The India-Pakistan War

Of 1971: A Modern War

CSC 1984

SUBJECT AREA History

ABSTRACT

Author: KYLE, R.G., Major, Royal Canadian Artillery

Title: Indian-Pakistan War of 1971: A Modern War

Publisher: Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Date: 14 March 1964

This paper examines the origins, conduct and results of

the war between India and Pakistan of 1971 from which the

nation of Bangladesh emerged. The study compares the

development of religion, culture and economy in East and

West Pakistan which led to the frustration of Bengali

nationalism within the "Islamic Nation" founded in 1947.

The role of the military government from 1958 to 1971 is

also examined to show how its activities further alienated

the people of East Pakistan and contributed to both the

rebellion there and the weakening of its own military

capability.

The second part of the study examines the development

of guerrilla war in East Pakistan between March and December

1971. The Political and Military organization of the

insurgents is analyzed along with the counter-insurgency

Actions of the government forces. The effects of the war on

India and the policies that nation developed to deal with it

are also analyzed. The roles played by the United States,

China, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations in the

conflict are studied.

The study goes on the analyze the military operations

of India and Pakistan during the fourteen days of

conventional war between them. Finally, conclusions are

drawn concerning the conditions which precipitated the

conflict and the reasons for the success of the Bengali and

Indian forces.

No primary sources of information were available for

this study. Therefore, the author relied heavily on

articles in military journals as well as several books on

the subject.

WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR

The India-Pakistan War of 1971

A Modern War

Major Rodney G. Kyle, Royal Canadian Artillery

2 April 1984

Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Marine Corps Development and Education Command

Quantico, Virginia 22134

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 1

Chapter

I. Origins of the Conflict 2

II. Rebellion and Repression 18

III. The 14-Day War: 3-16 December 1971 38

IV. Conclusion 55

Appendices

I. Map of West Pakistan-India Frontier 1971 57

II. Map of East Pakistan 1971 58

Bibliography 59

INTRODUCTION

This study is concerned with a guerrilla war fought by

two peoples who had joined together enthusiastically to form

the new nation of Pakistan just twenty-five years before.

It is also concerned with the short, violent conventional

war fought by India and Pakistan which resulted in the birth

of the new nation of Bangla Desh. The conflict was

influenced by both the legacies of ancient India and the

contemporary interests of world politics. The study may

interest the reader concerned with the techniques of modern

guerrilla and conventional war, but the study should also

lead the reader to conclude that we cannot understand modern

conflict without understanding the historical environment in

which it occurs.

Unfortunately no primary sources of information were

available for this study. Information was gathered from

military journals and several books on the subject.

I would like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Donald F.

Bittner, USMCR, staff historian of the Marine Corps Command

and Staff College for his help in finding source material

and his many helpful suggestions to improve a very rough

first draft. A special thanks also must go to Mrs. Pam

Lohman who had to transform this work to typescript. Any

errors, however, are entirely the responsibility of the

author.

CHAPTER I

ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT

When Pakistan was formed in 1947, it was a result of

Islamic nationalism of the Moslems of India. Islam had been

introduced to the Indian sub-continent following the Afghan-

Turkish conquest in the 13th century. A large part of the

native population in the area of East Bengal was peacefully

coverted from Hindu to Islam in the following two centuries.

In the 16th century the Moslem sultanate of Bengal was

absorbed into the north Indian Mughal empire. The Moslem

rulers of the empire were non-Bengali. Their culture was

based on Arabic and Persian influences, and the Urdu

language. Socially, Bengal was divided into a Bengali

Moslem peasantry and a Persianized Urdu speaking ruling

class. 1/

In 1764 the English East India Company succeeded the

Mughals as the government of Bengal. The British rule

encouraged the rise of the Hindu commercial class in Bengal

while the former Urdu-speaking Moslem rulers and landowners

were displaced from their positions of power. In this

climate Bengali culture during the 19th century developed in

a new direction led by the Hindu elite and influenced by the

emerging middle-class of Bengali-speaking Moslems. The

Bengali-speaking Moslems became increasingly conscious of

their ethnic identity and nationalism throughout the 19th

century. For their part, the British were gradually

loosening restrictions on local institutions and government:

Hindu dominated schools and the secular university of

Calcutta played their part in developing Bengali identity

among the Bengali-speaking Moslems. To counter the

continuing loss of position and status, in 1906 the Urdu-

speaking Moslems established the first modern political

movement among the Moslems of India called the All-India

Moslem League. 2/

The concept of a separate state of Pakistan did not

develop until the 1930's when India grew closer to self-

government. By 1937 there were two political parties in

Bengal which formed a coalition provincial government. The

first was a radical peasants and tenants party backed by

Bengali-speaking Moslems, while the other was the more

conservative Moslem League representing the Urdu-speaking

Moslems. This government proposed the "Pakistan Resolution"

calling for the regions of Northwest and Eastern zones of

India where there was a Moslem majority to be grouped into

independent states that would be autonomous and sovereign.

A federation of 12 to 14 states with strong local

governments was envisioned.

Bengal became a war zone during World War II. As well,

in 1943 a famine took more than two million lives. The

destruction and sacrifices of these catastrophes increased

the nationalism and solidarity of the Moslem population in

Eastern India. Support for the "Pakistan Resolution" and

the Moslem League swelled. On August 14, 1947, the nation

of Pakistan was created from the regions of India having a

Moslem majority. Two states, Bengal in the East and Punjab

in the West, were divided into Hindu and Moslem regions.

Only the Moslem sections were included into Pakistan.

Pakistan itself had two wings separated by 1,000 miles of

Indian land.

The partition of Bengal led to the restoration of power

to the traditional Urdu-speaking Moslems who had led the

Moslem League. However, this elite could only be sustained

by the active support of the Urdu-speakers who controlled

West Pakistan. While the Moslem League had sustained Moslem

nationalism in Bengal during the previous decade, it could

not provide a focus and support for the nationalism which

continued to be a potent force among Bengali Moslems. 3/

In East Pakistan, the Bengali-speaking Moslem middle-

class was an important social force. This class comprised

small land owners, professionals and traders. They had a

deep loyalty to Bengali culture, and respect for

parliamentary tradition and the rule of law. In West

Pakistan, land holdings were larger and concentrated in the

hands of fewer people. Power was essentially vested in a

plutocratic and feudal system. West Pakistan had a

population of 42.9 million in an area six times larger than

East Pakistan: East Pakistan had a population of 50.8

million (1961 census). The two parts of Pakistan were

separated by about 1,000 miles and, because of hostilities

with India, it was impossible to maintain land or air

communications across the intervening Indian territory. Air

and sea communications routes were 3,000 miles around the

southern tip of India. The two wings of Pakistan had

a religious belief in Islam in common, but the significant

geographic and social differences increasingly divided the

two wings. 4/

When Pakistan was formed in 1947, it was to be an

Islamic nation. However, the political institutions of the

new nation and the way they would function were left

undefined. The East and West wings could not agree on a

constitution defining the political institutions before the

deadline date for independence. The constitution was left

to be sorted out by the new nation itself, but the different

political traditions and aspirations of the East and West

wings were to be the source of serious, continuing friction.

The British had ruled India (including the territories

making up Pakistan) with a strong central government under

the Viceroy. However, the province of Bengal had developed

a provincial democratic parliamentary system much more

advanced than that of the northwestern provinces. For a

viable constitution these two traditions had to be

reconciled within the concept of the Islamic nation. As

well, the British since 1905, had designed the provincial

representative institutions on the basis of separate

electorates for members of the main religious groups --

Moslem and Hindu. West Pakistan had the majority of Moslems

(42.9 million) in the new nation since about one fifth of

the population (10 million of 50.8 million) of East Pakistan

was Hindu. If Pakistan was to continue the tradition of

separate electorates, then West Pakistan would dominate.

But if a single electorate was constituted, then East

Pakistan would dominate while owing its control to its Hindu

minority. Thus, from the beginning, the Islamic nation

concept involved friction between the nationalism and power

of different cultural and social communities within the

state. 5/

For the next seven years, the National Assembly in

Karachi wrestled with the drafting of a constitution.

However, by 1952 Bengali nationalism was reasserting itself

in a number of political parties, the most important being

the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujib-ur Rahman.

