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The Islamic revival in CentralAsia: A potent force or amisconception?Ghoncheh TazminiPublished online: 01 Jul 2010.

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Central Asian Survey (2001) 20(1), 63–83

The Islamic revival in Central Asia:a potent force or a misconception?GHONCHEH TAZMINI

Introduction

During the � rst months after independence in 1991, numerous scholars andcommentators suggested that the de� ning characteristic of the � ve Central Asianrepublics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan—was their Islamic heritage and predicted that the region would unite with thewider Muslim world to create a fundamentalist bloc. The concern for radical andfundamentalist interpretations of Islam is legitimate, as there is a strong regionalinclination toward Islam. However, the widely held assumption that Islam islikely to be a potent force in shaping the future of the Central Asian republicsis not entirely accurate. In fact, there are a number of factors suggesting thatthese republics will not fall under the sway of an Islam-led opposition and thata uni� ed Muslim state across the whole of Central Asia will not materialize. Thisanalysis is an attempt to put into perspective the dynamics of the Islamic revivalin Central Asia and to provide a realistic assessment of its role in the region. Iwill do so by:

· Describing the survival of Islam as cultural phenomenon in Central Asia afterseventy years of the Soviet anti-religious crusade;

· Examining the nature and scope of the Islamic revival post-independence inthe region;

· Assessing a number of factors capable of having an impact on the process ofthe Islamic revival, including:

(a) internal factors such as economic determinants in pushing the republicstoward Islam;

(b) external pressures exerted from the Middle East in shaping the Islamicorientation.

Before I venture into a discussion, it is important � rst and foremost, to qualifywhat scholars are referring to when they diagnose an ‘Islamic threat’ in CentralAsia. Aware of Islam’s role as an important cultural force and a component ofthe Central Asian’s national identity, these experts believe that Islam’s socio-cultural clout is a fertile soil-bed for the manifestation of Islam as an authoritat-ive political ideology. They subscribe to the view of a region-wide, anti-Western

ISSN 0263-4937 print/ISSN 1465-3354 online/01/010063-21 Ó 2001 Central Asian SurveyDOI: 10.1080/0263493012005546 0

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Islamist network operating throughout Central Asia which is dedicated toestablishing Islamic governments based on the principles of the Sharia (sacredlaw of Islam) and using violence as a method of spreading militant and fanaticalIslam. My argument will attempt to demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses ofthis interpretation of the nature of Islam in the region.

The suppression of Islam under Communism

When we think about the Muslim world, the former Soviet Union does notusually come to mind. But with approximately 50 million adherents, it had oneof the largest Muslim populations in the world. However, the religious institu-tions of the organized Muslim community in the Soviet Union were subject todecades of anti-religious policies and restrictions imposed by the Soviet govern-ment on all religious activity. After the October 1917 revolution, the foundationfor an anti-Islamic strategy was laid out as the Bolshevik government imple-mented a radical programme separating religion from the state, and launchedviolent campaigns against all religious institutions in general. The rationalebehind this strategy was derived from the Marxist belief that religion was anobstacle to modernization and social development. The Muslims felt the blow ofthis policy when mosques, Sharia courts and religious schools were closeddown, members of the clergy were persecuted, and religious endowment lands(waqf) were con� scated. One of the most serious consequences of this campaignwas the Basmachi revolt that began in 1918. The revolt involved the MujahidinSu� s who fought � ercely to resist the establishment of Soviet rule that wouldexclude the native Muslim population from power. By 1924, the revolt hadweakened but continued in the Pamirs until 1928.

Lenin’s policies were reversed once again in 1924 when some prominentMuslim-turned Communists advised him to rethink his tactics. The anti-Islamiccampaign was put on hold and an attempt was made to restore trust among theMuslims by returning waqf property, reopening mosques and Islamic schools,and resuming the practice of the Sharia law.1 When a relative degree of supportand trust was achieved, Lenin reverted to his long-term anti-Islamic strategy.Between 1925 and 1927, a number of decrees were issued to curb the in� uenceof the Sharia courts by prohibiting the establishment of new courts and cuttingoff � nancial aid disbursed to them by the local government. Nationalization ofparts of the waqf property was initiated in 1925, depriving religious andeducational institutions of material support. Much of the Muslim religiousof� cialdom was dispersed through relocation, exile, imprisonment and assassin-ation. All Islamic schools were banned and the Latin script replaced teaching andpublishing in Arabic.2 The harsh treatment of Muslims continued into the 1930swhen mosques continued to function and clerics continued to preach, but invastly reduced numbers and under conditions of persistent persecution. UnderStalin, the elimination of the outward attributes of Islam was important, thus,three of the � ve pillars of Islam—the payment of the zakat (alms), the hajj(pilgrimage) to Mecca, and the observance of the fast of Ramadan-wereoutlawed.3

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Soviet efforts to undermine all religions continued until World War II, whenthe repression of religion and the clergy almost ceased. During the war years, theSpiritual Directorate of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (SADUM) wascreated. With the Mufti at its head, it was charged with regulating the regis-tration of mosques, appointing imams to lead local congregations and evendictating the content of sermons and the nature of ‘proper’ Islamic practice. Theof� cial Muslim was co-opted by and took its cues from the communist partyleadership. The Muftiate was essentially designed as Oliver Roy puts it: ‘toundermine and even attempt to destroy popular Islam, particularly the connec-tions between national and religious identities, and to create a token, regulated,of� cially appointed clergy in order to manage the few remaining religiousinstitutions , and after 1955, to improve relations with friendly Muslim coun-tries’.4 The easing of pressure on the Muslims had to do with the need forMuslim contribution to the war effort, the Soviet Union’s subsequent rise inglobal status and its foreign policy that attempted to widen its sphere ofin� uence in the Muslim Middle East. This strategy was pursued until themid-1950s when the effects of the war had been overcome and Soviet authoritiesno longer needed religious support.

The anti-religious campaign was once again reinvigorated as the CommunistParty leadership began attacking religion. Krushchev maintained that: ‘Com-munist education proposes the liberation of consciousness from the religiousprejudices and superstitions which still hamper some Soviet people from fulldemonstration of their creative powers’. He issued a decree entitled, ‘Onthe strict observance of the laws on religious cults’ in March 1961, a three-fold strategy. First, an attack was to be launched against the clergy. Second, theexisting anti-religious laws were to be thoroughly implemented. Third,the penalties for religious offences were made harsher. This was the of� cialline taken in regard to religion, including Islam until the beginning ofPerestroika.

However, despite years of reprisal and persecution in the Soviet Union, Islamhas managed to preserve its spirit as a way of life that culturally de� ned everyfacet of the believer’s existence.5 Sociological studies published in the Brezh-nevite period document the astonishing persistence of both belief and practice.This was especially true of Islamic lifestyle rituals including, fasting, feasting,pilgrimages, polygamy and the handing out of alms.6 In retrospect, the Sovietcampaign against Islam had proved to be only partially successful. It managedto curb Islamic activity and perhaps contain Islamic sentiments in the region butit was far eradicating the Islamic faith.

