Cambridgemedievaltextbooks

THEHUNDREDYEARSWAR

CambridgeMedievalTextbooks

This is a series of speciallycommissioned textbooks forteachers and students,designed to complement themonograph series CambridgeStudies inMedievalLifeandThought by providingintroductions to a range oftopics in medieval history.This series combines both

chronological and thematicapproaches, and will dealwith British and Europeantopics. All volumes in theseries will be published inhardcoversandinpaperback.

For a list of titles in theseries,seeendofbook.

THEHUNDREDYEARSWAREnglandandFranceatwarc.1300–c.1450

CHRISTOPHERALLMAND

FormerlyProfessorofMedievalHistory,UniversityofLiverpool

CAMBRIDGEUNIVERSITYPRESSCambridge,NewYork,

Melbourne,Madrid,CapeTown,Singapore,SãoPaulo

CambridgeUniversityPressTheEdinburghBuilding,CambridgeCB22RU,UK

PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyCambridgeUniversity

Press,NewYork

www.Cambridge.orgInformationonthistitle:

www.cambridge.org/9780521319232

©CambridgeUniversityPress1988

Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexceptionand

totheprovisionsofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements,noreproductionofanypartmaytake

placewithoutthewrittenpermissionofCambridge

UniversityPress.

Firstpublished1988Reprinted1989,1991,1994,1996,

1999Revisededition2001

Acataloguerecordforthispublicationisavailablefromthe

BritishLibrary

LibraryofCongressCataloguinginPublicationdataAllmand,C.T.

Thehundredyearswar(Cambridgemedievaltextbooks)

Bibliography:p.Includesindex

1.HundredYears’War,1339–1453.2.France–History

Military–1328–1589.3.GreatBritain–History,

Military–Medievalperiod,1066–

1485I.Title.II.Series.

DC96.A441987944′.02587-13251

ISBN-13978-0-521-31923-2paperback

ISBN-100-521-31923-4paperback

Transferredtodigitalprinting2005

ForBernadette

CONTENTS

Preface

Listofabbreviations

Maps

Genealogy:thesuccessiontothecrownofFranceinthefourteenthandfifteenth

centuriesINTRODUCTION

1THECAUSESANDPROGRESSOFTHEHUNDREDYEARSWAR

Thecausesofthewar1337–13601360–13961396–1422

1422–1453

2APPROACHESTOWAR

3THECONDUCTOFWAR

MilitaryobjectivesLandforcesLeadershipMercenariesFortificationandartillery

NavalobjectivesNavalforces

4THEINSTITUTIONSOFWAR

CentralorganisationRecruitmentSuppliesTaxationandfiscalinstitutionsOrderandcontrolDiplomacy

5WAR,SOCIALMOVEMENT,ANDCHANGE

6WAR,PEOPLE,ANDNATION

7WARANDLITERATURE

CONCLUSION

Selectbibliography

Index

PREFACE

Thisbook is theproductofawayofpresentingthesubjectwhich has been forming inmy mind since I began toteachthesubjectagoodmanyyears ago. I am not the firstnor, I suspect, shall I be thelasttohavefoundthewriting

ofa‘general’bookmoreofachallenge than I hadanticipatedwhenItookiton.Only the reader will be ableto tell how useful andsuccessful the experimentwillhavebeen.

The preface is usually thelast part of a book to bewritten.Bythetimethatstageis reached, the writer knowsto whom he is indebted. Tothe many Liverpool students

who, over the years, havestopped me in my tracks bytelling me that what seemedclear to me was not so tothem, I owe a debt ofgratitude. I am grateful, too,to the Syndics of theCambridge University Pressfor inviting me to write thisbook, toMrsBetty Plummerfortypingthetext,andtoKayMcKechnie for carrying outher work as the Press’s

subeditor with suchefficiency.

To an old friend, JamesSherborne, I owe aparticularly warm word ofthanks. A dozen or moreyearsagoheorganisedaverysuccessful conference atBristol on the theme of thisbook.WhenIaskedhimifhewould read my draft, heaccepted and completed thework with speed. He saved

me from a number of errorsof both fact andinterpretation, while alsomaking valuable suggestionshow to improve the text.None the less, as the personwhose name appears on thetitle page, I accept fullresponsibility for what iscontained in the chapterswhichfollow.

ChristopherAllmand

ABBREVIATIONS

A.H.R. AmericanHistoricalReviewA.B. AnnalesdeBourgogneA.Est Annalesdel’EstA.M. AnnalesduMidi

B.I.H.R.BulletinoftheInstituteofHistoricalResearch

Econ.H.R. EconomicHistoryReviewE.E.T.S. EarlyEnglishTextSocietyE.H.R. EnglishHistoricalReviewH.T. HistoryToday

J.E.H. JournalofEcclesiasticalHistory

J.Med.H. JournalofMedievalHistory

J.W.C.I. JournaloftheWarburgandCourtauldInstitute

M.A. LeMoyenAgeM.M. Mariner’sMirror

P.B.A. ProceedingsoftheBritishAcademy

P&P Past&PresentR.H. RevueHistoriqueR.S. RollsSeries

S.H.F.Sociétédel’Histoirede

France

T.R.Hist.S.TransactionsoftheRoyalHistoricalSociety

1Francein1337

2Francein1360

3Francein1429

ThesuccessiontothecrownofFranceinthefourteenthandfifteenthcenturies

INTRODUCTION

There is normally more thanone way of writing about aparticularhistoricalsubjectorperiod. A book with a titlesuch as this one could haveconcentratedonnarrativeandanalysis of the political,military, and diplomatic

aspectsoftheHundredYearsWar. The task was carriedout, in remarkablecircumstances, more thanforty years ago by a goodfriendofEngland,theFrenchhistorian, Edouard Perroy.With justice, his book is stillregarded as the soundestnarrative account of the waravailabletoEnglish–speakingreaders.Forall thecriticismswhichcanbelevelledagainst

it, the work remains asuccessful attempt to makesense of the complicatedrelationship which existedbetween England and Franceover a periodofmore than acentury at the end of theMiddleAges.1

But the demands ofmodern approaches to theteaching of the subject, aswell as the influence ofresearch, have tended to

move the writing of historyaway from narrative towardsthat of the study of themes.The influence of the‘Annales’schoolofhistoricalwriting has been largely toplace the studyofwar in thewider social, economic, andcultural background of thesocieties in which it wasfought, to make war part of‘total’ history. Such anapproach has been

characteristic ofmuch of thebest historical writing of thelastgenerationorso.In1962Piero Pieri addressed aParisian audience on how hesawmilitary history ‘spillingover’ into other aspects andspecialisms of history,creating chain reactionswhich would bind them alltogether.2 Three years laterDrH.J.Hewittpublishedhisinfluential book, The

organization of war underEdward III, 1338–62, inwhich, rather than describeactivity of a narrow,militarykind, he wrote about therelatively unglamorousbackground and preparationneeded for war at that timeand, indeed, ever since.3Othershavenowfollowed inplacing war in its widestcontext, not only social andeconomic, but political,

administrative, and legal.Philippe Contamine’s longstudy,Guerre, état et sociétéàlafindumoyenage.Etudessur les armées des rois deFrance, 1337–1494, includesalltheseelements–andmanymore.4 As a book on thehistory of men who went towar, it takes up Pieri’schallenge, and meets ithandsomely. One day,perhaps, somebody will

attempt to do for Englisharmies what Contamine hasdoneforFrenchones.

Inwritingthisbook,ithasbeen my intention to try toseehowwar,overaperiodof150 years or so, affecteddevelopments andchanges intwo of Europe’s leadingsocieties,thoseofFranceandEngland. The purpose of abook of this kind is to distilthe essential from modern

specialisedscholarshipandtopresent the whole in somerecognisable form. In thiscase,muchofthatscholarshiphas come out of France.Inevitably, therefore, theEnglish-speaking reader willfind that in some sections ofthe book the emphasis is onFrance and on how thatcountry, inparticular, reactedto the war. In other places,the stress is more upon

England.Ingeneral,however,I have had it in mind to try(butnotslavishly)tocompareandcontrasttheeffectsofwaruponEngland andFrance, inthe belief that this approachcan provide a thought-provoking approach to thesubject.

This book begins with anarrativeaccountofthemainevents and developments ofthe war. Even so apparently

straightforward a task is notcarriedoutwithoutdifficulty.Thehistorianmayrelatewhathappened;butwhen itcomesto explaining why eventsoccurredastheydid,andwhydecisions were taken as theywere, he cannot always fulfilhisroleashewouldwish.Hemust be ready to speculate,for the sources (in this casethe chronicles and records ofgovernment which provide

him with much of hismaterial)donotalwayscomeup to expectation. Bycomparison with what isavailable to the student ofmore modern times, themedievalist’s sources areoftenofverythinquality.

Thereare,happily,notableexceptions to thisgeneralisation. Financialrecords, for instance, whentheysurviveatall,oftendoso

inlargequantities.Thisisthecase for the English king’sfinancial archives whichprovide us with muchinformation on the sumscollected, how they werespent, and the organisationwhich lay behind thatexpenditure. In a word, evenfrom accounts we learn howadministration functioned. IfFrance’s surviving financialrecords are not as good as

English ones, her legalarchives,particularlythoseofthat great central institution,the Parlement of Paris, haveleft us with a remarkablehumanrecordoftheeffectsofwaruponsocietyinFranceinthe fourteenth and fifteenthcenturies. By using suchevidence the historian cancome to terms with some ofthe everyday reality of thewar, and how it touched the

livesandoutlookofmenandwomen, famous and not sofamous,richandpoor,whoseexperiences are described inthe proceedings of civil andcriminal cases which havecome down to us in somenumber. The pleadings ofadvocates contain muchvaluable information of aneconomic and social nature;wecanlearnmuch,too,abouthuman motivation which

made men go to war. Legalrecords are unique in givingus an inkling of how peopleof the age saw the worldaboutthem.5

Important, too, althoughnot always easy to evaluate,istheevidencewhichwemaycall literary, not merely thechronicles, but rather thetracts, pamphlets, newslettersand even poetry throughwhich people expressed their

ideas and views, as well astheir emotions, oncontemporary issues andproblems,whichmightbetheneed for government to bebetter managed, hope ofpeace, or the criteriaaccording to which society’smilitary leaders should bechosen. Some of these textsaretheworkofwriterswhoseliteraryfameandabilityhavemerited thecloseattentionof

scholars of literature.Christine de Pisan andAlainChartier are two such whoalso attract the attention ofhistorians for a differentreason,namelythattheywereobservers and critics of theworld of early fifteenth-centuryFrance, bothof themhaving things to say which,theyhoped,wouldturnitintoa better world. It is in theirobservations and criticisms

that the historian has aninterest, for they enable himto judge what was importantat the time, and howintelligent contemporariesreacted to thedifficultiesanddilemmas which faced menandwomenoftheage.

What the historian istrying to do is notmerely torecord the events andhappenings of war, but tostudy them against the

background of the world inwhich the longAnglo-Frenchconflictwasfought.Weneedtoknowwhytherewasawar,andwhat factors in the earlyfourteenth century wereinfluential in encouraging it.Something,then,mustbesaidof how men of that timeregarded war, and howcommonly-heldattitudesmayhaveencouragedthemtotakean active part in it. The

conflict under way, thesignificantquestionsarethosewhich concern its conduct.Far from being unimportant,the study of administrationand institutions has much totell us about the increasingeffectiveness of the state andcentral government in anaspect of governmentgrowingmore importantwitheverypassingyear.

Not all will necessarily

agreewiththesuggestionthatthose who fight in wars arehistorically more importantthan the wars themselves.War should be studiedthrough those who take partin it,so that theattitudesandhuman reactions of thoseinvolvedmaybeappreciated,and the phenomenon of warmay thus come to be betterunderstood. Much recentresearchhascentredon these

broader aspects of war. FewwhohavereadProfessorJ.F.Verbruggen’s The art ofwarfare in western Europeduring theMiddleAges fromthe eighth century to 1340will forget this vividapproach to the subjectincluding, for example, hisdescriptionoftheveryhumanfear experienced by menabout to face battle,6 anemotion also vividly

described in the morepopular, but no less seriouswork of John Keegan, Theface of battle.7 In these, andotherworks,thesoldierasanindividualoccupiesthecentreofthestage.

Since wars involve othersthan those who face battle,that overwhelming majoritywho may prefer to havenothingatalltodowithwar,they cannot, and should not,

be omitted from anymodernconsideration of the subject.For the non-combatant wasnot to be merely the quietunderwriter of his country’smilitaryundertakings.Hehadan active part to play, too,behind the scenes and,particularlyinFrance,hewastobeoneof themain targetsof the enemy’s attacks.Increasingly, historians havecome to appreciate his role,

and have sought in sources,often of a literary character,to understand how he facedwar and reacted to thesituationswhichitcreated.8

Finally, war served tobring all members of asociety, soldier and civilian,under the umbrella ofnational consciousness. Howthat consciousness should bestudied, what forms it took,how it expressed itself, are

questions which those whostudythesubject,atwhateverperiod, must be ready toanswer. In the late MiddleAges, symbolismwaswidelyused to express a feeling ofbelonging to a people;likewise institutions, such asmonarchy, played animportant part in creating asense of national identity;while the writing of historywas deliberately fostered to

encourageafeelingwhichthesingle word ‘roots’ willconveytoatwentieth-centuryreader. Since the quarrelwhich put the kingdoms ofFrance and England at oddswith each other was baseduponhistoricaldifferences, itwas only reasonable thathistoryshouldalsohavebeenused both to emphasise thedifferences between them,and to allow each to show

itselfhowitsownhistoryandits own characteristics haddeveloped.

By treating his subject aswidelyaspossible,by seeingit in terms of the history ofwar, rather than as the morenarrowly defined militaryhistory, the modern studentwill come tounderstand it inits many facets andcomplexities. In so doing hemay come as near as he can

everhopetoanunderstandingof war as people of the lateMiddleAgesknewit,noeasytask even in the mostfavourable conditions, butone which cannot beattempted with any hope ofsuccess without a properappreciation of the manythreads which make uphistory. Not the least is therolewhichindividualsplayedin war. Without them, there

canbenohistory.

1TheHundredYearsWar,trans.W.H.Wells(London,1951).

2‘Surlesdimensionsdel’histoiremilitaire’,Annales,18(1963),625.SeealsoK.A.Fowler,‘WarandchangeinlatemedievalFranceandEngland’,TheHundredYearsWar,ed.K.A.Fowler(London,1971),pp.

1–27.3Manchester,1966.4Paris:TheHague,1972.5SeethecollectionsoftextsfromtheserecordseditedbyP.Timbal,LaguerredecentansvueàtraverslesregistresduParlement(1337–1360)(Paris,1961),andbyC.T.AllmandandC.A.J.Armstrong,EnglishsuitsbeforetheParlementofParis,1420–1436(Camdenfourthseries,26,London,1982).

6Trans.fromtheDutchbyS.

WillardandS.C.M.Southern(Amsterdam:NewYork:London,1977),pp.50–2.

7Harmondsworthedn,1978,pp.70–2.

8C.T.Allmand,‘Thewarandthenon-combatant’,TheHundredYearsWar,ed.Fowler,pp.163–83.

THECAUSESANDPROGRESSOFTHEHUNDREDYEARS

WAR

Generally speaking, theMiddle Ages accepted war

with fatalism. It was part ofthe divine plan, linked withfamine,flood,andplagueasamanifestation of God’spunishment for sinscommitted. A nation whichexperienced years of defeatanddisaster(asFrancedidinthe mid-fourteenth century)beatitsbreastinself-reproachand accepted war’safflictions. Since fewquestionedsuchaview,those

of pacific leanings met withlittle sympathy. While war’sexcesses were oftencondemned, war itself wastakenforgranted.Inasocietywhose social and economicsystem had originally been,and to a certain degree stillwas,organised toprovideforsuch eventualities, this wasscarcely surprising. A worldgearedtowarwasunlikelytoquestionwhy it shouldbreak

out. It formed part of theaccustomedandnaturalorder.

Inmorequestioningtimes,with the historian seeking toexercise his right to examinethepast, peoplehave tried toexplain why wars occur.Attempts to do this are farfrom new. Long ago,Thucydides distinguishedbetweencausesandoccasionsof war. In modern times,people have looked to many

different aspects of humanactivityassourcesofconflict,notallofwhichmaybeseenas appropriate to medievalsocieties. But some are. TheCrusadesmayberegardedaswars fought in the name ofideology and religion. TheItaliancitystates,andothers,were for centuries in conflictin the Mediterranean oversources of, and outlets for,trade.1 The movement of

peoples, associated with thegreat increase in populationof the thirteenth century, ledto wars which, for example,inSpainwereassociatedwiththe Christian reconquest ofthe Iberian peninsula fromMoorish control, but whichwerealsowagedtosatisfytheurgetofindnewlands,aswasto happen in northern andeastern Germany under theruleoftheTeutonicKnights.

In France and England itwas the breakdown of thehistoric feudal order, nolonger able to meet thedemands of changing times,and its gradual replacementby an order of nationsincreasingly aware of theirgrowing nationalcharacteristics,whichwasthefundamentalcauseofthelongconflict which forms thesubject of this book. In all

these cases, war was theresultofmajorchangesinthedevelopment of societies. Insome, the need for land wasimportant, if not paramount;inothersitwasthesearchformarkets. In the case of theHundred Years War, thecausesoftheconflictweretobe found both in the longhistoric links betweenEngland and France, linkswhich were gradually

becomingweaker, and in theneed toexpress innewtermsthe relationship between thetwo countries (arguably thetwomostpowerfulinwesternsociety in the late MiddleAges) taking into accountelements such as nationalconsciousness and divergingmethods of government (toname but two) whichhistorians recognise as beingcharacteristicoflatemedieval

Europeansocietyasawhole.

THECAUSESOFTHEWAR

Wherehavehistorianssoughtthe causes of the so-calledHundred Years War?Traditionally, the answer hasbeenfoundinthestudyofthetwomain factorswhichwereat issue in the years leadingup towhat is regardedas themoment of outbreak of war,

theconfiscationof theduchyof Aquitaine by King PhilipVI of France in May 1337.This act brought to a headproblems of long standingwhoserootsweretobefoundintwofactors.2Thefirstwasthat, since the eleventhcentury,thekingsofEnglandhad been lords of much ofnorth-westernFrance,anareaextendingfromNormandy(inthe time of William the

Conqueror) through Maine,Anjou, Touraine, and Poitouto the duchy of Aquitainewhich,acentury later,HenryII had come to controlthrough his marriage to theduchess, Eleanor, previouslythe wife of Louis VII ofFrance. There thus stretchedfrom the Channel to thePyreneesan‘empire’(termedAngevin), ruled by one manwho was also king of

England. At the same timethere had grown up, mainlyduring the twelfth century,theextensionoftheauthorityof the royalhouseofFrance,thedynastyofCapet,throughtheinsistencethatthehomageduefromthegreatfeudatoriesto their king should be‘liege’. Then, when KingJohn took over the Frenchlandswhich he had inheritedin1200,hewasallowedtodo

so only on condition that heshould recognise them asbeingfiefsheldofthekingofFrance. The power of thatking, Philip-Augustus, overhis vassal was furtherincreased when, in 1203 and1204, he conquered AnjouandNormandywhichJohn,inspiteofanattempttodosoin1214, never recovered. Norwas his heir, Henry III, anymore successful, although he

took part in an enterprise inwestern France in 1230. InOctober1259HenrysealedapeacetreatywithLouisIX(StLouis)ofFrancewhereby, inspite of his son’s objections,he renounced his claim toNormandy, Maine, Anjou,Touraine and Poitou, whilethe French king, recognisingHenry as his vassal inAquitaineandotherterritoriesinthesouth-west,createdhim

a peer of France. The termsmightappeargenerous to theEnglish.Inreality,sincetheyestablished a new feudalrelationship between thekingsofFranceandEngland,they sowed the seeds formuchfuturetrouble.

Thesourcesofthattroublewere twofold. The first wasthe liege homage owed byHenry III (and, in future,whenever there might be a

change of king in eitherEngland or France) to thekings of France, a kind of‘priority’ homage whichcould involve the giving ofmilitary aid against anyenemy of the French crownwhenever it was demanded.Equally, thegiverofhomagecouldnotactinconcertwith,or give help to, any of hislord’senemies.Bycreatingapeerage for Henry III, Louis

IX was only emphasisingfurther the closeness of theallegiance which bound thetwomen.

Secondly, and in this casea matter of particularimportance,was the fact thatthe duchy of Aquitaine washeld by a king who, forpurposes of this treaty, hadbecome a vassal of anotherking. Such a situation waslikely to make for untold

complications. Thus, forinstance, there were placeswithin the lands held by theking-dukewhichweresubjectto a hierarchy of courtsultimately controlled by theParlement, the supremecourtof Francewhich sat in Paris.The sovereign legal rights ofthe French crown could, ifandwhen required, be put togood political use inundermining the authority

andprestigeoftheking-dukewithin his duchy. Appealscould be heard and judicialenquiries set in motion bybodies outside the duchy.Andallthewhilesuchactionslessened the actual legalpowers and authority of theking-duke, serving toencourage factionaldissension within Aquitaineand, in particular, within itscapital,Bordeaux.3

Itwassoonrecognisedthatunityofinterestbetweenlordand vassal did not exist. InFlanders, an area in whichFrench and English interestsclashed over issues whichwere strategic, economic andlegal,Edward I intervened in1294 as king of England indefence of the count, Guy,thenindisputewithPhilipIVof France. But thisinterventionwasmore thana

defence of English interestsinnorth-easternFrance.Intheprevious year Philip IV hadsummonedEdwardI,asdukeofAquitaine,toanswerforanallegedlyillegalactatseaoffthe coast of the duchy, andforthecaptureofLaRochelleby men from Bayonne.Attempts to find a solutionhaving failed, Philipannouncedtheconfiscationofthe duchy of Aquitaine in

May 1294. In the followingmonth, Edward broke hisfeudal links with the Frenchcrown, and the two countriessoon drifted into war.Although the fightingeffectively ceased in 1297,peace was not establisheduntil 1303, when the duchywas returned and the statusquo of 1294 was restored,Edwardagreeingtomarryhisheir, the Edward II to be, to

Isabella, daughter of theFrenchking.

If, at least for some yearsafterwards, therewas no realwar, there was none the lessplenty of tension in south-westernFrance.Thewar justended had shown up thedivisions between the pro-French and the proEnglishfactions within Bordeaux. Inthe summer of 1306 theretook place at Montreuil the

first of a series of meetings(‘processes’) between FrenchandEnglishrepresentativestotry to work out the legalposition of the lands held bytheEnglishinAquitaine.Themeeting was a failure, andwasfollowedin1307bycivildisturbancesinBordeauxandan appeal to Paris regardingthe English appointment tothe mayoralty of the ducalcapital. In 1311, further

discussions were held atPérigueux: but, like itspredecessor, this ‘process’also failed to resolvefundamental differencesbetweenthetwosides.

Theonlywaynowopentothe English, in these yearsdeeply involved in waragainst the Scots and in adomestic situation turningmore and more violent, wasretaliation.WhenVigierdela

Rousselle dared to advocatethecontinuationofappealstoParis in 1312, the wholematterwastakenupinavery‘political’ way by theauthorities in Bordeaux,whoaccused Vigier of contemptof ducal authority and hadhim executed on a chargewhich was, in effect, that oftreason. Likewise when, in1323, King Charles IVorderedanewfortified town,

or bastide, to be built atSaint-Sardos,thiswasineptlytaken as a physical and legalattack upon the authority ofthe English who, probablywithout the knowledge ofEdward II, attacked andburnedthetowninNovember1323. In its turn, such an actprovoked French retaliation:the duchy of Aquitaine wasagain declared confiscate tothe French crown, and an

army was sent to takepossession. Within a shorttime a truce had beenarranged, and in September1325PrinceEdward, soon tobecome Edward III, didhomage, paid a relief (orfine),andtherebysecuredthereturn of much of the landwhich the French hadoverrun. But not all. TheAgenais and other territorieswere not restored

immediately; it needed afurther war in 1326 and anagreement, concluded inMarch 1327, to secure therestorationof those lands.Atthis stage, it is unlikely thatthe French were anxious tocarry out a conquest ofAquitaine. All that theywanted was the fullrecognition of their king’ssovereignrightsintheduchy,a moderate enough approach

inwhichtheyhadthesupportofthepapacy,nowbecomingincreasingly aware of itsobligation to help in thediplomatic negotiationsbetweenthetwocountries.

Sofar the issueshadbeenlargely feudal. By 1327,however,asecondmatterwaspoised to sour relationsbetweenEnglandandFrance.In January 1327 Edward IIwas deposed and succeeded

byhisson,EdwardIII.LittlemorethanayearlaterCharlesIV, uncle (through his sisterIsabella) of Edward III, alsodied,leavingnodirectheiraskingofFrance.Asnephewofthe late king, Edwardappeared to have a goodclaim,indeedperhapsthebestclaim, to succeed him. Hisright, however, had beentransmitted to him throughhis mother, and it was this

transmission through thefemale, laterexplainedas theinability of a woman to passon a claim which, as awoman,shecouldnotherselfexercise, which workedagainst Edward’s ambition.When the French nobility, inwhosehandstheresolutionofsuch a crisis lay, made itschoice, that choice was tomake one of their number,Philip, count ofValois, king.

The groundswere essentiallythose of suitability: Philipwas French; hewas eighteenyears older than his Englishrival(thenagedonlyfifteen);and he had always lived inFrance. Although not, asEdward III was, a directdescendant of Philip IV, hewas at least his nephewthroughhisfather,CharlesofValois. In the circumstancesthe degree of kinship was

sufficiently close to securehimthesupportherequired.

Yet, in the context of thelong-standing dispute ofAquitaine,EdwardIII’sclaimwas strong enough topersuadehimthatheoughttopursue it, if only as analternative means ofachieving sovereign rule inAquitaine. Certainly, theclaimwastheretobeusedtoEdward’s advantage. None

thelessin1329hedidsimplehomage(allthatwasaskedofhim for the moment) atAmiens, following this upwithliegehomagein1331.Inthis mood of optimismnegotiators met for another‘process’, this time at Agen,in 1332 and 1333. In theirdiscussions the fundamentaldifferences between the twosides slowly emerged: thelegal position of the king-

duke and the lands held byhim; and, secondly, theproblem of which lands theFrenchweretocontrol.Atthesame time a polarisation ofopinion in Aquitaine wasgradually taking place,largely in favour of Englishrule,andby1337tensionhadreached a high level. On 24May Philip VI declared theduchy confiscate to theFrench crown because of

Edward’s many acts ofdisobedienceandrebellion.Itisthisdecisionwhichistakentomark the beginning of theHundredYearsWar.