In provincial elections in 1954 the conservative Moslem

League was swept from power in East Pakistan by a coalition

of Bengali nationalist parties. When the new government

leader, Fazlul Haq, of East Pakistan made a speech

supporting the reunification of the old province of Bengal,

the national government in Karachi dismissed the provincial

cabinet and imposed Governor's rule. Any large increase of

non-Moslem population in East Pakistan (such as that of West

Bengal) would have further unbalanced the power between East

and West Pakistan as well as brought a real threat of war

with India. With the endless constitutional debate and

steady deterioration of the cohesion of Pakistan, the

President of Pakistan dismissed the National Assembly.

Under threat of imposition of military rule a cabinet with

members drawn from various sections of political opinion was

appointed and tasked to frame a constitution.

By 1956 a constitution had been drafted which included

the concept of parity and equal status between the two

communities of East and West Pakistan. This concept had the

support of most leaders in East Pakistan. While the

arrangement did not go as far as the original resolution of

1937 which called for "autonomous and sovereign" states, it

did maintain a political balance between East and West.

However, West Pakistan comprised fourteen states of the old

India of which the Punjab was the largest it would dominate

the affairs of West Pakistan: the politicians in the West

could not agree to accept this arrangement. Although the

constitution was proclaimed law, elections were never held.

In 1958 the President, Islamabad Mirza, abrogated the

constitution, and he was soon deposed by the Army Chief of

Staff, General Ayub Khan, who proclaimed martial law. The

army had moved to fill the power vacuum created by the lack

of workable political institutions. 6/

The military government of General Ayub concentrated

power toward a central executive government. A new

constitution was proclaimed in 1962 replacing sovereignty of

the people with the sovereignty of Allah. Effective

electoral power was given to an equal number of nobilities

from both wings of the nation, but the national and

provincial legislatures were given only minor powers. Most

powers were concentrated in the presidential executive

located in Karachi. General Ayub had created an autocratic

government in the tradition of the Urdu-speaking Moslems.

The Bengali movement for autonomy of East Pakistan was left

virtually without influence or power.

In the period 1960-1970, the Bengali's felt dominated

economically as well as politically by West Pakistan. East

Bengal lacked natural resources, was remote from main trade

routes, and was limited by a large expanding population

which was difficult to feed. The main exports were jute and

tea. Traditionally, these crops were exported to West

Bengal in exchange of manufactured goods. After partition

in 1947, the economic dependence on West Bengal was shifted

to West Pakistan. Here the central managers controlled the

foreign exchange earned by the exports as well as foreign

aid and foreign investment. In West Pakistan, the per

capita income was 61% higher than in East Pakistan. The

Bengalis resented the faster growth and higher incomes of

the West. They tended to blame the much higher proportion

of West Pakistanis in the civil and armed services and many

of the professions for diverting wealth to the West which

was generated in the East.

As resentment was growing, India and Pakistan went to

war over Kashmir in 1965. This conflict ended in stalemate

but it demonstrated the vulnerability of East Pakistan. The

complete cessation of economic activity with India hurt East

Pakistan and reinforced the Bengalis sense of economic

domination from West Pakistan. 7/

The resentment toward West Pakistan fed growing support

for the Awami League. By 1967 the League had adopted a six-

point manifesto aimed at economic and political autonomy for

East Pakistan. According to the manifesto the central

government should only retain control of foreign affairs and

defense while the provincial government should control

economic, taxation, trade and foreign aid policies.

The economic expansion in West Pakistan was also

producing social strains there. Radical socialists competed

with the traditional land-owning elites on which the

government and army were based. By 1968, strong support for

Ali Bhutto's radical Peoples Party emerged in the West wing.

The party's support was based on social justice for the

"common man" and hostility toward India. It was also

opposed to any action which would reduce the political and

economic status of West Pakistan.

In the rising tide of opposition to his policies,

General Ayub called a conference of political leaders to

resolve the most pressing conflicts. However, no settlement

was reached. General Ayub resigned on 26 March 1969 to be

replaced by General Yahya Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the

army. The constitution was again suspended. Pakistan had

reverted back to the position it was at in 1958.

General Yahya quickly promulgated a set of decisions

aimed at reducing political tensions in both wings of the

country. The first addressed the major grievance of East

Pakistan: national elections would be held by December 1970

based on a common electorate in both wings to give East

Pakistan a majority of seats. The second regrouped the 14

political regions of West Pakistan into four provinces more

equal in political power to the Punjab. Later General Yahya

expanded on these decisions with an outline for the transfer

of power from military government to constitutional

institutions.

a. A new constitution had to be prepared by

the national assembly within 120 days after being

called into session.

b. The constitution had to conform to certain

principles which included: a provision that the

territorial integrity and national solidarity of

Pakistan should be respected; and a federation

should be established in which provinces would

have maximum autonomy but, the federal government

would have adequate powers to carry out its

responsibilities for external and internal affairs

and to preserve the independence and territorial

integrity of the country.

c. To ensure that the constitution conformed

to the principles, it had to be approved by the

President.

With these decisions, General Yahya probably intended

to achieve some popular support for the military regime

after the long period of confusion of General Ayub's rule.

The guidelines for the constitution also gave protection to

the central power of armed forces. With the cooperation of

the Bengali members, the army could thwart Mr. Bhutto's

radical Peoples Party in West Pakistan. 8/

These guidelines were generally acceptable to the

civilian political leaders in both the East and West. As

the election approached, the two most active parties were

Sheikh Mijib's Awami League and Ali Bhutto's People's Party.

The results of the election, however, sent shock waves

through the nation. Of the 313 total seats in the assembly,

the Awami League took 167, a solid majority, all from the

East. Mr. Bhutto's party took 85 seats, all in the west. 9/

The Islamic parties of the old elite were decisively

defeated in both wings, and with this defeat went any hopes

the old elite and the army had of influencing the actions of

the assembly. With a parliamentary majority the Awami

League did not need the army or the old traditional parties

to win support for a draft constitution reflecting the

Bengali concept of autonomy within Pakistani federation.

Admittedly, President Yahya would have final approval of the

constitution, but the results of the election clearly

reflected an overwhelming demand for reform. The President

could draw little comfort from the opposition of Ali Bhutto

in the Assembly. The Peoples Party was equally anxious to

draft a constitution which limited the traditional powers of

the army and the Moslem elites. Again power was split

between the two geographic regions of the nation. 10/

The strong position of the Awami League persuaded many

supporters that there need be no retreat from the manifesto

adopted four years earlier demanding virtual economic

sovereignty for East Pakistan. This degree of autonomy was

unacceptable to the military government as well as Ali

Bhutto's party. There was stalemate again.

The military government of General Yahya was highly

centralized but not particularly sensitive to the political

currents of the civil population. Senior officers held key

positions in both the civil and military administrative

systems. These systems were largely parallel and often

competitive for power. At the top, Yahya held the offices

of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, Chief Martial Law

Administrator, President and Supreme Commander, Minister of

Defense and Minister of foreign Affairs. Yahya

theoritically had enormous scope for initiative, but the

elite of the army had considerable power which Yahya had to

take into account along with the political factions of the

country. Within the army, opinion generally belonged in one

of three positions: the center, including Yahya, hoped to

transfer power to a civil government headed by Sheikh Mujib

(Awami League) while retaining a special position for the

armed forces; the right, including many senior officers,

hoped to retain the power of the armed forces and opposed

any move toward more autonomy of the provinces and the

social policies of Mr. Bhutto's People's Party; finally, the

left, including many junior officers, combined a strong

nationalist feeling with social opinion leaning toward Mr.

