell. Asproof,considerthatwemustfollowthis

precept,hesays,evenifdoingsoimpliesthatweforfeitourprospectsforfuture.6

Theprecept,then,takespriorityoverseekonesownandthereforetrumps

eudaimonism:

, , .

, , , .' , , ' .NEIII.9.1117b29.1168a3132.

Ifthissortofthingholdstoointhecaseofcourage,then:deathandwoundswillbepainfulforacourageousman,andnotsoughtafter,buthefacesthesethingsbecauseitiskalon,orbecausenotdoingsoisaischron.

Andthemorehehasoftheothervirtues[lit.virtueinitsentirety],andthemoreheiseudaimn,tothatextent,hewillbemoregreatlypainedbydeath.Thatsortofmanmostdeserveslife;andheisawareofbeingdeprivedofthegreatestgoods;andthisissomethingpainful. Butforallthatheshowscourageevenmorecourage,presumablybecausehechoosesforhimselfthekaloninwarfareinexchangeforthosethings.

f)

ThekalonplaystheroleforAristotleofunifyingthespeculativeandpracticalvirtues,andthereforetheprimaryandsecondaryforms,sincebothformsaredevotedto

acquiringthekalon,thoughtheydosoindifferentways:speculativeactivitythrough

contemplatingkalaobjects,andpracticalactivitythroughbringingaboutactions,routines,

culture,relationships,andinstitutionswhicharekala.

' '

. ,

Noattainmentsinourhumanspherehaveasmuchsolidityasactionswhichspringfromvirtue. Theselooktohaveevengreaterlastingnessthanthevarioustypesofexpert

knowledge. Ofthelatter,themostestimablearemorelastingbecauseblessedlyhappymenmaketheirlivesconsistmostlyofthese,andwiththefewestinterruptions(thisisthereason,mostlikely,whytheyarenever

6HeretoothereseemstobeaPlatonicorSocraticprovenancetothiscommitment,ifweconsiderthattheprinciplestatedintheCrito,neverwronganyone,isregardedherebySocratesandCritotogetherasaninstanceofthemoregeneralprinciple,dowhatiskalon,avoidwhatisaischron.


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'.NEI.10.1100b1220.

forgotten). Thenwhatwearelookingforwillbeattributabletotheeudaimnman.Moreover,hellbelikethatthroughoutthewholeofhislifebecausehewillalways(ormoreoftenthananythingelse)beeitherdoingordwellingup actionswhichspringfromvirtue.

Insum,tokalonisundeniablyacentralnotionforAristotlesethics,andyetAristotlesayslittlebywayof

explainingit. Heseemssimplytotakethenotionforgranted. Perhaps,then,hetakesthenotionfrom

PlatoandisrelyinginpartonwhatwascommonlyheldaboutitintheAcademy?

2.

Platosviewontokalon

Althoughwemightfindtokalonadifficultorunfamiliarnotion,forPlatoapparentlynothingcouldbemoreobviousandclear. Atleast,invariousdialogues,whenSocrateswishestodrawhisinterlocutors

attentiontoForms,typicallyhisfirstexampleisoftokalon.

WearefamiliarwiththefamousUltimateArgumentofthePhaedoinreplytoCebes,wherethe

principlethatitisbytokalonthatanythingiskalonisPlatosfirstexampleofasecondvoyage.But

eventhoughthePhaedoisnotinanysenseaboutthekalon,stillintheCyclicalArgumenttooonefinds

thesamething,

' , , , ,

Letusthenseeasregardsallofthesewhethertheycometobeinanyotherwaythanoppositesfromopposites, iftheyhaveopposites,asforexamplethekalonisoppositetotheaischron,andthejusttotheunjust,andamyriadotherthingslikethat(70e14).

LikewisetheRecollectionArgumentbegins:

, , ,

If,aswearealwaysgoingonabout,thereissomethingwhichiskalon,andgoodandeverysubstancesuchastheseandallmattersfallingunderperceptionwetraceup()tothatkindofbeing()(76d79)

Butthekalonleadsfirstinotherdialoguesaswell.Forinstance,SocratesasksTheatetus,whenan

exampleofapureconcept,immunefromcontradiction,iswanted:


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' .

