THE INFLUENCE OF PLOTINUS ON MARSILIO FICINO‘S...

THE INFLUENCE OF PLOTINUS ON MARSILIO FICINO‘S DOCTRINE OF THE

HIERARCHY OF BEING

by

Nora I. Ayala

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of

The Dorothy F. Schmidt College of Arts and Letters

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

Florida Atlantic University

Boca Raton, Florida

May 2011

ii

THE INFLUE CE OF PLOTINUS ON MARSILIO FICINO'S DOCTRINE OF THE

HIERARCHY OF BEING

by

ora 1. Ayala

This thesis was prepared under the direction of the candidate's thesis advisor, Dr. MarinaPaola Banchetti, Department of Philosophy, and has been approved by the members ofher supervisory committee. It was submitted to the faculty of the Dorothy F. SchmidtCollege of Arts and Letters and was accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements forthe degree ofMaster of Arts.

SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE:

J)

~'S{L~=-~Clevis R. Headley, Ph.D.

~> (L.. ~-=--~Clevis R. Headley, Ph.D.Director, Liberal Studies

~; .~.Q. L

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my sincere thanks to those who were, have been, and are a part

of my life. I am who I am because of their unique gifts.

iv

ABSTRACT

Author: Nora I. Ayala

Title: The Influence of Plotinus on Marsilio Ficino‘s Doctrine of the

Hierarchy of Being

Institution: Florida Atlantic University

Thesis Advisor: Marina Paola Banchetti, Ph.D.

Degree: Master of Arts

Year: 2011

Marsilio Ficino provides the ground to consider Renaissance Platonism as a

distinctive movement within the vast context of Renaissance philosophy. Ficino‘s

Platonism includes traces of earlier humanistic thought and ideas from Neoplatonic

philosophers such as Plotinus, Proclus, and Dionysius the Areopagite. Ficino was able to

rebuild a traditional philosophy that, from the ancient Greeks to Plotinus, had established

the harmony between paganism and Christianity. Neoplatonism, characterized by

complex metaphysical, ethical, and psychological canons, provided the grounds for

Ficino‘s cosmological challenge to merge the cyclical aspect of the universe with the

religious notion of the soul, in order to secure its cosmic position. Ficino adopted Plotinus

hierarchy of being as a dominant component of his own thought. His formulations on the

v

three hypostases and the movements of the soul allow him to develop his own hierarchy

of the universe, in which soul anchors the metaphysics of the structure and reaffirms its

ontological nature as immortal.

vi

THE INFLUENCE OF PLOTINUS OF MARSILIO FICINO‖S DOCTRINE OF THE

HIERARCHY OF BEING

INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................1

CHAPTER I ....................................................................................................................6

Neoplatonism as a Philosophical Movement ................................................................6

Plotinus as a Neoplatonist: The Enneads .................................................................... 11

The Three Primary Hypostases (Enneads V. 1) .......................................................... 17

Soul ....................................................................................................................... 21

Intellect .................................................................................................................. 24

The One ................................................................................................................. 26

The One and the Theory of Emanation ....................................................................... 28

CHAPTER II ................................................................................................................. 35

Neoplatonic Heritage and Pseudo-Dionysius.............................................................. 35

CHAPTER III ................................................................................................................ 51

Renaissance Platonism ............................................................................................... 51

Marsilio Ficino as a Renaissance Platonist ................................................................. 53

The Hierarchy of Being ............................................................................................. 54

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 78

BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 82

1

INTRODUCTION

If each of us, essentially, is that which is greatest within us, which always remains

the same and by which we understand ourselves, then certainly the soul is the man

himself and the body but his shadow. Whatever wretch is so deluded as to think

that the shadow of man is man, like Narcissus is dissolved in tears. You will only

cease to weep, Gismondo, when you cease looking for your Alberia degli Albizzi

in her dark shadow and begin to follow her by her own clear light.1

Marsilio Ficino, a Florentine priest who has been described as a combination of

scholar, philosopher, and magus, not only revived Plato for Renaissance thought but also

introduced into his own philosophy several Neoplatonic philosophers such as Plotinus,

Proclus, and Dionysius the Areopagite. His profound understanding of their metaphysics

provided him with a better understanding of pagan ideas, thereby facilitating his

reconciliation of Platonism with Christianity. His own vision of unity, however,

surpassed that of his philosophical ancestors in that it is a totalizing unity, in which the

universe is seen as a manifestation of the One, God, or the Good. His Platonic

evangelization has influenced European thought to the present time, most fundamentally

through his teaching that:

1 Marsilio Ficino, Meditations on the Soul: Selected Letters of Marsilio Ficino, trans. from the Latin by

members of the Language Department of the School of Economic Science, (Vermont: Inner Traditions

International, 1997), 15.

2

The human soul was immortal and unlimited, [which] links directly with the

unshakeable confidence and creative genius that so many of the giants of the

Renaissance expressed in so many fields. His view that the whole creation was

moved by love and inspired to return to God through His beauty was reflected in

the intense beauty of physical form that the masters of the Renaissance manifested

with such skill. His emphasis on the importance of human nature and the virtues

that lie within it gave support to a new direction in education. Ultimately it is the

practice of these virtues that leads to the discovery of the divine in man.2

Of all his commentaries, letters, writings, translations, and interpretations of

Plato, Plotinus, and other Neoplatonists, his own Platonic Theology is the most

influential work because it played a central ―role in the Lateran council‘s promulgation of

the immortality of the soul as a dogma in 1512.‖3 The Platonic Theology was written at

the beginning of the 1470s, a time during which Ficino finished the first epic translation

of Plato‘s works, entered the priesthood, and tried to draft a ―unitary theological tradition,

and particularly a theological metaphysics.‖4 It can be described not only as a summa

theologica, but also as a summa philosophica, and a summa platonica, an audacious,

sometimes problematic, endeavor to re-emerge ancient and late ancient philosophy for an

intellectual and governing elite, who were the Florentine equivalents of Socrates‘ most

intelligent audience, with a style which imitates in Latin what Plotinus did in Greek,

2Marsilio Ficino, Meditations on the Soul, xix.

3 Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology, trans. by Michael J. B. Allen with John Warden, Latin text edited by

James Hankins with William Bowen, Volume I, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), viii.

4 Ibid., ix.

3

approaching sublimity in a manner that is both, simple and ―rhetorically challenging.‖5

Ficino considered his Platonic Theology his major and longest philosophical toil, his

masterpiece in which he developed his search for the existence of an afterlife and which

included notions of the mind, spirit, and body, reserving for the human soul a privileged

place in the hierarchy of God‘s creation, appealing to medieval and scholastic theories

but mainly reviving ―ancient theosophical themes‖6 which will foresee the predominantly

cosmological theories characteristic of the late Renaissance philosophers and

astronomers. Ficino formulates a hierarchy which is unity within plurality, ―an ordered

song which is both inside and outside the soul both as unitary self and as all things – a

part becomes the whole, a whole of parts and in parts, in the world and yet in God as

God.‖7

Since Ficino is considered a Renaissance Platonist, the Platonic Theology

includes references to Plato and Plotinus but, as the name‘s similarity to Proclus‘s

Theologia Platonica insinuates, it is also a tribute to this last Neoplatonist, who carried

Plato into the Middle Ages. The subtitle On the Immortality of the Soul is exactly the

same subtitle as that of Plotinus‘s Enneads 4.7 which marks the clear indebtedness to

both Plotinus and Marius Victorinus, who translated Porphyry‘s compilation of the

Enneads into Latin. In his letter to Besarion, the Greek cardinal of Sabina, Ficino

describes Plato‘s discussion on beauty in Phaedrus as referring to the beauty of the soul,

required from God, that is called wisdom and is compared with gold. ―When this gold

5 Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology, ix. 6 Ibid., x.

7 Ibid.

4

was given to Plato by God, it shone in him most brilliantly, because he was so pure in

heart.‖8 And he adds later that when that gold was first put into Plotinus‘s work, ―then

that of Porphyry, Iamblichus, and eventually of Proclus, the earth was removed by the

searching test of fire, and the gold so shone that it filled the whole world again with

marvelous splendor.‖9

It is clear that Plotinus‘s mystical formulations on the soul greatly influenced

Ficino‘s development of his own hierarchy of being and the role of soul from both

ontological and metaphysical perspectives. From the ontological perspective, soul is

considered immortal by creation and able to transcend death and, from the metaphysical

perspective, it is considered to have a twofold opposition of structures or natures. Based

on Plotinus‘s two assumptions, Ficino places the soul in the middle of his pentadic

structure, where it is located at the dividing line between the intelligible and the sensible

realms and is able to ascend toward the eternal realm through contemplation and also,

through energies and activities, to descend to the temporal realm. This privileged position

in the middle of the hierarchy enables soul to link the eternal to the temporal, to become

the microcosm that contains within man all the reflections of what is in the eternal realm,

and to sustain the metaphysics of the hierarchical structure.

The emphasis of this thesis will be the study of three different philosophies, which

are intimately connected, following a chronological order. Chapter I will discuss

Neoplatonism as the last great movement in ancient philosophy. The focus will be on

Plotinus and on the influential role of his treatises compiled as the Enneads, on the three

8 Marsilio Ficino, Meditations on the Soul, 82.

9 Ibid., 83.

5

hypostases of Being, on his theory of emanation, and on the nature of the soul. Chapter II

will focus on the medieval transition from the notion of the One to the notion of God. At

this time, Greek intellectual Christianity displayed a strong Platonic and Neoplatonic

influence, as seen in the works of Dionysius the Areopagite, commonly known as

Pseudo-Dionysius. The discussion will emphasize Pseudo-Dionysius‘ works The Divine

Names, The Celestial Hierarchy, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, and The Mystical

Theology, in which the ―Neoplatonic aspect of his thought included mysticism.‖10

Chapter III will discuss the philosophical thought of Marsilio Ficino who, while

translating Plato into Latin, read the Enneads and incorporated Plotinus‘s ideas into his

own and christianized Platonism by combining Christian and Plotinian ideas, all the

while developing his doctrine of the hierarchy of being. The influence of Plotinus‘s

hierarchy of being will be compared and contrasted to Ficino‘s, analyzing both

similarities and differences in detail, while acknowledging other influences on Ficino‘s

thought, such as Humanism and Christianity. This last chapter will concentrate on Book

III of his Platonic Theology, which is titled ―On the Immortality of the Soul.‖

10Pauliina Remes, Neoplatonism, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 199.

6

CHAPTER I

Neoplatonism as a Philosophical Movement

The philosophical tradition of Neoplatonism thrived from the third century to the

sixth century CE in such intellectual cities as Alexandria, Rome, and Athens.

Neoplatonism originated in the thought of the philosopher Plotinus, who moved from

Alexandria to the capital of the Roman Empire and began teaching his own interpretation

of Plato‘s philosophy. His numerous disciples included Porphyry, who exhibited such

originality that he ultimately bestowed on the movement an identity of its own. By the

time the Christian emperor Justinian closed the Athenian Academy in 529 CE,

Neoplatonic philosophy had expanded to Syria, Asia Minor, and Alexandria, as well as to

the birthplace of Platonism itself, Athens. Neoplatonism and Christianity co-existed at a

time when Christianity was the official religion of the empire, and were able to engage in

intensive but peaceful debate. The Neoplatonic school came to an institutional end when

the School of Athens was officially closed, but its philosophy survived in both pagan and

Christian contexts and influenced the thought of Christian intellectuals who had an

interest in philosophy and theology. Through these thinkers, Neoplatonism was able to

leave its long-lasting mark on Western philosophy.

7

Although the term Neoplatonism entails that this movement was primarily

influenced by Plato, it distinguished itself in several ways during the five hundred years

that separated Plato from Plotinus. As a matter of fact, two theories have been argued on

the applicability of the term. One branches from ―nineteenth-century German scholarship,

and bears no relation to the self-understanding of Plotinus and his followers, who, no

doubt, understood themselves as simply the spiritual and philosophical pupils of Plato‖.11

For them it was more important to prove Plato‘s philosophy correct than to claim their

own originality. The second theory is that the name builds a false gap between the

Neoplatonists and the Middle-Platonists, ignoring the fact that there exists a continuity of

thought between Plotinus and the later Platonists. Because Plotinus‘s works survived the

test of time, unlike the others, there may be support for this last theory. Neoplatonism is

closely related to Middle-Platonism, which begins around 130 BCE and lasts until the

late-second century CE. This crucial and challenging period marks a return to a stricter

reading of Plato, combined with the doctrines of Aristotle, the Stoics, Pythagoras, and

synthesizing Plato‘s formulation of the intelligible realm with Aristotle‘s perfect intellect

or Nous, ―separated from the individual human intellects [thereby] rendering Platonic

forms as contents of the supreme intellect.‖12

But the most important aspects of

Neoplatonism, which make it unique in its approach to Platonism, are the following five

characteristics:

11 Pauliina Remes, 2.

12 Ibid., 5.

8

1. The formulation of the One, which is superior to the Nous or Aristotelian intellect,

as a first principle from which everything emanates and which is indefinable,

while the emanations are accessible by reason.

2. The multiple metaphysical levels proposed by Plotinus, which are more complex

than the Platonic idea of two different realms; one material, changeable, and

temporal and the other eternal, immaterial, and permanent. For Plato, the

empirical realm is just an imitation of the eternal realm, which is true reality.

3. The Platonic idea that the higher realm is prior, more perfect, simpler, and more

unified than the metaphysically lower realm is applied to a ―hierarchical

metaphysical system‖13

which extends from perfect unity to the multiple

manifestations of the observable realm, in which the goodness of the higher level

diminishes further at each lower level.

4. The central levels of reality are both metaphysically real and intimately connected

to the human soul. ―Neoplatonists as metaphysical realists‖14

believe that reality

exists independently from the human mind but also that reality inhabits in the

mind. Therefore, ―the complexity of thinking must coincide with the complexity

of being. Reality is thereby essentially minded or intelligible, that is both

intelligibly organized and penetrable to reason, as well as in some sense

essentially thought.‖15

13Pauliina Remes, 7.

