Zagorka Golubovi6Institute for PhilosoPhY

UniversitY of Belgrade,and Social TheoryYugoslavia

UDK 3 I 6.48( 497 .I):37 7 (9 | 4'tOriginalni naudni rad

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONFLICTIN EX-YIIGOSLAVIA FOR THE

EUROPEAN SECURITY-

Summary; In the paper it is stressed that the national question hus once

again beconre u top issue of dehate in international politics, indicuting that the19E9-1990 events were interpreted inatlequately. In other words, i.nternutional

factors, triumphant about the collap.se ol'commuism, tnerlooked the dunger stenr-ming from the growth tf'natktnalism. Former Yugosluvia is the clearest e.tample,where the nutional co4flict hus turned inn u grave chullenge to European securi4,,particularu- since the nationalist euphoria seems to be spreading n other parts oJEurope und the world; tttpi.

Furtlur, attentlbn is t:oncentrated upon tle.fining ancl anall,z.ing ,,ethnicnationalism" , distinguishing behveen nattonal iclentity and nationalism as ideology,and pointing to the double meaning ol'the concept of nation in the sense of' ,,ethnic"anrl ,,civic" . It is asserted that ethnic il.ttionalism,,stiving J'or a ,,n'ihal unitiuttion"and honngeniz"ation of a people on its txyn territor"), tvith un ethnicallT' ha.sed stutedestro)-e(l Yugoslavia us e state ancl led to civil war. Condition,s are also e,raminetltvhich resuhed in the eventual clomination of'ethnic conception ofthe nationa undethnic natktnalism, as opposed to dem<tcraticalll' solving national question undconstituting the neglectecl national identity.

In the ,second part oJ the p(sper the policy oJ the Europen Unktn tot+,urd thcsolution oJ'the conflict in.former Yugo.rlavia is considerecl and it i,s concluded thatit always respontletl post-fbst,on rather than time\, anrl preventivel\', undere.rtim(jtingthe destructive porver of natktnulism in d countr), so ethnically mixetl us .formerYwgosluviu.Thus neither the European Union t:ttn be resolvet! o.f certain respon.si-hility for the tragir: olttcome ol'national conJlicts in this part oJ the *'orkl, thoughthe primary sources must be sought in the inlernal circumstctnces ancl events.lt isfinally conclutletl that the intcrnitional community should learn its lesson tntm theYugoslav case, ubove all, to atlt4tt a mure upprol)riute interpretution oJiemantls

for national self'-cletermintilktn, which in multiethnic states mr$t not he interDretedin the sense o.f creuting, ethnicalllt lture nution-states.

Kcy words: national identrtl,, ethnic nationalism, ,,ethnic" and ,,civic"nail o n, int e r n.tt io n al c o mmun i ry, E ur o 1t e a n s e c ur ity.

* Puo"t Drcscntcd at thc Woodrow Wilson Ccntcr Alumni in Francc inSeptembcr le9O.

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Introduction

I shall begin this exposition with a thesis that ,,nationalquestion" has returned to the forefront of debates in internationalpolitics. ,,Today, with nationalism reinvigorated and wreaking hav-oc in parts of the globe where it long since has been considered aphenomenon of the past" - as Liah Greenfeld put it - the ex-Yugoslavia of which is the most tragic example - the whole Europeis confronted with a need for the new policy of security, whichwould prevent regression to elementary level of nationalism' (see:L. Greenfeld, 1992: VII).

'

It signals an elror in the interpretation of the events of1989/90, namely, that international forces which triumphed overthe collapse of communism lost sight of the dangers arising withthe growing nationalism.

The case of Yugoslavia, as its most obvious victim, representsone of the greatest challenges to the policy of the European security.However, the intensification of national conflicts in ex-Yugoslaviawhich ended in a bloody and irrational inter-ethnic war, may notremain an isolated case but may be renewed in another multiethnicstate unless the flame of an exclusive and particularistic nationalismis extinguished.

Therefore, it is very important to clearly define the notionof nationalism in order to prepare ourselves for coping with itsenormous negative energy. First and foremost, it is necessary tomake a clear-cut distinction between national iclertiry as nation-hood which may be freely chosen, i. e. as a feeling of belonging toa political and cultural community, and ethnic natittrrulism whichlinks people by a common ancestral origin in terms of ,,blood andsoil" ties, implying that the links are not chosen but prescribedonly to the members of that community, in relation to which theothers are treated as ,,outsiders" and potential enemies. That is, thedistinction between civic and ethnic nation should be recognized,because it is the latter that emanates the negative energy whichcan explode if a society has no inbuilt mechanisms for controllingand resolving the tensions, as was the case in ex-Yugoslavia.

In such an interpretation the phenomenon of nationalism isfar from being harmless, as it appeared in the statements of manyof its defenders who seemed to welcome its emergence in the

second half of this century, without being aware of its destructiveforce.

It was such a kind of nationalism that destroyed ex-Yugoslavia as a multinational and multicultural community. Whowill be the next if this misfortune will be furtherly treated unprop-erly?

This is the reason why we should speak of the implicationsof the national conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia for the European security.But we should also ask whether the European Community has sofar undertaken appropriate steps in order to safeguard its securityby preventing such outcomes of national conflicts in certain regionsof Eastern and South-East Europe? Since we live in the age ofneo-nationalism it is necessary to elaborate the proper policy inorder to direct the national feelings towards their democratic reso-lution and avoid destructive force of ultranationalism..

l. The nature of tlw crisis in ex-Yugoslaviain the beginning'of the I990's

Joseph Rothchild wrote that Yugoslavia was historically,religiously and culturally the most complicated state amongst East-Central European countries ( 1974:201).It is because yugoslaviaas a multinational community was composed of ethnicities of his-torically and culturally different backgrounds. Therefore as to theperiod after World War Two it is very important to consider howthe national question has been treated by the communist policy.

The Yugoslav Communist party which came out as the win-ner in the war against the German occupation, when the war wasover continued with the policy based on the ideology of ,,brother_hood and unity" applied in the liberation war. ThuJthe federationof the constituent nations was constituted assuming political andcultural equality of all nations but without strictly fiiing republics'autonomies until the 1974 Constitution. The latter gave riJe to theconcept of the ,,nation-states" when defining republics as the au-tonomous state units, even lifting to that stitus two provinces ofDerbra. Until then nationalism had not been stimulated but ratherwas fairly controlled by the charismatic leader. Even though nations'and national minorities' rights were recognized, the official policydid not pay much attentioi to the nationil question assuming that

320 321

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Introduction

I shall begin this exposition with a thesis that ,,nationalquestion" has returned to the forefront of debates in internationalpolitics. ,,Today, with nationalism reinvigorated and wreaking hav-oc in parts of the globe where it long since has been considered aphenomenon of the past" - as Liah Greenfeld put it - the ex-Yugoslavia of which is the most tragic example - the whole Europeis confronted with a need for the new policy of security, whichwould prevent regression to elementary level of nationalism' (see:L. Greenfeld, 1992: VII).

'

It signals an elror in the interpretation of the events of1989/90, namely, that international forces which triumphed overthe collapse of communism lost sight of the dangers arising withthe growing nationalism.