The medium and short-termcausesoftheoutbreakofthe war were, as we haveseen, the problem of thefeudalrelationshipofthekingof France with his mostimportant vassal, the dukeofAquitaine,otherwisetheking

of England, and that of thedisputed succession to thecrown of France. Bychanging the historian’sfocus, these problems can beput into another perspective.TraditionallytheperiodoftheHundredYearsWarhasbeenregardedasthetimewhenthecrown of France made greatsteps forward towards theachievement of a policy ofcentralisationbegununderthe

Capetianssometwocenturiesearlier.While the differencesbetween thecrownofFranceand its vassals wereexpressed in a languagewhich was essentially feudal(a new political vocabularymore suited to developmentshad not yet evolved), whatwas really happening wassomething remarkably‘modern’, the laying of thefoundationsofanationalstate

under one monarch whoseterritorial authority couldonly be effectively exercisedthrough annexation orconquest. Such a view tendstoplace lessemphasison thewar between two countriesand more on the internalconflict between the king ofFrance and the duke ofAquitaine,astrugglebetweentwo blocks of territory andtwo rather different legal

traditions: the ‘Angevinempire’, once ruled by theEnglish,representingtheareaof customary law and localindependence, the other partof France the morecentralisingtraditionbasedonRomanlaw.

Thealternativeand, in thelast resort, not so verydifferent view is that whichsees the Hundred YearsWarasawidercivilwar inwhich

a policy of royalcentralisation,basedonParis,was opposed not only by thedukes of Aquitaine andNormandy(inbothcaseskingof England), but by those ofBrittany, and (late in thefourteenth and fifteenthcenturies), Burgundy.On theone hand was thedevelopment of the Frenchstate, its administration, itsbudget, its army, together

with its emphasis upon theattributesofmonarchy.Pittedagainst it were the greatprinces, some with ambitionto achieve political and legalindependence of the crown.To a slightly later age, theidea of France as ageographicalunity,withParisas its capital, seemed self-evident. But men of the lateMiddle Ages did not alwayssee things that way: for

reasons of history, language,sentiment,aswellaspoliticalexpediency, their ownindependence and,consequently, the continuedfragmentation of France,oughttobemaintained.

Yet another view wouldsee the war in terms of therelative geographicalpositions of France andEngland,andoftheinfluenceof these upon economic

interests. On the one hand,France needed to bring her‘natural’ maritime provinces(which included Aquitaine,Normandy, Brittany andFlanders) under royal controlin order that the ports mightbe used for both commercialandmilitarypurposes.Ontheother,England’s best interestlay in denying the Frenchking the use of ports andaccess to other coastal

activities such as fishing, sothat English trade, whetherwith Flanders or Aquitaine,mightbeconveyed ingreatersafety. Aquitaine, with hervaluable wine trade, was amajor trading partner.Flanders, at the beginning ofthewar,wasstilltheprincipalmanufacturer of cloth madefrom English wool, althoughfrom the mid-fourteenthcenturymore andmore cloth

was to be made in England.The loss of trade in eithercase(andtherewasthematterof England’s wider marketsto be considered, too) wouldmeanagravefinanciallosstothe country, not to forget thecrownwhich, since the reignofEdwardI,hadbeentaxingcertain commodities, such aswool and cloth, as they leftand arrived in the country.Theabilitytodothismustbe

defended,bywarifneedbe.

1337–1360

Wasa longwar inevitable in1337? The hostilities whichhad followed upon theprevious confiscations of1294 and 1324 had not beenlonglasting. Now, however,matters were morecomplicated. For givingmoral support to Robert ofArtois, who had been

condemned by the French asatraitorandadeclaredenemyofthekingofFrance,EdwardIII could be regarded ashaving acted against his oathof fealty through such aserious act of defiance. Butthe French were capable ofplaying a similar game. InJuly1333theScotshadbeendefeatedatHalidonHill,nearBerwick, andEdwardBalliolhad done homage to Edward

III for Scotland, while KingDavid II retired to France,there to seek the support ofPhilip VI against England.Almost immediately Philip,realisingwhat anopportunitysuch an appeal for help gavehim, declared that he wouldmake no lasting settlementwithEnglandunlesstheScotswere included in it. Edwardhad met this challenge byinvadingScotland,buthewas

unable tobring the enemy tobattle. Nor could he get theScots and their French alliesto the negotiating table; theFrench publicly declared fortheScots,andpromisedthemmilitary help if they neededit. As ‘man-in-the-middle’Edward III was in a delicateandunenviableposition.

Hisopportunity tocountertheFrenchthreatcameintheLowCountries,anareawhich

had witnessed Englishintervention against Francealmost half a century earlier.None the less,Edward’s taskwasdifficult.Louis, countofFlanders,waspro-French;hissubjects,however,dominatedby the great cloth-weavingtowns of Bruges, Ghent, andYpres were more likely toturntoEngland,thesourceofthe wool upon which theirindustry and wealth

depended. In Hainault thecount,William,wasfather-in-law to Edward III andbrother-in-law to Philip VI;hemightsupporteitherinhisquarrelwith theother. Itwasupon such insecurefoundations that thekinghadto build. In May 1337 asplendid embassy left for theLowCountries; by amixtureof economic bribery (in theform of direct subsidies, the

promiseofwool,orimportanttrading concessions) it wonEdward some allies. InSeptember1338,theemperor,LewisIV,wasprevailedupon– at a price – to appointEdward imperial vicar inGermany and France, givinghimrightstodemandmilitaryservice against France fromsubjectsoftheempire.CouldEdward make proper use ofsuch advantages? Evenmore

important,couldheaffordthedebts which he hadcontracted?

The fact was that Edwardcould not. Nor did theFlemings feel that he wasreally supporting them; hehad appeared to be usingthem for his own ends. Thusthe military activity whichbeganinFlandersin1339hadlittle effect. In January 1340Edwardformallyassumedthe

title of king of France (towhich he had already laidclaim in 1337), perhaps tomake his Flemish allies feelthattheywerelegallyentitledto help him oppose theirtraditional lord, the king ofFrance. On 24 June Edwardwon the first notable victoryof thewar in thenavalbattlefought off Sluys (Fr.L’Ecluse)atthemouthoftheriverZwyn,atwhichalarger

French fleet was decimatedby superior English tacticsand the better use ofprevailing conditions. Yet,althoughitbrokethethreatofapossibleFrenchinvasionofEngland, the victory in itselfbrought little immediateadvantagetotheEnglish.Nordidthewaronlandmakeanyprogress, while those whoearlier had been promisedEnglish largesse demanded

whatwasduetothem.WhenEdward failed to pay, theyabandoned him, forcing himtosealatrucewiththeFrenchatEspléchin,nearTournai,on25September1340.

Although the victor of abattleatsea,Edwardreturnedhome a bitterly disappointedman. In 1338 he had issuedthe so-called ‘WaltonOrdinances’tohelpmaketheraising of supplies more

efficient. Once home, hesought scapegoats for hisevident failure by dismissinghis treasurer and chancellor,who had not, he argued,provided the backing heneeded and deserved, and byturning on John Stafford,archbishop of Canterbury,whomhesuspectedofhavingbeen responsible for the lackof success.At an early stageEdward III had come to

realise that war wasexpensiveand thathispolicyof subsidising princes to actin his interest against theFrench was not the wayforward. Other methods hadtobefound.

This process of discoverydid not take long. Thedependence on allies wassoon dropped. In 1341England and France foundbotha causeanda theatreof

war in which they mightmeddlefurther.InApril,JohnIII, duke of Brittany, died,leavingtwopossibleheirs,hishalf-brother, John deMontfort, and Charles deBlois, whose claim wasthroughJeanne,anieceofthelast duke. Each party soughtassistance of one of the rivalkings.MontfortwaspromisedtheearldomofRichmondandsought active English

interventioninBrittanyonhisbehalf, while Blois obtainedthesupportofPhilipVI.Thewar between them was todrag on until 1364, a periodof some twenty years. If itsdetails are largely peripheralto the main story which weare tracing, its significancewas considerable. Here, lessthanayearaftertheendingofthe‘phoneywar’inthenorth-east,wasapropercasusbelli

whichwas important to eachsideinthewiderconflict.Forthe French king, theopportunity of exercising agreater measure of controlover Brittany, with itsmaritime outlets, was not tobe missed. For Edward III,thepossibilityof establishinga ‘client’ ruler in astrategically placed duchy(offwhoseshoresallEnglishmilitary and commercial

traffic bound to and fromAquitaineandwesternFrancehadtopass)wasalsoahighlydesirable political end.Furthermore, it gave theEnglish a door into France:soldiers might land on theBretonpeninsulaontheirwayinto the interior of France,and the possibility of amoreco-ordinated attack fromdifferent directions came astep nearer. Both France and

England had positive reasonsforinterveninginBrittany.Inthe autumn of 1342 EdwardIII himself did so, winningover parts of the duchy andleaving Englishmen in manyof the castles and garrisons,including Brest, the portdestinedtoremaininfriendlyhands for much of the nexthalfcenturyorso.

The war was slowlyescalating. To counter this

development, Pope ClementVIcalledthemainpartiestoaconference at Avignon inOctober 1344. But it soonbecame apparent that thedivisions between theFrenchandEnglishranverydeep.Tothe English, no settlementcould be envisaged withoutconsideration of their king’sclaimtothecrownofFrance,a claim which might becompensatedforby thegrant

of other territories in France,tobeheldinfullsovereignty.The French, on the otherhand, would only seedevelopments which tookaccount of the most recentfeudalsettlementof1327.4Ifthey gave up territories inexchangeforthesurrenderofAquitaine, these would haveto be held feudally independence of the crown ofFrance. Not surprisingly, the

talksbrokedown.NowonderthatthewinningoftheFrenchcrownbecamesoimportantapart of Edward III’s warpolicy.

Before long the king wasbackagain inFrance. In July1346he landed inNormandywithanarmyofperhapssome15,000men.Inthisenterprisehe had the support of one ofthe leading Norman‘dissidents’, Geoffroi

d’Harcourt, who representedthe dissatisfaction of theduchyatthewayitwasbeingruled by theValois king.Onthis expedition Edward metlittle opposition. The mostnotable capture was that ofCaenwhichfellat theendofJuly,andwhich,accordingtothe chronicler Froissart, wasthe source of much materialgain which was taken downtheriverOrnetothecoastfor

shipment back to England.Continuing his marcheastwards, Edward came towithin not many miles ofParis before swingingnorthwardsinthedirectionoftheChannel. Itwaswhile hewas on his way that he wasovertakenbytheFrencharmyat Crécy-en-Ponthieu where,on 26 August 1346, the firstof the major land battles ofthewarwasfought.

Had Edward in factplanned to meet the Frencharmy?Itispossible,althoughwecannotbesureofit.Therecan be little doubt that histactics constituted aninvitation to the French tocatchandchallengehim.Yetin1340PhilipVIwasalreadyshowinghimselftobemasterofthetacticwhichtheFrenchwere to employ in the yearsto come, that of avoiding

directcontactwiththeenemy.The question was, for howlong could such a policy ofinactivity be allowed tocontinue? The Englishmanner of waging war, thatof the chevauchée, the raidcarried out largely bymounted soldiers (who werethusfullymobile)throughtheenemy’scountryside,withtheintention of pillaging enemyproperty, destroying crops,

andtherebycreatinganairofinsecurity, could not beallowed to continue too longunchallenged, since such anexercise undermined (as itwas intended to do) theauthority of the king ofFrance, who was responsibleforthedefenceofhispeople.How long could the Frenchking continue to ignore thethiefinhisbackgarden?ThusitwasthatPhilipVI,whowas

notwithoutmilitaryskillandexperience, felt obliged toseek out and, if possible,defeat the English king andhis Norman supporters. Theattempt was to provedisastrous.Althoughtiredandrunningoutofprovisions,theEnglish had severaladvantages: agooddefensiveposition; a united command;andtheuseofanarmywhichhad already proved highly

successfulagainsttheScots,acombination of archers anddismounted men-at-arms forwhich, in the conditionsprevailing on the day, theFrench cavalry and thecrossbowmen of theirGenoese allies proved nomatch.

Intheevent,PhilipVIfledthe battlefield, with both hispersonal and his royalreputation tarnished. The

same day, however, was tomake the reputation ofanother man, Edward, eldestson of the king of England,known since Tudor times asthe Black Prince, whosecourageandchivalricconductwon him general admiration.NorwasCrécytheendofthecampaign.TheEnglish, freshfromtheirvictory,wentontoCalais, at that time stillFrench. The place was

besieged,andoveraperiodofmonths, including a winter,the English grip tightened.Frenchattemptstorelievethepressure failed, and on 4August 1347, after almost ayearofblockadebybothlandandsea,CalaisfelltoEdwardIII.Thiswasthefirstofmanylongsiegeswhichwere tobecharacteristicofthewar.Asaresult, England now had itsown foothold upon France’s

northerncoast throughwhichtradeandarmiesmightenter;or, as the emperor-elect,Sigismund, was to express itin the next century, a secondeye to match the other,Dover,inguardingthestraits.

While the siege of Calaiswasinprogress, inanswertoa call from the French, theScots attacked the north ofEngland. InOctober1346,atNeville’s Cross, near

Durham, they were met anddefeated by the defensiveforcesof the region, thekingof the Scots, David II, beingtaken prisoner. Further, inJune 1347 Charles de Blois,the French candidate to theduchy ofBrittany,was takenin battle by Sir ThomasDagworth; like David II he,too,wassenttotheTowerofLondon as a prisoner. Thefighting season 1346–7 was

one for the English toremember. It proved a fittingfinale to what had been thefirst period of sustainedfightinginthewar.

A factor which could beregarded as an act of Godnow intervened. In 1348 thebubonicplague,knownastheBlack Death, struck Europefor the first time and, inconditionsofpoor sanitation,famine and

undernourishment, maderapid progress. Spreadingthrough France, it made adramatic impact uponEngland and Wales in thefollowing year, and reachedScotlandin1350.Then,foradecade or so, its effectsdiminished considerably.None the less thesehadbeensufficient to bring the waralmost to a stop. When it isrecognised that Englandmay

have lost about one-third ofher population in thesecritical years, the lull inmilitary activity becomesunderstandable. Nor wasthere much inclination inFrance to pursue an activemilitary policy. In the midstofthis,inAugust1350,PhilipVI died. If, at first, his rulehad appeared to be to thebenefit of France, in the lastyears it had suffered

considerable setbacks. Couldhisson,John,whohadsofarhad no success against theEnglish in the south-west ofFrance,doanybetter?

It seemed not. When, in1353 and 1354, thenegotiators got down to theirwork again, this time inGuines, near Calais, theEnglishmadedemandswhichthe French at first seemedwilling to concede:

Aquitaine, Maine, Anjou,Touraine, as well as otherlands would be ruled by theEnglish in full sovereignty.At the last minute, however,when the terms were beingfinalised at the papal court,the French withdrew: themaking of such concessions,which involved so muchprinciple aswell as territory,could not be countenanced.The French, however, were

on the defensive. InNormandy opposition to thecrown (already seen in thehelp given by Geoffroid’Harcourt to Edward III in1346) was increasing. Thetrouble was being fanned byCharles, king of Navarre,count of Evreux, son-in-lawof King John II, who, likeEdwardIII,hadaclaimtothecrown of France throughbeing a descendant of the

house of Capet through thefemale line. King John wasnowfacedbytworivalswho,for the next few years, actedtogether with the possibilityof partitioning the Frenchkingdom between them. Intheautumnof1355theBlackPrinceledanexpeditionfromBordeaux towards France’sMediterranean coast. Thischevauchée was anoutstanding success: the loot

taken was considerable, andthekingofFrancewasagainchallenged on his ownground.

In the following AprilJohn II, fearing that thedauphin, Charles, who wasduke of Normandy, wasplotting against him withmembers of the Navarreseparty and others, wentsecretly toRouenand, as thedauphin was entertaining his

guests to dinner, arrestedsomeandhad themledawayto immediate execution. Thepolitical tension, bothbetweenthekingandheirandbetween the politicalgroupings,roserapidly.Inthesummer of the same year(1356) theEnglish planned athreefold attack on France.The Black Prince was tomarch from Bordeaux intothe north-central areas of the

country; Henry, duke ofLancaster, planned to attackfrom Normandy; whileEdward III himself was alsotocomefromthenorth.Sucha multiple attack had been apossibility for some time. Intheeventitfailed,leavingtheBlack Prince alone, at theheadofanarmyheavilyladenwithbooty,incentralFrance.

For the second time theFrench set out to catch the

English. This they did nearPoitiers in mid-September,and for two days papalrepresentatives went to andfro between the forces in thehope of securing anarrangement.Buttheireffortswereunsuccessful,andon19September the two armiesmet. By the evening theFrench, who lacked archers,hadbeendefeatedbyanarmywhich, although numerically

inferior,hadonceagain(asatCrécy) enjoyed a sounddefensive position and whatseemed like an unbeatablecombination of longbowmenanddismountedmen-at-arms.To this the Frenchcontributed their ownmistakes which soon lostthemanyadvantagetheymayhaveenjoyed.Tocrownitalltheirking,John,wascapturedinbattle.A secondkingnow

took up residence in theTowerofLondon.Nowonderthe people of the capitalcheered.

In France, the authorityand prestige of the crownwere in crisis. Two majordefeatsintenyears,followednow by the capture of theking, led to rebellion inNormandy and civil troublesinPariswhichweretoendinviolence. The royal authority

was being challenged notonly by princes but by agrowing menace of anotherkind, the increasing numberof freelance soldiers, orroutiers, whowere graduallybecoming a characteristicforce in French society,reflectingthefalteringgripoflawfully-establishedauthority. Although thedauphin, Charles, whoassumedpowerinhisfather’s

place,showedhimselftobeafine leader and a man ofcourage, he appeared in thecircumstances to have littlechoice but to negotiatewithout giving away toomuch.What termswould theEnglish try to impose, andwhat could the French hopetogetawaywith?

Negotiations wereprotracted,lasting,onandoff,from 1358 to 1360. In May

1358 the French agreed tocede Aquitaine with otherterritoriesamountingtoaboutathirdofthekingdom,infullsovereignty, and to pay, inaddition, 4,000,000 crowns(£666,666) for the ransomoftheir king. A year later,having received only part ofthesumowedtohim,EdwardIII demanded and got more:all thathehadbeenceded in1358, to which were added

Normandy, Maine, Anjou,and Touraine, also in fullsovereignty. Theimplementation of theseconcessions, made by thecaptiveKingJohninLondon,wasrefusedbythecouncilinFrance, and late in 1359Edward set out with a largearmy for France to see howpersuasive a strong show offorce could be. Theexpedition was a military

failure,butitledtothetreatyof Brétigny of May 1360,whichgaveEdwardthelandsceded to him in 1358with aransom reduced to 3,000,000gold crowns. Two otherclauses were to have a vitalsignificance. Edward agreedto renounce his claim to theFrench crown, while Johnwas to abandon his demandforsovereigntyoverthelandscededtotheEnglish.Later,at

a meeting held at Calais inOctober,thetwoclauseswereremoved to form a separatetreaty whose implementationwas to depend upon theclauses concerning thecession of land having beenproperly carried out. Onlythen were the Calais clausestohavetheirfulleffect.

With justice the treaty ofBrétigny is often regarded asthemomentatwhich, for the

first time, both sides decidedto call a halt and have theirwillingness todosoformallyrecognisedina treaty,oneofthe most important of thewhole war. In terms of theconcessions made by theFrench, the treaty can beinterpreted as a success forthe English, althoughhistorians have not alwaysagreed about this. True,Edward’s failure on the

expeditionof1359–60(whenhe had not been able tocapture either Reims, wherekings of France werecrowned,orParis,thecapital)meant that he had to foregothe important territorialconcessions made to him in1359, including Normandyand the Angevin lands incentral-western France. OntheotherhandhewouldhaveamuchenlargedAquitaine,to

be held in sovereignty, the‘perpetual liberty’ which hehad instructed the BlackPrincetodemandofhisroyalprisoner in 1357, and whichwouldremoveatastroke thethreatofconfiscation.

Thefactthathehadagreedto surrender his right to thegreater claim – that of thecrown of France – in returnfor concession on thesovereignty issue shows

where, in 1360,Edward III’spriorities lay. In the event,however, the renunciationsremovedfromthebodyofthetreaty’smain textwerenevermade.Asaresultitwouldbepossible for the French atsome future date to renewtheir claim to sovereigntyover Aquitaine, and for theEnglish to do the same inrespect of the crown ofFrance. The significance of

thiscouldnotbeignored.What had been some of

the main characteristics anddevelopment of this, the firstperiod of the war? Notunnaturally, it has alwaysbeen traditional to see theyears to 1360 as constitutinga period unfavourable toFrance: the initiative laylargelywith theEnglish, anditwasmainlytheFrenchwhowere on the defensive. So it

wasthatEdwardIIIwasableto extend the areas directlyinvolvedinwarandtobenefitfrom this by using landingpoints on different parts oftheFrench coast.The theatreof war slowly becameenlarged, a fact which,paradoxically, was to provesomethingofanadvantagetothe kings of France as theytried, if not always withsuccess, to unite their entire

population in a commonwareffortagainsttheEnglish.Foras the war spread, so thefiscal demands of the Frenchcrown to meet it could beextended with justification.By the second half of thefourteenth century, few inFrance could claimnot to beinvolved in it in one way oranother.

The effects on domesticpolitics were considerably

and predictably different. InEngland,theneedsofwar(interms of money andprovisions) provoked aconsiderable crisis in theyears 1338–41. ThereafterEdward III, having learnedsome valuable politicallessons,wasabletodevelopafar greater degree of co-operation with his people, inparticular with the fightingnobility, a spirit fostered by

the two outstanding victorieswonatCrécyandPoitiers.InFrance, by contrast, in spiteof what seemed like earlysuccesses, the personalfortunesofbothPhilipVIandJohn II sank very low. Bothmet defeat and one sufferedcapture, thus becoming, in avery real sense, a nationalliability. The lack of strongleadership served toexacerbate these disasters,

and the nobility of Francewas obliged to endure strongcriticism for its failure toprotect the kingdom and itspeople in their hour of need.The crisis in the royalauthority was underlined bythe activities of Charles ofNavarre in Normandy. AsmuchasEdwardIII,hewasachallenge to the civil andmilitary authority ofsuccessive French kings,

whose power, for themoment,was tooweak todomuch about him. Theexistence of the routiers wasa further aspect of the sameproblem. The kingdom ofFrance was becoming theplayground of Europe’sfootloosesoldiers.

1360–1396

Yettherewasnogoodreasonwhy it should not recover.

The treaty of Brétignybroughtameasureofpeacetoboth England and France.Openhostilities,atleast,wereat an end. But there wereproblemstoberesolved.Onewas that, arising from thetransfer of lands from oneallegiance to theother,manyfound themselves under anew lord; and some did notlike it. A more seriousproblemwaswhat todowith

the soldiers who, nowaccustomedtofightingandtowar’s many attractions, werefindingthemselveswithoutanoccupation. The 1350s hadseen relatively little fightingat an ‘official’ level, but thedecade had witnessed thegrowth, in both numbers andsize, of bodies of soldierswho, although sometimesfinding local employment,more often than not roamed

the countryside in search ofadventure and the easypickings ofwar. Peacemadeit more likely that theirnumber would increase.Certainly, returning soldiersgave the authorities inEngland many a headache,the country’s justices beingordered in 1360 to see thatthe peace was not broken.Many Englishmen remainedin France and joined the

bands of soldiers who madetheir services available towhoever would lead oremploy them. Thesignificance of the dangerwhich they constituted soonbecameapparent.On6April1362 these routiers met anddefeated a royal army atBrignais,intheRhônevalley.Some, too, entered theservices of Charles ofNavarreandhelpedtospread

disorderinNormandyandthesurrounding areas. On 16May 1364, however, anotherarmy under Bertrand duGuesclin, a Breton who hadhimself led such troopsbefore entering the king’sservice, defeated theNavarrese army, helped bysomeEnglish,atCocherel,insouth-easternNormandy.Theevent was significant, for itfollowedharduponthedeath

in April of King John II inEngland,wherehewasstillaprisoner. Cocherel witnessedan important blow struck forroyal authority by an armyunder a commander ofundoubted skill andexperience.WiththedefeatatBrignais avenged,CharlesV,who had just succeeded hisfatherasking,couldgotohiscoronationasatisfiedman.

Cocherel was a move in

therightdirection.Butitwassoon partly cancelled by thevictoryoftheEnglish-backedMontfortists at the battle ofAuray, in southern Brittany,on 29 September 1364, atwhich Charles de Blois waskilled and du Guesclin, notfor the last time, was takenprisoner. This event led to aformal settlement of theBreton succession aftermorethan twenty years of

intermittent war. It alsoreleased more soldiers whowere free to seek a livingbyfighting elsewhere.However,some sort of a solution towhat was becoming anendemic problem was soonfound. At the request ofHenry of Trastamara, thenseeking to wrest thesuccessionofthekingdomofCastile fromhis half-brother,Peter, known as ‘the Cruel’,

French troops, under duGuesclin, recently ransomed,crossed over into Spain tohelpbringaboutthedefeatofPeter. Feeling himselfthreatened,Peterappealedforhelp to Edward III whoauthorised the Black Prince,since 1362 prince (andeffective ruler) of Aquitaine,to intervene. The threat ofalliance between the king ofFrance and an unfriendly

ruler of northern Spain wasonewhichmusthaveworriedthe English in Bordeaux.There was, in addition, animportant prize at stake, theuse of the Castilian galleyfleet, perhaps the finest inEurope, with which theFrench, in particular, couldgive amuch-needed boost totheir war efforts at sea. Thiswas something which theEnglish would do their

utmost to prevent happening.Responding to the call, theBlack Prince raised a force,and, in the early spring of1367, crossed into northernSpain through Navarre,whose king, Charles, hadonly recently receivedEnglish help in Normandy.On3Aprilhisarmy,linkedtothat of King Peter, met theFrench and Henry ofTrastamara’s force at Nájera

(Fr.Navarrette).Forasecondtime du Guesclin foundhimself a prisoner of theEnglish,whoroutedhisarmy.The Black Prince had justachieved the third, and final,greatvictoryofhiscareer.

Contrary to what somehistorians have thought, thecampaign inSpainwasnot amere side issue.5 It reflectedthe growing problem of howto deal with surplus

manpower once peace hadbeenmade inamajor theatreofwar.Italsoservedtoshowthat the Hundred Years Warwas no longer simply aconflictbetweenEnglandandFrance: others were beingcaught up in it, too. ButalthoughitbroughtvictorytotheBlackPrince,thebattleofNájerawastobethecauseoftherenewalof thewarwhichhadbeenhaltedin1360.The

EnglishhadagreedtofightinSpainifpaidtodoso.Yetthemoney had never come. Nordid Peter regain effectivecontrol of his kingdom asHenry, although defeated atNájera, staged a politicalcomeback. In March 1369,the armies of the two menmetatMontiel,wherethatofPeter was defeated and theking himself was murderedbyhishalf-brotherandrival.