Trytorememberifyouhaveeversaidtoyourselfthatthekalonisactuallyaischron,ortheunjustjust(190b12).

ParmenidesintheeponymousdialogueisevendepictedaspickinguponSocrateshabitofputtingthe

kalonfirst,since,whenhewarnsthatSocratesneedsmoretrainingbeforeheattemptstodefinetheforms,hespecifiesthemas:todefinewhatthekalonis,andthejust,andthegood(135c9).

Theseexamplesshow,Ithink,thatPlatoregardedtokalonasthebestconceptorformforshowingthe

relationshipbetweensensibleparticularsandformsgenerally. Whatdoesthisamountto? Itmeans

suchthingsasthat:Anobjectsbeingkalonlookstobesomethingborrowedfronmanotherandnot

originallyorinevitablypossessed;thekalonstrikesusasakindorradiance,ormanifestation,and

itrepresentssomethingelsequamakinganappearance;yetthekalonisreceivedbyusnotassomekind

ofadumborbruteimpression,butratherasintelligible,andindeedascapableofstandinginfor

anythingthatisintelligibleatall. Thekalonshowsbesthowwetracethingsupand,asdescribedin

theSymposium,itbestshowshowwecanfollowthemupwardsaswell,ifweknowhowtodothat.

NowAristotlelargelystaysawayfromthissortofPlatonicromanticism,yetevenheretherearesome

signsofinfluence,forexample,inthematteroffactwayinwhichAristotlewillusekalonasastock

predicatefortestingsyllogismsintheAnalytics,alongwiththepedestrianpredicatesleukonand

anthropos,andotherslikethat,asifontheassumptionthatthekalonisentirelyunproblematic.

OragainconsiderwhetheritwouldbenaturalforsomeoneunaffectedbyPlatosviewtowrite,as

Aristotledoes,thatintheforebearancewhichagoodmancanshowinthemidstofadversity,tokalon

shinesforth,revealinghishighdestinyandgreatnessofsoul:

, , ',

,I.10.1100b302

Thekalonshinesthrough,whensomeonewalkswithalightstepundermultiple,great

misfortunes,notbecausehehasatoughskinbutratherbecausehehasasenseofhisownworthandisgreathearted.

AnevenbetterexampleisfoundofcourseinPartsofAnimalsI.5,where,afterdeclaringthatevena

glimpseofcelestialthingsgivesgreaterdelightthaneverythingputtogetherinourdomain(

' ,echoingaphraseintheProtrepticus),Aristotlenonethelessdeclaresthat,becauseof

thefashioningskill( ),whichisevidentinthem,evenhumbleanimalshavea

shareofthekalon( ). InanunusualphraseAristotleaddsthatthese

humblecreaturscometooccupytherankofthekalon( ,645a256.).

PlatoissurelythesourcetooofAristotlesconceptofthekalonasagoodthatcanbeacquiredthrough

action. OneseesthisideadevelopedbothinSocratesfirstrefutationofPolusintheGorgias,andalsoin

AlcibiadesI. Intheformer,Socratesisconcernedtoarguethatsomeonewhoappearstobebetteroff

bydoingsomethingaischron,infactputshimselfinaworseposition,becausethegoodheloses,and

theharmheendures,indoingtheaischronaction,isfarworsethanwhatevergoodhemightgain. In

theAlcibiadesI,Socrateslooksattheconversesituation,wheresomeonedoessomethingkalonatthe

costofcertaingoods,andtheretheargumentisthatthekalonhegainsisfargreaterthanwhathe


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loses. ThelatterpassageisparalleltothepassageinNEIIIabove. Thesamepairofevilsismentioned,

deathandwounds(,). Inbothpassagestheyarefacedorreceived(,

). Onepassagesaysthedisplayofcourageisevil()inthatrespect,theotherthatit

agentisunwilling(). Bothpassagessaythatthepersondoingthiscourageousactionobtains

(,)thekaloninwarfare( )

, , ,, ;

Doyoumaintainsuchthingsasthese,thatforexamplemanymenwhoinwarfaresincetheycometotheaidofacomradeorneighbor,receivewoundsanddeath,butotherswhodonotdososo,astheyought,getawayhealthy?