The case of Yugoslavia, as its most obvious victim, representsone of the greatest challenges to the policy of the European security.However, the intensification of national conflicts in ex-Yugoslaviawhich ended in a bloody and irrational inter-ethnic war, may notremain an isolated case but may be renewed in another multiethnicstate unless the flame of an exclusive and particularistic nationalismis extinguished.

Therefore, it is very important to clearly define the notionof nationalism in order to prepare ourselves for coping with itsenormous negative energy. First and foremost, it is necessary tomake a clear-cut distinction between national iclertiry as nation-hood which may be freely chosen, i. e. as a feeling of belonging toa political and cultural community, and ethnic natittrrulism whichlinks people by a common ancestral origin in terms of ,,blood andsoil" ties, implying that the links are not chosen but prescribedonly to the members of that community, in relation to which theothers are treated as ,,outsiders" and potential enemies. That is, thedistinction between civic and ethnic nation should be recognized,because it is the latter that emanates the negative energy whichcan explode if a society has no inbuilt mechanisms for controllingand resolving the tensions, as was the case in ex-Yugoslavia.

In such an interpretation the phenomenon of nationalism isfar from being harmless, as it appeared in the statements of manyof its defenders who seemed to welcome its emergence in the

second half of this century, without being aware of its destructiveforce.

It was such a kind of nationalism that destroyed ex-Yugoslavia as a multinational and multicultural community. Whowill be the next if this misfortune will be furtherly treated unprop-erly?

This is the reason why we should speak of the implicationsof the national conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia for the European security.But we should also ask whether the European Community has sofar undertaken appropriate steps in order to safeguard its securityby preventing such outcomes of national conflicts in certain regionsof Eastern and South-East Europe? Since we live in the age ofneo-nationalism it is necessary to elaborate the proper policy inorder to direct the national feelings towards their democratic reso-lution and avoid destructive force of ultranationalism..

l. The nature of tlw crisis in ex-Yugoslaviain the beginning'of the I990's

Joseph Rothchild wrote that Yugoslavia was historically,religiously and culturally the most complicated state amongst East-Central European countries ( 1974:201).It is because yugoslaviaas a multinational community was composed of ethnicities of his-torically and culturally different backgrounds. Therefore as to theperiod after World War Two it is very important to consider howthe national question has been treated by the communist policy.

The Yugoslav Communist party which came out as the win-ner in the war against the German occupation, when the war wasover continued with the policy based on the ideology of ,,brother_hood and unity" applied in the liberation war. ThuJthe federationof the constituent nations was constituted assuming political andcultural equality of all nations but without strictly fiiing republics'autonomies until the 1974 Constitution. The latter gave riJe to theconcept of the ,,nation-states" when defining republics as the au-tonomous state units, even lifting to that stitus two provinces ofDerbra. Until then nationalism had not been stimulated but ratherwas fairly controlled by the charismatic leader. Even though nations'and national minorities' rights were recognized, the official policydid not pay much attentioi to the nationil question assuming that

320 321

it was resolved in the liberation war. On the other side, the policywas not oriented towards the creation of the feeling of ,,Yugoslavi-anisnl" as a ground of the modern concept of nation as a politicaland cultural unit.

This should be considered in the context of Yugoslav postwarhistory. The roots of the Yugoslav social and economic crisis mybe traced in the 1948 break with the Soviet block, which in factdid not mean the complete rejection of Stalinism as ideology andas the conception of one-party political structure. The policy whichfollowed that break my be characterized as a combination of amild trend towards liberalization in the field of economic refbnns,which allowed a limited market to appear, and Bolshevism in regardswith the constitution of the state as a political unit based on one-partyrule and mono-organizational model. Such a contradictory founda-tion was the source of the incessant tensions, which fettered society'sreal democratic transformation.

Still, thanks to such even partial reforms Yugoslavia becameone of the most advanced communist countries: its standard of lifewas much higher than in Eastern Europe; it opened its borders tofree flow of both the ideas and people; it allowed the emigrationof the labor force diminishing thus the unemployment rate; it openedrooms to the enterprises' and regional autonomies when introducingself-management, even though under its facade a dictatorial ruleof a very strong charismatic leader and mouopoly power of theparty-state were hidden, arresting any political reform which couldhave threatened one-partY rule.

Viewed fiom that standpoint one may understand why socialchange was allowed only in tenns of semi-reforms reduced to thelimited development of the market which was constantly superuisedby a strong party-state. Such a half-way liberalization was, however,an alibi used to reject any form of oppositionai (underground)

movement, restricting rebellicln to small groups of dissidents whoseinfluence was very limited (primarily to the students and intellectu-als). Hence, after the breakdown of ,,real socialism" Yugoslaviawas confronted with the absence of a viable political fbrce capableof undertaking the process of a democratic transformation. That

was the source of an apparent paradox, naniely that Yugoslavia'which was much ahead until 1989 in comparison with the East-Central European countries. faced the greater difficulties in theperiod of transition, adding to the above-mentioned its multinationrl

problems. This must be viewed in light of the growing disintegrativeforces beginning with 1970's which actually turned the yugoslavstate into a fragile co-federation incapable of controlling u-no oi-recting the growing aspirations tnward national liberation, stimu-lating separation and causing dissolution of the yugoslav state.This trend prevailed over the need for a democratic transformationin 1990's.

Next question to be considered is the following: why thisnew nationalism, u'hich reemerged in ex-yugoslavia in 1990'semanated primarily a negative energy. The answer my be found inthe fact that al the dissolution of the yugoslav state was not aneasy problem, because large numbers of yugoslav peoples livedwithin one of the others ,,national" territory, rvhich ls to sav thatterritories were so ethnically mixed that ihe call for r.purutionmeant a threat to the other nation's minorities; anct b/ nationalliberation was not defined in terms of an orientation towards thefuture, i.e. to the democratic transformation of the ancient authori-tarian regime, but iather its orientation was towards the past, thatis, to a romantic dream of ethnically based nation-states as thefulfillment of historical myths of a ,,great Serbia.. or a ,,great Croat_ia". In other words, glorification of one's own nation assumed thenegative attitudes, based on the pre.iudices, against the other nations,that produced xenophobia. Thai is to say, a ieak democratic foun-dation of ex-Yugoslavia turned national liberation movernentsa€ainst the integration and globalization - the trends prevailing inWestern Europe.

When after the fall of the ,,Berlin wall., in l9g9 all East_Central European countries were confronted with primarily demo_cratic quests expressed as: l. the abolition of the principle of theruling party, 2. the establishment of the multiparty systan, and 3.a free election - the yugoslav political elites were preoccupiedwith the dilemma: whether fedeiation or co-federation, and over_

:l:lT:a with the quesr for national self-determination, pushing

aslde the request concerning a democratic reconstruction of thestate.

^r_ ^.Th:t"tbre, democratic principles were interpreted in lightll,l1,t9,nul quesrion. For thar reason the multiparrf system me-ant::|Tt.iJ{."

possibility to form political organizaiions along rhettattonal line, the result of which was the constitution of national

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it was resolved in the liberation war. On the other side, the policywas not oriented towards the creation of the feeling of ,,Yugoslavi-anisnl" as a ground of the modern concept of nation as a politicaland cultural unit.