Perestroika: ‘the true banner of Allah’7

When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he set out to transform Soviet societythrough his policies of perestroika (radical economic restructuring and reform)and glasnost (policy of openness intended to ensure the success of perestroika).An inevitable product of this process was the gradual revival of Islam in Central

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Asia. Gorbachev had not anticipated this outcome because during the � rst yearsof his leadership, glasnost and perestroika encompassed neither Central Asia norIslam. However, these reforms slowly found their way into the region. MehrdadHaghayeghi describes two phases in the application and impact of perestroikaand glasnost in Central Asia. He explains that the � rst phase lasted from 1985until 1988. During this period massive anti-corruption campaigns and partypurges were conducted as Gorbachev attempted to establish tighter control in theregion. In fact, Gorbachev followed his predecessor’s policies on religion duringthis phase and went so far as to blame Islamic culture for the socio-economicand political ills of Central Asia. Michael Rywkin makes an interesting point bysuggesting that this policy was an instrument of a more generalized anti-nationalist and anti-Islamic strategy aimed at strengthening central control in theface of a Muslim population explosion and the dread possibility of nationalistcontagion from turbulent Iran and Afghanistan.8

The second phase corresponded to the 1988–1991 period when there was achange in Gorbachev’s policy orientation—glasnost was permitted to be prac-ticed relatively freely on a similar scale to other republics in the Soviet Union.9

Moscow was forced to back away from its anti-Islamic policy because theCommunist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was visibly on the retreat, comingunder attack by both the reformist wing of the Politburo leadership (led byAlexander Yakovlev) and by the ‘nationalists ’ in the Baltic republics communistparties. To salvage the situation and to appease the demands of growingnationalism in the republics, the party began to grant the republic leaders morecontrol over the ideological sphere, which including policies covering religion.10

The trend towards liberalization resulted in quantitative changes for Islam inCentral Asia. Among these changes was the drive to construct new mosques.The bureaucratic obstacles that had traditionally impeded the operation ofmosques were removed, leading to the reopening of old mosques and newshrines. According to some � gures, by 1992: in Uzbekistan, about 3000 mosqueshad been restored or built anew; in Tajikistan, 130 large town mosques wereoperating; and in Turkmenistan, 500 mosques were functioning in denselypopulated areas.11 Publishing activities of the Muslim Religious Boards wereexpanded as well, resulting in the printing of more Muslim calendars, book titlesand the creation of a mass-circulation Muslim press.

The waqf were re-established during this period, after being nationalized inthe 1920s; this was very signi� cant since it provided the clergy with anindependent source of � nancing. With more resources at their disposal, cleri-cally-led religious institutions were in a better position to mobilize the com-munity around the notions of Islam. Soon, clerics began a process ofenlightenment in every republic, by educating ordinary Muslims with the historyand philosophy of their religion and by promoting their notions of distinctionand integration with regard to the Muslim community. Young educators invarious � elds of the humanities, and local journalists , joined in these efforts. Theprocess of enlightenment was organically intertwined with nationalist sentimentsand the notion of national revival was intertwined with Islam. As enlightenment

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became more pronounced and, as ethnic and nationalistic views grew, Islamicexpression grew accordingly. Initially, the appearance of Islamic slogans andpropaganda was seen as something new in Soviet practice, but by 1991, thehoisting of green � ags was not unusual.12 Ostensibly, a new trend was growingrapidly in Central Asian Islam, namely its politicization and the emergence ofthe Muslim religion as an independent political force.

The rebirth of Islam in Central Asia

Internal dynamics of the Islamic revival

With the end of Soviet power the world witnessed a resurgence of Islam in theCentral Asian republics, an understandable reaction to Islam’s long oppressionunder Soviet rule.13 However, this ‘Islamic renaissance’ is discussed chie� y inconnection with the emergence of Islam on the political stage (in a militant,doctrinaire form), rather than in relation to the strengthening of enlightenmenttendencies. During the Soviet era, Islam was largely de-intellectualized , surviv-ing mainly in its ritual and traditional forms.14 Prolonged isolation from thesources of knowledge about the religion led to almost universal ignorance aboutthe basic tenets of Islam. With independence, the Central Asian leadership aimedto re-educate their subjects about the basic principles of their faith, recognizingIslam’s strength as an element of national rediscovery. As such, it is importantto understand that the Islamic revival is principally bound upon the reconais-sance of national identity and cultural heritage.

This is re� ected in the dramatic increase in mosque construction, Islamicschools and the observance of Islamic rituals. For example, in Uzbekistan, by1997, the number of mosques had increased from 80 to 5000.15 In conjunctionwith this, madrasahs or Islamic schools opened, offering courses in Arabic,Shariah law and Islamic history. They also provide clerical training for youngMuslims who wish to make Islam into a career. And although the vulnerabilityto Islam of the different peoples of Central Asia varies from republic to republic,the observance of Islamic rituals has generally been on the rise: Central AsianMuslims invariably observe circumcision of newborns and the tradition ofproviding a kalym (bride price) to the bride’s family.16 They also performimportant acts of faith, such as fasting, pilgrimages to Mecca, participation inFriday prayers and mosque attendance, which have all increased dramatically.17

Whilst the republics have a desire to connect more fully with the traditionalpractices and culture of the Islamic past, their religious awareness does notnecessarily translate into radical, political behaviour. In fact, some importantfactors suggest that Islam will not take a revolutionary form in Central Asia.First, 98 per cent of Central Asia’s Muslims are Sunni Muslims of the Hana�School of law, not Shi’ite Muslims. This immediately works to the disadvantageof the most radical Islamic clergy in the region, in Iran, and to the advantage ofmore conservative elements.18

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Second, we must take into account the fact that the revival of Islamicconsciousness came in a variety of forms. Unfortunately, many people neglectthe diversity of Islam and espouse the politicized form as the absolute version.This is certainly not the case, especially if we look at the huge revival in Su� sm,the mystical strand of Islam. Su� sm has traditionally been one of the mosttolerant forms of religion, incorporating Buddhist, Shaman and Christian tenetsand it has helped mould tolerance towards all religions. Su� s do not believe inpolitical parties and have no desire to preach a political cause and focus insteadon the ritual and tradition.19 Other Muslim devotees continued to follow aprimarily secular path, adopting the Muslim appellation and identity withoutcorresponding religious practice. Others observed holidays, rituals and Fridayprayer, but altered little else in their lifestyle.20 Some, particularly the youth,chose a stricter form of religious practice: they undertook religious educationand adopted religious dress and other obligations prescribed by a conservativeinterpretation of Islam. Still, others saw Islam as the basis for an alternativepolitical system. The differences in Islamic adherence re� ects the absence of truereligious solidarity in the region. The Islamic bond in Central Asia is highlyexaggerated whilst sectarian, tribal, ethnic, linguistic and national differenceshave been underestimated. But these disparities are not necessarily a barrier tounited Islamic activity, they can signi� cantly decelerate, or even hinder thedevelopment of a radical Islamic movement that, similar to other politicalideologies, requires a high degree of national unity and support if it is to succeedin capturing power.