,

;[ ]

;

Courageisanevilforthem

asregardstheirdeathandwounds?

, , , ; ;

Sothentheaidinginwarfareofonesfriends,insofarasitiskalon,yourefertoassimplykalon,asregardsthegoodnessofthecourageousaction? Andthesemenobtainthesethingsbyactingwellandinakalonmanner?

' , , ' .

Platoslineofthought,whichAristotleseemstoshare,isthatwecannotbeadmiringtheheroicaction(ofrescuingacomradeasoneshould)fornoreason;ifwearedrawntoit,thentheremustbe

somethinggoodaboutit(asthatissimplywhatagoodis,anend);buttheverysamegoodwhichwe

admire,andinasenseacquirebywonderingatit,thedoerofthedeedacquires,presumablytoa

greaterdegree,7intheactitself;infact,thatthedoerpursuesandacquiresagoodexplainsthedoers

motivation;finally,theworthofthegoodshegivesuptestifiestothegreaterworthofthegoodhe

reasonablyacquiresinexchange.(Attheendofthepassage,Alcibiadesblurtsoutthathewouldnever

wanttobeacowardandwouldnthesitatetogiveuphislifetoavoidbeingso.)

SowehaveseenthekalonforPlatoasamanifestationwhichdrawsupward,andthekalonasagenuine

goodacquiredbydoingdeedsthatwegenerallyadmire. Ontheseunderstandings,thekalonisnot

presentedassomethinganalyzeable.ButthereisathirdmainunderstandingofkaloninPlato,inwhichthekalonisanalysedasgoaldirectedintelligenceatwork.Wehadalreadyseenthisviewreflectedin

AristotlesPartsofAnimalsdiscussion,butitisvaluabletosaysomethingmore.

7Itmakessensetodietosavesomeoneinbattle,assavingsomeone,butitmakesnosensetodiefortheopportunitytopondertheadmirabilityofsavingsomeoneinbattle.


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Thisthirdviewshowsupinpassinginmanyplaces.Forexample,intheTimaeus(87c):

, : .

Allthatisgoodiskalon,andthekalonisnotvoidofduemeasure;whereforealsothelivingcreaturethatistobekalonmustbesymmetrical.

Here meansnotEnglishsymmetricalbutratherproportionateandindicatesarelationship

whereoneormorepartsfiteachotherforsomepurpose.

PlatosmostrevealingdiscussionofthisthirdunderstandingofkalonisprobablyintheCratylus(416c

d).Thetermtokalon,hesaysthere,derivesfromtokaloun,thatis,thenameconferringpower,andit

isappliedtoanyproductofthoughtandreasoning,onthegroundsthatwecanrefertotheworksofa

power,withanamederivedfromthenameofthatpower,andthebestnameforthepowerofthought

andreasoningisnameconferring,asthatisitsmostbasicandmostdistinctiveact. Sotokalonmeans

thatwhichistheworkofintelligencewhetherofgodsorofmen(

;).Thatiswhytokalonistoepaineton,Platosays,becauseweare

praisingtheintelligenceandreasoningresponsibleforthekalonobjectweadmire( , , ,;). Ineffect,tobekalonisto

evinceintelligentdesignthekalonispreciselyamanifestationofthe which

Aristotletooksomuchdelightin.

Nowifwewantanadditionalanalysisandwonderwhatsomethingisthereforelike,ifitistheproduct

ofintelligence,wemightlooktowhatPlatosaysabout inthelastthirdoftheGorgias. Perhaps

themostimportantassertionthereisthefollowing(503e4504a5):

,, , , ,

, ,

Forinstance,ifyouwishtoconsiderpainters,housebuilders,shipbuilders,oranyoftheothercraftsmen,youllfindthateachplaceseachthing

thathedealswithinacertainorder,andifonethingisdifferentfromanother,heforceseachtobeadaptedandtofitin,untilhesmadeitsothatthewholeworkisputinorderandisbeautifullyarranged.