Bythistime,however, theBlack Prince was indifficulties.Heavilyindebttocertain members of hisnobility and to routiercaptains,andletdownbyhisCastilian ally, he had had toseek the financial resourceswith which to pay for hisSpanish expedition. Hisrequests for money inAquitaine met withresistance, for in a real sense

the expedition had broughtlittle or no advantage to theduchy. Jean d’Armagnac,followingonthereluctanceofthe estates, meeting atAngouleme, to contributetheirshareofatax,refusedtoallowit tobecollectedinhislands, pleading ancientprivileges which had alwaysbeen enjoyed locally. Whenthe Black Prince announcedmeasures against him,

Armagnac first appealed toEdward III; on receiving anunfavourable response, hetook the matter further andappealed to the king ofFrance,CharlesV. In thishewasjoinedbyhisnephew,thelord ofAlbret,who lodged asimilar grievance against theBlackPrince.

Charles V could scarcelyavoid having to respond tothe appeals lodged byAlbret

andArmagnac.Inlegaltermsit seemed thathewas free tointervene; his claim toexercise sovereignty inAquitaine had not beenrenounced in 1360. Anxiousto do things properly,however, Charles sought thebest specialist advice whichhe could get; he found it byconsulting eminent jurists ofthe legal centres of Bologna,Montpellier, Orléans, and

Toulouse. Their opinion wasthat Charles was entitled toreceive the appeals made tohim. In December 1368 heannounced that he would dothis. In June 1369, inretaliation, Edward IIIresumed the use of the title‘kingofFrance’.Towardstheendoftheyear,inNovember,the French king confiscatedAquitaine.Thetwokingdomswereoncemoreatwar.

The nature of the conflictfoughtinthe1370swastobevery different from that ofearlierdecades,anditseffectsmore dramatic. The Frenchwere not unprepared, andalmost immediately took theoffensive. A glance at themap on p. xiiwill show thattheenlargedAquitainewhichtheEnglishhadtodefendhadvery long frontiers,vulnerable to small mobile

forceswhich theFrenchnowused to excellent effect. In1371theBlackPrince,asickman, retired from thethankless task of rulingAquitaine, and the Englishcommand now becamefragmented. Nor did Englishforces, when sent to France,properly encounter theenemy. The use of Fabiantactics by the Frenchfrustrated the English who

spent large sums on thewar,but to little purpose. The1370s saw England neglectthe serious implications ofthisessentiallydefensivewar,so that the chevauchées ledbySirRobertKnollesin1370and John of Gaunt, EdwardIII’s third surviving son, in1373 achieved little militaryadvantage.ThedaysofCrécyandPoitierswereover.

Little by little, the French

initiative paid off, as theirarmies ‘reoccupied’ firstthose parts ceded by treatyand then much of the duchyof Aquitaine itself In 1371,Charles V and Charles ofNavarre came to terms. InBrittany, in spite of theEnglish success of Auray,opponents drove out DukeJohn IV from his duchy. Atsea, the Franco-Castilianalliance, which had sprung

from the events in Spainbetween 1366 and 1369,began to have effect. In thesummer of 1372 an Englishfleet was defeated byCastilian galleys off the portof La Rochelle, and manyEnglishmen were taken asprisonerstoSpain.Forsome,the war was brought muchnearerhomewhentheFrench(with their Castilian allies)began once again to attack

and plunder towns andvillagesonthesouthcoastofEngland, the legitimateactivities of Englishfishermenbeingamong thosewhich suffered from suchraids. Not surprisingly, thislack of success provoked anoutcry in England,accustomed more to victorythan defeat. Protests in 1371were followed by furtheroutbursts in 1376 in the so-

called ‘Good Parliament’,whose members suspectedthat the search for personalprofit had, in some cases,taken precedence over thepursuit of the nationaladvantage. In the midst ofthese events, in June 1376,theBlackPrincedied.Ayearlater his father followed himtothegrave.

As contemporary writingtestifies,itwasthesadendof

a glorious period in Englishhistory.InviewofthelackofEnglish success in the pastyears,thewarwasnowbeingdiscussed in terms whichsuited the French, theemphasisbeingon thefeudalinterpretation of the treaty ofBrétigny. Once again, papalenvoys tooka leadingpart inthe proceedings and, on thisoccasion, a possible way outwas found. John ofGaunt, it

wasproposed,wouldbecomeaFrench prince and, throughhim, the link with Englandanditsroyalfamilywouldbemaintainedwhileat thesametime thefundamentalEnglishobjection that their kingshouldnot be a vassal of thekingofFrancewouldbemet.If the plan failed, it wasbecause of Gaunt’s personalambitions in Spain, ratherthanbecauseofanyobjection

of principle to the scheme.For the while the war wenton.6

Other issues and eventsnow came to complicateevents. In England the deathof Edward III placed hisgrandson, Richard II, thesurviving son of the BlackPrince, upon the throne.Richardwas to prove one ofthe most enigmatic of kings.Two factors about him

concern this story. He wasyoung, only ten years old,when he came to the throne.Further, as a result of hisyouth, he had not known thegreat days of Englishvictories in France, althoughthese had been concernedwith the activities of hisfather, and he himself hadbeen born in Bordeaux notlong before his father hadcrossed to Spain to win his

final victory. The effect wasto make Richard moreinclinedtopeacethantowar:war,hewastotellParliamentin 1397, caused great harmand unnecessary destructionto both kingdoms,7 a viewalmostcertainlysharedbyhisnear contemporary, CharlesVI, who had succeeded hisfather in 1380, a year whichalsowitnessedthedeathofduGuesclin.Bothkingscameto

besurroundedbyuncleswhosoughttofurtherwarfortheirown ends. Each, in his ownway, reacted againstavuncular pressure. Bothcametofavourpeace.

Itisevidentthatmanyhadcome to feel like them. Latein the1370s and early in the1380s the world order,already upset by long war,seemed set to suffer yetfurther disruption. In 1378 a

schism, occasioned by adoubleelectiontothepapacy,split the western Church.Therewerenownotonlytwopopes but two centres ofpapal authority, Rome andAvignon. What was worse,England and Francesupported opposing sides onthisissue,sothattheSchism,one of the most importantfactors dividing westernChristianity in the years

1378–1417, also accentuatedtheexistingpoliticaldivisionsbetween the two countries. ItisopentodebatewhethertheHundredYearsWarhelpedtoprolongtheSchismwithintheChurch, but that the Schismhardened the attitudes of theFrenchandEnglishnationstoeachother is undoubted.Thechurch councils which werecalled in the first threedecades of the fifteenth

centurygaveeachsidereasonand opportunity to seeksupportforitsownattitudetothewar before the remainderofChristendom.TheSchism,wemaysay,tragicallyhelpedtopolariseincreasinglystrongnationalist attitudes towardsthewar.

Domestic troubles alsooccurred. The summer of1381sawtheoutbreakof thePeasants’ Revolt in England,

an uprising against thegovernment of the day, towhose causes the financialdemands of war and theinability (or unwillingness?)of theroyaladministration todefend adequately the coastof southern England againstFrench and Castilianincursions of increasingfrequency and intensitycertainlycontributed. In June1382 troubles in Rouen,

causedpartlybyareactiontothe French crown’s fiscaldemands, were suppressedwith some vigour; the eventsmay have lost Charles VIfriends and supporters inNormandy,stillanareatobetended with attention by theroyal authority in Paris. In1380 it had been the turn ofThomas,earlofBuckingham,uncle of Richard II, to leadwhat would prove to be the

last English expedition toFrance in the fourteenthcentury, while in 1383 thereligious divisions of Europewere underlined by thesending of a force led byHenry Despenser, bishop ofNorwich, intoFlandersunderthe guise of a crusade.8Neitherproducedanyeffects.In 1386 England wasfortunate not to experienceinvasion from France,

planned by the king’s uncle,Philip, duke of Burgundy,with support not only fromBrittany and Flanders butfrommuchofthekingdomofFranceitself.

Yet, in spite of theaggressivespiritfoundamongmanyof the nobility on bothsides of the Channel, and ofRichard II’s personalparticipation in anexpeditionin 1385 against the Scots, at

that moment in receipt ofFrenchassistance, theideaofpeace was now increasinglyin the air. In England thecriticism of continuedmilitary activity by JohnWyclif, theoppositiontowarexpressed bymen of Lollardsympathies such as WilliamSwynderby, the lassitudeprovokedbysomanyyearsofconflict,mirrored in some ofthe works of Geoffrey

Chaucer and John Go wer,9are indicative both ofpeople’s reflection regardingthe morality of war and theways in which it was beingfought, and of the apparentfutility of allowing it tocontinue along its presentdrift, no real advantageaccruingtoeithersideinspiteofthegreatcost,bothhumanandfinancial,toall.Thiskindof sentimentwas reflected in

France, where the influentialcourtier, Philippe deMézières, in works of asemipolemical nature (one ofthemanopen letter onpeaceaddressed to Richard II)asked whether the long warshouldcontinue.

Other factors seemed toencourage a movementtowards peace with whichboth kings appeared tosympathise. For all its

successes,theFrenchmilitaryeffortofthe1370sand1380shad failed to dislodge theEnglish hold in France,particularlyinthesouth-west.True,bythetimethatEdwardIII’s long reign ended, onlyBordeaux, Bayonne, and acoastal strip in that regioncould be controlledeffectively by the Englishadministration.None the lessthe fact was that the English

had hung on, and thereseemedlittlechancethattheywouldbedislodged.

So peace was formallysought. The possible wayforward, ‘the separation ofEngland and Aquitaine andthe creation of a separateEnglish dynasty in theduchy’, had already beenproposed in 1377. In 1383,the proposal got as far as adraft. Seven years later, in

1390, Richard created hisuncle,JohnofGaunt,dukeofAquitaine for life, an act ofgoodintent,andastepin therightdirection.Then,in1393,a provisional agreement wasreached giving the EnglishCalais (which they alreadyheld) and that part ofAquitaine south of the riverCharente(muchofsouth-westFrancewhichwaslargelyoutoftheirhandsatthistime),all

this to be alienated to Gauntin the near future. Yetwhatever the hopes of kingsand their legal advisers, theywerenotsharedbythepeoplethemselves.InApril1394thepopulation of much of thearea rose in support of itsattachment to the crown ofEngland. In spite of allefforts, the well-intentionedplan of the negotiators wasspoiled by the people

themselves.10The agreement had

involved some radicalthinking regarding thehistoric and legal legacy ofAquitaine. A way ofcircumventing variousobjections had been foundwithout offending too manyinterests. Peace was clearlydesired,andifitcouldnotbearranged on these agreedterms, it must be found by

other means. Between 1394and 1396 negotiationscontinued,andinMarch1396the two sides agreed to atruce of twenty-eight yearsand the marriage of RichardII to one of Charles VI’sdaughters, Isabella, who wasto bring with her a largedowry. Once again, even ifthe main points at issue hadbeen side-stepped, the twocountries were at peace, and

had agreed to be so for awholegeneration.

1396–1422

The problem of making alasting peace had beenpostponed. In the lightof theexperience of thirty yearsearlier,whatwerethechancesforthetemporaryagreement?Some may well have hadtheirfears.InFrancetheruleof the dukes who sought to

governintheplaceofCharlesVI who, since 1393, hadsufferedfromtheintermittentattacks of a mental illnesswhich was to remain withhim until his death in 1422,appealed to a rising sense ofnationalism which tended tofavour a vigorous defence ofFrench interests. Then, whenthe truce had run for littlemore than three years,Richard II was deposed and

murdered,hisplaceaskingofEngland being taken byHenryIV, thesonofJohnofGaunt.Richard’syoungwife,Isabella, no longerwanted atthe English court, wasdespatched – without herdowry – back to France,where feeling turned sharplyagainst Henry for hisdeposition of the Frenchking’sson-in-law.

Insuchcircumstancesit is

notsurprisingthatthetruceof1396 was never properlyobserved. The French gavesupport to the Scots who,fromveryearlyoninthenewreign, caused trouble in thenorth; while to the west, inWales, where Owain GlynDŵr was to rise againstEnglish rule in 1400, Frenchtroopslandedandatonetimemight have been seen in theHerefordshire countryside.

This was a game which twocould play, and the Englishwere to raid the coast ofNormandy several timesbetween 1400 and 1410.During these years, too,piracy in the Channel wasrife, probably encouraged byboth sides as a matter ofpolicy.11 Yet neither side,partly because of the veryexistence of the truce, partlybecause of its own domestic

divisions (which werebecoming more serious inFrance as the first decade ofthe new century progressed)wished to raise fundamentalissues. Henry IV appears tohavehadnoburningambitionto secure the French crown,and during his reignAquitaine suffered fromrelativeneglect.Thewarhadmoved, well and truly,towards more northern parts

ofFrance.Or almost so. In 1411, at

the request of John, duke ofBurgundy, a small Englishforce took part in what wasrapidly becoming a situationofcivilwarinFrance.InMay1412 a treaty (that ofBourges)wassealedbetweenHenry IV and the dukes ofBerry, Bourbon, and Orléanswhich gave the English kingmuch of what his

predecessors had spent yearsfighting for: a recognitionthat Aquitaine was rightfullyEnglish, and an undertakingtohelpthekingdefendit;thecession of twenty importanttowns and castles; andagreement that certain lands,notably Poitou, were to beheld by them of the Englishcrown,andwouldrevert to itwhen the present holdersdied.12

Suchconcessionsappearedmomentous; yet they weremade largely to secureEnglishmilitary help for onefaction against another in asituation of civil war, andwere unlikely to commandlasting support, above allsince the king, Charles VI,had had no part in thisdismemberment of hiskingdom. When the Frenchdukes made peace among

themselves at Auxerre threemonths later, the only losersweretobetheEnglish.WhenThomas, duke of Clarence,second son of Henry IV,broughtaforceintoFranceinAugust 1412 to fulfil thetermsof theagreementmadein May, he was met by aunited opposition. Unable toimpose himself, Clarenceallowedhimself tobeboughtoff before returning home

throughBordeaux,plunderingon the way. Yet the text ofthe treaty of Bourges hadmade concessions whichcould be regarded as at leastimpolitic, at worsttreasonable, to the Frenchcrown. Henry V was toremindtheworldofwhathadbeen conceded when, in histurn, he became king ofEnglandin1413.

Onceking,Henrysoonset

aboutmakingheavydemandsof the French. In thefollowing year these becameeven tougher: he demandedthe crownofFrance; thenhereduced this to the territoriesofAngevin days,Normandy,Maine, Anjou, Touraine,Aquitaine (to include Poitou,part of the concession madeby the princes at Bourges in1412), together with thesubstantial arrears still due

fortheransomofJohnIIand,following the now well-established pattern, the handof a daughter of the Frenchking, this time Catherine,sister to Isabella whomRichard II had married in1396, togetherwith a dowry.By 1415 he showed himselfwilling toacceptagooddealless: he would settle for thelegal and territorial termsagreedatBrétigny,nowmore

than half a century earlier,and a smaller dowry. That,forthemoment,wasasfarashe would go. When theFrenchrefusedhisconditions,Henry decided on the warwhich his diplomacy hadgivenhimtimetoprepare.Hewould fight the enemy in agoodcause:denialofjustice.

InAugust1415anEnglisharmy landed in Normandyandatoncebeganthesiegeof

Harfleur, at themouth of theriver Seine. Six weeks laterthe town,whichhad sufferedheavily from thebombardment of Englishcannon, capitulated. Theproblemnowwaswhat todonext. Probably against theadvice of his commandersHenry decided to lead whatremained of his army,decimated by illnesscontracted at the siege, to

Calais, thought to be about aweek’s march away. In factthe English were almostoutmanoeuvredbytheFrencharmy. Yet, on 25 October1415, although outnumbered,Henry and his force, relyingon the traditional weapon ofarchersandmen-at-arms,metand defeated the French atAgincourt. The French,probably over-confident ofvictory, allowed themselves

to be drawn into a cavalryadvance, carried out under ahailofarrows,acrossrecentlyploughedgroundmade softeryet by the rain which hadfallenthepreviousnight.Thechronicles record the largenumberofFrenchwho,attheday’s end, lay dead on thefield,while,bycontrast,veryfew Englishmen lost theirlives. Among the manynotable prisoners taken was

Charles, duke of Orléans,who was to spend the nextquarter of a century anhonourable captive inEngland, developing aconsiderable talent as a poetin both French and English.In the meanwhile, Englandandherkingwere to live formanyyearson the reputationwon on that autumn day.Only too evidently had Godgivenhisjudgementinfavour

of the English claim forjustice.

In1416theFrenchmadeaserious attempt to regainHarfleur, which theyblockaded by land and sea.The garrison sufferedconsiderably, but on 15August 1416 John, duke ofBedford, defeated the enemyfleet in the estuary in whathascometobeknownas thebattleoftheSeine.Thethreat

to Harfleur was now eased,andthevalueofbeingabletodefeat the enemy at sea wasonceagainproved.

In the following year,1417, Henry returned toNormandy. Harfleur hadtaught him a lesson: hemustbeproperlypreparedforsiegewarfare,allthemoresosincehe now planned a conquestwhichcouldonlybeachievedthrough sieges and the show

of effective military might.By the summer of 1419 allNormandywashis:themajorwalled towns of the duchy,Caen, Falaise, Cherbourg,and Rouen had all fallen tothe English besiegers. Thismarked an important changein English policy towardsFrance. The day of thechevauchée, or prolongedraid, was now almost over.Henry wanted nothing less

than military conquest. Withit went the need to governand administer lands thusacquired,andthedemandthatthe inhabitantsof those landsshould recognise thelegitimacyofEnglishrulebytakinganoathofallegiancetoHenry. He went farther still.Thosewho refused him theirrecognition were deprived oftheir lands and forced into aform of internal exile within

France, into that area whichthe Valois ruled. Lands thusconfiscated were Henry’s todowhathelikedwith.Many,ranging from large estates tosmall-holdingsintowns,weregiven by him to his Frenchsupporters and to thoseEnglishwhomhecouldtemptover to settle in northernFrance.Inthisway,throughadeliberate policy of conquestand settlement, Henry V

extended the sharing of theprofits of war (in this caselargelyimmoveableproperty)to many of his compatriots,both soldiers and civilians.By so doing he changed theverycharacteroftheconflict,for through the creation of awider involvement in itssuccesshetriedtoensurethathe,andhissuccessors,wouldhave broad support for thecontinued involvement of

England and Englishmen inFrance.ThepresenceofthoseEnglishmen was the mostconvincing proof availablethat, in Normandy at least,warhadsecuredjustice.

Normandy won, wherewould Henry turn to next?The divisions among theFrench,somuchatoddswithone another, helped himmilitarily. Yet when it cameto negotiation, who would

speak to him in the name ofFrance? Faced by an enemytriumphant on their ownterritory, the French partiestriedtomakecommoncause.At Montereau, south-east ofParis, the dauphin Charlesmet his great political rival,John, duke of Burgundy, on10 September 1419. At thismeeting the dauphin mayhave implied that the duke,whose reluctance to adopt a

strongly anti-English stancewasgenerallyrecognised,hadbeen guilty of treason to theFrenchcrown.Analtercationblew up, and in the ensuingscene Duke John was felledbyablowfromamemberofthedauphin’sentourage.

This politicalmurder onlyaggravated the politicaldivisions within France. ItalsogaveHenryVthechancehe needed. The brutal death

of Duke John inevitablypushed Philip, his son andsuccessor,ontothesideoftheonemanwhocouldhelphim.Henry grasped theopportunity; it could lead toParis (which the Burgundianparty at that momentcontrolled)and tomuchelse,besides. It may well havebeen at this moment, in theautumnof1419,thatHenryVdecided that the crown of

France, which none of hispredecessors had achieved,might be his.13 During thecourseofthecomingmonths,the terms of what Henrycould obtain in concessionsfrom the French (or at leastfrom thatbranchof thebodypolitic which was, at thatmoment, dominant) wereworked out. The result wasthe treaty of Troyes of May1420.

This was the mostimportant treaty of theHundred Years War.14 Itovertook in significance andended the sixty-yeardomination of the treaty ofBrétigny. The reason issimple enough. The treatyarranged betweenEdward IIIand John II had adopted amainlyfeudalapproachtothedispute which separated thetwokingsandtheirpeople;it

had decided who held what,and how. That arrangedbetween Henry V and DukePhilip of Burgundy, imposedupon the sick king, CharlesVI, and then formallyregistered (or approved) byFrance’s highest judicialbody, the Parlement, did notcarveupthekingdom,atleastnot on paper. Its aimwas topreserve the unity of France,to arrange matters in such a

way that, induecourse (and,in view of the king’s health,not before too long) a newdynasty might assume thecrown of France. Thatdynasty was to be the royalhouseofEngland.

ThetreatyofTroyesmadeHenryVheirtothecrownofFrance.CharlesVI,nowonlyoccasionally lucid, was toremain king until his death,but in the meantime Henry

wouldactasregent(ineffect,incontrolofthegovernment)succeeding to the crownwhen Charles died, a factwhich was soon to beinterpreted to imply Englishrecognition of the legitimacyof Charles VI’s rule as kingof France. To give thesettlement greater weight itwas also agreed that HenryshouldtaketowifeCatherine,Charles’s daughter, whose

hand he had sought innegotiation some yearsearlier. The couple weremarried in the cathedral atTroyeson2June1420.

Whatthetreatydidnotdowas to make the twokingdoms of France andEngland one; they were toremainseparate,eachwithitsown legal and administrativeidentity. The unifying factorbetween them was to be

dynastic and personal. Howeffectively the king ofEngland could direct thegovernment of France wasthe most important of anumber of unresolvedquestions left by the treaty.Translating a paperagreement into reality waslikely to prove difficult;several major problemswould need to be overcome.The greatest was that the

dauphin, Charles (he was, infact, the third dauphin, twoelder brothers having diedprematurely) had beendeprived of his legitimateright to succeed his father asking.Muchplaywasmadeofthe fact that, since he hadbeenpresentatthemurderofJohn, duke of Burgundy, atMontereau he could notproperly and worthily inheritthe throne, from which he

was now excluded. Yet, itwas asked,was it possible toexclude him by treaty, somanifestly an arrangementbetween the king of Englandand the Burgundians (thedauphin’s political rivals),andthenimposeduponasickkingwhowas in no positionto resist? To many, loyal tothe idea of direct successionwithin the royal family, thisseemed wrong. To such, the

dauphin became the livingsymbol of resistance toEnglish rule in the years tocome.

A further complicationwastheundertakinggivenbyHenry V that he would useeverymeansathisdisposaltobring under his control thoseextensiveareasofFrancenotyet according him theirallegiance, an ambitiousmilitary plan which, it could

be argued, was beyond hisfinancial and militarycapabilities. For not the leastofHenry’sproblemswashowto raise the money requiredfor the accomplishment ofsuch an undertaking. Wouldhis new French subjects paytocontinueacivilwaragainsttheir compatriots?Alternatively, wouldEnglishmen be willing tosubscribe towards the

accomplishment of this greattask? Henry must very soonhavebeguntohavedoubtsonbothscores.

ThetreatyofBrétignyhadbeen termed the ‘GreatPeace’; that of Troyes cameto be known, at least inEnglish circles, as the ‘FinalPeace’.Onecanseewhy;butwas it really to be so? Bornout of a particular set ofcircumstances, the treaty did

little to unite France, butservedrathertounderlinethedivisions which had existedfortwodecadesormore.TheEnglish had come to Franceencouragedtomakethemostofalackofunitedoppositionto them.This they succeededin doing. But it cannot beclaimedthattheunityimpliedintheterm‘FinalPeace’wasachieved,either thenor later.France remained a divided

country.Thiscanbestbeseenin the demand made byprinces who had subscribedto the treaty that those wholivedintheir landsshoulddothesame.Manyrefused;eventhe town ofDijon, capital ofthe duchy ofBurgundy, onlydidsowhenorderedtodosoby its duke. Classified as‘rebels’,thosewhowouldnotrecognise the new politicalorder which the treaty

represented suffered theconfiscation of their propertyand were forced to move tothe rival obedience where,over the coming years, somehelpedtofosteroppositiontoEnglish rule in northernFrance.

Henry, on his part, turnedseriously towards thefulfilment of his newobligations. It was while hewas away in England,

crowning his wife as queenand seeking further materialsupport for the war, that hisbrother, Thomas, duke ofClarence, was defeated andkilledatBaugé, inAnjou,byaFranco-Scottishforceon22March 1421.Had the Frenchtaken proper advantage oftheirunexpectedvictory, it ispossible that theycouldhavereversed the way the warseemedtobegoing.Butthey

failed to do so, and whenHenry returned to France hewas able to clear the enemyfrom strongholds which theystillheldnearParis,includingthe formidable town andfortress of Meaux, beforewhich he spent some sevenmonths in 1421–2. It waswhile he was besieging thattownthat thekingcontracteda fatal illness.On 31August1422, he died at Vincennes,

just outside Paris. HissuccessoraskingofEngland,HenryVI,wasnotyetayearold.

HenryVhadgiventhewarwith France a new twist.15He had come to France (inwhichhespentmorethanhalfhis life as king of England)and had, as contemporariesrecognised, achievedconsiderable conquests,something which his

predecessors had never doneon that scale or within soshortaperiodoftime.Hehaddone better than they had inthesensethathehadclaimedthe crown of France and, bytreaty, had come close toexercising its authority. Hehad done more, too, thatwould be of significance inthefuture.InNormandy,thatpart of France which he hadmade peculiarly his, he had

taken over everydaygovernment,nowexercisedinhis name by men appointedby him. Furthermore, in anattempt to reward men formilitary service and toencourage others to serve inFrance,Henry had pursued apolicy of granting lands andtitleswhichhadcomeintohishands, thereby creating animportant interest, other thanhisown,intheextensionand

maintenance of the conquest.Englishmenweregiven landstoexploit,butalsotodefend.A number of them settled inFrance, took up what wereessentially non-militaryoccupations, and sometimesmarriedFrenchwives.Beforelong they had becomesettlers; their children knewnoother life.If thereweretobe a failure in maintainingthisconquest,the‘livelihood’

of these people would be atstake. Every effort must bemadetokeepthemthere.

1422–1453

It was precisely this thatJohn, duke of Bedford, theelder ofHenryV’s survivingbrothers, tried todowhenhebecame regent of France onthedeathof theking.Withinless than two months, theailing Charles VI followed

his son-in-law to the grave,giving effect to thesuccession clause of thetreaty of Troyes. Henry VI,still less than a year old,alreadykingofEngland,nowassumedthecrownofFrance,a position which his fatherhadneverquiteachieved.