Islam and national identity

An increasingly important role played by Islam is its function as a componentof Central Asian identity in an area that is desperately searching for an identity.While Islam is not a signi� cant factor in the politics of the republics, it will bequite useful in dealing with Russia, since Islam along with their Turkishheritage, is what distinguishe s the republics from Russia.21 Islam, as GrahamFuller puts it, is an element of nationalism itself.22 In my opinion, Fuller’sinterpretation is quite correct because the Islamic renaissance and nationalrebirth are closely intertwined in each state. Islam in the republics is largely ameans of national self-identi� cation, an instrument of spiritual liberation fromMoscow, from the excessive in� uence of the communist system and Slavicculture—expressions of foreign colonial domination.23 It is likely, therefore, thatas nationalist movements build identity and grow vis-a-vis Russia in theforthcoming years, the Islamist factor will increasingly play a part in anyconfrontation. Islam and nationalism, rather than act as opposing forces, willmutually stimulate each other: the Islamic consciousness will help shape CentralAsia’s national and regional identities and vice versa. However, Islam, as anexpression of national self-consciousness , is and will remain innocuous and farfrom revolutionary.

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Islam as a political force

After independence, Islam’s participation in politics seemed quite unexpected tomany people. It was not easy at � rst glance to � nd a place in the politicalmakeup of Soviet society that could be taken by Islamists. The total dominationof the Communist Party, the absence of political freedom and the generalpassiveness had created a political culture which rendered it unlikely that Islamicgroups would pursue serious political activity. However, the threat of fundamen-talist Islam in the political sphere was seen clearly in the Tajik Civil War.

The Tajik con� ict

When commentators write of an ‘Islamic threat’ in Central Asia, they often usethe Tajik civil war to back their claims. They point to this con� ict in order toillustrate how Islam, a cultural–religious phenomenon, manifests itself in poli-tics. In May 1992, � ghting erupted in Dushanbe between the governmentdominated by former communist regional elites from Khujand and Kulob and theIslamic and democratic parties representing mostly Gharmi and Badakhshaniclans. Fed by weapons supplied by both the disintegrating Soviet Army andneighbouring Afghanistan, the war spread across south of Tajikistan and backinto the capital. By September, the opposition ousted President Nabiev, leadingto a counter-offensive by restorationis t forces spearheaded by a para-militaryorganization, the Popular Front. A precarious stability returned in Decemberwhen these forces, now backed by Russia and Uzbekistan, pushed the � ghters ofthe Islamic–democratic opposition and thousands of refugees across the freezingAmu Darya into Afghanistan.24

To the West and to Russia, the events of spring–autumn 1992 in Tajikistanshowed the radicalization of the Islamic movement, especially as the oppositionwas said to be inspired and armed by militant Iranian and Afghan Islamistswanting to further the cause of Islam. What is more, the media portrayed thecon� ict in Tajikistan as a model for future con� icts in Central Asia, whereIslamic fanatics would use force to challenge state authority. Indeed, on thesurface, the civil war pitted an ‘Islamic–democratic’ coalition, whose essentialcomponent was the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), � ghting against the oldcommunists. And certainly the Islamists played up the ideological dimension ofthe con� ict: during anti-government rallies, they conspicuously deployed thewhole vocabulary of Islamic symbolism including the green � ag, quotationsfrom the Koran and chants borrowed from the Islamic revolution in Iran.25

However, it is imperative to understand that the Islamic-led opposition wasdriven as much by clan rivalries, the growth of localism and regionalism as bytheir desire to establish a theocratic state based on Islamic principles. Localpeople saw the IRP as a political party � rst, representing the interests ofparticular regions and clans, and an Islamic party second.26

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Islam and the state

However, there is one important reason why Islam could become radical: Islamcan grow as a vehicle of protest against Central Asian regimes, when they areoppressive and incapable of meeting economic and social needs. Fuller explainsthat there is no reason that Central Asia should be immune from the pattern ofIslamic political trends and movements that we see in other Muslim countrieswhere the Islamists have often become the primary vehicle of organizedopposition against the illegitimate or failing regime. Islam could emerge as apolitical force in case of the existing regimes’ economic and political failure;such failure would discredit the governing elites’ ideology, and thus create anopportunity for an Islamic regime to emerge as the only alternative.27

In my opinion, this is a possible scenario given the authoritarian nature of theCentral Asian leadership. For a short time after independence, the rulerssupported the Islamic revival, nudging their subjects toward the path of enlight-enment. Today the state, fearful of possible Islamic extremism, is resistingIslamic activity outside the of� cially sanctioned framework (as exempli� ed bythe Muftiate). If such moderate Muslim movements are denied the right to takepart in politics, the region may become susceptible to extremism or militancy asIslam offers an attractive ideology for an oppressed populace. But if Islamicpolitical participation is encouraged, extremist elements will not have a place inCentral Asian politics.

The Central Asian leadership

It is evident that the largely secular elites of Central Asia are in a stickysituation. On one hand, they have to develop Islamic credentials in order toreinforce their legitimacy, but on the other, they have no intention of allowingIslamic activism to challenge their own position. As a result, as Martha Olcotthas pointed out, these regimes have come to recognize that in practice theIslamic revival has taken two forms, one they can live with and one which theyreject entirely. The authorities do not feel threatened with the revival of Islamas long as it is limited to the rediscovery of ancient culture and a greaterparticipation in religious ritual.28 Furthermore, we must not overlook the import-ant point that the basic orientation of the elites is toward building secular andmodernist republics. So even though Islam is being reinvigorated in CentralAsia, the impact and in� uence of Islam will be modi� ed by the prevailingsecularism of Central Asian elite who tend to ‘look everywhere and anywherefor guidance and assistance in solving their severe problem of development’.29

Nonetheless, wary of the potency of religion, the leaders of the republics havetaken measures to ensure control over religious institutions and to prevent thepoliticization of Islam.

Kazakhstan

In Kazakhstan, President Nazarbaev is attempting to keep Islam itself in

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administrative check. In 1990, he removed Kazakhstan from the jurisdiction ofSADUM, creating a separate Muftiate for Kazakh Muslims in an attempt toreduce the spillover effect of the perceived fundamentalist activities in neigh-bouring Uzbekistan.30 Ratbek Nisanbaev, the religious head who supportedNazarbaev’s of� cial view that the creation of Islamic parties would endangerethnic harmony in such a multinational and multiethnic republic, was appointedmufti. On many occasions Nisanbaev spoke out against the formation of anIslamic party in Kazakhstan, which he labelled as ‘a breach of peace’. Inaddition to the new muftiate, Kazakhstan has kept in place a Council forReligious Affairs attached to the republican Council of Ministers, whoseresponsibilitie s include guaranteeing religious freedom and ensuring that re-ligious institutions do not act beyond the perimeters established by thestate.

