The Islamic Thought of Ali Shariati and Sayyid Qutb
Transcript of The Islamic Thought of Ali Shariati and Sayyid Qutb
Robert Heck and Dawud Reznik Religion 5365: Modern Islamic Thought
Dr. Gwendolyn Zoharah Simmons May 2, 2007
The Islamic Thought of Ali Shari’ati and Sayyid Qutb
Introduction1
Since 9/11, a disproportionate amount of international political rhetoric and
mainstream social science research has focused on “Islamism,” a supposed threat of
unimaginable proportions ready to efface Western civilization if given a chance. “Islamist”
groups from al-Qaeda to the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been described as
well-organized networks of international terrorism, collectively known as the “axis of evil.”
Islamic social movements of all types have been lumped under the “Islamist” umbrella term
without regard for their differing ideologies and practices. Praising Allah or asserting the truth
of the Qur’an is enough these days to be de-legitimized as an Islamic “fundamentalist”.
Underlying the Western discourse on “Islamism” is the preconceived notion that political
Islam is inherently antithetical to human development. The basic principles of an Islamic
political worldview are assumed to be mutually exclusive of universal ideals such as democracy,
diversity, equality, and freedom. “Islamism” is thus perceived as an illegitimate submission to
religious dogma that is incapable of producing valid knowledge, technical progress, and just
social order.
At a time of such hysteria, it is important to reflect critically on the varying intellectual
forms of “Islamism.” There are diverse renditions of political Islam that emerge from different
1 This section was co-authored.
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socio-political-historical contexts; this fact alone negates the homogenizing logic of the Western
discourse on “Islamism.” Furthermore, visions for social change differ from “Islamist” thinker
to thinker, making it critical to engage each on their own terms rather than simply lumping
together (often times contradictory) viewpoints under an overarching umbrella term.
In this vein, the purpose of this paper is to deconstruct the two differing “Islamist”
worldviews of Ali Shari’ati and Sayyid Qutb. The paper will attempt to provide an introduction
to the Islamic thought of these two important radical Muslim intellectuals of the twentieth
century. First the epistemology, methodology, and social ontology of each will be discussed.
Then, a critical comparative analysis will reveal the similarities and differences between their
worldviews, particularly with regard to Islamic practice.
Ali Shari’ati2
Epistemology
Understanding Shari’ati’s epistemology begins with recognizing his critique of Cartesian
dualism. He describes the Islamic worldview as fundamentally anti-dualist, since it is impossible
for humans to access the unmediated realm of absolute Knowledge, which is only God’s to
behold. For Shari’ati, attempts at achieving epistemological objectivity, contingency-less truth,
and factual purity are misguided and idolatrous.
In particular, Shari’ati criticizes the Western project of positivism for falsely proclaiming
the ability to separate knowledge from its human context. He describes this deceit as a sinful
skirting of social responsibility:
Science has been separated from the fabric of society. It has lost touch with people’s thoughts. Not being able to criticize the present situation, it… no longer
2 This section was written by Dawud.
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help[s] solve life’s problems… It no longer concern[s] itself with the fate of society and its ability to control its own destiny and achieve its ideals.3
Shari’ati chastises the mala, or intellectuals, for aligning themselves with the mutrif, or
exploiting classes.4 He argues that all science should actively affirm its human interests, rather
than pretending to rise above them. Human knowledge should thus always be recognized as
having been produced through human social relations.
What separates Shari’ati’s epistemological perspective from other critiques of Cartesian
dualism made by the Geisteswissenschaften schools of pragmatism, phenomenology, and
postmodernism is his emphasis on the inherent axiological quality of knowledge. He sees the
inextricable link between subject and object as judgment. In this regard, he believes that
humanity’s defining feature is its ability to approach the world in terms of value:
Value consists of the link that exists between man and any phenomenon, behavior, act, or condition where a motive higher than that of utility is at issue; it might be called a sacred tie, as it is bound up with reverence and worship to the extent that people feel it justifiable to devote or sacrifice their very lives to this tie…What grants man, a non-material being, an independence from, as well as a superiority over, all other natural beings is his high regard for value.5
Shari’ati has thus introduced a new co-founding principle to the standard existentialist doctrine:
it is an ethical existence that precedes essence. All human knowledge, including basic self-
awareness, emerges from a fundamental position relative the universal values of Good and Evil,
or as Shari’ati calls them the “infinitely exalted plus” and “infinitely vile minus.”6
Using this epistemological framework, Shari’ati argues that all developments in
knowledge, even the supposedly secular rationalism since the Enlightenment, represent a form of
religion as an ethical proposition of faith:
3 Shari’ati, Ali. 1990. School of Thought and Action. Albuquerque, NM: Abjad, pgs. 32-3. 4 Shari’ati, Ali. 1979. On the Sociology of Islam. Oneonta, NY: Mizan Press, p. 33. 5 Shari’ati, Ali. 1980. Marxism and Other Western Fallacies. Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, pgs. 26-7. 6 Shari’ati, On the Sociology of Islam, p. 91.
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History knows no era or society which lacks religion. That is, there is no historical precedence of a non-religious society. There has been no non-religious human being in any race, in any era, in any phase of social change on any part of the earth.7
Since all human knowledge is intrinsically tied to the human knower, and all humans are
religious, all knowledge is thereby necessarily religious.
In short, Shari’ati views the history of thought as a struggle of religious concerns.
Specifically, epistemological conflict through the ages has symbolized the struggle between the
religion of legitimation (shirk/multitheism) and the religion of revolution (tauhid/monotheism).
Multitheism is characterized by idolatry, beliefs in various forms of determinism and
predetermination, and reactionary attempts to conserve the conditions of dualism and inequality
that have pervaded human societies throughout history. Monotheism reflects the prophetic
attempt to destroy all idols, abolish all social hierarchy, and thus construct the Kingdom of God
on earth.
Within this context, Shari’ati distinguishes between Good and Evil using “the
transcendental dimension of human existence”8 as his defining criteria. The evil multitheists
worship the idols of either the measurably physical (materialism) or the manifestly thinkable
(idealism), without recognizing that neither is as virtuous as the supernatural and supra-logical
spirit of God that can never be fully begotten:
Man’s propensity for what actually exists degrades him. By pursuing values that do not exist in nature, he is lifted above nature, and the spiritual and essential development of the species is secured.9
In other words, Good knowledge emerges from love of existence as a dynamic movement
oriented towards the future, rather than servitude to the idols of the present-past.