Bhutto's party. The left and the right grew toward a

consensus opposed to any concession to the Awami League

which would weaken the power of the central government. 11/

General Yahya appears to have been unable to reconcile

the widely differing views both within the armed services

and the various political factions. Although Sheikhs

Mujib's party had decisively won the election and therefore

felt it had the right to form the national government, it

could do nothing until the President called the assembly

into session. This Yahya refused to do until the Sheikh

softened his stand on autonomy as stated in the Awami

Leaguer's manifesto. The League, sensing power, refused to

give any concession. Talks between President Yahya, Bhutto

and the Sheikh continued through January 1971, but no

agreement was reached. Finally, on February 13, 1971 Yahya

summoned the Assembly to meet on March 3, 1971. Bhutto

immediately announced his party, with 85 seats, would

boycott the session unless all parties reached a consensus

on an outline constitution before the Assembly met. On

March 1, 1971, President Yahya agreed with Mr. Bhutto and

announced that the Assembly session was postponed

indefinitely. 12/

The postponement of the Assembly session was followed

by widescale rioting and demonstrations throughout East

Pakistan. Sheikh Mujib called a series of general strikes

to demonstrate that East Pakistan would be ungovernable

unless the Assembly was called into session. 13/ It is

unlikely that the civil disorder came as a surprise to the

government for it had been reinforcing the military

garrisons in East Pakistan since mid-February. However,

throughout March, Yahya and Mujib engaged in a complicated

series of negotiations in which some concessions were made.

But on March 25, 1971, Yahya suddenly broke off talks and

left for Islamabad. At the same time the army, which had

been brought up to strength of 40,000 in the East, moved

against the Bengali police, Bengali-manned army units and

other paramilitary forces. Sheikh Mujib was arrested along

with many other Awami League leaders. Newspaper offices

were seized and university halls attacked and occupied. It

seemed that Yahya had used the last session of negotiations

as pretext to allow time for the army to be brought up to

sufficient strength to overwhelm Bengali opposition. 14/

The drive for political and economic autonomy of the

Bengali people entered a new phase. The efforts to win

power through the election process and parliamentary system

were a complete failure. The central military government

was incapable of reconciling the aspirations of the Bengalis

with social reform pressures of the West Pakistanis and the

traditional elitism of the Urdu-speaking Moslems. Military

repression of the Bengali nationalist movement followed.

The Bengali Moslems had a common religion with the Urdu-

speaking Moslems of the West, but social and political

traditions, as well as language and economic base, were

quite different. When Pakistan was formed as an Islamic

nation in 1947, there was no consensus on the form its

political institutions should take. The Moslem states in

the West were governed by traditional elitists who

considered strong federal government essential to preserve

Islamic ideals. The Bengali Moslems' aspirations for more

democratic institutions responsive to regional politics

would not be accommodated by those in the West. At the same

time, demands for social reform in the West by lower-classes

went unheeded.

After more than ten years of political stalemate, the

armed forces, in particular the army, seized power to break

the political deadlock. The officers of the army were

largely drawn from the traditional Moslem elite of the West.

Their administration was highly centralized and emphasized

the economic development as well as the social welfare of

the West and the Urdu-speaking traditional Moslems. This

administration only added to the frustration of the Bengalis

who increasingly saw East Pakistan as an economic and

cultural colony of the West. Indeed, the poorer classes of

people of the West also became increasingly disaffected as

they received little benefit from the economic and social

policies of the army administration. By 1971, after 12

years of military rule, Pakistan was even further from

political unity than it was in 1958.

The years of military rule also had a deleterious

effect on military capability. Government administration

detracted from the professional education of the officers as

well as the combat training of the army as a whole.

Political factions appeared in the army which probably

detracted from the cooperation and trust essential to an

effective military force. When open conflict erupted in

March 1971, the armed forces were forced to disarm and

remove Bengali officers and men. These actions must have

had a serious negative effect on the efficiency of the

services' war fighting capability.

In summary, the common religion of Islam could not

overcome the deep divisions of geography, culture and

political goals. Pakistan moved toward insurrection and

war.

ENDNOTES

(Chapter I)

1/ Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India,

Pakistan and Bangla Desh. (New York: Praeger, 1975)

p. 9.

2/ Ibid., p. 10.

3/ Ibid., p. 14.

4/ Ibid., p. 15.

5/ Ibid., p. 16.

6/ Ibid., p. 18.

7/ John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 3rd ed.,

(New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982), p.

8/ Jackson, pp. 22-23.

9/ Ibid., p. 24.

10/ Robert LaPorte Jr. "Pakistan 1971: The Disinte-

gration of a nation," Asian Survey. 12, No. 2 (Feb 1972),

p. 100.

11/ Jackson, pp. 25-27.

12/ LaPorte, p. 100; Jackson, pp. 27-28.

13/ Jackson, p. 28.

14/ Ibid., p. 33.

CHAPTER II

REBELLION AND REPRESSION

When Pakistan's army struck on the night of March 25,

1971, all Awami League leaders were arrested, killed or fled

into exile to India. Sheikh Mujib was arrested and flown to

West Pakistan to await trial on unspecified charges.

President Yahya stated in a radio broadcast the next day

that the Sheikh's "action of starting his non-cooperation

movement is an act of treason." 1/ Disorder and confusion

reigned in Dacca and other parts of East Pakistan. Many

civilians were killed as the army struck violently to clear

barricades in the cities. The Dacca University was shelled

and occupied; this resulted in many casualties. Police and

Bengali soldiers in Dacca were disarmed and detained. 2/

The army became an army of West Pakistanis and was viewed by

Bengalis as an occupying force.

Outside Dacca the army attacked Bengali officers and

men of the armed forces. The army then moved against other

paramilitary organizations such as the police, border

security forces and the militia. In some cases, the attacks

lasted several days but almost everywhere there were heavy

Bengali casualties and destruction. The Bengali military

and police units were scattered throughout the country and

many members began to withdraw toward the borders sabotaging

bridges and rail links where possible. The actions were

brutal and had elements of a cultural war: the army

attacked Bengalis, while Bengalis murdered members of the

Urdu-speaking minorities. By the end of April 1971, the

army had secured the major towns in East Pakistan and

organized resistance ceased. However, the nucleus of an

armed and trained guerrilla force had escaped into India and

to remote areas on the border. At the border Indian units

welcomed the fleeing Bengalis but India played no part in

the resistance at that time. 4/ As April drew to a close,

the attack by West Pakistan on the Eastern wing had

successfully stopped the immediate possibility of armed

revolt. However, the population was subdued but remained

passively hostile. The army reacted to this hostility with

increasing brutality and destruction of civilian property

continued. Civilian refugees began to pour into India.

As news of the uprising and repression in East Pakistan

spread in India, there was considerable public pressure on

the Indian Government to intervene. On March 29, 1971, the

Indian parliament passed a resolution pledging sympathy and

support for the people of East Bengal in their struggle for

the transfer of power to their legally-elected

representatives. The parliament expressed confidence that

"... the historic upsurge of 75 million people of East

Bengal will triumph." 5/ This resolution represented a

change in Indian policy toward Pakistan. Previously, India

had respected the unity of Pakistan in order to protect her

own unity, which had been also threatened by regional

factions and demands for autonomy.

Indian support to the rebels in the following weeks

consisted of assisting voluntary efforts to help the East

Pakistan cause and of encouraging escaped Bengalis to form a

provisional government. India, however, withheld formal

recognition of this government-in-exile. These cautious

actions were probably the result of military advice that

India would not be prepared for military action till after

the monsoon season ended in September. 6/

In response to India's statement of support for the

Bengalis, Pakistan protested that India was interfering in

Pakistan's internal affairs. The apparent object of this

diplomatic effort was to gain international support to

oppose any Indian intervention. But on April 2, 1971,

Russia publicly appealed to Yahya to quickly put an end to

the repression in East Pakistan. Islamabad replied that the

situation was under control and normal routine was being

established. Also on that date, the United States expressed

concern for the human suffering and the need for multi-

national assistance. President Nixon was probably concerned

that the balance of power in Asia would be upset and he was

anxious not to jeopardize the effort to develop closer

relations with China. 7/ The U.S. needed a stable Asia and

support of China to implement the planned withdrawal from

Vietnam.

Although slow in coming, on April 13 China expressed

support for President Yahya's efforts. Chou En-lai stated

that should India attack Pakistan, China would fully support

the Pakistani people and government to safeguard "State

Sovereignty" and national independence. The phrasing was

important as it did not state full support for the unity and

integrity of the nation as Pakistan wanted. From April

onwards, China provided economic and military assistance

appropriate to their statement of support; that is,

sufficient to guarantee only that in a war with India the

Western wing would survive, but not necessarily the Eastern

wing. Both India and the Soviet Union had long standing

disputes with China. China's interests would be served by

continuing to have Pakistan interposed between the U.S.S.R.

and India. Should West Pakistan cease to exist, then China

would be surrounded by unfriendly neighbors. On the other

hand, continuing rivalry between Pakistan and India over

East Pakistan would divert India's attention away from her

border with China. Thus survival of West Pakistan was

important to China, while the dispute in East Pakistan would

add to the rivalry between India and West Pakistan to ensure

that India's attention would be diverted from her Northern

border with China.