Furthermore, with an eye toward the Islamic regimes in nearby Iran andAfghanistan, the government has provided constitutiona l provisions de� ning theparameters of religious activity. The 1995 constitution forbids organizations thatseek to stimulate political or religious discord and imposes strict governmentalcontrol on foreign religious organizations . Both the 1993 and the 1995 constitu-tions stipulate that Kazakhstan is a secular state. This position was based on theNazarbaev’s foreign policy as much as on domestic considerations. Aware of thepotential for investment from the Muslim countries of the Middle East, Nazar-baev visited Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. So far, Kazakhstan’s ties with Iranhave been limited to commercial activity. In 1998, Iran and Kazakhstan signedan agreement to ship oil by tanker to Iran across the Caspian; Kazakhstan doesnot receive any money for the shipments but sends crude oil (100,000 tonsannually) to Iran and receives a like amount of re� ned oil in return.31

Kyrgyzstan

In this republic, the Kyrgyz Kozi has refused to entertain the idea of a separatemuftiate. His excuse is based on spiritual considerations, arguing that the Islamiccommunity is a notion that transcends territorial boundaries, and as such, theformation of a separate muftiate runs counter to the nature of Islam.32 However,President Akaev remains suspicious of religious activism and emphasizes theimportance of secularism. For this reason, the preamble to the 1993 constitutionmandates a secular state, forbidding the intrusion of any ideology or religion inthe conduct of state business. The non-Central Asians have also expressedconcern about the potential for a fundamentalist Islamic revolution that wouldemulate Iran and Afghanistan by bringing Islam directly into the making of statepolicy, to the detriment of the non-Islamic population.33 Because of the anxietyabout a continued out� ow of skilled or professional Russians, Akaev has takenpains to reassure the non-Kyrgyz that no Islamic revolution threatens the state.During the summer of 1995, a presidential decree forbade the teaching ofreligion or atheism in public schools and a state body to monitor religious

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organizations was established, a move that may have stemmed from securityclaims about the growth of Islamic militancy along the border.34

So far, there have been a few manifestations of Islamic militancy. In August1999, a large group of Uzbek militants, numbering between 500 and 1000,seized several Kyrgyz villages. They also captured four Japanese geologistsworking at a gold mining site in southern Kyrgyzstan and a high-ranking of� cialfrom Kyrgyzstan’s Interior Ministry. The group crossed into Kyrgyzstan during22–23 August saying they would carry holy war back to Uzbekistan.35 Theseincidents clearly demonstrate the existence of extremism in the region. However,these random acts of terrorism in the name of Islam, are very far fromdeveloping into a politically salient movement that could threaten the state’sleadership.

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan has not yet of� cially organized a separate muftiate but thegovernment stresses its secular nature and its support of freedom of religiousbelief in the 1991 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religions in the TurkmenSoviet Socialist Republic and in the 1992 constitution . The document guaranteesthe separation of church and state; it also removes any legal basis for Islam toplay a role in political life by prohibiting proselytizing , the dissemination of‘unof� cial’ religious literature and the formation of religious parties. Interest-ingly, the government also reserves the right to appoint or dismiss anyone whoteaches religion or is a member of the clergy. Yet simultaneously , PresidentNiyazov has sought to bolster his Islamic credentials. Though the constitutionasserts that the state is secular, the president has proposed the teaching of Islamichistory in schools, permitted the decriminalization of traditional marriage prac-tices (polygamy and kalym) and allowed morning radio broadcasts to begin withverses from the Koran.36

Uzbekistan

Islam is by far the dominant faith in Uzbekistan, and of all of Central Asia, itis perhaps this republic that has the strongest religious traditions. After indepen-dence, the government’s leadership appeared to view of� cial Islam as a usefultool in building national identity and solidifying and legitimating its monopolyon power. On the day of his inauguration as the � rst president of independentUzbekistan, Islam Karimov, former secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party,made reference to Islam in his speech and even held a Koran in one hand andthe country’s constitution on the other. However, the lines of control between thegovernment and of� cial Islam during the Soviet era changed little in post-SovietUzbekistan. By 1992, the Muslim Board was decentralized with the establish-ment in each of a Muslim regulatory board. The Muslim Board of Uzbekistanassumed the same functions that the Soviet era board had performed. Nonethe-less, some Muslims in Uzbekistan established their own mosques beyond the

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government’s purview, selected their own imams and adopted Islamic practice ascongregations saw � t. The Karimov government regarded this innovation asthreatening, both in light of the violence that had wrecked Tajikistan andAfghanistan and no doubt, because Islam remained one of the few potentialforces for alternative political organization in Uzbekistan.37

In view of the threat of politicized Islam, the government began to takerepressive measures by eliminating the Islamic Renaissance Party in 1992 withArticle 57 of the constitution that prohibits the establishment of political partieswith national or religious features.38 It then proceeded with a vigorous campaignagainst ‘unof� cial’ Islam, reiterating its commitment to preserving secularism. Inlate 1994, the government began a major crackdown against independentMuslims, primarily in Tashkent and in the major cities of the Ferghana valley.This involved arbitrary arrests, ‘disappearances’ of Islamic leaders, the detentionof bearded men and the harassment of women wearing veils—symbols ofreligious piety.

The crackdown intensi� ed in 1997 after the murders of police of� cers inNamangan, which the government immediately blamed on the Wahhabis.The Wahhabis, supporters of the religious–political teaching elaborated byMuhammad Ibn Al-Wahhab, view themselves as ‘true Muslims’ who seek toreturn to the purity of original Islam based on the Koran and the Sunnah of theProphet which also suggests giving Islam central place in the political arena.39

As a result of the murders, authorities arbitrarily detained or arrested hundredsof men in Namangan and Andijan. The sweep then spread to other cities in theFerghana Valley in January 1998 and continued till March. In 1998, thecampaign went so far as to order the Institute of Oriental Studies to close itsIslamic studies department and even expelled some Muslim students wearingbeards or veils in 1999.40

It is clear that the Karimov government is determined to preserve secularismand to eliminate politicized Islam, even at the expense of individuals ’ rights toreligious expression. The repressive policies have not been entirely successful;in fact they are dangerous in that they could back� re and strengthen Islamicextremism rather than weaken or destroy it. The threat of extremism still existstoday: in Tashkent on February 1999, there were a series of bomb explosions(allegedly planted by Islamic militants) that killed 16 people. Also the armedgroup of militants led by Uzbek � eld commander, Juma Namangani, is widelyheld responsible for the recent politically-motivate d kidnapping of four Kyrgyzof� cials inside Kyrgyzstan.41 Whilst Karimov’s repressive policies have madehim a popular president, they have purchased short-term control at the expenseof long-term stability.