7 Shari’ati, Ali. 2003. Religion vs. Religion. Chicago, IL: Kazi Publications, p. 20. 8 Shari’ati, Marxism and Other Western Fallacies, p. 31. 9 Ibid., p. 100.
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To summarize, Shari’ati’s epistemology posits that all knowledge is inherently value-
laden relative the universal ethics of Good and Evil which join existence in preceding essence.
All knowledge must therefore be situated within the historical struggle between the religions of
legitimation and revolution. Shari’ati thus advances an axiological epistemology that collapses
Cartesian dualism without affirming a subjectivist, “anything-goes” ethical relativism.
Methodology
Consistent with the axiological anti-dualism of his epistemology, Shari’ati prescribes a
methodology of critical hermeneutics. Because only God has universal knowledge of cause and
effect, any attempts at unearthing an absolute semiotics is futile and impossible. Instead,
Shari’ati argues that the only appropriate model for advancing human knowledge is the
continuous interpretation of facts relative to their social construction and religious politics.
Broken down into its constituent parts, Shari’ati’s hermeneutical method involves
“objection, criticism, and the inner choice or selection of the individual.”10 This process of
negative dialectics emerges from the idol-destroying tradition in Islamic monotheism; one must
seek out and supersede the fundamental contradictions of human thought, since only God’s
thought is complete, infinite, and limitless.
The first part of Shari’ati’s method calls for objecting to any human knowledge that
claims to be universal and free from interpretation: “the necessity of the religion of monotheism
is rebellion, denial, and saying ‘no’ before any other power.”11 The point here is that Godly
knowledge cannot be humanly beholden, and so any human attempts to build Godly knowledge
10 Shari’ati, Religion vs. Religion, p. 52. 11 Ibid., p. 39.
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must be resolutely rejected as the construction of a temple of idolatry. In Shari’ati’s words,
“How disgraceful… are all fixed standards. Who can ever fix a standard?”12
Following the objection to supposedly pure knowledge, human agency must be
recognized as the basis for the production of all human knowledge. Hence Shari’ati advocates a
line of interpretive criticism that traces the construction of knowledge back to the human
presence and power relations. He calls on all monotheists to recognize that “the course… [a
multitheist] has chosen for our humiliation is the best guide for us to choose as the way to our
glory: Returning from the same way that he has led us.”13 The negation of God that the
multitheist has promoted through an idolatrous claim to value-freedom must thus be itself
negated.
Criticism can only be accomplished by discovering the contradictions and limits to the
knowledge in question, particularly with reference to its axiological quality:
Fixed and motionless forms that have become crystallized into ineffective “sacred” institutions should be transformed into moving and active elements, with a clearly defined role in the existential movement of society.14
This process of recognizing the qualitative aspects of knowledge allows for a nuanced
understanding of the history of any knowledge. In particular, Shari’ati urges the situating of
knowledge relative the political struggle between multitheists and monotheists.
These combined efforts of both objection and criticism ultimately result in a religiously-
vital democratization of knowledge, as persons can only begin to make informed decisions about
faith when idols have been destroyed. Citing the example of the Prophet (PBUH) and his
companions, Shari’ati encourages all to become conscious self-aware mujahideen.15 He asserts
12 Shari’ati, On the Sociology of Islam, p. 93. 13 Shari’ati, Ali. 1992. Hajj:Reflections on its Rituals. Chicago, IL: Kazi Publications, p. 34. 14 Shari’ati, On the Sociology of Islam, p. 29. 15 Ibid., p. 30.
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true belief in God can only be actualized through this process, which comes as a result of
critically interpreting all knowledge:
Correct thought is the prelude to correct knowledge, and correct knowledge is the prelude to belief; these three taken together are the necessary attributes of an aware conscience and of any movement that strives in practice and theory for the attainment of perfection.16
When knowledge has been negated, critiqued, and situated relative its axiological-religious roots,
the enlightened individual can perform his/her prophetic-like duty of shining the light of
revelation on others so they too can begin to “discern things as they really are.”17
In short, Shari’ati’s negative dialectical method of critical hermeneutics flips the
mainstream scientific methodology of positive knowledge creation on its head. Instead of
converting human experience into empirical data in order to abstract supposedly objective facts,
critical interpretation grounds all knowledge into its existential constitution: the historical
politics of personal ethics, value, and religion. Representing a truly democratic understanding of
religious faith, Shari’ati’s method calls for criticism of all knowledge in order to attain
consciousness of its limitations and ethical implications. Only then can the individual make the
“dutiful and aggressive passage”18 to monotheistic faith.
Social Ontology
Shari’ati’s imagery for social order is perhaps the most important element of his
liberation theology. Much of his writings are dedicated to detailing the subtle nuances of tauhid,
or the Islamic concept for the absolute Unity of God, as a social ontology. This metaphor allows
for the indivisibility of humanity without the imposition of abstract structural mechanisms or
systemic metaphors, since all humans are understood to be God’s creation.
16 Ibid., p. 34. 17 Shari’ati, Religion vs. Religion, p. 12. 18 Shari’ati, Hajj:Reflections on its Rituals, p. 207.
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As with his discussions of epistemology and methodology, Shari’ati describes tauhid first
by contrasting it from its opposite: shirk, or the legitimation of social inequality based on
multitheistic beliefs and idolatry. Shirk rears its ugly head in both realism and nominalism, the
traditional social ontologies of Western mainstream thought.
Realists conceive of society as a structural whole requiring the assimilation and
integration of its individual parts according to an abstract, mechanistic logic that is supposedly
divorced from human agency.19 This imagery of society as an autonomous system sui generis
has historically been used by social theorists as a way to control what they perceive to be the
innate chaos and disorder of individuals if left to their “human nature.”
Employing his critical hermeneutical method, Shari’ati rebukes realist social imagery.
He points out the political interests of multitheism as the axiological underpinnings of realist
ontologies that legitimate an assimilatory social order:
It is [multitheism] which continuously denies social power, social control, the responsibility of human beings in their fate, their expectations and the physical, spiritual, and instinctive needs of individuals, all to the advantage of the coercive and wealthy forces.20
Hence Shari’ati highlights the power interests involved in the Western realist tradition, including
the neo-liberal ideal of the capitalist market as a supposedly neutral arbiter of social life.