In France Bedford, actingfor his nephew, strove toreducetheareaofthecountrystill faithful to the Valois

‘claimant’, the dauphin,Charles, now regarded bymany as Charles VIIalthough, like his youngEnglish nephew, stilluncrowned.On31 July1423an army representing thecombined power of Englandand Burgundy defeated aFranco-Scottish army atCravant,whileayearlater,on17 August 1424, at Verneuilanotherarmy,ledbyBedford

himself, encountered and,after heavy fighting,convincingly defeatedanother such enemy army,this time reinforced byGenoese crossbowmen. Theoutcome had considerablesignificance. It marked thesecond French defeat in ayear; it fully restored to theEnglish their militaryreputation which was nolongerseentodependonone

man, Henry V; and, mostimportantofall,itopenedtheway southwards for furtheradvance into central France.In Normandy, the settlerscould sleep more soundly asthe theatre of active warmovedsouth.Thefutureheldconsiderablepossibility.

For the French, on theother hand, the dark years ofthewar,notunlikethe1340sand 1350s, appeared to have

returned. By 1427, much ofMaine and Anjou, nameswhose familiarity stems fromtheir frequent appearance onthe listofEnglishdiplomaticdemands, were in the handsof the English, nowadvancingsouthwards.Itwasthe line of the river LoirewhichwastosavetheFrench.TheEnglishcouldnotcrossitleaving behind themunconqueredFrenchoutposts,

ofwhichOrléanswasone.Inthe autumn of 1428 theEnglish, under one of theirmost notable commanders,Thomas, earl of Salisbury,besieged the town. InNovember, Salisbury, achivalric figure, was killed,the victim of a cannonball.ButstilltheEnglishpersisted,whileallFrancelookedtothesiege. In May 1429 thestruggle was resolved. An

unknown peasant girl fromLorraine, Joan of Arc,persuaded the dauphin thatshe had been sent byGod toraise the siege. In spite ofscepticism and outrighthostility to her at the court(howcould sheachievewhatprofessionalcommandershadfailed to do?) Joan receivedpermission and activeencouragement to attemptwhat she claimed she had

beensent tocarryout. In theevent, she succeeded. On 8May 1429 the Englishabandoned the siege; France,throughJoan,hadwonagreatmoral victory. As ChristinedePisanputit,‘thesunbegantoshineoncemore’.

It was a victory whichcould,anddid,leadtogreaterthings.Within amonth or sothe French, having wonimportant skirmishes at

JargeauandPatay,couldturntowards achieving the nextlogical step of their successstory, the coronation of thedauphin as king of France.On17July1429,lessthantenweeksafterrelievingOrleans,and having in themeanwhilebroughtbacktoFrenchruleanumber of towns, includingTroyes where the fatefultreaty had been sealed in1420, Joan stood in the

cathedral at Reims watchingthe dauphin as he underwenttheriteofcoronation,theriteby which his predecessorshad become full kings ofFrance. A fundamentalchallengehadbeenlevelledatthesettlementmadeatTroyeswhich had altered the line ofsuccession to the crown ofFrance. Could the challengebemaintained?

The English saw the

coronation of Charles VII atReims as a considerablethreat to their authority. InDecember 1431 Henry VI,now ten years old, wasbroughttoParisandcrownedinNotre-DamebyanEnglishbishop; the fact that theceremonyhadnottakenplaceat Reims did not escape thenoticeofcontemporaries.Yetin spite of the need to bringstrong and immediate

pressure to bear upon theEnglish, the Frenchwere notable to follow up theirsuccesses of 1429. In thefollowing year, indeed, Joanof Arc was captured atCompiègneandinMay1431,afterwhatwasapoliticaltrialcarried out underecclesiastical rules, she wascondemned and burned atRouen. The war was goingthe way of neither side. The

English defences held. Therewasdeadlock.

In the circumstances menturned to negotiation. In thesummermonthsof1435theretookplaceatArras, innorth-eastern France, a greatcongress attended by therepresentatives of a numberof European states and theChurch.16 After weeks ofdiscussion, thesides failed toagree terms, either over the

crown of France or over thelands to be held by theEnglish, and under whatconditions. However thecongresswas theoccasionofan event of somesignificance.Havingobtaineda papal dispensation, Philip,duke of Burgundy, forsookhis support of the settlementmade at Troyes and, hence,too, his allegiance to theEnglish as rulers of France.

FromnowonheeitherfoughtontheFrenchsideoractedasaneutralbetween theparties.If, in the years to follow, hedidrelativelylittletohelptheValois war effort, hisdefection greatly angered theEnglish who reacted instrongly emotional terms towhat they regarded as an actof betrayal and treasonagainsttheEnglishcrown.

In 1439 a further attempt

was made to secure adiplomatic settlement whenthe French, the English, andthe Burgundians (but not therepresentativesoftheChurch,excluded by the English fortheir alleged partiality atArras)metnearCalais in thesummer of that year. Theterritorial offers were neverreallymorethanvariationsonothers made earlier in thewar. Although the French

offerofa‘half-peace’(atrucefor a set period of betweenfifteen and thirty years, inexchange for an Englishundertaking not to use theFrench royal title during thatperiod)wastakenseriouslyatfirst, it was turned downwhentheEnglishdemandedaperpetualpeace togetherwiththegrantofNormandyandanenlarged Aquitaine (as in1360)infullsovereignty.

Moresignificant,however,was the influence which theEnglish settlement inNormandy came to exerciseupon the proceedings. Whenasked to restore thoseFrenchmenwhohadlosttheirlands for refusing torecognise the legitimacy ofEnglishruleintheduchy,theEnglish negotiators refusedpoint blank. They could notgive the impression that they

doubted the validity of theirking’s claim to the crown ofFrance, for by so doing theywould have thrown doubtupon the symbolic and legalimportance of Henry VI’sFrench coronation, renderingillegal theveryauthority (theroyal one) upon which thevalidityofthegrantsmadetoEnglishmen (and others) inNormandydepended.Further,to havemade the concession

over restoration of landswould have meant deprivingtheir own people of theirFrench interests, somethingwhich, for both moral andfinancial reasons, they werenotpreparedtodo.

Ifdiplomacywasbringinga settlement no nearer,military events would do soonly very slowly. It is truethat in the late 1430s theEnglish suffered some

reversesandterritoriallosses.In 1435 both Dieppe andHarfleur were taken by theFrench and in the next yearPariswentthesameway.Theloss of the two ports wasserious, as the English nowhad only limited access toNormandyand to thecapital,Rouen, which had come toreplaceParis.Yettheyfoughton, trying to defend the longlinewhichwas the border of

their dominion in northernFrance, much as theirpredecessors had done inAquitaine in the 1370s. Insuch a situation the initiativelay with the attacker. TheEnglishmusthaveechoedtherejoicings of the people ofRouen when it wasannounced, in the earlysummerof1444, that a trucehad been agreed betweenEnglandandFrance,and that

Henry VI was to marryMargaretofAnjou,aniecebymarriage of Charles VII.Once again it was hoped topostpone a settlement andplace faith upon a personalunion between the royalfamilies of the two countriestoresolvetheoutcomeof theolddisputebetweenthem.

ThetruceofToursmarkedthebeginningofanotherbriefphase of diplomacy. At the

negotiations, the Englishmade an importantconcession in saying that theclaim to the French crownmight be traded for asovereign Normandy. Then,inDecember1445,HenryVIsecretly undertook thesurrender of the county ofMaine, insodoingappearingto renounce sovereignty overit and implying, too, that theEnglishmightyieldtofurther

pressure, military ordiplomatic.

If Henry had hoped forpeace, he was to be sadlydisillusioned. From 1446 to1448 the French spared noeffort to bring about thesurrender of Maine whichthoseEnglishmenholdingLeMans, its capital, refused tocarry out until, in March1448, they finally gave way.Fifteen months later, under

the pretext that the Englishhad broken the truce, theFrench invaded Normandyfrom several directions. Thewell-planned attack led to acampaignof less thanayear.Bytheearlysummerof1450the English, driven out oftheir lands and defeated inbattle at Formigny in earlyApril, had lost their hold onnorthern France.OnlyCalaisremained to them. The issue

had been settled by force ofarms.

The final act was soon tofollow. Aquitaine, stillEnglish, had not attractedmuch attention from eitherside since 1413, the militaryemphasis since then havingbeen on northern France.NeitherHenryV nor his sonhadplacedthesolutiontotheproblemofAquitaine(theoldfeudal problem) high in his

list of priorities. Yet theduchy was not entirelyforgotten. When Philip ofBurgundy abandoned theEnglish alliance and returnedto that of France in 1435, hereleased French troops fromeasternFrancewhoseservicesCharles VII could nowemploy in the south-west. In1442 both the king and thedauphin, Louis, went on anexpedition into Aquitaine

which greatly troubled thegovernment inLondon.Soonafterwards,thetruceofToursintervened. None the less,once war had been renewedin 1449 and Normandy hadbeenrecovered,itwastimetoturn again towardsAquitainewhere theEnglishmust havefelt isolated andapprehensive. In 1451 theFrenchinvaded,overranmostof the duchy, and took

Bordeaux. In the followingyear, however, a plot washatched by the English andtheir supporters, whichregained for them control ofthe city. The pro-Englishparty must have realised,however,thatneithertheynortheirmastersinLondonwerein a position to hold out forlong. Nor did they. In 1453the French returned in forceand at Castillon, on 17 July,

they defeated the Englishwhose commander, JohnTalbot,earlofShrewsbury,aman of long experience,waskilled by the murderous fireofFrenchcannon.

Although men of the daymay not have known it, theHundred Years War waseffectivelyover.

1W.H.McNeill,Thepursuitofpower(Oxford,1983),ch.3.

2ThereaderwillfindmuchofvalueforthischapterinJ.LePatourel,‘Theoriginsofthewar’,TheHundredYearsWar,ed.Fowler,pp.28–50.

3J.A.Kicklighter,‘EnglishBordeauxinconflict:theexecutionofPierreVigierdelaRousselleanditsaftermath,1312–24’,J.Med.H.,9(1983),1–14.

4SeetheessaybyJ.J.N.Palmer,

‘Thewaraimsoftheprotagonistsandthenegotiationsforpeace’,TheHundredYearsWar,ed.Fowler,pp.51–74,whichisparticularlyvaluableforthefourteenthcentury.

5Perroy(TheHundredYearsWar,p.157)calledit‘theCastiliancomedy’,scarcelydoingjusticetoitsimportance.ItspropersignificancewasdevelopedbyP.Russell,TheEnglishinterventioninSpainandPortugalinthetimeof

EdwardIIIandRichardII(Oxford,1955)

6Palmer,‘Waraims’,p.63.7M.McKisack,Thefourteenthcentury,1307–1399(Oxford,1959),p.475,n.3,citingRotuliparliamentorum,III,338.

8N.Housley,‘ThebishopofNorwich’scrusade,May1383’,H.T.,33(May,1983),15–20.

9V.J.Scattergood,‘ChaucerandtheFrenchwar:SirThopasandMelibee’,Courtandpoet,ed.G.S.Burgess(Liverpool,1981),pp.287–96.

10Palmer,‘Waraims’,pp.64–5.11C.J.Ford,‘Piracyorpolicy:thecrisisintheChannel,1400–1403‘,T.R.Hist.S.,fifthseries,29(1979),63–78.

12J.H.Wylie,HistoryofEnglandunderHenrytheFourth(4vols.,London,1884–98),iv,68–9;R.Vaughan,JohntheFearless.ThegrowthofBurgundianpower(London,1966),pp.94–5.

13Palmer,‘Waraims’,p.69.14SeetheassessmentofM.Keen,

‘Diplomacy’,HenryV.Thepracticeofkingship,ed.G.L.Harriss(Oxford,1985).PP.181–99.

15Formuchofthisandwhatfollows,seeC.T.Allmand,LancastrianNormandy,1415–1450.Thehistoryofamedievaloccupation(Oxford,1983),andR.Massey,‘ThelandsettlementinLancastrianNormandy‘,Propertyandpolitics:essaysinlatermedievalEnglishhistory,ed.A.J.Pollard(Gloucester:NewYork,1984),pp.76–96.

16SeeJ.G.Dickinson,ThecongressofArras,1435(Oxford,1955).

APPROACHESTOWAR

What purpose did men thinkwar should serve? Manywould have claimed that itserved none, that it was butthe result of the Fall and of

sin, and that it brought onlyharm and hurt to the world.This opinion, which had along Christian ancestry, wasstill widely held andpropagated in the fourteenthcentury. It did not, however,gounchallenged.Asfarbackasthelatefourthcenturytwomen had expressed the viewthat war should be fought inorder to bring about peaceand order. One was

Augustine,whose ideasweretobefundamental informingmedieval Europe’s views onthe subject. The other wasVegetius, also a Christian,wholikewiseregardedwarasa means of bringing aboutpeace. His work on war, theDe re militari, grew tobecome the main expressionof the ideas of late antiquityontheaimsofwarandhowitshould best be fought. Cited

in the writings of theCarolingian age, the De remilitari began to enjoy aparticular vogue during therenaissance of the twelfthcentury, being referred to asan authority on militarymatters by writers who hadno first-hand knowledge ofwar. By the late thirteenthcentury, when the firsttranslations into thevernacular were

commissioned (often at thebehest of men of a militarycastofmind,suchasEdwardI, who had one made inAnglo-Norman)Vegetiuswasbeginning to enjoy apopularity which was to lastuntilearlymodern times.Hisview that war could bejustified by the need to findpeace, a view which wonsupport from laterphilosophers,theologiansand

lawyers, was to be aninfluentialone.

Implied in this idea wasthe notion that war was not,as some would have argued,the main cause of socialdisharmony, but rather thechief means of attaining therestorationofanorderwhichhad been broken by othercauses. The influence of thisviewisclearlyreflectedintheworks of the two thirteenth-

century Dominican friars,Raymond of Peñafort andThomasAquinas,who,overaperiod of half a century, setout what was to become theorthodox justification ofcertain wars, the ‘just’ wars,aswetermthem.War,arguedAquinas, was the defence ofpeace which, in practice,might involve the forcibleprotectionof rights, lands,orhonours under threat or

attack. This was itsjustification: ‘All who makewar seek through war toarriveatapeacemoreperfectthanexistedbeforewar.’

Such a view took accountofthefactthatwarwaslikelyto hurt some; for that reasoneveryeffortmustbemade torestrict it. But this did notprevent theDominicans fromsetting out thatwar could bejustified as a means of

restoring order in situationsof political or socialdisharmony, for instancebetween territories (here weseethebeginningsoftheideaof the territorial unit and thedefence of its justifiablerights) or between sovereignrulersandtheirvassals(ifthevassal chose to rebel againsthis lord and thus fell into astate of disobedience). ThusAquinas,whostoodinalong

tradition which came to himthrough the teachings of theearlycanonistssummedupinGratian’s Decretum (1140),wasclearthateverystatehadboththerightandthedutytodefend itself, its legitimateexistence,anditsrightswhenthesecouldbelegallyproved(‘It is legitimate to opposeforce with force’, asJustinian’sDigest put it). Inthiswayof thinkingwarwas

seenasanattempttopursuea‘reasonable’claimwhichwasbeing forcibly threatened orattacked, which implied notmerely the use of force butthe means of persuasion(propaganda) and discussion(negotiation) as well. As SirJohn Fortescue was to writein the second half of thefifteenth century, ‘a King’swar is a legal trial by battle[when] he seeks the right he

cannot obtain by peacefulmeans’.Warwas ameansofrestoringjusticetosociety.

Legitimate war, however,was concerned not onlywiththe defence of sovereign orhistorical rights to territory.Thestabilityoffeudalsocietyhad always depended upon arelationship of trust betweenlordsandvassals.Inasocietyin which the king wasregarded as God’s regent,

rebellion was seen as risingagainst an authority divinelyappointed.Therebelortraitorwasadestabilising influence,whose bad example mighttempt others to emulate him.In such circumstances, warwas a necessary and finalpunishment imposed upon arecalcitrant vassal who hadignored all calls to obey hisfeudal lord. It is for thisreasonthat insomuchof the

literature and documentationdealing with the justificationofawaremphasiswasplacedupon the enemy as a rebelwhomustbepunishedforhisactsofinfidelityortreason.

The French justified thewar against the English intwomainways.Itwasanactof punishment, or vindictivejustice, against an arch-rebel,the king of England as dukeofAquitaine,whohadbroken

faith. It was also seen as awar of national self-defenceagainst those who hadinvaded French territory andhadincitedloyalsubjectsintorebellion.1 For the Englishkings,ontheotherhand,warwas an attempt to asserthistoric and feudal rights toAquitaine, Normandy, andotherpartsofFrance,aswellas their legal claim to theFrench crown, which had

beenunjustlydeniedthembysuccessiveFrenchkings.Theattentive listener present atthe English coronation ofHenryVIin1429wouldhaveheard the young king beingexhorted to avenge injustices(‘ulciscarisiniusta’)andtobe‘thepowerfuldefenderofhiscountry… triumphant overthe enemy’ (‘sit fortissimusprotector patrie…triumphator hostium’). The

traditional way of doing thiswasthroughwar.

The need for war, then,wasfairlygenerallyaccepted,although it was widelyrecognized that it broughtdestruction and death.Although the innocent mightsuffer, such tragedies wereoften acceptedphilosophicallyaspartof thedivinewillorpunishment. Insuch a way of thinking, war

wasregardedasan invitationfor divine intervention,carriedoutthroughthedivineinstrument, thesoldier.Yetitwas not merely an appeal tothe strength of God that wasbeing made. God wasGoodness: He was Justice:Christ had shown himselfhumbleevenuntodeath.Godwould reward good; hisjudgementsinbattlewouldbejust; he would favour the

humble who honoured himand recognised his strengthby bringing down the proud.HumanpowerwasasnothingcomparedwiththestrengthofGod.

Numbers on the field ofbattlecountedforlittle.WhenArchbishop Bradwardinepreached before Edward IIIafter English victories atCrécy andNeville’sCross in1346 he claimed that God

granted victory to whomeverhewilled, and he hadwilledto grant it to the virtuous.Experience clearly showed,Bradwardine declared, thatvirtue, not numbers,triumphedovertheiniquityoftheenemy.SimilarlyHenryVwas seen as the JudasMaccabeus of his day who,faced by great odds atAgincourt, worried littleabout his lack of forces but

trusted in therightnessofhiscause, thepietyofhispeopleat homepraying for him andfor his army, and in divinestrength. The result of thebattle showed how just wasthe cause of England’s king.In effect, God had declaredhimself for the English andagainst the French. Had theFrenchnotbeensoproud,theanonymouschaplainofHenryV’s household asserted, they

would have recognised thatearlierdefeatswhichtheyhadexperienced(hewasreferringto the battles fought at Sluysin 1340 and at Poitiers in1356),constitutedaclearsignof divine arbitrament, andmuch bloodshed would havebeen avoided. But what elsecould be expected from suchastiff-neckedpeople?2

How did defeat, even thepossibility of defeat, fit into

thispatternofthought?Sinceit was to act against hope, itwas wrong to assume thatdefeatwasanexplicitsignofdivine condemnation of acausefromwhichtherecouldbenorecovery.Tothinkthatway made it almostimpossible to understand apattern of battle results otherthan that which pointedconsistently in one direction.How, then, to explain defeat

in awarwhichwas regardedas just? The answer lay inseeing such defeats as signsof God’s temporarydispleasurewithapeople,notwiththeircause,adispleasurewhich resulted from theirsinfulness which was nowbeingpunished.Onmorethanone occasion French writersexplainedthedefeatsandset-backs suffered by their kingsand military leaders by

emphasising that these weredivine punishments for civildisorder and pride. Once thepeoplehadbeenchastisedbyGod’s flail (‘flagellumDei’),withtheEnglishactingastheinstruments of hispunishment, then the days ofvictory would return. Eventsweretojustifysuchaviewofthings, and God was dulythanked, by the royal orderthatmassesshouldbesaid to

commemorate the defeat ofthe English at Formigny inApril 1450, for the way hehad turned his gaze towardsthe French cause which, forso long, had appeared to belackinghissupport.3

If Frenchmen had doubts,Englishmen had them, too.What if the argumentsconjured up to justify a warwere false, or a king’smotives reflected factors

(nakedambition,forinstance)less worthy than a seekingafter justice? The lingeringdoubtswere probably alwaysthere, even if awar receivedthe approval of the Churchthat itwasbeingfoughtforagood cause. For men wereworried not only by the factthat thecause forwhich theyfought might not be morallysound. A more importantmatter concerned them: the

fate of their souls in eternityif they were to die fightingfor an unjust cause. Wouldmen,misled into fighting fora cause which, in spite ofclaims made on its behalf,was a war fought for thewrong motives, be eternallydamned if they met theirdeathsuddenlyinbattle,evenif they were fighting out ofloyalty to theirking? In sucha case it was argued,

following St Augustine, thatsince the soldier was in theserviceofhis lord, itwasthelord who must acceptresponsibility.

A different answer,however,mightbegiventoasoldierwhofollowedaleaderof his own choosing – forpay; he could not pleadobedience if his conscienceleft him uneasy. StAntoninoof Florence felt that the

professionalsoldiercouldnotfight in a war the justice ofwhich was not above doubt,nor could he be givenabsolution as long as hecontinued to fight in thatcause.4 The whole problemwas one which drew somefinetheatrefromShakespeareinHenry V.5 The playwrightwas only reflecting,dramatically,upononeaspect

of the problem of death, andits consequences, whichsoldiers of the later MiddleAges had constantly beforethem.

To the knighthood, orchivalry, of theMiddleAgeswarhadlonggivenasenseofpurpose.FortheChristian,aswehaveseen,warswereactsof pacification since theywere fought to secure peacewhichdependeduponjustice.

HadnotStAugustinewritten:‘Therearetwofriends,justiceandpeace’?TheCrusades, inone view, had been anattempt to restore Christ’sinheritance (into which hehad entered in triumph) bothto him and to his heirs, theChristiancommunity.Seeninfeudal terms, the Crusadeswere adefenceof theLord’srightstowhich,inallloyalty,all Christians should

contribute, either personallyor in other ways. Or, again,the Crusades might be seen,as they were in muchpropaganda,aswarsfoughttodefend fellow Christianssuffering physically at thehandsof theMuslimworld–those who took part being‘fired by the ardour ofcharity’ towards theirbrothers.6

Such ideas might be

translatedintoamoresecularcontext nearer home. AsBishop Thomas Brinton ofRochester said whenpreaching at the time of theBlack Prince’s death in thesummer of 1376, it was partofaknight’sduty tohelphiskingintimeofwar;failuretodo someant loss of the rightto be called a knight, whichwasbothasignofhonouranda mark of responsibility

which had to be lived up to.The knight must be ready tofight hard when his princerequired it of him; he mustnever desert; nor must herefuse to fight for thecommon good; and, aboveall, he must fight fearlessly.Particularly influential weretheideasofservingthefeudaloverlord, of fulfilling theobligationinherentinfidelity,and of helping to restore

justice when the lord or hisally was deprived of whatwas justly his. As BishopBrinton said, it had been torestore a rightful heir to hiskingdom and to defeattyranny that the campaign innorthern Spain had beenfought in 1367. Withoutjustice there could be nopeace;aknightwasinhonourbound to strive for justice,and at the ceremony of his

dubbing his sword had beenblessed so that, with theapproval of the Church thusclearly implied, it mightbecomeaswordforjustice.7

War gave to the chivalryofmedievalEuropeasenseofpurpose and of justificationfor their existence andprivileged state. It gave, too,a chance of winning merit.Essential to the ethos ofchivalry was the earning of

fame, which enabled theknight to hold his head highin the world, and wascomplementary to lordship,inheritance, or manor houseas signs of his position insociety. Honour, the esteemofbothpeergroupandothers,was something to be won inwar. To be the first over thewallofacastleortownwhichwas being stormed; to beencampedclosetothewallof

a besieged city and thuswithinrangeofmissilesfiredfromitswalls,thesewereactswhich merited honour andrespect. Martial acts mightalso be more dramatic orbetter recorded for widerpublic esteem. The accountgiven by Froissart of themanner in which the BlackPrincewonhisspursatCrécyin 1346 shows this clearly.The young man (he was but

sixteenyearsoldat the time)was fighting for justice, forthe claim of his father,Edward III, to the throne ofFrance.Bytheendofthedayhe had not only helped tofurther that cause; byshowing outstanding courageand skill in arms in the thickof the fightinghehad shownhow the knight could usesituations of war to winpersonalrenownforhimself.

Theimportanceofthiswasconsiderable.Whenmembersof the French royal order ofchivalry,thatoftheStar,metfor their annual feast, aspecialtablewasreservedforthose princes, bannerets, andknights, three from eachgroup, who were judged tohave performed the mostvaliant deeds of war duringthe past year.8 In someorders, special books of

adventurewerekeptsoas‘togive valour its due’. Thewords used by Froissart toexpresshisaiminwritinghisgreat chronicle, ‘that thehonourable enterprises, nobleadventuresanddeedsofarmswhich took place during thewars waged by France andEngland should be fittinglyrelated and preserved forposterity’, fit admirably intothe pattern of thought and

practice which regarded waras a noble way of life. ‘Quiplus fait, mie[u]x vault’(‘Who does most is worthmost’), the refrain in theLivredechevaleriewritteninthe middle of the fourteenthcentury by Geoffroi deCharny, the standard-bearerofKing John II of France atthe battle of Poitiers, whopreferred to stand and dierather than run away in the

momentofdefeat,aptlysumsup the chivalrous attitude towar.9

War was also a means offinding and experiencingcompanionship among like-mindedpersons.Tournamentsprovided opportunities forpractising some of the artsandskillsofwarincommon.Itisclearthatsuchoccasionsbrought together, often frommany countries, knights who

were brought up and trainedinthesamemartialtraditions.Knights also went to war incompany; a number,sometimes from the samelordship, would serve in theretinue of a great lord. It isnot fanciful (we have theevidence of the fifteenth-century French lord, Jean deBueil,toshowit)toseethemdiscussing war, its dangers,its ‘occasions’ rather as men

today recall political orsporting occasions over adrink. The physical thrill ofwar and itsperils, andof theintense satisfaction of a deednobly done, is what emergesfromBueil’swork.10

Essentially based on war,too, were the martialassociations, the orders ofchivalry, election to whichwas itself an honour and asign of good military

reputation, whose membersvied with one another in thestakes for further recognitionborn out of daring andcourage shown in war.Associated with the orderswere the colour and thepageantryofwar:therichnessof theapparels; theemphasisontheoutwardtrappings(sayoftheheralds);thesensethatgoingtowarwasanoccasion,just as tournaments or jousts

were occasions. Somedescriptions of armies on themove,lefttousbywritersofthe chivalric tradition,notably Froissart, glow withlight and colour. War wasnever intended to be a drabaffair. Prestige, if nothingelse, demanded that it beentered into with due pompandcircumstance.

Writing soon after the

expulsionoftheEnglishfromFrance in the mid-fifteenthcentury, the author of Ledébat des hérauts d’armescould underline theimportanceof thenobility, inparticular the great nobility,in French society. Their roleas supporters (‘pilliers’) ofthemonarchy he regarded asspecially significant. Had italways been so in the periodof theconflictwithEngland?