Tajikistan

When the civil war ended (detailed earlier in the section entitled ‘The TajikCon� ict’), the government launched a campaign of suppression and persecutionin an effort to extinguish any activity associated with Islamists. Islamic-based

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political groups were banned in 1992, activities of the press were severelyconstrained and opposition newspapers were closed. Many journalists and evenopposition leaders were arrested, several disappeared, and others were founddead. Despite a 1994 cease-� re accord and promises from both sides toseek reconciliation through political means only, the Islamic–democraticcoalition continued to wage small-scale guerrilla warfare from bases inAfghanistan. The continuous � ghting has killed thousands and driven hundredsof people from their homes. Participation by the opposition was restricted inthe November elections, including a referendum on a draft constitutionreinstalling the presidentia l system. The voters approved the constitutionand elected Imamali Rakhmonov, a member of the former Communist Party,as president. Legislative elections in 1995 were similarly restricted and manyformer communists ran virtually unopposed. In early 1995, about 25,000Russian troops as well as contingents from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan andKyrgyzstan, guarded the Tajik border with Afghanistan, the neighbouringcountry responsible for supplying the anti-government Islamic militants withweapons. Armed opposition groups captured the cities of Tursunzade andKurgan-Tyube in January 1996 and came within 12 miles of Dushanbe.Responding to the demands of these opposition groups, the Tajik governmentdismissed members of the government, including the prime minister JamshidKarimov.

After neighbouring Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul, fell to the fundamentalistTaleban militia, negotiations took on a new urgency. In December 1996, underpressure from Moscow, President Rakhmanov signed a cease-� re and agreedwith the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) on a process for reaching a � nal peacesettlement. Russian troops helped provide military muscle necessary to stabilizethe country whilst peace was being negotiated.42 Their presence provideda reasonable amount of security as the Tajik–Afghan border remained asource of instability , particularly as the UTO � ghters and refugees returnedfrom Afghanistan. However, in spite of the presence of Russian troops,Tajikistan still experiences random acts of terrorism traced back to Islamists:in August 1998, Tajik � ghters took several hostages in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan.Consequently , the Russians, the Tajiks and the Uzbeks have formed a ‘troika’dedicated to work against the rise of religious extremism and meet frequently todevelop a strategy to curtail it.43 In my opinion, the political participation ofMuslim-based groups can reduce the likelihood of radical in� ltration andsubversion of the political system. The new version of the Law on PoliticalParties was drafted by a Conciliatory Commission, established by the presidentand adopted into law, allowing the legal functioning of the IRP. Co-optingIslamic elements in this fashion, will probably prove to be the best strategy, asopposed to stationing more troops which is bound to provoke radicalism andmilitancy.

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Islam and economics

The collapse of the Soviet Union rapidly catapulted the Central Asian states intothe internationa l arena and dramatically deepened the economic crisis in theregion. Within the following two years, the republics received a fast lesson inwhat independence signi� ed. In December 1991, Russia cut off trade withKazakhstan and when Uzbekistan and Russia disagreed over cotton prices, theUzbeks went into the winter of 1992 short of fuel and grain. New bilateraltreaties were quickly negotiated which eased the crises, but the republics learnedthat that they had to make their own way into the world. This was not an easytask considering that none of the Central Asians had any foreign legations sinceRussia had seized the Soviet Union’s foreign assets, saying that the price ofreceiving a share of them was to accept a share of the Soviet’s foreignhard-currency debt. This was something that the republics felt they could not do,so by 1993, they each signed treaties with Russia in which they renouncedclaims to the Soviet Union’s legacy. Domestically, they were suffering as well,with in� ation rampant and economic productivity dropping rapidly. The CentralAsians’ acute economic need compelled them to turn to the internationalcommunity. Olcott explains that with independence, the leaders of the new stateshoped to use their ethnic composition to attract international investment andforeign support. She contends that in order to strike the best deals possiblebetween their own national interest and those of a partner, the republics couldplay various ‘ethnic cards’ in the internationa l arena. Among these ‘ethnic cards’is their Islamic religion. Olcott has made a very interesting point since she issuggesting that internal economic forces could be responsible for pushing therepublics towards Islam.44

Indeed the Central Asian leaders, though committed to the development ofsecular societies, hoped to use Islam for � nancial reasons, since the oil-rich Gulfstates were potential sources of aid and investment. However, the way in whichthe ‘Islamic card’ has been played varies among the Central Asians. Uzbekistanand Turkmenistan, where the Muslim population is more devout and homoge-neous, have shown a lot of motivation in pursuing contacts with the Gulf states.Their leaders, hoping to expand commercial activities in their respective repub-lics, have made well-publicized trips to a number of Arab countries. Olcottexplains that Turkmenistan’s President Niyazov, a strong advocate of a secularstate, went so far as to replace Lenin’s statue in Ashgabat’s main square with astatue of himself as a haji (Muslim pilgrim). President Karimov of Uzbekistanalso emphasized his devotion to Islam by taking his presidential oath on a Koranand telling interviewers that he only ate halal meat that met Muslim standards.However, when Nabiev was ousted in neighbouring Tajikistan, Karimov saw thedanger of religiously inspired political activism inspired by Islamic extremismand soon became hesitant about advancing Uzbekistan’s ‘Islamic interests’abroad and began cracking down on suspected religious activity at home.

President Akaev capitalized on his Muslim heritage in October 1992, whenhe went to Saudi Arabia joking that he would become a ‘haji’ if it would

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help bring Saudi money to Kyrgystan. He also declared two Muslim holidays asstate holidays. On the other hand, Nazarbaev has been quite reluctant aboutforming a direct association with Islam since the beginning of independence. Infact, he went so far as to ban all religion-based political parties in the countryon the basis that religious extremism could threaten the region’s stability.Nevertheless, economic needs have compelled Nazarbaev to accept offers fromOman, Saudi Arabia and Iran for assistance in the oil and � nancial sectors, evenwhen these ‘gifts’ have been linked to funds for the construction of newmosques.45

Overall, the republics have been cautious in playing their ‘Islamic card’.Muslim societies are good sources of commercial investment, but the problem isthat most of their foreign aid programmes are linked to projects designed topropagate faith,46 and in light of the dangers of Islamic extremism, the republicshave been more eager to work with the rest of the world instead. Central Asiahas already begun nurturing relationships with countries and multilateral institu-tions where the big money is. The United States, Germany, France, Japan, Chinaand South Korea are all on their way to becoming the region’s major tradingpartners and investors. Malaysia and Indonesia, moderate Islamic countries, havealso expressed interest in becoming economic partners with the republics and inassisting them in their path toward development. In addition, the InternationalMonetary Fund and the World Bank have been quick to supply much-neededforeign exchange to the region. In the foreseeable future, the Muslim countriesof the Near and Middle East are likely to play the least important economic rolein the republics.47 Much more signi� cant actors in Central Asia’s struggle tobuild market economies are going to be the capital-rich West, Japan, the Far Eastand Southeast Asia. Thus, it is unlikely that economic exigencies will force therepublics to play their ‘Islamic card’ to attract commercial activity since theyhave other alternatives.