Nominalism, on the other hand, posits that only the individual is existentially real, and
thus social ties are simply utilitarian means for achieving self-centered, egocentric ends. This
social Darwinist image of society legitimates a survival of the fittest scenario, whereby
individuals compete for a scarce quantity of resources to survive.
19 Murphy, John W. 1989. Postmodern Social Analysis and Criticism. New York, NY: Greenwood Press. 20 Shari’ati, Religion vs. Religion, p. 58.
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Shari’ati shrewdly points out that the same multitheist interests involved in realism are at
play in promoting nominalism. In his eyes, individualistic social imagery is used as a means to
divide-and-conquer the masses and reinforce the inequalities in society produced by shirk:
It is [also multitheism] which opens separate metaphysical accounts for each of its members so that through this means, the assembling of people would be transformed into dispersion and isolation.21
His point here is that a religion of revolution is thoroughly undermined when the masses are
viewed as self-interested monads competing for individual salvation. Shari’ati also identifies the
undemocratic nature of realist conceptions of history, which are supposedly driven
spontaneously or by elites. This contradicts the model set forth in the Qur’an, which posits that
al-nas, or “the masses,” are actually the ones behind historical change.22
Thus, according to Shari’ati, the religion of legitimation offers two contradictory images
of social order to keep persons from recognizing their inherent equality as common creations
from God: society as a structural whole constraining its individual parts and society as an
aggregation of autonomous, sovereign atoms. Both of these social ontologies are used by those
who profit from an alienated, fragmented, and unequal society to keep the masses from
recognizing their common existential ancestry in God and consequently effecting revolution.
In opposition to the realist and nominalist metaphors of shirk, Shari’ati defines tauhid as
simply “the unity of nature with metanature, of man with nature, of man with man, of God with
the world and with man.”23 Shari’ati describes the personage of society as the “Household of
God,”24 a metaphor which asserts the existential equality of all humanity as the common product
of the divine realm of creation. Tauhid also mandates the liberating framework of praxis, or the
21 Ibid., p. 59. 22 Shari’ati, On the Sociology of Islam, p. 49. 23 Ibid., p. 85. 24 Shari’ati, Hajj:Reflections on its Rituals, p. 20.
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unity and simultaneity of thought and action. Shari’ati again cites the example of the Prophet
(PBUH) and his companions, who did not “divide up life into two sections, the first consisting
exclusively of talk and the second, exclusively of action.”25
With tauhid, social order is presupposed between persons without having to resort to the
assimilatory ideals, contractual obligations, or other structural props of realist social imagery. In
other words, humans need not belittle or deny themselves to fit into an autonomous social
totality. Instead, as Shari’ati points out:
The relation of God and man is one of reciprocity, where self-knowledge and knowledge of God come to be synonymous, or, alternatively, where the former functions as a preliminary to the latter.26
Hence in tauhid true actualization of one’s individuality reinforces the inherent sociality of
human existence and the essential unity-in-diversity of God’s creation.
At the same time, however, Shari’ati describes the individual in tauhid as fundamentally
different from the nominalist notion of atomistic, zero-sum sovereignty. In tauhid, the individual
can only recognize his/her uniqueness relative to another, which means having to always see
oneself in reference to the totality of God’s creation. In this manner, Shari’ati argues:
To the extent that the man of tauhid perceives his poverty, he perceives his wealth; to the extent that he feels humility, he feels a pride, a glory, within himself; to the extent that he has surrendered to the service of God, he rises against whatever powers, systems, and relations exist.27
The point here is that by resisting the zero-sum logic preached by a society of shirk, an
individual remains true to the virtues of God’s creation and realizes tauhid.
Shari’ati lays out a social ontology which manages to collapse dualism while reaffirming
individuality. He refutes the idolatry of worshipping abstract schemes like realist assimilation or
25 Shari’ati, On the Sociology of Islam, p. 40. 26 Shari’ati, Marxism and Other Western Fallacies, p. 69. 27 Ibid., p. 120.
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nominalist individualism. Instead, persons in society are essentially tied together through their
common creator and can therefore feel secure in actualizing their uniqueness and individuality as
a mutual recognition of tauhid.
Sayyid Qutb28
Egyptian intellectual Sayyid Qutb also put forth how Islam, as a complete system of
thought and action, could serve as a useful model for liberation. Qutb is widely linked to the rise
of the Muslim Brotherhood and other oppositional Islamic organizations. Like Shari’ati, Qutb
asserted his ideas were true to the Qur’an and the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)
and his companions. Yet Qutb’s conclusions widely differ at times. His emphasis is on creating
a just and harmonious Islamic society through instituting Shari’ah, the Divine Law direct from
Allah that “provides the necessary ways and means to overcome any problem.”29 One of the
main obstacles according to Qutb is the prevalence of jahiliyyah, or the corrupt and immoral
“rebellion against God's sovereignity on earth.”30 This open hostility towards not only the
imperialism and materialism of the West but the servile mimicry of his own society meant Qutb
ultimately met the same fate as Shari’ati, facing imprisonment and torture by his own
government before being executed in 1966.
Epistemology
To understand Qutb’s Islamist worldview, it is critical to identify first his epistemology
of Islamic truth:
28 This section was written by Robert. 29 Qutb, Sayyid. 1993. Islam and Universal Peace. Indianapolis: American Trust Publication, p. 2. 30 Qutb, Sayyid. 1990. Milestones. Indianapolis, IN: American Trust Publications, p. 4.
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Islam’s [epistemological] stand is very clear. It says that the truth is one and cannot be divided; if it is not the truth, then it must be falsehood. The mixing and co-existence of the truth and falsehood is impossible.31
Hence Qutb places knowledge within a Cartesian dualist binary, using the logic of Aristotle
(A=A, B=B, A≠B). The point here is that for Qutb, there is a singularity to truth; it is an
indivisible objective reality or a fully-formed “thing.” Anything outside of this “thing” is
absolutely false, and the objective truth and all the surrounding falsehood are eternally mutually
exclusive.
To this dualist binary Qutb adds an axiological element, seeing religion as “a criterion, to
approve what is good and to discard what is evil.”32 In other words, Qutb understands
knowledge in an either/or framework of righteous truth and sinful falsity. Within this
framework, Qutb argues the epistemological struggle of truth and falsehood is reflected in the
struggle between Islam, or absolute devotion to Allah, and jahiliyyah, or ignorance born out of
“rebellion against the authority of God”33 through worship of humans and their constructs
(including knowledge).
