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Sutch: The Impact of the 1936 Corn-Belt Drought
Page 1 of 42 Draft of December 8, 2009
The Impact of the 1936 Corn-Belt Drought on
American Farmers’ Adoption of Hybrid Corn
Richard Sutch
University of California, Riverside
and the
National Bureau of Economic Research
Draft of January 6, 2010
ABSTRACT
The severe drought in 1936 revealed an advantage of hybrid corn not previously
recognized – its drought tolerance. This revealed ecological resilience motivated some
farmers to adopt hybrids despite their commercial unattractiveness in normal years. That
response to climate change had a tipping effect. The increase in sales of hybrid seed in
1937 and 1938 financed research at private seed companies that led to new varieties with
significantly improved yields in normal years. This development provided the economic
incentive for late adopters to follow suit. Because post-1936 hybrid varieties conferred
advantages beyond improved drought resistance, the negative ecological impact of the
devastating 1936 drought had the surprising, but beneficial, consequence of moving more
farmers to superior corn seed selection.
Thanks to Vilma Helena Sielawa Ferreira, Connie Chow, and Hiroko Inoue for research assistance, to
Susan B. Carter for critical advice, and to Norman Ellstrand for assistance with the plant biology.
Comments by Paul David, Bronwyn Hall, Gary Libecap, Michael Roberts, Paul Rhode, Hugh Rockoff,
Richard Steckel, and Gavin Wright on earlier drafts are gratefully acknowledged. Parts of this chapter
were previously released as a National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Number 14141
[Sutch 2008]. Financial support was provided by a National Science Foundation Grant: ―Biocomplexity in
the Environment, Dynamics of Coupled Natural and Human Systems.‖ Administrative support was
provided by the Biotechnology Impacts Center and the Center for Economic and Social Policy at the
University of California, Riverside.
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A severe and sustained drought struck central North America during the 1930s. Centered
on eastern Kansas, it extended north into the Canadian prairies, east to the Illinois-
Indiana boarder, south to the Gulf of Mexico, and west into Montana and Idaho. See
Figure 1. The seven-year period of low rainfall and high temperatures, 1932-1938, was
unprecedented in the memory of the Euro-Americans who inhabited the region in its
extent, severity, and duration. It has been described by climate scientists as ―one of the
most severe environmental catastrophes in U.S. history‖ [Schubert et al, 2004: 1855].
The period is best remembered for the ―Dust Bowl‖ conditions created on the panhandles
of Texas and Oklahoma, and adjacent parts of New Mexico, Colorado, and Kansas.1
My interest in this paper is – not with the Dust Bowl – but with the Corn Belt that
lies to the northeast of the Dust Bowl. Figure 1 also displays the outline of the Corn Belt
on the drought map. As can be seen, the eastern portion of the Corn Belt (western Ohio,
and Indiana) was largely outside the region struck by the severe drought. By contrast the
western Corn Belt (southwest Minnesota, western Iowa, southeast South Dakota, and
eastern Nebraska) was hard hit. This geographical contrast will allow me to explore the
adaptations made by corn farmers to sudden climate change. The lens through which I
will look is the adoption of hybrid corn in the 1930s.
The suggestion that I make in this chapter is that the severe drought of 1936
revealed an advantage of hybrid corn not previously recognized – its drought tolerance.
This ecological resilience motivated some farmers to adopt hybrids despite their
commercial unattractiveness in normal years. But that response to climate change had a
tipping effect. The increase in sales of hybrid seed in 1937 and 1938 financed research at
1 The Dust Bowl is not synonymous with the drought area. The Dust Bowl had a naturally semi-arid
climate and was settled during an untypical period of favorable climatic conditions. The first farmers
imposed a ―system of agriculture to which the Plains are not adapted to bring into a semi arid region
methods which, on the whole, are suitable only for a humid region.‖ Arid conditions returned with the
North American precipitation anomaly of the 1930s. For more detail see the Report of the President’s
Great Plains Drought Area Committee [August 27, 1936], Libecap and Hansen [2004], and Hornbeck
[2009].
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private seed companies that led to new varieties with significantly improved yields in
normal years. This development provided the economic incentive for late adopters to
follow suit. Because post-1936 hybrid varieties conferred advantages beyond improved
drought resistance, the negative ecological impact of the devastating 1936 drought had
the surprising, but beneficial, consequence of moving more farmers to superior corn seed
selection sooner than they might otherwise.
There is no doubt that the drought decimated corn crops in 1934 and 1936. One
index of the impact is the fraction harvested of each year’s acreage planted to corn.
When the damage to the crop is extensive, it is not worthwhile to attempt a harvest. If the
damage is total, there is no crop to harvest. Figure 2 presents the percentage of the corn
acreage planted that was harvested in the state of Iowa for the years 1926 to 1950. The
two years 1934 and 1936 stand out as quite depressed. Figure 3 displays the data for
Illinois (top panel), a state that was less affected by the participation shortfall, and Kansas
(bottom panel), a hard hit state at the epicenter of the drought.
Another index of drought is the yield (in bushels of corn per harvested acre).
Figures 2 and 3 also display the yield statistics.2 As Figure 3 suggests, the yield data is
somewhat less satisfactory as an index. All we have for most counties and crop districts
is the yield per harvested, not planted, acres. In a state like Kansas only a very small
fraction of the acreage was harvested, presumably located in areas that escaped the worst
of the drought. On those privileged farms relative yields were depressed but not to the
extent in percentage terms as in Iowa. In a state like Illinois the drought effect is more
evident in the harvest-to-planting ratio than in the yield per harvested acre.
The Adoption of Hybrid Corn
Hybrid corn (technically ―double-cross inbred-hybrid corn‖) was ―invented‖ by Donald
2 Unpublished state and county level data on acreage planted and harvested was made available by Michael
Haines. I am most grateful.
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F. Jones in 1917-1918 and was developed and introduced on a trial basis in 1924 by
Henry Agard Wallace. In the 1920s the Iowa Experiment Station began scientific field
trials. Wallace’s hybrid was first entered in the Iowa tests in 1921. It won first place in
1924. It was first sold commercially in 1925. Competitors began sales in 1928.
Widespread commercial adoption began in 1932 [Olmstead 2006: IV-9; Zuber and
Robinson 1941: 589]. The US Department of Agriculture began tracking the adoption of
the new varieties in the following year, 1933. At that time only about 0.1 percent of the
nation’s corn acreage was planted to the new seed. In 1936 the USDA proclaimed
significant increases in yield per acre could be achieved by adopting hybrid corn [Jenkins
1936: 481]. Yet it took another decade before 70 percent of the corn acreage had been
planted with hybrid seed. By 1960, 96.3 percent of acreage was planted to hybrid
varieties [USDA, Agricultural Statistics 1962, Table 46: 41; USDA, Track Records,
April 2004: 19]. Figure 4 reproduces the annual data for the country as a whole and
reveals a lazy S-shaped cumulative diffusion pattern.3
Zvi Griliches made the adoption of hybrid varieties in the United States the
exemplar for a statistical model of technological diffusion and fitted the cumulative
adoption patterns reported by the USDA to a logistic curve [Griliches 1957b]. Despite the
nearly three decades between initial adoption and full acceptance, Griliches considered
the adoption pattern displayed in Figure 4 to have been remarkably rapid [p. 502]. By
examining the pattern of adoption, first, state by state, and then, crop district by district,
he argued that at the local level adoption proceeded rapidly. But, he continued, the initial
introduction into a local farming community proceeded slowly as commercial seed
3 National and state level data on the percentage of corn acres planted to hybrids are available in various
annual issues of Agricultural Statistics. I have relied on the volumes for 1945 (Table 46, p. 42), 1948
(Table 50, p. 48), 1950 (Table 49, p. 47), 1952 (Table 43, p. 40), 1954 (Table 38, p. 30), 1957 (Table 40, p.