At the United Nations, Secretary General U. Thant asked

Pakistan to allow United Nations relief agencies to act in

East Pakistan while recognizing that the situation was an

internal matter of Pakistan. President Yahya firmly refused

any outside intervention. 9/ He probably believed that his

policy of counter-insurgency was sufficient to reestablish

control.

By May 1971, organized resistance in East Pakistan had

been crushed. Pakistan diplomacy appeared successful as

most countries viewed the affair as an internal problem.

However, the flow of refugees into India had turned to a

flood. India claimed that the refugees (mostly Bengali

Moslems) were arriving at a rate of 60,000 per day and

now totaled 1.5 million. These people moved mostly into

West Bengal and were costly to India in food and clothing;

furthermore, they were causing a severe economic dislocation

in a province already impoverished. In this situation,

India could do little more than provide indirect support to

the Bengali government-in-exile and provide sanctuary,

training and arms for the guerrilla forces. Diplomatically,

India stressed that whether or not the problem was an

internal one for Pakistan, the refugees were becoming an

internal problem for India: Pakistan must be responsible

for developing conditions for the safe return of the

refugees. 10/

India's diplomatic efforts began to get results.

Britain and the United States declared no new aid would be

extended to Pakistan until the government in Islamabad

cooperated with international relief agencies; however,

United States aid already approved would continue.

Pakistan's economy was weak. There was a shortage of

foreign exchange and exports from East Pakistan had slowed

significantly. 11/ Pakistan needed aid and needed the

return of the economic base of East Pakistan.

Thus in mid-May Pakistan informed the United Nations of

its willingness to accept relief aid if the activity was

coordinated by Pakistani officials. Within a week Yahya

appealed to the refugees to return and announced he would

soon reveal a plan for the orderly transfer of power to the

representatives of the people. Refugee reception centres

were set up and a general amnesty announced on June 10,

1971. The shift in Pakistani policy eased tensions in East

Pakistan. Many influential members of the Awami League

signed a declaration accepting the concept of national unity

and supporting the reintroduction of separate electorates

for Hindus and Moslems. To gain support of the right-wing

factions of the army, Yahya proposed that a new constitution

be drafted by a committee of experts rather than the

National Assembly. Although India now reported more than

six million refugees, the flow slowed considerably and she

was being pressured to accept international assistance for

the repatriation of refugees. 12/

By June, India had become distrustful of United

Nations' actions to repatriate refugees. When Pakistan

shifted ground to accommodate United Nations' actions, India

rejected the proposal for posting United Nations observers

on her border. 13/ India was probably concerned that East

Pakistan would return to the pre-crisis situation with

little or no gain toward self-determination of East Bengal.

Public opinion in India's turbulent eastern provinces also

favored severing Pakistan's link with East Bengal as an

opportunity to weaken a dangerous enemy. India, therefore,

insisted that Pakistan must come to a political solution of

the crisis founded on self-determination for East Bengal

before social and economic aid should be extended. On the

other hand, the United Nations' approach was to put social

and economic recovery in place before a political solution

should be attempted. The United States clearly supported

the U.N. approach which would return the South Asian balance

of power to the pre-crisis condition.

During May and June, leaders of the Awami League who

had fled to India continued to develop the Bangla Desh

movement (as they now called East Pakistan) politically and

militarily. The government-in-exile was nominally headed by

Sheikh Mujib, but because he was under arrest in West

Pakistan, the real head was Tajuddin Ahmid, the prime

minister. 14/

The stated goal of the movement was the independence

of East Pakistan; its unannounced objective was to gain

political power for the Awami League. 15/ To this end, the

government-in-exile tried to exclude Bengalis representing

left-wing and communist movements. The government-in-exile

remained composed principally of Awami League members but

its military arm, the Mukti Fanj, eventually incorporated

armed groups organized by other political factions. 16/

The government-in-exile pursued three broad strategic

programs to achieve its goal. These were:

(a) organizing the support of the population of East

Pakistan;

(b) gaining favorable international support; and,

(c) disrupting the economic strength of Pakistan

through attacks on the lines of communication in East

Pakistan.

To translate the disaffection of the Bengalis into

supportive action for the Bangla Desh movement, an

underground was organized to publicize its goals. Insurgent

propaganda emphasized the atrocities of the Pakistani army

and described the army as an occupation force restoring the

colonial rule of West Pakistan. This program succeeded to

get support in the form of volunteers as well as

information, supplies and concealment in the rural areas.

In the urban areas, the Bengalis were encouraged to boycott

schools, offices and factories to further disrupt the

economy. The insurgents also used terror tactics to

intimidate civil servants and factory managers to keep their

facilities closed. Furthermore, Bengali leaders who openly

supported Pakistan unity or collaborated with the army were

assassinated selectively to discourage others. 17/

To influence the international community, the main

effort emphasized recognition for the Bangla Desh government-

in-exile. Many Bengalis who were with Pakistani foreign

missions defected and set about publicizing the legitimacy

of the Bangla Desh movement. Although not initially

successful in obtaining formal recognition, these diplomats

developed popular sympathy for the Bangla Desh movement.

The Mukti Fanj was used primarily in an offensive role

to attack the lines of communication and to disrupt the

military and economic strength of East Pakistan. The

monsoon season of June to September favored guerrilla

tactics. Two-thirds of the country was water soaked

limiting mobility to roads, railways and river craft. The

roads and railways ran close to the border, crossing many

bridges vulnerable to attack. The India-East Pakistan

border itself was 1,400 miles long with no natural

obstacles. The interior of East Pakistan could be reached

easily by guerrillas from the border area by river and delta

channels. 18/

The Mukti Fanj mounted small, deep raids from their

sanctuaries in India and remote border enclaves.

Detachments of the Pakistani army were attacked causing

casualties which were duly reported by the foreign press.

These reports conflicted with Pakistani claims that the area

was under control and thus tended to undermine international

support for Pakistan. However, the attack on communications

was much more successful and had immediate effects.

Railways were largely inoperable beyond 30 to 50 miles from

Dacca. Roads were cut isolating the principal towns and

ports. The Pakistani army was left isolated in the urban

areas while the major export crops of jute and tea could not

be moved from the rural areas to markets. 19/

As July closed, the military situation in East

Pakistan was worsening. The monsoon was restricting army

mobility while the Mukti Fanj (renamed the Mukti Bahini)

mounted an increasing number of small raids aimed at

sabotage and terror. The army was forced to conduct

viscious counter-insurgent tactics which increased the

hostility of the disaffected population.

After a lull in June, refugees in large numbers again

poured into India. President Yahya continued to press for

the United Nations to force India to withdraw her support to

the Bangla Desh rebels and to decrease border tension to

induce more refugees to return home. He also stated that if

India tried to seize a base in East Pakistan for rebel

operations there would be general war. This was followed by

reports of Pakistani military build-up along the West

Pakistan border with India. 20/

Pakistani diplomacy at the United Nations, supported by

the U.S. was having an effect. U Thant recommended raising

substantial relief aid for East Pakistan. The resources

would be allocated for the refurbishment of transportation

systems as well as food and clothing. India remained

opposed to this plan as well as the U.N. proposal for

representatives on the border to facilitate passage of

refugees back to East Pakistan. It is now clear that India

was determined to see East Pakistan independence and would

not agree to any measures which increased West Pakistan's

strength there. By continuing to support the Bangla Desh

movement, India was becoming increasingly isolated at the

U.N. Her policy also implied eventual direct military

intervention since she could not support the enormous number

of refugees and ignore public support for intervention

indefinitely. 21/

Up to the end of July, the Soviet Union had tried to

maintain a balanced approach to India and Pakistan in an

effort to increase her influence on the sub-continent.