For Qutb, only Islam as revealed through and practiced by the Prophet (PBUH) offers
truth, since it has “the purity of the first source of Islamic guidance”34 Knowledge is only
considered true when it is absolutely divorced from the human knower, in parallel with Allah’s
total sovereignty from humanity and the world. In this sense, the separation between the worldly
realm and the metaphysical is bridged through the revelation of the Qur’an. Through the
complete implementation of Allah’s Divine Law, i.e. Shari’ah, and the subsequent creation of an
31 Ibid., p. 116. 32 Ibid., p. 80. 33 Ibid., p. 4. 34 Ibid., p. 7.
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Islamic society, humanity is given the “ability to contact the eternal source of power, to
comprehend the universe and to harmonize [ourselves] with it.”35
Since it is directly from Allah, Islamic knowledge is thought to be cleansed from the
subjective contingencies of mortal beings:
The pure law of God cuts through [human] roots and provides a system of laws which has no human interference, and it is not influenced by human ignorance or human desire or for the interests of a particular group of people.36
Even the uncertainty and irrationality that can be thought to underlie the existential human
challenge to believe in Allah is annihilated in Qutb’s Islamic epistemology, since “matters
pertaining to faith had been explained fully.”37 The complete application of Shari’ah
“automatically” translates to “complete emancipation from all forms of enslavement”38 and
provides the “necessary ways and means to overcome any problem.”39
In short, Qutb argues that the only “pure” knowledge is Islamic knowledge as revealed in
the Qur’an and the Prophet’s (PBUH) life, since its divine source transcends the inherently error-
prone nature of all humanly-constructed knowledge. This knowledge is not only pure and true,
but good, natural, and righteous as it submits completely to the epistemological sovereignty of
Allah and does not have the taint of human desires or jahilliyah.
Methodology
Reinforcing his epistemology, Qutb articulates what some Western critical theorists call a
“realist” methodology.40 Because the human mind is considered to be passive vis-à-vis Allah,
and truth is thought to be an accessible objective reality, “unmediated” knowledge becomes the
35 Qutb, Islam and Universal Peace, p. 1. 36 Qutb, Milestones., p. 118. 37 Ibid., p. 10. 38 Qutb, Islam and Universal Peace, p. 27. 39 Ibid., p. 2. 40 Murphy, John W. 1989. Postmodern Social Analysis and Criticism. New York, NY: Greenwood Press.
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ultimate goal for Qutb. He thus privileges formalized procedures, technical rigor, and
circumscribed parameters over more subjective considerations such as interpretation and socio-
historical analyses.
Specifically, Qutb advocates a literalist return to the divine truth of Allah that was
revealed during the time of the Prophet (PBUH). Strictly literal readings of the Qur’an and
hadith are not only possible, but the mandatory procedure for accessing truth in Qutb’s eyes:
If there is a clear text available from the Qur’an or from [the Prophet (PBUH)], then that will be decisive and there will be no room for Ijtihad (using one’s judgement).41
Only when “clear judgement” is unavailable does Qutb believe that the human being can begin
to turn to interpretation, although strictly within “well-defined principles” that prevent the
infusion of human “opinions and desires” from invalidating the otherwise untainted truth.42
Hence Qutb’s rendition of ijtihad has no “vagueness or looseness;” it is limited to “a sincere
attempt… to find out the will of God through reference to [the Qur’an] and the teachings of [the
hadith].”43
Here it is important to note a contradiction: although Qutb argues for a strict literalism, he
does not offer any criteria for assessing the “clarity” of the text nor the “sincerity” of the
interpretation. While he is unmistakably clear on the need for an absolute absence of human
interpretation in Islamic truth-claims formally speaking, Qutb is ironically silent on the criteria
for judging the content of these truth-claims. This is a tautology, or circular logic, since the
“literality” of the text and the validity of the interpretation are thought to be self-evident. Yet
“self-evidence” is a fluid and dynamic rhetorical tool that can be appropriated by anyone.
41 Qutb, Milestones, p. 43. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid., p. 80.
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Thus, the text is still left open for interpretation through this circular logic. This allows
Qutb to interpret the Qur’an and hadith with particular lenses and assumptions that he holds—
like sexism, anti-Semitism, and belief in private property—while purporting to use a universal
lens, i.e. the true, literal meaning behind Allah’s message revealed through the Prophet (PBUH).
For example, even though Qutb acknowledges all are equal before Allah, he incorporates his
anti-Semitic views on “world Jewry” into his supposed universal interpretation:
Jews penetrate into body politic of the whole world and then may be free to perpetuate their evil designs. At the top of the list of these activities is usury, the aim of which is that all the wealth of mankind end up in the hands of Jewish financial institutions which run on interest [contradictory to Islamic law].44
Since this is also related to Qutb’s imagery of social order, this will be explored in more detail in
the following section on social ontology.
Regardless of these apparent contradictions, there is a methodological aspect of Islamic
life that Qutb presents in a very liberating fashion: jihad. To understand Qutb’s
conceptualization of jihad, it is important to first reflect on his understanding of Islam as praxis.
For Qutb, Islam is always already dialectical between theory and practice, thought and action,
believing and becoming. Rather than simply an abstract, inwardly-focused, and metaphysical-
reaching spirituality, Qutb sees Islam as “a practical religion,”45 “a dynamic movement which
changes conditions and events,”46 as well as “a way of life working with actuality.”47 He asserts
that Muslims are compelled to struggle against injustice and oppression, “whether inflicted upon
Muslims, non-Muslims, allies, or non-allies.”48 Qutb chastises the “Western concept of
44 Ibid., p. 58. 45 Ibid., p. 15. 46 Ibid., p. 7. 47 Ibid., p. 15. 48 Qutb, Islam and Universal Peace, p. 73.
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‘religion’” for merely representing “a ‘belief’ in the heart” while Islam relates directly “to the
practical affairs of life.”49
However, one must first plant “the seed of faith,”50 in the form of absolute personal
surrender to Allah, before the collective mobilization of Islamic jihad can be undertaken. Only
when the individual has made a conscious decision to attain the purity of the Islamic way can
jihad be said to have begun. In Qutb’s words, Islam is “the spirit of knowing with the intention
of acting upon it,”51 and thus “the [Islamic] movement should become a real representation and
an accurate mirror of its belief.”52 Although Islam is dialectical for Qutb, he unfortunately
contradicts this liberating potential by falling back to an atomistic and metaphysical
understanding of individual belief. This paradox will be further discussed in the following
section on Qutb’s social ontology.