The answer to this must benegative. On a number ofoccasionsduring thewar, theroleof thenobilityhadcomeunder attack, in particular atmoments of severe crisis. In1357theclericalauthoroftheshort De miserabili staturegni Francie, reflectingupon the disaster of Poitiers,praised the courage of theking,JohnII,whohadfoughtbravely up to the very

moment of his capture, butcondemned in strong termsthe failure and lack of heartof the nobility, the ‘ducesbelli’whohad failed in theirobligationtotheFrenchstate.The author’s indignationwasexpressed ironically. Thosewho liked to regardthemselvesasheroes(‘militesdelicati’)mustshowachangeof heart and a will to winbefore any victory might be

theirs.11 Further, and moreimportant, it was open todoubt whether the nobilitywasproperly trained forwar.Without training, all itsefforts were doomed tofailure.

The criticisms of theluxurious life led by thenobility (with its attendantimplicationsofbetterdietandbetterhealth)werenotlimitedtothewritersofsuchpolitical

pamphlets. Criticisms of thesame kind were also to bemade by such as Philippe deMézières, whose longreflectiveworkonthestateofFrench society, theSonge duvieil pèlerin, was writtentowards the end of thefourteenth century. InEngland, an attempt wasmadein1316tocutdowntheamount of luxurious foodwhich the nobility might

consume. Such may appearlikeattacksonthewealthandprivilegeofthe‘haves’bythe‘havenots’. In reality, itwaspart of a wider problem,perhapsbestexpressed in theQuadrilogue invectif of theNorman, Alain Chartier,written in 1422 when hishomeland had been overrunbytheEnglish.

Chartier was reluctant toplace all responsibility for

thisdisasteruponthenobilityalone.Liketheclericalwriterof 1357, he saw the Englishvictory as a sign of divinedispleasure and punishmentfor divisions within France.Where Chartier went furtherwas in asking whethernobilitywassomethingwhichcame to a man by virtue ofhisbirth (andcould thereforebe inherited) or whether itwas accorded in recognition

ofmerit?Did nobility derivefrom birth, function, orattribute? The debate was anold one: ‘does gentilesseproceed from birth’, JohnGower had asked ageneration earlier in hisConfessio amantis.12 Itssignificancein1422layintheway it questioned whetherbirthwasasufficientwarrantfor high military office, orwhethertheresponsibilitiesof

leadershipinwartimeshouldonlybe accorded (and itwasthekingwhoaccorded them)to those whose experienceand reputation in militaryaffairsmerited them. Societyhada right toexpect thebestfrom thosewith responsibiltyforitsdefence.

War, indeed, causedquestions to be asked aboutthe nobility’s role in it.Traditionally, war had given

men opportunities to achievehonour through individualacts of valour and courage.Times, however, werechanging. By the earlyfourteenth century RamonLull could stress the need tofight not merely for self-glorification but for thecommon good. The didacticworkswhichthenobilityusedto educate their childrenstressed, in the words of the

Burgundian, Ghillebert deLannoy (himself anobleman), the obligation to‘expose themselves to deathfor the good of the land’, anidealwhichmanywouldhavebeenabletoreadaboutintheworks of classical authorssuch as Valerius Maximus,Livy and Caesar. Chivalrywas coming to mean life inthe public service under theruler’s direction. When

Charles de la Trémolïle wasmortally wounded in thebattle ofMarignano in 1515,hisdeathbroughtprideforhisfamily since he died fightingfor the public good in anengagementatwhichthekingof France himself had beenpresent.13

Inaword,thenobilitywasbeing restored to its formerrole as the protector ofsociety,arolewhich,farfrom

contradictingthetruespiritofchivalry, correspondedexactly with it. But althoughthe spirit might be willing,thereweredifficulties,chieflyeconomic ones, to beovercome. Whether theowners of large or smallestates, noblemen weremembers of a caste whichwas expected to live noblywith a certain liberality andpanache (‘vivre noblement’)

as befitted their rank. Yet todo this was provingincreasingly expensive, forarticles of luxury were fastrising in price. But nonecould deny that a fine housewas a symbol of status andwealth. In border areas,dwellingswhich incorporatedarchitectural featuresconcerned with defence (the‘maison-fortes’ of France)were both dwellings for a

family and, in certaincircumstances, they mightprovide some measure ofprotectionforlocalpeople,inso doing underlining thenobleman’s responsibility forthedefenceofthepeople.14

The expenses incurred inparticipating in campaignswere, by the early fourteenthcentury,alreadyconsiderable.Furthermore, they wererising. There was the war

horsetobethoughtof:afineanimal might be worth thevalue of a small lordship or,put differently, in the mid-fifteenth century a chargercould cost a French man-at-arms the equivalent ofanythingfromsixmonths’ totwoyears’wages.Thehighera man’s rank, the better themount he was expected tohave, so that the horse of aknight could cost twice that

expectedofanesquire,whileabanneretmight,inturn,paydouble the price a knight-bachelorcouldpayforhis.Inaddition, the cost ofequipment and armour, thequality of which could varyconsiderably,addedgreatlytotheexpenseofgoingtowar.

It was the matter of costwhich played an importantpart in changing nobleattitudes towards the practice

of war. In the summer of1297,theearlofArundelmaynot have wished toaccompany his king, EdwardI, on an expedition toFlanders. But the excusewhichhegavehadagenuinering about it: he could notafford to go, for nonewouldserve inhis retinueunlessherewarded themwithrevenuesfrom his own lands, whichwould entail a loss of status

(‘grant abesement de monestat’) which the king wouldnot wish. Nor could the earlfind anyone whowould lendhimmoney to be secured onhislandedrevenue.15

Arundel’s predicamentwas an early warning ofdifficulties to come. Theeconomic boom of thethirteenth century,accompaniedbyanexpansionin the population of Europe,

wasbeginning to tail off.Bythe late thirteenth century,those for whom landedincome was the chief sourceofrevenuefacedanuncertainfuture. A century later theFrench nobility would beamong the worst affectedvictimsoftheactivitiesoftheroutiers, often calledCompanies, whose particularstyle of war entailed thedestruction of a wide variety

ofnoblerevenues.ThehazardofconfiscationbyFrenchmenofopposingloyaltiesintimesof political turbulence, or atthe hands of the Englishduring the occupation ofmuch of northern Francebetween 1417 and 1450,could also lead to greatlydiminished revenues. Theneedtopayransomscouldberuinous since, to raise thecash required, landoftenhad

to be sold. The trouble wasthatitdidnotnecessarilysellwell so that in some cases,such as that of theBurgundian lord, Guillaumede Châteauvillain, both heand his family,who acted asguarantorsforthepaymentof20,000 saluts which he hadagreed to paywhen capturedby theFrench in 1430, facedfinancial ruin.16 The FrenchandEnglish kings sometimes

had to help those who hadserved them to regain theirfreedom: in 1444 Sir JohnHandford, who had been inFrance for more than twentyyears, received 1,500 livresfrom Henry VI as acontribution towards thepurchase of his freedom;while Jean deRodemack gotasubstantialsumtowardsthepayment of his ransom fromRené d’Anjou,17 and

Georges de la Trémolïlereceived a seigneurie inPoitou from Charles VII inlieu of ransom promised butnot paid. Similarly, theinsistence of lords that theirtenants perform their feudaldutyofwatchandward(guetet garde), or carry outnecessary repairs to castlewall or ditch, as theirpredecessors had customarilydone,wasaninsistencewhich

reflected economic necessity.It was that same necessitywhichforcedtenantstorefusetheirserviceor,asinthecasebetween Guy le Bouteillier,as lord of La Roche-Guyon,andthepeopleofthetown,tohave the dispute betweenthem on these matters heardbeforetheParlementofParis.

Fewcould resistpressureswhich were making thewaging of war, never cheap,

more expensive than everbefore. The fourteenthcentury was to see a changeamong the natural leaders ofmilitary society from freeservice in the fulfilment ofobligationtoserviceinreturnfor pay or reward. In a veryrealsensewarwasbecomingan important supplementarysource of livelihood, forwhich the nobilityincreasingly sold their

services to the king in returnfor wages and promises ofopportunities of obtainingwhat were euphemisticallyknownasthe‘advantages’ofwar: the profits of ransoms;booty; and grants of landseized from the conquered.As in the case of warpresenting the knight with achance of achievingreputation,sointhisdifferentcontext the key word was

‘opportunity’.War gave to men of

initiative many suchopportunities. Sir JohnFastolf, involved in a longdrawn-out lawsuit in Parisbetween 1432 and 1435,couldremindthecourtthathehadbeenthefirsttojumpintothe sea when Henry V hadcome ashore in France in1415, and that the king hadrewarded him with the grant

of the first house which hehad seen in France.18Beingthe first ashore was anhonourable achievementwhich brought its ownreward; respectability waswhat Fastolf was claiming.Some of the bookswhich heis known to have possessed,which included Christine dePisan’s Letter of Othea toHector, a didactic work forknights, reinforce this view.

At the same time Fastolf’sattitudetothepracticalitiesofwar reflect a hardheadednesswhichwas essentially of thisworld: the plan which hedrew up in 1435 favouring a‘tough’ approach to the warmade little concession toromantic ideas of chivalrywhich would influence aknight’s conduct in war.19His long career in Francewhich led him to hold high

military and administrativeposts, as well as amassing afortunethroughthecaptureofprisonersinbattle,theseizingof property and theexploitationofestates,showshimtohavebeena‘realistic’personinallthathedid.

Asoftenthecase,Froissarthad a story which illustratesthispoint.DescribingEdwardIII’sarrivalatCalais in1359with a sizeable army, the

chronicler recalled that alarge number of men, ofdifferent backgrounds andnationalities, were therewaiting in the hope of beingallowedtojoinhim,some,headded significantly, wishingto advance their honour,others intent upon pillagingthe kingdom of France. Inmany cases, those who hadcome had spent large sumspreparing themselves

adequatelytojointheEnglishranks, such was theirkeenness to serve under acommander of highreputation.20 Their motives,at least as described byFroissart, indicate that theprofit motive wasincreasingly important inattracting men to war, andthat mundane, as well asidealistic,motivesprovidedadouble purpose for the

achievementofskillinarms.Society was faced with

twoimagesofthesoldier.Onthe one hand was thetraditionalknightofchivalry,the figure of the romances,and, more recently, of thenew chivalric orders, one ofwhose social functions wasthe defence of those inphysical need and danger.Not surprisingly, St Georgeand St Michael were the

patrons of new orders: bothwere depicted in art as thedefenders of the innocentagainst the forcesofevil.Ontheotherhandwastheimage,conveyed with increasingfrequency by the chroniclers,of the common soldier as asymbol of something to befeared, the perpetrator ofviolence and destruction,whetherthistooktheformofattacks on property (pillage

and arson) or on people(murderandrape).

The image of the drunkenand ill-disciplined soldier, afigure who aroused anemotional response, moreoften thatof fear than thatofrespect, was nothing new inthisage.Mercenaries,likethehireling of the bible, couldnotbetrusted:thebellswhichwarned the inhabitantsof thevillages and towns of

southernFranceofthedangerof the approachingCompanies reflect society’sfear and mistrust of suchmen. If soldiers could find adefender from outside theirnumber (as they did in thepoet Thomas Hoccleve, whopleaded that greater respectbe paid to their economicpredicament in old age),21more often than not theysuffered from the verbal and

literary lash of preachers,moralists and other writers.The mid-fourteenth-centuryEnglish Dominican, JohnBromyard, launched intowhat he regarded as theincreasingly unChristianspirit of those, both knightsand common soldiers, whowenttowarwiththevilestofintentions and ‘oaths andcurses in their mouths’. Theviews of his French

contemporary, the Carmelite,Jean de Venette,corresponded almost exactly;not without reason did thepoor people of France havelittletrustinthenobilitywhoabused them and theirproperty and virtually heldthem to ransom in the mostdisgraceful way. The remarkof Honoré Bouvet, aBenedictine who was acontemporary of both

Bromyard and Venette, thatno man who did not knowhowtosetplacesonfirewasworthy of the name ofsoldier,mightbecynical,butit was not entirelyunmerited.22

The gamekeeper, it wouldseem, had turned poacher,leaving much of societyundefended. If war was ameansofachievingpeace,orsocial and political harmony

and order, how compatiblewere the activities of manysoldierswith that aim?Werenot soldiers, and theiractivities, the enemies ofpeace? It was for reasonssuchasthisthateveryattemptwasmadetobringameasureof order to war. Although itwas difficult, in practice, tostop war from breaking out,serious attempts were madeto control it by emphasising

that only a war duly andproperly declared by asoverign authority could beregarded as just. The causeslying behind such adeclaration had to be serious(the denial of rights, thebreakingof the feudalbond),andeveryattempttoresolveapossible conflict bynegotiation had to be made.War was only to be a lastresort.

Therewas, too, thematterof the methods used by thesoldierinwar.Theyhadtobereasonable (no sledge-hammer to crack a nut),controlled, and moral. Wereall weapons moral? TheChurch certainly had doubtsabout the crossbow, with itsdeadly bolt or quarrel, areaction which was about tobe extended among certaincirclestotheuseofcannonin

its early days. Should allmembers of the enemy’spopulation be equally at riskin time of war? An unarmedcleric must not be harmed;but no more should women,childrenoroldmen,andevenstudents travelling to theirplace of study should not bemolested or put to ransom.But what of the farmer whogrew crops to feed theenemy’s army, or who paid

taxes to theenemyking (andmore and more people werenow doing this, in one formor another), or whosefarmyard provided feathersforenemyarrows?Themakerof weapons, the fletcher orthe bowyer, might not soeasily claim immunity fromwar. The problem was toknowwheretostop.Andwhowould say that enough wasenough, and would take on

the task of punishing thosewho transgressed therulesofthegame?

At this stage, the need tocontrol war to prevent itbecoming a tragic and self-defeating activity demandedstrong action. War had itsrulesandconventions,theso-called laws of war (‘jus inbello’),which,internationallyunderstood, bound militarysociety togetherbyproviding

a common code of practiceand a moderating influenceupon its conduct.23 Therewere ways of treatingprisoners properly, and ofrecognising that they hadcertain claims upon theircaptors; therewerealsorulesaboutthetaking,sharing,anddisposing of booty andpillage; there were signs offormal war, such as theunfurling of banners or the

settingoffofacannonat thestart of a siege, whichinformed all those presentthat a certain legal situationnow existed, hostilitieshaving been formallydeclared.Indeed,asthestudyofthelawemergingfromtheapplication of these lawsmakes clear, it was theformalisationofwar,bringinga set of rules to apply to itsconduct, which men were

tryingtoachieve.Theparallelwith the tournament or thejoust, where the constraintsimposed by space andregulationsapplied,cannotbeignored. The free-for-all ofwarhadtobecurtailed.

The formulation of rules,however, was not sufficient.There must be peopleofficially appointed to applythem. Heralds were anessentialaspectofthewaging

of war, just as they were ofchivalry. Their task was notlimited to the granting ofcoatsofarms; theyhad tobeexperts in recognising sucharmorials to identifyboth thedead and those whoperformed noble (and base)deeds in war. It was in theirpower to make and breakmilitary reputations; mengave of their best in front ofthem. Equally, however, the

constable andmarshal of thearmyhad authority delegatedto them to try in their courts(in which the military lawwas applied) men such asdeserters and those whobroke the rules ofdiscipline.24 Unlike theheraldwhosoughttoobserveandnote theoutstanding (thechroniclers,notablyFroissart,madegooduseof thereportsof battle given to them by

heralds), the constable andmarshalweremoreconcernedwithmaintainingorder.Theyshared a common aim,however, foreachwas tryingto keep the standard ofsoldierly behaviour up to atleast that of an acceptableminimum.

The heralds and thedisciplinary officers couldachieve much; but it is clearthat no factor could ensure a

greaterrespectfortherulesofwar and for the interests andproperty of the non-combatant than could firmleadership. To theoutstanding leaders, thechroniclers and others gaveunstinted praise. One canreadily understand why. Theability to lead was acharacteristic once associatedwith nobility, an attribute ofsocial rank. As the period

wore on, leadership becameincreasingly associated withpersonal qualities and skillswhich earned nobility, thusbringing renown to the manblessed with them. Theapplication of such skills ledto the greater control of anarmy and, as a consequence,to itsmoreeffectiveuseas amilitary arm. At the sametime it assured that thosewho, under weaker

leadership, might havesuffered at the hands ofarmies, could live in greatersecurity. From this stems thehistorical importance of theordinances of war issued bykings on campaign: byRichardIIduringtheScottishwar of 1385; byHenryV inFrance in 1419; and by hisbrother John, duke ofBedford, in Normandy in1428, all three attempts to

control the illegal or ‘un-peaceful’ activities ofsoldiers, in particular in theirrelationships with non-combatants. Thatrelationship,anuneasyoneinall societies,was best servedby personality. The praiselavisheduponHenryVbyhiscontemporaries,bynomeansall English, is indicative ofthe admiration accorded toonewhoseholduponhismen

was such that, for a while,those parts of France underEnglishcontrolwerefreedoftheworstexcessescommittedby soldiers. To theanonymous writer of theParisian Journal theArmagnacs (‘faulxArmignaz’) were likeSaracens, as they hanged,burned, ransomed and rapedat will. He might havereservationsabouttheEnglish

but,generallyspeaking,undertheir rule both military andcivilian knew where theystood.Thatwassomethingtobethankfulfor.

It was not so much theexistence of war as themanner of fighting it whicharoused the criticism of anincreasingly outspoken bodyof persons who reflected theviews of society in thegrowing vernacular literature

and poetry of the time.Honoré Bouvet, whose Treeof Battles, composed in thelate fourteenth century, wassoon to become a kind ofhandbookon theconventionsofwar,wasdeeplyinfluencedbythemanyhumantragediescausedbywar.Asaresult,hewas inclined to take a viewwhich favoured the rights ofthe non-combatants againstthoseofthesoldier.Theleast

that can be said for himwasthat he convinced many thatthe non-combatants’ interestswereworthyofconsideration.Bouvet’s writings reflectedthe opinions of manychroniclersoftheperiodwhowroteasvociferouscriticsofthe excesses of the soldiery.WhenJeandeVenette,whosenative village of that namehad been destroyed byEnglish troops, described the

activities of armies, bothregular and irregular, hecondemnedtheirexcessesandbestowed his sympathy uponthevictims.Similarly, if in amuch more restrainedmanner, the Englishman,John Page, himself a soldierinHenryV’sarmy,describedin detail and in passages ofconsiderable emotion thesufferings of the helplesscivilians during the six-

month-long siege of RouenwhichendedinJanuary1419.If Venette attacked thesoldiers, Page did not,perhaps because the man incharge of the operation washis own king who put theblame for the fate of thecivilians firmly upon theshoulders of the French. Yetthe sensitivities of both forthe sufferings of men,women, and children drawn

unwillingly into the warreflect something of the wayinwhich thinkingmen askedthemselveswhetherwarwas,infact,notsomuchawaytopeace as the prolongation ofbitterconflict.25

Like all ages, the lateMiddle Ages had its criticswho took swipes at theactivities of soldiers. Weshould not leave this briefconsiderationofhowwarwas

regarded by people of thetimewith the impression thatgreed and anarchy prevailed.What emerges from recentstudyofthisimportantperiodis that war was increasinglycoming to be seen as aninstrument of state, to beorganisedby theking for thecommon good of his peopleand country. Gradually theideaofservingthekinginhiswars was being replaced by

the need to serve the respublica, a less particular andmore all-embracing highergood.Weshallseelaterhow,in the fourteenth century,taxation came to be voted inever larger sums for thepurpose of war; this was,indirectly, thecontributionofcommunities towards theirself-defence.

Out of the monies votedfrom this public pursewages

weretobepaidtosoldiers tocarry out that work ofdefence. The soldier, ofwhateverrank,thusbecameapublic servant whose task itwas, under the command ofthe king, to defend thecommunity’s intereststhrough war. To do thissuccessfully, the soldier hadtobeready:hehadtotraininmilitaryskillswhichhemightbecalledupontouse.Thisno

longer applied only to theknight who took part intournaments. In England, theobligationtoownarmsandtotrain in the use of them wasshared by all male adults, asthe Assize of Arms of 1181andtheStatuteofWinchesterof 1285 made clear. Thefourteenth century saw thematterbeingtakenfurther.In1363EdwardIIIordered thatregular training at the butts

should take the place offootball; a century later, in1456, the difficultiesexperienced in Scotland insummoning and arming aproper fighting force wererecognisedintheproscriptionoffootballandgolf infavourofarcherypractice.

Training in arms on anincreasinglywidescalewasacharacteristic of the period.Thephilosophicalmessageof

Vegetius’s De re militaricentred upon the need todefend the common good,and for that need to be metnot by the employment ofmercenaries but by membersof the community adequatelyprepared to fight. Thematterofleadership,andwhoshouldbe entrusted with it, wasmuch discussed. These werefar from sterile debates.Fundamentally, what was at

issue was whether the army,nowideallycomposedofmenwith at least a modicum oftraining and military skill,should be led by men whomerited their responsibilities,awardedtothemonbehalfofthe community by the kingwho paid them from publicfunds(‘lapeccunepublique’).If, as Honoré Bouvet wrote,the soldier who acted quasoldier did so as the king’s

deputy, all the more so didwar’s new leaders act in hisname. These leaders werenow slowly becomingofficers. Before long, in thesixteenth century, the age ofthe military academy, wheresoldiers (and above allofficers) were to be trained,wouldarise.Anewattitudetowarwasbeingdeveloped.26

The academy was for thefuture.Yet at the timeof the

HundredYearsWar,withtheconcept of the nation state,and of the need for itsinterests to be defended,taking root, the raison d’êtreofwarwas slowly changing.It certainly continued to giveopportunity for glory, forself-advancement, and formaterial gain; in that respectit has not changed much tothis day. None the less warwas coming increasingly to

be regarded as a form ofactivity to be carried out bythewhole community,whichwouldendeavourincommon,under the leadership of theking,todefenditshonourandsafety. If men had acceptedthelikelihoodofdeathinwaras a means of achievinghonour,warfoughtindefenceof agreatergood, thatof thecommunity, was becomingjust as honourable, if not

more so. ‘Pugna pro patria’,‘Fight foryourcountry’,wasa call which Bishop Brintoncouldmakefromthepulpitinthe 1370s. By the middleyears of the fifteenth centurylitigants in civil suits beforethe Parlement of Paris couldsend word that they wouldnot appear in person becausetheywereengagedinwarforthe public good (‘inexpedicione causa rei

publice’) or were beingdetained as prisoners by theenemy. Both excuses werepractical ones; it is evidentthat they were honourableexcuses, too. ‘Pro patriamori’,‘Dieforyourcountry’,would be the next step.27Death on the battlefield,fighting for a just cause and,preferably in the presence ofthe king who led andrepresented the community,

was,forthefightingmanlikeCharles de la Trémolïle, thesupreme accolade. A newviewofwar,albeitonewhichhad close links with pastideas, was graduallyemerging.

1SeeJ.T.Johnson,Ideology,reason,andthelimitationof

war.Religiousandsecularconcepts,1200–1740(Princeton,1975);C.T.Allmand,Societyatwar.TheexperienceofEnglandandFranceduringtheHundredYearsWar(Edinburgh,1973),p.21.

2GestaHenriciQuinti.ThedeedsofHenrytheFifth,trans,anded.F.TaylorandJ.S.Roskell(Oxford,1975),pp.123,125.

3Allmand,LancastrianNormandy,pp.305–6.

4SeeB.Jarrett,Socialtheoriesof

theMiddleAges,1200–1500(London,1926),ch.7.

5HenrytheFifth,iv,i.6J.Riley-Smith,‘Crusadingasanactoflove’,History,65(1980),177–92.

7ThesermonsofThomasBrinton,bishopofRochester(1373–1389),ed.M.A.Devlin(Camdenthirdseries,85,86,London,1954),sermon78.Ontheotherhand,JeandeCardaillaccouldwritehisLiberregalisin1367insupportofHenryofTrastamara’srightto

defendhisthronethroughwar(HistoirelittérairedelaFrance,40,Paris,1974,pp.203–6).

8M.Keen,Chivalry(NewHaven:London,1984),p.192.

9SeethetextinOeuvresdeFroissart,ed.K.deLettenhove,i,Chroniques(Brussels,1873),pp.463–533.

10SeeAllmand,Societyatwar,pp.27–9.

11‘Le“TragicumargumentumdemiserabilistaturegniFrancie”deFrançoisdeMonte-Belluna

(1357)’,ed.A.Vernet,Annuaire-bulletindelesociétédel’histoiredeFrance,années1962–1963(Paris1964),pp.101–63.

12J.Gower,Confessioamantis,trans.T.Tiller(Harmondsworth,1965),p.166.

13P.Contamine,‘L’idéedeguerreàlafindumoyenâge:aspectsjuridiquesetéthiques’Comptes-rendusdel’académiedesinscriptionsetbelles-lettres(1979),pp.82–3,andn.45.

14M.G.A.Vale,‘Seigneurial

fortificationandprivatewarinlatermedievalGascony’,GentryandlessernobilityinlatemedievalEurope,ed.M.Jones(Gloucester:NewYork,1986),pp.133–43.

15M.Prestwich(ed.),Documentsillustratingthecrisisof1297–98inEngland(Camdenfourthseries,24,London,1980),p.142.

16A.Bossuat,‘Lesprisonniersdeguerreauxvesiècle:larançondeGuillaume,seigneurdeChâteauvillain’,A.B.,23

(1951),7–35.17Allmand,LancastrianNormandy,p.77;A.Bossuat,‘Lesprisonniersdeguerreauxvesiècle:larançondeJean,seigneurdeRodemack’,A.Est,5esér.,3(1951),145–62.

18AllmandandArmstrong(eds.),Englishsuits,pp.263–4.

19M.G.A.Vale,‘SirJohnFastolf’s“Report”of1435:anewinterpretationreconsidered’,NottinghamMedievalStudies,17(1973),78–84.

20Froissart,Chroniques,ed.Lettenhove,VI,204.

21T.Hoccleve,Works,III:Theregementofprinces,ed.F.J.Furnivall(E.E.T.S.,London,1897),pp.32–4:Allmand,Societyatwar,pp.179–81.

22TheTreeofBattlesofHonoréBonet,trans.G.W.Coopland(Liverpool,1949),p.189.

23M.H.Keen,ThelawsofwarinthelateMiddleAges(London:Toronto,1965);N.A.R.Wright,‘TheTreeofBattlesofHonoréBouvetandthelawsof

war’,War,literatureandpoliticsinthelateMiddleAges,ed.C.T.Allmand(Liverpool,1976),pp.12–31.

24G.D.Squibb,Thehighcourtofchivalry(Oxford,1959),ch.1:M.Keen,‘Thejurisdictionandoriginsoftheconstable’scourt’,WarandgovernmentintheMiddleAges,ed.J.GillinghamandJ.C.Holt(Woodbridge,1984),pp.159–69.

