"The Inaugural Address: Wittgenstein and Augustine De Magistro"

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The Inaugural Address: Wittgenstein and Augustine De Magistro

Author(s): M. F. BurnyeatSource: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 61 (1987), pp. 1-24Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Aristotelian SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106832

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TheInauguralddressWITTGENSTEINAND AUGUSTINEDEMAGISTRO

M. F. BurnyeatAugustine, ndescribing is earning flanguage, ays hathewastaught ospeakbylearning henamesofthings. tisclearthatwhoever aysthishas nmindtheway nwhichachildlearnssuchwordsas "man","sugar","table",etc.He does not primarily hinkof suchwordsas "today","not", "but","perhaps". Wittgenstein,BlueandBrownBooks, . 77)

Everyone in this audience will know that Wittgenstein sreferring o the passage romAugustine'sConfessionsI viii 13)which he borrows or the openingwordsof the PhilosophicalInvestigations.ot everyonewill know thatimmediatelybeforethepassagequoted n PI1Augustine laims hat hiseldersdidnot teach him to speak. He taught himself. Fewer still, Iimagine,willbe awarethat on thispointtheadultAugustine'saccountof his childhoodderivesfrom a quite generalphilo-sophical hesis o theeffect hatno maneverdoes or canteachanotheranything.It is the general thesis, as elaborated and defended inAugustine'sDeMagistro,hatIaim todiscusshere.IstartedwithWittgenstein, otfromanydesire ocomplainatWittgenstein's'creativemisprision' f Augustine,but becausesomeof Witt-genstein's easonsordenying hat anguage staught nthewayhisAugustinedepictsarestrikinglyimilar osomeofthehistori-cal Augustine's easonsordenyingthatlanguage,oranythingelse, is taught.One recent critic of Wittgenstein,offeringhomo iatorheblessings fmodern ognitivepsychology, assaid hatAugustinehas it preciselyand demonstrably ight when Wittgensteinprotests(PI 32) that he 'describes he learningof humanlanguageas ifthechildcameinto a strange ountryand didnotunderstandhe languageof thecountry; hat is,as if it already


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2 M. F. BURNYEAThad a language, only not this one'.' Others see in Conf.I viii 13an Urbild:a primitive, prephilosophical picture of language,antecedent to argument, from which grow all the evil theorieswhich it is the calling of expositors of the Investigationsocombat.2 I shall exhibit the passage Wittgenstein has madefamous as the precipitate of some 800 years of Platonistphilosophizing. This will be a historical inquiry. But I hope thatit will contribute to a more nuanced sense than eitherWittgenstein's critics or his expositors have achieved of hisrelationship to the Platonist writer he admired and opposed.The paper hasthreeparts.The first is simplya translationandelucidation of enough of Conf. I viii 13 to make clear therelevance of the De Magistro.The second is a detailed discussionof the De Magistro.In the third I returnbriefly to Wittgenstein.An excerptrom ConfessionsI viii 13

I was no longeran infant who could not speak,but alreadya chattering boy. This I remember, and I have sincerealized from what source I had learned to speak(etmeminihoc,et undeloquididiceram,post adverti).For it wasn't that myelders had been teaching me, presenting words to me in adefinite order of training as they did a bit later with myletters. Rather, I had been teaching myself' with the mind

'Jerry A. Fodor, TheLanguage f Thought Hassocks 1976), 64. For older and moretheological versions of thisassessment,beginning with Augustine himself, see the classicstudy by Gerhart B. Ladner, 'HomoViator.

Mediaeval Ideas on Alienation and Order',Speculum2 (1967), 233-259.SG.P. Baker& P. M. S. Hacker,AnAnalyticalCommentarynWittgenstein'shilosophicalInvestigationsol. I (Oxford 1983), 21-3.3With sedego ipsemente upply medocebamrom nondocebantme, as in the Penguintranslationby R. S. Pine-Coffin(1961),the Bud6by P. de Labriolle (2nd edn. 1933), andthe BibliothequeAugustiniennetranslation by E. Tr6horel & G. Boissou (1962). This isthe only possible translation of the Knoll text (Teubner 1898) which Wittgensteinpossessed and read (Garth Hallett, A Companion o Wittgenstein's"PhilosophicalInvestigations"Ithaca & London 1977], 761), and of any text which follows Kn6ll (asdoboth Labriolle and the most authoritative modern edition, Skutella [Teubner 1934])inending the sentence at 'to everyone I wished'. The Pusey translation (now in theEveryman series), which Baker & Hacker, p. 21, reproduce to give the immediatecontext of Wittgenstein's quotation, is a translationof Pusey'stext (text and translationappeared as companion volumes in A Library of the Fathers of the Holy CatholicChurch Anterior to the Division of the East and West, Oxford 1838). Puseyfollowed the17th century Maurist edition (Migne, PatrologiaLatina 32) in printing praesonabaminstead ofpensabamnd a comma instead of a full stop before it soas to makepraesonabamthe main verb after sedego ipsemente:but I ... did myself, by the understandingwhich


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3ITTGENSTEIN ND AUGUSTINEDE MACISTROwhich you, my God, gave me, when I triedto express hefeelingsof my heart by cries and different oundsand allsortsof motionsof my limbs (in order o get my own way)but could not manage to expresseverything wished toeveryone wished. had been taking houghtwith the aidof memory (pensabamemorza):here begins Pl 1 whenthey (my elders) named some object, and accordinglymoved towards omething, saw this and I grasped hatthe thing was called by the soundthey utteredwhen theymeant to point it out. Their intentionwas shewnby theirbodily movements,as it were the natural anguageof allpeoples: he expression f the face,the play of the eyes, themovementof otherpartsof the body,and the tone ofvoicewhich expressesour state of mind in seeking, having,rejecting,or avoidingsomething.Thus, as I heardwordsrepeatedlyused n theirproperplaces n various entences,I gradually learnt to understand what objects theysignified; nd after I had trainedmy mouth to forrn hesesigns, I used them to expressmy own desires.