14 Ibid., 8.

15 Ibid.

9

5. The desire for wholeness, completion, and perfection belongs to the non-

intellectual life. The motivation to continue life and existence that is observable in

nature responds to the vertical effort to achieve the perfection of its origin and to

rise, at last, towards the absolute unity of the source of the hierarchy. The

contemplative character of creation, where the created constantly looks upward

toward the creator or origin causes a tendency to return to the first principle. This

upward or vertical movement is one of the most distinctive features of

Neoplatonism.

Neoplatonism exemplifies the role that philosophy played in antiquity. Philosophy was

seen as a way of life of which the main task was to heal the soul. For Neoplatonists, the

healing of the soul was achieved through a journey to the inner self by internal

contemplation, an activity that was not contrary to reason but was ―a kind of intellectual

intensification.‖16

Plotinus considered the role of reason as important in the therapy of the

soul, but he located the spiritual and ecstatic experiences outside the rational faculty. The

later Neoplatonists, on the other hand, favored theurgy, the process by which man tries to

be god-like by trying to subdue the desires and passions of the body to the use of reason,

which was considered ―the most divine aspect of human nature.‖17

In Neoplatonism, philosophical studies were combined with religious practices in

which prayer and mystical rituals were also incorporated. Theurgy became a captivating

object of study of religion, religious practices, mysticism, and meditation. At the

Neoplatonic school, philosophical studies did not begin until the purification of the soul


17 Ibid., 10.

10

had been achieved. Students became acquainted with the Pythagorean Golden Verses

followed by Aristotle‘s Metaphysics as an introduction to philosophical matters

concerning nature and the sensible realm. While most Middle-Platonist believed that

Plato and Aristotle displayed some degree of harmony and philosophers previous to

Plotinus showed animosity towards Aristotle, Plotinus tried to portray Aristotle‘s position

as conflicting and, therefore, tried to complement or substitute it with Platonic ideas.18

After Porphyry, the notion that the two theories were compatible was accepted. Once the

student of Neoplatonism had reached clarity of thought and learned the art of

argumentation, Plato‘s dialogues were then introduced, not in chronological order but in a

peculiar order that served the purpose of the school‘s curriculum. Special emphasis was

placed on the dialogues Timaeus and Parmenides, because both deal with metaphysics

and cosmological order. While the first of those offers explanation for the ―physical‖

aspect of Neoplatonism, the second of those establishes the foundation for the idea of the

One as a separate entity from being.

Several ancient philosophical schools had some influence on the development of

Neoplatonism. These were skepticism and stoicism which provided Plotinus with some

materialistic ideas that he adjusted to his non-materialistic philosophy. ―The Stoic

conception of the physical universe permeated by internal ‗sympathy‘ had an influence

on the way the Neoplatonists regarded nature and the hypostasis Soul as responsible for

the temporal and living unity of the cosmos.‖19

But it is also important to examine how

Neoplatonism related to the two most prominent religious movements prevalent in the


19 Ibid., 14.

11

Roman Empire at the time; Christianity and Gnosticism. All of them had in common the

belief in one god or first principle, in the immortality of the soul and its return to the first

principle, in evil, prayer, and mystical experiences. The differences between them,

however, were based on the discrepancy between the simple Neoplatonic One, which

created out of necessity, and the anthropomorphic Christian God, and between the

Christian return to God through personal salvation and the Neoplatonic idea of an ascent

of the soul to achieve perfect goodness. Of the three movements, Neoplatonism was the

only one loyal to philosophical argumentation, in addition to its spiritual and mystical

characteristics.

Plotinus as a Neoplatonist: The Enneads

The philosophy of Plotinus provided an answer to the anxiety experienced during

the third century CE in the Roman Empire, in which twenty-nine emperors reigned

during a period of seventy years. Social and political unrest were provoked internally by

antagonists and externally by the hostility of barbarians, who threatened the stability of

the empire. The Stoics‘ exhortation to accept reality as it was, in order to become

untouchable by the swings of fate, was no longer convincing. Therefore, a philosophy

which established that the freedom of the soul would not be achieved in the empirical

world but by ascending into an ideal realm gave credence to the idea that the political and

social unrest of society should not interfere with the soul‘s ultimate aspiration.

Accordingly, we find an inspirational disregard in Plotinus for ordinary matters, and this

disregard and silence about them is ―the only tribute which Plotinus ever pays to the

turbulences which after all must have been an insistent enough fact in people‘s lives—but

12

a formidable tribute it is, as it signifies the philosopher‘s sense of powerlessness in regard

to the ordinary world.‖20

It seems that Plotinus‘s purpose as a philosopher was to chart

the insensible realm, the world that transcends sensory reality, and to live in it abundantly

despite the soul‘s ties to the human body. His philosophy has its roots in the Hellenic

tradition, as he stated in one of his debates against the Gnostics. But although it does not

abruptly depart from his predecessors‘ ideas, it is new in many respects to the point that

19th century scholars linked Plotinus to the beginning of Neoplatonism.

What we know about Plotinus‘s life and his school is known through his

biography, The Life of Plotinus written by his pupil Porphyry. In this text, Porphyry

prepares the reader for understanding Plotinus‘s treatises and his peculiar silence about

his parents, race, and native land, something interpreted by Porphyry as indicating

Plotinus‘s disregard for the human body and the sensible realm. It is estimated that

Plotinus was born in Lycopolis, Egypt, in 204 or 205 CE, moved to Alexandria in his

twenties and discovered there his intellectual affinity. Guided by his teacher Ammonius

Sacca and motivated by the idea of becoming acquainted with Eastern philosophies,

Plotinus enlisted in the military expedition of Gordian III to Persia. The expedition failed

before he reached his goal, and he was forced to return to Rome where he spent the rest

of his life teaching and writing. Among his listeners were highly ranked officials, such as

Emperor Gallienus and Governor Rogatianus, who found that the cure for psychosomatic

problems merely required changing their way of life. It was in Rome that Plotinus began

writing philosophy and those writings were the reflection of his oral lectures, which

20

Plotinus, The Philosophy of Plotinus: Representative Books from the Enneads, ed. Sterling P.

Lamprecht. (Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1950), viii.

13

followed a seminar style in which students‘ questions and oppositions provided him with

grounds for his own further philosophical development. His works are preserved in full

due to the flawless recompilation by Porphyry, who organized them in six groups of nine

treatises each, called the Enneads, which means ―nine‖ in Greek. He ordered them, not in

chronological order, but following the Aristotelian division of philosophy, probably not

approved by Plotinus himself, into ethics, physics, and metaphysics. The Enneads begin

with easier ethical treatments, proceeding in Enneads II and III to discussions pertaining

mostly to natural philosophy and cosmology. The psychological benefits of philosophical

contemplation are discussed in IV. Epistemological issues and intellection are mostly

discussed in V. The last group of treatises deal with the higher levels of the hierarchy of

being, namely numbers, being in general, as well as the One beyond Being.21

Because

Porphyry also provides the chronological order in which the treatises were developed by

Plotinus, it can be noted that for Plotinus the telos of a wise life was its identification with

Intellect or nous rather than with the One.22

His writings were not easy to follow and,

unfortunately, he did not mention the different philosophers who could have influenced

his thought. He called these philosophers ―they‖ and expressed their thoughts in a very

condensed manner. The exceptions to this are references to Plato, in whom Plotinus

found a source for most of his principles. ―Nevertheless, those who applied the name

Neoplatonism to distinguish the philosophy of such thinkers as Plotinus from that of

Plato [and the Middle-Platonist philosophers], were perhaps even more right than they


22 Ibid.

14

imagined‖23

, because there are two fundamental differences between them. One is a

difference in method and the other in focus. According to the former, while Plotinus

dedicated his life to teaching a doctrine, Plato wrote dialogues with the purpose of

confronting different philosophies with one another. Plotinus‘s dialectic becomes

―metaphysics.‖ That is, what is ―dynamic takes on the garb of fixity, though the breath of

mystical aspiration which dominates the Enneads confers its own powerful impulse upon

the whole.‖24

While Plato focused his concern on the reorganization of Athenian society,

Plotinus tried to disengage himself from earthly matters. But overall, Plotinus exerts a

major role in later interpretation of Plato, to the point that Ficino declares that Plato

speaks through the words of Plotinus. There are three critical points in Plato‘s doctrine

that are essential for Plotinus:

1. The clear distinction between the eternal realm and the temporal, between Ideas

and sensible things, and between the here and the beyond. These dichotomies are

characteristic of a relaxed dualism, contrasted with radical dualism, whether

Gnostic or Manichean. The same relaxed dualism reappears in the doctrine of

creation to ―achieve a fusion with the relaxed monism, different from pantheism,

of Semitic and Biblical thought.‖ 25

Plotinus does not emphasize the distinction

and opposition between the intelligible and the sensible world, which are bound

together by what he calls ‗participation‘. The intelligible realm is the realm of the

three hypostases; the One, Intellect or Nous, and Soul.

23 Plotinus, The Philosophy of Plotinus, x.

24Paul Henry, introduction to Enneads, Plotinus, trans. Stephen MacKenna, ( London: Oxford University

Press, 1954), xi.

25 Ibid.

15

2. The Socratic idea of a soul that is immaterial and immortal. This idea, which was

not common to all the Greeks, isolates Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus from the rest

of the Greek tradition. Plotinus, in his first treatise On Beauty, one of the most

striking and widely read, follows Plato in placing the essence of beauty not in

symmetry but in a non-material principle, that is, in participation with the idea of

beauty in the intelligible realm. Thus, this kind of idealism becomes a feature of

his relaxed dualism. In On the Immortality of the Soul, he attacks the Stoics,

Pythagoras‘s view of the soul as harmony, and Aristotle‘s view of the soul as a

body‘s form or entelechy, and emphasizes the distinction between the spiritual

and the physical realms. Plotinus shares with Plato the notions that the soul

survives death and that it is individual.

3. The idea of a transcendent God who is superior to the Ideas and to Being. Plotinus

finds the foundation for his idea of ‗negative theology‘ in the notion of the Good

in Plato‘s Republic and in the description of the absolute One in the Parmenides,

in which the Good is described as being above everything and in which the One

does not allow for any kind of multiplicity.

Plotinus‘s teachings and writings are so rich that they provided the foundation for the

Neoplatonic movement. While for his pupils he was a wise teacher, his interpretations of

Plato provoked a departure for the later representatives of the school, who embraced a

different position on the status and the ascendant movement of the universal soul.26

According to Plotinus, the ascent of the soul was attained through the use of reason,

allowing man to lift himself from sensible objects. This idea of intellectual training as


16

means of purification classifies Plotinus‘s thought as non-humanistic, because the type of

immortality he attributes to the human soul is independent from its deeds in the empirical

world. This position conflicted with Christianity, which did not see much value in the

wisdom of the Greeks for the attaining of salvation, since it contradicted the Christian

idea of salvation after death.

To fully understand Plotinus‘s idea on the ascent of the soul, one must consider

his ethical aim, which is neither Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, nor Epicurean. Plotinus

does not emphasize changing the empirical world because, in terms of his metaphysics,

he has already affirmed the existence of an intelligible world.27

Humanity can transcend

its worldly circumstances through thought. But, the kind of intellectual activity

advocated by Plotinus is not everyday intellectual activity. According to Plotinus,

―thought could be carried to the point of embracing the totality of existence [and] the true

objects of thought are not the things of sense but their ideal exemplars, the ‗forms‘ or

‗intelligibles‘ of whose unchanging beauty we sometimes get a glimpse in some beautiful

object.‖28

For him, however, intelligence is not the ultimate reality, since knowledge

implies a desire for what we do not have, and what we lack is a state of unity with the

One. In order to achieve this inner experience, it is vital that the soul break away from the

body and return upon itself. ―In the equation between contemplation and action lies the

very center of Plotinus‘s metaphysics.‖29

This inward movement, so characteristic of

Neoplatonism but also of Gnosticism and Christianity, shows Plotinus as closer to Plato

27 Plotinus, The Philosophy of Plotinus, xxii. 28 Ibid., xxiii.

29 Paul Henry, xlii.

17

than to Aristotle. This is because Plotinus‘s metaphysics is closer to meta-psychology,

and his theodicy departs from Aristotle‘s views of the movement of the spheres towards

the unmoved mover to the satisfaction of the soul‘s desire for unity, that only the One can

gratify. In Plotinus, the starting point of movement is Soul, not nature. The soul travels,

through the power of dialectic, back to the Intellect and, through a process of purification,

to the One. Since Plotinus does not take into consideration the ideas of sin or salvation,

he does not consider the soul as being in opposition to sin, and he criticizes the idea of

man as ―the centre of the universe and the subject of redemption.‖30

Although Plotinus‘s theory is not systematic, it brilliantly synthesizes the

religious and philosophical problems of the soul, of the world, and of its rational

justification. His theology fuses the cosmos and the soul and, without departing from

rationality, he is able to incorporate mysticism in his philosophical approach to these

problems.

The Three Primary Hypostases (Enneads V. 1)

Porphyry placed The Three Primary Hypostases, one of the most important and

revealing of the treatises, at the beginning of what is considered the ‗theological‘

Ennead31

. It not only reflects the unbreakable unity of personal spiritual life and

metaphysical reflection that is typical of Plotinian theology, but it is also the most cited

after ―Eusebius of Caesarea, by Basil and Augustine, Ciryl and Theodoret.‖32

As is

30 Paul Henry, xliii. 31 Ibid., xliv.

32 Ibid.

18

suggested by its title, it gives an extensive explanation of the three hypostases of the

intelligible realm, their characteristics, their differences, and how each derives from the

other. They are presented in ascendant order: Soul, Intellect, and the One.33

This Ennead

explains the ascent of the soul as an upward journey of the mind to the One, where man is

called to understand his true nature and dignity. It describes how the soul, in its

estrangement in the sensible realm, is reminded of ―its true nature in a language of a

power unsurpassed in the Enneads; then we are shown how, having returned to an

understanding of our true nature as soul, we find transcending it Intellect and the One or

Good, and are brought to see how the Good must transcend and generate Intellect.‖34

We

are reminded, at the end, that we as soul are able to find Intellect and the One within us.