Notethattheprincipleforestablishingthevirtuesasinthemselveschoiceworthy(theprojectofRepII

IV)issetdownhere:oneneedsadistinctionofparts,withadueordering,whichstateswhereeachis

supposedtogo,andhowitsgoingtherecontributestosomeorderingofthewhole. ButintheGorgias,

Socratesisnotsomuchconcernedwiththebeautyofavirtuoussoulasawholebutratherwithrefuting

Calliclesbrazenaffirmationofunlimitedlibidoastheprincipleofagoodlife. Hethereforewishesto

insistthateveryvirtueisitselfakindofordering,8andthereforemanifestsprinciplesoflimitationandboundedness,andwhichmoreoverequipsthethingwhichhasthatvirtuetobelawful(nominom)and

itselfabletofitwithinalargerorder. Lookingatthevirtuesinthisway,henaturallytakesmoderation

(sphrosun)tobethemostfundamentalvirtue,andfindsthattheorderlinessandcomeliness(kosmon,

kosmia)ofmoderationofimplythatanyonewhohasthatvirtuewillasaconsequencehavetheother

cardinalvirtues. Intheentirediscussionheseemstobeusingcomelinessratherthankalontoreferto

8 (506e1).


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whatisappealingandadmirableinvirtue. Ifso,thenthepassagegivesusanexplicationofthekalonof

virtueandvirtuousaction: thisinvolvestheadaptationofparts(summetria),toconstituteanordered

whole,whichworkstogetherforsomeendbeyonditself,wherethatwholefitsreadilyintosomelarger,

reasonablelawlikearrangement.

Platosviewofthekalonasmanifestingintelligencecanbetraced,Ibelieve,backtowhathesaysabout

namingintheCratylus. Namingisthedistinctiveactivityofthepowerofintelligence,afterwhichto

kalongetsitsname.Hedoesnotconceiveofnamingasthearbitraryapplicationofaspokensoundtoa

thing.Rather,namingisanactionthatcanbecorrectornot,andtonamecorrectlyistoexhibit,reveal,

andshowthesortofthingitis,whichisnamed(

, ,422d)9 Namingismore

likewhatwemightcallforminganappropriateconcept,whichcapturestheessenceofathing,ofwhich

thesoundednameisonlyasign.

Alongtheselineshesaysthat,whenanameiscorrectlygiven,thenatureofthethingnamedatthe

sametimemakesthenameclear.Theyclarifyeachother,apparently. Thenaturemakesthenameclear

too( , 429c).Theearliest

namesdosobyimitation,forinstance,raisingone'shandtoshow()whatisabove(423a1).In

generalanameandapictureare"correct",andthenamefurthermore"true,"ifitimitatesthatwhichit

namesand"rendersinreturntoeachthing()thatwhichsuitsitandisliketoit".10

ThisisalltosaythatPlatoispreparedtothinkofnamingaslikeareciprocalexchange,where

somethingisreceivedfromthethingtobenamed,itsnature,andsomethingis"givenback"inreturnto

thethingnamed,bythenaming,whichis"like"whatwasreceivedandforthatreason"suitable"toit

(). (See431balso.) Inanotherplace,Platolikensanametoadistributionwhich,ofthe

variousnamestobedistributed(),assignsthatnametoathingtowhichismostlikeandbest

suited( , ;).

Sothen,somethingiskalon,ifitrepresentstheactivityofintellect,whichisbestunderstoodbylookingattheactivityoftheintellectinnaming,itsdistinctivework. Namingisarenderingbackordistribution

ofwhatissuitabletothatwhichisnamed,becauseitissufficientlylikeit,whichthen,inthe

comparison,"shows"whatthethingnamedislike.Hencethemarksofthekalon:itinvolvesproportion,

thatis,amatchingofsomethingplaced,toitsplacement;anorderlyarrangementofpartstoawhole,

whichisakintoadistribution;andthenclarity,akindofmovementinreasoningfromobscuritytoa

betterunderstanding,attainedbysimplification.This"clarifying"andshowingofthingsisthevery

9Elsewherehesaysthatacorrectnameendeixetai("shows"or"exhibits")whatsortofthingsomething

is(428e). Therefore,tonameistoteachandtrain(ininvolvesdidaskalia),whichisthejoboflawgivers

(429a).10 ,430c.Thelikenessisnotanexact

reproduction,becausethenitwouldbethesamething,butratheralikenessthatisprosekon(432e).