Augustine'smemory s of being alreadyable to talkas a boy,not of how he had earlier earned o talk,and it is the firststagein his autobiographical arrative o be certifiedby memory.Forthe earlier period, going back to birth and conception,Augustinerepeatedly ays that he has no memorybut believesthe testimonyof his parentsand othersand makesconjecturalinferencesromhis (adult)observation f otherbabies.Thusthefamous account of language learning is not presentedas adeliveranceof memory,real or apparent.thou, my God, gavestme, practise he sounds n my memory'.The effectof this s tosubmerge,f nottotally o drown,Augustine'slaim o have aughthimself.The Mauristcommawas retainedby Gibb & Montgomery1908),who werealso still temptedbypraesonabam,ut the only disagreementmongmorerecenteditors s whether o beginthe newsentencewithpensabamKnoll,Skutella) r with(notthe weak raesonabamut)another ariant, rensabamLabriolle, olignacn the Bibliotheque ugustiennedition):'I had been trying o grasp words)with my memory'.Thisdisagreement, nlike heMaurist omma,has no philosophicalonsequences.On Wittgenstein's nowledgeof Latin, see HerbertSpiegelberg, Augustine nWittgenstein: CaseStudy n Philosophical timulation',. Hist. Phil. 17 (1979),320.In any case, the translation hichHallettreports hathe owned,by O. F. Lachmann(Leipzig1888),manages he right translation ven with the Maurist ext.


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4 M. F. BURNYEATBut neither does it rest on testimony or inference from

observation. Post adverti'I have since realized') is stronger thanand different romcredidi'I believed')and conieci'I conjectured')in, for example, I vii 12. Its only parallel in the precedingnarrative is in I vi 7 on the comfort of women's milk:Neither my mother nor my nurses filled their breasts bythemselves. It was you who gave me, through them, thefood of infancy . .. because you, my God, are the source ofall good and everywhere you preserve me. This issomething I realized later (animadverti ostmodum),becauseyou proclaim it through all these things you give me, bothwithin and without. At the time all I knew (noram)was howto suck...

That little Augustine sucked at the breast and learned to speakare two ordinaryempiricalfactsof family history,vouched forinordinary ways by testimony and inference from like cases. Butwhat the autobiographer is pointing to is the divine presencewhich explains them both. (Compare I xii 13 on God's good useof his parents' bad reasons forputting him through the miseriesof school.) The account of language learning in Conf.I viii 13 isneither a simple memory nor an empirical psychologist'sconjectural hypothesis, but a highly self-conscious contributionto theological understanding.I conclude from this that for the author of Conf.I viii 13 itscentral focus is on God's responsibility for the mind teachingitself. In I xiv 23 Augustine ismore precise:he must have learnedsomewords at his own prompting, nona docentibus ed a loquentibus,i.e. in the manner describedin Iviii 13and without being taughtby others. The Confessionsoes not provide arguedjustificationfor either claim. The earlier De Magistro does.4 To giveAugustine's own account of the matter:

At the same time [389 or 390 AD] I wrote a book entitledOn theTeachern which afterdiscussionand investigation itis discovered that there is no teacher who teaches man

SContrastHallett, p. 73, and Baker& Hacker, p. 22, who tell studentsofWittgenstein(apparentlyon the authorityof Norman Kretzmann's article 'Semantics, History of' inPaul Edwardsed., TheEncyclopediaf PhilosophyNew York & London 1967], cited byHallett) that De Magistro s critical of the primitive view expressed iri Conf.I viii 13.


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WITTGENSTEIN AND AUGUSTINE DE MAGISTRO 5knowledge (scientia) xcept God, as it is in fact written inthe Gospel: 'One is your Teacher, Christ'. (Retractationesxii)5

ThedialogueDe MagistroAt firstsight, the thesisthat no man (homo)ver does orcan teachanother has nothing to recommend it but the authority of theScriptures. Moreover, if so paradoxical a thesis were true, itwould apply to itself.Augustine could not have learned it fromSt Matthew (23:10), nor could he have taught it to his 16-yearold son Adeodatus in the discussion (real or imaginary)6presentedin the De Magistro.ButAugustinenevertiresof tellingus to believe in order that we may understand.And in fact atthe end of the dialogue (xiv 46) Adeodatus accepts that he hasnot been taught by his father that no man can ever teachanother. Nonetheless he has learned that this is so; he knows itnow, without a trace of doubt. I take this to be a deliberateindication by Augustine that his dialogue is meant to illustrateits own message-that we will understandhis thesis,and maybesee that it is not so paradoxicalafterall, if we relate it notjust tothe arguments he has provided but to the whole course of thediscussion in which Adeodatus learns without being taught.Augustine, like most of us, thinks of teaching as impartingknowledge. The question whether teaching is (humanly)possible is the question whether one human being can bringanother to know something. So it is worth a preliminarydigression to ask about Augustine's conception of knowledge(scientia).There is an importantand revealinglyPlatonistpassagein theRetractationes,he work inwhich Augustineinhis old age gave hisconsidered judgement on ninety-three of his earlier writings.Here he is supplying a clarification or qualification to anepistemological distinction drawn in the De UtilitateCredendif391-2 AD:

' In the Retractationesugustinecan be quite scathingabout hisearly works. That hehasnothing self-criticalto sayabout the DeMagistrompliescontinuing satisfactionwithits methods and conclusion.6According to Conf.IX vi 14 all the ideas ascribed to Adeodatus in the De Magistrowere genuinely his: another marvel for which God alone can be responsible. ButAugustine does not claim, as some scholarshave supposed, that the De Magistro s thereport of an actual historical discussion.


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6 M. F. BURNYEATAnd when I said.. . 'What we know, therefore,we owe toreason, what we believe, to authority' (quod cimus gitur,debemusrationi, quod credimus,auctoritati), this is not to betaken in such a way as to make us frightened in moreordinary conversation of saying that we know what webelieve on adequate testimony. It is true that when wespeak properly (proprie),we say we know only that whichwe graspby firmreasoningof the mind. Butwhen we speakin language more suited to common use, as even the HolyScripture speaks, we should not hesitate to say we knowboth what we perceive by our bodily senses and what webelieve on the authority of trustworthy witnesses, whileneverthelessunderstandingthe distance between theseandthat. (Retractationes xiv 3)