There is a final plea not to be concerned with worldly problems ―but to turn inwards and

listen to the voices from on high.‖35

According to Paul Henry, Plotinus intelligently

asserts that his doctrine is a continuation of Plato‘s doctrine, and he elaborates his

hierarchy of the intelligible world linking the differences between the One, Intellect, and

Soul with the three ‗ones‘ of Parmenides’ first three hypotheses, with other passages in

the Timaeus, and with passage VI. 508c, d, e and 509 of the Republic in which Socrates

explains to Glaucon:

…What the good itself is in the intelligible realm, in relation to understanding and

intelligible things, the sun is in the visible realm, in relation to sight and visible

things.

33 Plotinus, Enneads, trans. by A. H. Armstrong, (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,

1987), 7.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., 8.

19

How? Explain a little more.

You know that, when we turn our eyes to things whose colors are not longer in

the light of the day but in the gloom of night, the eyes are dimmed and seem

nearly blind, as if clear vision were no longer in them.

Of course.

Yet whenever one turns them on things illuminated by the sun, they see clearly,

and vision appears in those very same eyes?

Indeed.

Well, understand the soul in the same way: When it focuses on something

illuminated by truth and what is, it understands, knows, and apparently possesses

understanding, but when it focuses on what is mixed with obscurity, on what

comes to be and passes away, it opines and is dimmed, changes its opinions this

way and that, and seems bereft of understanding.

It does seem that way.

So what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower is

the form of the good. And though it is the cause of knowledge and truth, it is also

an object of knowledge. Both knowledge and truth are beautiful things, but the

good is other and more beautiful than they. In the visible realm, light and sight are

rightly considered sunlike, but it is wrong to think that they are the sun, so here it

is right to think of knowledge and truth as godlike but wrong to think that either

of them is the good—for the good is more prized. …

20

… Therefore you should also say that not only do the objects of knowledge owe

their being known to the good, but their being is also due to it, although the good

is not being, but superior to it in rank and power.36

Plotinus is not only indebted to Plato in the development of his theory of the three

hypostases and of the transcendent One, but also to Aristotle and to the Stoics. Although

he criticizes Aristotle‘s view of the first principle as an entity which thinks itself, Plotinus

owes to him the ―fundamental principle that the thought par excellence is self-thought, in

which intelligence and intelligible coincide.‖37

Since this is the most distinctive attribute

of Aristotle‘s Unmoved Mover, which is separated and distant from the world of man as

is Plotinus‘s One.38

The immanent God of the Stoics can be found in the nature of

Plotinus‘s notion of the world soul, which can be both ―transcendent to the sensible world

and the seat of Providence.‖39

Thus, Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism are

represented by each one of the three hypostases: ―the One, on this assumption, would be

the God of Plato, the Good in the Republic identified with the absolute One of the

Parmenides. The thought which thinks itself and in which Being and Intellect coincide

would be the first principle of Aristotle. Lastly, the soul of the world would conjure up

certain features of the Absolute of the Stoics, the vital principle of the immanent in the

world.‖40

36 Plato, The Republic, trans. G. M. A. Grube, revised by C. D. C. Reeve, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing

Company, Inc., 1992), 182.

37 Paul Henry, xlvi.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid., xlvi.

21

Soul

What is it, then, which has made the souls forget their father, God, and be

ignorant of themselves and him, even though they are parts which come from his

higher world and altogether belong to it? The beginning of evil for them was

audacity and coming to birth and the first otherness and the wishing to belong to

themselves.41

The soul, in its desire to become different, chooses a direction that leads it away

from its origin, forgetting that its life derives from it, and is unable to seize the power and

nature of divinity. This kind of ignorance is the product of the soul‘s excessive

attachment to the sensible world and to its disregard for itself, since the desire to seek and

admire something implies the acknowledgement of one‘s inferiority to the thing sought.

The soul, which now belongs to the sensible world, can return to the intelligible realm by

instructing and reminding itself of its true nature and worth and accepting the low value

of the things it prizes at the present.42

The soul needs to gain knowledge of itself before it

examines the object of its desire and needs to know whether it is capable of such

investigation since, if it cannot recognize the thing it seeks, this is not worth the task. But

if the soul shares its nature, the task will be possible. The soul needs to know that it is

that which infuses the spirit of life to all the animals on earth, the air and water, and all

the stars and the heavens. But because it is different from them, it is superior to them, and

it does not perish with them. Since it never departs from itself, it is eternal. According to

Plotinus, although soul is only one, it has two halves. The one that is higher, called

41 Plotinus, Enneads, trans. by A. H. Armstrong, V.1.1.1-7, 11.

42 Ibid., V.1.1.17-30, 13.

22

‗World Soul‘, is nourished by the Intellect and serves as a guide. The other that is lower

is called ‗Individual Soul‘. But both halves have the same rank. Even though soul

animates all things and is present in every single point of mass, the World Soul remains

whole and present in its totality, resembling the Intellect from which it obtained its

indivisibility and omnipresence. Its power makes possible a world of plurality contained

within the ties of unity and its presence makes the world divine. We are divine because

our soul is of the same kind as the World Soul, which gives life to the deities. As Plotinus

states:

Let look at the great soul, being itself another soul which is no small one, which

has become worthy to look by being freed from deceit and the things that have

bewitched the other souls, and is established in quietude. … … Into this heaven at

rest let it imagine soul as if flowing in from outside, pouring in and entering it

everywhere and illuminating it: as the rays of the sun light up a dark cloud, and

make it shine and give it immortality and wakes what lies inert. … … For soul

has given itself to the whole magnitude of heaven, as far as it extends, and every

stretch of space, both great and small, is ensouled; one body lies in one place and

one in another, and one is here and another there; some are separated by being in

opposite parts of the universe, and others in other ways. But soul is not like this

and it is not by being cut up that gives life, by a part of itself for each individual

thing, but all things live by the whole, and all soul is present everywhere, made

like to the father who begat it in its unity and universality.43

43

Plotinus, Enneads, trans. by A. H. Armstrong, V.1.2.4-23; 31-40, 17.

23

Without soul we are only earth, just as the fire is nothing without the principle that ignites

its flames. Therefore, if it is the soul that calls our attention then, rather than seeking it in

others, we should seek it in ourselves, although ―by admiring the soul in another, you

admire yourself.‖44

Because Soul has a divine character, it can help us to reach divinity or pure unity,

ascending with the help of its power. According to Plotinus, we as human beings

―will not look far; and the stages between are not many.‖45

That which will guide us

during the ascension towards union with the One is the upper part of the soul, its more

divine part, which is an image of the Intellect from which it proceeds. Just as the spoken

word is the image of the word of the soul, the soul is the image of the word or reason of

Intellect and of that segment of its activity by which life is produced in another level or

reality.46

Plotinus compares this phase of the Intellect‘s activity to fire, which holds heat

as part of its essence but also radiates it outwardly, although ―the activity on the level of

Intellect does not flow out of it, but the external activity comes into existence as

something distinct.‖47

Because Soul proceeds from Intellect, it has intellectual existence,

manifested by its discursive reasoning, and some degree of perfection that is never equal

to its predecessor. When Soul establishes itself in the sensible world, it never departs

from Intellect since it only finds its actualization in the continuous contemplation of the

Intellect. Therefore, Intellect makes Soul divine by being its progenitor and by being part

44 Plotinus, Enneads, trans. by A. H. Armstrong, V.1.2.5, 19.

45 Ibid., V.1.3.5, 19.

46 Ibid., V.1.3.10-15, 21.

47 Ibid.,V.1.3.13, 21.

24

of it. These internal and intellectual activities of the soul are active and superior

compared to the inferior activities, of foreign origin, which are passive. The only thing

that separates Soul and Intellect is their nature. As matter is to form, Soul is to Intellect,

the recipient of a simple intellectual form not composed by parts. Although Soul

possesses great excellence, Intellect is superior to it. Plotinus explains that it is normal for

soul to try to transcend the sensible realm and to observe the ―pure Intellect presiding

over [it], and immense wisdom, and the true life of Kronos, a god who is fullness and

intellect. For he encompasses in himself all things immortal, every intellect, every god,

every soul, all for ever unmoving.‖48

Intellect

Plotinus describes the Intellect as a superior reality that embraces all immortal

beings, all intelligence, divinity, and soul. Since it does not have a future or a past and it

does not change due to its perfection, it is eternal and immutable and all the things in it

are perfect and remain identical with themselves, satisfied with their present condition.

Therefore, it lacks nothing and its state of harmony is not contingent on anything else. In

contrast with Soul, whose action is always divided by the different objects it tries to

animate, Intellect remains unchanged because all the things it contains are perfect,

―having nothing which is not so, having nothing in itself which does not think; but it

thinks not by seeking but by having.‖49

This reflects Plotinus‘s idea that knowledge


49 Ibid., V.1.4.15, 23.

25

implies a want or a lack. For him, knowledge is not a possession but a desire to obtain

something we do not have.

Each thing contained by Intellect is both Intellect and Being, since the cause of

thinking is also the cause of Being. Intellect gives existence to Being in thinking it and

Being, as the object of thought, provides Intellect with its thinking and its existence.

But the cause of thinking is something else, which is also the cause of being; they

both therefore have a cause other than themselves. For they are simultaneous and

exist together and one does not abandon the other, but this one is two things,

Intellect and Being and thinking and thought, Intellect as thinking and Being as

thought. For there could not be thinking without otherness, and also sameness.

These then are primary, Intellect, Being, Otherness, Sameness; but one must

include Motion and Rest.50

The activity of thought implies difference as well as identity. Thus, it is important to

consider other terms beside Intellect and Being, terms such as Identity or Sameness that

describe the unity of Intellect, Difference or Otherness that explain the difference

between the thought and its object, Motion or Movement that are part of the thinking

process, and Rest that results from sameness. The multiplicity of objects or forms creates

number and quantity, while the individual characteristics of each create quality, ―and

from these as principles everything else comes.‖51

The reality of the Intellect is multiple,

and the soul lives in it until it decides to separate and descend to the sensible realm as a

giver of life. But when it comes closer to Intellect and becomes one with it, it has the


51 Ibid., V.1.4.44, 25.

26

desire to seek knowledge of that which has begotten Intellect, the perfect unity that is also

the cause of Number. Because Number is not primary and dyad is secondary, the cause of

this must be a Being whose simplicity and unity precedes multiplicity and is the cause of

their existence as a manifold. The dyad is indefinite in itself but, when it becomes

determinate, it becomes Number, which is substance. Therefore, soul is also number,

because only things without mass or extension belong to the higher levels of the

hierarchy. The things that the senses experience as real are ranked as inferior. Plotinus

exemplifies this concept by comparing it with a seed, the value of which does not reside

in its observable properties but in the importance of the unseen, which are Number and

the seminal reasons.52

According to Plotinus:

what is called number in the intelligible world and the dyad are rational principles

and Intellect; but the dyad is indefinite when one forms an idea of it by what may

be called the substrate, but each and every number which comes from it and the

One is a form, as if intellect was shaped by the numbers which came to exist in it;

but it is shaped in one way by the One and in another by itself, like sight in its

actuality; for intellection is seeing sight, and both are one.53

The One

Before discussing the One, Plotinus invokes us to reach out with our souls and

pray to the One in quiet solitude, so that we can observe God resting alone as in an inner

sanctuary in which he remains undisturbed and removed from all things. To accomplish

52 Plotinus, The Philosophy of Plotinus, 14.


27

this, we must first observe all those objects that resemble the images surrounding the

sanctuary or simply the image that first emerged and the principle by which it appears.

―Everything which is moved must have some end to which it moves.‖54

The One,

according to Plotinus, differentiates itself from everything else by not having an end or

telos. Therefore, it does not need to move towards such an end and that which it generates

is generated without motion on its part. The One creates the secondary hypostases below

it without volition or movement, because the One is akin to an energy that overflows

without exhausting itself, like the ―light of the sun which, so to speak, runs around it,

springing from it continually while it remains unchanged.‖55

All things, during their

existence, necessarily generate from their own substance some further existence, which

depends on their power. This new reality resembles the image of its genitor. Therefore,

everything that possesses this kind of perfection is productive and, because the One is

complete perfection, its production is eternal. However, that which it produces is not as

perfect as itself and perfection diminishes further with each lower level that is produced.

According to Plotinus, the Intellect, emanated from the One, contemplates and needs the

One for its existence, though the One does not need Intellect. The Soul, which is an

emanation of Intellect, depends on it as a derivation of Intellect‘s activity and directs

itself to Intellect, just as Intellect contemplates the One. Therefore, as there is nothing

between Intellect and the One, there is nothing between Soul and Intellect. The only

separation between the begetter and the begotten is the difference between them. When

Plotinus calls Intellect the image of the One, he implies that Intellect retains some of the


55 Ibid., V.1.6.31, 31.

28

attributes of the One, but it is not the One. Thus, he raises the question of how the One

gives origin to Intellect. According to Plotinus, it is by ―its return that it sees; and this

seeing is Intellect.‖56

Plotinus did not believe that the One returns upon itself and sees

itself ―as the unity-in-multiplicity which is Intellect‖57

because, in his account, there is no

division or multiplicity in the One since it is perfect unity. ―Intellect, certainly, by its own

means even defines its being for itself by the power which comes from the One, and

because its substance is a kind of single part of what belongs to the One and comes from

the One, it is strengthened by the One and made perfect in substantial existence by and

from it.‖58

Therefore, Intellect is characterized by multiplicity, has in itself the power to

generate and to characterize Being out of itself, is of pure origin, and includes in itself the

whole of being, all the beauties of ideas, and all the intelligible deities, without letting

them descend into matter. It is this Intellect that, out of its perfection, generates Soul, the

last hypostasis of the divine sphere.