39), 1959 (Table 43, p. 33), and 1961 (Table 43, p.33). The year 1960 is the last date this data is available.
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producers developed and marketed acceptable hybrids in different locales. Thus the rate
of diffusion across the US proceeded slowly [p. 507].
Griliches’s explanation for the rapid and complete abandonment of open-
pollinated corn in favor of the new hybrid varieties was based on a simple set of ―stylized
facts.‖ He considered hybrid corn superior to the traditional open-pollinated varieties
from the beginning and suggested that that superiority was established in 1935 and
persisted thereafter.4 The advantage of hybrids, according to Griliches, could be
objectively measured by the relative increase in yield over the open-pollinated corn
[Griliches 1957b: 516-517]. He assumed that the new varieties required no significant
increase in capital investment or annual inputs. According to this analysis the adoption
process in a given crop district was one of disequilibrium transition [p. 503]. Griliches
attributed the lags in the process to ―imperfect knowledge.‖ It ―takes time to realize that
things have in fact changed‖ [p. 516]. The spread of hybrid corn geographically was
slowed by the supply lags in developing and introducing hybrid varieties tailored to the
specific soil type, weather conditions, and latitude of the peripheral regions.5 But even
this process was rapid. Using the rule of thumb suggested by Griliches to mark the start
of an adoption process as the date that ten percent of acreage was planted to hybrid corn,
Iowa in 1936 was followed by Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin in 1937, by Minnesota in
1938, and by Ohio, Nebraska, and Missouri in 1939.
4 The date 1935 is the year that acreage planted to hybrid corn exceeded ten percent of the total in the
district at the heart of the hybrid revolution. Griliches chose ten percent ―as an indicator that the
development had passed the experimental stage and that superior hybrids were available to farmers in
commercial quantities.‖ The region where this breakthrough occurred was the Sixth Iowa Crop Reporting
District [Griliches 1957b: 507 and Table II, p. 508]. The sixth district comprised Bremer, Black Hawk,
Benton, Buchanan, Linn, Delaware, Jones, Dubuque, Jackson, and Clinton Counties, all in Iowa.
5 Paul David, in an insightful review, has criticized the Griliches approach ―for lacking any real micro-level
technology choice model‖ [David 2006:4]. Edwin Mansfield [1961] can be credited with supplying such a
model to explain the logistic shape (although as David points out, Mansfield’s model is simply one of many
formulations consistent with the data). Mansfield suggested that the probability that a non-user would
switch to a new technology would be a function of the number of those in the immediate neighborhood
who had already accepted the technology. This ―contagion‖ model, borrowed from epidemiology, leads to
the logistic diffusion curve. Bronwyn Hall [2004] provides a review of the theoretical literature on
diffusion from both sociology and economics.
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The development of hybrid corn and its rapid adoption were, nearly from the
beginning, hailed as a triumph of twentieth-century biotechnology and one that carried
with it enormous welfare benefits [Sprague 1946:101].6 In a chart that is perhaps even
more famous, at least among plant scientists, than Griliches’s logistic, the rise in corn
yields per acre is employed to suggest that hybrid corn was responsible for a
biotechnological revolution that abruptly ended a sustained period of ―biological stasis.‖
Figure 5 displays the ―hockey stick‖ graph reproduced dozens of time in the scientific
literature.7 The chart plots USDA statistics on corn yields per acre dating back to 1866.
There was a remarkable stability in yields with no discernable trend before 1936.8
Thereafter yields began to increase and they have continued upward ever since. Yields
per acre rose from an average of 25 bushels per acre before 1936 to 135 bushels per acre
in the years 2000-2002 [Carter et al 2006: Series Da693-694], more than a five-fold
increase. Perhaps too casually, this increase has been attributed (1) to the continuing
adoption of the hybrid varieties between 1936 and 1960 and (2) to the continuing
improvement of hybrid traits as new varieties were introduced between 1936 and 1989
[Duvick 1992].
I say ―perhaps too casually,‖ because the introduction of hybrids was also
accompanied by the increased use of synthetic nitrogen fertilizers, increased planting
densities, and the adoption and improvements in planting and harvesting machinery.
However, these developments were intimately interrelated. One of the hybrid traits
introduced improved the plant’s ability to absorb nitrogen fertilizers and indeed the use of
6 Griliches estimated the rate of return on hybrid corn research to have been at least 700 percent annually as
of 1955 [Griliches 1958: 419].
7 As an indication of how ubiquitously Figure 5 appears, I note that a standard textbook on corn for plant
scientists [Smith, Betrán, and Runge 2004] reproduces a version of this chart four times in four separate
chapters [Troyer 2004: Chapter 1.4, Figure 32, p. 218; Betrán, Bänziger, and Menz 2004: Chapter 2.3,
Figure 6, p. 351; Wisner and Baldwin 2004: Chapter 3.8, Figure 2, p. 759; and Halauer 2004: Chapter 4.4,
Figure 1, p. 901].
8 Alan Olmstead and Paul Rhode have challenged the notion of a biological stasis before 1936. They view
the stability of yields before 1936 as due to a balance of conflicting forces some of which would depress
yields and counterbalancing ones that worked to raise yields [Olmstead and Rhode 2008: 64-97].
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fertilizer was required to reach the potential of the hybrids. Similarly, the increased
planting densities were possible only because of traits that reduced the plant’s
requirements for full sunlight and that increased its resistance to lodging – the tendency
of the plant to lie down or fall over when beaten down by the wind. Even then high
density was possible only with the heavy application of fertilizer. Increased planting
densities also required the abandonment of the horse and the horse-wide path between the
rows of corn. Thus the adoption of machinery was a necessary component for achieving
the full potential of hybrid corn.9 Since hybrid seed, synthetic fertilizer, and gasoline
tractors were a necessary triad, it is not really possible to partition responsibility for the
yield increases among them.10
The continuing improvement in the performance of hybrids after their initial
introduction is an important part of the story. Figure 6 reproduces the results of field
experiments conducted in 1989 and 1990 in central Iowa. Forty-one varieties introduced
between 1934 through 1989 by Pioneer Hi-Bred (a leading seed producer and a key
player in the story to follow), ―all popular in their time,‖ together with the most famous
open-pollinated variety, Reid’s Yellow Dent, were planted in adjacent fields in a
demonstration designed to illustrate the advance of yields due to genetic improvement
[Duvick 1992: 70]. As Figure 6 illustrates, yields advanced at an average rate of 1.16
bushels per acre per year throughout this 55-year period.11
9 On these points see: Castleberry, Crum, and Krull [1984: 33]; Shaw and Durst [1965, Table 21, p. 39];
Johnson [1960], and Sutch [2008].