However, when the United States and China moved toward

closer mutual relations and both supported the Pakistani

position, Moscow concluded Treaty of Peace, Friendship and

Cooperation with New Delhi on August 9. The Treaty had

little effect on India militarily, but it gave support for

her position at the United Nations Security Council. The

Soviet Union opposed every proposal for any kind of

intervention which might allow Pakistan to get a political

settlement unacceptable to India, i.e., denial self-

determination for the people of East Pakistan. 22/

During August, President Yahya continued to try to win

some support within the population of East Pakistan as well

as satisfy the "hard-liners" in West Pakistan. On August 9,

Yahya announced that Awami League members who would support

Pakistani unity would be allowed to take their seats in the

National Assembly, while the remainder of the unfilled seats

would be filled by by-elections to be held at end-November.

About half the Awami League delegates elected in December

1970 signed a document agreeing to this move. Yahya also

announced that Sheikh Mujib would be tried by military court

on charges of "waging war against Pakistan." These two

proposals were a key compromise of the political factions of

Pakistan. 23/

In September more positive aspects of Yahya's plan

emerged. General Tikka Khan, who was the prime proponent

for military repression, was replaced as Governor of East

Pakistan by a civilian, and press censorship was officially

lifted. On September 5, a general amnesty was granted to

all civilians and members of the armed forces alleged to

have committed crimes since March 1. A number of detainees,

mostly politicians aligned with the Awami League were

released. 24/ These moves were countered by the government-

in-exile which remained committed to complete independence.

the Mukti Bahini intensified its propaganda aimed at the

Bengali population. As well, assassinations of candidates

standing for election were increased. For her part, India

would not provide assistance for refugees wanting to return

to East Pakistan. These actions were largely successful in

discouraging any popular Bengali support for the authorities

in Dacca and Islamabad. Candidates failed to stand for 18

out of 78 seats of the Assembly available and no significant

number of refugees returned from India. 25/

India also increased its support to the Mukti Bahini

military operations by providing artillery fire across the

border for the guerrillas and stopping the Pakistani army

from pursuing them into Indian territory. With their lines

of withdrawal more secure the guerrillas undertook deeper

raids into East Pakistan to destroy bridges, roads and army

posts. The increased military activity put further pressure

on the army to repress the actions and divereted effort from

rebuilding the economy and reestablishing civil order.

On October 12, Pakistan proposed to India mutual troop

withdrawals and posting of United Nations observers in the

border areas. Although India refused, Pakistan went ahead

and withdrew its army to stronger positions 10-12 miles

behind the border. 26/ This action was indicative of the

success of the guerrillas in their attacks against the

isolated Pakistani outposts.

At the same time Pakistani diplomacy emphasized the

requirement for United Nations action to restrain India from

supporting the rebels of East Pakistan. Pakistan continued

to argue that India was interfering in her internal affairs.

New Delhi's position was that the problem was not an "India-

Pakistan" problem, but strictly a Pakistani one for

Islamabad to correct. Therefore, United Nations' action was

inappropriate Pakistan had only to create conditions in

East Pakistan of peace and security for the refugees to

return home. 27/ While New Dehli's argument had a

legalistic logic, it must have been clear that Pakistan

could not create conditions of peace while fighting

guerrillas armed and trained in India. India obviously had

little desire to see East Pakistan survive as a province of

her rival in Islamabad.

While the Soviet Union consistently supported Indian

positions at the United Nations, in October Moscow pressured

New Delhi to soften her policy on Bangla Desh independence.

As a result, the Indian Foreign Minister announced that

India was committed only to a political solution acceptable

to the already elected representative of East Pakistan.

With many of these representatives in exile, their leader,

Sheikh Mujib, under arrest in West Pakistan it would have

been unreasonable that these representatives would demand

anything less than political automony for East Pakistan. In

any case, President Yahya refused to negotiate with them.

India returned to her previous position of demanding self-

determination for Bangla Desh. New Delhi had won a

propaganda victory and persuaded the Soviet Union to

continue to support her, all without any material or

political cost.

While Pakistan probably could have restored order

eventually in East Pakistan, President Yahya realized he had

little hope of prevailing without outside help if India

invaded there. He, therefore, tried to persuade China to

increase her commitment to the security of all Pakistan:

this the Chinese refused to do. Peking remained committed

to support Pakistan only to the extent required to ensure

the survival of West Pakistan as a nation. Despite public

pronouncements from Islamabad that China would supply all

the weapons Pakistan would need in a future conflict with

India, the Indians never appeared to be in any doubt as to

the true nature of China's commitment. When war came in

December, several Indian divisions were withdrawn from the

Sino-Indian border and moved into East Pakistan. 28/

As November drew to a close, Pakistan could no longer

tolerate Indian military actions in the border area.

Shelling and tank fire from the Indian army continued to

inflict casualties on Pakistani posts and provide support

guerrilla operations. Islamabad viewed the conflict as

India's responsibility and this was endorsed by the United

States who, on November 30, suspended licenses for arms

exports to India. 29/ On December 3, 1971, Pakistan struck

India with air and ground attacks across the border from

West Pakistan.

The period from March to September was marked by the

rapid deterioration of the political situation in East

Pakistan. When confronted by demands of the elected

representatives of the Awani League for economic and

political automony, the central military government in

Islamabad reacted with a ruthless and brutal repression

which ultimately failed. Islamabad appears to have

seriously underestimated the strength and the organization

of the Bengali nationalist movement embodied in the Awami

League. Faced with the arrest of over half its leadership,

the remaining Awami League leaders went into exile in India

with even firmer resolve to win independence. From there

they were able to quickly transform the party organization

into a credible government-in-exile with a military arm to

prosecute guerrilla warfare. The actions of the Islamabad

government worked to the advantage of the Bengali resistance

by providing the elements of a successful revolution.

By arresting and detaining Bengali leaders Islamabad

indicated to the world at large and the Bengalis, in

particular, that no political compromise was possible. The

ruthless and brutal purge of Bengalis from the armed forces

succeeded in sending a trained and dedicated cadre of

soldiers into exile in India where they were available to

the Bangla Desh government-in-exile as a cadre for the

guerrilla force. At the same time, Pakistani military

operations caused such destruction and intimidation of

civilians that millions also fled to India where they were

available and willing to support the Bangla Desh movement.

Little attempt was made by the Pakistan government to

encourage these refugees to return home. It is possible

that the Islamabad government consciously followed a policy

of forcing large numbers of civilians out of East Pakistan

in order to reduce the population to below that of West

Pakistan. This would ensure that in future governments West

Pakistan would hold a majority of seats in the National

Assembly and could protect its privileged position in the

nation. In any case, these destitute refugees provided a

large pool of manpower opposing the West Pakistani

government.

India saw the conflict as an opportunity to weaken her

major rival in South Asia. Pakistan had humiliated India in

the war over Kashmir in 1965. India at that time had had to

divide her forces between East and West while maintaining

considerable forces on her northern border with China. New

Delhi was determined to not be defeated again by Pakistan.

Breaking East Pakistan from the remainder of the nation

would greatly simplify her defense problem. India,

therefore, adopted the policy of supporting the Bangla Desh

movement while preparing her own armed forces for war with

Pakistan should intervention be necessary. The independence

of East Pakistan was pursued consistently and with skill

throughout the period.

Indian public opinion largely supported New Delhi's

policy. The burden of millions of refugees in India's most

populous and impoverished region was costly and caused

social unrest. Furthermore, most Indians saw Pakistan as a

threat which would lead to war eventually in any case.

When India's goal appeared in danger of being thwarted

by United Nations' intervention, New Delhi quickly found the

necessary Security Council veto by concluding a treaty with

the Soviet Union. This treaty did not place any military

obligation on either party, but only pledged cooperation.

For the Soviet Union the treaty demonstrated to the world

its increasing influence in South Asia while for India the

treaty gave her what she needed most -- an ally with veto

power in the Security Council.