This should be considered in the context of Yugoslav postwarhistory. The roots of the Yugoslav social and economic crisis mybe traced in the 1948 break with the Soviet block, which in factdid not mean the complete rejection of Stalinism as ideology andas the conception of one-party political structure. The policy whichfollowed that break my be characterized as a combination of amild trend towards liberalization in the field of economic refbnns,which allowed a limited market to appear, and Bolshevism in regardswith the constitution of the state as a political unit based on one-partyrule and mono-organizational model. Such a contradictory founda-tion was the source of the incessant tensions, which fettered society'sreal democratic transformation.

Still, thanks to such even partial reforms Yugoslavia becameone of the most advanced communist countries: its standard of lifewas much higher than in Eastern Europe; it opened its borders tofree flow of both the ideas and people; it allowed the emigrationof the labor force diminishing thus the unemployment rate; it openedrooms to the enterprises' and regional autonomies when introducingself-management, even though under its facade a dictatorial ruleof a very strong charismatic leader and mouopoly power of theparty-state were hidden, arresting any political reform which couldhave threatened one-partY rule.

Viewed fiom that standpoint one may understand why socialchange was allowed only in tenns of semi-reforms reduced to thelimited development of the market which was constantly superuisedby a strong party-state. Such a half-way liberalization was, however,an alibi used to reject any form of oppositionai (underground)

movement, restricting rebellicln to small groups of dissidents whoseinfluence was very limited (primarily to the students and intellectu-als). Hence, after the breakdown of ,,real socialism" Yugoslaviawas confronted with the absence of a viable political fbrce capableof undertaking the process of a democratic transformation. That

was the source of an apparent paradox, naniely that Yugoslavia'which was much ahead until 1989 in comparison with the East-Central European countries. faced the greater difficulties in theperiod of transition, adding to the above-mentioned its multinationrl

problems. This must be viewed in light of the growing disintegrativeforces beginning with 1970's which actually turned the yugoslavstate into a fragile co-federation incapable of controlling u-no oi-recting the growing aspirations tnward national liberation, stimu-lating separation and causing dissolution of the yugoslav state.This trend prevailed over the need for a democratic transformationin 1990's.

Next question to be considered is the following: why thisnew nationalism, u'hich reemerged in ex-yugoslavia in 1990'semanated primarily a negative energy. The answer my be found inthe fact that al the dissolution of the yugoslav state was not aneasy problem, because large numbers of yugoslav peoples livedwithin one of the others ,,national" territory, rvhich ls to sav thatterritories were so ethnically mixed that ihe call for r.purutionmeant a threat to the other nation's minorities; anct b/ nationalliberation was not defined in terms of an orientation towards thefuture, i.e. to the democratic transformation of the ancient authori-tarian regime, but iather its orientation was towards the past, thatis, to a romantic dream of ethnically based nation-states as thefulfillment of historical myths of a ,,great Serbia.. or a ,,great Croat_ia". In other words, glorification of one's own nation assumed thenegative attitudes, based on the pre.iudices, against the other nations,that produced xenophobia. Thai is to say, a ieak democratic foun-dation of ex-Yugoslavia turned national liberation movernentsa€ainst the integration and globalization - the trends prevailing inWestern Europe.

When after the fall of the ,,Berlin wall., in l9g9 all East_Central European countries were confronted with primarily demo_cratic quests expressed as: l. the abolition of the principle of theruling party, 2. the establishment of the multiparty systan, and 3.a free election - the yugoslav political elites were preoccupiedwith the dilemma: whether fedeiation or co-federation, and over_

:l:lT:a with the quesr for national self-determination, pushing

aslde the request concerning a democratic reconstruction of thestate.

^r_ ^.Th:t"tbre, democratic principles were interpreted in lightll,l1,t9,nul quesrion. For thar reason the multiparrf system me-ant::|Tt.iJ{."

possibility to form political organizaiions along rhettattonal line, the result of which was the constitution of national

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parties in all the former republics of Yugoslavia and their competi-tion for national power. The fact was that national parties becamethe ruling ones in all the regions, which may explain why theirmain objective was to strengthen the newly formed nation-states,regardless their political structure, which represented rather a con-tinuation of the former authoritarian state than its democratic trans-formation. The ruling role of the national (or rather, nationalistically-minded) parties (in Serbia SPS, in Croatia CDU, in Bosnia andHerzegovina Muslim Party for Democratic Action) representedthe main obstacle to the democratic transformation of ex-Yugoslavialogically leading to its dissolution.

Democratization was thus substituted for national self-determination in terms of the creation of ethnically-based states'The main slogan at the beginning of 1990's in ex-Yugoslavia was:.,National self-determination first, democracy afterwards", consid-ering ,,the right of self-determination as the right of ethnicallydefined nations to secede from federation regardless of the massviolence such an act would surely enteil" (V. Pe5ii, 1996: 30).

When keeping in mind that it was a time of the profoundsocial-economic crisis in ex-Yugoslavia, it became clear why suchan overturned perspective deepened the national conflicts and ledthem at the end to the inter-ethnic war in Croatia and Bosnia'Under the conditions of economic crisis all the republics had afeeling as being threatened by the others, which was interpretedmore in terms of ,,economic injustice" than as a cultural and politicaloppression, because a/ in cultural terms all the nations had rightsto tbllow their national traditions, and b/ when politics was inquestion, the whole population was in the same position character-ized by the absence of civil rights and liberties, which meant thatthe citiz.ens and not particularly the natiorts were deprived of theserights. When having in rnind the latter, it called, first and foremost,for a democratic process in order to incorporate basic human rightsin a democratically constituted state, on whose basis the improve-ment of national/ethnic rights could have been achieved as well.Florvever, what dominated among Tito's successors, who wereseconcl-hand quality leaders, was struggle for power, instead ofsocial awareness of the existing crisis and of the growing ethnicconflicts.

While the Yugoslav population has stil l l ived peacefullyand has not been yet contaminated by an exclusive and aggressive

nadonalism (what the results of sociological investigations during1980's confirmed), in the beginning of 1990's the narional politicalelites started with an aggressive propaganda persuading their peoplethat living together became impossible and suggesting dissolutionof the Yugoslav state as the only resolution. Only Serbian govern-ment did not follow in these steps because Yugoslavia was theframework within which all the Serbs could live together in thesame state. However, the Serbian party leadership also relied upona nationalistic movement in order to strengthen its power, recallingthe Serbian historical myths and the memory to genocide againstSerbs during the World War Two under the nacist regime in Croatia.Thereby, the war through mass media preceded the actual inter-ethnic war, changing rapidly the attitudes of the population withregards to the other peoples which lived in yugoslavia, but alsovis-h-vis their own nations which were glorified and opposed tothe ,,inferior ethnicities" (Slovenes and Croats treated themselvesas superior,,westernized" nations as opposed to ,,barbarian.. Serbs;Serbs glorified lpemselves as a ,,heroic nation" which was in allwars on ,,the right side", etc.).

Empirical research carried out in Serbia in 1993 showed therapid gfowth of nationalism and animosities in the last decadetowards the other Yugoslav nations (the results of which are pre-sented in Z. Golubovid, B. Kuzmanovii, M. Vasovid, 1995), *hichmight be observed in the other former republics of yugoslaviatoo.

Unlike the situation before 1990's, the situation rapidlychanged since then thanks to the fact that ultranationalism is anexclusive, aggressive and militant attitude, was imposed fromabove, first by the national political elites, then aidedby culturalelites. Lust for power stayed behind the intentions of thl former,while the latter was led by an imagined national missionary role,which national intelligentsia had always pretended to play u*ongSlavs.