10 The biological revolution in corn, commonly associated with the introduction of hybrid varieties, was not
a unique phenomenon. Indeed, I find remarkably similar ―hockey stick graphs‖ for the yields per acre in
cotton, wheat, tobacco, oats, potatoes, and barley [Sutch 2008: 19-26] . The simultaneous increase in the
yields of so many different crops during this period is more properly attributed to the discovery of an
economical process for synthesizing ammonia and the consequent increase in the use of synthetic fertilizers
[Smil 2001].
11 Also see Cardwell [1982], Russell [1983] and Castleberry, Crum, and Krull [1984].
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Despite the undeniable improvement in plant traits and the obvious appeal of the
Griliches adoption story, I make the following claims:
1] There was not an unambiguous economic advantage of hybrid corn over the
open-pollinated varieties at the time of planting in 1936.
2] The early adoption of hybrid corn before 1937 can be better explained by a
sustained propaganda campaign conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture at the
direction of the Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Agard Wallace. The Department’s
message echoed that of the commercial seed companies. Wallace was the founder of the
Pioneer Hi-Bred Seed Company, the first and largest producer of hybrid seed.
3] Later adopters of hybrid seed were motivated by the drought resistance of one
experimental hybrid variety vividly demonstrated during the drought of 1936. The
eventual improvement of yields as newer varieties were introduced and the imitative
force of ―collective logic‖ explain the continuation and acceleration of the process.
Given the required capital investments in fertilizer tanks and tractors and the inability to
save and plant one’s own seed, adoption tended to be irreversible.
The Iowa Corn Yield Tests and Hybrid Superiority
Griliches assumed that hybrid corn had an economically significant and unambiguous
superiority over open-pollinated corn from the time it was first introduced. He reported
that this superiority could be gauged by a 15- to 20-percent higher yield achieved with
hybrid corn over the traditional open-pollinated varieties. Griliches also suggested that
this relative advantage applied to both high- and low-yielding soils, good years and bad
[Griliches 1957b: 516-517; 1958: 421]. His citations to support this estimate of the yield
advantage were from an unpublished Federal Commodity Insurance Corporation source
dated 1942, and published sources dated 1940 [USDA], 1946 [Sprague], and 1952
[Rogers and Collier]. None of these sources referred to the 1932-1936 period of early
adoption. The 1940 USDA report cited the claims of ―plant breeders‖ [Griliches
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1957b:517].12
G.F. Sprague, an agronomist at Iowa State College, based his 20-percent
estimate on the increase in per acre yields observed in Iowa between 1933, when only 0.7
percent of the corn acreage was hybrid, and 1943, when 99.5 percent hybrid planting was
reported and he attributed the entire advance to the use of hybrid seed [Sprague 1946:
Figure 1, p. 101].13
John Rogers, a professor of agronomy at College Station, Texas, and
Jesse Collier, at the Texas Blackman Experiment Station, simply reported without
citation ―experience in other corn-growing regions‖ [1952: 7]. None of these reports
seems a very reliable source and none explicitly examine the relative superiority of
hybrid corn in the first half of the 1930s.
The best and most appropriate data on the relative yields of different corn
varieties are the reports of field trials conducted by the agricultural experiment stations.
These remain unexploited by quantitative historians.14
Beginning with the Iowa
Agricultural Experiment Station in the early-1920s, many of the stations in corn-belt
12
There was a survey of ―scientists engaged in crop breeding‖ taken (probably) in 1938 that reported
estimates of the hybrid yield advantage that ranged from 5 to 25 percent, the authors concluded that the
probable range was 10 to 15 percent [Dowell and Jesness 1939: Table 1 and pp. 480-481]. This may have
been the source for the USDA’s 1940 report of the opinions of ―plant breeders.‖
13
The actual increase in yields between those two years was 38 percent [USDA, Track Records, 2004], but
1945 was a very poor year for Iowa corn, so perhaps Sprague, writing in 1945, tempered his estimate.
14
Although not cited in his published Econometrica article [1957b], Griliches’s unpublished Ph.D. thesis
for the University of Chicago contains a comment in an Appendix that rejects the Agricultural Experiment
Station data:
The data raise several difficult problems. They represent results on one or several fields
in the whole state, conducted under varying and better than average conditions. The
relation between the experiment station results and what the farmer may expect on his
own farm is not clear. In particular, this relation may not remain constant between
different states. For example, while the average yield in Iowa tests was around 80
bushels per acre at a time when the average yield for the state was around 40 bushels, the
North Carolina tests averaged more than 100 bushels, but at the same time the average
state yield was only around 30 bushels [Griliches, Thesis, 1957a: 56-57].
These considerations may make the Iowa test results an exaggerated estimate of the absolute advantage, but
all that is needed for Griliches’s disequilibrium model is an estimate of the relative advantage. Elsewhere
Griliches argued that the relative advantage was independent of the level of yield per acre. Moreover, to
the extent that the test results exaggerated the absolute gain, they bias the farmer’s decision calculus toward
adoption, and thus they would bias the argument against the claim I make that the hybrid advantage was not
large enough to encourage early adoptions.
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states conducted controlled plantings of open-pollinated, experimental hybrid, and
commercially-available hybrid seeds and published the results in the Stations’ Bulletins.
This paper relies on the data available from the Iowa Corn Yield Tests. These are the
most complete. They begin at the earliest date. And, they are the most relevant. Iowa
was both the heart of the Corn Belt and the first state to widely and most quickly adopt
hybrid corn.
For the Iowa tests the state was partitioned into 12 districts, shown in the inset
map in Figure 7. A volunteer farmer from each district, who was also a member of the
Iowa Crop Improvement Association, planted several varieties in adjacent fields and
employed a uniform cultivation practice to raise them to maturity. At harvest, the yields
were measured separately for each variety and reported back to the Experiment Station.
The Table displayed in Figure 7 summarizes the results for the years 1926 through 1940.
For each district and each year the average yield for all hybrid varieties tested is
expressed relative to the average for all open-pollinated varieties. It is immediately clear
why the introduction of hybrid corn caused such excitement. Of the 166 observations in
the table, only two recorded a relative below 101 (district 3 in 1926 and district 8 in
1927). These data provide strong support for the concept of hybrid vigor, or ―heterosis‖
to use the scientific term. As we will see, however, hybrid vigor is not the same as
economic superiority.
Hybrid Vigor
American corn, or more properly, ―maize‖ (Zea mays, L.) is native to North America.15
It originated in Mexico where farmers cultivated it for millennia, gradually improving the
plant by the selection for genetically-based traits. Before the development of hybrid corn
15
The sources for this and the next several paragraphs are many, but the science is well-known so a
detailed list of sources will be omitted. References to the names and historical dates can be found in
Duvick [2001]. For a history of corn varieties (germplasm), see Troyer [2004]. Much of the science is
elaborated in Smith, Betrán, and Runge [2004]. A useful discussion of the relevant agricultural history is
provided by Bogue [1983].