The Awami League which formed the leadership of the

Bangla Desh movement was thus provided all the essential

elements to prosecute its guerrilla war for the independence

of East Pakistan. The league had safe havens in India from

which to organize politically and militarily. The arrest

and detention of the popular leader, Sheikh Mujib, provided

tangible and symbolic evidence of the persecution of the

Bengalis by the West Pakistani. The widespread destruction

of personal property and the economic deterioration in East

Pakistan gave the Bangla Desh movement an enormous pool of

manpower willing to resist the Pakistani authorities. The

Bengali soldiers who had escaped formed a trained and

dedicated nucleus for a guerrilla force. Finally, the

support of India in form of arms and training allowed the

guerrillas to move to the offensive quickly and effectively.

By December, it became apparent to Islamabad that it

was not regaining control of East Pakistan. The guerrillas

were striking deeply into East Pakistan in greater strength.

India was deploying raids across her border with East

Pakistan to support the guerrillas. Pakistan, therefore,

mounted an attack on December 3 aimed at destroying as much

Indian combat power as possible before she herself was

attacked by India.

ENDNOTES

(Chapter II)

1/ "Presidents Broadcast," Pakistan Affairs, Special

Issue, (Washington), No. 18, March 31, 1971.

2/ Robert Laporte Jr. "Pakistan 1971: The Disin-

tegration of a Nation," Asian Survey, 12, No. 2 (February

1972), p. 102.

3/ Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India, Pakis-

tan and Bangla Desh, (New York, Praeger, 1975), pp. 34-35.

4/ Ibid., p. 35.

5/ Bangla Desh Documents, (New Dehli: Government of

India, 1971), p. 672.

6/ Jackson, p. 38.

7/ Ibid., p. 42.

8/ Ibid., p. 173.

9/ Ibid., p. 43.

10/ David H. Bayley, "India: War and Political Asset-

tion," Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 2., February 1972, p. 91.

11/ Jackson, p. 48.

12/ Ibid., pp. 52-54.

13/ Ibid., p. 61.

14/ M. Rashiduzzaman, "Leadership, Organization, Stra-

tegies and Tactics of the Bangla Desh Movement," Asian

Survey, Vol. 12, No. 3, March 1972, p. 187.

15/ Ibid, p. 193.

16/ Jackson, p. 57.

17/ Rashiduzzaman, p. 195.

18/ Jackson, p. 59.

19/ Rashiduzzaman, p. 196. See also Chopra, p. 59

and Jackson, pp. 60-61.

20/ Jackson, p. 68.

21/ Ibid., p. 69.

22/ Ibid., p. 73.

23/ Ibid., p. 80.

24/ Ibid., p. 81.

25/ Rashiduzzaman, p. 198.

26/ Jackson, p. 92.

27/ Ibid., p. 82

26/ Ibid., p. 96.

29/ Stroessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 3d ed., St.

Martin's Press. New York, 1982, p. 134.

CHAPTER III

THE 14-DAY WAR: 3-16 DECEMBER 1971

When general war opened on December 3, India and

Pakistan had unequal military capacities. India had

developed an arms industry with aid from the Soviet Union

and the West which was capable of producing major weapons

such as tanks and aircraft. India also had received and

continued to have access to military equipment from Moscow.

On the other hand, Pakistan's industry was much less

developed. She had been unable to get arms when cut-off by

the West and Russia in the summer of 1971. China had

provided military supplies, but these could not redress the

imbalance. 1/

The relative strengths of the armed forces of the two

countries are shown in Table 1. It must be noted that India

maintained considerable army forces guarding the Himalayan

border with China which reduced the forces available for

combat with Pakistan. 2/

Early in the counter-insurgency phase of the conflict,

Pakistan had purged Bangali units from the armed forces.

Many Bengalis who belonged to predominantly West Pakistan

units had defected: those who remained were not trusted and

the combat effectiveness of Pakistani units suffered as a

result. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was particularly

affected because many of the ground crew had been Bengali.

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The officer corps of all three Pakistani services had

been politicized, especially at the general officer level,

by years of military government. The need for political

balance in the government often overrode the requirements

for ability in many senior military appointments. This

resulted in poor leadership and incompetence as well as lack

of cohesion and trust. By 1971, the chiefs-of-staff system

had been modified so as to be almost unrecognizable. Yahya

Khan retained control of army operations in addition to his

duties as President and supreme Commander of all the

services. The structure was overly centralized and

dominated by the army. Not surprisingly, communications and

cooperation were poor between General Headquarters co-

located with the army at Rawalpindi, and the PAF and navy

located at Peshawar and Karachi respectively. 3/

The Indian system emphasized the distinction between

government and the armed services. Each service had equal

status and was controlled by a civilian minister of the

cabinet responsible to parliament. The service chiefs were

members of a chief-of-staff committee. A joint planning

staff provided coordination. This system was well-suited to

respond to civilian management. 4/

Pakistan's strategy tried to involve the United

Nations to prevent India from intervening militarily. But

when it became apparent that this strategy could not prevent

war, Pakistan attacked from the West. Yahya probably

considered East Pakistan indefensible in the long run, but

he hoped to gain sufficient Indian territory in the West

which could be traded for East Pakistan territory in the

negotiations following the cease-fire. The land battle in

the West was thus crucial for Pakistan.

Indian strategy was to act quickly in the East to

decisively defeat Pakistani forces there while defending

Indian territory in the West. This strategy reduced the

danger of China intervening as it clearly did not threaten

the existence of West Pakistan. 5/ A quick decision in the

East would ensure an independent nation in East Bengal

before international action could be mobilized to separate

the Indian and Pakistani armies there and preclude the

decision India sought.

When the PAF struck at 1747 on December 3, Pakistan

attempted to disable the superior Indian Air Force (IAF) by

a preemptive strike. Airfields at Amritsar, Srinagar,

Avantipur, Pathankot and Faridkot were attacked; however,

the strike failed to achieve any significant success. The

IAF had dispersed their aircraft to hardened shelters on a

large number of airfields where only a direct hit could

damage them. The late afternoon forced the attack to be

brief as it could not be sustained in darkness. Not only

were too few airfields struck for too short a time, but only

30 percent of the available aircraft were used. The

aircraft may have had a low serviceability or the PAF may

have attempted to save aircraft since they could not be

easily replaced. In any case, from this raid onwards, the

IAF dominated the air-war. 6/ On December 4, the IAF flew

over 500 sorties on tactical and strategic targets in

Pakistan. In 14 days of war, the Western Air Command of IAF

alone flew over 4,000 sorties. 7/ The IAF claimed 94

aircraft, while the PAF claimed 81. This air campaign

demonstrated again the value of mass and boldness: the IAF

influenced the war significantly with relatively small

losses while the PAF flew far fewer sorties with greater

losses and less effect. 8/

The border between West Pakistan and India followed no

natural topographical feature, but it had been inherited on

the basis of the old pre-1947 borders. There Pakistan

deployed ten infantry divisions, two armoured divisions,

various brigades and almost all its combat aircraft. The

general deployments are shown in Appendix I. The order of

battle of the Indians has not been disclosed, but it was

probably comparable. 9/

On December 3, the Pakistani 26 Infantry Brigade

attacked east from Kahuta toward Punch in northern Kashmir.

They had made virtually no progress against Indian ground

defenses and heavy air attacks when the offensive was

terminated two days later. On December 9, a second attack

toward Punch was again thwarted by IAF bombing. The Indians

then made a series of small attacks which secured several

Pakistani posts north and west of Punch. Further north in

the area of Kargil, the Indians secured all the Pakistani

outposts which overlooked the Zoji La Pass. These actions

were conducted at night at elevations above 16,000 feet at

sub-zero temperatures. 10/

To the south, the area of Chhamb was an important

communication link to all parts of Kashmir. The II (Pak)

corps attacked on December 3 with four infantry and one

armored brigade with eight artillery regiments in support.