This hidden motive of the Yugoslav national elites was notrecognized by the international community, which took for srantedtheir declarations for self-determination as identical to deriocrati-zation. Such a misinterpretation which replaced the concept of'people" with ,,ethnicities" territorially localized in certain repub-lics, made a basic frame of reference foi conceptualizing the deitinyof the Yugoslav state, the request of Slovenia and Croatia for

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parties in all the former republics of Yugoslavia and their competi-tion for national power. The fact was that national parties becamethe ruling ones in all the regions, which may explain why theirmain objective was to strengthen the newly formed nation-states,regardless their political structure, which represented rather a con-tinuation of the former authoritarian state than its democratic trans-formation. The ruling role of the national (or rather, nationalistically-minded) parties (in Serbia SPS, in Croatia CDU, in Bosnia andHerzegovina Muslim Party for Democratic Action) representedthe main obstacle to the democratic transformation of ex-Yugoslavialogically leading to its dissolution.

Democratization was thus substituted for national self-determination in terms of the creation of ethnically-based states'The main slogan at the beginning of 1990's in ex-Yugoslavia was:.,National self-determination first, democracy afterwards", consid-ering ,,the right of self-determination as the right of ethnicallydefined nations to secede from federation regardless of the massviolence such an act would surely enteil" (V. Pe5ii, 1996: 30).

When keeping in mind that it was a time of the profoundsocial-economic crisis in ex-Yugoslavia, it became clear why suchan overturned perspective deepened the national conflicts and ledthem at the end to the inter-ethnic war in Croatia and Bosnia'Under the conditions of economic crisis all the republics had afeeling as being threatened by the others, which was interpretedmore in terms of ,,economic injustice" than as a cultural and politicaloppression, because a/ in cultural terms all the nations had rightsto tbllow their national traditions, and b/ when politics was inquestion, the whole population was in the same position character-ized by the absence of civil rights and liberties, which meant thatthe citiz.ens and not particularly the natiorts were deprived of theserights. When having in rnind the latter, it called, first and foremost,for a democratic process in order to incorporate basic human rightsin a democratically constituted state, on whose basis the improve-ment of national/ethnic rights could have been achieved as well.Florvever, what dominated among Tito's successors, who wereseconcl-hand quality leaders, was struggle for power, instead ofsocial awareness of the existing crisis and of the growing ethnicconflicts.

While the Yugoslav population has stil l l ived peacefullyand has not been yet contaminated by an exclusive and aggressive

nadonalism (what the results of sociological investigations during1980's confirmed), in the beginning of 1990's the narional politicalelites started with an aggressive propaganda persuading their peoplethat living together became impossible and suggesting dissolutionof the Yugoslav state as the only resolution. Only Serbian govern-ment did not follow in these steps because Yugoslavia was theframework within which all the Serbs could live together in thesame state. However, the Serbian party leadership also relied upona nationalistic movement in order to strengthen its power, recallingthe Serbian historical myths and the memory to genocide againstSerbs during the World War Two under the nacist regime in Croatia.Thereby, the war through mass media preceded the actual inter-ethnic war, changing rapidly the attitudes of the population withregards to the other peoples which lived in yugoslavia, but alsovis-h-vis their own nations which were glorified and opposed tothe ,,inferior ethnicities" (Slovenes and Croats treated themselvesas superior,,westernized" nations as opposed to ,,barbarian.. Serbs;Serbs glorified lpemselves as a ,,heroic nation" which was in allwars on ,,the right side", etc.).

Empirical research carried out in Serbia in 1993 showed therapid gfowth of nationalism and animosities in the last decadetowards the other Yugoslav nations (the results of which are pre-sented in Z. Golubovid, B. Kuzmanovii, M. Vasovid, 1995), *hichmight be observed in the other former republics of yugoslaviatoo.

Unlike the situation before 1990's, the situation rapidlychanged since then thanks to the fact that ultranationalism is anexclusive, aggressive and militant attitude, was imposed fromabove, first by the national political elites, then aidedby culturalelites. Lust for power stayed behind the intentions of thl former,while the latter was led by an imagined national missionary role,which national intelligentsia had always pretended to play u*ongSlavs.

This hidden motive of the Yugoslav national elites was notrecognized by the international community, which took for srantedtheir declarations for self-determination as identical to deriocrati-zation. Such a misinterpretation which replaced the concept of'people" with ,,ethnicities" territorially localized in certain repub-lics, made a basic frame of reference foi conceptualizing the deitinyof the Yugoslav state, the request of Slovenia and Croatia for

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separation, as well as the definition of the ,,aggressor" and the,,victim", etc.

A Yugoslav author writes: ,,The violent breakup of Yugo-slavia demonstrates the inability of the international community torely on any solid legal principles, guidelines or established mecha-nisms to avoid such chaos and mass suffering when constituentparts of these types of multinational states decide to go their ownway" (Vesna Pe5ii, 1996). And when the Yugoslav state collapsed,the attempt to draw the international frontiers on the ethnic basisin Bosnia led to the division and segregation of ethnic communities,inevitably producing ,,ethnically pure" areas and armed coercionas well as armed resistence (see: Nansan Behar. 1996: 101).

2. Responsibility of International (European) community forthe intensification of national conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia

A bloody destruction of the state and society in ex-Yugoslaviawas not only a result of the collapse of the given order and theimpact of the inner national tensions, but may also be interpretedin terms of a bankruptcy of internationalism which led to the revivalof nationalism of the elementary level (see: Francois Furet, 1992).

A Yugoslav author who studies the European integrationwrites that national cultures have been so far oriented towardsnational individuation, contributing thus to the European particu-larism and disintegration (B. Stdkovid, 1995: 36). The trend whichwas obviously opposed to the West-European tendency towardsintegration. Were the officials of the European Community awareof this contradiction?

Tom King (1993:63) wrote that in Yugoslavia the processof normal diplomacy has failed. Therefore, UN have much lessonsto learn from their two most recent involvments in the Gulf and inYugoslavia with regards to the strategy, i.e. how to be involvedwith persuasion and peaceful presence before the crisis breaks andbefore real killing starts.This was pointed out by another Yugoslavauthor saying that the reactions of UN and the other internationalagencies to the international conflicts have been so far counterpro-ductive, because they customarily undertake the retroactive andpunitive measures instead of preventive ones. E.g. if they reactedas soon as the first signs of the state crisis in Yugoslavia appeared

\, ly organizing a conference on Yugoslavia in order to establish

\ rules how the crisis could be dealt with; or if European Community

i accepted the intention of ex-Yugoslavia in the mid-eighties to joinEC, its problems as a part of the community might have beeneasier solved (S. Stojanovi1,1995: 116-117). And we may add:: ifthe Yugoslav Prime Minister, Ante Markovii, g<lt a real economicand political support in 1991 from the intemational community,his programme for saving and democratizing the yugoslav statemight have succeeded.

Taking as an example the crisis in ex-USSR and ex-Yugoslavia Mikail Gorbachev wrote about the negative impacts ofthe fragmentation of the states and nations, saying that any furtherfragmentation of the states according to the ethnic criteria wouldbe apt to send the existing international structure into chaos (speechof M. Gorbachev at the Win Conference). And he rightly so putinto question the motives of certain countries which were in ahurry to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, not to speak of Bosnia.