The One and the Theory of Emanation

Plotinus‘s philosophy embraces two ideas that imply and represent two

movements. One movement is downward from perfect unity to multiplicity, and the other

movement is an upward journey away from multiplicity and towards the perfect unity of

the One. The first movement is justified by the hierarchical organization of living reality

or hierarchy of Being, which proceeds eternally from its transcendent First Principle, the

One, and descends in an uninterrupted chain of levels from the Divine Intellect and the


57 Ibid., footnote, 34.

58 Ibid., V.1.7.12-16, 37.

29

Forms to the Soul and to the last reality, Matter. The ascendant movement can be

achieved as a result of the Soul‘s desire to abandon the sensible realm and by a process of

gradual purification, to achieve union with the object of desire, that is, the One. The

theory of emanation explains the origin of this hierarchy. Plotinus, taking into account the

principle of prior simplicity, believes that all things must be originated by one single

source. This principle postulates that ―every composite thing depends and derives in

some way from what is not composite, what is simple.‖59

Plotinus applies this principle

with a rigor that distances him from Aristotle and brings him closer to Plato and such

Platonists as Alcinous, who states that divine intellect cannot be simple because, although

it has a high degree of unity, it is still a composite. Therefore, for Plotinus, there must be

something prior to divine intellect, something that represents perfect unity. ―But it must

be single, if it is to be seen in others. Unless one were to say that it has its existence by

being with others. But then it will not be simple, nor will what is made up of many parts

exist. For what is not capable of being simple will not exist, and if there is no simple,

what is made up of many parts will not exist.‖60

Plotinus, in this passage, emphasizes a

duality that will be characteristic of the natures of Intellect and Soul. Both have dual

natures, one as part of the whole and the other in itself, outside of the whole. As well, that

which is prior to multiplicity must be superior in power and in being, since it produces

the complex and displays unity, independence, and self-integrity.61

60 Plotinus, Enneads, V.6.3.10-15, quoted in Dominic J. O‘Meara, Plotinus: An Introduction to the

Enneads, (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1993), 46.

60 Dominic J. O‘Meara, Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads, (New York: Oxford University Press,

Inc., 1993), 44.

61Ibid., 49.

30

Plotinus describes the One as ineffable and unknowable, because it cannot be

considered as an object ―of knowledge and discourse.‖62

It is formless and infinite,

neither intellect nor Being. Therefore, it is not nothingness but an incredible source of

power and perfection, originator of everything else that emanates from it, such as form,

number, measure, order, and limit.63

In Plotinus‘s universe, immanence does not rule out

transcendence since, for him, the One is both immanent and transcendent. The One is

transcendent as the source of all Being. But, the One is also always in the world, in us as

much as we are in It. Plotinus describes the lower realm as being in the higher realm,

body as being in soul, soul as being in the Intellect, and Intellect as being in the One. The

hierarchical order does not imply a physical separation between hypostases, since these

are distinctive while also together. The One derives the Intellect out of necessity without

experiencing any change and outside ordinary time. Its derivation is eternal, since it does

not have a beginning or an end. Intellect is, for Plotinus, a living conglomeration of

beings, which have the characteristics of Forms and Intelligences, ―in which every part

thinks and therefore in a real sense is the whole; so that the relationship of whole and

parts in this spiritual world is quite different from that in the material world, and involves

no sort of separation or exclusion.‖64

This idea of ‗unity-in-diversity‘ constitutes the most

perfect representation of the unity of the One, which the Intellect cannot fully grasp in his

normal contemplation. While Intellect is infinite due to its power and to its

immeasurability, it is also finite by virtue of its constitution as a whole that is made of

62 Dominic J. O‘Meara, 55.

63 Plotinus, Enneads, trans. by A. H. Armstrong, xvii.

64 Ibid., xxi.

31

numerous Forms. For humanity, Intellect represents our higher level of perceptive

thought, which grasps its object without the need for reason. At this highest stage, we

become Soul, which is formed as an image of the Intellect.

The Soul in Plotinus is very similar to that in Plato. It serves as a liaison between

the intelligible and the sensible realms, representing the former in the latter. Soul is

derived from Intellect and returns to it through contemplation, as the Intellect returns to

the One. However, its relationship to Intellect is much closer than that of Intellect to the

One because, at its maximum state, Soul belongs to Intellect. The Soul is constituted by

two parts or levels, the higher level where it performs as ―a transcendent principle of

form, order, and intelligent direction and the lower where it operates as an immanent

principle of life and growth‖65

in what Plotinus called Nature. The lower soul is

connected to the higher soul, as the higher soul is connected to Intellect, through

contemplation. But, since Nature belongs to the sensible realm, the contemplation of the

lower realm is so weak that what it produces ―is the immanent forms in body, which are

non-contemplative and so sterile, and below which lays only the darkness of matter.‖66

The soul, differently from Intellect, moves freely from one thing to another, causing

physical movement in space and time. It does not possess being as a whole but as

individual parts. The Plotinian soul has two characteristics that define its nature in terms

of its relationship to the material world. It organizes bodies and it is present in bodies. It

is rational, and it is both one and many. Our individual souls are simply parts of the

Universal Soul. Therefore, spiritually having the whole within them, they can turn to

65 Plotinus, Enneads, trans. by A. H. Armstrong, xxii.

66Ibid., xxiii.

32

universality through contemplation, abandoning the bodies that they rule. The soul

divides itself when it enters the body without ceasing to be whole, because its unity is not

the same as the unity of body, which is the sum of its parts. The soul, being divisible and

indivisible at the same time, is not one in the sense of being continuous and the possessor

of different parts. It is divisible, because it is present in every part of the body that it

inhabits. But it is indivisible, because it is present as a whole in each part that constitutes

the body. This indicates the magnitude of the soul‘s power, which establishes it as a

divine entity that is situated at the privileged location between the superior, or

intelligible, realm and the sensible realm.

Nature, as Plotinus defines it in the Enneads, is part of the range of powers or

activities that are manifested by Soul. Thus, Nature is not a reality separated from Soul,

as Soul is separated from Intellect. It is an image produced by Soul, which does not work

on matter but creates without moving or changing because, in all production, ―there is

something which does not move or change, the form guiding the process, and since it is

in matter that change occurs and that visible shapes are generated in accord with this

form.‖67

For Plotinus, then, Nature as the formative principle of things is described as

contemplation, as an object of contemplation, and as a rational principle. ―For it is the

product of a contemplation that remains and does anything else, but makes in being

contemplation.‖68

It is a contemplation guided by superior principles in which things are

created in harmony with the nature of the maker. Nature contemplates Soul as Soul

contemplates Intellect. Nature‘s type of contemplation belongs to the lowest level in the

67 Dominic J. O‘Meara, 75.

68 Plotinus, Enneads, quoted in Dominic J. O‘Meara, Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads, 75.

33

series of contemplations, in which contemplation manifests itself as derivation. Intellect

exists as a contemplation of the One, Soul exists as a contemplation of Intellect, and

Nature exists as contemplation of Soul. Therefore, everything derives from contemplation

and is contemplation. For Plotinus, the individual soul descends into a body in order to

fulfill the law of the universe and the plan of Universal Soul in its desire for expansion.

However, the spiritual state of the individual soul determines the degree of attachment to

the material world. The soul that is completely attached to the body and isolated from the

whole is trapped inside the body and is deviated from its higher destiny to rise from the

trivialities of the material world and ascend ―to the universality of transcendent Soul and

to the world of Intellect,‖69

towards perfect union with the One. Plotinus‘s work and

philosophy are captured in the following words: ―try to bring back the god in you to the

divine in the All.‖70

According to Plotinus, the material world, as an organic living form, is the best

imaginable representation of the realm of Forms within Intellect. These are fused together

―by a universal sympathy and harmony,‖71

in which evil and misery belong as part of a

greater design. Everything that is alive and has a form is good. But matter, which is the

last and lowest level of the One‘s derivation or emanation, constitutes the principle of

evil. For Plotinus, however, evil does not represent a positive form or spiritual entity in

the universe. It is, rather, a privation or lack of goodness that is inevitable as part of the

69 Plotinus, Enneads, trans. by A. H. Armstrong, xxiv.

70 Ibid., xxv.

71 Ibid., xxiv.

34

material world, since the lowest emanation is also the one that is furthest removed from

the One‘s absolute perfection and unity.

35

CHAPTER II

Neoplatonic Heritage and Pseudo-Dionysius

Platonic and Neoplatonic influences are very difficult to separate when studying

their roles in Western philosophy, because the Platonism present in medieval and

Renaissance thought is saturated by the Neoplatonic interpretations of Plato‘s work.

Therefore, it is important to study this Neoplatonic legacy as divided into two categories.

The first category is that of direct influence, in which the thinker includes in his writings

what he imported directly from the Neoplatonic source. The other category is that of

indirect influence, in which the thinker imports Neoplatonic ideas through intermediary

sources. Direct influence is the most prevalent but also more difficult to prove. In the

case of Neoplatonism, however, it is the most common form of influence. The

Neoplatonic heritage can be then divided ―into Plotinian, Athenian, and Alexandrian

strands of thought.‖72

The Plotinian branch is faithful to the Enneads, the Athenian

branch is characterized by its marked mysticism and embraces metaphysical and

theological ideas and concepts, and the Alexandrian branch is Neoplatonic but also

embraces Aristotelianism and, particularly, Aristotelian logic. The most influential

thinkers of this period were Marius Victorinus, the fourth century Christian rhetorician

and theorist who translated Greek Neoplatonism into Latin, Augustine of Hyppo (354-

430 CE), whose interpretation of Plato is close to Plotinus‘s and Porphyry‘s and who is


36

responsible for synthesizing the Christian faith with Platonic philosophy, and Boethius

(480-525 CE), who forms a strong link between antiquity and medieval philosophy in the

Latin West. Of the medieval philosophers, the most important Neoplatonists were

Johanes Scotus Eriugina (800-877), whose translations of Plato were employed by

Arabic philosophers, William of Moerbeke, who translated Proclus‘s Elements of

Theology and his commentaries of Parmenides and the Timaeus into Latin, and Meister

Eckhart (1260-1327), who retained the mystical side of Neoplatonism and adopted its

idea of negative theology.73

It is, however, in the Greek Christian world in which one finds the strongest

Neoplatonic influence, as exemplified in the ideas of Basil of Cesarea (330-379 CE),

Gregory of Nazianzen (329-390 CE), Gregory of Nyssa (d. 394CE) and, most

fundamentally, Dionysius the Areopagite, commonly known as Pseudo-Dionysius. While

Gregory of Nyssa followed the Plotinian branch of Neoplatonism, Pseudo-Dionysius

embraced Proclus‘s tradition. Proclus, who has been considered the ―great systematizer

of Neoplatonism,‖74

departed from some of Plotinus‘s beliefs and embraced Iamblicus‘s

idea of a more prolific ―supra-sensible realm.‖75

Confronted with the dilemma of how the

One can be both absolute and transcendent unity and imminent multiplicity in being, later

Neoplatonists took different approaches from that of Plotinus. While Iamblichus claims a

new entity above the One, which he calls the Ineffable, Proclus retains the One with its

transcendent and perfect attributes. But he also adds the Henads, a group of entities

73 Pauliina Remes, 199. 74 Ibid., 29.

75 Ibid., 28.

37

located above the Forms that have the properties of being, in some way, transcendent and

unknowable, while being definable by and accessible to the human soul. Therefore, the

domain of the One is expanded by the Henads, which each act as the beginning of a chain

of entities, so that every entity below is subordinated to the One and to each of the

Henads. Basically, the Henads narrow the gap between the One and Being, but they do

not solve the problem presented by multiplicity. They function as the catalyst in the

process of unity becoming multiplicity and vice versa. They do not interparticipate as do

the Forms, and they are beyond thought and Being.76

The introduction of these new

hierarchies helped the later Neoplatonists to include a new system of divinities, which

were absent in Plotinus‘s hierarchy, and to create a system that was not only more

amenable to the mysticism and literature of the time but that also synthesized

metaphysics with traditional religion, thereby heightening the value of paganism in an

environment that was increasingly dominated by Christianity.

Neoplatonism left a strong legacy for the development of the philosophy of

religion, with regard to issues concerning God and the immortality of the soul. With

respect to the issue of God, three important factors should be considered:

1. The idea of the One as the unity of being, truth, and happiness is transformed into

the notion of a God who maintains these threefold characteristics but also

differentiates Himself through direct creation. Truth is endowed to the world as

part of the creation, rather than as a thought within the divine Intellect. As in

Neoplatonism, happiness is understood as a form of bliss, a product of the union

with the Creator, who represents order, goodness, and beauty.


38

2. The doctrine of emanation from the creator appears first in Augustine‘s On the

Trinity. The triadic nature of the power of the Neoplatonic God, which has

internal activity or rest, external activity or movement, and the ability to return

back to the creator proved very influential on Christian thinkers such as Gregory

of Nyssa, Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus the Confessor, and Thomas Aquinas in

their interpretation of cosmic theology and creation. ―It became interpreted as the

distinction between ousia (substance), dunamis (power or potentiality) and

energia (activity).‖77

According to Christianity, God creates through an act of

will. God makes Himself known through His creation, and the idea of the divinity

regressing to Himself through His creation is manifested in one of the pillars of

Christian faith, that is, the idea of a transcendent God who creates the universe

and the return of man to God through salvation.

3. The theory of negative or apophatic theology, elaborated first by Plotinus in his

definition of the ineffable One and which defines God by what He is not,

influenced the Cappadocian Fathers, Maximus the Confessor, and Pseudo-

Dionysius who adopted the via apophatica, thus differentiating themselves from

thinkers in Latin West who adopted the via cataphatica, defining God in positive

terms.

Although the Neoplatonic idea of the immortality of the soul is rooted in Plato and the

idea of the soul as a divine intellectual entity is shared with other ancient philosophers,

the most particular aspects of the Neoplatonic conception of the soul are its two

movements: The ability to descend and separate from its creator and its desire to return to


39

its origin through purification. The later Neoplatonists decided to remove divinity from

the soul, so that human beings would have their own nature and their own place in the

creation. This idea fits with the Christian assumption that the soul is not able to reach the

level of the transcendent God. However, they maintained the ability of the soul to ascend,

through the practice of virtues and the purification from sin. The union of the soul with

its creator is no longer achieved through its own desire, as Plotinus had stipulated, but by

the grace of God.

The historical importance of Pseudo-Dionysius rests both on the fact that ―his

doctrine is the first Christian version of a type of Neoplatonic philosophy taught mainly

at two centers of learning, Athens and Alexandria, from approximately the fourth to the

sixth century A.D.‖78

and on the fact that he is responsible for transmitting the tenets of

ancient philosophy to many influential thinkers of the Byzantine world. Pseudo-

Dionysius is an enigmatic author whose treatises are difficult to decipher and whose

thought includes themes such as ―the hierarchical vision of the world, the approach to

God and the different ways of naming him, the correlative presentation of the divinizing

intelligences, and the treatment of symbols.‖79

Although several theories were developed

regarding his real identity, none of these has been conclusive. What we know about

Pseudo-Dionysius we know through his works, which appeared bearing his name around

500 A.D., in Syria, and were immediately embraced by other thinkers. His works,

referred to as the Corpus Aeropagiticum, consist of four treatises and ten letters. The first

78 Stephen Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena: an investigation of the prehistory and evolution of the

pseudo-Dionysian tradition, (Leiden: Brill, 1978) , 1.