After four days, they had succeeded in driving two Indian

infantry battalions out of their prepared defense to

positions across on the east bank of the Munnawar Tawi

River. Two days later the Pakistanis took the town of

Chhamb and established a bridgehead on the east side of the

river. On December 10 the Indians counter-attacked, sending

the Pakistanis back across the river. In the next two days,

units of II (Pak) Corps recrossed the river two more times

only to be forced to withdraw. By December 12, when the

sector stabilized, the Indians estimated they had lost 17

tanks and 440 men killed while the Pakistanis had lost 36

tanks and 1350 men killed. 11/

In the Punjab, the Sialkot-Shakargarh salient juts into

India. The Indians launched an attack there to relieve

pressure on the Chhamb area. They attacked the salient on

two axes: one from the north to cut the road between

Shakargarh and Zafarwal, the other from the east with

Shakargarh as the objective. Good Pakistani defensive

positions and extensive mining made progress slow, but by

the time of the cease-fire on December 16, the Indians had

secured about 1000 square kilometers of the salient. 12/

South of the Shakargarh salient in the area of Dera

Baba Nanak and Fazilka, the Indians expected a major

Pakistani offensive. Both sides fought local engagements in

effort to gain favorable position. However, no major

offensive was attempted. Although the 1 (Pak) Armoured

Division was available to strike, lack of air cover probably

kept it from entering the battle. 13/

Actions in the Sind-Rajasthan sector were aimed a

drawing strategic reserves of both sides down from the other

northern sectors. A Pakistani force of one infantry

brigade, supported by a reinforced armoured regiment,

crossed the border near Ramgarh on December 4. Without air

cover, the Pakistanis were caught in the open and lost an

estimated 34 tanks and 100 other vehicles in one day before

withdrawing. 14/ On December 5, while Pakistani armour was

being destroyed north in the desert, the Indians captured

Gadra and moved southwest on to Nagar Parkar and the Rann of

Kutch. This advance had possibilities of cutting the main

north-south lines of communication through Hyderabad to

Karachi. Indian progress was slow, but by the time of the

cease-fire 11 days later they had advanced to Naya Chor

and had captured 4,700 square kilometers of Pakistani

land. 15/ Its quite probable that the Indian advance in the

Rann of Kutch was deliberately slow in order not to

threaten seriously West Pakistan and thus arouse Chinese

military intervention.

At the time of cease-fire the Pakistanis had not

achieved any of their objectives. They had no large tracts

of Indian territory to use as bargaining chips for East

Pakistan. India had been able to deploy similar military

strength to a battle which, for them, was defensive. Indian

air superiority allowed them flexibility while negating any

Pakistani local ground concentration.

The 14-day war was the first full-scale Indian naval

war. India's fleet was much superior to that of Pakistan

and was well prepared when war came on December 3. The

Indian navy was able to defend the coast while blockading

East Pakistan and attacking shore targets in support of

ground operations. 16/

Pakistan's surface fleet had neither air cover nor

weapons to defend against India's missile boats. Therefore,

it stayed in Karachi harbour while submarines were given the

task of destroying India's aircraft carrier and cruiser.

They were unsuccessful: on December 4, Dafne-class

Pakistani submarine was sunk by a carrier escort in the Bay

of Bengal while a second submarine was sunk off Visakhapatna

harbour. The only Indian loss was the frigate Kukri sunk by

a sumbarine in the Arabian Sea on December 9. 17/

India's main naval support effort was in the Bay of

Bengal where a carrier task force blockaded the sea

approaches to East Pakistan. Six merchant ships and

"numerous" small craft were captured. Carrier based

aircraft struck assembly points of small boats in the Ganges

delta area, preventing the escape or reinforcement of

Pakistani army elements. The establishment of air

superiority early in the war allowed the ships freedom to

maneuver to attack shore targets at Chittagong, Cox's Bazar,

Chalna, Kulna and other economic and military targets. 18/

These actions had a significant effect on the collapse of

East Pakistan.

But the decisive theater of the war was East Pakistan

shown on the map at Appendix 2. The area is divided by

three major river systems into four parts with Dacca, the

capital, at the center. The Jamuna River runs north to

south cutting the country in half. West of the Jamuna the

Padma (Ganges) River flows west to east to join the Jamuna

west of Dacca. South of the Padma lies the South-Western

Sector with the major towns of Kushtia, Jessore, Khulna and

Chalna. To the north of the Padma the North-Western Sector

contains the towns of Rangpur, Dinajpur, Bogra and Rajshahi.

The Surma-Meghna River flows southwest from Sylhet joining

the Jamuna south east of Dacca and dividing the remainder of

the country into the Northern Sector and Eastern Sector.

India deployed six infantry divisions and various

supporting troops on all sides of East Pakistan. Supporting

the Indian force were eight battalions of Mukti-Bahini and

many irregular Bengali soldiers. 19/ To force a quick

decision, India had to strike deep toward Dacca. Since the

trafficability of most of the region is poor, the combat

forces were lightly equipped but they were well trained and

were reinforced with engineers to assist in river crossings.

The Indian forces were deployed as follows: II Corps

comprising of two infantry divisions was tasked to advance

eastward through the South-Western Sector in the general

direction of Dacca; XXXIII Corps with one infantry division

and two brigades was tasked to attack to the Bogra area in

the Northwestern Sector and then on to Dacca; 101

Communications Zone with one brigade was to strike south

through the Northern Sector toward Dacca; and, IV Corps in

the Eastern Sector had three divisions with missions to

advance westward to Dacca. 20/

Opposing the Indians, Pakistan deployed five divisions

with two armoured regiments and supporting artillery. The

forces were deployed forward in strong points based on towns

near the border with light forces screening to the border.

In the Southwestern Sector the Indian II Corps advanced

on three axes. Nine (I) Division struck southeast bypassing

Jessore to the south then moved on the Kulna, Chalna and

Barisal. A second element of 9 (I) Division passed north of

Jessore on December 5 and, moving cross-country, took

Jheneida two days later. A third column composed of 4 (I)

Division moved eastward on the right bank of the Padma and

took Kushtia with its important railway bridge after heavy

fighting on December 11. The Pakistani forces based in

Jessore withdrew piecemeal without a fight when they found

themselves cut-off by the advancing Indian columns. By

December 15, the resistance in this sector had

collapsed. 21/ The Indians had demonstrated that they could

move rapidly across the marshy ground and numerous streams.

Good training and assistance of Mukti-Bahini guides allowed

them to outflank the major strong points which then

crumbled.

In the Northwestern Sector, XXXIII (I) Corps advanced

southeast on three axes, bypassing strongly defended areas

at Hilli, Dinajpur and Rangpur. Bogra was capatured on

December 13, cutting-off the defenders further to the north.

In this sector the Indians again proved they could move

quickly around static defenses to cut the routes of

withdrawal and reinforcement. Even though the Pakistani

army continued to fight from their strong points they could

not stop or eject the Indians. 22/

The Northern Sector provided the best approach to

Dacca for there are no major river obstacles. However, the

Indians used only two brigades in this sector. This force

took Jamalpur early, but was held up at Mymensingh until

December 11 before moving south to Tangail, 46 miles from

Dacca. The Indians dropped a parachute battalion into

Tangail on December 11 to cut the withdrawal route of

Pakistani forces to the north. On December 12, resistance

at Tangail crumbled and by December 16 Indian units were in

the outskirts of Dacca. 23/

In the Eastern Sector three Indian divisions faced two

Pakistani divisions. The 8 (I) Division advanced southwest

from Karimgan, reaching Maulvi Bazar on December 6. The

Pakisani garrison at Mualvi Bazar withdrew to Sylhet where

the elements continued to fight for some days. Meanwhile,

the main force of 8 (I) Division continued to Ashuganj on

the Megna River. The 57 (I) Division struck west from

Akhaura reaching Ashuganj on December 9. The 23 (I)

Division bypassed Comilla with one column moving south

toward Chittagong while the main body proceeded west to

reach the Megna River. Four days later the Indians were

within 12 kilometers of Dacca. 24/ After artillery had

fired on Dacca on December 15, the Pakistanis requested a

cease-fire and, on December 16, General Niazi, commander of

Pakistan's forces in Dacca, signed an unconditional

surrender. The war ended and Bangla Desh was a reality.

At the beginning of December, Islamabad had realized

that the Indians were massing to attack into East Pakistan.