It is tempting to read this passage as introducing two senses ofthe verb 'to know', a strict or philosophical sense whichpreserves the truth of Augustine's earlier dictum 'What weknow, we owe to reason',and a plain man's sense which makes itfalse because in this sensewe also know thingsthat we believe ongood authority. But temptation should be resisted. WhatAugustine distinguisheshere is the proper meaning of the verb'to know'7 and the catachrestic or improper way it is used inordinaryconversation. The ordinaryuse isharmless;it would bepointless pedantry to object to it: but it remains true that in theproper acceptation of the term we know only what we owe tofirm reasoning of the mind. Thus it is not that a change ofmeaning is involved when in ordinary life we claim to knowwhat we believe on adequate testimony, but that the standardmeaning is loosely and improperly applied to a case whichstrictly speaking it does not fit.This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that both uses ofthe verb 'to know' seem, in modem terms, to involve justifiedtrue belief. The differencebetween them isdrawn in terms of themode of justification. When a true belief is justified by sense-perception or trustworthy testimony, the plain man calls itknowledge, the philosopher belief. But this belief is vastly im-portant for Augustine, since it includes the Christian'sbelief in

7The meaning of propries well illustrated in the next paragraph: 'we cannot propriecall little children wise or foolish'.


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WITTGENSTEIN AND AUGUSTINE DE MAGISTRO 7the testimonyof the Scriptures.When hesaysit isnotknowledge,in the proper acceptation of the term, this is not to disparagebelief, or to impugn its rationality, or to deny that it is fullyjustified; the testimony is, after all, describedas adequate andtrustworthy.What ismissing, by comparisonwith cases where atrue belief isjustified by the mind's firmreasoning,issomethingother than justification: something which justification byreasoningcontributesalong with and in addition tojustificationas such,and whichjustification by sense-perceptionortestimonycannot supply.What that extrasomething isbecomesclear, I think,when welook back to the original statement in the De UtilitateCredendi.We discover that the contrast between believing and knowing(scire)was presented there (UC xi 25) as a contrast betweenbelieving and understanding(intellegere).he originalstatementwas, 'What we understand (intellegimus), e owe to reason'. IfAugustine feels that it makesno odds whether he writes scireorintellegere,hat implies that in his view the proper meaning ofscire s intellegere.nd that in turnexplainswhy he thinks it looseor improperto use 'knowing' (scire)n the ordinaryway of whatwe believe on adequate testimony. Intellegere ould not fit hereat all. Adequate testimony isexcellentjustificationforbelievingsomething, but it does not contribute an understandingof thething believed. Firm reasoningof the mind, on the other hand,does both: it justifiesa belief in sucha manneras to enlighten itwith understanding.8This would have been a very traditional conception ofknowledge, reflecting the continuing influence of Plato andAristotle on the philosophical climate of the times. Butinfluencesare lessimportantthanwhat theDeMagistrotselfcantell us about Augustine'sunderstandingof 'understanding'.Forif it is correctto suggestthat Augustinethinks of understandingrather than justification as the differentiating ingredient ofknowledge, the main thesisof the De Magistro, hat no man can

8This conclusion fits well with R. A. Markus' account of Augustine's conception ofknowledge in TheCambridge istory fLaterGreekndEarlyMedievalPhilosophy,d. A. H.Armstrong (Cambridge 1970),348-353, 362 ff.Butit mustbe tempered bya recognitionthat when Augustine has his sights trained on Academic scepticism (e.g. in Contr.Acad.and De Trin.XV xii 21), he will insist in no uncertain termsthat both sense-perceptionand testimony yield knowledge (scire).Furtherqualifications below.


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8 M. F. BURNYEATteach another knowledge (scientia),can now be glossed as theclaim that no man can teach another to understandsomething.The argumentwill not be that informationcannot be transmittedfrom one person to another, but that the appreciation orunderstandingof any suchinformation isa taskthat each personmust work at for himself. And while this as it stands is by nomeans clear and lucid, it is at least a proposition one couldimagine coming to appreciate and understand in the course ofworking through the dialogue.The dialogue begins with what looks like an exercise in theAcademic procedureofarguingboth sidesof a question. It is firstargued that all teaching is effected through words or, moregenerally, through signs (i 1-x 31), then that no teaching iseffected through words or signs (x 32-35). But the two sides arenot in fact equally weighted. The second thesisprevails and theremainder of the dialogue (xi 36-xiv 46) explains how, giventhat words and signs teach nothing, we can and do learn thingswithout them. In retrospect, therefore, the long first section iscast as an exposition of the view to be overthrown. The thesisthat all teaching is effectedthroughwordsand signsis the wronganswer which has to be worked through first, before the rightanswer can establish itself in the mind as a satisfactory andilluminating solution. As Augustine (or Plato) would have beenhappy to say, 'To convince someone of the truth, it is not enoughto state it, but rather one must find thepathfromerrorto truth'.9It is obvious enough why it should be tempting to think thatsomeeaching iseffectedthroughwords or signs.As we ordinarilythink of it, a good deal of what teachers do is 'talk and chalk'.Words and signs are the instruments by which knowledge istransmittedfrom them to us. That is the common sense view ofteaching, and it implies no great distinction between teachingand information-communicating discourse in general; or atleast they come to much the same once we set aside as inessentialany institutional associations that the word 'teaching' mayintroduce. Accordingly, the dialogue begins with a perfectlygeneral question about the intended effect, or function, ofspeaking, to which an answer isreturnedthat gives to the notion

9Wittgenstein, 'Remarks on Frazer's GoldenBough', in C. G. Luckhardt ed.,Wittgenstein:ources ndPerspectivesHassocks 1979), 61.