79 Pseudo-Dionysius, the Aeropagite, Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, trans. by Colm Luibheid, Mahwah, (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1987), 5.

http://fsu.catalog.fcla.edu/fs.jsp?st=Gersh+&ix=au&submit=Go&V=D&S=0881297782419195&I=5#top


40

treatise, On Divine Names, is devoted to the intelligible names of God. The second

treatise, On Celestial Hierarchy, is devoted to the angels. The third treatise, On the

Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, is devoted to the Christian Church and its sacraments and

orders. Lastly, the fourth treatise, Mystical Theology, explains the union with God. The

Letters expose the techniques used by the author in his adoption of Neoplatonic ideas and

also explain how the author adapts those ideas to the Christian faith. ―The symbolic

theology in which the Letters culminate is inseparable from the affirmative and negative

theologies expounded in the four treatises, and the Letters were composed on a hierarchic

plan, which elaborates in many details on the obscure discursive treatment of hierarchy in

the treatises, a subject on which, this Neoplatonist is the discoverer and master.‖80

Although some scholars have claimed that Pseudo-Dionysius rejected paganism, his

Letters confirm his reliance on Proclus and Neoplatonism.

The Dionysian spirituality takes two routes in its journey to posterity as being a

significant influence in the history of Western spirituality. One route leads from the

paganism of the East to the Christian Orthodox East. The second route leads from the

Christian Orthodox East to the Catholic West.81

Through the first route, Dionysian

spirituality had been cleansed of any traces of paganism by the work of Maximus the

Confessor and, due to Maximus‘s legitimacy as a saint of the church, the medieval West

pushed his ideas towards the second route. By this time, Pseudo-Dionysius‘s works have

been translated by different authors, including John Scotus. Phillipe Chevallier‘s

80 Ronald Hathaway, Hierarchy and the Definition of Order in the Letters of Pseudo-Dionysius: A Study in

the Form and meaning of the Pseudo-Dionysian Writings, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), xiv.

81 Pseudo-Dionysius, 13.

41

enormous anthology of The Corpus Aeropagiticum made possible its evaluation by later

Latin translators, including Marsilio Ficino reinforcing the notion that Pseudo-

Dionysius‘s spirituality has been better received and more influential in the West than in

the East, where Augustine had been more influential. According to Jaroslav Pelikan, ―the

most fascinating aspect of the westward odyssey of Dionysian spirituality is the

interaction between the Neoplatonism of Dionysius and the Neoplatonism of Augustine.

Each had a distinctive metaphysics; but more importantly, each was the fountainhead for

a distinctive piety and devotion.‖82

Pseudo-Dionysius‘s metaphysics of creation claims of God ―that he is all, that he

is no thing‖83

and is the cause of everything. ―It is the cause of all beings, but itself

nothing, as transcending all things in a manner beyond being…But since…it is the cause

of all beings, the beneficent providence of the Thearchy is hymned from all the effects.‖84

When Pseudo-Dionysius refers to God as cause, he does not mean this as ‗first cause‘ or

Supreme Being. Rather, he means this in the sense that everything that exists is God‘s

effect. In this sense, Pseudo-Dionysius remains loyal to the Neoplatonic idea of causation

as vertical, in which a lower ontological level is the effect of a higher level.85

As already

mentioned, Pseudo-Dionysius‘s influence derives from Proclus who, on the subject of

causation, differs from both Plato and Plotinus. This is because his doctrine of causation

departs from the dual relation between the ‗participated‘ term that involves the


83 Pseudo-Dionysius, On Divine Names, I.2, 596C.

84 Ibid., On Divine Names, I.5, 593C-D.

85 Eric Pearl, Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Aeropagite, (Albany: State of New York Press, 2007), 17.

42

individuated properties and the ‗unparticipated‘ term that represents perfect unity and

does not belong to anything. Proclus‘s doctrine embraces a three-term relation that

includes the participated, the participant, and the unparticipated. The purpose of this

division is not to keep the participants alienated from the unparticipated but to assert

God‘s presence in all of them. Thus, ―the cause is separated in the sense that it is not

conditioned by its effects, not in the sense that it is not present to or immanent in them.

The unparticipated term, then, is simply a universal determination considered as one and

the same and hence transcendent to its instances; while the participated terms are the

same determination considered as differently present in each instance.‖86

Thus, in the

doctrine of creation as manifestation, the effect is contained in the cause and, regardless

of the number of levels or triadic subdivisions, the creation represents the differentiation

of the One.

According to Pseudo-Dionysius, God is ―the source of all holy enlightenment, a

Source which has told us about itself in the holy words of scripture, the cause of

everything that is origin, being, and life. … It is the Life of the living, the being of

beings, it is the Source and the cause of all life and of all being, for out of its goodness it

commands all things to be and it keeps them going.‖87

The manifestation of God in all

things created is what Pseudo-Dionysius refers to as ―powers, participations, processions,

providences, manifestations, or distributions of God.‖88

His God is both transcendent and

immanent. It is transcendent because it is not a being at all and is not part of reality.

86 Eric Perl, 24.

87 Pseudo-Dionysius, On Divine Names, I.3 589B-C.

88 Eric Perl, 29.

43

However, it is immanent because it is present in each one of the things created. In this

account, using Plotinus‘s metaphor of the One as source of light that is not itself

illuminated, Pseudo-Dionysius‘s God is the being in which all beings participate, but It is

not one of these beings. Thus God, as light or illumination, both transcends and

permeates from the higher and most revered level to the lowest. When he calls God ―the

Different‖ in On Divine Names, Pseudo-Dionysius tries to explain God‘s divine

difference as God‘s ―unitary multiplication and the uniform processions of his multiple-

generation to all things.‖89

For Plotinus, Proclus, and Pseudo-Dionysius, God is simple

and unified, in which all the differentiated beings become one undifferentiated entity that

contains everything but also has the power to unfurl and multiply in different beings.

Therefore, the whole of reality is the appearance or occurrence of God. It is theophany. It

is the presence of God in the content of any being in a distinctive finite way, endowing

such a being with the gift of intellect and transforming it into a representation of God.

―For to be present means to be given or available to thought, i.e. to be intelligible. And as

intelligible, as given to thought, God is apparent, or manifest, in and as the being.‖90

This

idea of being as theophany, in Pseudo-Dionysius, is a response to the Neoplatonic idea

that being belongs to the intelligible realm.

At this point it is important to clarify what it means for God to appear in reality, in

order to truly grasp the doctrine of being as theophany. This is because referring to God

as a mere appearance could lead to a reduction of God to a mere thing or object of

thought. This would remove all divine attributes from God and would consider God as

89 Eric Perl, 31.

90 Ibid., 32.

44

just another member of reality. But since God is not just another thing but is the sum of

all things, God is beyond being.

It is the supra-being beyond every being. It sets the boundaries of all sources and

orders and yet it is rooted above every source and order. It is the measure of all

things. It is eternity and is above and prior to eternity. It is abundance where there

is want and superabundance where there is plenty. It is inexpressible and

ineffable, and it transcends mind, life, and being. It is the supernatural. It is the

transcendent possessor of transcendence.91

Pseudo-Dionysius, in On Divine Names, elaborates his own notion of reality, as

hierarchic and triadic, based on the Platonic and Neoplatonic models of three classes,

three stages, and three functions. Therefore, his angelic universe, which corresponds to

the Plotinian intelligible realm, is constituted by three triads, each divided into three

orders, each of which is branched into three levels of intelligences, each one belonging to

the threefold arrangement. In every single triadic cluster, perfection belongs to the first

element, illumination to the second, and purification to the last.92

The angelic and the

human realms are parts of a dualistic universe, which ―constitutes a sacred order, an

understanding, and an activity, all regulated by the law of hierarchical mediations, both in

the sense of the descent of divine illumination and in that of the ascent of divinization.‖93

The stability and synchronization of each of the parts and of the whole depend on

occupying their proper place and function. In part, this is possible because Pseudo-

91 Pseudo-Dionysius, On Divine Names, II.10, 648C-D. 92 Pseudo-Dionysius, 5.

93 Ibid., 6.

45

Dionysius only includes the divine in his hierarchy. Thus, the steadiness, the dynamism,

and the effectiveness of his hierarchy is totally dependent on the creator, which is both

the origin and the final desire of all divinization. It is through this approach that Pseudo-

Dionysius reaches the idea of God, whose divine name maybe either of biblical or of

philosophical origin, since all these names imply the paradoxical idea that God reveals

itself in the creation but nobody has ever seen it. Therefore, God could be the recipient of

numerous names or could continue without a name, because God is above everything that

can be named. From the perspective of the process of creation, it is possible to name God

based on its work by adopting affirmative or cataphatic theology. But, from the

perspective of the divine ascent or return, God will not bare a name, as affirmed in the

negative or apophatic theology. The divine names that Pseudo-Dionysius introduces in

On Divine Names, are Good, Being, Life, and Wisdom. Arranged in a hierarchical mode,

each one of these names represents the manner in which God is present in the different

classes of beings: matter, plants, irrational living beings, rational living beings, and

intelligible beings. The last three of these, considered cognitive beings, are ―participants

in God as Wisdom.‖94

The divine name ―Good‖ tells of all the processions of the universal Cause; it

extends to beings and nonbeings and that Cause is superior to being and

nonbeings. The name ―Being‖ extends to all beings which are, and it is beyond

them. The name of ―Life‖ extends to all living things, and yet is beyond them.

94 Eric Perl, 65.

46

The name ―Wisdom‖ reaches out to everything which has to do with

understanding, reason, and sense perception, and surpasses them all.95

I do not think of the Good as one thing, Being as another, Life and Wisdom as yet

other, and I do not claim that there are numerous causes and different Godheads,

all differently ranked, superior and inferior, and all producing different effects.

No. But I hold that there is one God for all these good processions and that he is

possessor of the divine names of which I speak and that the first name tells of the

universal Providence of the one God, while the other names reveal general or

specific ways in which he acts providentially.96

Therefore, the divine processions, as Pseudo-Dionysius called them, are organized by

taking into account the extent of universality by which each is present in different beings.

The divine order is established by placing the Goodness of God at the apex, followed by

Being, Life and, at last, Wisdom. Following Proclus, Pseudo-Dionysius situates Being as

prior to Life, because Being, Life, and Intellect participate, in that order, in the

intelligible realm. All of these are below the Good, which is itself beyond Being. While

Proclus‘s thought implies the existence of several gods of different types and ranks,

Pseudo-Dionysius discards this position, arguing that his ranks are not substances or

hypostases located between God and his creation but are the different ways in which God

makes itself present in its creation. This rejection of polytheism illustrates the process of

Christianization that Pseudo-Dionysius is experiencing. The disparity between Proclus

and Pseudo-Dionysius, however, is more rooted in what concerns religious practices than

95 Pseudo-Dionysius, On Divine Names, V.1, 816B.

96 Ibid., On Divine Names, V.1, 816C-D.

47

in metaphysics, because both sustain the idea that the universe is filled and constituted

―by a multiplicity of divine powers at work differently in different things, all of which are

presences or manifestations of the One, or God.‖97

According to Pseudo-Dionysius, both beings and nonbeings participate in God as

the Good, identifying nonbeings with matter, which does not have form but constitutes

the substratum of every other being capable of receiving or possessing forms. Therefore,

matter takes its origin from the Good. Inanimate objects are produced by the Good and

Being. Plants are produced by the Good, Being, and Life. Animals are produced by the

Good, Being, Life and Wisdom. Within this arrangement, the more universal encloses the

less universal, so that Being is above Life because Life is a specification of Being and

Life is above Wisdom because Wisdom is a specification of Life. As intellection is the

highest form of consciousness, intelligible beings possess the higher modes of Life and

Being. These celestial beings or angels, mentioned in On Divine Names and the

Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, are considered to represent the most perfect level in the

hierarchy because they are closer to God.

Divine intelligences do exist in a manner superior to other beings and they live in

a fashion surpassing other living things. They have understanding and they have

knowledge far beyond perception and reason. They desire and participate in the

beautiful and the Good in a way far above the things which exist. They are very

much closer to the Good and participate much more in the Good, from which they

have received more and certainly greater gifts. … The more a thing participates in

97 Eric Perl, 68.

48

the one infinitely generous God, the closer one is to him and the more divine one

is with respect to others.98

The Good then is present in all things according to their rank, as it shines through them.

―These illuminations are the participated determinations of creatures, and they are

analogous to each in that each being participates in God in the manner appropriate to and

constitutive of that being.‖99

In the Celestial Hierarchy, Pseudo-Dionysius makes clear that although the

activity of each level in the hierarchy represents the presence of God according to that

level, the activity of the lower level is similar to that of the higher but in a lesser manner.

Therefore, when Pseudo-Dionysius states that the higher beings are closer to God, he

does not mean that they are between God and the lower beings. Rather, he means that

God is not present in all things equally but in a just proportion. Pseudo-Dionysius departs

from the Neoplatonic idea that each level causes the one below it and postulates that only

―cognitive illumination and not being is transmitted through the created hierarchy.‖100

Each being in the hierarchy participates in God according to its desire to fulfill the role of

its proper position in relation to other beings above or below, exercising its activities, not

individually but in constant relation to the other beings. ―Therefore, when the hierarchic

order lays it on some to be purified and on others to do the purifying, on some to receive

illumination and on others to cause illumination, on some to be perfected and on others to

bring about perfection, each will actually imitate God in the way suitable to whatever role

98 Pseudo-Dionysius, On Divine Names, V.3, 817B. 99 Eric Perl, 71.

100 Ibid., 73.

49

it has.‖101

The purpose of the hierarchy, then, is for beings to become like God and to be

united to God. Its core principle is what Pseudo-Dionysius calls immediate mediation, the

hierarchical mediation of beings by which God constitutes them through his presence.