I. Ivekovid Ftated that European Community failed to ad_equately solve the conflict in Yugoslavia because it had no strategicprojection for the future with regards to a more ,,common,, policy.Therefore, Maastrich Treaty did not create a mechanism ior theeffective implementation of common foreign and security policy(lee6).

The European Community did not follow the suggestion ofBadinter Commission in January 15, IggZ which proposecl ttrerecognition of Slovenia and Macedonia, but not Croatia due to itsdiscriminatory legislation against minorities. The same author alsoposed the question regarding the responsibility of the internationalcommunity for the failure of the first peace plan for Bosnia inMarch 1992 in Lisbon, which was at drst signed by both Serbsand Muslims, but later rejected by the latter -with agood reasonfor doubt that it was done under the suggestion of1 powerfulforce.

.-- According to Thomas Fleiner, international community hadan illusion rhat by recognizing the unilaterally declared indepen_oence of some of the republics of ex-yugoslavia, it would ancicould contribute to a peaceful settlement, while the events demysti-tted such an illusion 0994:i3\.

After the unsuccessful peace treaty, war in Bosnia enor-mously escalated and brought thousands of deaths ruining the entire

326 3 2 7

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separation, as well as the definition of the ,,aggressor" and the,,victim", etc.

A Yugoslav author writes: ,,The violent breakup of Yugo-slavia demonstrates the inability of the international community torely on any solid legal principles, guidelines or established mecha-nisms to avoid such chaos and mass suffering when constituentparts of these types of multinational states decide to go their ownway" (Vesna Pe5ii, 1996). And when the Yugoslav state collapsed,the attempt to draw the international frontiers on the ethnic basisin Bosnia led to the division and segregation of ethnic communities,inevitably producing ,,ethnically pure" areas and armed coercionas well as armed resistence (see: Nansan Behar. 1996: 101).

2. Responsibility of International (European) community forthe intensification of national conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia

A bloody destruction of the state and society in ex-Yugoslaviawas not only a result of the collapse of the given order and theimpact of the inner national tensions, but may also be interpretedin terms of a bankruptcy of internationalism which led to the revivalof nationalism of the elementary level (see: Francois Furet, 1992).

A Yugoslav author who studies the European integrationwrites that national cultures have been so far oriented towardsnational individuation, contributing thus to the European particu-larism and disintegration (B. Stdkovid, 1995: 36). The trend whichwas obviously opposed to the West-European tendency towardsintegration. Were the officials of the European Community awareof this contradiction?

Tom King (1993:63) wrote that in Yugoslavia the processof normal diplomacy has failed. Therefore, UN have much lessonsto learn from their two most recent involvments in the Gulf and inYugoslavia with regards to the strategy, i.e. how to be involvedwith persuasion and peaceful presence before the crisis breaks andbefore real killing starts.This was pointed out by another Yugoslavauthor saying that the reactions of UN and the other internationalagencies to the international conflicts have been so far counterpro-ductive, because they customarily undertake the retroactive andpunitive measures instead of preventive ones. E.g. if they reactedas soon as the first signs of the state crisis in Yugoslavia appeared

\, ly organizing a conference on Yugoslavia in order to establish

\ rules how the crisis could be dealt with; or if European Community

i accepted the intention of ex-Yugoslavia in the mid-eighties to joinEC, its problems as a part of the community might have beeneasier solved (S. Stojanovi1,1995: 116-117). And we may add:: ifthe Yugoslav Prime Minister, Ante Markovii, g<lt a real economicand political support in 1991 from the intemational community,his programme for saving and democratizing the yugoslav statemight have succeeded.

Taking as an example the crisis in ex-USSR and ex-Yugoslavia Mikail Gorbachev wrote about the negative impacts ofthe fragmentation of the states and nations, saying that any furtherfragmentation of the states according to the ethnic criteria wouldbe apt to send the existing international structure into chaos (speechof M. Gorbachev at the Win Conference). And he rightly so putinto question the motives of certain countries which were in ahurry to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, not to speak of Bosnia.

I. Ivekovid Ftated that European Community failed to ad_equately solve the conflict in Yugoslavia because it had no strategicprojection for the future with regards to a more ,,common,, policy.Therefore, Maastrich Treaty did not create a mechanism ior theeffective implementation of common foreign and security policy(lee6).

The European Community did not follow the suggestion ofBadinter Commission in January 15, IggZ which proposecl ttrerecognition of Slovenia and Macedonia, but not Croatia due to itsdiscriminatory legislation against minorities. The same author alsoposed the question regarding the responsibility of the internationalcommunity for the failure of the first peace plan for Bosnia inMarch 1992 in Lisbon, which was at drst signed by both Serbsand Muslims, but later rejected by the latter -with agood reasonfor doubt that it was done under the suggestion of1 powerfulforce.

.-- According to Thomas Fleiner, international community hadan illusion rhat by recognizing the unilaterally declared indepen_oence of some of the republics of ex-yugoslavia, it would ancicould contribute to a peaceful settlement, while the events demysti-tted such an illusion 0994:i3\.

After the unsuccessful peace treaty, war in Bosnia enor-mously escalated and brought thousands of deaths ruining the entire

326 3 2 7

country. The outcome of this irrational war was an intense inter-ethnic hatred which resulted in,,ethnic cleansing" that left a hugemasses of all the nations' population without homeland. Could theinternational community prevent such a disaster'l I believe yes, ifthe common interest of Europe and an international solidarity haveprevailed over the particular interests either of individual govern-ments, or of the European Union which gave priority to its ownunity over a long-run strategic projection of the future of Europe.If a support to the preservation of the Yugoslav state and its demo-cratic transformation was more material than declarative; if thedecisions were guided by the knowledge about the historical devel-opment of the Yugoslav nations, which could have indicated wherean accelerated separation may lead, i. e. that an aggressive nation-alism, which stood behind such a request for the secession couldnot but lead to the war in such an ethnically mixed tenitory; if theinternational democratic forces were more interested in makingcontacts and supporting the Yugoslav democratic movements,which existed in all of its parts, instead of exclusively communicat-ing with the nationalist leaderships and relying upon their pseudo-democratic declarations. But all the above-mentioned ..ifs" weremissing. And all of the international interventions failed to basicallygrasp the complexity of the situation.

That is the reason why one may state that the catastrophicresults of the Yugoslav conflict are partly produced by the inad-equate European Community's foreign policy; therefore the conse-quences for the European security under the influence of the Yugo-slav conflict, are also in the domain of the European responsibility.This is not to say that the federal leadership and national politicalelites in ex-Yugoslavia are to be amnestied from their responsibility.On the contrary,I believe that the inner conflicts and incapabilityof the Yugoslav political and cultural elites to cope with themproduced the Yugoslav tragedy. Still, if the EC implemented awiser foreign policy, it might have prevented the catastrophe.

3 . What are tlrc consequences of Yugoslav conflicts for theEuropean security?

If an analogy of the French writer, G. Sorman (in his bookGoing out of S.ocictlism) is right that the fall of the ,,Berlin wall" isequal to the fall of Roman Empire, the question should be raised:

has Europe had time to prepare itself to face such a grandioserurnover and react accordingly?