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the seed used for farm-planted corn was the result of natural cross-pollination. Under
these conditions, corn is said to be ―open-pollinated.‖ Pollen, produced by the corn
plant’s tassels, is released and carried on the air. Some of the pollen typically reaches the
cornsilks (the ―ear shoots,‖ which are the stigmas of the female flower) of one or more
nearby plants. The geminating pollen tube grows down the silk and fertilizes the egg cell,
thereby starting the growth of a seed. In principle each seed on an ear of corn could have
a different male parent. The fraction of corn seeds set by self-pollination is known to be
very low. If this fertilization process is left to the wind, selective breeding consists of
choosing individual ears of corn on the basis of desirable plant or grain properties and
saving those seeds for the following year’s crop. A great deal of natural hybridization
between separate corn populations and varieties took place in this way.16
As a
consequence of repeated selection under open-pollination, corn lines evolved that were
adapted to new climates and soil conditions such that corn cultivation spread across the
North American continent in the nineteenth century.
The next step, deliberate control of parentage, produced ―varietal hybrids‖ in
experiments conducted by farmers and agronomists in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Ever since Charles Darwin’s experiments with inbred and cross-
pollinated corn, reported in 1876, it was known that the progeny of inbred plants were
inferior to those of the cross-bred hybrids.17
In Darwin’s terms, hybrid plants had ―innate
constitutional vigour.‖ The lack of this vigor in the inbreds is known as ―inbreeding
depression.‖ Not surprisingly, Darwin’s results stimulated experimentation with
deliberate cross-variety hybrids.
16
For a brief review of the history of maize cross pollination see Olmstead and Rhode [2008: 71-76]. The
most popular open-pollinated variety at the time that the first hybrids were introduced was Reid’s Yellow
Dent. This was an accidental hybrid between a reddish semi-gourd and a yellow flint. The story is told by
Russell Lord [1947: 147] and Troyer [2004].
17
Darwin married his first cousin and their first child was retarded. He had a life-long interest in
inbreeding.
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Neither natural hybrids nor the deliberate varietal hybrids are the hybrid corn of
the hybrid revolution under discussion. Hybrid corn as it is known today is more
accurately described as a hybrid of inbred lines. Due to their inferior quality, the inbreds
were generally avoided by plant breeders. So it took a leap of imagination when George
Shull and Edward East, working independently, crossed two pure inbred lines of corn
(homozygous strains) and produced plants superior to the run-of-field open-pollinated
varieties. The results were published in 1908. The Shull-East ―single-cross‖ hybrid of
inbred lines in principle could revolutionize corn farming. Seeds could be produced on a
field-wide basis by removing the tassels from one inbred line and allowing it to be
fertilized by the pollen from a second inbred line planted in the neighboring row. It
seemed evident, however, that this approach was impractical. Producing the inbred lines
that were to be crossed involved laborious hand pollination and these parent lines were so
depressed by inbreeding that their seed yields were extremely low, making the input costs
to large-scale seed production prohibitive.
The problem of producing hybrid seed that the farmer could afford was further
compounded by the need to plant freshly-made hybrid seed each year. If the seeds of an
inbred hybrid were planted, the yields achieved the following season would drop
significantly because seed from a hybrid field would suffer from inbreeding depression
[Jugenheimer 1939: 18-19].
The practical problem was solved in 1918 by Donald F. Jones. He found that a
―double-cross‖ hybrid could be made by crossing two single-cross varieties. The
progeny, while generally not as productive as their single-cross parents, nevertheless out
performed the open-pollinated varieties. Since single crosses were prolific parents (unlike
the pure inbred lines) production costs for the double-crosses were reduced to an
economical level.
All of the hybrids in the Iowa Corn Tests recorded in the table in Figure 7 were
double-cross varieties. The trial results for the period 1926-1933 (before the drought of
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1934) are plotted both as a histogram and as a density estimate in Figure 8. The average
yield advantage of the hybrids was 9.3 percent (averaging across the 12 districts and 95
observations). The median yield advantage was 9 percent. An advantage of 15 to 20
percent would be an exaggeration for this period. The average advantage in District 6,
where the adoption of hybrid corn first took place, was only 7 percent.
Although the 15-20 percent advantage cited by Griliches is an exaggeration for
the period of first adoption, perhaps the story of a disequilibrium transition would be just
as valid with the more modest 7 to 9 percentage advantage reported by the Iowa
Experiment Station. The typical yield with open-pollinated corn reported by the farmers
conducting the Iowa corn yield tests, 1926 through 1933, was 61.3 bushels per acre
[Shaw and Durost 1965, Table 12: 28]. Presumably, this represents the yield achieved
with best-practice farming by experienced farmers. The state-wide average for that
period, however, was only 38.2 bushels per acre. Thus the typical farmer could anticipate
a yield gain of less than four bushels per acre and an experienced best-practice farmer
could anticipate perhaps as much as a six-bushel gain.
Before we can conclude that an advantage in physical yield translated into an
economic advantage, we must factor in the depressed value of the corn crop and the high
price of hybrid corn seed. With the advent of the Great Depression in the 1930s, the
market price of corn came down from a high of 80 to 85 cents a bushel in the late 1920s
to 32 cents in 1931 and 1932 [Carter et al, Series Da697]. During the Depression hybrid
seed was selling in Iowa for $6.00 a bushel [Culver and Hyde 2000: 91].18
Since a bushel
of seed would plant two acres [Duvick 1992: 71], a farmer would have to expect a
financial gain approaching $3.00 an acre to be tempted to pay full price.19
Expecting no
18 Elsewhere Culver and Hyde report ―at the depths of the Depression, corn sold in Iowa for ten cents a
bushel‖ and that Pioneer’s price was $5.50 a bushel [p. 147].
19 Corn seeding rates varied widely depending upon the local practice and climate. States with abundant
rainfall, such as Ohio, supported heavier seeding rates [Fernandez-Cornejo 2004: 8].
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more than 32 cents per bushel for the crop when sold, the advantage of the hybrid seed
would have had to approach nine bushels per acre, not the four to six bushels that could
be anticipated on the basis of the Iowa Corn Tests.
Henry Agard Wallace and Hybrid Hype
The puzzle then is why some adventurous farmers were willing to adopt hybrid corn
before its economic superiority was demonstrated by controlled tests. My suggestion has
two parts: (1) there was an aggressive marketing campaign launched by the commercial
seed companies directed at potential adopters, and (2) the Secretary of Agriculture, Henry
Agard Wallace, a commercial promoter of hybrid seed and former President of the major
seed company, Pioneer Hi-Bred International, put the full weight of the Federal
government behind an advocacy of hybrid corn.
Henry Agard Wallace, Franklin Roosevelt’s first Secretary of Agriculture, was a
multifaceted, complex, prolific, and eccentric man.20
He was an early champion of
scientific farming, a path-breaking plant scientist, a talented statistician and geneticist,
America’s first econometrician, author of a dozen books, a journalist, and the influential
editor of Wallaces’ Farmer, from 1921 to 1933, the most prominent agricultural
magazine of its time.21
Later he became the editor of The New Republic, 1946-1948.