Qutb goes on to define jihad as the liberation of a truly democratic space within which
the populace can practice Islam without interference. He points out that while Islam “forbids the
imposition of its belief by force,” every Muslim is expected to work toward the annihilation of:
All of those political and material powers which stand between people and Islam, which force one people to bow before another people and prevent them from accepting the sovereignty of God.53
In this sense, jihad “has no relationship to modern warfare, either in its causes or in the way in
which it is conducted,”54 since it is not governed by a logic of seeking political power, natural
resources, or any other materialist aim, nor is it practiced through primarily military means.
Instead, jihad is a personal and collective existential struggle of resistance in refusing to bow
49 Qutb, Milestones, p. 37. 50 Ibid., p. 32. 51 Ibid., p. 12. 52 Ibid., p. 20. 53 Ibid., p. 28. 54 Ibid.
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before any power other than Allah, including a rejection of the intersectional matrix of
domination that Qutb describes as “political power which rests on a complex yet interrelated
ideological, racial, class, social and economic support.”55
With this rendition of jihad, Qutb appears to transcend some of realism in his Islamic
methodology. For instance, contrary to his aforementioned reification of ijtihad, Qutb proclaims
that absolute “obedience to laws and judgments is a sort of [idol] worship”56 which must be
eschewed through jihad. Hence prayer practices, cultural rituals, and religious traditions are not
to be followed blindly, since “all the people of the earth should be free of servitude to anyone
other than God.”57 Qutb also argues that jihad is “not a temporary phase but… the eternal
struggle for the freedom of man.”58 This description of jihad as a permanent revolution can
potentially counter previous notions that the Islamic way is pre-given and prescribed. Yet
whether Qutb ultimately takes advantage of this potential will be further discussed in the
following section on his social ontology.
To summarize, then, Qutb’s Islamic methodology involves a pre-occupation with
literalism. He attempts to limit Islam to a “clear” and “sincere” emulation of the explicit laws
and rituals revealed in the Qur’an and practiced by the Prophet (PBUH). However, he does not
offer any standards or criteria for assessing the clarity or sincerity of Islamic practice, thus
leaving open the possibility for power interests to interpret according to their own interests.
Nevertheless, Qutb offers a vision of Islamic jihad which calls for revolutionary action from all
idolatry, including political power and the worship of technique. Hence there is a clear tension
in Qutb’s Islamic methodology between realism in form and humanist praxis in content.
55 Ibid., p. 29. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid., p. 30-1.
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Social Ontology
Finally, it is important to discuss Qutb’s Islamic social ontology as it relates to his
epistemology and methodology. Although much of his writing reflects concern for the Islamic
community as a whole, Qutb expresses a nominalist understanding of the human condition.
Typical of those who believe in nominalism, Qutb then calls for realist measures to ensure social
stability since individuals, conceptualized in an atomistic and inherently negative fashion, are
thought to be in need of an overarching social structure to bind them together.
The first element of Qutb’s nominalism emerges in his description of belief and faith.
Repeatedly he stresses the importance of purifying persons’ individual hearts, hence
appropriating a metaphor which physiologically separates human beings as existential atoms.
Qutb separates the public and private spheres of life, asserting “relationships of understanding
are one thing and daily business is something else.”59 This creates the conceptual space for
individuals to be ontologically divorced from the social world in which they exist.
Given such nominalist tendencies, Qutb advocates a realist social order predicated on the
sovereignty of Allah:
All affairs have been submitted to the laws of God and the society as a whole is willing to accept the just division of wealth prescribed by Him, and every individual of the society…firmly believes that this system has been legislated by God Almighty.60
“This system” is Shari’ah, which Qutb believes to be universal and directly handed down from Allah, in keeping with Qutb’s dualist epistemology and supposed literalist methodology:
[Allah] who has created the universe and man, and who made man obedient to the laws which also govern the universe, has also prescribed a Shari’ah for his voluntary actions. If man follows this law, then his life is in harmony with his
59 Ibid., p. 8. 60 Ibid., p. 21.
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own nature. From this point of view, this Shari’ah is also a part of that universal law which governs the entire universe, including the physical and biological aspects of man.61
Hence, Allah is constructed not in the manner Shari’ati argues for, i.e. the relationality and unity
of all social living, but as the ultimate ontological being abstracted from existence. Such
imagery allows for an ontological force ordering atomistic individuals from above and outside
the social milieu of humanity in order to keep “total harmony between human life and the law of
the universe... living in accord with its laws and its movements.”62 As Qutb mentions
throughout his works, persons should live with the understanding that they are under the constant
surveillance of Allah, the absolute metaphysical arbiter of social existence.
Qutb’s vision of all humanity consolidated under the rule of a sovereign is thought to
transcend and neutralize more “worldly” divisions across contemporary societies. He sees the
Islamic “community of belief”63 as moving beyond all previous “low associations”64 of identity,
whether class, race, language, or nationality:
The homeland of the Muslim, in which he lives and which he defends, is not a piece of land; the nationality of the Muslim, by which he is identified, is not the nationality determined by a government; the family of the Muslim, in which he finds solace and which he defends, is not blood relationships; the flag of the Muslim, which he honors and under which he is martyred, is not the flag of a country; and the victory of the Muslims, which he celebrates and for which he is thankful to God, is not a military victory.65
In other words, truly Islamic society will bring together peoples across their humanly-
constructed divisions into a new sense of community predicated on submission to the law and
order of Allah. Here one sees the tension in Qutb’s methodology once again, for although such a
re-conceptualization of identity is more in-tune with Qutb’s notions of jihad as praxis, i.e. you 61 Ibid., p. 45. 62 Ibid, p. 46. 63 Ibid., p. 43. 64 Ibid., p. 78. 65 Ibid., p. 45.
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are what you do and practice, Muslim identity refers back in the end to a rigid, narrow, and
literalist definition of a supposedly universal Islamic practice.