25ThechronicleofJeandeVenette,trans,anded.J.BirdsallandR.A.Newhall

(NewYork,1953)‘JohnPage’spoemonthesiegeofRouen’,ThehistoricalcollectionsofacitizenofLondoninthefifteenthcentury,ed.J.Gairdner(CamdenSociety,London,1876),pp.1–46:TheBrut,ed.F.W.D.Brie(E.E.T.S.,London,1908),11,404–22.

26Onthisdevelopment,seeJ.R.Hale,Renaissancewarstudies(London,1983),chs.8–10.

27E.Kantorowicz,‘Propatriamoriinmedievalpoliticalthought’,A.H.R.,56(1951),

472–92:reprintedintheauthor’sSelectedstudies(NewYork,1965),pp.308–24.

THECONDUCTOFWAR

MILITARYOBJECTIVES

Whatwere themainmilitaryobjectives of the participantsof thewar and, in particular,

what were those of theEnglish, the aggressors? Thenames of the battles areknown, some better thanothers; formost theseare themoments in the war whichstand out. A rather closerlook at the diary of militaryevents easily conveys theimpressionoftimesofintenseactivity, followed by periodswhenlittleornothingseemedto occur. Ifmilitarymethods

were as aimless as theymayappear, should we notconcentrate on thosemoments, perhaps thedecisive moments, of violentactionwhenthearmiesofthetwo sides clashed in battleswhich have become part ofnationalmyth?

Ittakeslittleknowledgeofhistory to appreciate thatrelatively few of the battlesrecordedinhistoryhavehada

decisive effect upon thefutureofthoseinvolved.Thisis certainly true of theHundredYearsWar,anditisas well to remember that atCrécy, Poitiers, andAgincourt, although theEnglish emerged as victors,on each occasion they werenot entering the Frenchkingdom to attempt itsconquest, but were actuallyleaving it, heading for the

coastinsearchoftransporttotake them back to England,the main aim of theexpeditionalreadyfulfilled.Ifeach success broughtreputation (as it did) to thevictors, and loss of men andmorale to the vanquished,none brought immediateterritorialadvantage.

Was an army’smain aim,then, not to draw the enemyto battle? The chevauchée

may have been seen as achallenge to the enemy’sprideandabilitytodefendhisterritory, but it is doubtfulwhether the leader of achevauchée,oftenattheheadof but a few thousand men,and needing to make theexpedition profitable throughthe taking of booty andprisoners,was seekingbattle.In fact, the opposite wasnearer the case. Vegetius’s

teaching on war was notlikely to have beeninterpreted in terms of tryingto draw the enemy onto thefieldso thathemightbemetand defeated. Furthermore, abattlewas regarded bymanyas an invitation to God tointervene in human affairs,and God had thedisconcerting habit ofbringing defeat upon thosewho faced the prospect of

victorywithoverconfidence.In a word, rather than seekbattle, it was better to avoidit. Such a doctrine would beformallyexpressedlateinthefifteenth century by PhilippedeCommyneswhodisplayedan unheroic attitude to warand a marked preference fordiplomacy.Inthemeanwhile,we may perhaps see here areflection of a decline ofnoble and, possibly, of

literaryinfluenceontheplaceaccordedtothebattle inwar,in which it was no longerregarded as the greatopportunity for individualacts of courage, but more asthe culmination of amilitaryprocess whose aim was theachievement of a particularpoliticalgoal.

If battles, in themselves,did not usually lead to theachievements of such goals,

what would? What were theenemy’s weaknesses (notnecessarily military ones)which could be attacked? Inthe middle years of thefourteenth century Frenchkings had such weaknesses.For instance, how widelywere they accepted as thelegitimate kings of France?Propaganda could be used toundermine their subjects’faith in their legitimacy,

while a war of successfulraids (or chevauchées)mightshake that confidence yetfurther by showing that, askings, they lacked the powerto fulfil one of their primeroles, the defence of theirpeopleagainsttheEnglish.Inthis way their credibilitywould be undermined andtheir power weakened. Thechevauchée, then, had as itsprimeaimtheunderminingof

theenemyking’sauthoritybychallenging his militaryeffectiveness. The campaignsof the Black Prince in 1355and 1356, the defeats ofFrench armies at Crécy andPoitiers (not to mention thatatBrignaisin1362)servedtounderline that lack ofeffectiveness and to increasethefearsofthedoubters.

Frenchweakness couldbeemphasised still further by

taking the war to the non-combatant population. Thecivilian became the soldiers’main target. Eventually, itwashoped,thiswouldleadtoa demand for peace whichcould not be ignored, atwhich moment the strongerpartywouldbeabletodictatethetermsitwished.Secondly,wars which involved civiliantargets were less dangerousand cheaper to organise, but

very costly for the defender.Not only was there animperative to respond tothreatened attacks bydivertingmuch time, energy,and, above all, money intodefence, principally into thebuilding of urbanfortifications and castles;when the raids occurred thedefenders’ means ofproduction (crops, fishponds,mills,barns)wereamong the

prime targets for destruction,so that their economiccapability was seriouslyundermined. With theirmaterial resourcesdiminished,andfearsfortheirphysical safety dampeningsuch vital initiatives asrebuilding and continuedcultivation (for who wouldcarryoutsuchtaskswhentherisks of further loss anddestruction were high?),

civilians became a political,and even a financial liabilitytotheirking.Whatwasmorethey could not, or claimedthey could not, pay taxes,direct or indirect, so that theking of France soon came tofeel the impact on his fiscalpolicy of English raids intocertain parts of his kingdom.That was what thechevauchée was intended toachieve.

What of the Frenchresponse? Failure to reactwould allow the English tothink that they could do asthey wished. Inaction wouldlikewisebetakenasasignofweakness by the Frenchpeople themselves.At a timewhenneithertheFrencharmynor fiscal arrangements tomeet its needs had beensufficiently developed torespond to a new military

situation, the only possibleresponsewasnonethelesstocalltraditionalforcestogetherto form an army with whichtointerceptand,itwashoped,to defeat the English. By1356 such a way ofapproaching the problemhadclearly failed. Less thantwenty years later, however,things had changed. TheFrench army had becomerelatively small and

manageable; it was nowcomprisedofpickedmen; itsleaders, too, were the bestavailable;anditstaskwasthespecific one of taking theinitiative and winning backtheareasoflandcededbytheterms agreed at Brétigny –andmore,ifpossible.Insteadof trying to confront theEnglish in pitchedengagements,theFrenchtriedthe tactic of clearing towns

andcastlesof theirgarrisons,employingunitsofmounted–hence mobile – troops to dothis.Thesystemworkedwell.In the 1370s the English,lacking good leadership andthenecessarycommitmentofmen and money to defend along frontier (availablemoney might have beenbetter spent on defence thanon more popular campaignsthroughFrance),soonlostthe

ground which they hadgainedbytreaty.

Treaty.Thewordservestoremind us of the importanceof that element so far notintroduced into thediscussion: diplomacy. Itsrolecouldhavebeenvital,forin theory skilful negotiatorsmighthavemadethemostofmilitarysituationswhich,atagiven moment, greatlyfavouredonesiderather than

the other. In 1360 Frenchweakness (and in particularthe capture of King John)gavethenegotiatorsreasontomake some fairly radicalalterations to the map ofFrance. In 1420, Frenchweakness and Anglo-Burgundian strength were tosettle the question of thesuccession in favour of theEnglish king. At no othertime,however,didthecurrent

military situation make itsimpression deeply felt upondiplomatic bargaining. Yetevenin1360theFrenchroyalcouncil did not feel weakenough to be obliged toacceptthetermscededbythecaptive king in London. Theuse of the ‘half-peace’ (witheach side making a majorconcessionwhich left neitherside fully satisfied)1 and ofthe truce were proof of the

failureofmilitarypressuretoforceafinalsettlementofthewar, one way or the other,through diplomaticnegotiation.

Such, briefly, was HenryV’s inheritance from thefourteenth century. How didhechangeit?OfHenry,asofEdward III, we must admitthatwedonotknowwhathisprecise political ambitions inFrance were. Yet no doubt

exists about the differentapproach of the twokings tothe conflict with France.From the first, Henry V setout to conquer, and then tomaintain, that conquest.Harfleur was taken by siegeand, in the year whichfollowed, everything wasdone to ensure that it shouldnot be lost. In 1417, Henrybegan the more systematicconquest of Normandy.

Places which felt they couldresist did so, were besieged,andwere taken.Henry’snewsubjects were asked for theirloyalty on oath; those whorefused were expelled, andtheir properties confiscated.An administration to rule inhis name was also set up.Garrisonswereestablished topolicetheconqueredareaandto act as islands of Englishauthority, attempts being

made to keep the soldieryunder some discipline.Castlesalsoactedasbasesforfieldarmieswhichwereusedto extend and defend thefrontier with Valois France.Ineveryway,HenryVactedasifallthathedidwastobelasting in its effects. It wasfrom this position of moraland physical strength that henegotiated the treaty ofTroyes, whose terms suggest

that he wanted to change aslittle as possible. Only thedynasty would be new.Normal life would go on asusual if people accepted himas heir to the French crown.Hewasusingthetreatynotsomuchtoconquerastoacquirelegitimatelywhatheregardedashisownbyright.

Once again, we ask whatwastheFrenchresponse?Weneed scarcely remind

ourselves that the 1420smarked the nadir of Frenchfortunes.Aflashofhopeafterthe unexpected success atBaugé in 1421; but Cravantand, in particular, Verneuilput paid to hopes of a quickrevival. As the Englishmoved southwards intoMaine andAnjou, so Frenchprospects grew bleaker.Reconquestwould take time,inparticularifdiplomacydid

notcometotheirhelp.Intheend, itwasgeography(intheform of the river Loire) andJoan ofArc that saved them.Charles VII’s rule waslegitimisedbyhiscoronation.Valois morale slowly begantorise,whileEnglishmorale,in particular after the loss ofthe Burgundian alliance,declined.

The French were to winthefinalsetbyacombination

of factors. They appealedincreasingly to popularopinion:CharlesVIIwasnowthe true king who should besupported by all loyalFrenchmen.Thenhismilitarysuccesses, modest at first,increased in number. ThecareerofJohnTalbot,earlofShrewsbury,showsthatinthelate 1430s and 1440S theEnglish were waging anincreasingly defensive war:

nowastrongholdhere,nowacastle there was comingunder attack and being lost.2Over a decade (soreminiscent of the 1370s inthe south-west) Englishmilitarypower, togetherwithits dependent legal andadministrative authority, waseroded away.Englishmoralesank further, and both itspolitical and militarycommitment to the war

declined.Itisnotablethat,onthe final French campaign of1449–50, carefully andconfidently organised by theking, and carried out by amuch-reformed army, themajority of fortified placesdid not resist, preferring toopen their gates to the sidewhich not only controlledmore firepower but claimedwith greater vigour torepresent legitimate and

effective rule. In Aquitaine,between 1451 and 1453,French armies did indeedmeet with resistance: but thefactremainsthatthebattlesofFormigny (1450) andCastillon(1453)onlyfinishedoff in dramatic fashionprocesseswhichwere all butcomplete when the opposingarmies met. It had beenshown that the essentiallynon-dramatictactic,slowasit

might be, was in the lastresort the onewhich broughtresults.Andresultswerewhatwarwasincreasinglyabout.

LANDFORCES

A late-medieval army was,essentially, composed of twogroups, those who fought onhorseback and those whofought on foot. In itself, thehorsewasbothanarmandasign of social distinction, as

well as ameans of transport.In the English civil wars ofthemid-thirteenthcenturythecavalry had been incommand; but fifty yearslater, things were beginningtochange.Ifthecavalrywerestill, in every sense, thearmy’s natural leaders, thevictories of the Flemishburgher forces and militiaover French knights atCourtrai in July 1302, and

that of the mountaineers ofSchwyz and Uri over theformidable feudal array ofknights and footmenbelonging to Leopold ofAustria at Morgarten inNovember 1315 had shownwhat could be done inconditions and terrainunsuited to the effective useof cavalry. Not surprisingly,some saw these victories assigns that the days of the

mounted knight as thedominant military arm werecomingtoanend.

Yetcaremustbetakennotto dismiss too readily thevalue of cavalry as an arm–or worse, as a relic – of thepast. The mounted soldierstillhadalongwaytogoandhis influence was veryconsiderable in the wholeperiodcoveredbythisbook.3None the less, as has been

argued, the Hundred YearsWar would never be settledby a major engagement inwhich the cavalry aloneplayed thedecisive role. It isimportant to recognise this,for an acceptance of thisfundamentalpointleadsmoreeasily to an understanding ofthe reasons which caused anincrease in the militarysignificanceofthosewhodidnotfightonhorseback.

For what sort of wars areweconcernedwith?Thoseofthe first two Edwards werefoughtagainstenemieswhosecommonaimwas to rid theircountries of the Englishaggressor,butwhosemethodsof doing so differed. In bothcases the leaders did theirbest to avoid full-scaleconfrontation. In Wales(underEdwardI),inScotland(under the first three

Edwards)andinFrance(fromEdward I to Henry VI)England fought a successionofwars inwhich shewas, infact,theaggressor.Inspiteofthis,howfardidtheinitiativereally lie with England, andtowhatextentwassheabletodictatethekindofwarwhichshe wanted to fight? In allcases English kings had tocome to terms with theconditions which they found

in these three differentcountries; and in all casestheyhadtoshowanabilitytoadapt themselves and theirarmies to new conditions,military,socialandeconomic,aswellas tonew thinking inthe ways that armies wereformedandwarwasfought.

TheEnglishwerefacedbythe different physicalconditions and socialorganisation of the countries

which they invaded. Thearmy which Edward I ledagainstLlewelynapGruffyddin north Wales in 1277consisted of less than 1,000feudal cavalry and some15,000 foot soldiers; in 1282the king had only some 750cavalry as against 8,000 or9,000 foot soldiers, includingarchers and crossbowmen,most of them paid troops. InWales the nature of the war

was largely dominated byphysical factors: inmountainous territory footsoldiers were of greater usethan heavy cavalry wouldeverbe.Ideally,awayshouldbefoundtoemploybotharmstogether. At Maes Moydog,near Montgomery, in March1295 that way was found.The cavalry, combined witharchers and crossbowmen,played havoc among the

Welsh. A new weapon hadbeendiscovered.

That weapon may havebeen used to good effectagainst the Scots who weredefeated at Falkirk in July1298.Here,inamajorbattle,twofactorswereemphasised.Onewas the effectiveness ofthe longbow in the hands ofthe Welsh archers of whomEdwardIhadover10,000,allof them paid, on campaign

thatsummer.Theotherfactorwas the importance of theformationswhichallowedthearchers to act in liaisonwiththe cavalry, of whom some2,500 served that year. Herewere the two developments,the use of the longbow andthe adaptation of thetraditional use of cavalry,whichweretobringvictoriestotheEnglishinanumberofforeign fields in the coming

centuryorso.It was the willingness to

adapt which was important.The process begun underEdward I was continued inJuly 1333 when, at HalidonHill, outside Berwick, theEnglishshowedthattheyhadlearned to coordinate the useof ‘traditional’ cavalry withthe ‘new’ archer force, thecombination on this occasionbeing that of archers and

dismounted men-at-armsdrawn up in a defensiveposition which showed whatsuccesses a measure offlexibility could bring to anarmy led by men willing toexperiment.

Yet, in the immediatefuture, thesuccessofEnglisharms would be limited. TheScottish leaders, notablyRobert Bruce, understoodwelltheneedtoapproachthe

enemy with care. Bruce,therefore, became a kind ofguerilla leader whose mainmeansofharmingtheEnglishwas to harass them ratherthan seek a formalconfrontation with them.Using highlymobile soldiersto avoid battle, Bruce usedthe physical geography ofScotland to make conditionsasdifficultashecouldfortheEnglish who, risking

starvationandambush,hadtobe very careful not tooverstretchthemselvesandtokeep open their lines ofcommunication as best theycould through the control ofcastles, in particular the vitalone at Stirling, whichdominatedthelowestpointatwhich the river Forth couldbecrossedbybridge.

It was with this kind ofexperience of rapidly

changing war behind themthat the English began theirlong conflict against France.There they were to face yetanother situation, a largecountrywhosemain physicalcharacteristic was opencountryside (‘plat pays’)brokenupby rivers,with thesocial and economiccharacteristic of castles andtowns (some alreadyfortified) which helped

society to defend itselfagainst enemies from bothwithin and without. Inpractice the countryside waseasy to conquer; but it couldonlybecontrolledproperlyifthe fortified places uponwhich it depended for itseconomic well-being anddefencewerealso in friendlyhands. Control of the townsand castles of France,therefore, was the first

objective which the Englishneededtoachieve.AsregardstheFrench,theiraimmustbeto harass the English as besttheycould,tomaketheirtaskof governing those parts ofFrancewhichtheycontrolled,and of conquering those notyetintheirhands,asdifficultandasexpensiveaspossible.In this process, battles didlittle to help either sideachieve its military aim, and

were not to be an importantpart of the strategies pursuedby the twomainprotagonistsintheHundredYearsWar.

Ifbattlesweretoassumearole of secondarysignificance,thenthecavalry,whomightplayavitalpartonsuchoccasions,werelikelytobecome less important. Afurther – and connected –factor contributed to thischange: the expense which

the individual cavalrymanhad to incur inorder to fulfilhis proper role inwar.Therecan be little doubt that thisfact proved influential inreducing the strength of thecavalry (a strengthwhich, aswe have seen, wascontracting because of thenewrequirementsofwar)andof turning many who mighthave fought on horsebackinto men-at-arms who rode

into battle, dismounted, andthen fought on foot. In suchcircumstances, the armourneeded by each individualprovided less cover and waslesscumbersomeandcheaperthan that required by themounted knight. In theseconditions, too, the mountrequiredeithertogiveaforcemobility or to approach abattlefieldcouldbeofinferiorbreed, and consequently

cheaper, thanacavalryhorsecapable of carrying a fullyarmoured knight, in additiontoitsownarmour.

Thus the hobelar, a formof light horseman, came toprovide the mobile andversatile force which was tobe characteristic of so muchwar on the Anglo-Scottishborderintheearlyfourteenthcentury. For a few decades,too, the English also used

hobelars with success alongthe borders which separatedthem from the enemy inFrance, and in particular atthesiegeofCalaisin1346–7,where they had some 600 orso to help them keep theFrenchatadistance.Norwasthe lesson lost upon theFrench whose army, whichharassed the English bordersinsouthwesternFranceinthe1370s, contained a

preponderance of mountedsoldiers.

The weapon of the daywas to be the bow. Thecrossbow, most useful indefence when thecrossbowman, who neededprotection for the timerequired to wind up hisweapon, could hide himselfbehind a wall, was an elitistweapon,mosteffectiveinthehands of Gascons, who

foughtinWalesforEdwardI,and of Genoese, a largecontingent of whom foughton the French side at Crécy.But itwas the longbow,withitsrangeofupto200metres,its power of penetrationwhich was to compel thedevelopment of moreeffective plate armour in thefirst half of the fourteenthcentury, itsrateoffirewhichwas easily twice that of the

crossbow, and which, heldvertically, (earlier bows andcrossbows were heldhorizontally) could be aimedmore accurately along thelineofthebow,whichwastogive the archer, above allthose serving in Englisharmies,soimportantaroletoplay in every form ofwar atthis time.Thebow’s greatestasset was its versatility. Itcould be used in sieges; it

was valuable when used inthe open by a lightly armedfoot solder; likewise, amounted archer,who did notneed a first-class horse toride,couldprovetobeaverymobile and effectivecombatant. In the earlythirteenth century Gerald ofWales had advocated thecombined use of archers andknights; it was precisely thiscombinationwhich,asshown

above,wastobeemployedtosuchgoodeffect indefensivepositionsagainst theScots inthefirsthalfofthefourteenthcentury,beforebeingused,inbroadly similar conditions,against the French at Crécy,Poitiers and, later, atAgincourt.

Whatessentialchangesdidthis new combination ofarchers and men-at-arms,some mounted, others on

foot, bring about? In attack,the archers could break upeither those massed indefensive position or, as atAgincourt, they coulddisperse cavalry which hadbegun to charge, leaving thefrightened and woundedhorsestoturnupontheirownside. In such conditions,concentrated fire from thearchersonthewingswroughtsuch havoc that the French

could provide but littleresistance to those Englishwho set upon them. Indefence,thedismountedmen-at-arms and archers (thearchers being either in‘wedges’orsetoutbeforethemen-at-arms) provideddensity of resistance, givingeach other support, themen-at-arms being all the betterprotected, since the archerswere able to fire their

weapons a considerabledistanceagainstanadvancingenemy, thus disrupting thembefore they reached thedefending men-at-arms who,withtheirowncavalry,couldthen mount a counter-attack.The ability of each group tofight alongside the other(something which dependedupon a very disciplinedapproach) was undoubtedlyone of the main tactical

developments of thefourteenth century, and wasto play an important part inhelping bring about asuccession of Englishvictoriesinbattle.

The other importantdevelopment was that of theuse of the mounted archer,who, paid twice the wage ofthe foot archer, was firstfound in English armies in1334.By the timeof thewar

inBrittanyin1342therewerealready more than 1,700 ofthem in service.Not allmayagree with one critic whotermed these ‘the finestfighting men of the MiddleAges’.4 None the less, theirability to achieve rapidmovementsnotonly inbattlebut,moreimportant,beforeit,and to act in unisonwith themen-at-arms (who were alsomounted)madetheminto‘by

far the most importantelement in the armies whichfought in France’.5 By thetime of the Crécy campaignin 1346 men-at-arms andmounted archers,whowouldfight on foot in positionschosen,asfaraspossible,fortheir defensive possibilities,were being recruited inbroadlythesamenumbers.Inboth England and France theneed to make armies mobile

wasperhapsoneofthemajordevelopments of the period,and shows how importantversatility was coming to beregardedbytheleadersoftheday.

It was this factor whichcontributed heavily to thesuccesses achieved by theFrench army in the 1370s.Yet we should not forgetanother: the significance ofthe noble contribution to the

relativelysmallarmyofsome3,000orsomen(increasedbyhalf for part of the year),drawn largely from localmen, all of them volunteers,all regularly paid andreviewed.Thesewere factorsof telling importance as thearmy sought to fight a warwhich would rely on itsmobilitytoachievesuccess,awar in which confrontationon a large scale would be

avoided. Well organised andwell led, the small Frencharmy fulfilled theseimportant, if undramatic,military objectives withcompletesuccess.

For the French the peaceof the last years of thefourteenthcenturyledtolittlemore than the need togarrison their frontiers. Butthen thecivilwarof the firstyears of the new century

causedwhatwasvirtuallythecollapse of the French army,a collapse confirmed by thedefeat at Agincourt at thehandsofEnglishmen-at-armsandarchers.Formuchof thenext generation there couldscarcelybe said to be such athingasaFrencharmy,forasizeableproportionofCharlesVII’s soldiers came fromScotland. On the Englishside,whatwasneededwasan

army to fulfil two essentialfunctions: conquest andmaintenanceofthatconquest,requirements whichdemanded both field armiesand garrisons. Partly becausethosewhoservedingarrisonshadtobereadytoserveinthefield when required (for acastle acted as a base wheresoldiers could remain whennot in the field, and fromwhich they could control the

countryside around bymountedraidswithinaradiusof,say,adozenmiles),partlybecause of an increasingdifficulty in securing activesupportfromthenobilityandgentry for thewar inFrance,English armies at the end ofthewarsometimesincludedagreater ratio of archers tomen-at-armsthaneverbefore,sometimes 7:1 or even 10:1,ratherthanthemoreusual3:1

underHenryVandtheparityof archers to men-at-armsnormallyfoundinthesecondhalfofthefourteenthcentury.Weshouldalsorecallthatthenature of the war, siegespursuedbybothsidesandthedefence of a long frontierstretching fromLeCrotoy intheeasttoMont-Saint-Michelinthewest,dictatedakindofwar in which heavy cavalryplayed relatively little part

other than in defence. Animportantchangewascomingabout.

As already suggested, itwaspaidparticipation inwarwhich saved a large numberofthenobilityand, incertaincases, helped them improvetheir social status. Fewer ofthe French nobility weredrawn to looking after theirestates.Rather theypreferredto farm them out at a fixed

rent, at leases which, in thefourteenth century, becameprogressively longer, and toenjoy the freedom to takeupoffices or to serve in thearmy. To a certain extent, itcould be argued, taxes paidontheirlandsanditsproductscould be recouped from thecrown by entering royalservice. Thus, instead ofraiding thecountrysideundercover of defending it, or

stealing money to pay forhorses and their harnesses,the nobility entered the royalservice in large numbers inboth England and France sothat,ironically,‘thebudgetoftheStatewastosomeextentabudget of noble assistance’;6used by kings on both sidesof the Channel to pay thenobility, among others, fortheir services in war. InFrance many noblemen,

especially those of middlingto lower rank, were soimpoverished that theyneeded the king’s wages,which provided them with abetter and surer income thandid their lands. In the periodof the reforms carried outunderCharlesV,muchoftheFrench army was composedof members of the lower-ranking nobility. Being asoldier, they found, could be

profitable.In theEngland ofEdward

I, if thegreat feudatorieshadrefused payment for fear oflosing caste, by the reign ofEdward III all were ‘nowprepared to acceptwages formilitary service’. The kinghimself was not paid(although Edward Balliol,‘king’ of Scots, drewpaymentbothintimesofwarandpeace)butdukesreceived

13s.4d;earls6s.8d;knights-baneret 4s; knights-bachelor2s;andesquires is; these lastsums correspondingproportionatelytotheamounteach might expect to spendonahorse(asoutlinedabove)whose value was agreed inadvance, so thatcompensation for its losscouldbepaidbythecrown.

Boththegreatnobilityandthearmigerousgentry,whose

influence was more local,played a significant role inthe organisation of militaryservice, the gentry acting assub-contractorsintheworkofraising forces. Together theyactedasrecruitersresponsibleforbringingtogetherthelargenumbers of men whoconstituted the armies of theday. In this role theimportance of the nobility inenlistingnotonlytheirfeudal

tenants but, in some cases,members of their householdsor those bound to them byindenture for service in warandpeace,isconsiderable.Ascaptains, they servedsometimesasleadersofsmallexpeditions,sometimesunderthepersonalleadershipoftheking; as lieutenants, theyexercised authority in castlesand garrisons; while othersstillservedasmen-at-armsin

thearmiesofbothsides.However,notallchosethe

wayof active service inwar,for other outlets, appropriateto their ranks and talents,could be found. War policywassettled in thecouncilsofkings; many members of thenobility made the giving ofcounsel their contribution towar. Not far distanced fromthecouncil,inEnglandatanyrate, was Parliament,

dominated for much of thefourteenth century by thepeerage; and in that body,too, matters of policy andnational finance werefrequently discussed, for itwas there that kings liked tobenefit from the practicalexperience of men who hadtaken an active part in war.For others still, theadministration which warinevitablybroughtinitswake

providedfurtheropportunitiestoservetheircountry’scause.