I think that both Western and Eastern Europe believed thatonce the communist regimes have been eliminated, the question ofa democratic transformation and integration of the countries of,,real socialism" into the European Community would be more orless automatic - but developments proved them wrong.

As professor Hans Kung (1993: 52) put it: the integrationcalls for ,,world ethos", however, it is not a question of exporting amodel, an artificial ,,globalization", or ,,the concept of universality"as opposed to the ,,concept of regionality". He appealed for a ,,rela-tive universality" which recognizes co-existence of differing enti-ties, and I would add, in particular national entities. Within such aconcept, if it has been implemented in ex-USSR and ex-Yugoslavia,the basis to the preservation of the multinational states could havebeen built, as against mono-national and mono-cultural states whichpromoted a radical ethnification of politics.

The ,,Europepn Constitution" declared a need for new legal-political order whiOh would make impossible the regression tonationalist particularism. However, this declaration has not beenput into practice when the problems arose. Instead of working onthe creation of a new ,,world ethos", the European Union wasengaged in making a new ,,closed community.. where only themost developed privileged states could have access. That is to say,as being afraid of the intrusion of East European countries into,,our community", the European Union made barriers and newboundaries vis-i-vis non-members of the Union, defining thus theEuropean security in narrow terms. From which one mayloncludethat the mentality of the ,,Cold War" has not been yet transcended,and Western and Eastern Europe have not come much closer.^ Richard Falk (1994:57) explained the situation in Europe

after the collapse of communism as follows: ,,The breakup of yu-goslavia has unleashed a prolonged challenge to European securitythat has not been met, and whatever the outcome, wilt leave uglyscals from waiting too long and doing too little; the flow of refugeesand other foreigners into Western European countries is severelythreatening to a politics of moderation and tolerance in severilcountries, especially in Germany; the emancipation of Eastern Eu-ilpl {.9* Soviet hegemony and Communisl rule inflicted manynardships on these societies in the course of their transition to

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328 329

country. The outcome of this irrational war was an intense inter-ethnic hatred which resulted in,,ethnic cleansing" that left a hugemasses of all the nations' population without homeland. Could theinternational community prevent such a disaster'l I believe yes, ifthe common interest of Europe and an international solidarity haveprevailed over the particular interests either of individual govern-ments, or of the European Union which gave priority to its ownunity over a long-run strategic projection of the future of Europe.If a support to the preservation of the Yugoslav state and its demo-cratic transformation was more material than declarative; if thedecisions were guided by the knowledge about the historical devel-opment of the Yugoslav nations, which could have indicated wherean accelerated separation may lead, i. e. that an aggressive nation-alism, which stood behind such a request for the secession couldnot but lead to the war in such an ethnically mixed tenitory; if theinternational democratic forces were more interested in makingcontacts and supporting the Yugoslav democratic movements,which existed in all of its parts, instead of exclusively communicat-ing with the nationalist leaderships and relying upon their pseudo-democratic declarations. But all the above-mentioned ..ifs" weremissing. And all of the international interventions failed to basicallygrasp the complexity of the situation.

That is the reason why one may state that the catastrophicresults of the Yugoslav conflict are partly produced by the inad-equate European Community's foreign policy; therefore the conse-quences for the European security under the influence of the Yugo-slav conflict, are also in the domain of the European responsibility.This is not to say that the federal leadership and national politicalelites in ex-Yugoslavia are to be amnestied from their responsibility.On the contrary,I believe that the inner conflicts and incapabilityof the Yugoslav political and cultural elites to cope with themproduced the Yugoslav tragedy. Still, if the EC implemented awiser foreign policy, it might have prevented the catastrophe.

3 . What are tlrc consequences of Yugoslav conflicts for theEuropean security?

If an analogy of the French writer, G. Sorman (in his bookGoing out of S.ocictlism) is right that the fall of the ,,Berlin wall" isequal to the fall of Roman Empire, the question should be raised:

has Europe had time to prepare itself to face such a grandioserurnover and react accordingly?

I think that both Western and Eastern Europe believed thatonce the communist regimes have been eliminated, the question ofa democratic transformation and integration of the countries of,,real socialism" into the European Community would be more orless automatic - but developments proved them wrong.

As professor Hans Kung (1993: 52) put it: the integrationcalls for ,,world ethos", however, it is not a question of exporting amodel, an artificial ,,globalization", or ,,the concept of universality"as opposed to the ,,concept of regionality". He appealed for a ,,rela-tive universality" which recognizes co-existence of differing enti-ties, and I would add, in particular national entities. Within such aconcept, if it has been implemented in ex-USSR and ex-Yugoslavia,the basis to the preservation of the multinational states could havebeen built, as against mono-national and mono-cultural states whichpromoted a radical ethnification of politics.

The ,,Europepn Constitution" declared a need for new legal-political order whiOh would make impossible the regression tonationalist particularism. However, this declaration has not beenput into practice when the problems arose. Instead of working onthe creation of a new ,,world ethos", the European Union wasengaged in making a new ,,closed community.. where only themost developed privileged states could have access. That is to say,as being afraid of the intrusion of East European countries into,,our community", the European Union made barriers and newboundaries vis-i-vis non-members of the Union, defining thus theEuropean security in narrow terms. From which one mayloncludethat the mentality of the ,,Cold War" has not been yet transcended,and Western and Eastern Europe have not come much closer.^ Richard Falk (1994:57) explained the situation in Europe

after the collapse of communism as follows: ,,The breakup of yu-goslavia has unleashed a prolonged challenge to European securitythat has not been met, and whatever the outcome, wilt leave uglyscals from waiting too long and doing too little; the flow of refugeesand other foreigners into Western European countries is severelythreatening to a politics of moderation and tolerance in severilcountries, especially in Germany; the emancipation of Eastern Eu-ilpl {.9* Soviet hegemony and Communisl rule inflicted manynardships on these societies in the course of their transition to

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market economies; the collapse of the Soviet Empire has generateda cycle of vitious ethnic politics in several of the fbrmer republics,as well as producing a continual constitutional and economic crisisin the Soviet Union..." He also adds that even though the ,,ColdWar" is definitely over, no appropriate architecture of regionalsecurity has yet emerged, and if taking the case of Bosnia, onemay notice a regression in terms of cooperative capacity in thesecurity domain. The same author thinks that Western diplomacyin case of Yugoslavia was a ,,gross mismanagement" because ,,Yu-goslavian breakdown is not perceived as linked closely to anyissue of major strategic importance" (p. 63); and continues: ,,Theinability to act early and effectively in relation to war in ex-Yugoslavia underscored the inability of Europe to act in unitywithin the broad domain of regional security in post-Cold Warcircumstances..." (p. 69).

Disintegration of Yugoslavia does not indicate only collapseof a multinational state, but more than that, it is a sign of a regressiontowards national particularism which represents a great challengeto European integration and its common foreign and security policy.As mentioned earlier, if such a tendency to fragmentation escalates(and we see new movements towards so-called national self-determination in Great Britain, in Spain, in Italy and elsewhere),European security would be at stake, for the multiplication of smallindependent states makes the communication and peace controlmore difficult, because separation contributes to the growing intol-erance and distrust.

According to Maastrich ,,Provisions on a Common Foreignand Security Policy", the relationships between the ,,member states"are defined in terms of their cooperation and coordination in theirrelations with third countries. Does this document provide a cleardefinition of the ..member states" and third countries, in terms ofinternal and external sovereignty in European Community's policy'in order to find ,.solutions for serious conflicts on its soil, or fbrefficient prevention of actions of undemocratic regimes"(see: S.SamardZi6, 1994: 106).