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9ITTGENSTEINAND AUGUSTINEDE MACISTROof teachingan extremely eneral cope: Speech s instituted orno other reason than for teaching (docere)r for reminding(commemorare)'i 2).Someobjections o this largeand implausible eneralizationare dealtwith by deciding hat a question, orexample, eachesthe other personwhat it is you want to know (cf. PI 24), andthat wordsaddressed o God in inwardprayerare remindersooneself (i 1-2). But remember hat Augustine s engaged n adialectical xercise. Playwith the purpose f sharpening p themind' is how he will characterize t later on (viii 21), and thefinal messageof the dialogue is that all throughhe has beenusingwordsneither o teachnor to remind,but to stimulatehisson to learnfor himself.What mattersat this stage is that bothcommon sense and many theorists ancient or modern) willagree that one absolutelycentral functionof language s thetransmissionf information,ettingpeopleknow hings, eaching(docere).deodatus'irst ask s to getclearabout he implicationsand ramificationsof his common sense belief that, whensomeonedoes not alreadyknow hatp, he can be told or taughtby meansof wordsand therebycome to knowwhat he did notknow before.If, then, some teaching s by words,how do wordseffecttheteaching, how do they convey the information they areinstituted o convey cf. x 25-6)?The answer iven s thatwordsare signs and teach by signifying ii 3, x 30). Here Augustinestartsa lengthy and intricateargument or the thesisthat allwords signify something,even connectives ike 'il?and prep-ositions ike 'from',and consequently ll wordsare names.Weare at once remindedof Wittgenstein'suse of Augustineas astalkinghorse for his attack on the idea that the wordsof alanguageare namesand its sentences ombinations f names.Wittgenstein uggestsPI 1, BBas quoted) hat one fallsvictimto the temptation to think this way when one concentratesattention on common nouns like 'table' and proper names,leaving other kinds of words to take care of themselves.Thehistorical Augustine was more thorough. Not only did heexpressly rgue or the namehood f wordsother hannouns,hewasalsocareful o explain(vi 17) that of coursehe did notmeanthat a word ike 'from' s a noun ike 'table'or 'Socrates' nomenas one of the eight partsof speech).What he meant is neither


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10 M. F. BURNYEATmorenor ess han hat from's a signof or signifiesomething(not,of course, physical bjectbut, f you ike,a separationfthethings n question),nd hat hecontribution adeby 'if toa sentences differentrom hecontribution adeby 'because'in the sameposition ii 3-4, v 16).No doubt it is true that 'Whenwe say: "Everyword inlanguagesignifies omething"we have so far said nothingwhatsoever;nlesswe haveexplained xactlywhat istinction ewish o make' PI 13). Augustineouldadd,rightly, hat hesameholdswhen we say 'All wordsare names'.)But in theancientcontext there was a distinction, ndeed a dispute,between he claim (originally toic)that everywordsignifiessomething nd a rival (Peripatetic)iew that this holdsfornouns ndverbs nly,otherwords eingmerelyco-significant',not significantn theirown right,because heyare essentiallydevices orcombining nd embellishing.10ugustinemakes tclear hat he is just playingwith Adeodatusn ii 3-4 whenheforces imto try to specifyhesomethingignified y 'if3, from'and 'nothing'.He acceptsfor he moment' hat ifn ignifiesmental tateofdoubt,hewillnotstop o bring ounter-examplesagainst he 'separation' ccountof 'from',and it would beabsurdf thediscussion asheldupbynothing.Buthisremarksabout ifn nd because'n v 16canbe taken sa serious-mindedillustration f what is meantby the thesis hat all wordsarenames.If I seean object n thedistance ndI amuncertain hat t is,I should esatisfied ith ayingIfit sa man, t isananimal' utnot satisfiedwithsaying Becauset is a man, t is an animal'.Thisestablisheshat t makes difference hether ouuse if or'because'. owconsiderhe ollowingentencesrememberhatAugustines writingbefore he age of inverted ommas):

If satisfiesme (placeti)Because oesnot satisfyme (displicetuia)If we apply he modern se/mention ichotomy,t is clear hat

10The evidence is too complicated to set out here (it is persuasivelyassembled in an asyet unpublished Cambridge PhD thesis by C. Atherton), but some sense of the debatecan be gathered from Plutarch's lengthy attack on the Stoic view in his PlaZonic uestionox. At 101 c Plutarch complains that the Stoic theory makes speech an enumeration likea list of magistrates or days of the week.


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WITTGENSTEIN AND AUGUSTINE DE MAGISTRO 11'if' and 'because' are not used, as they were in the originalsentences. But an earlier argument (v 13-14) confirms thatAugustine would also refuse to opt for the other half of themodem dichotomy. For it is not the soundwhich satisfiesordoesnot satisfy(as if I were trying to composea sonorouspoem). It isthe meaning, or (perhaps better) the word considered alongwith its meaning, which Augustine elsewhere calls dictioincontrast to verbum r the word as sound (DeDialectica hap. 5).The thesis that 'if' and 'because' are names is, firstly,the thesisthat they can be used to name (stand for, refer to) their ownmeaningsor themselvesas dictiones." his holdsfor all words(vii20) and, secondly,anywordcan be usedautonymously,to nameitself as verbumwnviii 22-4).Presumably it is a matter of convention to allow 'if and'because' to be used in these extra ways,just as it is a matter ofmodern convention to use inverted commas instead. Thesubstantive claim-but it is not very radical-is that evenconnectives make a distinct, hence nameable, contribution tospeech. The reasonAugustine insists on this, I think, is that histopic is teaching. He wants to saythat everywordcontributestothe informationcontent of the sentences in which it occurs, towhat is taught by them. That is the burdenof the thesisthat allwords are names.So interpreted, the thesis is entirely compatible with thesensible (Stoic) view that you specify he meaning of 'if and'because' by stating the truth-conditions of whole sentences inwhich they occur." The fact is that, while Augustine is havingfun, what he is having fun with, for Adeodatus' benefit, is dryand sensible (often Stoic) theory. He is not in the grip of anUrbildwhen he says that all words are names. Nor has he

" Compare the pseudo-mediaeval theory of suppositoemanticanvented by N. E.Christensen, 'The Alleged Distinction between Use and Mention', Phil.Rev.76 (1967),358-367, to deal with theexample 'Youshould neversay"never"', which wouldrequirea translator to render into the foreign language boththe two different ccurrencesof'never'.2 Diogenes LaertiusVII 71-4. Stoic also, in all probability, is the thesisthatany wordcan be used autonymously, to name itself:direct evidence is lacking, but it is the mostlikely explanation of Chrysippus'claim that absolutely every word isambiguous (AulusGellius XI 12, Augustine, De Dialectica haps 8-9; cf. Cicero, DeInv.II 117, QuintilianVII ix 1). In a world without inverted commas Chrysippus'claim is simply true. Theadditional ambiguity imported by the dictio/verbumistinction, if I am right about it,may well be Augustine'sown development.