Although Pakistan had approximately 40,000 troops deployed

there, the preceeding months of guerrilla war had taken its

toll. The Pakistani army's morale there had been weakened

by terrorist activity and the consistent hostility of the

civilian population. The terrain itself reduced mobility

and forced the army to deploy in strong points near the

larger towns where they would control the major road and

railway networks. These strong points were not mutually

supporting and there were insufficient forces to fill the

gaps between them. At best the Pakistani forces could delay

the likely Indian attack to gain sufficient time for an

international intervention to pressure India to stop. If,

as was entirely possible, no international intervention

materialized, then Pakistan would need to take Indian

territory elsewhere which could then be traded for the

return of East Pakistan during cease-fire negotiations. To

do this Yahya had to mount a swift, violent offensive into

India from West Pakistan. In the 14-day conventional war

Pakistan's strategy completely failed for a number of

reasons.

Firstly, the Pakistani forces needed air superiority

and they failed to achieve it. The PAF tried a surprise pre-

emptive attack on the Indian Air Force (IAF), but through

poor intelligence and planning failed to strike Indian

airfields in sufficient numbers or depth. IAF operations

were never seriously challenged. In the following days of

the war, the PAF could not or would not provide sufficient

sorties to gain even local air superiority to support the

ground forces even though aircraft were available. It is

probable that the PAF command thought it necessary to avoid

loss of aircraft so they would be available to counter an

Indian offensive into West Pakistan should it arise. It

appears that the Pakistani high command were not aware of

Yahya's objectives of gaining Indian territory as a defense

for the integrity of Pakistan as a whole.

Secondly, the Pakistani army attacked along a very

broad front of the western Indian border. But nowhere did

they mass sufficient forces to ensure a rapid breakthrough.

Generally, the points of attack were in terrain unsuited for

wide maneuver and hence mobility and speed could not be

developed to gain significant amount of Indian land.

Although battles were fiercely contested at battalion and

brigade level, the attacks were only loosely coordinated at

the corps and army level, and hence, lacked unity.

Thirdly, the effect of the Indian naval blockage was to

completely isolate West from East Pakistan. Combined with

Indian domination of the air, there was no possibility of

reinforcing or withdrawing army forces in East Pakistan.

This could only have further reduced morale and the will of

the soldiers there to resist. As well the Indian navy was

able to carry the war directly to Karachi while the

Pakistani navy could not venture out without risking

irreplaceable losses.

The Pakistani navy was simply not equipped to take on

the missiles and aircraft of the Indian fleet in order to

protect its own or commercial ships. Thus, West as well as

East Pakistan was isolated from its major sea supply routes.

The state of the navy was indicative of the neglect for

reality of the military government in Islamabad.

Lastly, the Army in East Pakistan underestimated the

ability of the Indians to move forces through the sodden

terrain of Bengal. The Pakistanis had deployed in strength

in the towns while leaving the rural areas relatively

unprotected. The Indian army, supported by Bengalis with

local knowledge, quickly outflanked these strong points.

With no strategic reserve available, the Pakistanis could

not block the Indian's advance. When the strong points were

surrounded, there was simply no place for the defenders to

go and they surrendered in thousands. 25/ The speed of the

Indian advance helped relieve Indian's logistic effort of

improving roads, bridges and railways necessary to move

large quantities of supplies for slower, more deliberate

operations. Their forces were lightly equipped to move

quickly through to Dacca.

In summary, the conventional phase of the war was one

of limited objectives by both sides. However, the

Pakistanis could not properly coordinate their strategy or

their forces to realize success. On the other hand, the

Indians produced a simple but flexible plan which they

executed with determination and skill. East Pakistan fell

much more quickly than Islamabad had anticipated and there

was no time for international intervention. In the West the

Indians defended successfully while making minor gains in

the South. Their actions were entirely consistant with

their objective of ejecting Pakistan from Bengal without

inviting intervention from other nations, particularly

China.

ENDNOTES

(Chapter III)

1/ Jackson, p. 107.

2/ Accounts vary. At least eight mountain divisions

remained guarding India's northern border. See Jackson, p.

107; Chopra, pp. 53-54; and Ravi Kaul, "The Indo-Pakistan

War and the Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean,"

United States Naval Institute Proceedings, No. 14, May 73,

pp. 186-187.

3/ Jackson, p. 108.

4/ Ibid., p. 108.

5/ Ravi Rikhye, "Why India Won: The 14 Day War," Armed

Forces Journal, 109, April 1972, p. 39.

6/ Sir Robert Thompson, ed., War in Peace, (New York:

Harmony Books), 1982, p. 225.

7/ Jackson, p. 122.

8/ Thompson, p. 225.

9/ Ibid., 226.

10/ Jackson, pp. 116-119.

11/ Rikhye, p. 40.

12/ Ibid., p. 40.

13/ Jackson, p. 120.

14/ Thompson, p. 227. See also Jackson, p. 120.

15/ Jackson, p. 121.

16/ Kaul, p. 188.

17/ Ibid., p. 191.

18/ Ibid., pp. 188-189.

19/ Jackson, p. 133.

20/ Ibid., p. 133.

21/ Chopra, p. 56.

22/ Ibid., p. 56.

23/ Ibid., p. 58.

24/ Jackson, p. 142.

25/ Chopra, p. 58.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

The course of events which shaped the conflict between

India and Pakistan in 1971 had their origins in history made

many years before. The concept of a single Islamic nation

on the Indian sub-continent had brought the peoples of East

and West Pakistan together in the aftermath of British

colonial rule. But the concept was not powerful enough to

hold the nation in the face of differing race, language,

culture and geography.

When the autocratic rulers in the western wing denied

the democratic aspirations of the Bengalis while continuing

a policy of apparent economic domination, resentment was

inevitable. The established rulers had fashioned a severely

centralized government which was incapable of harmonizing

the political and social forces emerging in the western as

well as the eastern wing of the nation. Consequently

military repression of the Bengalis was implemented without

a serious attempt to rectify the causes of the grievances.

The millions of refugees who poured into India caused

serious economic and social problems in one of her most

unstable slates, West Bengal. The Indian government, with

considerable support from the public, seized this

opportunity to decisively weaken her most dangerous rival.

By skillfully managing her diplomatic affairs, while

encouraging the Bangla Desh movement, India won time to

prepare for military intervention while preventing wider

international intervention damaging to her aim. And clearly

her aim was to reduce the power of Pakistan by promoting the

autonomy of East Bengal.

China considered Pakistan, in particular West Pakistan,

vital to restricting Soviet influence on the sub-continent.

Should both India and Pakistan be drawn into the Soviet

sphere, China's borders would be threatened on all sides.

With India and Pakistan rivals, the threat to China from

India would be much reduced. For similar reasons, the

Soviet Union was initially trying to steer an even course in

the India-Pakistan dispute. However, when rebuffed by Yahya

in July 1971, Moscow quickly saw the chance to increase her

influence with India.

When conventional war finally came in December,

Pakistan found herself unable to defend the east or

successfully gain in the west. Pakistan's complete failure

in the air was most damaging. Her armies and navy lacked

information available from reconnaissance. Both the army

and navy could not maneuver without incurring damaging

losses from the Indian Air Force.

In the end, India prevailed because she was able to

maintain the initiative both politically and militarily,

guided by a simple but realistic and flexible strategy.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bayley, David H. "Inida War and Political Assertion."

Asian Survey VII, No. 2 (February 1972): pp. 87-96.

A political and social analysis of India during the

crisis of 1971.

Chopra, Maharay K. "Military Operations in Bangla

Desh." Military Review, LTT, No. 5 (May 1972)

pp. 51-60.

A good description of the military operations from

an Indian viewpoint. Includes map.

Jackson, Robert. South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan

and Bangla Desh. New York: Praeger Publishers,

1975.

A thorough discussion of the history of Bengal

nationalism and the international politics of the

1971 crisis.

Kaul, Ravi. "The Indo-Pakistan War and the Changing

Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean." U.S. Naval

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A detailed description of naval operations of the

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(February 1972). pp. 97-108.

A political analysis of Pakistan during the 1971

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Rashiduzzaman, M. "Leadership, Organization, Strate-

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Asian Survey XII, No. 3 (March 1972): pp. 185-200.

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An analysis of the success of India in war 3-16

December 1971. Gives force ratios and deployments

of India and Pakistan.

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and Guerrilla Warfare Since 1945. New York: Harmony

Books, 1982.

Provides short summary of the background and conduct

of the war. Includes maps.

Stoessinger, John G. Why Nations Go to War. 3d ed.

New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.

Chapter 5 provides analysis of the political cur-

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