Pseudo-Dionysius‘s influence on Scholastic theology became noticeable during

the twelfth century and continued through the thirteenth century, when monks of the

Franciscan and Dominican orders translated and commented on his works. Thomas

Aquinas discussed some of his treatises and Saint Bonaventure considered him the

―prince of mystics.‖102

In the sixteenth century, no other writings of the early Christian

era received similar attention in terms of translations, excerpts, commentaries, and even

cumulative corpora, with the exception of the Bible and the works of Boethius.103

As mentioned above, Pseudo-Dionysius‘s ideas influenced not only medieval

mystical thought but also Scholastic theology. His ―apostolic authority was supported by

Hilduin‘s conflation of three Dionysii: the Areopagite, the first bishop of Paris, and the

author of the corpus‖104

within Roman traditionalism. However, after being discredited

by the humanist Lorenzo Valla, Pseudo-Dionysius and his writings lost credibility with

Protestant thinkers. The different inclinations towards and interest in the study of the

Dionysian corpus during the fifteenth century within some humanist circles continued in

the next century among Protestant and Catholic scholars. The relationship of humanism

to Dionysian thought was significant. The humanists‘ philological interest in reading

101 Pseudo-Dionysius, On Celestial Hierarchy, III.2, 165B-C.

102 Ibid., 29. 103 Ibid., 33.

104 Ibid., 32.

50

ancient texts and translating them into Latin improved the condition of Greek texts and

made it possible to have greater access to the Dionysian corpus. Humanistic pedagogy

rejected Scholastic logicism and intellectualism and embraced Pseudo-Dionysius‘s idea

that Christian learning and contemplation imply one another, promoting the concept that

the study of the liberal arts, accompanied by deep contemplation, were the remedies for

the ills of the time.105

For the members of the Florentine Academy, Pseudo-Dionysius

offered the perfect combination of Platonic philosophy and Christian faith. The head of

the Academy, Marsilio Ficino, not only translated and commented on The Divine Names

and The Mystical Theology but also included Dionysian thought in his own Theologia

Platonica, including Pseudo-Dionysius with Plato and Paul, ―as the pillars of his religious

synthesis.‖106


106 Ibid.

51

CHAPTER III

Renaissance Platonism

Renaissance philosophy, although a direct product of Medieval thought, placed

tremendous emphasis on the ideas of humanistic intellectuals, who were captivated by the

revival of ancient Greek texts. The translation and reinterpretation of those texts,

especially those of Plato and of the Neoplatonists, dethroned Aristotelian scholasticism in

favor of humanistic pedagogy that emphasized rhetoric and ethics over logic and the

production of commentaries. Apart from humanism, as primarily a pedagogical reform

movement, two schools of thought dominate Renaissance philosophy. These are

Platonism and Aristotelianism. In the context of Renaissance philosophy, these two

schools of thought share the fundamental concepts of the dignity of man, the unity of

truth, and the immortality of the soul, which distinguish them from both earlier and later

forms of Platonism and Aristotelianism. ―The theme of dignity and excellence of man,

derived though it was from a patristic and mediaeval Christian tradition, was the principal

medium through which the status and powers of man in relation to divinity, cosmos, and

polity were treated in a focused way.‖107

The relevance of the concept of the hierarchy of

being is, on the other hand, specific only to Renaissance Platonism as a result of Marsilio

107 Charles Trinkaus, ―Marsilio Ficino and the Ideal of Human Autonomy,‖ in Ficino and Renaissance

Neoplatonism, ed. by Konrad Eisenbichler and Olga Zorzi Pugliese, (Toronto: Dovehouse Editions Canada,

1986), 141.

52

Ficino‘s development of this notion, which he inherited from Neoplatonism and Pseudo-

Dionysian philosophy.

Renaissance philosophy was enriched by access to previously unavailable texts

from ancient Greece and Rome. Therefore, the predominant role of Aristotle during the

later Middle Ages is, in part, replaced by Plato and other non-Aristotelian philosophers.

Plato‘s manuscripts were read under a new light in part because of the great

accomplishments of Ficino, who retranslated and reinterpreted the works of Plato and the

Neoplatonists.108

Some Platonic dialogues, such as Timaeus, acquired particular

importance during this period. The success of Ficino‘s work facilitated the development

of Renaissance Platonism, which also incorporated humanism but was also characterized

by a definitive departure from medieval philosophy. Since Aristotle did not take a

definite position on the existence of God, the eternity of the world, and on the

immortality of the soul, Plotinian thought offered a better alternative for the Church

Fathers in their attempts to reconcile paganism and Christianity. Plato had a great

influence on Eastern theologians ―such as Clement, Origen, and Pseudo-Dionysius, but

Latin authors read in the medieval West also saw the advantage of buttressing their faith

with Platonic wisdom,‖109

which fit well with the Christian teachings on creation, the

immortality of the soul, and eternal life. However, because Christianity and

Neoplatonism were closer in time and doctrine, it was easier for Ficino to resolve

theological problems from the point of view of the Plotinian unitarian conception of God

108 Brian Copenhaver and Charles Schmidt, Renaissance Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1992), 15.

109 Ibid., 128.

53

than from ―Plato‘s less schematic theology.‖110

The Neoplatonic philosophers had great

interest in Plato‘s metaphysics and were eager to incorporate the idea of hypostatical

hierarchies, therefore focusing their attention on dialogues such as Phaedrus, Symposium,

Timaeus, and Parmenides. The Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato led to the development

of theologies in which God‘s transcendent being was so far removed from the material

realm that new spiritual levels or hierarchies had to be created in order to close the

ontological gap. Neoplatonists championed the idea of unity, of the superiority of cause

over effect, and of the creation of different levels of reality, and they distinguished

themselves from Plato by creating a more doctrinaire and schematic philosophy.111

Marsilio Ficino as a Renaissance Platonist

Marsilio Ficino, as the leader of the Florentine Academy, provides the grounds to

consider Renaissance Platonism as ―a distinct movement within the broader context of

Renaissance philosophy.‖112

Ficino‘s Platonism has a distinctive character that contains

both traces of earlier humanistic thought but is also imbued with ideas from other sources

that enrich its ―highly diversified thought.‖113

Between 1469 and 1474, Ficino wrote the eighteen books that comprise his

longest original work, the Platonic Theology, dedicated to his patron Lorenzo de‘ Medici.

The central theme of this work is the ascent of the human soul, maintaining that

110 Brian Copenhaver and Charles Schmidt, 135.

111 Ibid.

112 Paul O. Kristeller, Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance, (Stanford: Standford University Press,

1964), 37.

113 Ibid., 38.

54

―although man‘s worship of God puts him closer to divinity than any other mortal thing,

to allow death to thwart the human yearning for immortality would make mankind the

most wretched of creatures, thus violating the order given the world by its creator.‖114

In

Platonic Theology, Ficino combines the influence of Plato, Plotinus, and Proclus with

that of Pseudo-Dionysius, Augustine, and Aquinas. This is due to the fact that the

preoccupation with the immortality of the soul was present in both Platonic and

Neoplatonic philosophy and in early and late medieval theology. Through the influence

of medieval theologians, Ficino incorporated ideas on the faculties of the soul, the

different attributes of God, and Nature‘s order. Through Pseudo-Dionysian influence,

Ficino revised the Neoplatonic ontological levels in the hierarchy of being and tailored

these to Christian theology.

The Hierarchy of Being

Ficino remained faithful to his Neoplatonic and medieval sources and tried to

describe the universe in terms of a hierarchy descending from God. Each level below

God has its specific place and shares in a degree of perfection. Ficino‘s final

metaphysical position claims a hierarchy constituted by five substances. These are the

One or God, Angelic Being or Mind, the Soul, Quality, and Body or Matter.115

In his

revision of the Plotinian hierarchy, Ficino treats quality as a separate level of being but

also adds symmetry. He locates the soul in the middle of the hierarchy, between the

eternal and the temporal realms, providing the human soul with a privileged position that

114 Paul O. Kristeller, 38.

115 Ibid., 42.

55

defines the metaphysical background needed to develop his theory of the dignity of man.

The upper part of Ficino‘s hierarchy corresponds to Plotinus‘s three hypostases: The One,

Intellect (Nous), and Soul. Since Plotinus did not give a full account of the relation

between the hypostases and the sensible realm, his successors added these details.

Proclus, in his Elements of Theology and Theology of Plato developed the five levels that

influenced Ficino‘s chain, in which the soul‘s metaphysical centrality secures its role as a

cosmic link between the divine and sensible realms. Representing ―the cosmos in

miniature, the little totality, [and] the all here in us which mirrors the All There which is

also us,‖116

the soul debilitates the position of angelic beings above it and quality below

it. Ficino understood the Neoplatonic principles that govern the description of being that

mediates between the One and Good, on the higher level and evil and non-being in the

lower level. The first two levels, as divine, transcend being and the lower two levels, as

absence of the good, do not possess being. The gap between these two extremes has to be

filled with different levels of being that display goodness and existence, but in different

degrees. Therefore, a hierarchy is constructed based on several principles such as ―the

superiority of one to many, of cause to effect, of rest to motion, and of whole to part.‖ 117

The arguments presented by Ficino in his description of God‘s supremacy in the

hierarchy show the influence of two schools of thought and of two ways of seeing the

universe. First, the establishment of God‘s omnipotence through the direct relation

between power and absolute unity responds to Platonic and Neoplatonistic ideas in which

116

Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology, trans. by Michael J. B. Allen with John Warden, Latin text edited

by James Hankins with William Bowen, Volume I, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,

2001), xv.

117 Brian Copenhaver and Charles Schmidt, 150.

56

body or matter is divisible. Quality lacks steadiness, the soul has the inner capacity to

move itself and emulate pure minds or angelic beings, and angels have all knowledge but

depend for their being on a superior entity which is total unity. Secondly, the notion of

God‘s omnipotence, which is based on the infinite character of being and the infinite

power needed for creation, are derived by Ficino from the ―Thomistic doctrine of being

and act, developed in the [later] discussion of primary and secondary causality.‖118

Thus,

causality serves as the link between the Platonic/Neoplatonic and the Thomistic views of

the universe.

The factor that determines the five different hierarchical levels of Ficino‘s

universe is the level of unity and power that each manifests. For Ficino, the Platonic ideal

of self-knowledge is best achieved by knowing the world and God. This is a view of the

world that is unified by its connection to divine power.119

The lowest level of Ficino‘s

hierarchy corresponds to body or corporeality, which is characterized by extension. Since

it is extended, it is passive, composed of parts, and infinitely divisible. When left to itself,

matter is capable of constant change. It is not determined by species or kind and it

possesses, by nature, the potency to become any corporeal body. Thus, lack of stability

translates into lack of unity and, because unity is closely related to power of action,

matter or corporeality lacks the capacity to initiate action though it has the ability to

undertake it.

118 Ardis Collins, The Secular is Sacred: Platonism and Thomism in Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology,

(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 22.

119 Ibid., 8.

57

If it is the characteristic of body to receive and to be acted upon, but characteristic

of incorporeal nature to give and to act, then in corporeal nature dwells what we

call potency (the potency the theologians call receptive or passive) and in

incorporeal nature act, that is, the capacity for action.120

Since corporeal things show stability and are capable of acting, characteristics which are

not innate in corporeality, there must be another factor responsible for this display of

unity and power. This is what Ficino calls quality. Quality is capable of influencing the

way in which corporeal things differentiate between each other, not in essence but in

action. It has the ability to differentiate one body from another by stamping its specific

action, because quality is a form and, as a form, it is a principle of being that causes a

thing to be what it is. Furthermore, ―the way a thing is determines the way it acts.‖121

According to Ficino, quality is a source of being, for the same reason that it is a source of

action.

So powerful is the gift of unity itself and of stability that only at the lowest level

of the universe does it seems to be overtaken by its opposites. Yet even there the

gift sometimes prevails in a way, since it continually keeps the matter which is

subject to infinite plurality and change, constant in the unity of substance and

order.122

120 Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology, Book III, Chapter I.5, 217. 121 Ardis Collins, 9.

122 Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology, Book III, Chapter I.2, 213-214.

58

Quality, defined as ―the many and the one,‖123

constrains bodies into species and, while it

is undivided within itself, it becomes divisible when it mixes with body. This implies that

quality, as a form, is both a principle of being and a principle of unity. Since unity is

related to the power to act, the unifying role is assigned to quality. Thus, quality is

responsible for stabilizing the body and defining its capacities. Since it provides the unity

of body, it must be more unified than corporeality. Quality, by nature, is not extended

and, even when a body is divided, its quality remains intact in each of the parts as it is in

the whole. Consequently, it is indivisible. ―But because it is received in matter and

divided up and thus made in a way corporeal, it is not pure act but rather act

contaminated with the passivity of body. So quality is composed of both act and

potency.‖124

Because it is indivisible in itself and is the cause of action, it is situated

above corporeality. However, because quality is said to subsist only in matter, there must

be a higher principle that can supply quality‘s deficiencies.

The call for a higher principle responds to the lack of perfection in the form

present in quality. This higher principle must be able to hold unity of substance. A body

can only be whole if all of its parts belong to a single entity that will remain

unchangeable. According to Ficino, this unifying principle, the cause of harmony, is

called soul or life.

The universal principle must always have existed, and must always continue to

exist, through its own power. It must always have existed, because it could have

not been produced at some time out of itself—for that would involve its pre-

123 Ibid., Book III, Chapter I.1, 213.

124Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology, Book III, Chapter I.5, 217.

59

existing itself—nor could it have been produced from another—for nothing comes

before what is first (nothing else would ever have existed if the first had not

existed first). It will always continue to exist, because, if the principle is once

destroyed, the totality of things collapses, and neither the principle itself nor

anything else can any more restored to being.125

This principle, considered incorporeal, has infinite power because it is immortal, does not

have any of the body‘s characteristics but provides the body with qualities, and is the

body‘s true form given that ―it exists through itself.‖126

Because this principle is not made

out of parts, it is immortal. First, it can never be disbanded. Second, it is not attached to

anything on which its existence depends. Third, it is not polluted by any other substance.