Has the European Community any lesson to learn from thecase of Yugoslavia so as to find the better way for cooperation, inparticular with East-Central Europe?

One of the most complex and difficult problems Europe isfaced with today is a controversy between the quest fbr national

self-determination and the growing need for globalization. Thisimplies that both concepts should be clearly defined and reconciled,so as to avoid misjudgments and secure world peace which hasalready been imperiled due to the violation of the balance of thoseopposed tendencies. The best way for the European Community tosafeguard European security is to support (with economic aids notonly declarations) democratic reforms in ex-Yugoslavia and theother East-Central European countries, conceptualizing thus self-determination more in terms of political determination towardsdemocracy rather than as territorial separation (i. e. the creation of,,nation-states").

We may conclude with a question posed by a yugoslavauthor when treating the Yugoslav case in European context: ,,Forwhom the bell tolls", and with her reply: ,,Not only for yugoslavia..(R. Nakarada, 1994: 54\.

References . -:

Behar N. 1996, ,,Ethnic Conflicts and Regional Security in South-East Europe", in N. Genov (ed), Society untl politics inS outh- Ea.st Europe, Softa.

Falk R. 1994,,,Failure in Europe: Regional Security after the ColdWar", in Europe and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia, IES ,Beograd.

Fleiner Th.1994,,,Europe and the Right to Self-Determinarion,,,in Europe and the Disintegration of Yugoslavie,IES,Beo-grad.

Golubovi6 Z.,Kuzmanovii B., Vasovii M. 1995, Druineni ketrak-ter i druitvene promene u svetlu nacionulnih konflikata (So-cial Character and Social Change in Light of National Con-flicts), Filip ViSnjii, Beograd.

ureenfeld L.1992, Ncttionalism, Five Roads to Moclernity, Harvard- Uniyersity Press, Cambridge.Ivekovii L 1996,,,The Laboratory of yugoslavia and the Balkans,,,

paper presented at the International conference in Belgrade:,,Frontiers - The Challenge of Interculturality" (30-3 1 June).

King T. 1993, ,,security Policy", in How Secure is our Future?Win Conference.

3 3 0 J J I

TX

afEo

-tt

N

JtJ-

!l

(nlJ

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Y

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market economies; the collapse of the Soviet Empire has generateda cycle of vitious ethnic politics in several of the fbrmer republics,as well as producing a continual constitutional and economic crisisin the Soviet Union..." He also adds that even though the ,,ColdWar" is definitely over, no appropriate architecture of regionalsecurity has yet emerged, and if taking the case of Bosnia, onemay notice a regression in terms of cooperative capacity in thesecurity domain. The same author thinks that Western diplomacyin case of Yugoslavia was a ,,gross mismanagement" because ,,Yu-goslavian breakdown is not perceived as linked closely to anyissue of major strategic importance" (p. 63); and continues: ,,Theinability to act early and effectively in relation to war in ex-Yugoslavia underscored the inability of Europe to act in unitywithin the broad domain of regional security in post-Cold Warcircumstances..." (p. 69).

Disintegration of Yugoslavia does not indicate only collapseof a multinational state, but more than that, it is a sign of a regressiontowards national particularism which represents a great challengeto European integration and its common foreign and security policy.As mentioned earlier, if such a tendency to fragmentation escalates(and we see new movements towards so-called national self-determination in Great Britain, in Spain, in Italy and elsewhere),European security would be at stake, for the multiplication of smallindependent states makes the communication and peace controlmore difficult, because separation contributes to the growing intol-erance and distrust.

According to Maastrich ,,Provisions on a Common Foreignand Security Policy", the relationships between the ,,member states"are defined in terms of their cooperation and coordination in theirrelations with third countries. Does this document provide a cleardefinition of the ..member states" and third countries, in terms ofinternal and external sovereignty in European Community's policy'in order to find ,.solutions for serious conflicts on its soil, or fbrefficient prevention of actions of undemocratic regimes"(see: S.SamardZi6, 1994: 106).

Has the European Community any lesson to learn from thecase of Yugoslavia so as to find the better way for cooperation, inparticular with East-Central Europe?

One of the most complex and difficult problems Europe isfaced with today is a controversy between the quest fbr national

self-determination and the growing need for globalization. Thisimplies that both concepts should be clearly defined and reconciled,so as to avoid misjudgments and secure world peace which hasalready been imperiled due to the violation of the balance of thoseopposed tendencies. The best way for the European Community tosafeguard European security is to support (with economic aids notonly declarations) democratic reforms in ex-Yugoslavia and theother East-Central European countries, conceptualizing thus self-determination more in terms of political determination towardsdemocracy rather than as territorial separation (i. e. the creation of,,nation-states").

We may conclude with a question posed by a yugoslavauthor when treating the Yugoslav case in European context: ,,Forwhom the bell tolls", and with her reply: ,,Not only for yugoslavia..(R. Nakarada, 1994: 54\.

References . -:

Behar N. 1996, ,,Ethnic Conflicts and Regional Security in South-East Europe", in N. Genov (ed), Society untl politics inS outh- Ea.st Europe, Softa.

Falk R. 1994,,,Failure in Europe: Regional Security after the ColdWar", in Europe and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia, IES ,Beograd.

Fleiner Th.1994,,,Europe and the Right to Self-Determinarion,,,in Europe and the Disintegration of Yugoslavie,IES,Beo-grad.

Golubovi6 Z.,Kuzmanovii B., Vasovii M. 1995, Druineni ketrak-ter i druitvene promene u svetlu nacionulnih konflikata (So-cial Character and Social Change in Light of National Con-flicts), Filip ViSnjii, Beograd.

ureenfeld L.1992, Ncttionalism, Five Roads to Moclernity, Harvard- Uniyersity Press, Cambridge.Ivekovii L 1996,,,The Laboratory of yugoslavia and the Balkans,,,

paper presented at the International conference in Belgrade:,,Frontiers - The Challenge of Interculturality" (30-3 1 June).

King T. 1993, ,,security Policy", in How Secure is our Future?Win Conference.

3 3 0 J J I

Kung H. 1993, ,,Uncertainties - Beliefs - The Future", Win Con-ference.

Nakarada R. 1994, ,,The Breakdown of Yugoslavia and the Consti-tution of the New World Order", in Europe and the Disinte'gration of Yugoslavia, IES, Beograd.

PeSi6 V. 1996, Serbian Natiortalism and the Origin oJ the YugosluvCrisis ,US Institute of Peace, Washington, D. C.

Rothchild J. 1974, East-Central Europe hetween the Two WorldWars, University of Washington Press, Seattle.

SamardZi6 S. 1994, ,,The Pathways of European Policy", in Europeand the D i s int e g r at io n oJ' Y u g o s I av ia, IES, B eograd.

Stojanovii S. 1995, Propctst komuniz.ma i raz.biiunie Jugoslaviie(The Fall of Communism and Breakdown of Yugoslavia),Filip Vi5njii, Beograd.

Stojkovii B. 1995, Kulturnu yilitika evropske integ,raciie (CulturalPolicy of European Integration), IES, Beograd.