Did thenobility,however,keep up with the changes inwar taking place in thisperiod? There has been (andtheremaystillbe)atendencyto run down the role of theEuropeannobilityinthewarsso characteristic of the lateMiddle Ages. To many, theworldinwhichtheyappeartohave lived seems to have

been distanced from reality.Changes in social status;changes in the technology ofwar; changes in thegeographical and temporalscale onwhich itwas foughtare seen as having led to adecline in noble influenceuponitsconduct.

Some of theseobservations are wellfounded.Thelongoccupationof northern France by the

Lancastriankingscouldneverhavebeencarriedoutwithoutthe active participation ofmen, many of them not yetnoble,performingthetasksoftheir captains who, asnoblemen with lands inEngland, had to return everysooftentotheirestatestoseetotheirupkeep.Inthiscaseitwas the prolongation of warwhichgaveanopportunitytomen lacking landed ties in

England to show howimportant their presence inFrance could be. For if themajority of the great nobilityjoined Henry V on his firstexpeditiontoFrancein1415,such support could not longbemaintained.By theendofthe reign it was alreadyfalling off, and while HenryVI had much noble supportfor his coronation expeditionin 1430–1, those who

continuedtoservehimintheFrench war in the years tocome constituted a relativelysmall group of men. Inallotting commands, bothEnglishandFrenchkingshadto recognise that theextensionofwarwasmakingconsiderable demands uponthenobility,andthatchangeswerebeingforceduponthem.

It is sometimes argued,too, that developments of a

technological natureeventually forced the declineof the nobility as a fightingforce. The successes of theEnglish archers at the greatbattles of theHundredYearsWar appear to point to thatconclusion. Froissart’saccount of the way in whichmany of the leading Frenchnobility, by going forward atthe battle of Crécy, in effectchose the likelihood of death

to a dishonourable flight,suggeststothemodernreadera group more intent uponself-immolationthanupontheserious business of achievingvictory through order anddiscipline. But the protectivearmour upon which amountedknightandhishorse,bothveryvulnerableinbattle,depended did not remainundeveloped. The middleyears of the fourteenth

century saw the change frommail armour to plate, whilethe coming century or sowitnessed manyimprovements in design, sothat arrows, bolts, and pikeswere met with glancingsurfaces which, like thechanges in architectureintendedtocountertheeffectofthecannonball,causedthedeflectionofthemissileawayfrom its target. Such

developments, to which canbeaddedimprovementsinthequality of steel used in themakingofarmour;theability,asaconsequence,toabandontheuseof the shield, therebyfreeing the left arm; and thedevelopment of special restswhich permitted the use of amuch heavier lance, meantthat thecavalryman, far frombeing an outmoded liabilityon the field, remained an

indispensable element of thearmy, one whose value was,aswehaveseen,enhancedbytraining and by associationwith men using otherweapons. The long-lastingvalueofcavalryasa‘follow-up’ force after a battle wasshown on several occasions:atVerneuil in1424and,halfa century later, in the battlesinvolving the French, theSwiss and Charles the Bold,

dukeofBurgundy.Itisarguablethatadecline

in the traditional role of themilitary nobility in war waspresaged by the ever-greateruse made of artillery, thatmost ‘un-noble’ andindiscriminate causer ofdeath, which claimed amongits victims several greatnoblemen, among them theBastardofBourbon,killedatSoisson in 1414; Thomas,

earl of Salisbury (‘a worthiwerrioure amonge allCristenmen… slayne at the sege ofOrliaunce with a Gonne’, asthe author of the Brutreported the event);7 JohnTalbot, earl of Shrewsbury,killed at Castillon in July1453;andJacquesdeLalaing,‘le bon chevalier’, killed inthe very same month at thesiegeofPoeke,nearGhent.Itis undeniable that artillery

was making progress, andthat itsdevelopmentwasoneof the major changesassociated with the conductof war at this time. But asense of proportion must bemaintained, and to regardartillery as an alternative tocavalry would be a mistake.The vision of Talbot and hismounted companions beingmowndownbyanenfiladeofartillery (as they were) was

not typical of the time. Theaction smacked too much ofthe grandiose, if futile,gestureoftheFrenchnobilityat Crécy just over a centuryearlier.

By and large, theoccasions when the nobilitymight exploit a situation ascavalry and those whenartillerycouldbeusedtobesteffectwerenotthesame.Onearm was valuable in certain

circumstances, the other indifferent ones. It would bemore profitable to relate thetemporary decline in the useof cavalry to other factors.The wars of this periodpresentedlittleopportunitytoshock troops fighting onhorseback. In the fourteenthcentury the Fabian tactics ofthechevauchée foundgreaterfavour on both sides,although there were notable

exceptions when the heavycavalrydidplayamajorrole.Aboveall,itmustberecalledthat, at least in the fifteenthcentury, military objectivescould best be achievedthrough siegewarfare,whichgave the cavalry lessopportunity than it hadenjoyed before. It is to thesefactors,ratherthantoartilleryitself, that we should turn ifwe wish to see which arms

were proving to be of thegreatest significance in thewar.

But one thing is clear.Knightly warfare, if it nolongerenjoyedthesupremacyof past centuries, was farfrom dead. It was still there,and would be used to goodeffect in the relatively nearfuturewhenthepitchedbattlereturned as the more usualwayofdeciding theoutcome

ofwars.In1494,itisaswelltoremember,atleastonehalfof the army which CharlesVIII led into Italy wascomposedofheavycavalry.

LEADERSHIP

It is evident that the successachieved by any armydepends verymuch upon thequality of its leadership, asubject much discussed bywritersoftheday.Therewere

two closely related matterswhich concerned men of thelate Middle Ages. One wasthe recognition thatleadership was of primeimportance if discipline wasto be maintained and armieskept together as teams ratherthan as collections ofindividuals.Theotherwas toask who were to be theleaders of armies, and bywhatcriteriatheymightclaim

tolead.On the first of these the

influenceoftheancientworldwas to be considerable. Eversince the twelfth century aparticular form of didacticliterature, an instructionmanual written for princesgiving them both moral andpractical advice on how besttorulethoseundertheircare,had been developing.Reasonably enough, princes

required to be taught how tomakewar,andsincemanyofthe authors of these workswere clerics, they turned towhat were the standardhandbooksonwartofindtheinformation they needed.Broadly,suchadvicecameintwo forms. One was thecollection of anecdotes,culled from Greek andRoman history, which madepointsofmilitaryimportance:

armies should avoid havingtheir backs to a river whenconfronting the enemy inbattle (Bertrand du Guesclinignoredthisadvice,withfatalresults, at Nájera in April1367);or,attemptsshouldbemadetomanoeuvrearmiessothat the sun shone in theenemy’seyes.Thesemaxims,many of them reflectingnothing more than commonsense, and taken from the

recorded experience of thepast,weretobefoundmainlyin two works: the Facta etdictamemorabiliaofValeriusMaximus,written in the firstcentury AD, and theStratagemata of Frontinus,composed in the samecentury by a man who hadbeenforashortwhileRomangovernor of Britain. Bothworks were to be translatedfromLatinintothevernacular

languagesinthecourseofthefourteenth and fifteenthcenturies; both were knownin military circles; and bothmayhavehadsomeinfluenceon theformationofchangingattitudestoleadership.

More important, however,was the most read handbookon themilitaryart, theDeremilitari of Vegetius,compiled in the late fourthcentury AD. It was to this

work that most writers ofmanuals on the exercise ofprincely authority turned iftheywantedtolearnhowwarshould be fought. Vegetiuswas important less for histechnical advice than for thegeneral philosophicalmessage on the conduct ofwar which his workcontained. For, likeFrontinus, he set great storeby leadership, the moral

qualities required of thosewho aspired to it, and theexperienceofwarwhichtheyrequired to achieve it. Inbrief, the good leader, theman who could inspire hisarmy, not merely he whocould avoid the obviouspitfalls of generalship whichFrontinus had pointed out,might be born with certaininherent qualities, but thesehad to be developed in the

only way that could lead tosuccess, throughpractice andexperience.

There was implied, inwhat Vegetius wrote, amostimportant message: leadersdid not choose themselves,buthadtobechosen.Putintothe social context of the lateMiddle Ages this meant thatthe class which hadtraditionally provided theleadership of armies was

having its position, foundedlargely on social factors,questionedifnotundermined.For the drift of the argumentwas essentially that men didnot assume leadership, butthat it was granted to themaccording to criteria whichtookmeritandexperience,aswell as birth and socialstanding, into consideration.We may see this ideareflected in a number of

ways. When John Barbour,archdeacon of Aberdeen,wrote his long verse accountofthecareerofRobertBruce,kingofScots,about1380,heemphasised that his hero’ssuccesses against theEnglishstemmed from his militaryqualities,hisunderstandingofhis men, his appreciation ofthe tactics required forvictory, in a word his‘professionalism’asamanin

arms. Likewise, the lives ofother soldier-heroes of theperiod, the Black Prince, duGuesclin, even that ofHenryV, although written in thechivalric vein, stress thatthese men were successfullargelybecause their inherentqualities of leadership hadbenefited from training andexperience.Similarlywemaynote that the feeling whichwas so openly exhibited

against the French nobilityafter the battle of Poitiersreflected something of agrowingopinionthat,inspiteof tradition, the nobility hadno absolute right to assumepositions of responsibilitywithin the army. If theyexercised them, it should bebecause they had earnedthem.

Thehistorian isentitled toregard the matter of

leadershipasan‘issue’inthemindsofthemenofthistime.Wecannotignorethefactthatlong-held attitudes were inthe process of change. Warwastooimportanttobelefttothose who, by tradition, hadbeen charged withsupervising it. Thisdiscussion–ifwemaycallitthat–waspartofawider,on-going debate of whatconstitutedtruenobility.Was

itbirthandlineage,orcouldaman acquire nobility, and ifso, how? Was it somethingwhichcouldbeconferred,bymeans of an act of dubbing,or by the issue of a patent?And,ifso,didtheassumptionof nobility mean that a manmust act nobly to merit hisnewposition?Suchproblemsreceived considerableattention at this time; it isclear that nothing was being

takenforgranted.How far was reality

influenced by such ideas?Certainly, the decline of thefeudal force did not lead tothe demise of the traditionalleadership in war. In bothEngland and France, at thebeginning of the HundredYears War, the commandstructures were broadlysimilar. At the head of eachwere the kings, advised by

men of martial experiencewhomightbe theirkinor,atleast,membersofthenobilitywho frequented the courts.Beneath them, in France,there existed an ordered andfairly hierarchical structurewhich saw to the day-to-daydefence of the country, fromthose with wide territorialjurisdictions to those whomight be sent to a particulararea, town or castle to

organiseitsdefenceintimeofcrisis.Byandlarge,themoreimportant a command(importance being judged bythe size of territorialauthority, or, moreappropriately in time ofpeace,bythenumbersofmeninvolved) the more likely itwastobegiventoamanwhohadachieved it as a resultofattendanceatcourt.Foritwasat court, as the more astute

realised, that positions ofpowerandwealthwere tobefound.

In time of war thepresence of a king oncampaignwas an asset to beexploited.Notonlydiditgiveprestige and add a sense ofurgency to an undertaking, italso exerted the pressure ofold feudal practice uponvassals to join their lord inperson. Expeditions led by a

king were regarded as beingof greater importance andwere invariably larger thanthose led by others, howeverexalted in rank a royallieutenantmightbe.Therearenumerous examples of kingsthemselves leading in battle.Philip VI did so at Crécy in1346;JohnIIwascapturedatthebattleofPoitiers in1356;CharlesVIIpersonallyledtheassault on Pontoise in 1441;

while on the English sideEdward III and Henry Vprovide us with excellentexamples of the martialqualities demonstrated bycertainkings.

The command structure,then, began at court andcentredaroundtheking.Thisfact, and the importance ofroyal patronage in thegrantingofmilitaryauthority,gave a considerable

advantage to those whosebirth gave them naturalaccess to kings.8 In Francethe brothers of Charles V,Louis, duke of Anjou, John,duke of Berry, and Philip,dukeofBurgundy,allgainedmilitary advantage forthemselves, their clients anddependants from their closerelationship with successivekings.InEngland,EdwardIIIwastomakethefullestuseof

themilitarycapabilitiesofhissons,inparticularofEdward,Black Prince, whoseemployment in the warstressedtheimportancetothefamily of their father’s claimto the French throne. Such apolicy of employing royalsons or brothers continuedunder theLancastrians, asallfour of Henry IV’s sonsfought in France, and threeweretodieinthatcountry.

Beneath the very greatestintheland,otherswerereadyto act in positions ofcommand whencircumstances,suchaswaronanumberoffronts,demandedit.InFrancewhosewhoheldhighcommand,sometimesaslieutenants du roi, wereusually princes or men whohad achieved the rank ofbanneret,thoseseniorknightswhose swallow-tailed

pennons had been cut to thesquare banners of their newrank. In England, too, themembers of the highestnobility, fromdukes to earls,gave service and exercisedcommands throughout thewar. Edward III alwaysrecognised the importance ofnoble support in his wars,and, both in his reign and inthat of his grandson,RichardII who succeeded him in

1377, the nobility led fromthefront.

We should be careful,however, to emphasise thatthe nobility (or noblesse, aswewouldtermit inaFrenchcontext) also had its high,middling and lower ranks.The highest nobility wereonlyveryfewinnumbers,sothat when we speak of theirholduponmilitarycommandswemust, consciously or not,

include those who hadinheritedrelatively lownoblerank or who had only risenthat far through their ownefforts. These men were,largely, in a class apart, foreventheEnglishknightcouldbeamanofimportanceinthecounty society in which hemixed.Aswardevelopedandthe need for multiplecommands increased, it wasto such men that the

monarchies of both Englandand France turned. Theyproved to have a vital, if attimes unspectacular, role toplay in the organisation ofwar. If the great aristocracywasresponsibleforprovidinglarge contingents for thewar(and, in England, at least, itwas theywho,after theking,providedthelargest)theworkof raising these soldiers wasoften done by men of local

knowledgeandinfluencewhosubcontracted with the royalcaptains to raise the troopsrequired. For the raising ofarmies depended uponnetworks of connection,based upon bonds ofvassalage, regional influence,family and office. In thismatter the lowernobilityhadacrucialroletoplay.

It went further than that.Because of its sometimes

precariouseconomicposition,no rank would refuse toaccepttheking’swage.Manyturned to war as a serious,full-time occupation, whileothers, constituting a largeproportion of the lowernobility, sawmilitary serviceat some time or other. As aresult of this, theirprofessional commitment toarms grew: in France, in thesecond half of the fourteenth

century, some esquires (menon the very fringe ofnoblesse)werepromotedoverthe heads of knights, whosenumbers in the French armydeclined anyhow after about1380, a suggestion thatprofessionalism was comingto be well regarded. And inthe persons of men such asBertrand du Guesclin, SirThomas Dagworth, SirRobertKnollesandSirHugh

Calveley, the lower ranks ofthe aristocracy assertedthemselves even further. Forthese were the real‘professionals’ who, atcertaintimesinthewar,tookover either as commandersappointedby thecrownorasleadersofgroupsoffreelancesoldiers who could ignoreroyal orders and get awaywith it. Such men dependeduponsuccess for support: for

whileduGuesclinmightplayupon his Breton origin togather a force (or route)aroundhim,theEnglishcouldnotdosowiththesameease,and therefore came to relyupontheirreputationstodrawmen to their service. Thesewerethefirstmenoflessthanfully aristocratic backgroundto gain prominence throughtheirmerit.

By the fifteenth century

the higher ranks of thenobilityhadtakenoveragain.In France the factionalismfrom which the countrysuffered was largely inspiredby the nobility, so thatcommandof thearmy,as thetragedy experienced atAgincourt in 1415demonstrated, was chiefly inthe hands of noble leaderswho gave the army acharacter as noble as it had

hadin the1330s.If thesamecould be said of the Englisharmy (with this difference,that the nobility was totallycommitted to Henry V, whohadcompletecontrolover it)mattersweretochangeunderthe rule of the duke ofBedford, acting in the nameoftheyoungHenryVI.First,a riftgrewbetween the royalcouncil inEnglandand thosewhose daily task it was to

face the French in France.Secondly, as thewar becameless lucrative (with fewerexpeditions into enemyterritory) and the needs ofdefence came to dominatemilitary activity, so theglamour of war which hadundoubtedly existed both inthe previous century andunder Henry V, began todiminish. Members of thehigharistocracytook turns to

rule Normandy, with mixedsuccess. The number ofplaceswhichneededguardingand which required thepresence of a person ofauthoritymeant that, insomecases, men of military talentand experience, but notnecessarily of high birth,were given positions ofconsiderable responsibility.The exigencies of war weresuch that those with long

yearsofservicetotheirname(and there were probablymoreof them in the fifteenththan in the fourteenthcentury) almost inevitablyfoundthemselvesinpositionsofcommand.Andbecauseofa decline in the number ofknights in the English armyby1450,itwasuponthoseoflower social status thatmanyofthesecommandsdevolved.

In themid-1440s, Charles

VII organised major reformswithin the French army. Theaim appears to have beentwo-fold: to reassert theauthority of the crown toappointtomilitarycommandsand,byaruthlessdismissalofthe majority of commanderswho had come to assumesuch commands, tomake thearmy once more an efficientweapon of state in royalhands. The exercise was

remarkably successful. Mostof those whom the kingpreserved inofficeweremenof the middle nobility, menwhose experience wouldenable them to take effectivecharge of those placed underthem.Thekingwasfortunate:he had plenty fromwhom tochoose, and he could affordto take only the best into hisservice.

If, then, we recall that

thereweredegreesofnobilityandaristocracy,wecanadmitthat the leadership of FrenchandEnglisharmiesduringtheHundredYearsWarwasverylargely noble. Both in thegiving of counsel and in therecruitment of forces and,later, on campaign and inbattle, the nobility played adominant roleas theservantsoftheirrespectivekings.Thiswas the traditional pattern

which one would expect tosee continued, as indeed itwas, into the sixteenthcentury. Yet, as wassuggested earlier in thissection,newideaswerebeingbandiedabout.Inaclimateofopinion which laid greaterstressuponcollectivesuccessthan upon the fame orreputation of any oneindividual, could the desireforfame,whichmightimpair

theeffectivenessofthearmy,survive? The answer lay notin trying to play down thesearchforgloryinwar,butinchannelling these energiestowards the service of theking who represented thepublic good and honour of anationorpeople.After1400,it has been noted, lawyers inthe Parlement of Parisconsistentlytriedtoshowtherespectabilityoftheirsoldier-

clients by underlining theirservice to the king and thepublicgood:‘…alonguementservy le roy’;‘…tient frontiercontre les enemis’;‘… il aesté grevé car lui estant enexpedición pour la chosepublique’ are phrases which,when used regularly, tell ussomethingofthevaluesofthesociety in which they areuttered, and of the soldier’sroleinit.

The emphasiswas now tobe increasingly on service,given to and paid for by thestate,whichassumedtherightto appoint its commanders(this wasmade easier by thefact that all accepted thestate’s money for service inwar)andtodemandthatitgotthebestavailableinreturnforitsmoney. The leaders of itsarmies, appointed bycommission (as Charles VII

appointed his chieflieutenants in 1445) ratherthan by the ‘natural’ right ofbirth, were to become itsofficers for whomadvancement would be arecognition of merit. Thelogical outcome of this slowchange of direction was tocome later, but not muchlater. By the sixteenthcentury, no longer assumingthatithadarighttopositions

of leadership in the armies,the aristocracy began toattend military academieswhere it learned the art ofmakingwar.This iswhat thework of Vegetius and otherswasdestinedtoachieve.9

MERCENARIES

Into a pattern of militaryadministration which mayappear deceptively well

organised there stepped aclass of soldier, themercenary,whosepresencetopeople of the late MiddleAges meant destruction anddisorder. While they made adeep impressionuponFrenchsociety in this age, it shouldnot be forgotten thatmercenaries constituted aphenomenon encounteredelsewhere, in Spain, inGermanyand,inparticular,in

the country dominated bymerchant states, Italy. In thatcountrytheyfirstappearedinthe mid-thirteenth century,groupsofmenwho,undertheleadership of enterprisingleaders,contracted(hencethename condottiere which theywere given) with individualcity stateswhich lacked theirownarmiesbuthadthefundsnecessary to pay them, toguard their territory and

maintain ameasure of order.Fromsuchrelativelypeacefuloriginstheycame,bytheendof the century, to undertakeexternal war for theiremployers,pittingthemselvesagainstothersuchgroups(theCompanies or routiers), inwhich might be found notonly Italians and Germans,but Flemings, Spaniards,Frenchmen and, at times, afew Englishmen. By 1300

such men were coming toform an essential part of theItalian military and politicalscene. For us, theirappearance elsewhere inEurope constitutes an earlyexample of the principle ofpayment for military servicewhich, as we have seen,becameanintegralelementoftheformationofroyalarmiesin England and France intheseyears.

Such mercenaries werespecialist fighters, owing nofirm allegiance, men whofought forpayandwhat theycould get out of war. Theywere specialists in that theywere full-time soldiers; warwas their life. They werespecialists, too, in that theyfavouredonetypeofwar,thatofsurpriseinwhichthedawnraid was more effective thanthe siege.Since their success

dependedupontheirmobility,they could not takecumbersome engines withthem;instead,theydevelopedmilitary skills sometimesrather different from thoseemployed by moreconventional soldiers. Norwere these men, like theirpredecessors in Italy, alwaysconcernedwiththenicetiesofloyalty. John Hawkwood, asleaderoftheWhiteCompany,

spent years fighting againstthe interests of Florencebefore entering Florentineservice: changing sides didnot unduly worry him.Whatattracted men like him wasthe prospect of pay in returnforwar service. Itwas, then,peace or truce whichthreatened their existence,and it was because of thetermination of hostilitiesbetween England and France

whichresultedfromthetreatyofBrétignyin1360,followedas this was in 1364 by theending of the Navarresechallenge to the royalauthority in Normandy andthewarofBretonsuccession,that France, Italy and Spainwere to be hosts to theCompanies in the1360s.Theproblem arose again thirtyyears later, when theirenergies were channelled off

on a crusadewhich ended indefeat at Nicopolis in 1396,and yet again in 1444–5when, after the truce ofTours, the ‘Ecorcheurs’ whowere, as their name implied,‘skinning’ France, were ledoffforawhiletoSwitzerlandandtheimperiallands.Onallthree occasions, peace hadcreated unemploymentamong soldiers who werelooking for adventure and

pay. No ruler, possibly otherthan in Italy, had the meansor the wish to employ largeforces when there was nowar.

To no other group ofsoldiers functioning in thisperiodwasleadershipafactorof such prime importance.Freelance soldiers that theywere, they depended upontheircaptainsforrecruitment,organisation, distribution of

booty, and pay. The form of‘unofficial’ war which theyfought was morecharacteristic of brigandageand open robbery, but itwould be wrong to assumethatthosewhoconstitutedtheCompanies were all, ofnecessity, men of criminalbackground or low degree.Indeed, the opposite wasfrequently nearer the truth,for their leaders were often

members of the lowernobility, driven to makingwar in thiswaybyeconomicfactorsand,insomecases,bybeingyoungersonswithlittlehope of inheritance. Themembers themselves aremore difficult to assess anddescribe. But one importantfactor is clear: the Englishelement was a considerableone. By the mid-fourteenthcentury, thepredominanceof

those of English origin was,indeed, so marked that theterm ‘Inglese’ and ‘LesAnglais’ became virtuallygeneric names for thesegroups.Yetmanycamefromelsewhere, notably fromBrittany and Gascony. AsPhilippedeMézièreswroteinthe late fourteenth century,some may well have comefrom those members of thelower nobility who did not

normally go to war exceptwhensummonedbytheking,but who, in certain cases,were now being forced totake up arms as a business.Others were men of ‘petitétat’who, out of daring or awish to commit pillage, tooktothiswayoflife.Othersstillwere from the very lowestranks of the Church whopreferred the more excitinglife of the camp. One of the

most notorious, Arnaud deCervole, was not known as‘theArchpriest’fornothing.

Generally speaking theCompanies had a bad nameamong the populations fortheir greed, unscrupulousattitude to the law, andapparent contempt for theforces of order. In Italy, itwas said, an ‘Ingleseitalianato è un diavoloincarnato ‘, an Italianate

Englishman is the devil inperson. Their methods wereoften far from respecting thechivalric norms of war.Roamers of the countryside,surprise was their chiefweapon, great daring beingshowninwhatsomeregardedas the finestmilitary feats ofall, the capture of walledtownsandcastleswhichwerethen ransomed, havingperhaps been used in the

meanwhile as bases formilitary activity furtherafield.Yet,forall that,manyofthesemen,eithersinglyorasmembersofalargergroup,entered royal service and didwell in it. In the fourteenthcentury, for instance,ArnauddeCervolewas inandoutofroyal employment and wasactually appointed royalchamberlain in 1363, whilehis son had the duke of

Burgundy as his godfather.Similarly, Amiel de Bauxheld office under the Frenchcrown,andwasservingintheroyal army when it enteredAquitaine in 1371. On theEnglish side Hugh Calveley,having at first sold hisservices in Spain to duGuesclin, changed sides andservedtheBlackPrincetherein 1367; later hewas to joinJohn of Gaunt, and he even

worked for Richard II inFrance. Sir Robert Knolles,likewise, fought both forhimselfandforhisking.InasimilarwaytheFrenchcrownwasabletomakegooduseofthe experience of such men,the Valois intervention inCastile in the mid-1360s,under the leadership of duGuesclin (who understoodtheir mentality well), beingbased largely on the services

ofthesemercenaries.In the fifteenth century,

the freelance soldiers had animportant part to play in thewar. Henry V and his sonemployedsomewhosenamescan be spotted on musterrolls, not infrequentlyfulfillingaspecialistcapacity,especially in the artillerytrains. François de Suriennecertainly showed himselfcapable of independent

activity before throwing inhis lot for some years withHenry VI, whom he servedbeforebeingelectedaKnightoftheGarter.

But it was in the Frencharmy of the first half of thecentury that the mercenarieswere most prominent. In thedecade 1420–30, a sizeableproportion of Charles VII’sarmywascomposedofScotswho fought at both Cravant

and Verneuil, a strongcontingent of Genoese alsotaking part in this secondbattle against the English.The king also depended to aconsiderable degree uponindividuals who, like theleaders of the companies ofthe previous century, servedin the royal army: Poton deXaintrailleswasforaperioda‘véritable routier’, pillagingin different parts of France

beforeacceptingofficeunderCharles VII; Antoine deChabannes, a captain ofroutiers, at one time hadcommand of 1,000 horsemenbefore finding employmentunder the crown. These, andothers, like Hawkwood inItaly,foughtagainstauthoritybefore joining it. Some ofthemreceivedhighcommandin the mid-fifteenth century,and some introduced their

own characteristics to thefighting of war. Etienne deVignolles, known by thename of La Hire which hisBurgundian enemies hadgiven him, brought off aspectacular stroke with thecapture of Château-Gaillard,on the river Seine, in 1430,while in the following yearAmbroise de Lore and hisbandtravelledacrossmuchofNormandy to attack a fair

near Caen, before retreatingin good order with theirprisoners. Such coups gavethe perpetrators of thesedaring acts something of aromanticimageinthepopularmind.Someassumed,orweregiven,namesother than theirown: Jacques d’Espailly wasknown as Forte-Epice; LaHire had a cannon namedafter him, as did Guillaumede Flavy; while, in the

eighteenth century, La Hirewas to become the namedknave of hearts on Frenchplayingcards.Thesewerethefighting heroes of their day,whose exploits lived long inthepopularimagination.