Wallace was a successful entrepreneur who made a personal fortune as the leading
founder of the Hi-Bred Seed Company (later Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.). Today,
Pioneer is a wholly-owned subsidiary of E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company and is
the largest seed company in the world with a market share in 1997 of 42 percent
[Fernandez-Cornejo 2004: Table 12, p. 26; Beck 2004: 568]. Henry Agard Wallace was,
20
As one index of his eccentricity, I note that Wallace was a mystic and an ambidextrous, vegetarian,
teetotaler before any of these affectations was considered legitimate. Republican teetotalers holding high
office in Roosevelt’s New Deal administration were rare indeed. The best biography of Wallace is by John
C. Culver and John Hyde [2000] from which I draw the details in this paragraph.
21
It was the USDA’s statistician Louis Bean that named Henry A. Wallace the first American
econometrician based on Wallace’s book, Agricultural Prices [1920]. See Culver and Hyde [2000: 51].
Sutch: The Impact of the 1936 Corn-Belt Drought
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according to historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr [2000], America’s best Secretary of
Agriculture.22
He was Vice President of the United States during World War II – the
most influential and powerful Vice President before Dick Cheney. Wallace served as
Secretary of Commerce during the economic transition to peace time (1945-1946). He
ran for President on the Progressive Party ticket in 1948. The Des Moines Register
identified Henry A. Wallace the "Most Influential Iowan of the 20th Century" on
December 31, 1999. His biographers identified him as the ―state’s greatest son‖ [Culver
and Hyde 2000: ix]. When he died of Lou Gehrig’s disease in 1965, the then-reigning
Secretary of Agriculture, Orville Freeman, could declare, without hyperbole that: ―No
individual has contributed more to the abundance we enjoy today than Henry Wallace‖
[p. 531].
A unifying theme – an obsession, really – for Wallace throughout this prolific and
many-sided career was hybrid corn. In 1910, two years after Shull and East reported on
their single-cross inbred hybrid experiments, Wallace was debating the findings with
Iowa State College agronomists in Ames. In 1912 he conducted his own experiments to
produce single-cross hybrids. At the time, he concluded that the difficulty of hand
pollination ―was too laborious‖ [Wallace quoted by Culver and Hyde 2000: 67]. Over
the next several years Wallace experimented with varietal hybrids without achieving
consistent success. But when Edward East visited Wallace in 1919 and introduced him to
Donald Jones’ results with double-cross hybrids, Wallace immediately saw the
commercial potential and began his own experiments with the new technique. He also
used the pages of Wallaces’ Farmer to proclaim the coming revolution [Culver and Hyde
2000: 68]. In 1920 the circulation of Wallaces’ Farmer was 65,200 [Galambos 1968:
344]. The journal was read by a high proportion of corn and hog farmers.
22
Precision requires that I use Wallace’s middle name since his father, Henry Cantwell Wallace, was also
Secretary of Agriculture (1921-1924), appointed by Warren Harding. Another Henry Wallace in the family
was Henry A. Wallace’s grandfather and the founder of Wallaces’ Farmer. This Wallace had no middle
name [Lord 1947].
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In 1920 Wallace convinced the Iowa State Agronomist, H.D. Hughes, to establish
the Iowa Corn Yield Tests. The idea was to challenge the current practice of judging
corn by the physical appearance of the ear and instead focus on yields per acre. Wallace
did not have enough seed to offer an entry of his own that first year, and his entry for
1921 failed to outperform the best of the open-pollinated varieties. He entered a new
hybrid, named Copper Cross, in the 1922 tests and again in 1923, but it too failed to out-
yield the best open-pollinated entries. However, Copper Cross was successful enough
that Wallace was able to draw up a contract for its commercial release with the Iowa Seed
Company. When Copper Cross won the gold medal at the 1924 test, the
commercialization of hybrid corn was launched.23
Wallace himself wrote the first
advertising copy. ―An Astonishing Product—Produces Astonishing Results … If you try
it this year you will be among the first to experiment with this new departure, which will
eventually increase corn production of the U.S. by millions of bushels‖ [quoted by Culver
and Hyde 2000: 71].
In 1926 Wallace founded the Hi-Bred Seed Company [Culver and Hyde 2000: 82-
83]. He continued to use the pages of Wallaces’ Farmer to proclaim the virtues of hybrid
corn and, of course, to advertise his company’s seed. In that same year and the following
year hybrid maize did reasonably well in the Iowa Corn Yield Tests recording about a 7
percent greater yield than their open-pollinated rivals. But that was an insufficient
advantage to create much demand.
There were several obstacles, not the least of which was the astonishing price that
Wallace was asking for his ―astonishing‖ seed – it was $52 bushel in 1924 [May 1949:
514, Culver and Hyde 2000: 71]. Two founding principles of the Hi-Bred Seed Company
were first, total honesty in advertising and, second, high prices. ―High prices, Wallace
believed, were necessary to convince farmers they were buying something special‖ and,
23
The Funk Brothers Seed Company introduced its first double-cross hybrid in 1928 [Fitzgerald 1990:
218].
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of course, high profits helped cover the cost of on-going research intended to improve the
varieties [Culver and Hyde 2000: 91 and 148].
Another obstacle that had to be overcome was the reluctance of many farmers to
abandon their reliance on their own home-grown seed and instead entertain a visit by, and
the commercial pitch of, the traveling seed salesman. The role of the salesman was not
so much to educate the farmer – the genetics of inbred-hybrid crosses and the ―magic‖ of
heterosis exceeded the common-sense knowledge of most farmers and indeed of most
seed salesman. The claims of superiority had to be accepted, if they were, on faith. It was
a particularly sore point with many farmers that seeds saved from a hybrid crop could not
themselves be planted the next season with any hope of success. So, old habits were
challenged. A commitment to hybrid seed was tantamount to an agreement to deal with
the seed salesman every subsequent year as well as the current year. And that
commitment meant that the farmer’s skill in selecting seed corn from his own crop, a skill
which many took great pride in, would be no longer needed or esteemed [Fitzgerald
1993].
Pioneer Hi-Bred designed a sophisticated marketing plan to address these
problems. Seed salesmen working for Wallace offered to provide the reluctant farmer
enough seed free of charge to plant half of his acreage. The farmer would plant the
remaining land with the open-pollinated seed he preferred. In exchange the Hi-Bred
company would reclaim one-half of the increased crop produced by its seed judged
against the farmer’s regular crop [Lee 1984: 43, Culver and Hyde 2000: 91]. Typically,
only one farmer on each lane was offered the deal with the hope that a demonstration
would spread interest to the neighborhood. Other farmers were given yield guarantees
[May 1949: 514]. According to Culver and Hyde, it often took several years to persuade
a farmer that the higher yields achieved with the Hi-Bred seed were not a fluke [p. 91].
With the advent of the Great Depression in the 1930s, marketing the new seed
became even more difficult. As I have noted, the Depression had sent the market price of
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corn tumbling from a high of 85 cents a bushel in the late 1920s to 32 cents in 1932 and
Iowa farmers, many who faced ruin, were hardly in the mood for experimentation and
risk taking. Safety first was the general rule. Moreover the average yield gains from
switching to hybrids were, as I have already pointed out, generally insufficient to justify
the cost of seed.