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12 M. F. BURNYEATsuccumbedoanotherdeathat iguresentrallynWittgenstein'sictureof hisAugustine'spictureoflanguage, heideathattheeaningofanyword ustistheobject orwhich tstands PI1).r at least, the historicalAugustinedoes not succumbin aimpleway. He hasvarious emarkswhichdistinguishbetweenhat a word signifies and the way in which it signifies.Coloured'nd 'visible', name'and 'word',arepairsof wordshich ignify hesamethingsbut in differentways, n virtueofifferentspectsof the thingssignified;and on the strengthofhisAugustinedescribes hemas havingdifferentmeaningsorignificationsv 12, vii 20). Nor, finally,doesAugustine hinkhatwe can relyon ostension o teach the meaningof words,ven ith morefavourableexamplesthan 'if and 'from':Aug.SupposingI hadno ideaof themeaningof the wordwalking',and I wereto askyou whenyou werewalkinghat 'walking'means,how wouldyou teachme?deo.I shouldwalka littlemorequickly.The change inpeed would give notice that I was replying to youruestion,and I shouldstillbe doing what I was askedtoemonstrate.Aug.But you knowthereis a differencebetweenwalkingnd hastening.He whowalksdoesnot necessarilyhastenndhewhohastensdoesnotnecessarilywalk.We speakofastening n writing,readingandverymanyotherthings.onsequently, f, aftermy query,you did what you hadeendoing, only a littlemorequickly,I shouldconcludehat walking was the same thing as hastening, for theccelerationwas the new featureof yourbehaviour.So Ihouldbe misled. (iii 6)l3Tohichdeodatusateraddsthatyouareno betterofftryingoeachomeonewhat'walking'meansbystarting o walkthanypeedingpyourwalking;orhe mighttakeyoutomeannotalkingut walkinga certaindistance(x 29).romll this Augustinegets Adeodatusto conclude thatothinghatever s taughtwithoutwordsor, moregenerally,13Thisndfuturequotationsrom heDe Magistroaregiven nthetranslation fJohn.S.urleigh,ugustine: arlierWritingsLibrary fChristianClassicsVol. VI,LondonPhiladelphia953),adjusted oDaur's ext(CorpusChristiandrum970)andwithaumberf corrections f my own.


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WITTGENSTEIN AND AUGUSTINE DE MAGISTRO 13signs (x 31). The inference is unsound and invalid. Thatostensionisopen to a varietyof interpretations s a Wittgenstein-ian point well taken but, as father and son will shortlyacknowl-edge (x 32), it does not prove that ostension never succeeds inteaching someone the meaning of a word. Even if this wasproven, and we accepted as true that all teaching about wordsrequiresthe use of other words (or at least nonverbal signs likepointing-cf. iii 5-6, x 34), it does not follow from

(a) Some teaching is effected through words or signs,plus (b) All teaching about words or signs is effected throughwords or signs,that

(c) All teaching whatsoever is through words or signs.But Augustine knows that it does not follow. He warns his sonnot to be upsetwhen an opinion held as the resultof a too readyand precipitate assent is shattered by a contrary argument (x31).The shattering blow is this:

Suppose someone ignorant of how birds are deceived bytwigs and birdlime should meet a birdcatcherequippedwith his instrumentsbut merelytravellingand not actuallyengaged in his work. Supposehe followedthe birdcatcherstep by step and wonderingly thought and inquired whatcould be the purpose (meaning, significance)14 of the man'sequipment. Suppose the birdcatcher, seeing him allattention, and eager to displayhis skill,got readyhistwigsand tubes and hawk and caught a bird he spotted nearby,would he not teach the spectatorwhat he wanted to knowby the action itself and without any signs? (x 32)

Formally,thisisjust a counter-example o the rashgeneralization(c): 'It is sufficientforour present purposethat somemen can betaught some, not all, thingswithout a sign' (x32). The troubleisthat it is also a counter-example to the final conclusion of theentire dialogue. For Augustine is about to argue that

14quidnamibi ... vellet s a phrase that could equally well be used to formulate aquestion about the meaning of a word. No doubt that is why Augustine chose it.


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14 M. F. BURNYEAT(d) No teaching is effected through words orsigns (x 33 ff.),

and thence, by another questionable inference, that(e) No man teaches another anything (xiv 46).

In the end the counter-exampleseems to have been a temporarydialectical concession.Thisbewilderingsequenceofabout-turns howsthatAugustine,like Plato often (and Wittgenstein), is determined not to tell ushow to read his writing. I think that we can understand what isgoing on if we distinguish between teaching by telling andteaching by showing. In the first part of the discussionshowingwas gradually squeezed out in favour of telling. Indeed, ifteaching is restrictedto telling, (a), (b) and (c) are innocuouslytrue. What is more, the dry and sensible semantic theoryinvoked to prove that all words are names can stand as aninnocuous account of how one does tell thingswith words. In thesecond part of the discussion,by contrast, showing is privilegedover telling. If teaching is restricted to showing, (d) isinnocuously true, and in arguing for (d) Augustine does sorestrict it:

The utmost value I can attribute to words is this. They bidus look for things, but they do not show them to us so thatwe may know them. He alone teaches me anything whosetsbeforemy eyes, or one of my otherbodily senses,ormymind, the things which I desire to know. (xi 36)It is the example of the birdcatcher which pivots the discussionfrom telling to showing. And I would suggest that, if we lookcarefully at the example, we can see how to resolve thecontradiction between the claim that the birdcatcher teachesand the final conclusion (e) that no man teaches another.As Augustinedescribesthe case, the birdcatcherknows that heis being watched by someone who wants to know what hisequipment is for and he catches a bird with the intention ofsatisfyingthe spectator'sdesire to know. That is all. It is not saidor implied that the birdcatcher has the further (Gricean)intention that the spectatorshould realize that he is putting onthe show for this very purpose, in order that the spectator maylearn from it what he is so curious to know. In no sense is the