Ultimately, Qutb seeks a totalizing social system that would reflect the “Will,” “Power,”
and “Law” of Allah66:
Total harmony between human life and the law of the universe is entirely beneficial for mankind, as this is the only guarantee against any kind of discord in life. Only in this state will they be at peace with themselves and at peace with the universe, living in accord with its laws and its movements. In the same way, they will have peace of mind, as their actions will agree with their true natural demands, with no conflict between the two. Indeed, the Shari’ah of God harmonizes the external behavior of man with his internal nature in an easy way. When a man makes peace with his own nature, peace and cooperation among individuals follow automatically, as they all live together under one system.67
Similar to Thomistic natural law principles that were used to legitimate the Christendom model
in Europe during the Middle Ages, individuals are simply part of a larger “system,” which for
Qutb is Islamic society with Shari’ah. As previously stated, this system is thought to be able to
function independent of humanity even though it is nothing more than social relations, a product
of human practices and ideas. Yet Qutb frequently asserts this system is not composed of “man-
made laws.”68 Shari’ah was not created through historical and political contestation but by
direct “legislation from Allah.”69 Through absolute submission to a theocratic code of laws, the
individual will be in a state of peace with society, and in turn society with the rest of the natural
universe. All of the possible conflicts that would occur within an Islamic society under Shari’ah
are thus neutralized, since they are thought to simply be part of the natural order of the rule of
Allah.
66 Ibid., p. 83. 67 Ibid., p. 84. 68 Ibid., p. 11. 69 Ibid.
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An unfortunate effect of conceptualizing social order so individuals are simply a part of a
larger system that impinges upon them is that people can be easily sacrificed in order ensure the
continuation of the harmonious operation of the system. This is typified in Qutb’s failure to
critique the capitalist economic relations. Private property, which Shari’ati identifies as a basis
for shirk since it creates hierarchies and encourages greed, does not contradict the Islamic
principles of equality and justice for Qutb. Although Qutb attacks the boundless greed that he
identifies with the West, he sanctifies private property and the modern division of labor as
“freedom to express individuality”70 and a “legitimate and justified… individual right”71 despite
the wage slavery and class hegemony that capitalism produces. This is because the divinely
inspired “Islamic laws governing property… conform to human nature [and] safeguard the
society and the individual from class friction.”72 Qutb appropriates other neoliberal principles
when comparing an Islamic believer to “the holder of a precious stone,”73 reducing faith to being
“the only commodity in demand” in “God’s market,”74 and describing the community of
Muslims as “mere workers for God” who receive just remuneration and have no right to question
the nature of their “endeavor.”75
In similar fashion, Qutb’s social ontology constantly invokes the supposed universality of
the Islamic community, asserting that Islam “commands unqualified tolerance towards all human
beings.”76 However, he argues that the allowing women to work outside the home is prohibited
by Shari’ah. Qutb even goes so far to contradict his supposed literalist methodology since there
is no explicit mention of this in the Qur’an:
70 Ibid., p. 75. 71 Qutb, Islam and Universal Peace, p. 66. 72 Ibid. 73 Qutb, Milestones, p. 132. 74 Ibid., p. 137. 75 Ibid., p. 142. 76 Qutb, Islam and Universal Peace, p. 74.
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There must be one captain to every ship. In family life likewise there must be a leader who assumes the responsibility and brings about order and discipline. In Islamic logic, the choice of this leader is simple, as we have to choose between the wife who is naturally adapted to the task of motherhood and the man who is responsible for the support of the family. Leadership is assigned here to the man for this reason and because he is the more fit owning to his natural role in life.77
“Free mixing of the sexes” is likewise prohibited because “sexual urges are so powerful they
cannot be sublimated by constant exposure to temptation.”78 Qutb’s sexism is buttressed by his
social ontology since he believes allowing women to work outside of the home and mixing with
men contravenes natural roles, results in “moral depravity,” and upsets the harmonious social
balance created by an Islamic society.79
And finally, Qutb’s social ontology requires a “vanguard” group which has the ability to
see beyond “the vast ocean of Jahiliyyah which has encompassed the entire world”80 and lead
the people “in order that they come of darkness into light and may get rid of their miserable
condition.”81 This group of prophetic-like visionaries is required to at once “keep itself aloof
from [the] all-encompassing Jahiliyyah” in the world today while simultaneously keeping “some
ties with it.”82 The promotion of a vanguard contradicts the otherwise unified social system that
Qutb presents. Yet Qutb argues it is a necessity since those “who have understood [pure]
Islam”83 have a responsibility of upholding the supposedly “natural” order under the guidance
and supervision of Allah.
In conclusion, Qutb conceptualizes Islam in a nominalist fashion, arguing that the
atomistic individual is the indivisible unit of existence. To mitigate this nominalism, he employs
77 Ibid., p. 31. 78 Ibid., p. 33. 79 Ibid., p. 55. 80 Qutb, Milestones, p. 6. 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid.
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realist imagery of a social order imposed from above and outside of human agency by Allah
through the Shari’ah. Like Islamic knowledge and method, the Shari’ah is considered pure and
untainted by human political interests. Therefore, Qutb believes that its implementation will lead
to a harmoniously-integrated social system that will achieve universal peace and natural order,
despite the many possible inequities and social problems that are glossed over in the process.
Comparisons and Conclusions84
As the preceding accounts of the Islamic thought of Shari’ati and Qutb reveal, there are
different epistemologies, methodologies, and social ontologies within “Islamism.” Although
both scholars believed in the inextricable intertwining of Islam and politics, their visions
diverged fundamentally regarding what Islamic knowledge constitutes, how Islam should be
actualized, and what an Islamic social order entails. In this section, a review of the specific
points of similarity and difference between Shari’ati and Qutb will lead to some conclusions
about how “Islamist” movements can dialectically synthesize the thought of both in their
everyday activities toward liberation.
Epistemologically speaking, Shari’ati and Qutb represent the two sides of the centuries-
old debate on dualism. While Shari’ati espouses a rejection of the separation between knower
and the known, Qutb appropriates dualist binaries in abstracting the Qur’an and hadith as divine
knowledge that transcends all subjective contingencies. While both include an axiological
component to their understandings of truth, Shari’ati’s criteria for Good and Evil is in fact the
post-modern condition wherein there are limitless truths. Qutb, on the other hand, sees truth as a
84 This section was co-authored, with all references to Shari’ati written by Dawud and all references to Qutb written by Robert.
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reality sui generis, a universal and totalizing singularity that is forever mutually exclusive from
the evil and sinful falsehood outside the Truth.
With regard to methodology, Shari’ati and Qutb reveal important similarities in their
politicization of Islam, but diverge in their Islamic hermeneutics. For both, praxis is the key to
true Islam; Islam is always already a political project that is both theoretical and practical. In
fact, both Shari’ati and Qutb go a step further in articulating Islam as a permanent revolution of
unifying all humanity within absolute monotheism. The terms of this monotheism, however, are
where the two disagree: while Shari’ati’s methodology employs a negative dialectic that would
invalidate the elevation of any human interpretation over another, Qutb champions a literal
rendering of the Qur’an and hadith by a vanguard of Muslim scholars that includes himself.