Henry Agard Wallace became President Roosevelt’s Secretary of Agriculture in
1933. The public position did not damp his enthusiasm for hybrid corn. For many years
the Agriculture Department had published an annual volume, The Yearbook of
Agriculture, devoted to reporting on the activities of the Department, of advances in
many fields, and offering both general and specific advice to farmers. The Yearbooks
had large press runs and were widely distributed by members of Congress to their
farming constituency. For the 1936 edition Wallace made an unusual decision. As he
explained:
The 1936 Yearbook of Agriculture differs … from those published in
recent years. … This year it is devoted to a single subject – the creative
development of new forms of life through plant and animal breeding
[Wallace 1936: foreword].
The article on ―Corn Improvement‖ for this Yearbook was written by Merle T. Jenkins,
the USDA’s Principal Agronomist. A headline exaggeratedly claimed ―Yield Advances
up to 35 Percent over Open-Pollinated Varieties‖ [Jenkins 1936: 481]. The report was
based on the Iowa Corn Yield Test despite the exaggeration of the headline.
In retrospect, and perhaps even at the time, the focus of the 1936 Yearbook was in
jarring contrast to other efforts of the Roosevelt Administration to deal with the Great
Depression. For the first several years of his administration, Wallace presided over the
acreage reduction and crop destruction policies of the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration. He was the one who ordered the plowing up of ten million acres of
cotton in 1933 and the slaughter of six million baby pigs and sows in September [Culver
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and Hyde 2000: 123-125]. Yet Wallace looked into the future beyond the current crisis
to foresee a time when the yield increases to be made possible by the spread of hybrid
corn would be welcome.
By today’s standards, the glaring conflict of interest between Wallace’s financial
interest in the Pioneer Hi-Bred Company and the use of the government agency he
controlled to advertise and advocate his product would be outrageous. But even this
propaganda barrage combined with the innovative marketing strategy of his company
might not have been successful in tipping the balance in favor of hybrid corn. It took two
other factors to put the company on the road to success.
Drought and Research
The eventual success of hybrid corn was due, first, to a tipping event and then to the self-
reinforcing momentum of biotechnology. The factor which acted to tip the balance in
favor of hybrid adoption was paradoxically another disaster to bedevil corn farmers in the
1930s. As if the Depression, with its devastating impact on agricultural prices were not
enough, there were catastrophic droughts in 1934 and 1936. An index of the severity of
these droughts, as we have suggested, is the fraction of the crop planted which was
harvested. In Iowa and in the country overall, thirty to forty percent of the acreage
planted was so devastated by drought that it was not worth harvesting. In Nebraska and
Kansas the losses were nearly total. Consult Figures 2 and 3.
What the droughts starkly demonstrated was that the relative yield of hybrid corn
was greatest when the absolute yields were generally depressed. Figure 9 reveals the
relationship using, once again, the Iowa Corn Yield Test results to illustrate the
correlation. In the extreme drought conditions of the mid 1930s, the yield differences
between the new and traditional varieties were stark. Edward May, President of the May
Seed Company, recalled:
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Yield differences became plainly evident in 1936, which was also a
severe drouth year in Iowa. At this time nearly all farmers who were
testing hybrid seed corn planted only a limited acreage. Yields of
hybrids under these conditions in many areas of the state were
approximately double the yields of other corn grown on the farm. The
results were so convincing that it marked the end of the vast efforts of
initial adoption [May 1949: 514].
―Almost overnight, demand for hybrid seed exploded‖ [Culver and Hyde 2000: 149].
Big percentage point gains in adoption came in 1937: 22.3 percentage points accounted
for by new adoptions in Illinois, 21.2 percentage points Iowa, 18.3 points in Ohio, 17.4 in
Indiana, 12.9 in Wisconsin [see footnote 3 for sources].
Once the move to hybrid corn was launched -- and only because the switch was
made – the technological diffusion process became self-sustaining and irreversible. The
steady improvement of the yield advantage of hybrid corn began in 1937. See Figure 6,
but also Figure 10 which illustrates the shift in the relative hybrid advantage after 1936.
Farmers might have switched to hybrid corn out of fear of continued drought, but soon
the genetic advance in hybrid corn made open-pollinated corn obsolete even though the
price of hybrid seed was high and a farmer using it would need to purchase fresh seed
each season. This genetic improvement was achieved thanks to continuing research
funded by the seed companies using retained earnings generated by soaring sales and
high prices.
Wallace believed that his hybrid revolution would have collapsed without a
continuing, well-financed, research effort [Culver and Hyde 2000: 148]. Research by the
federal government also played a supporting role.24
The research in both sectors was
closely co-coordinated. According to Sprague [1946: 101] there was unrestricted
24
In 1922 when Henry Agard Wallace’s father, Henry C. Wallace, was Secretary of Agriculture a well-
funded hybrid corn research program was established by the Department in cooperation with the
Experiment Stations in several corn-belt states. This federal program was vital during the 1920s. Donald
Duvick suggests that ―the commercial maize breeders probably could not have succeeded in the early years
[without the contributions from the public sector], for individually they simply did not have enough inbred
lines …‖ [Duvick 2001: 71].
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interchange of ideas and seed stock between government researchers and the private
companies. Most observers agree that the for-profit research was the driving partner of
the private-federal joint effort after 1937 [Griliches 1958: 420-421 and Table 1, p. 424;
Duvick 2001: 71; Fuglie, Ballenger, et al 1996: 45, Fernandez-Cornejo 2004: 41-50].
Wallace claimed that his company spent more money on corn research than the USDA
and the state experiment stations combined [Culver and Hyde 2000: 148].
Ironically, the drought of 1934 was, in part, responsible for the remarkable
improvement in hybrid development seen thereafter. One of the farmers that Hi-Bred
recruited as part of its experimental research on new hybrid strains suffered greatly in the
drought of 1934. Most of his experimental plants were lost. But he continued to work
with the few plants that had managed to survive. The result was the unexpected
discovery of a hardy new hybrid, number 307, with a remarkable ability to withstand
drought. Consult Figure 6 again, where number 307 is labeled for easy identification.
The experimenter remarked that this plant ―proved very valuable when we found
ourselves in another serious drought condition in the summer of 1936‖ [Culver and Hyde
2000: 149].
What we have, then, is a story of the diffusion of hybrid corn that is more
complex and more interesting than the one usually told by Griliches-inspired plant
scientists [Griliches, Science, 1960]. Rather than disequilibrium transition slowed by
information imperfections that were gradually overcome by commercial advertising and
agricultural extension education, the history reveals that neither the innovation of 1918,
nor the commercial product of 1924, nor the highly-touted seeds of 1936 were
economically and culturally attractive. The advertising and marketing campaigns of the
seed companies were effective in the late 1920s or early 1930s not because they educated
farmers, but because they offered inducements designed to lower the costs and risks of
adoption, shifting those costs and risks to the seed companies. The tipping point came in
1936 when farmers choose what seeds to plant in 1937. How much credit should be
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given to the Yearbook of Agriculture that year and how much to the drought would be
difficult to say given their simultaneity. But what is clear is that the genetic advance in
hybrid corn varieties beginning with hybrid 307 (which was introduced commercially in
1936) is what locked in the transitional adopters and made the hybrid revolution seem
inevitable in retrospect. Had Wallace not used the bully pulpit of the USDA to promote
his own commercial and financial interests, had the USDA not supported the research
effort in the late 1920s and early 1930s, had the droughts of 1934 and 1936 not occurred,
had Hi-Bred not continued a major research effort following 1936, the Wallace crusade
might have succumbed as just another fatality of the Great Depression.