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WITTGENSTEIN AND AUGUSTINE DE MAGISTRO 15birdcatcher trying to communicate the information that theequipment is forcatching birds.'"He is merely doing somethingfrom which he knowsthe spectatorcan gather that informationfor himself. No wonderAugustineproceedsto claim that God isconstantlyshowingthesun,themoon, thestars,the earthand thesea and the innumerablethings they bear toeveryonewho looksat them (x 32; compare the wall at iii 6). In that sense I couldteach everybody about flowerssimply by putting some on viewin a vase. But most of us would agree that this is not reallyteaching, or even showing.It ismerely providingan occasionforthe spectator to learn.'6In sum, if showing or teaching requires no more thandeliberately so acting or arranging things that other peoplemay, if they wish, learn for themselves, then nothing is easierand the birdcatcheris a perfectlygood teacher.What Augustineis denying when he reacheshis conclusion (e) is that anyonecando what telling is supposedto do, namely, transmitknowledgeto another mind. On that common sense understanding of'teaching', the birdcatcherdoes not teach.This bringsme to the centraland most interestingissueof thedialogue. Why is it impossibleto bring anotherpersonto knowsomethingby telling him?Augustineproceedsto tellAdeodatus(who doesnot speak again until theend of thedialogue) in a longdiscoursewhich startswith a sentence fromthe storyin the Bookof Daniel about the three youths whose strength of beliefenabled them to survive the fiery furnace of KingNebuchadnezzar:

If we consider this a little more closely, perhapsyou willfind that nothing is learned even by its appropriate sign(per uasigna).IfI am given a signand Ido not knowwhat itis the sign of, it can teach me nothing. If I know what it is'5IHere, of course,I am drawingon H. P. Grice's famousarticle 'Meaning', Phil. Rev.

67 (1957), 377-388.61 do not deny it can be called teaching/showing. Ordinary usageextends'teaching'to any x such that I learn something fromx, regardlessof whetherx intendsto teach orintends me to learn,regardless ven of whetherx is an animate being. Examplesare: 'Shetaught/showed me what couragecould be', 'The mountain taughtme the value of life',and Augustine's example of the wall showing itself at iii 6. But inadvertent andinanimate teaching are presumablyso called only because there is deliberate teaching,and I suggest that the same holds for deliberately contrived opportunities to learn.


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16 M. F. BURNYEATthe sign of, what do I learn through the sign?When I read(Dan. 3:27: LXX Dan. 3:94): 'Their sarabaraewere notchanged', the word sarabara oes not show me the thing itsignifies. If some covering of the head is so called, I surelydo not learn from being told this" what a head is, or acovering. Those thingsI knew already, and the knowledgeof them came to me not when they were named by othersbut when I actually saw them. After all, when these twosyllables first struck my ear, ca-put,I was as ignorant ofwhat they meant as I was of the meaning ofsarabarawhen Ifirst heard or read it. But when the word, caput,wasfrequently repeated, observing when it was said, Idiscovered it was the name of a thing well known to mefrom my having seen it. Before I made that discovery theword was merely a sound to me. I learned that it is a signwhen I found out what it is the signof-the thing itself,as Isaid, I learned not from any signifying but from my ownseeing. So the sign is learned from knowing the thing,rather than the thing itself being learned when the sign isgiven. (x 33)

The first sentence in the quotation indicates that the argument(a semantic version of Meno's paradox) concerns individualwords.'8No word showsme the thing it signifies.No word, takensingly, tells me what it signifies or anything about what itsignifies. Someone may tell me that a sarabara is a certaincovering for the head, but that is no help unless I already knowwhat a covering is and what a head is. Fairenough, but supposeI do know what a covering is and what a head is. Augustineargues that I still do not know what a sarabarais.'"It is notjustthat the word sarabara annot teach me this. Neither can anyother word or combination of words, even words I understand7Alternatively, 'from hearing this word'.'"This saves Augustine from being guilty of the view which Kretzmann, op. cit.,ascribes to him, that knowingwhat the words mean in 'Armadilloesare mammals' eoipso

precludes one's learning anything through hearing that sentence uttered. Augustinesimply supposes, and reasonably, both here and later, that knowing what the wordsmean is a necessary condition for such learning. The bad argument which Augustinedoes not use may, however, be observed in Sextus Empiricus, PH III 267-9."'This further point, which is the vital one, is missed in the (frequently inaccurate)account of the De Magistrogiven by Etienne Gilson, The ChristianPhilosophy f SaintAugustineLondon 1960), 66 ff.


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WITTGENSTEIN AND AUGUSTINE DE MAGISTRO 17perfectlywell. I have to lookat someactual sarabarae.The mostthat words can do, providedI understandthem, is tell me to lookand see when some sarabaraeare on view (x 35). Thus telling isnot so unlike the birdcatcher's showing as we might haveexpected it to be: in theirdifferentways, neither doesmore thanprompt people to learn for themselves,but both can be of valuefor so doing.At this point it becomes obvious, I think, that already in theDe MagistroAugustine has special requirementson what it is toknow something. Knowledge is notjust a matter of having theinformation and beingjustified in accepting it. It is not moreorbetter justification that I need in order to know what thatpeculiar word sarabara ignifies, but a particular kind of first-hand justification which, now that sarabaraeare extinct, noneof uscan ever have."2 This emphasison first-hand ustificationisconfirmedwhen Augustine moves on fromthe individual wordsarabara o the whole narrative in which it occurs.When wordsare combined to form sentences and stories they still cannotimpart knowledge to the hearer, but tertiumdatur betweenknowledge and ignorance, namely, belief. A story about thetriumphof belief is used to illustrate the importanceofbeliefforan epistemology which insists that knowledge requires first-hand learning:

But you may say: granted we cannot know those head-coverings, the sound of whose name we remember,unlesswe see them, and that we cannot fullyknow the name untilwe know the thing. But what about those young men ofwhom we have heard (Dan. 3) how they vanquished KingNebuchadnezzar and his fiery furnace by faith andreligion, how they sang praises to God, and won honoursfromtheirenemy? Have we learned about them otherwisethan by meansof words?I reply,Yes. Butwealreadyknewthemeaningof all these words.Ialreadyknewthe meaningof 'three youths', 'furnace', 'fire', 'king', 'unhurtby fire'2'

2oAnyone who wants to know (and is content to be told) what sarabaraeally meansmay however be referredto a fascinatingly learned article by G. N. Knauer, 'sarabara(Dan. 3, 94 [27] bei Aug. mag. 10, 33-11, 37)', Glotta33 (1954), 100-118.21This last example shows that Augustine has not forgotten that not all words arenouns.