Thisisalsosaidtobealikenessinwhich"theintrinsicqualityispresent"(433a),whichagainsuggests

somethingimmanentandhardtoseemadeexplicitthroughasimplifieddrawingattentiontoit

somehow.


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purposeofnaming.Akalonobject,then,sinceithasbuiltintoitthedistinctivefeaturesofanactof

naming,isasitwereareflectionorimageofthismostbasicactivityofintelligence.

SoweseeabasisinPlatoswritingsatleastforthefamousstatementofPseudoDionysiusthatthe

kalonisthatwhichhasunity,proportion,andclarity.

3. AristotlesviewcomparedwithPlatos

IhavebrieflypresentedPlatosviewofthekaloninordertoshowsomepointswhereAristotlehas

drawnfromit,butalsotostrengthenourinitialproblem. GivenPlatosviews,andtheextentof

AristotlesborrowingonPlatosviews,thekalonwouldhavebeenanotionaboutwhichAristotlewould

havebeenexpectedtohaveatheory,yethedoesnotgiveoneintheworkinwhichhereliesonthat

notionmost,nordoesheevenhintatitwithoneofhisusualphrases(thatsaninvestigationwhich

doesnotbelonghereetc.).

WeprobablycannotcountRhetoricI.9asgivingsuchatheoryorevenasdescribingwhatreallycounts

askalon,asopposedtowhatanaudiencewillbeinclinedtoregardaskalon. ItistruethatAristotlegivesaformulationtherewhichatfirstglancelookslikeadefinition:

, , .

Kalonwouldbewhat,besidesbeingchoiceworthyonaccountofitself,ispraiseworthy,orwhat,besidesbeinggood,isfoundpleasantonthegroundsthatitisgood.

ButAristotlecouldnothaveacceptedthisasadefinition,becauseitrestrictsthekalontoobjectsof

humanchoice:theheavens,forexample,wouldnotcountaskalonbythisformulation,becauseit

makesnosensetosaythatwecouldchoosethem. Also,heimmediatelygoesontosay,afterthisformulation,thatvirtueisthemainthingthatcountsaskalon,butthen,laterinthechapter,whenhe

wantstoexplainwhatpraiseis,heexplainsitwithreferencetovirtue:

.

Praiseislanguagewhichmanifeststhegreatnessofavirtue.

Thusthepair,kalonpraise,isinterdefinedwhichnodoubtisunobectionable,ifonesaimismerelyto

tellarhetoricianhowtocraftpraise.

Butbesidesthis,Aristotlescharacterizationofvirtueinthechapterisununsual:

, , .

Avirtueisapowerof(asisthought)providingandsafeguardinggoods,andapowerofconferringmanyandgreatbenefits,inallcircumstances[]andforeveryone[].


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Thus,Aristotlesays,acourageousmanispraisedforhiscourage,becausehetendstoactsoastosave

yourlifeandthatofothers;ajustmanispraisedbecausehewilldistributegoodsfairlytoyouand

others;aliberalmanisdisposedtogivehismoneyawaytoyouandothers;andsoon. Sotheupshotof

thisformulationofavirtueisthatitturnspraiseintoakindofsocialmechanismforencouraging

behaviorswhichbenefitthesocialgroupasawholewhichseems,again,asuitableenough

understandingofpraiseifoneisarhetorlookingtostirupacrowd,butnotnecessarilyasoundphilosophicalanalysis. Inparticular,IseenoreasontoagreewithIrwinsinterpretation,inthe

aforementionedarticle,thathereAristotleisanalyzingkalonasmeaningpromotesthecommongood.

ItistruethatacoupleoftimesinRhetoricI.9Aristotlesays,ineffect,thatthelessabeneficentaction

workstothebenefittooofthebenefactor,themorekalonitis. IrwinsaysthatAristotlelookstobe

articulatingaprincipleofaltruism. Itmustbeadmittedthattheseremarkslineupnicelywithhandfulof

passagesinNEinwhichAristotleidentifyaparticularclassofactionsaskalon,asfollows:

11 Eagerlylookingtoreceivebenefitsisnotkalon.

'.12

Itismorekalontosupplythesegoodthingstothecausesofyourexistencethantoyourself.