Hence both seek the Islamization of the world, but the consequences of such a project are
radically different.
These differences in the epistemologies and methodologies between Shari’ati and Qutb
ultimately manifest in fundamentally different imageries of social order. Shari’ati consistently
invokes the notion of tauhid to symbolize the fundamental unity of existence (humanity and
nature) with Allah; instead, Qutb emphasizes the sovereignty and thus separation of Allah from
all creation. In this sense, Qutb abstracts Allah above and outside human relationality as an
ontological being that can somehow be begotten by human consciousness yet is not beholden. A
human construct—including the conscious objectification of Allah—becomes a thing for
worship, sacrifice, and surrender. Such reification would be considered idolatry in the social
ontology of Shari’ati.
The similarities and differences between the Islamic thought of Shari’ati and Qutb are
perhaps most evident and meaningful, however, in their practical implications. By all accounts
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both were practicing Muslims (albeit one Shi’a and the other Sunni). And both had harsh
criticisms for the way they saw most Muslims worldwide treating Islam as empty idealism
without material consequence or significance. For instance, Shari’ati was not shy in condemning
Islam as practiced by the majority of Muslims, calling it “tightly bound, overly ritualized, [and]
socio-politically castrated.”85 Qutb echoed such sentiments, proclaiming that:
It is necessary to revive that Muslim community which is buried under the debris of the man-made traditions of several generations, and which is crushed under the weight of those false laws and customs which are not even remotely related to the Islamic teachings, and which, in spite of all this, call itself the “world of Islam.”86
Hence both Shari’ati and Qutb seemed to understand Islam in a radically different manner than
the political mainstream in their times, a fact that was substantiated by the ways they were
brutally attacked for their views.
However, their views on Islamic practice diverge from this point forward. Shari’ati
argues that a lack of critical interpretations and democratic debate has stifled Islam; he notes that
the Qur’an has been converted into a “storehouse of scientific and technical information” rather
than a “human, historical, and intellectual movement.”87 For Shari’ati, the worst possible
direction for Islam to take is a fetish over tradition, since that would reflect “multitheism hid[ing]
behind the mask of monotheism.”88 His key concern was that religious scholars not usurp their
powerful positions in society to negate the public’s ability to actively participate in interpreting
dynamically the meanings and principles within the Qur’an:
By preventing people from studying the Qur’an and thinking about it, religious scholars made it into a book so that only its form remained for the people. Its spirit, purpose and aim remain unknown. They turned it into phrases and verses of secret words without their meaning being understood.89
85 Shari’ati, Hajj: Reflections on its Rituals, p. 11. 86 Qutb, Milestones, p.3. 87 Shari’ati, School of Thought and Action, p. 24. 88 Shari’ati, Religion vs. Religion, p. 36. 89 Shari’ati, School of Thought and Action, p. 34.
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For Shari’ati, a hyper-emphasis on the purity of practice in Islam mirrors the problems of the
secular movement of Western positivist science in its standardization, formalism, and technical
rigor.
Relating this attitude to the “five pillars” of Islam, Shari’ati offers a fundamental break
with tradition. For instance, although he does not critique the rituals that accompany salat,
Shari’ati expands and re-conceptualizes it:
Since worship, when conscious and heartfelt, becomes a manifestation of all absolute sacred values, the worshipper nourishes these values in a relative human mode in his own being.90
The practice of prayer thus becomes less a matter of technique and more an issue of the
destruction of idols through one’s actions. In this manner, prayer can be as varied in its formal
manifestations as the historical circumstances and multitheistic idols that Muslims face, since
“whether you consider yourself responsible to the people or to God, in practice, our work is the
same, our responsibility, the same.”91
Shari’ati recognizes that zakat, the outlawing of riba, and other traditional forms of
wealth redistribution in Islam, no matter how efficient or progressive, will not be able to resolve
the systemic inequalities and class hegemony produced by capitalist modes of economic
relations. Thus Shari’ati actively promotes the abolishment of private property as a necessary
part of Islamic faith, proclaiming that “true Islam is true socialism.”92 He refutes the notions of
“God’s property” that currently are used to legitimate an Islamic variant of capitalism:
“Wealth belongs to God” and God has given it (in trust) to the people… [Property] is not the property of special individuals. Rather, it is property which belongs to the people. God is the owner of property, that is, the owner of the property is the people because the people and God are in one front as “people are
90 Shari’ati, Marxism and Other Western Fallacies, p. 86. 91 Shari’ati, Hajj: Reflections on its Rituals, p. 34. 92 Shari’ati, Religion vs. Religion, p. 6.
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of the family of God.” It is clear that the guardian of the family is in the same front as his own family.93
Here Shari’ati invalidates arguments for a narrowly-defined Islamic economic system that
perpetuates private property relations given his belief in the tauhid of Allah that should manifest
in the indivisibility of humanity and its economic resources.
Although Qutb claims that Islam “encourages the individual to use his mind and body
and does not substitute ritual for rules to govern behavior,”94 Qutb’s epistemology, methodology,
and social ontology nearly completely contradict Shari’ati’s. These contradictions are
exemplified in Qutb’s actively seeking a return to rigid Islamic traditional practices derived from
literalist interpretations of the Qur’an and hadith. Qutb often issues narrowly specific fatwa-like
declarations in his writings on specific matters ranging from conflict resolution to gender roles.
For example, he mandates the following of the traditionally prescribed three day waiting period
after disagreeing with a fellow Muslim.95 Women are permitted the “privilege of beautifying
themselves in ways that are forbidden to men… for finery may cause effeminate behavior in
men.”96 While Shari’ati does not fall into the trap of advocating mere reformist economic
measures, Qutb fails to deviate from the traditional inadequate forms of wealth redistribution like
centralized banking, nationalization of resources, prohibition of interest, and numerous taxes.
Even though he advocates supposedly radical principles of social justice like Shari’ati that would
theoretically lend support for socialist modes of economic relations, the form is continually
privileged over the content for Qutb.
Unlike Shari’ati, for whom there was no romantic past to which Muslims should turn for
guidance, Qutb argues that “we must return to [the era of the “Qur’anic generation”] with a sense 93 Ibid., p. 47. 94 Qutb, Islam and Universal Peace, p. 3. 95 Ibid., p. 24. 96 Ibid., p. 20.