Lastly, it is not limited by space, motion or time.127

Following the principle that a cause

always has some part in its effect, there must be something in quality which resembles

the soul. Since quality is totally mobile in itself and in its operations, the soul must have

some kind of mobility because that ―which bestow(s) mobility must possess it.‖128

The

source of the soul‘s motion is not external to it, as it is for quality. Soul is mobile due to

an internal source of motion, called life. When the soul is present in the body, which is in

itself powerless to act, the body lives and moves from within itself in order to act.

Without a soul, however, the body can only move as the result of external force.

125 Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology , Book I, Chapter III.23, 51.

126 Ibid., Book I, Chapter III. 25, 53. 127 Ibid.

128 Ardis Collins, 12.

60

Ficino describes the rational soul as stable in its essence, mobile in its activity,

and both mobile and stable in its power.129

Thus, it is more simple and more stable than

quality, because it has the power of a true form. Although it supplies quality‘s

deficiencies, it has it owns weaknesses when it comes to its mobility in its operations.130

Both its external and internal functions are performed in time and divided into

consecutive moments. Thus, in operation, the soul is not stable or unified because it

hesitates ―between potency and act, between the capacity for something which is not

possessed and the actual possession of it.‖131

The soul moves, because it does not have

internal rest. This is due to its constant desire to reach something that will complete and

perfect its nature and that can be attained only by reaching for something more perfect

than itself. The soul yearns for understanding, because its capacity to understand depends

on something that is above it.

Therefore something exists above soul, in order than soul—which by its nature is

open equally to understanding and to not understanding, switching as it does from

the one to the other in alternation—may be ordered and determined for

understanding through the influence, in this genus [of understanding], of that

which is always in act. Such a something is what is always understanding or

always actually understood which is the same.132

Ficino does not explain in clear detail how the entity above soul endows soul with

understanding. But he explains that the rational soul, through an internal enlightenment,

129 Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology, Book I, Chapter IV, 55.


131 Ibid.

132 Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology, Book I, Chapter V.4.4, 63.

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is constantly aware of the existence of the angels and of God. Thus, it is through this

knowledge that soul desires to be, in its functions, as angelic beings and God are in theirs.

The motion through which it pursues this end is innate to the soul, but the purpose of

such activity originates from an external source. Angelic beings need to be posited

between the soul and God as intermediaries because, as perfect minds, they act as a link

between the rational soul, which is imperfect mind, and God, who represents perfect truth

that is above mind. Faithful to Plotinus‘s description of the soul as two folded, Ficino

describes the rational soul, which is capable of two different types of activities, as if it

were made out of gold and silver, depending upon the realm in which its activity takes

place. Those activities that are executed in union with the body in the temporal realm

correspond to the silver part of the soul, while those activities that are rational and

performed independently of the body and are geared towards the eternal belong to the

gold part of the soul. Since soul is not unified in its activities and is always in motion, it

contains plurality and is not perfect. However, its existence implies the existence of a

perfect and pure mind, totally independent from the body, which is capable of infinite

understanding in an eternal act of knowing.133

Angelic being precedes soul, which is

mobile and multiple. Thus, angelical being cannot be both motionless and unified. As

cause of soul, angelic being has to share one of the two characteristics of soul. It has to be

either mobile or multiple but cannot be both. Since it has multiplicity, it must therefore be

immobile. Thus, angelic being is characterized by its multiplicity and stability. It is

―motionless plurality. It conforms to soul in that like soul it is a plurality; but it differs


62

from soul in that it is motionless while soul is moved.‖134

Multiplicity in angelic being is

manifested through intellect, the essence and being of which are the combination of its

capacity of understanding, of the act of understanding, and of the different things that are

understood. Since multiplicity derives from unity, which does not itself need to be

derived, multiplicity has an intrinsic need to become unified. Thus, angelic being, as

multiple, depends on something above it, that is, complete unity. Following Plotinus,

Ficino claims that this perfect unity is God, ―the most powerful of all in that He is the

simplest of all.‖135

God represents absolute unity, goodness, and truth in itself. These are one and the

same because, since unity is simplicity and truth is purity, what is good is the result of its

purity and simplicity. ―What is one and the same in things must be one and the same in

their cause, since an effect retains the vestiges of its cause and it is similar to it.‖136

All

things are part of and seek unity, truth, and goodness. Thus, unity, truth, and goodness

must be the initial causes and the ultimate accomplishments of everything. Therefore

God, described by Plotinus as absolute unity, is for Ficino the pinnacle of the hierarchy of

the universe. As previously established, Ficino views the universe as a hierarchy of

causes in which what is superior must provide for the inadequacies of what is inferior.

God cannot have anything above it, since that which is absolute unity, goodness, and

truth, cannot be caused and cannot receive anything from outside itself. Multiplicity

134 Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology, Book I, Chapter II.3, 81.

135 Ibid.


63

implies weakness, while unity represents power and, since there is not anything more

powerful than unity itself, God must be omnipotent.

Just as extreme dispersion leads to infinite weakness, so in the highest unity

dwells infinite power. Act by its very nature contains no limit, for to be subject to

a limit is passion, which is the opposite of act. Therefore, act is only subject to a

limit to the extent that it depends on a substrate which possesses a degree of

passive potentiality. The divine act, however, subsists in itself. The active power,

insofar as it is power, is not itself confined to a fixed number of levels. For what

prevents the power as power from being thought about or from existing on one

level as on another? Therefore it accepts no limit as to its levels except from the

passive potentiality into which it is mixed, or from a limiting cause. But the divine

power is unmixed and is the highest power.137

Influenced by Neoplatonism, the dependence between the various levels in the hierarchy

is explained in terms of unity and power because, according to Ficino, unity is power.

Ficino‘s identification of unity with power becomes evident when the hierarchy of the

universe is explained by taking into account the concepts of potency and act. Here,

potency is the capacity to receive and to endure influences, while act is the capacity to do

things and impose influences. Potency belongs to corporeality, whereby nature has the

potency to become anything due to its passive and receptive characteristics. On the other

hand, the power to cause or act belongs to that which is incorporeal. Quality, which does

not share any of the characteristics of the corporeal but becomes embedded in the body, is

considered to be a mixture of potency and act. Soul maintains itself separated from the

137 Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology, Book II, Chapter IV, 1, 114.

64

body, so it is an act. But Soul is not considered as a pure act because, although it exerts

movement on something, it is also receptive of what it lacks in itself. Angelic being is not

pure act, because a pure act must be unique, while angelic being displays multiplicity.

Thus, angelic being is a combination of potency and act. ―[B]ecause it remains distinct

from truth and dependent upon it, its essence is in potency to its act of understanding and

receptive of those forms by which it understands.‖138

Angelic being is not unity but

multiplicity because, for understanding, it depends on God, who is absolute unity and

pure act.

In his description of God, Ficino introduces the principle of Being that, when

associated with effective power, is considered as a necessary condition of action. Thus, a

thing acts according to what it is: ―The mode of action follows the mode of being.‖139

God, then, has unlimited power because he is absolute unity, pure act, and Being itself.

His act or capacity to impose influences and to be causal is infinite, because the only

thing which could limit the causal power of act is the passive potency of something

external of itself, such as the potency of what is caused but does not cause. Based on the

assumption that pure act is limitless, and that being is a necessary condition of action, it

follows that pure Being is, in nature, infinite perfection. Being can only be limited, not by

a flaw in itself, but by the nature of what has caused it. God has not been caused and, in

God, ―being itself is that which exists.‖140

Therefore, God is infinite being and has

infinite power.

138 Ardis Collins, 18. 139 Ibid., 19.


65

Being itself, considered absolutely, is immeasurable, because it can be

communicated to an infinite number of things and be thought about in

innumerable ways. So if the being of anything is finite, it must be either limited

by its cause or by its substrate. Neither of these conditions applies to God. In

infinite being is infinite power just as in finite being is finite power.141

The analysis of the relations between act and between potency and between unity and

power explains the dynamic unity that holds the hierarchy together. From the perspective

of mobility, it is necessary to concentrate on the causes for the existence of soul, which is

the first level capable of movement. At the pinnacle of the hierarchy, God is unmoving

absolute unity, followed by angelic being, which is plurality that is not subject to

movement, then followed by soul, which retains plurality and is subject to movement. If

soul lacked movement, soul would be angelic being. If, on the other hand, soul was

totally movable, it would be quality.

Soul, as also described by Plotinus, is the first entity capable both of being mobile

and of conferring movement to bodies. ―This proves that soul is the source of movement

and that the uncontrolled turbulence of the universe issues from it.‖142

Ficino enumerates

four causes that account for the existence of soul.

1. Soul contains something from what caused it, because anything caused by another

thing can trace something in itself back to its cause.

141 Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology, Book II, Chapter IV.2, 115.


66

2. Soul has the capacity to be a mover that is not moved. If all existing things were

eternally moving, they could escape the hierarchy and wonder into infinity or

move in eternal circles in which the cause and the effect would be the same.

3. Soul is closer and its essence is identical to what it moves.

4. Soul has the capacity to move towards the things to be moved.

Without soul, bodies would not be able to move because angelic being and God, both

immutable, are incapable of turning towards bodies. As bodies are totally passive, they

would not be able to turn towards angelic being and God.

Therefore, there has to be some mutable nature which of its own accord turns

towards inactive bodies and arouses them. Always alert, it experiences changes in

itself before producing them in body, with the result that, just as corporeal

substance is made by spiritual substance, so corporeal movement is produced by

spiritual movement.143

In order to explain why soul can move itself, although it is dependent on God and angelic

being, Ficino appeals to Plotinus‘s idea that soul has an innate desire to become like its

progenitors in behavior and activity. In the act of becoming like angelic being and God,

the soul moves itself. This movement, described as ―activity within time,‖144

flows from

its nature but is incited by the levels above it. As in Plotinus‘s theory of emanation, what

flows into the soul from God and angels is perpetual, invariable, and immediate. The

effect that it produces on the soul has the same characteristics as angelic being and God.

But the soul, being weaker than God and the angels, acts gradually over time and has the

143 Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology , Book III, Chapter II.13, 227.


67

ability to descend from the divine to the corporeal and to ascend back to the divine by

virtue of its own desire.

Ficino begins Chapter II of Book III of the Platonic Theology by stating that ―the

soul is the middle level of being. It links and unites all the levels above it and below it

when it ascends to the higher and descends to the lower levels.‖145

Thus, the soul exists

halfway between the intelligible realm and the sensible realm. It is the third level from

the top down and vice versa. Without soul at this level, the whole hierarchy would

collapse. Soul is absolutely necessary in nature because angelic being, as unchangeable,

is always being and quality, which can be set in motion at any time and is always in the

process of becoming. Hence, a mean that shares the characteristics of both is required,

something that is eternal like angelic being and that is capable of being moved,

something ―which can always be in motion and alive, and which can by means of its

motion infuse life into bodies.‖146

Soul has the capacity to link the eternal and the

temporal due to its innate capacity of being both mobile and immobile. It is capable of

descending to the temporal realm without renouncing the eternal and is capable of

ascending to the higher realms without abandoning the lower. Borrowing from Plotinus‘s

analogy of the Sun, Ficino compares the soul‘s activity with the activity of the Sun‘s

light, which radiates from the Sun without detaching from it and mixes with the air

without contamination. In the same fashion soul, which is spiritually united with the

eternal through its knowledge, fills the temporal bodies with life, thus fusing the eternal

and the temporal.

145 Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology, Book III, Chapter II.1, 231.

146 Ibid., Book III, Chapter II.1, 233.

68

Since soul is not subject to extension or quantity, once it confers life to the body,

it does this as a whole, as though it were the center of a circumference. The center is not

attached to any point of the circumference and always holds the same position in regard

to the whole circle.147

Thus, as in Plotinus, soul is concomitantly divided and undivided.

It is undivided because, although it is present in each of the body‘s parts, it is always

present as a whole. It is divided, because although it has a stable and unified essence, it

divides itself in many parts when it acts in space and time. It descends into plurality but,

when in contemplation of the eternal, it becomes totally unified.

This is what implants itself in things mortal without itself becoming mortal. For

just as it implants itself as a whole and is not split asunder, so it withdraws as a

whole and it is not dispersed. And because it controls bodies while it also clings to

things divine, it is the mistress of bodies, not their companion. This is the greatest

miracle in nature.148

Soul, as a universal medium, contains within itself the divine images of what is above it

and uses these as patterns for what it produces at the lower level. As the true link for all

being, it has the power to move into individual things while it conserves all things. As the

center of nature, the soul is ―the mean of everything in the universe, the succession or

chain of the world, the countenance of all things, and the knot and bond of the world.‖149

According to Ficino, the rational soul gives life to the body within time. It is intelligent,

and its motion is perfect in its circularity. Its beginning and its end are the same. Thus,

147 Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology, Book III, Chapter II.4, 239. 148 Ibid., Book III, Chapter II.6, 243.

149 Ibid.

69

soul begins as moved from itself and returns to itself, thereby creating movement for its

own sake. It recognizes itself as spiritual and free from the constraints of matter by

essence.

The mystical nature of the soul is analyzed by Ficino from a perspective that is

different from that of the Neoplatonic tradition. In Plotinus, Plato‘s notion of the

immortality of the soul had been overshadowed by the notion of Intellect as a derivation

from the One and of soul as an emanation from Intellect. Ficino, on the other hand, is less

concerned with the origin of the soul and more concerned with its return to ―being, life,

and intellect—to the triad of which formally, originally, ultimately it is part—and thence

its ascent within its own unity to mystical union with the transcendent One.‖150

It is here

that Ficino departs from the Plotinian notion that the soul needs to pass through Intellect

in its journey towards the One. Ficino follows Augustine‘s doctrine of common truth, in

which there is one truth contemplated by all souls but not one intellect for all souls.

Ficino holds ―that all intellects are plunged into the same font of truth, as if to

contemplate the work of the artificer in that one idea (ratio) through which he has

produced it.‖151

Closely related to the ascent of the soul is Ficino‘s theory of the

immortality of the soul, which constitutes the central theme of his Platonic Theology.

Ficino defends the notion that the soul is immortal by explaining the relationship

and difference between essence and being. While essence is what a thing is in itself,

―being is the act of the essence and its presence in the nature of things.‖152

It belongs to a

150 Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology, xv.