Zagorka Golubovii

IMPLIKACIJE KONFLIKTA U BIVSOJ JUGOSLAVIJI

ZA EVROPSKU SIGURNOST

Rezime

U tckstu sc naglalava da.ic nacionalno pitanjc ponovtt doilo u vrh dcbatcu mcdunarodno.j politici, Sto ukazu.ic na grclkc u intcrprctaciji doga<la.ia it' l989lVJ,tj. da su mealunarrxlnc snagc, trijumfuuii zbog kolapsa komunizma, it'gts,bile rtvida opsanost ko.la .jc nastala sa porastom nacionalizma. Za ttt .ic na.ioiiglcdni.liprimer bivSa Jugoslavi ja, u kqo.l.ic nacionalni konflikt postao naiozbniliniji izazovcvropskoi sigurnosti, pogotovo Ittt dogada.li ukazulu na to da nacionalistiika culbriiacskalira i na drugc dckrvc Evropc i svcta.

Daljc sc paZnja usrcdsrcdu.ic na definisanh.ic i analizu ,,ctnidkog nacionali-zma", praveii razliku izmedu nacionalnog idcntitcta i nacionalizma kao ideologiici ukazujuii na dvostruku znaicnjc poima naci.lc u smislu ,,ethnic" i ,,civic". Kon-statu.ic sc da jc ctniiki nacionalizam ko.li teZi ,,plcmcnskom uicdinicniu" i homog-cnizaciji jednog nanxla na vlastitoj tcritoriii sa etnidki utcmcljenom drZavtrm, razorioJugoslaviju kao drZavu i dovco do gradanskog rata. Razmatraju sc i uslovi koii su

dovcli do toga cla prcovlada ctnidko shvatanie naciic i ctnidki nacionalizam, na.suprotdcmokratskom rclavanju nacionalnog pitania i konstituisania zancmarnog nacitt-nalnog identitcta.

U drugom dclu tcksta trctira sc politika Evropskc zajcdnicc u odnosu narazreSenjc konflikta u bivio.j Jugoslaviji ikonstatu.jc sc da.jc ona uvck rcagovalapost-lbstum a nc blagovrcmcno i prcvcntivno, podccnlu.juCi dcstruktivnu snagunaciunalizma u etnidki toliko izmclanoj drZavi, kao lto.lc bila buivla Jugoslavija,rc da ni Evropska i'ajcdnica nc m<>ipizb&i odguvornost za tragidan ishrxl nacionalnihkonflikata na ovim prostorima, mada sc primarni uzrmi moraju tra)iti u unutra\njimokolnostima i dogaclajima. Konstatujc se, stoga, da mcdunartxlna za.iodnica trcbada izvudc poukc iz sluiaja Jugoslavilc, a prc svcga, da adckvatniic tumali zahtcvcza nacionalnim samooprcdcljcnjcm, koic sc u vilcnacionalnim ddavama nc moZcinterprctirati u smislu stvaranja ctnilki Iistih nacija-drlava.

Kljuine reii.' nacionalni idcntitct, ctniiki nacionalizam, ,,cthnic.. i ,,civic.,nation, mcdunartxlna za.jcdnica, cvropska sigurnost.

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3 3 3

Kung H. 1993, ,,Uncertainties - Beliefs - The Future", Win Con-ference.

Nakarada R. 1994, ,,The Breakdown of Yugoslavia and the Consti-tution of the New World Order", in Europe and the Disinte'gration of Yugoslavia, IES, Beograd.

PeSi6 V. 1996, Serbian Natiortalism and the Origin oJ the YugosluvCrisis ,US Institute of Peace, Washington, D. C.

Rothchild J. 1974, East-Central Europe hetween the Two WorldWars, University of Washington Press, Seattle.

SamardZi6 S. 1994, ,,The Pathways of European Policy", in Europeand the D i s int e g r at io n oJ' Y u g o s I av ia, IES, B eograd.

Stojanovii S. 1995, Propctst komuniz.ma i raz.biiunie Jugoslaviie(The Fall of Communism and Breakdown of Yugoslavia),Filip Vi5njii, Beograd.

Stojkovii B. 1995, Kulturnu yilitika evropske integ,raciie (CulturalPolicy of European Integration), IES, Beograd.

Zagorka Golubovii

IMPLIKACIJE KONFLIKTA U BIVSOJ JUGOSLAVIJI

ZA EVROPSKU SIGURNOST

Rezime

U tckstu sc naglalava da.ic nacionalno pitanjc ponovtt doilo u vrh dcbatcu mcdunarodno.j politici, Sto ukazu.ic na grclkc u intcrprctaciji doga<la.ia it' l989lVJ,tj. da su mealunarrxlnc snagc, trijumfuuii zbog kolapsa komunizma, it'gts,bile rtvida opsanost ko.la .jc nastala sa porastom nacionalizma. Za ttt .ic na.ioiiglcdni.liprimer bivSa Jugoslavi ja, u kqo.l.ic nacionalni konflikt postao naiozbniliniji izazovcvropskoi sigurnosti, pogotovo Ittt dogada.li ukazulu na to da nacionalistiika culbriiacskalira i na drugc dckrvc Evropc i svcta.

Daljc sc paZnja usrcdsrcdu.ic na definisanh.ic i analizu ,,ctnidkog nacionali-zma", praveii razliku izmedu nacionalnog idcntitcta i nacionalizma kao ideologiici ukazujuii na dvostruku znaicnjc poima naci.lc u smislu ,,ethnic" i ,,civic". Kon-statu.ic sc da jc ctniiki nacionalizam ko.li teZi ,,plcmcnskom uicdinicniu" i homog-cnizaciji jednog nanxla na vlastitoj tcritoriii sa etnidki utcmcljenom drZavtrm, razorioJugoslaviju kao drZavu i dovco do gradanskog rata. Razmatraju sc i uslovi koii su

dovcli do toga cla prcovlada ctnidko shvatanie naciic i ctnidki nacionalizam, na.suprotdcmokratskom rclavanju nacionalnog pitania i konstituisania zancmarnog nacitt-nalnog identitcta.

U drugom dclu tcksta trctira sc politika Evropskc zajcdnicc u odnosu narazreSenjc konflikta u bivio.j Jugoslaviji ikonstatu.jc sc da.jc ona uvck rcagovalapost-lbstum a nc blagovrcmcno i prcvcntivno, podccnlu.juCi dcstruktivnu snagunaciunalizma u etnidki toliko izmclanoj drZavi, kao lto.lc bila buivla Jugoslavija,rc da ni Evropska i'ajcdnica nc m<>ipizb&i odguvornost za tragidan ishrxl nacionalnihkonflikata na ovim prostorima, mada sc primarni uzrmi moraju tra)iti u unutra\njimokolnostima i dogaclajima. Konstatujc se, stoga, da mcdunartxlna za.iodnica trcbada izvudc poukc iz sluiaja Jugoslavilc, a prc svcga, da adckvatniic tumali zahtcvcza nacionalnim samooprcdcljcnjcm, koic sc u vilcnacionalnim ddavama nc moZcinterprctirati u smislu stvaranja ctnilki Iistih nacija-drlava.

Kljuine reii.' nacionalni idcntitct, ctniiki nacionalizam, ,,cthnic.. i ,,civic.,nation, mcdunartxlna za.jcdnica, cvropska sigurnost.

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