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of instruction for obedience and action.”97 While Shari’ati emphasizes that we too can struggle
with conviction just as the Prophet (PBUH) and his companions, Qutb’s fetishism of this “golden
age” of Islam leads him to claim that “no other generation of this caliber was ever gain to be
found... even in the entire history of man.”98
In Qutb’s eyes, “the entire range of human activity”99 is circumscribed by “the Divinely-
ordained method”100 of Shari’ah:
Its system extends into all aspects of life; it discusses all minor or major affairs of mankind; it orders man's life—not only in this world but also in the world to come… it penetrates through the whole system of life, which is a practical interpretation of this faith. By this means, those who believe are already pleased with the system which this faith uniquely determines and submit in principle to all the laws and injunctions and details even before they are declared. Indeed, the spirit of submission is the first requirement of the faith. Through this spirit of submission the believers learn the Islamic regulations and laws with eagerness and pleasure.
Islam is conceptualized not as a liberating framework that guides one’s life with noble and just
principles but as a system that imposes itself and which individuals must conform to. Thus, the
radical potential Qutb identifies for Islam, that it “does not tolerate oppression” and “all humans
are equal before the law,”101 is ultimately annulled through his dualist epistemology, literalist
methodology, and nominalist social ontology.
In conclusion, Islam is often characterized as having two main traditions: a reactionary
and conservative “Islamism” that is backwards and harsh, and a “progressive” form of Islam that
attempts to assimilate its practices and beliefs into Western modernity. However, the preceding
comparative analysis of Qutb and Shari’ati reveals that modern Islamic thought potentially offers
more than previously considered. Through making a sort of “post-modern turn,” Shari’ati does 97 Qutb, Milestones, p. 9. 98 Ibid., p. 6. 99 Qutb, Islam and Universal Peace, p. 3. 100 Qutb, Milestones, p. 19. 101 Qutb, Islam and Universal Peace, p. 73.
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not have to reject principles of social justice for fear of not conforming to the mandates of
history. Indeed, for Shari’ati the struggle between shirk and tauhid is a historical one, and
therefore he seeks the dialectical “way out” of the contemporary situation of sin.
Without rejecting or undermining Islamic identity and/or practice, Shari’ati asserts a new
type of Islam that is centered on the obligation not to worship idols. As he so brilliantly
illustrates, true monotheism is always already a paradoxical solution to the ever-worsening
existential crisis of humanity, since only through the complete surrendering to the irrational and
unknown can humanity hope to transcend the labyrinth of multitheism in which it has lost itself.
For Shari’ati, the moment of pure tauhid in Islam is yet to be found, for it has no precedent in the
past or manifestation in the present; it can only therefore be realized in the future. His poetic
words are an inspiration to all, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, to carry the torch of Islamic
revolution forward ceaselessly through a denial and rejection of all worldly possessions/desires:
Make your land a sacred area For you are in the sacred area. Make your age a sacred time For you are in the sacred time. Make the earth into a sacred mosque For you are in the Masjid al-Haram. For “the earth is God’s mosque” And you see that: It is not.102
On the other hand, Qutb’s writings seem to embody many of the philosophical
assumptions in the Western tradition of neo-liberalism. This is ironic since Western neo-liberals
have been some of the most responsible for constructing the false “good Muslim, bad Muslim”
dichotomy in modern Islam. Although certainly arriving at different conclusions, both Qutb and
neo-liberals typify dualist epistemology, realist methodology, and nominalist social order. Qutb
102 Shari’ati, Hajj:Reflections on its Rituals, p. 255.
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thus sees history as an autonomous force of development, as evidenced by his celebration of
modernity:
This was the era during which Europe’s genius created its marvelous works in science, culture, law, and material production, due to which mankind has progressed to great heights of creativity and material comfort.103
In this sense, Qutb simply seeks to reform modern “progress” so that it is controlled by Islamic
Shari’ah law, never once questioning the sinful roots of the Western project which surely
manifest in its resulting products.
And herein lies perhaps the most fundamental difference between the two thinkers.
Although it is difficult to sense the pain and suffering that Qutb must have felt during his
repeated tortures by the Egyptian government, he did indeed espouse a worldly grasp of power
which is precisely the bane of Islam in Shari’ati’s eyes. For Qutb, Muslims should “feel superior
to others when weak, few, and poor, as well as when strong, many, and rich.”104 In this sense,
Qutb separated the material “benefits” of modernity from Islamic ideals, while Shari’ati
consistently recognized the dialectical nature of idealism and materialism. Qutb, although
expressing ambivalence at times about worldly authority, still advocated for Islamic “dominance
in the world,”105 a notion that Shari’ati categorically rejected as idolatrous.
Therefore, in the end, while both Shari’ati and Qutb are inspirational in their calls for
“Islamist” praxis, it is ultimately the former whose thought reveals fewer contradictions and a
wider range of possibilities for effecting human liberation. A more penetrating biographical-
historical account of the two might reveal material reasons for their differences, including a
nuanced discussion of the comparable severity of their mistreatments and the social location of
their families/upbringings within two differing contexts of intersectional domination. 103 Qutb, Milestones, p. 3. 104 Ibid., p. 127. 105 Ibid., p. 147.
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Regardless, however, what is clear is that while Shari’ati leaves the reader with a sense of
limitless world-openness, Qutb’s proposed solutions to the crises in modern Islam feel far more
stifling. An appropriation of Qutb’s unsurpassed passion and revolutionary spirit within the
epistemological, methodological, and social ontological framework of Shari’ati’s worldview
would represent perhaps the greatest possible synthesis in modern Islamic thought.
References
Qutb, Sayyid. 1993. Islam and Universal Peace. Indianapolis, IN: American Trust Publications. ------. 1990. Milestones. Indianapolis, IN: American Trust Publications. ------. 1980. This Religion of Islam. Salimiah, Kuwait: International Islamic Federation
of Student Organizations. Shari’ati, Ali. 2003. Religion vs. Religion. Chicago, IL: Kazi Publications. ------. 1992. Hajj: Reflections on its Rituals. Chicago, IL: Kazi Publications. ------. 1990. School of Thought and Action. Albuquerque, NM: Abjad. ------. 1980. Marxism and Other Western Fallacies. Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press. ------. 1979. On the Sociology of Islam. Oneonta, NY: Mizan Press.
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