151 Ardis Collins, 8.1

152 Ibid., 47.

70

thing by virtue of its form. Every essence has the capacity to receive being, and being is a

form. Forms, which by definition are that which exists, are immortal. Essence, as a form,

is also immortal because it is not constrained by space or time. There are forms that

belong to a body and are limited by temporality. Nevertheless, the form remains immortal

due to its own nature and to being, which does not exist except through matter. Other

forms have existence of their own, so that what is received is received with relation to the

capacity of the recipient. Therefore, if the essence is immortal, it would receive being as

immortal. The rational soul, which does not have its being in matter, is different from

other forms because it is immortal due both to its essence and to its being. Since matter

does not have the capacity to think, the action of thinking that is executed by the mind

follows the subject of being, and the form of the action is the same as the form of being.

The human mind has existence because it belongs to an existing person. Its form of action

and its form of being is human. But the rational soul is capable of endless knowledge, an

action in which matter is not involved, since mind can know things independently from

matter and material conditions. As matter is characterized by multiplicity and mutability,

soul possesses unalterable knowledge. Through knowledge, it brings things to simplicity

and unites them under ―one universal idea.‖153

Rational soul has the capacity to act

independently from matter, and its embodiment is not essential for its being, since the

soul‘s being belong to the soul itself. The rational soul does not originate from matter,

because all the forms which attain their being from the power of matter decay as a result

of the same power. Therefore, the rational soul must have its origin in the power of


71

essence, which by definition is a ―capacity for being.‖154

As everything corporeal owes

its existence to corporeal act, that which is spiritual, like essence, must exist through

spiritual act. In both cases, the pure ability to be created is nothing if stripped from the

actual act of creation. Thus, when the soul becomes being, it has to be by the power of

God who alone has the ability to create ex nihilo. According to his immutable nature,

God gives to things what is suitable to them. Therefore, God creates rational soul with the

innate capacity of being, a necessary and unconditional existence.

The soul is the principle of being for the body and its parts, capable of conferring

essence and power when it is intrinsically united with the body. If the union collapses so

does the essence, because the manner in which something relates to being is identical to

the manner in which something relates to unity. Thus, the soul can give being to the body

if and only if it is present in the body. This idea of intimate unifying presence leads

Ficino into a discussion of God‘s role as the ultimate source of being and unity. God‘s

divine presence is in each one of the levels of the metaphysical hierarchy and man,

burning with desire for unity with God, aspires to discover and to know him. The process

of examination is an introspective one in which man, through his soul in the act of

contemplation, reaches towards God who is perfect unity. In his letter to Giovanni

Cavalcanti, Ficino explains that when the soul is in union with the body, it is occupied in

multiple activities that provoke agitation and confusion. It is also more engaged with

temporal activities than with eternal ones, since that is God‘s assignment for it in its

service to man. During this period, the soul cannot see clearly the incorporeal realm. But,


72

when those activities decline, the mind can see the divine because, freed from the body,

mind is capable of knowledge from within, unencumbered by sensory experiences.

Then indeed the soul will observe through itself, and it will see the light of

intellect more clearly than it now sees the light of the senses through the glass

windows of this bodily prison. Entirely at peace, it will perceive through its own

perfect transparency the highest impressions in the light of the divine sun. So

bright is that light, that the light of this sun becomes a shadow in comparison, and

because it is so clear it is hidden from impure eyes but fully manifest to those that

are pure. Nor will the mind then gaze as if at painted images, but rather at real

objects, of which all other things are images.155

Ficino, following Plato, compares the role played by God in the act of knowing to the

role played by the sun in the act of seeing. As there are three components in the act of

seeing, that is, motion, sight, and the light that binds them, there are three components in

understanding. These are the act by which intellect moves the mind, the act of knowing,

and God who binds them. Here, the intellect represents truth, knowledge represents

science, and God represents goodness. Thus, ―what we know in things is their truth and

what we desire in them is their goodness.‖156

God, who is both truth and goodness, has

the faculty to unite the knower with the known, and since the same discourse that applies

to knowledge can be applied to desire, God also unites the lover and the object of

desire.157

Soul desires God, who represents absolute goodness and is above intellect or

155 Marsilio Ficino, Meditations on the Soul, 44. 156 Ardis Collins, 77.

157 Ibid.

73

being, because only God can attract and transform the soul. Being relates to God not as

his effect but as a demonstration, through its imperfection and incompleteness, of the

perfection of God. In agreement with Plotinus, Ficino explains that the perfection of a

thing depends on how close it is to the perfect being. From his knowledge of the divine

ideas or intellect, God knows himself as perfect and absolute being and ―as imitable in a

certain finite mode of being.‖158

As first principle, God creates soul and everything below

him through the light of being and, ―by knowing all things in this light, the soul

recognizes a certain unity among them; all are understood in terms of being, which is to

say that all are understood in their relation to that one cause who is the cause of being.‖159

When all the different essences are known as effects of being, God is known as unity that

contains plurality within itself.

In its desire to unite with God, the soul detaches itself from the body and turns

inwards in order to know things through the light proper to its own capacity. It then turns

to the common light or truth, which illuminates and acquires true knowledge of all things

created by God. In this highest state of bliss, the soul loses all multiplicity and becomes

stable, so it can ascend to God and become one with him, not due to its own power but to

the presence of God in it. In Ficino‘s letter to Michele Mercati, titled “A theological

dialogue between God and soul,” God explains to the soul that He is with it and within it.

Therefore, soul does not need ―to be drawn in many directions in order to take hold of

[Him],‖160

because He is unity in itself. The soul will be able to ascend ―by understanding

158 Ardis Collins, 79. 159 Ibid., 87.


74

and love beyond any kind of intellect, to life itself, pure existence, absolute being.‖161

The soul which, by virtue of being incorporeal in its rise towards God, can abandon the

material world with its constantly changing forms reaches the intelligence of angelical

being, also incorporeal but unchangeable. Here, it finds that which creates itself, which

creates everything else without limits, and which is absolutely pure. The union of the soul

with God is possible through the ―transforming power of the love of God which takes

complete possession of the mind and makes it divine.‖162

In Ficino‘s theory of love, intellect and will have the same goal. While intellect

deals with the subjective, the will is the force behind the love which moves soul and body

into action to obtain the object of their desire.163

Thus, intellect is responsible for the

inward movement of the soul and will is responsible for outward movement. These

constitute the two Platonic wings, as described by Ficino that carry the soul in its flight

toward God.164

The role of the will in Ficino is Plotinian, but the difference between

intellect and will is not. According to Ficino, intellect and will are not the same, even in

God. Plotinus, on the other hand, claims identity of the will and being in the One and of

will and intellect in the Nous. Although both philosophers claim that desire motivates the

soul‘s contemplative journey towards God, Plotinus claims that the journey is an

intellectual experience, while Ficino claims that it is an emotional one. Ficino, following

Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius, also emphasizes the role of the contemplative life. But



163

Laura Westra, ―Love and Beauty in Ficino and Plotinus,‖ in Ficino and Renaissance Neoplatonism, ed.

by Konrad Eisenbichler and Olga Zorzi Pugliese, (Toronto: Dovehouse Editions Canada, 1986), 181.


75

since the humanists attributed to man an extraordinary importance, the belief in

immortality was considered to be man‘s ability to achieve another dimension. In Ficino‘s

case, immortality becomes essential to his understanding of human life and of its highest

goal. He claims that such a goal is not exclusive to a few people but is attainable by a

great number of people and attainable forever.165

According to Ficino, the love of God

and the knowledge of God constitute two different aspects of the same experience, which

―holds the key to Ficino‘s metaphysics and ethics alike.‖166

For Ficino, man accomplishes

more by his love for God than by his understanding.167

Based upon his interpretation of

Plato‘s definition of love, combined with theories of friendship developed by Aristotle

and Cicero, the Christian view of love extolled by St. Paul, and the notion of courtly love

of the Tuscan poets, Ficino develops a theory of human love in which the love of God is

the result of the love of one human being for another. Ficino sees the mutual love

between people as a preparation for the love of God, which represents the ultimate goal

of man‘s desire. Any relationship between two people is a spiritual union based on their

individual love for God. Therefore, God is always the third component in any human

friendship and love, as the bond and guardian of such a relationship. Proper love and

friendship between human beings always originates in the love of each individual for

God, as manifested in the person‘s desire to ascend to God.168

The inner ascent of the

soul constitutes, for Ficino, the central goal of human existence as a representation of the


166Ibid., 45. 167 Laura Westra, 182.


76

human good and of man‘s moral life. The entirety of Ficino‘s moral teachings, as

expressed in his letters, is a synthesis of the rules which would lead man into a

contemplative life. Only the person who can achieve this kind of life would be free from

the earthly worries and ―animated by his inner certainty and insight, he will know and do

the right thing under any given circumstances.‖169

If man could not reach this goal, the

dignity conferred to him by his central position in the configuration of the universe would

have no purpose, and man would be more unhappy than the animals that can fulfill their

own natural needs.

I will conclude this final chapter with the beautiful words of Ficino, as he wrote

them to Giovanni Cavalcanti in his Meditations on the Soul.

That is why Plato advises us to retreat from ―here‖ to ―there‖—that is, from

attachment to the body and involvement with worldly affairs, to the cultivation of

the soul. Otherwise we cannot avoid evil.

[…] Such freedom we gain principally through the three virtues of prudence,

justice, and piety. Prudence recognizes what we owe to God and what to the

world. Justice gives its due to the world, and piety its due to God. Thus the man of

prudence yields his body, as a limb of the world, to the turmoil of the world

wherever it happens to move it. But his soul, the offspring of God, he removes

from all dealings with the body and freely commits to the guidance of divine

providence.


77

My dearest Giovanni [Cavalcanti], if we follow this golden rule of Plato, with the

wind of heaven behind us we shall circumnavigate successfully this vast

whirlpool of fortune, and quite untroubled, sail safely into harbor. Farewell.170

170 Marsilio Ficino, Meditations on the Soul, 119

78

CONCLUSION

Marsilio Ficino considered that the Neoplatonism of Plotinus was ―the soul

philosophy, the living light that had shone across the darkness of corporeal death bringing

hope and comfort to the minds of the ancients.‖171

And, in accord with St. Augustine, he

believed that the soul is essentially immortal by origin and of angelic and divine

character, because it was created as an image of the eternal. Although some passages of

his writings show Ficino‘s rational strive to convince the skeptic human mind of his

assumptions about the soul, these also reflect the difficulties he encountered from

introducing and embracing Neoplatonic ideas. Based on his ―philosophico-religious

concerns,‖172

he rebuilt a traditional philosophy that, from the ancient Greeks to Plotinus,

had established the harmony between paganism and Christianity. He successfully argued

for the acceptance of Neoplatonic philosophy, because he was able to recognize the

impossibility of reconciling Christian beliefs with Aristotelianism in areas such as the

eternal character of the world, the soul‘s immortality, the unifying nature of intellect, and

the ―astrological determinism that regarded the individual person, and indeed religion

itself, as transient phenomena bound by astrological cycles.‖173

171 Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology, xiv. 172 The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. by Charles B. Schmitt and Quentin Skinner,

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 237.

173 Ibid.

79

Neoplatonism, characterized by an intricate and complex corpus of metaphysical, ethical,

and psychological canons, provided the grounds for Ficino‘s cosmological challenge to

merge the cyclical aspect of the universe with the religious notion of the soul, in order to

secure its cosmic position. The site of the rational soul at the center of the hierarchy of

being and as a link between the incorporeal and the corporeal is an acknowledgment of

its function as the giver of life to the sensible world. Accordingly, the rational soul, which

includes the human soul, marks the ontological difference between the two realms and

institutes a continuous interaction between them. According to the Neoplatonic tradition,

this specific location of the soul guarantees an understanding of the universe, its forces,

and the relation between the five-substance levels of Ficino‘s hierarchy of being in which

he can find ―an ever-changing and different reflection of God‘s actions.‖174

Ficino, familiar with Aristotle‘s cosmology of celestial and elemental spheres

surrounding a static earth, tried to decrease the gap between the intelligible, or

supralunar, realm and the sensible, or sublunar, realm. The ability of man to return to its

source in an ascendant vertical movement, as also explained by Plotinus, establishes the

ontological nature and function of the rational soul as the link between the intelligible and

the sensible realms. The soul, as a celestial body, decreases the gap between the two

worlds because it has the ability to give life to the corporeal world through its divine

nature, in a descendent movement, and also to ascent towards the divine. These two

movements are the basis for the formulation of soul‘s unique ontological status and for

the idea that the higher part of the soul is never attached to the body, an idea well

developed by Plotinus in his description of the soul as the third hypostasis.

174 The Cambridge History of Renaissance, 237.

80

In conclusion, although it is true that the immortality of the soul had been

defended from Plato to Augustine and other Christian thinkers, and that Marsilio Ficino

had read and adopted several arguments from each of these thinkers, it becomes clear that

Ficino adopted Plotinus hierarchy of being as a dominant component of his own thought.

His formulations on the three hypostases and the ascendant and descendent movements

characteristics of the soul allow him to develop his own hierarchy of the universe, in

which soul anchors the metaphysics of the structure and reaffirms its ontological nature

as immortal being.

Ficino‘s doctrine of the immortality of the soul and his arguments in support of it,

ensure his influence on the thought of many 16th century philosophers. Ficino may also

have indirectly influenced the adoption of the immortality of the soul by the Catholic

Church which declared this notion a dogma of Catholicism at the Lateran Council in

1512.175

Ficino considered the need to worship a higher being to be a natural need in

human beings, for the love and knowledge of God belong to man as ―part of his dignity

and excellence, and compensation for the many defects and weakness of his nature.‖176

Ficino attempted to establish the harmony between religion and philosophy, so that true

religion was considered to be Christianity and true philosophy was considered to be

Platonism. Ficino was convinced that Platonic reason was essential for understanding the

Christian dogmas, and he firmly believed that his mission was to restore the truth of

philosophy for the advantage of religion. He believed that those who cannot be guided

simply by faith can appeal to reason or intellect in their return to God.


176 Ibid.

81

Although Renaissance Platonism eventually lost its dominance in the Western

philosophical tradition, the eclectic philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, imbued as it was with

Neoplatonism, constitutes an important chapter in the historical development of

Platonism.

82

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