Islam and external in� uences

The Islamic Republic of Iran

Since the eve of independence, American of� cials have been warning theMuslim states not to fall prey to fanatical, theocratic, anti-Western Iran. Theypredict that Iran will attempt to establish Islamic theocracies in the new statesafter the Iranian model. The image they portray of Iran as the potential centreof a hostile Islamic empire has reached absurd dimensions. For example, in1993, American national security analysts engaged in planning drafts for the year2000 drew maps of Asia that displayed a wide green patch over the entire regionof Central Asia and Transcaucasia, as well as most of southwest Asia. The greenmass had a red dot at the location of Tehran, the new capital of the Islamicmegastate!48 Political analysts identify Iran’s trump cards in the region asgeographic proximity, common language (that they share with Farsi-speakingTajikistan) and similar Islamic heritage. Unfortunately, the West has been

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largely responsible for creating the misconception that Central Asia will fallunder the sway of the Muslim militants in Iran. To what extent, then, are theseWestern calculations accurate? In order to answer this question, it is necessaryto determine Iran’s position vis-a-vis Central Asia: what are Iran’s objectives,what interest will prevail and what considerations will guide the Iranians in theirforeign policy?

Since independence, Iran’s policy toward Central Asia has focussed onachieving two principal objectives. First and foremost has been the promotion ofcultural and historical ties in an effort to help Central Asians rediscover theirIslamic heritage. In 1992, Iran’s foreign minister, Ali Akbar Velayati articulatedthis goal by stating that, ‘Iran shares the Islamic heritage with her neighbouringcountries and in view of the recent urge for independence, it has to � ll theexisting cultural and economic vacuum. Hence all countries that seek Iran’sassistance in the realms of culture and economics, will be welcomed’.49 Accord-ingly, immediately after independence, Iran sent missionaries to Central Asiaand distributed religious books, including Farsi translations . It also provideddirect or indirect � nancial assistance to reopen madrassahs and to rebuildmosques.

However, Iran’s contributions to Central Asia have been relatively in-signi� cant especially when compared to the Sunni states, Pakistan and SaudiArabia. The latter country has shipped millions of Korans and has donated largesums of money for the construction of religious establishments; it has alsoinvited prominent Muslim clergy to undertake pilgrimages to Mecca andMedina, free of charge. Egypt has contributed to the area by announcing anambitious programme to spend $50 million on the construction of ten Islamiccentres in the region and Pakistan has set aside space in its theological schoolsfor Central Asian students.50 The secular leadership of the republics has beenmore forthcoming toward aid from Sunni countries as opposed to Iran, a countrythey still regard with deep suspicion and mistrust.

The fact is that despite formal speeches about the common cultural heritageof Islam and Persian, Iran lacks real leverage in Central Asia. The ‘Shi’itization’of Iran in the 16th century led to a cultural divide with Central Asia where theSunni Islam and the Su� orders, mostly Naqshbandia and Kubrawia, weredominant and given the major differences in the way the Shia and Sunni sectsorganize themselves religiously , Iran’s attempts to indoctrinate the Central AsianMuslims was met with resistance. If we look at any of the movements that� ourished in Central Asia, fundamentalist or reformist, we can see that they hadnothing to do with Iran. The Islamic leaders, of� cials as well as opponents, wereeither trained in Arab countries such as Jordan for the Tajik Turajonzoda or inthe Indian subcontinent through missionary movements like Jama’at ul Tablighor political organizations like Pakistani Jama’at ul Islami. The weakness of theIslamic leverage in the region is very clear and undoubtedly Iran’s policy towardCentral Asia has been shaped by such realities.

Consequently, Tehran has refrained from advocating the spread of a militantform of Islam in the region because it recognizes the profound ideological

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differences between it and the republics and is well aware of the atheistupbringing and secular outlook of many of the region’s leaders. Any attempt todo so could be counter-productive and is bound to exacerbate Iran’s diplomaticisolation. Furthermore, it could undermine moderate President Khatami’s endeav-ours to normalize relations with the West. Recently, Iran has proposed joiningforces with the United States and Central Asian security agencies to combatterrorism, crime and corruption in the region that is often instigated by militantMuslim rebels.51

A much more important factor in limiting Iran’s initiatives in Central Asia isTehran’s anxiety not to antagonize the Russians with whom they have developedeconomic, military and political relations.52 If Iran were to change its moderatepolicy in Central Asia, Russia would not tolerate it. The latter country hasmultilateral and bilateral co-operation treaties in culture, economics, military andsecurity matters with these states. Russia, the Russian language and the Russianminorities in these republics are important and will remain so. This is quiteobvious in Kazakhstan where there is a huge Slavic population. But even inTajikistan where the Russian population is less than 5 per cent of the total,Moscow has decided to take a stand by safeguarding the country against theadvances of Islamists from the Middle East: an enterprise in which it has the fullsupport of the United States. Russia will continue to be a powerful force as faras Central Asia is concerned; with Russia’s presence in the picture, Iran,Afghanistan and even secular Turkey will � nd that their in� uence in the regionis limited.53

Iran’s second policy objective is the development of mutually bene� cialeconomic relations with the republics, including expansion of land transportationlinks and oil and gas pipelines. Iranian of� cials have described their vision of theregion’s future as one in which Iran would serve as a bridge between thelandlocked countries of Central Asia and international markets beyond the PersianGulf and the Gulf of Oman. They believe that Iran has the infrastructure ofhighways, pipelines, ports, railroads and trucks that can be utilized to provideCentral Asia access to the sea. Iran offers Central Asia relatively short and directtransport routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, making it easier forthe republics to break out of their geographic con� nement and attenuate theirdependence on Russia. The most immediate transport issue is how to export oiland gas from the region. Iran has been negotiating with Turkmenistan, Kaza-khstan and Azerbaijan about the use of oil and gas from their countries in Iran’snorth, in order to save Iran the cost of pumping oil and gas from its � elds, milesaway on the Persian Gulf coast. Iran would then be able to export more oil fromits Persian Gulf � elds, which are convenient to world shipping routes. Importsto Iran of a limited amount of Kazakhstan oil have begun under an agreementin which Iran is to compensate Kazakhstan by exporting oil on its behalf in theGulf. Construction of pipeline systems has also begun on a pipeline to bringTurkmenistan oil into Iran.54 These negotiations demonstrate that whilst Iran hasbeen conservative in playing the ideological card in the region, it has been farmore assertive in expanding mutually bene� cial, economic ties with the republics.

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This is not to say that Iran’s foreign policy does not possess a pan-Islamicelement, Article 11 is certainly pan-Islamic, declaring:

In accordance with the sacred Koranic verse, ‘This your community is a single com-munity, and I am your Lord, so worship Me’ {21:92}, all Muslims form a single nationand the government of the Islamic republic of Iran has the duty of formulating its generalpolicies with a view to cultivating the friendship and unity of all Muslim people, and itmust constantly strive to bring about the political, economic, and cultural unity of theIslamic world.