The Impact of the Drought on Adoption: An Illustration
The relationship between the drought and the adoption of hybrid corn can be illustrated
using crop district data for the years 1926-1960. For the purposes of reporting the data
on the percentage of acreage planted to hybrid varieties and the statistics of acreage and
output, the USDA partitioned each of the corn states into nine (or fewer) districts that
aggregated contiguous counties. Unfortunately the county-level data on acreage planted
is not complete and the data on yields is available only for Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri, eastern South Dakota, and eastern Nebraska. Michigan and
Kansas are not yet available. Because the data on acreage planted is not available at the
county or district level for most of these states, I use the yield per harvested acre as my
measure of the severity of the drought in 1936. Specifically severity is measured as the
percentage yield shortfall in 1936 when compared to the average yield for 1926-1935
excluding 1934.
The more severe the 1936 drought, the greater its depressing impact within a crop
district, the faster we expect the adoption of the new drought-resistant hybrids would
have been. Zvi Griliches collected annual data on the percentage of acreage planted in
each crop district that was devoted to hybrid varieties. District-by-district he fit a simple
three-parameter logistic curve to estimate the timing and speed of adoption. We used the
Sutch: The Impact of the 1936 Corn-Belt Drought
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parameters that he published [Griliches 1957, Table 2] to calculate three measures:25
(1)
the year that the district achieved a 40-percent adoption rate, (2) the number of years that
elapsed between the time a 10-percent adoption rate was achieved and a 70-percent
adoption rate was recorded, and (3) the percentage of new acreage adopting hybrid corn
in 1937 compared with 1936. I name these three variables: ―penetration,‖
―cautiousness,‖ and ―jump.‖
We also conjecture that the eagerness to adopt the new varieties would be
correlated with the productivity of corn farming within the district. The higher the yield
per acre in normal years, the larger will be the pecuniary advantage of the higher yields
the new varieties seemed to offer.
Penetration: A 40-percent rate of adoption would indicate that hybrid corn had
made significant inroads in the region. Penetration is the date (in years) this threshold
was achieved. The average over the 44 crop districts was 1939. The smaller this
number, the earlier substantial penetration was achieved. I performed a simple statistical
calculation to predict the year that 40-percent penetration was achieved for a cross
section of the 44 crop reporting districts in the cotton belt. See the map inset in Figure
11. The average yield reported for the 1926-1933 and 1935 period and our measure of
the yield shortfall in 1936 were used as linear regressors. The larger the shortfall in yield,
the greater severity of the drought, and thus the earlier penetration should have been
achieved. The regression confirms this relationship. The higher the normal yield per
acre the earlier 40-percent penetration was achieved. Both coefficients are statistically
significant at the 96 percent level. The regression statistics are presented in Figure 11.
25
A purest might prefer to use the original data rather than the fitted curves. I have been unable to locate
the original data. However, the fit of each curve as reported by Griliches is very high. Moreover, there is
certain logic in using the fitted values since they create a continuous variable, smooth the data, and correct
for noise in the original crop reporters’ estimates.
Sutch: The Impact of the 1936 Corn-Belt Drought
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Cautiousness: I expect that a severe drought would reduce caution and
accelerate the speed of adoption. The results, also in Figure 11, confirm this conjecture.
The larger the shortfall in the 1936 crop the faster the diffusion process proceeded.
Jump: The size of the jump in adoption rates, measured between 1936 and 1937,
would be expected to be positively related to yield and to the shortfall. These results are
also presented in Table 11. Both coefficients have the predicted sign. Large yields and
large losses in 1936 are associated with a bigger jump between 1936 and 1937.
We conclude that the drought of 1936 sped the process of adoption after it
revealed the drought resistance of hybrid corn. The commercial seed producers were
quick to spread the word. An advertisement for DeKalb seed published in the Prairie
Farmer of October 24, 1936 prominently featured hybrid corn’s drought resistance and
claimed it had been proven in eight corn belt states from Nebraska to Ohio [reproduced in
Fitzgerald 1990: 176]. After 1937 a new dynamic was set in motion. The explosion of
demand for hybrid corn generated large profits for the major hybrid seed companies:
Pioneer, Funk, and DeKalb. As a result prices of hybrid seed fell and the companies
invested heavily in research with new hybrid strains. They not only perfected the drought
resistance of the plant, but found ways to permit increased planning density, increase the
resistance to lodging, and increase responsiveness to artificial fertilizer. The result was a
steady improvement in the yields per acre that hybrid corn could achieve. Once these
post-1937 improvements were recognized adoption of hybrid corn became economically
advantageous; before 1937 it had not been so.
We can trace the diffusion of hybrid corn from district to district. The insert map
in Figure 11 illustrates when the various districts achieved 40-percent penetration. The
crop district in the center of the Corn Belt (Iowa District 6) was the epicenter for the
spread of the innovation. It had reached 40 percent in 1936. Eleven districts, all located
in a concentric ring around the origin districts achieved that threshold in 1937 in the rush
to achieve some protection in case another dry year were to follow. In 1938 the
Sutch: The Impact of the 1936 Corn-Belt Drought
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concentric ring expanded to the north and west. In 1938 there were also four districts in
northern Indiana and northwest Ohio that reached the penetration threshold. These
districts were less affected by the drought of 1936. It is possible that a geographical
contagion coupled with new and superior varieties introduced for the 1938 crop year
explain this move into northern and central Indiana and Ohio. Central Indiana and Ohio
filled in the map in 1939. The southern tier of those states did not reach 40 percent until
1940 or after.
The sociologists Bryce Ryan and Neal Gross, writing in 1950, studied the
diffusion of hybrid corn in two communities located in Greene County, Iowa [Ryan and
Gross 1950]. In their view late adopters were farmers bound by tradition. They were
irrational, backward, and ―rural.‖ The early adopters by contrast were flexible,
calculating, receptive, and ―urbanized.‖ ―Certainly,‖ they summarized, ―farmers refusing
to accept hybrid corn even for trial until after 1937 or 1938 were conservative beyond all
demands of reasonable business methods‖ [p. 672]. They drew a policy implication.
―The interest of a technically progressive agriculture may not be well served by social
policies designed to preserve or revivify the traditional rural-folk community‖ [p. 708].
In part this view was based on Ryan and Gross’ (incorrect) belief that hybrid corn was
profitable in the early 1930s [p. 668]. I have suggested that this was not the case. The
map in Figure 11 should also give pause to the view that rural laggards delayed the
adoption of hybrid corn. It would be hard to argue that the farmers in Iowa Crop
Reporting District 6 were predominantly forward-thinking leaders, attentive, and flexible,
while those in Indiana and Ohio were predominately backward rustics trapped by
inflexible folk tradition.
I think an implication of this study is that farmers (even those of rural America in
the 1930s) are remarkably resilient and adaptive. Sudden and dramatic climate change
induced a prompt and prudent response. An unexpected consequence was that an
otherwise more gradual process of technological development and adoption was given a
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kick start by the drought and the farmers’ response. That pushed the technology beyond
a tipping point and propelled the major Corn Belt states to the universal adoption of
hybrid corn by 1943. The country as a whole reached universal adoption by 1960.