', , , , ' ' , , ,

.13

[Doinggoodthingsforafriendismorekalonthandoingthosesamegoodthingsforoneself.]AbadmandoeseverythingforhisownsakeButagoodmanactsonaccountofthekalon,andtotheextentheisbetter,moreonaccountofthekalon,andforthe

sakeofafriend.

Butwhatwouldbetheunderlyingprinciplehere? Isitthatoneshouldorderoneslifesothat,asmuch

aspossible,oneisconferringbenefitsonothersratherthanononeself? Butwhatmakesthatwayoflife

kalon? Notbecauseitsselfless,becauseAristotleholdsthatsuchapersonactuallyloveshimselfmore

thananyoneelse;andnotbecauseitshelpsothersgenerallyinallcircumstances,becauseAristotle

recommendsextendingonesbeneficiencetoonesfriendsandnotbeyondthat.

ImentionedAristotlesseemingtoadoptPlatosviewthatanyworkwhichevincesintelligentdesignis

itselfkalon. AsalastincidentalremarkaboutAristotlesview,IwishtoobservethatAristotleseemsto

regardpowers,inclinations,ortendencieswhichworkforthekaloninthiswaytobegovernedbysome

kindofhigherorderprinciple,ofseekinggreaterefficiency,greaterelegance,andakindofsuperiorityandexclusivityofattainment. Wearefamiliarwiththishigherorderprincipleofnaturalteleologyasin

theParvaNaturalia(469a29):

11IX.11.1171b6.12IX.2.1165a23.13IX.8.1168a2934.


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Weobservethatnatureineverycircumstanceproducesfromthevariouspossibilitiesthemostkaloneffect.

AndinthePolitics(1252b23):

,,' , '

NaturedoesnotdothingsthewaycutlersmaketheDelphicknife,likesomeonewhohastostretchresources,butitmatchesinstrumentsandpurposesonetoone,sincethuseachinstrumentwillbeaccomplishitsworkinthemostkalonwaypossible.

IbelievethesameprincipleisfoundalsoinAristotlespracticalphilosophy,asinhisremarkinNEabout

howavirtuouspersonmakesthebestofbadcircumstances;histreatmentofmegalopsychiaas

involvingaconstantstrivingforevengreaterexcellence;hisnotionofcompetitionamongthevirtuous

toattainthekalon,foundinIX.8;andevenhisinterpretationofselfsacrificeinbattle,namely,thatavirtuouspersonwillpreferanextraordinaryachievementinashorttimeoveralongperiodof

undistinguishedaction.14

4. Someadditionaltexts

Therehavebeenmanytextsalreadyinthispresentation,asmyaimhasbeentoputbeforeyouthe

breadthanddepthofthisproblemofthekaloninAristotle,andtosetdownthephainomenawhich

needtobehandled,orsaved,indealingwiththatproblem.

Iseetheevidenceaspointinginoneortwodirections. CallthefirsttheBigIdea thatthereissomelargeinsightwhichunderliesanddirectsAristotlesethicaltheory,whichisevidencedinhistalkofthe

kalon,butwhichwehavenotsuccessfullyidentifiedorgivenappropriateweightperhaps,something

alongthelinesofPlatosastonishingassertionintheTimaeusthatgodhasnoenvyandcreatesfreely

outofbeneficence. IfoneweretoaddtothistheAristotelianthesis,statedinDeAnimaII.4,thatall

livingthingsstrivetoimitategodasmuchastheyareable,giventheirlimitations,onewouldarriveat

theviewthatanactioniskalontotheextent,basically,thatitimitatesdeusdiffusivussui.

Butthesecond,alternativedirectiontheevidencecouldconceivablypointtomightbecalledtheBig

Misapprehension,namely,thatwhatAristotlereferstoasthekalonnomoreexists,andplaystherole

Aristotlethoughtitplayedinhisethicaltheory,thanthatimpetusexistsandplaystherolethat

Aristoteliansthoughtitdidinphysicaltheorythat,sinceAristotlesdaywehavegottenclearthatthatsameroleneedstobeplayed,rather,bysomekindoflaw,aKantianbindingallreasonablebeings,

perhaps,ormaybe,simply,properlygroundedhumanlaw.