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18 M. F. BURNYEATand all the rest. But Ananias, Azarias and Misael, are asunknown to me as thosesarabarae,nd their names did nothelp me one bit to know them, nor could they help. IconfessI believe rather than know that everything we readof in that story happened at that time,just as it was writtendown. And the writers whom we believe were not ignorantof the difference.Forthe prophet says:'Unless ye believe yeshall not know' (Isa. 7:9: LXX). This he would not havesaid if he judged that there was no difference. What Iunderstand I also believe, but I do not understandeverything that Ibelieve. All that I understandI know, butI do not know all that I believe\ And I know how usefulit isto believe many things which I do not know, among themthis story about the three youths. Thus although there aremany things I cannot know, I do know how useful it is tobelieve them. (xi 37)

Augustine, it turns out, is a firm believer in what JonathanBarneshas called epistemic categories.22He sorts all knowabletruthsinto two classes:(1) truthssuch that ifx knowsthatp, thenx has perceivedby sense thatp, (2)truths such that ifx knowsthatp, then x has perceivedby the mind thatp. Ifx has not perceivedthatp in either way, he can only believe thatp, not know it. Thisis the effect of xii 39-40:Everything we perceivewe perceive either by bodily senseor by the mind. The former we call 'sensible things', thelatter 'intelligible things';or, to use the terminology of ourChristian authors, the former we call 'carnal things', thelatter 'spiritual things'. When we are asked about theformer we reply if they are present to our senses, forexample, if we are looking at the new moon and someoneaskswhat it is likeor where it is. If our questioner does notsee it he believes our words, or perhaps often does notbelieve them, but he learns nothing unless he himself seeswhat he is asking about. When he sees he learns not fromwords uttered but from the objects seen and his sense ofsight....

22JonathanBarnes,'Socrates and theJury: Paradoxes in Plato's Distinction betweenKnowledge and True Belief', PASS54 (1980), 193-206.


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WITTGENSTEIN AND AUGUSTINE DE MAGISTRO 19But when we have to do with things which we behold

with the mind, that is, with the intellect and reason, wespeak of things which we look upon directly in the innerlight of truth which illumines the "inner man" and isinwardly enjoyed. There again if my hearer sees thesethingshimself with his inwardeye, he comes to knowwhatI say, not as a result of my wordsbut as a result of his owncontemplation. Even when I speakwhat is trueand he seeswhat is true, it is not I who teach him. He is taught not bymy words but by the things themselves which inwardlyGod has made manifest to him.

It is a direct consequence of this epistemological stance thatthere is no such thing as historical knowledge or knowledgetransmittedby the word of anotherperson.23All knowledgehasto come fromfirst-handlearning, by the intellect or by my ownsense-perception, ust as Plato maintains in the Meno hat math-ematical knowledge has to come by reasoningand knowledgeof the road to Larissaby actually travelling there, and in theTheaetetushat what happened at the scene of a crime can onlybe known by the eyewitness who saw it with his own eyes.24You get a stronger Platonic position-more like Plato'sposition in dialogues other than the Meno and Theaetetus-namely, that knowledge is rational understanding, if youdemote the category of truths known by sense-perceptionandsay that this is knowledge only by courtesy, by an impropermanner of speaking.That is what Augustinedoes in the passagefrom the Retractationesquoted earlier, and elsewhere.25Plato'svacillation over whether to allow knowledge of sensible thingshas often been discussed. The fact that it has a parallel inAugustine suggeststo me that it derives from their sharedstresson first-handlearning.I suggest, in fact, that in the De MagistroAugustineneeds theanalogy of sense-perception precisely in order to enforce the

" Augustine accepts the consequence, so faras history isconcerned,at DeDiv. Qu.8348 (PL 40.31), Ep.CXX ii 9-in flat contradictionwith De Trin.XV xii 21 (n.8 above)." On Plato's treatment of these issues,see my 'Socrates and theJury: ParadoxesinPlato's Distinction between Knowledge and True Belief', PASS 54 (1980), 173-191, towhich the present paper is a sort of sequel.5Cf. Solil. I iii 8 and references in Markus, loc.cit. (n. 8 above).


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20 M. F. BURNYEATpoint that knowledge requiresfirst-handappreciation, and thatit is for the same reason that Plato in the Meno and Theaetetusneeds to be able to appeal to the knowledge of the eyewitness orof the man who has made thejourney to Larissa.The need is theneed of advocacy. For Augustine has no argumentor the thesisthat knowledge requires first-hand learning. There is no suchargument in Plato either. What there is, in both Plato andAugustine, is the attempt to make the thesis persuasiveto us bycalling upon our sense of a great gap between the epistemicposition of an eyewitness who watches an event with his owneyes and that of the jury later, or, in Augustine's example, theposition of present day readers of the Book of Daniel.Plato and Augustine want to persuade us that this gap is thegap between knowledge and mere true belief. We may replythat the alleged gap is no more than a difference: second-handjustification is a different kind of justification from first-hand,but it is not eoipso essof a justification. Suppose, then, that I amjustified in believing that p on the strength of an eyewitness'sstory,and supposefurtherthatp is true. Iclaim that I know thatp, just as the eyewitness does, although not on his grounds. Buttypically there will be other, connected facts of the case which Ido not know because the eyewitness has not told me. Theeyewitness frequently knows more than he tells. He saw thewhole thing. That synoptic graspin which the knowledge thatpis just one element does mark a gap, a cognitive differencebetween him and me. And it is this which makes the eyewitnesssuch a usefulanalogy fora philosopherwho wants in the end toassimilate knowledge to rational understanding."2For I take itthat the important difference between knowledge and under-standing is that knowledgecan be piecemeal, can graspisolatedtruths one by one, whereas understanding always involvesseeingconnections and relationsbetween the items known. 'Theonly part of modern physics I understand is the formula"E= mc2" is nonsense. 'The only part of modern physics Iknow is the formula "E= mc2"' is merely sad.There are several passages in the De Magistrowhich imply

2 The philosospher in question need not be a Platonist. In Locke, AnEssayconcerningHumanUnderstandingiii 24, eyewitnessing, the need for first-hand learning, knowledgeas understanding,and connectedness,all come together for his anti-Platonic attack oninnate principles.