Article 152 states that Iran’s foreign policy is based on ‘the defence of the rightsof all Muslims’ and Article 154 implicitly sancti� es exporting the revolution bystating that Iran supports the ‘just struggles of the oppressed against theoppressors in every corner of the globe’.55 So far, Tajikistan is the only republicthat has offered Iran the opportunity to apply this principle and to establish afoothold in Central Asia. During the Tajik con� ict, Iran supplied arms to theTajik IRP in 1992 and provided asylum in Tehran to some of its leaders.Western and Russian reporters were quick to accuse the Iranians of pursuingregional ambitions in Tajikistan by assisting Islamic radicals wanting to bring toTajikistan fundamentalist repression similar to that occurring in Iran andAfghanistan. However, contrary to alarming scenarios of Iranian export ofrevolution to Tajikistan, Iran did not have a leading role in the Tajik con� ict. AsI explained, a variety of indicators of social and political distress show Tajikistanwas bound to collapse when it became an independent state. It was not the resultof Iran’s efforts to create a duplicate model of the Iranian Revolution as we areled to believe. Tehran was sensitive to developments in Tajikistan because oflinguistic and cultural af� nities between the two countries; this emotionalattachment combines with ideological considerations on the part of the Islamicregime.

The fact is that Iran’s policy in the republic is dictated by far morefundamental considerations. As such, it is imperative to look at the broaderpicture and to examine the guiding logic of Iran’s Central Asian policy. Iran’sprimary concern is breaking out of the isolation it is suffering on the inter-national scene. Tehran’s policy, developed from this perspective, does not allowfor any exclusivity towards one country or another, and where necessary evenauthorizes some infringements of ideological constraints. In other words, Irancannot sacri� ce the totality of its policy towards its new neighbours by puttingan inordinate emphasis on the cultivation of fundamentalism in Tajikistan.

We must also take into account the fact that Iran’s clerical leadership is underpopular pressure to become more liberal socially and politically . As Iran markedthe 20 anniversary of the Islamic revolution in February 1999, a strong reformistmovement was gaining momentum in the country. The movement’s aims includethe development of civil society, pluralism, democratic participation, the rule oflaw and improving relations with the West, including Britain and the UnitedStates.56 With this long-term objective in mind, it would be illogical for Iran totarnish its image by taking a high pro� le in Tajik affairs. After taking these

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considerations into account, it becomes easier to understand why Iran’s role inTajikistan, a country with the necessary ingredients for cultivation of Islamicfundamentalism, was and remains marginal.

In the end, what became clear in the course of the civil con� ict in Tajikistanwas that the regional country that had the most impact on the hostilities wasAfghanistan, not Iran, which had been portrayed as the Islamic demon in theMiddle East.57 It was the Afghan Mujahidin , bristling with weapons, whoarmed and in� ltrated Tajikistan’s Islamic � ghters. Both Moscow andWashington had a lot to gain by exaggerating the Iranian input, ideological andmilitary, into the civil war in Tajikistan. Russia wanted to justify the supply ofarms and ammunition to the pro-Nabiev forces, and the Americans wanted toportray their long-term arch-enemy, Iran, as hell-bent on destabilization inCentral Asia.

The actual fact is that Iran’s relationship with Tajikistan has been bene� cialfor the Tajiks. Most of the exchanges between the two republics have been basedon historical, cultural and linguistic af� nity. For example, Tajikistan held anIranian � lm festival, an exhibition of Iranian art and two exhibits of Iranianpublications . Dushanbe was the site of internationa l conferences on Persianculture and the Tajik language. In the early 1990s, Iranian books and magazinesbecame increasingly available in Tajikistan, and Dushanbe television carriedprogrammes from Iran.58 Tehran also expressed approval when the TajikSupreme Soviet decided to change the Cyrillic script of the Tajik language toArabic in 1995. On a humanitarian level, Iran was one of the few countries toprovide aid to the people of Tajikistan during the civil war. Also, Iran is at leastpartially, if not mostly, responsible for bringing the two warring factions to thenegotiating table where they would later sign a peace accord. The � rst peacenegotiations between the Tajik government and the United Tajik Oppositionwere held in Tehran, as were some of the subsequent talks.59

Thus, based on Iran’s activity in Central Asia since 1992, it is safe to assumethat Iran will not pose as a regional threat to the republics in the near future. Itis simply not in Tehran’s best interest to export revolution or to destabilize theregion. While Iran’s interest in the area has been magni� ed in the press, thecountry’s record proves that its policy has been one of moderation.

Afghanistan

A more credible threat to Central Asia’s regional stability arises fromAfghanistan which has long land borders with Turkmenistan, Tajikistan andUzbekistan. It is through Afghanistan that the republics could be drawn into thepolitics of Islam. Tajikistan is of particular concern since it is directly affectedby developments in Afghanistan which could potentially threaten the entireregion. As I mentioned, from mid-1992, fanatical Afghan mujahidin tried tofoment a jihad against the communist rulers of Tajikistan; local mujahidinguerilla commanders in northern Afghanistan provided a consistent � ow ofweapons to militias and opposition parties in Tajikistan. Even though

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Afghanistan was devastated by war and absorbed with its own domesticproblems, it managed to support Tajikistan’s Islamic resistance to the best of itsabilities. 60 This sort of determination demonstrates Afghanistan’s readiness tosupport militant Islamic forces in Central Asia.

In fact, the emergence of the Afghan orthodox student militia known as theTaleban (currently controlling 80% of the territory of Afghanistan) has in-tensi� ed fears that militant, doctrinaire Islam would spread and similar groupswould rise in the region. Such anxiety is justi� ed: indeed the Taleban aredetermined to export their brand of Islam. However, in pursuing this goal, theyface two major obstacles. First, Afghanistan has to pass through a period ofnational reconstruction and its preoccupation with domestic affairs will make itdif� cult for them to exert any fatal in� uence on the destinies of the republics.Second, like the Iranians, the Aghans have to reckon with the Russians who willnot allow the republics to become Islamicized. Russia’s intervention in the Tajikcon� ict was principally motivated by its foreign policy objective of containingthe spread of Islamic fundamentalism from Afghanistan and Iran into Tajikistanand Uzbekistan. Barylski has provided the following account:

The Russian Federation made the struggle against Islamic fundamentalism part of itsgeneral foreign policy and the foundation for improved relations with the more conserva-tive political elite of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. This strategy was announcedat a Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conference held on the eve of a � nal push to placea reliable government in power in Tajikistan and in a general statement on Middle Eastpolicy issued in January 1993. Of� cial statements made a distinction between Islam as apositive force in societal renewal and radical Islam that promoted con� ict.61

This illustrates that one of Russia’s top priorities is preventing the spread ofintervention in the political affairs of the republics, and we can assume thatRussia is still very much interested in exercizing dominance over the region. Inlight of this powerful force, even if the Revolutionary Guards in Iran or theAfghan Mujahidin attempt to whip up religious hysteria in the republics, it ishighly unlikely that they would succeed.