14 ' , '


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Howeverthatmaybe,Iwanttoconcludebyputtingbeforeyouthreetextswhichraiseissues,in

particular,inrelationtothevirtuesofcharacter,whichweareconsideringatthisworkshop,yetwhich

havenotfitwellunderanyofthevariousheadingsunderwhichwehavesofarlookedatothertexts.

PASSAGEA.ThefirstisapassagefromEEdealingwithcourage. Itistryingtosolveapuzzlewhichis

actuallytakenuptwiceinthattreatise,namely,ofwhy,ifacourageouspersonlacksfear,asissaid,his

actionsshouldbepraiseworthyas,ifhereallydidlackfear,thenwouldseemtobenochallengefor

himinactingcourageously.

[1229] , . [ ], : . [5] , : , .

, . , . , [10],, : , .

[1229a]Courageisthefollowingoflogos. Logoscommandsthatwechoosethekalon. Thatiswhysomeonewhofaces[extremelypainfulthingsandhighlydestructiveforces],notonaccountofthekalon,iseitheroutofhismindoroverlybold.Onlysomeonewhofacesthesethingsonaccountofthekalonisfearlessandcourageous. Thecoward,then,additionallyfearswhatheshould

not,andtheoverlyboldmanisadditionallyemboldenedbywhatshouldnotemboldenhim.Butthecourageousmanbothfearsandisemboldenedbywhatheshould,andinthisrespectheisamean. Heiseitherfearfuloremboldened,aslogoscommands.Butlogosdoesnotcommandtofaceextremelypainfulthingsandhighlydestructiveforces,unlessdoingsowouldbekalon.Theoverlyboldmanfacesthesethingsevenifreasondoesnotcommandit,andthecowardwouldnotfacethemeveniflogosdidcommandit. Thecourageousmanistheonlyonewhofacesthesethingsonconditionthatlogoscommands.

Someobservationsonandquestionsaboutthispassage:

a. Supposeacommandingofficergivesanorder(logos),then,ifthesoldierwhoobeysitistoact

courageously,musthedosoonaccountofthekalonwhichthecommandingofficerpresumably

discerns,andwhichformsthebasisforthatorder,oronaccountofthekalonpresumablyfound

inthemerefactofhisfollowingalawfulorder,orforbothreasons? Whatisacting

forhim?15

b.

Thisaccountseemstoleavenoneoftheworkoffiguringouttheappropriatenessofanactiontotheemotions. Italsoseemstomakeasoldiersemotionalresponseirrelevant,asfearlessin

thefaceofpainfulthingsanddeathseemstoamountsimplytotheactionoffacingthose

things.

15ComparetheformulationofRhet.I.9,whichseemstogiveaplacetoboth: , , .


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c. Similarlyallofthedimensionswhicharetypicallythoughttogointofindingthemean(whenone

should,asoneshould,towhomoneshould,onthebasisofwhichoneshould,tothedegreethat

oneshould,etc.)arereducedtotheyes/noquestionofwhetheroneisfacingdangersonly

becausecommanded,andtohavetheviceofexcessistofacethemonmoreoccasionsthan

these,andofdefect,onfeweroccasions.

PASSAGEB, Thesecondpassage,fromtheendofNEIII.12,issomethingofananalogueofthefirst,but

nowdealingwiththevirtueofmoderation:

, , . , .

Thatiswhy[sensedesires]needtobemoderateandfew,andnotsetagainstephithumtikoninanywayandwerefertothatsort[ofephithumtikon]asdulysubmissiveanddisciplinedandjustasachildneedstoliveinlinewiththerequirementsofhispedagogue,sotheephithumtikonneedstoliveinlinewithlogos. Forthatreason,theephithumtikonofamoderatepersonneedstobeinagreementwithlogos. Forthekalonistheaimofboth,andamoderatepersondeisreswhatthingsheshould,andhowheshould,andwhen.Butlogosadditionallycommandsinthatmanner.

Again,somequestionsandobservations:

a. Hereincontrastitlooksasthoughtokaloncananobjectofanonrationalfaculty,the

ephithumtikon. ThatisperhapsnotasurprisingviewforAristotletohold,giventhathethinks

thatnatureingeneralaimsatthekalon.

b.