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WITTGENSTEIN AND AUGUSTINE DE MAGISTRO 21that the understanding which Adeodatus is aiming for is amatter of being able to get a clear synoptic grasp of a largecomplex field (x 31, xii 40, xiv 46). But I suspectthat Augustinehas a weaker conception of knowledge as understanding thanPlato would recommend. For Plato, like Aristotle, makes it acondition on knowing or understandingthat p that one graspsthe explanation of p. This of course involves seeing theconnection betweenp and a whole lot of otherpropositions,butit is not mere connectednessso much as explanatoryconnected-ness that counts, and it is by way of this thought that Plato andAristotlereach the conclusion that knowledge in the full sense,i.e. understanding,requiresthe synopticgraspofa whole field.27Augustine, however, says nothing in the De Magistroaboutexplanation. He may intend a more full-bloodedPlatonic viewin the Retractationes hen he demotes sense-perception andspeaksof knowledgeas owed exclusivelyto firmreasoningof themind. (In sense-perception one may perceive a complex ofelements as a coherent whole, but one does not perceiveexplanatory relations between one element and another.) Butthe important point for our purposes is that the emphasis onconnecting one item with another is enough by itselftoyield theconclusion that knowledge, in the sense of understanding,cannot be taught or conveyed by words from one person toanother. Knowledge must be first-hand if it is essentially ofconnections.I can of course be given the informationthatp is connectedwith q, r, etc., just as I can be given the informationthatp istruebecause q is true. What is more, I can accept that this is so withadequate justification and thereby, in the ordinarysense,knowit. But every schoolboy is familiar with the fact that it is onething to knowin thatexternalway that he connection holds (e.g.that these propositionsconstitute a proof of that theorem),andquite another to understand the connection, to see how theelements hang together. That is something one can only do foroneself.28And we stilldescribethe moment when this isachievedas a moment of illumination.

27 See my 'Aristotle on UnderstandingKnowledge', in E. Bertied., AristotlenScience:'The Posterior nalytics'Padua 1981), 97-139.8This answersan objection brought by Barnes,op.cit., 203, against my earlier(andmore detailed) argumentson this subject.


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22 M.F.BURNYEATThe De Magistrowas Augustine's first extended presentation

of hisfamousdoctrineof internal illumination. The doctrine hasbeen described as a misguided transference of the idea ofempirical vision into the intellectual sphere.29The same chargehas repeatedly been levelled at the visual metaphors of whichPlato is so fond. Both philosophersare represented as holdingthat knowledgeor understandingis an immediate relationto anisolated abstractobject, in much the same way as seeing a tableis a relation to a single physical object. Both philosophersare infact saying the very opposite, that knowledge or understandingis of the connections between things, of things only as partsof awhole interrelated system; that is why, like empirical vision, itinvolves seeing things for oneself. Both philosophers also havethe idea that there is such a thing as the complete synoptic visionwhich embraces all partial understandings, and that anyunderstandingwhich falls short of this is not in the fullest senseknowledge because it does not see all the connections. In otherwords,the whole truth isalso the light that givesunderstanding.All Augustine adds is that this Truth and this Light is God aspresent to our mind. Hence the dictum that Christ is the onlyTeacher, the one source of understanding.It is eloquent testimony both to Augustine's philosophicalacumen and to the coherence of the Platonic epistemology thatAugustine shouldhave been able to reconstructit, on the basis ofa quite new set of arguments, so much better than many peoplewho have actually read Plato's dialogues." Whatever is to besaid about Adeodatus, of Augustine at least it is true that helearned it for himself, without being taught.WittgensteinndtheConfessionsIt is inconceivable that Augustine should have forgotten the De

29R. A. Markus, 'Augustine', in D. J. O'Connor ed., A CriticalHistoryof WesternPhilosophyLondon 1964), 87.o0 ugustine thinks of himself as an admirer of Plato and refers to the Menooftenenough, but De Trin. XII xv 24 implies that he does not know what questions Socratesput to the slave. This would be because he read about the Meno n Cicero, Tusc.I 57-8.See furtherPierreCourcelle, LateLatin Writers ndtheirGreek ourcesCambridge, Mass.1969), 168ff., who suggeststhat Augustine'sfirst-hand knowledge of Plato wasconfinedto the portion of the Timaeusranslatedby Cicero. What he did read, thanks to God'sintervention,was 'the booksof the Platonists'(Conf.VII ix 13,VIII ii 3), i.e. Plotinus andhis followers.


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23ITTGENSTEIN ND AUGUSTINEDE MACISTROMagistro hen he came to write the Confessions397-401AD).The dialoguewas all too painfullyassociatedwith the deathofhis son soon after its dramaticdate.3l Besides,Wittgenstein'squotation rom Conf. viii 13 exactlymatcheswhat Augustinesays about how he learned the word caput n De Mag. x 33(quoted bove).Addtheprecedingentences, hichWittgensteinomitted;view the whole n the widersettingprovidedby the DeMagistro; nd it becomes clear, I submit, that Augustine'sconcentration,n the now famous ccountof language earning,on words orobjects hatcan be pointedout or shown ostendere)is due to epistemologicalonsiderationsather hana primitivetheoryof meaning.Language earning tartswith the interplaybetween visible objects and visible adults because these arethingsthe childcan see forhimselfand his task s to discover orhimself that certain of the sounds which adults emit areconnectedwith thingshe alreadyknows.To repeat:

I learned hat it is a signwhenI foundout what t is thesignof-the thing itself, as I said, I learned not from anysignifyingbut frommy own seeing.So the sign is learnedfromknowing he thing, rather han the thing tselfbeinglearnedwhen the sign is given. (x 33)

We have seen, moreover, that Augustine shares withWittgenstein strong ense hat nothingotherpeoplemaydo orsay, and no fact aboutthe worldaroundme, can determinemeto respond n the rightway.No-onecan achievemy understand-ing for me, not forthe trivialreason hat it is mine,but becauseto internalize he requisite onnections s to go beyondwhat ispresented n any occasionof so-called eaching.Augustine oesnot have Wittgenstein's ubtle arguments o bring out themultiplicity f ways n whichI mightseem tomyselfandothers)to understand nd later urnout to havemissed he point,whichin turndemonstrateshe multiplicity f connectionsnvolved nunderstanding tself. But we might read Wittgenstein asreviving the ancient understandingof the complexity ofunderstanding.And we certainly houldread Conf. viii 13 asagreeingwith Wittgensteinhat the description uoted n PI 1is wholly inadequate o explain how little Augustinecame to

3'Conf: X vi 14, cited above n. 6.


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"The Inaugural Address: Wittgenstein and Augustine De Magistro"

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