While this process was driven by individual farmers and privately-owned seed
companies, there was also a role played by the government. The USDA not only
campaigned vigorously for hybrid corn from 1936 onward, but engaged in the years
before 1936 in its own research, and subsidized the dissemination of knowledge and seed
samples. That this engagement was to some extent promoted by the Secretary of
Agriculture, Henry Agard Wallace, a hybrid researcher and the founder of the major
commercial producer of hybrid seed, should not blind us from recognizing the
importance of the government subsidizes in preparing the new technology for the leap
forward.
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Sutch: The Impact of the 1936 Corn-Belt Drought
Page 32 of 42 Draft of December 8, 2009
Based on Schubert, Suarez, et al [2004] Figure 1, p. 1855.
1932-1938 Composite
Precipitation Anomaly
Based on the 1950 Census of Agriculture. Counties with 25
percent or more of acreage planted to corn.
The American Corn Belt
Figure 1
Sutch: The Impact of the 1936 Corn-Belt Drought
Page 33 of 42 Draft of December 8, 2009
Figure 2
1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Percent of Acreage Plantedthat was Havested
Yield in Bushelsper Acre Harvested
Iowa
1934
1936
Sutch: The Impact of the 1936 Corn-Belt Drought
Page 34 of 42 Draft of December 8, 2009
Figure 3
1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Percent of Acreage Plantedthat was Havested
Yield in Bushelsper Acre Harvested
Illinois
19341936
1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Percent of Acreage Plantedthat was Havested
Yield in Bushelsper Acre Harvested
Kansas
1934 1936
Sutch: The Impact of the 1936 Corn-Belt Drought
Page 35 of 42 Draft of December 8, 2009
1932 1934 1936 1938 1940 1942 1944 1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960
0
20
40
60
80
100
Percent of Corn Acreage Planted
to Hybrid Varieties
96.3%
Source: Acreage planted to hybrid seed corn from USDA, Agricultural Statistics, 1962, Table 46, p. 41, divided by acreage planted to corn from
USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service, Historical Track Records, April 2004, p.19.
1932 1934 1936 1938 1940 1942 1944 1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
Acres Planted to Corn
Total
Hybrid
Figure 4
Sutch: The Impact of the 1936 Corn-Belt Drought
Page 36 of 42 Draft of December 8, 2009
1875 1900 1925 1950 1975 2000
0
40
80
120
160
U.S. Corn Yields, 1866-2002
Bushels per
Acre
Source: Carter, et al. 2006: Series Da693-694. USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2004: 7 & 9.
Open-pollinated corn
Increasing
adoption of
double-cross
hybrid corn
1%
96%
single-cross
hybrid corn
99%
Figure 5
Sutch: The Impact of the 1936 Corn-Belt Drought
Page 37 of 42 Draft of December 8, 2009
Figure 6
β = 1.16 bushels/year
RYD = Reid’s Yellow Dent (open pollinated)
Average over three planting densities
[12K, 19K, 26K plants per acre]
Hybrid 307
RYD
50
70
90
110
130
150
Bushels
per
Acre
1920 1940 1960 1980 2000Year of Introduction
Hybrid Grain Yield by Year of
Introduction of the Variety
Source: Dan N. Duvick, “Genetic Contributions to Advances in Yield of U.S. Maize,” Maydica (37) 1992: 69-79; Table 3, p. 73.
β = 1.16 bushels/year
RYD = Reid’s Yellow Dent (open pollinated)
Average over three planting densities
[12K, 19K, 26K plants per acre]
Hybrid 307
Sutch: The Impact of the 1936 Corn-Belt Drought
Page 38 of 42 Draft of December 8, 2009
District 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
1 117 109 110 109 114 116 115 114 112 111 107 107 115 110 108
2 105 117 120 124 113 * 102 110 101 109 118 109 109 115 122
3 97 103 109 114 111 106 102 107 119 106 126 112 118 114 +
4 116 105 110 110 116 112 107 129 111 121 * 108 114 113 121
5 107 111 108 108 114 113 108 128 108 107 129 114 112 107 127
6 105 110 103 103 105 109 106 116 106 103 117 108 117 116 115
7 105 103 114 109 113 107 112 * 150 131 120 121
10 111 102 111 108 102 105 102 140 133 120 141 132
8 104 98 115 109 124 108 110 127 109 112 112 116
11 103 114 108 112 111 106 111 154 114 134 115 #
9 105 102 114 114 106 107 106 149 114 106 110 122
12 110 107 104 106 103 102 100 141 118 115 108 118
* Crop lost -- drought
+ Poor crop -- "not calculated"
# Crop abandoned -- wire worms
105 115 105
*109 122
114 149 113
Iowa Corn Yield Tests, 1926-1940
Relative Average Yield for all Hybrid Varieties
All Open-Pollinated Varieties = 100
Note: For 1933-1935 districts 10, 11, and 12 were
combined with districts 7, 8, and 9 respectively.
Source: Marcus S. Zuber and Joe L. Robinson, “The 1940 Iowa Corn Yield Test,”
[Iowa] Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin P19 NS, February 1941:589.
Figure 7
Sutch: The Impact of the 1936 Corn-Belt Drought
Page 39 of 42 Draft of December 8, 2009
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8
90 100 110 120 130
Density Estimate of Relative Hybrid Yield
1926-1933 Iowa Corn Yield Tests
12 districts
N = 95
median 109
mean 109.3
std dev = 5.9
Relative Yield
[open-pollinated varieties = 100]
MIN = 97 MAX = 129
Figure 8
Sutch: The Impact of the 1936 Corn-Belt Drought
Page 40 of 42 Draft of December 8, 2009
Figure 9
0 20 40 60 80 100
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
Average Yield of Open- Pollinated Corn
Bushels per Acre
Relat ive Yield
of Hybrid Corn
[open-
pollinated
variet ies =
100]
Relat ive Advantage of
Hybrid Variet ies Best When
Yields are Depressed by
Unfavorable Weather
1935- 1938
n = 43
Sutch: The Impact of the 1936 Corn-Belt Drought
Page 41 of 42 Draft of December 8, 2009
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8
100 120 140 160
1926-1933
median 109
mean 109.8
std dev = 5.9
1937-1939
median 114
mean 116.1
std dev = 9.9
Relative Yield
[open-pollinated varieties = 100]
Figure 10
Sutch: The Impact of the 1936 Corn-Belt Drought
Page 42 of 42 Draft of December 8, 2009
Regression Estimates of the Reaction to the Severity of the 1936 Drought
44 Crop Districts in the Corn Belt
Dependent Variable
Penetration
Cautiousness
Jump
Independent Variables:
Yield
-0.257
-0.068
1.067
Shortfall
-0.015
-0.011
0.074
Constant 1948.2 6.02 -30.17
R-squared
0.668
0.125
0.464
Mean of Dependent Variable
1938.89
3.272
9.145
Standard Error of Dependent Variable 0.23 0.138 1.143
Figure 11
Insufficient data
Not in Corn Belt