IsAristotlesimilarlydisposedtosaythatthemiddlefacultyofdesire,thethumikon,cantakethe

kalonasitsscope? Perhapsso:hesaysinNEVIIthatinakrasiawithrespecttoangersomething

akintoreasoningtakesplaceinthatfaculty. Andwhendiscussingthefalseformofcourage

whichinvolvesjustrageandadesireforvengeance,Aristotlesaysthatitisnotafterallcourage,

because ' (1117a8), anditwouldmakesensetotakethe

firstclausetopointtoafaultrelativetothethumikonitself,andthesecondtothethumikons

relationshiptologos.

Inanycaseitsclearfromthesetwopassagesthatthethornyquestionoftherelationshipbetween

pathosand

logosin

the

virtues

of

character

cannot

well

be

addressed

without

a

better

understanding

of

thekalon.

PASSAGEC. Finally,apassageinsomewaysaboutthesameissuebutlookingatitfromadifferentway,

fromNEIII.4,aboutboulsisandwhetherboulsishasanaturalobjectornot. Attheendofthechapter,

Aristotleproposesthedoctrine,repeatedmanytimesinNE,thatthevirtuouspersonservesasa

standardfortruejudgmentsabouthumannature:


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, .' , , . . , .

Thegoodpersonjudgeseachkindofthingcorrectly,andineachkindofthingthatwhichistrue,isthatwhichtohimseemstobeso. Fortherearekalaandpleasurescorrespondingtoeachhexis,andpresumablythegoodpesonismostdistinguishedfromeveryoneelseinseeingwhatistrueineachcase,beingakindofstandardandmeasureofthesethings. Butmostpeople,itseems,aredeceivedbypleasure. Althoughpleasureisnotgood,itseemsgood. Theychoosethereforewhatispleasantassomethinggood,andtheyavoidpainassomethingbad.

Aboutthispassage: Aristotlesaysthattherearekalaandpleasurescorrespondingtoeachstate. So

whenhesaysthat,forpersonswhoarenotvirtuous,pleasureappearstobegood,doeshemean,or

doeshealsohold,that,inthosecases,pleasurealsoappearstobekalon? Presumablynot,forthree

reasons:(i)heneedstoclaimonlythatpleasure,assuch,becomesanobjectofpursuit,thatis,anend,andforthatclaim,itisenoughtosaythatthepleasureappearsgood;(ii)itseemsabsurdtosaythat

someoneseekingpleasureisinvariablyseekingitaskalon;and(iii)Aristotlesstandardclaimisthat

pleasureisanapparentgood,notthatitisanapparentkalon. Sotheninsayingthattherearekala

correspondingtoeachstateAristotledoesnotmean,aswemighthavetakenhimtomean,thatnot

onlyvirtuesbutalsoviceshavekalaassociatedwiththem. Hemustmeanthateachvirtuehasits

distinctivekalonthat,forinstance,thekaloninbattlesoughtbycourageisdifferentinkind,fromthe

kalonofanequaldistribution,andthatonereasonavarietyofvirtuesareneeded,isthatacompletely

virtuouspersonhastobesensitivetoallofthemanifestationsofthekaloninhumanlife.

Notethatthisreadingseemsconsistentwiththeplurals, and ,asthesenaturally

connotearangeofcasesofdifferentkindsthatneedtobejudged. Also,inthelinesimmediatelyprecedingthequotedpassage,Aristotlelikenedavirtuouspersontosomeonewhobecauseheisin

goodhealthisthebestjudgeofsensibilia:buteachsensehasitsidiomsensibile,thus,onthisanalogy,

eachvirtuewouldhavesomedistinctkindofkalonsuchthatonlythatvirtuecouldmakesomeone

sensitivetoit.

Thisconsideration,ifcorrect,goessomewaytowardexplainingwhyAristotleinbookVIholdsthe

puzzlingdoctrinethattheseparatevirtuessetsomanyendsasregardswhich,then,phronsisidentifies

whatcontributestowardtherealizingofthoseends,

The Kalon in Aristotles Ethics Louvain Presentation

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