Conclusion

Independence has made it plain that during the years of militant atheism, Islamsurvived as a cultural–religious phenomenon. The ideological void created bythe collapse of Marxism–Leninism nurtured the Islamic consciousness and raisedconcerns about the practical implications for the latter’s renaissance on theregion’s political development. This concern was warranted, considering theIslamic extremism prevailing in the Islamic Republic of Iran and in Afghanistan.Yet so far, while the cultural aspects of Islam have been on the rise in CentralAsia, its political manifestations remained relatively limited in scope. In fact, theIslamic revival in the region has been largely limited to the rediscovery ofculture, history and national identity. What is more, given the religious andethnic disparities in the republics, it is highly unlikely that radical Islam could

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grow as a movement. Even if Islam did become a threat, the measures taken bythe Central Asian leadership ensure that it will not become a potent force.Central Asia can also rest assured that external forces will not attempt to exportrevolution. Iran, the champion of the Islamic cause, has been remarkablynon-adventuris t and non-adversarial in the region. But even if an external powerdid try to spread fundamentalism, it would not succeed since Russia, still thedominant force in the region, has reiterated its commitment to protecting therepublics against Islamic fundamentalism—the Tajik crisis is a case in point.Therefore, given the moderate nature of Islam in the region, it is safe to assumethat Islam will not become a contending force in Central Asia’s future.

Notes and references1. Mehrdad Haghayeghi , Islam and Politics in Central Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), pp 15–18.2. Shirin Akiner, Political and Economic Trends in Central Asia (London: British Academic Press, 1994),

p 146. Excise ‘Cites Thrower, Notes of Muslim Theological Education’.3. Ibid, p 176.4. Oliver Roy, ‘Islam in Tajikistan’, Open Society in Central Eurasia Occasional Paper Series, No 1, July

1996.5. Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, Islam in Central Asia (Reading, MA: Ithaca Press, 1994),

p 110.6. Malik Hafeez, Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects (New York: St. Martin’s Press,

1994), p 244.7. Cited in ‘Islamic News’ (Islamskie novosti) published in Dagestan, 19 November 1991.8. Michael Rywkin, Moscow’s Muslim Challenge, 2nd edn (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), p 150.9. Haghayeghi , op cit, note 1, pp 48–49.

10. Anoushirvan Ehteshami, ed, From the Gulf to Central Asia (Exeter: Short Run Press, 1994). Cites Olcott,Islamic Consciousness and Nationalist Ideology in Central Asia, p 10.

11. Polonskaya, op cit, note 5, pp 115–116. They author cited the � gures from Narorodnaya Gazeta,Dushanbe, 5 April 1991.

12. Dale F. Eikelman, ed, Russia’s Muslim Frontiers (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), p 67.13. Michael Mandelbaum, ed, Central Asia and the World (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press,

1994), p 117.14. Anara Tabyshalieva, ‘Central Asia: polarisation of regional committees’, Paper prepared for the Center for

Political and Strategic Studies, June 1997—as appears on the NEXIS database.15. Dmitry Furman, ‘Veruyushchie, ateisty i prochie. Novoe issledovanie rossiiskoi religioznosti’, Svobodnaya

mysl, 1997, 1, pp 79–91.16. The practice of circumcision, although never mentioned in the Koran, is recommended by the Hadith.17. Haghayeghi , op cit, note 1, pp 98–99.18. Mandelbaum, op cit, note 13, p 135.19. Adeeb Khalid, ‘Reform and contention in Central Asian Islam: a historical perspective’, Central Eurasia

Project, SOROS Institute, 2000.20. Georgi Derluguan, ‘The religious factor in Central Asia’, Paper prepared for the Center for Political and

Strategic Studies, June 1997—as appears on the NEXIS database.21. Except for Tajikistan that has a Persian heritage.22. Mandelbaum, op cit, note 13, p 118; cites Fuller, Russia and Central Asia.23. Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (London: Zed Books, 1994), p

224.24. Karim Khodjibaev, ‘Russian troops and con� ict in Tajikistan’, Perspectives on Central Asia, Vol II, No

8, 1997, pp 67–76.25. Mohammad Reza Djalili, Tajikistan: Trials of Independenc e (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1998), p 188; Cites

Roy, Regional Ambitions and Interests in Tajikistan.26. Rashid, op cit, note 23, pp 245–246.27. ‘Islam as a political force in Central Asia’, International Research and Exchanges Board, 1999—as

reported on NEXIS database.

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28. Yaacov Roi, Muslim Eurasia (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp 23, 25—cited is Olcott, Islam andFundamentalism in Central Asia.

29. Mohiaddin Mesbahi, ed, Central Asia and the World (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press,1994). Cited is Hyman, Central Asia and the Middle East.

30. Ibid, p 129. Cited is Olcott, Kazakhstan Among the Other Republics.31. Bruce Panier, ‘Turkey and Iran in the former Soviet Central Asia and Azerbaijan: the battle for in� uence

that never happened’, Perspectives on Central Asia, Vol II, No 13, April 1998—as appears on the NEXISdatabase.

32. Haghayeghi , op cit, note 1, p 158.33. Glen Curtis, ed, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan: Country Studies (Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Of� ce, 1996), p 137.34. John Anderson, The International Politics of Central Asia (Manchester: Manchester University Press

1997), p 156.35. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ‘Kyrgyzstan: militants test regional security’, 31 August 1999.36. Ibid.37. Human Rights Watch, ‘Uzbekistan: persistent human rights violations and prospects for improvement’,

Human Rights Watch Report, Vol 8, No 5, May 1996.38. Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan.39. Akhmet Yarlykapov, ‘Islamic fundamentalism: towards a formulation of the problem’, Caucasian

Regional Studies, Vol IV, No 1, 1999—as appears on the NEXIS database.40. Human Rights Watch, ‘Uzbeks purge students from academia’, Human Rights Watch World Report,

Uzbekistan chapter, 20 October 1999.41. BBC News, ‘Analysis of Central Asia’s enduring quarrel’, 17 August 1999.42. Khodjibaev, op cit, note 24.43. ‘Central Asia and Caucasus update’, Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, May 1998.44. Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s New States (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1998),

pp 31–33.45. Olcott, op cit, note 44, p 33.46. Ehteshami, op cit, note 10, cites Olcott, p 7.47. Mandelbaum, op cit, note 13 p 175.48. Ehteshami, op cit, note 10, p 115 cites Hooglund, Iran and Central Asia.49. Cited in the Financial Times, 23 June, 1992.50. Pannier, op cit, note 31.51. Tehran Times, ‘U.S., FBI, Central Asian security organs join forces against terrorism’, 8 April 2000.52. Financial Times, 11 May 2000.53. Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Mohammad (London: Harper Collins, 1995), pp 324–325.54. David Menashri, ed, Central Asia Meets the Middle East (London, Front Coss, 1998), pp 201–204, cites

Clawson Disintegration of the Soviet Union.55. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organisation, 1979).56. Tehran Times, ‘Cook to promote friendship visit to Iran’, 13 April 2000.57. Hiro, op cit, note 53, pp 301, 322.58. Curtis, op cit, note 33, p 280.59. Central Asia and Caucasus Update: Published for the Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, May

1998—as appears on the NEXIS database.60. Mesbahi, op cit, note 29, pp 264–265.61. Robert E. Barylski, ‘The Caucuses, Central Asia and the near-abroad syndrome’, Central Asia Monitor,

No 5, 1993, p 24.

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