FORTIFICATIONANDARTILLERY

We have seen that warleaders of the late MiddleAges sought theachievement

of their military aims eitherthroughthedevastationofthecountryside or, in certaincircumstances, by seeking togaincontrolofthetownsandcastles which dominated it.Because an army’smain aimmay have been thedevastation of land, thedestruction of its produce,and the seizure of moveableproperty, there can be littledoubtthatwar’schiefvictims

were those who, if they didnot live within reasonabledistance of a defended townorgarrisonedcastle,rangreatrisktotheirpersonalsafety.Itis true that small localfortifications, sometimeschurches adapted at greatexpense by the addition oftowers, parapets, walls andevenmoats,mightbringsomemeasure of safety, at leastagainst small bands of

soldiers or evil-doers.10 Yetsince these cannot havepresented much of anobstacle,theywereoflittleorno use against large anddetermined forces of men,against whom only walledtowns and castles constitutedreasonably sure places ofsafety.

We have also remarkedhow,atleastinthefourteenthcentury, campaign leaders,

often inadequately equippedas they were, commonlyavoided attacking well-fortifiedtownsandcastles.Ina short campaigning seasoncurtailedbyeitherseasonalorfinancial considerations, orby both, the advantage didnotliewiththeattackerwho,if he began a siege, riskedbeing caught between theplace he was seeking tocaptureand(aconstantfear)a

force coming to relieve thebesieged. Further, he wouldalsorequiresomeveryheavyand unwieldy equipment,includingsiegeengines;eventhese might not bring thedesired success. It mightrequireastrokeof luck,suchasashortageofprovisionsorwateramongthebesieged,oran act of treason, to deliverthe well-defended place intoenemy hands. In hostile

territory a siege was notlightly undertaken; if certainreasonable precautions hadbeentaken,thosewhosoughtrefugeinsideatownorcastlecould reasonably hope tosurvive, in particular if theirrefuge were a town which,withitsgenerallygreatersizeandmoregenerousamenetieswhich favoured thedefender,presented a besieger with agreater challenge than did

eventhebestdefendedcastle.InFrancetheescalationof

war in the 1340s (after somefour generations of relativepeace) led to a number ofsignificant developments.Before this time, as FroissartwastonoteandEdwardIIItoexperience, many towns hadnoproperdefencesotherthanwhat could be provided byditches and water works,neitherofwhichwouldcause

a determined army muchtrouble.Norwastherepropercentral control over thebuilding and maintenance offortifications,many ofwhichwere sadly out-of-date or inbadneedofrepairbythetimethat the English began toinvade France. But bygalvanising men into action,theEnglishinvasionsweretochange all that. On royalorders, the towns were

directed to see to theirdefences, and they had to doso by finding their ownsources of finance throughlocal effort. At first, muchbuilding was done on thecheap. Where possible,material which could besalvaged from old buildingsorwallswasrecycledintothenew fortifications, while inmany places no indemnitywas paid to those who were

forced ‘pro bono publico’ tosurrender property on whichwalls might be built or toprovide the open ground,outside a wall, vital foreffective defence. At thesame time, it is evident thatthebulkofthemoneyneededtopay forurbandefencehadtoberaisedlocally,although,from1367onwards, thekingof France often allowed aquarter of the value of royal

taxes raised in a town to beretained as a contributiontowards it. Land was oftenacquired for littleornothing;in many places the citizensand those living within thejurisdiction of a town gavetheir services in the buildingof walls, the equivalent, itmay be argued, of a taxintended to cover buildingexpenses. Loans and giftswere sought as contributions.

But the biggest and best-organisedpartoftheexerciseof fund-raising wasundoubtedly the levy of anincreasing number of localtaxes on the trade of goods,including consumables, ofwhich the most profitablewerethoseimposedondrink,inparticularonwine.Alwaysdone with royal approval,which was soughtbeforehand, the collection of

such levies emphasised twofactors:thatthecrown’srightto tax and to organise thegeneral defence of Francewasrecognised;equally,that,in practice, the responsibilityfor carrying out defensiveprojects was left to localinitiative and energy. Theresult, it now appears, wasthatlocaladministrators,withimportant defensive budgetsto collect and administer,

took advantage of theexperience thus gained todevelop their own powers inparticularwhen,overaperiodof some decades, taxesoriginally levied for shortperiods came to be collectedforlongerandlongerperiods,until they became all butpermanently established aspart of the regular incomeofatownorcity.

Towns, therefore, were

coming to assume greaterimportance as places ofdefence and refuge for thesurrounding countryside. AtReims, for instance, theprocessoffortification,begunearly in the fourteenthcentury on the orders ofPhilip IV, was laterabandoned, only to bereactivated after the Englishvictory at Crécy. Between1346 and 1348, and again,

after the visitation of theBlack Death, between 1356and 1358, the people ofReims completed theconstruction of their city’sdefence, with the gratifyingeffect that even the king ofEngland,Edward III himself,couldnotforceanentryintheearly winter of 1359–60.Elsewhere, too, in differentparts of France, this periodwitnessed much building of

urban defences. Thewalls ofCaenwereconstructed in theyears following Edward III’scapture of the town in 1346;thoseofRouenwerebegunatthe same time on the ordersofPhilipVI,making the cityone of the few properlydefended towns, or ‘villescloses’ of upper Normandy;Avignon’swallwasstartedatthe instigation of PopeInnocent VI about 1355;

while the defences of Tours,in course of construction in1356, were probablysufficientlyadvancedtodeterthe Black Prince fromattacking the town on hischevauchée inthesummerofthatyear.

Such building, multipliedmany times over, providedFrance with a network offortifiedtowns(someofthemverylargebythestandardsof

theday), impressivetracesofwhichcanstillbeseentoday.Fromthemiddleyearsof thefourteenthcentury,suchstepsweresufficienttokeepallbutthemostdeterminedattackersat bay. Few commanderswouldhavewishedtoexpendthe time and energy requiredtoovercomeplacessoheavilydefended.

Change,however,wasnotfar away. While the

widespread building of townwallsinthesecondhalfofthefourteenthcenturyprovidedameasure of safety againstmarauding forces (evenagainst theCompanies), suchfortifications could not beignored by an enemy bentupon conquest. To theEnglish, when they returnedin the fifteenth century,fortified townsprovidedbotha military threat and a

challenge which they couldnot ignore. Paradoxically,therefore, instead ofproviding refuge for thosefleeing from the countryside,the very existence of thesefortified towns drew theattention of the invader tothem.Asthenarrativesofthesiege of Rouen, pursued byHenry V between July 1418and January 1419, underline,the results, both for the

civilians who had soughtsafety there and for thegarrison who had led theresistance, could bedevastating.

The existence of walledtownsandcastlescreatedtwoproblems.Hadtheinvaderthemeans of taking these newlyfortified places? Conversely,had the defenders the meansofeffectiveresistance?AtthetimewhentheHundredYears

warbrokeout,adefenderhada more than even chance ofbeating off an attack. By thetime the war ended, thereverse was probably true.This was in part due tochangesanddevelopments inweaponry. Against animmobile target, such as awall, even the early cannoncould inflict quiteconsiderable damage. Thereare references to such

‘gonnes’ in accounts of thesiege of Berwick as early as1333, while it is likely thatsome form of artillery wasbroughtacross theseaby theEnglish for the long siege ofCalaisof1346–7.During thenext generation both old andnew siege weapons were tobeusedin tandem.In1369atrebuchet, used for slingingstones, was employed at thesiege of La-Roche-sur-Yon,

andin1356–7anotherwasinevidence at the siege ofRennes; as late as 1378another was in use beforeCherbourg, having beenbrought there in pieces andassembled on the spot. Yetthree years earlier, at theimportant siege of nearbySaint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte,the French had used thirty-two cannons, gunstones forthem having been conveyed

there in carts and bypackhorse. These yearsclearlyconstitutedaperiodoftransition.

ThesiegeofSaint-Sauveurcanberegardedassomethingof a landmark in thedevelopment of the practicaluse of artillery.WhenHenryVlandedforthefirsttimeonFrenchsoilnearlyfortyyearslater, itwas soonputbeyonddoubt that in his artillery he

possessed a potential match-winner.Whiletheaccountsofthe siege of Harfleur in thelate summer of 1415 refer tothetime-honouredmethodsofminingandblockadeusedbytheEnglish,prideofplaceforeffectivenessisgiventotheirartillery, which caused bothfear and destruction to thebeleaguered town. The siegehadshownthat,withartillery,HenryVhadthecapabilityof

fulfilling his militaryambition. Setting out forFrance again two years later,thekingwasdescribedbytheanonymousauthoroftheBrutas leaving England with‘ordynauncegadredandwellestuffyd, as longyd to such aryalle Kinge’.11 Once againit was the towns and castlesofNormandywhichattractedHenry,bent,ashewas,uponconquest. Yet again the

chroniclesemphasise thepartplayed by the artillery in thecapture of Caen and Falaiseand, a little later, in that ofRouen.Thirtyyearslater, therapidreconquestoftheduchyby theFrench owedmuch tothethreatposedbytheFrenchking’s artillery against thedefences of towns whichpreferredtosurrenderthantomake a fight of it. Most, ithad to be recognised, would

have been unable to resist aheavy and sustainedbombardment.

Could nothing be done torestorethetraditionalbalanceofadvantagetothedefender?Wastheretobenoresistanceto this ‘new’ weapon? Thesuddenness of the increaseduse of artillery in the thirdquarter of the fourteenthcentury is evidenced by thefact thatwhenGastonFébus,

vicomte of Béarn in thePyrenees, had a network offortifications constructedbetween 1365 and 1380 (aperiod during which manycastles were built in France)he must have been buildingsomeofthelastfortificationstotakenoaccountofartillery,which was very soon tocompel importantdevelopments in the art ofdefence. For cannons could

be fired not only atfortifications but from them,too. As early as 1339, thetown of Cambrai had beguntointroducefirepowerintoitsdefensive system, anexceptionally early exampleoftheuseofsuchtechniques.WhenHenryYeveledesignedthewestgateatCanterburyin1378, he included roundgunportsonthedrumtowers,gunports having been

introducedintoEnglandsomeyearsearlier.InthesameyearthetownofSouthampton,notinfrequently threatened byattackfromthesea,appointedThomas Tredington, said tobe ‘skilled with guns andartillery’, to take charge ofthe municipal armoury.12Such examples are takenfrom the English scene:German towns could providemany more. But modern

scholarship hasmade it clearthatitwasinFrance,moresothan in England, that urbandefensive requirementsplayed a major part insecuring the widespreadacceptance of artillery as ameans of deterring orcountering a prospectiveenemy.AlloverFrance,fromLille and Dijon in the northand east to Bordeaux in thesouth-west, artillery became

anessentialandacceptedpartof the growing defensivesystem associateci withtowns. Materials werecollected in advance andstored inanticipationof theiruse; powder slowly gotcheaper in the course of thefifteenthcentury;whilemanytownsemployedoneormorementosupervisetheeffectiveuse of artillery in case ofattack.AsChristine de Pisan

was to show in the firstquarterofthecentury,theuseof artillery for defensivepurposes was now regardedasnecessaryandnormal.

However,resistancetotheincreasing employment ofartillery in the capture ofwalled towns and castleswouldbeevenmoreeffectiveif it stemmed from areassessment of architecturaldesign.Largelyinthehopeof

preventing or deterringattemptsatscaling,wallshadtraditionally been built high:thickness and solidity hadbeen sacrificed to this need,for walls could not be bothhigh and thick.Yet,with theadvent of cannon, thicknesswas precisely the maincharacteristic which thedefender demanded of thewall which protected him.The onus now lay upon the

architecttocomeupwithnewdesigns and new ideas withwhich to counter the rapidlygrowing effectiveness ofartillery aided, from about1430, by the reversion to theuse of cast-iron shot which,althoughmoreexpensivethanstone shot, didnot shatteronimpact, could be made moreuniformly in greaterquantities (the making ofstone shot was, to say the

least, laborious) and insmaller calibre, therebyincreasing efficiency byreducing the need for verylargeandunwieldycannon.

The architectural solutionwas ultimately to be foundand perfected in Italy in thesixteenth century, but thecontributions of English andFrench experience to thesediscoveries was notnegligible.13Byloweringthe

height of the wall, andtherebyenablingittobebuiltmore thickly, it could bemade more effective in bothdefence and counter-attack.To this could be added thepossibility of building thetowers only as high as thewall itself, thus enabling thecannonusedfordefencetobemoved along its length (nowon one level) to whicheverpart it was most needed.

Furthermore, as Yevele hadshown at Canterbury, thedefensive value of the roundtower was becoming betterappreciated;evenifitdidnotalways deflect a cannon shotaimed at it, such a towercould withstand an impactbetter than could a straight-facing surface. In addition,the need to achieve bothvertical and lateral defencewas also dealt with.

Machicolations, usuallyregardedasasignofnobility,had their practical value inthat they permitted verticaldefence against those whomight have reached the deadgroundnearawall,andmightbe setting about digging ormining under it.At the sametime the building of whatwere to become bastions,towers standing out from theline of the wall, enabled

defenders to fire all round,and in particular laterally,against approaching men ormachines, as the design forBodiam Castle in Sussex,which, likeCoolingCastle inKent,wasbuiltatthetimeoftheFrench invasionscaresofthe1380s,clearlyshows.Thebuilding, about 1440, at theMont-Saint-Michel,ofaformof bastion not dissimilar tothat to be developed in Italy,

underlineshowthismatterofovercoming the defensiveproblems created by thedevelopment of artillery wasbeing dealt with. By thesixteenth century theinitiative long held by thedefender, surrendered in thelate fourteenth century, hadbeenlargelyregained.

NAVALOBJECTIVES

Strangely, and certainly

wrongly, the history of thenaval war between FranceandEnglandattheendoftheMiddle Ages is an under-estimated subject, itscontribution not yet fullystudied by historians. Theapparent ineffectiveness ofnaval forces, particularlywhencontrastedwiththevitalrolewhich theycame toplayin the sixteenth century,mayhave turned students against

the subject. Yet, the factremainsthat,althoughwearedealing with an age whenhistory was not decided bybattles at sea, the first majorbattle of the Hundred YearsWarwasfoughtatseainJune1340. The subject has animportance in the history ofwar at this period whichmeritsemphasis.

During the thirteenth andfourteenth centuries, France

developed what was nothingless than a long-term navalstrategy. In 1200 the king ofFrance, ruling in Paris, wasvirtually land-locked, thecounty of Ponthieu, aroundBoulogne, being his onlyaccess to the sea. With theconquest of Normandy,however, Philip-Augustusgained control of a longstretch of coastline oppositeEngland, from which he

couldalso‘oversee’Brittany,while access from themouthof the Seine gave him ameans of developing tradeand a wider market. It alsomeantthatin1213,andagainin 1215–17, the French kingwas able to take the war toEngland, a thing unheard ofonlyagenerationearlier.Tenyears later the French, nowruled by Louis VIII, brokeout in another direction, this

time in the Bay of Biscay,with the capture of LaRochelle in 1224. Twentyyears later still, under LouisIXandwith theneedsof thecrusade in mind, a port wasbuiltatAigues-MortesontheMediterranean,tobeusedforcommercial and, even moreso,formilitarypurposes.Thevessels used by the Frenchhad to be brought fromMarseille and Genoa. These

werestilldaysofinnovation.Itisalltooeasytoseethe

development of France interms of an inexorable andinevitable process ofexpansion from earlybeginnings in the Ile deFrance around Paris to thecountry we know today. Yetitmaybe argued that part ofthe process was a search forthe open sea which Francehad been denied until the

early years of the thirteenthcentury,andthatthedesiretowin control of the peripheralduchies of Aquitaine,Brittany and Normandy wasbut an aspect of a widerpolicy which included anambition to have access to,and control of, the ports onthe Atlantic, Mediterraneanand Channel coasts formilitary as well as forcommercialreasons.

As the rivalry withEngland grew in the latethirteenthcentury,sothesea,which separated the twocountries, took on addedimportance. By 1294 therealready existed at Rouen, onthe river Seine, a shipyardcontrolled by the king andemploying specialist ship-builders brought in fromGenoa. Thesewere the signsfor the future, but at the

moment only signs. WhenPhilip IV tried to attackEngland in1295,he still hadto seek transport ships fromthe Baltic ports and fromthosewhichhecouldseizeinFrench harbours, togetherwith sailors from Flanders.But, as the king found, hecould not rely upon theFlemings; their links withEngland were too strong forthem to act with

determination against thosewho supplied them with thewool upon which their owneconomic prosperitydepended.

The fourteenth centuryshowed how valuable accesstothesea,andinparticulartonorthernwaters,wastobeforFrance. The sea coastsprovided sailors to man thevessels used in war, a largenumber of which were

requisitioned fishing ortradingvessels,astherecordsmakeclear.Theports,suchasHarfleur, at themouth of theSeine, could develop ship-building facilities, and thecontrol of the lower SeineeffectivelymadeRouenintoasea port and a shipyard. Itwas probably the success ofthese steps which, in 1337,caused Philip VI to decideupon the building of a naval

base at La Rochelle, a basewhichwastobecededto theEnglish by the terms of thetreaty of Brétigny, therebyunderlining the significanceof ports as pawns ininternational diplomacy. Inaddition,weshouldnotforgetthe value of the sea as asourceoffishwhichprovidedan essential dietary elementtopeopleoftheMiddleAges.Many French people, not

merely Parisians, benefitedfrom fish caught in theChannelornearbywaters.

Atthebeginingofthewarwith England the Frenchcrown, denied the use of theports and coastline ofBrittany and Aquitaine, hadto witness the English armyenjoying access to both, andusingthemasbastionsonthecontinental mainland fromwhich to launch attacks into

territoriesruledbythekingofFrance. In the fifteenthcentury the problem becamemore acute. Part of thestrategic significance of theEnglish occupation ofNormandy, and of thealliance with the dukes ofBurgundy, lay in the zone ofcontrol which was therebycreated: for not only did theEnglishrulebothsidesoftheChanneland theSeinebelow

Paris, but their Burgundianallies controlled the upperreaches above the capital. Intermsofpolicyitthusbecameessential totrytoweakentheEnglish grip upon both theseaand themain rivers, suchas the Oise, which flowedinto the Seine, by seeking todetach theBurgundians fromtheir English links. The vitalrole (which contemporariesfully appreciated) played by

such relatively smallportsasLe Crotoy, at the mouth ofthe river Somme, in theperiod 1420–50, togetherwiththefact that theportsofDieppe and Harfleur wereamong the first places to besnatchedfromEnglishcontrolin 1435 (leaving them withCherbourg as the only portfrom which they couldmaintain regular links withEngland between 1435 and

1440, a vital period in themilitary history of theoccupation), shows howimportant the Burgundianconnectionwas to bothmainprotagonistsastheystruggledto acquire and maintain ameasure of control over thesea.

The French crown, it isrightly argued, had a definitepolicywithrelationtotheseawhich it had followed since

the early thirteenth century.Ports it must have,particularly in the Channel.One of the last examples forthisperiodwastheconsciouscreation of a further navalbase at Granville, in westernNormandy,calledthe‘clefdupaysparmer et par terre’ byCharlesVII in the charterbywhich he granted privilegesto thosewhowould come tosettle there to keep it for the

good of France.14 But theremustalsobeships,andwhileFrance could not provide asufficientnumberofthemforherself, she was obliged (asthe English were on someoccasions) to seek themelsewhere. Thus both Castileand Genoa became suppliersofgalleyswhichoftenfoughtontheFrenchside,notablyin1416 when the Genoeseprovided part of the fleet

which suffered defeat at thehands of the English at thebattle of the Seine, offHarfleur.Ifoneisseekinganexample of a naval battlewhich was to haveconsequences, one need lookno further than this one. AtstakelaymorethanthefutureoftheEnglishgarrisoninthetown which the French werebesieging and blockading byland and sea. By sinking

several Genoese vessels andtaking others captive, theEnglish made sure that theport remained in Englishhands, that (for some while)they would control the wideestuaryof theSeine,andthatthey might, in the phrase ofthe day, ‘sweep’ the Frenchoffitswatersbypatrollingthesea. This was not simplylucky,norwasitunimportant.Itemphasisedthat therewere

men, in both France andEngland,whounderstood therole of the sea inwar andofthe part which it might playin determining the outcomeof future English expeditionsto France. After 1416, theEnglish had reason to beoptimistic.

Indeed, there is no doubtthat control of Frenchmainland ports was vitallyimportant to theEnglish, and

that much diplomacy in thecourse of the war wasconcerned with securing andmaintainingaccess to theuseof their facilities. In thisrespect England’s relationswith Brittany were likely tobe of great importance, notonly for the positive reasonthat a friendly duke ofBrittanywould allow the useofhisduchyasastepping-offplace into the mainland, but

for the negative one that ahostile duke might causeuntold harm to Englishmaritime interests, bothmilitary and commercial, byfailingtostoptheactivitiesofBreton pirates and privateerswhose ships gave muchtrouble at sea, as complaintsinParliamentand in someofthe political literature of thetime, notably The Libelle ofEnglyshePolycye,testify.

In the case of the LowCountries, England had asimilar interest which wasboth military andcommercial. The capture ofCalaisbyEdwardIII in1347had given England virtualcontrol of the Straits. But itwasacontrolwhich requiredactive defence, to which theCinque Ports contributed agood deal, particularly in thelate fourteenth century. As a

trade depot and naval base,Calais was to serve as anentrepôt for trade in and outof England, and as a backdoor,whicharmiesmightanddid use, into France. But sophysically restricted was theCalaisarea,andsooftenwasitunderFrenchpressure, thatforlongyearsatatimealltheneedsofthegarrison,whetherin provisions or materials,had to be shipped in from

England. In such conditionseveryefforthadtobemadetokeep theseapassagesopen–andsafe.

The military involvementofEnglandincontinentalwarmeant an unusually highconcern for achieving andmaintainingsomemeasureofcontrolof the sea.Tradewasvulnerable to attack, andcases of piracy werecommon. Fishing, too,

required protection, for theactivities of hostile seamencould easily lead to the lossof catches and vessels, forwhichtherewasnoinsuranceprovision.Thedefenceofthecoastline had also to be seento, and was not infrequentlyfound to be wanting, mostparticularly when smallforces of enemy soldiersattacked the English shoreand ravaged villages and

towns which they foundundefended. So importantwas this regarded that in thefinalquarterofthefourteenthcentury a system of coastaldefence on land wasdeveloped, essentially asecond line to carry theburden of defence once theenemyhadmanagedtoeffecta landing on English soil.15Likewise, at the time whenarmies and their

accompanying equipmentwere being shipped over toFrance,effortsweremade(asthey were by Henry V in1417) to keep the sealanesclear by sending out otherships on patrol, therebyensuringaminimumofsafetyfor those going to fightabroad.

The appreciation of thegrowingroleoftheseainwarcan be observed in the

positive attitudes of somekings of France and Englandto this matter. Kingsneglected the sea at theirperil.InEngland,ashasbeenshown, both Edward III andRichard II reacted tomercantile opinion expressedin Parliament by impressinglarge numbers of ships forpurposes of defence, suchfleets at times employingalmostasmanysoldiersatsea

asdidfieldarmiesonland,allat great expense.16 Thedevelopment of the Clos desGalées at Rouen, under thepatronage of the Frenchcrown(notablyinthereignofCharlesV),ismatchedbythesteps taken by Henry V todevelop a royal shipyard atSouthampton, somuchbetterpositionedthanthetraditionalone at theTower ofLondon,and by the appointment of

royalofficers to supervise itsworking and administration.Historians have tended toignore these importantdevelopments,which impliedthegrowingneed for a smallsupply of vessels speciallybuilt for war (like heavyartillery, these could only beafforded by the crown), thefacilities for theirmaintenance,andthegrowingappreciation that England’s

commercial interests shouldbedefendedbyshipsbuiltforthat purpose. Furthermore,sieges which were in effectblockades by both land andsea (Calais by theEnglish in1346–7; Harfleur by theFrench and their allies in1416) show that anunderstandingofthevalueofthe naval arm, used inconjunctionwith that of landforces,wasdeveloping.

The importance attachedto the sea bymore reflectiveEnglishmen and Frenchmenat the end of the HundredYearsWarmay also be seenin twoworks:The Libelle ofEnglyshe Polycye, writtenabout1437,andLedébatdeshérauts d’armes, composedabout 1455. The first, avigorous piece of polemicwritten in verse, leaves thereader in no doubt about the

strongly-held views of itsanonymous author on thevery positive policy whichtheroyalcouncilwasurgedtoadopt towards the seawhich,if England were not careful,foreignersfrommanynationswoulduse for purposes, bothcommercial and military,detrimental to Englishinterests.Amongthosewhomthe author singled out forpraise were Edward III, who

recalled his victory againstthe French at Sluys in June1340 by introducing afighting ship onto the nobleof England, and Henry V,who built great ships anddealt firmly with those whowere causing trouble toEnglish shipping. Action forthe good of England wassomething which the writeradmired, andhedemanded ittoforestalltheenemy.

TheFrenchtract,whilenotprimarily concerned with thesea and the exercise of seapower, none the less tried toshow not merely France’sequality but its superiorityover England in mattersmaritime. No longer mightthe English call themselves‘roys de la mer’, for Francehad not only good rivers butgoodports,too,thelistgivenincluding the new port of

Granville. Moreover, Francehad good ships in quantityand merchandise in plentywith which to trade. To theauthor, French superiority inthis respect was only oneaspect of the more generalsuperiority of his countryover the other. It was aconjunction of war andnatural conditions which hadbrought this about. It shouldnot escape our notice that it

was not only successes onlandbutthoseassociatedwithaspects of the war at seawhich had contributedtowards the satisfactorysituationwhichhedescribed.

NAVALFORCES

Unlike war on land, war atseawasnotanoccupationforwhich the nobility wastrained. Indeed, theauthorofLedébatdeshérautsd’armes

could state that the Frenchnobility did not regardfighting at sea as being anoble activity: it is perhapsfor this reason that navalwarfaredidnotfeatureinthechroniclesinthewaythatwaron land did.Nor did it seemapparent to all that the warfought at sea, the damagewhichmightbeinflicteduponenemy vessels and morale,and the consequences which

victory at sea could have forthosewholivedinareascloseto coasts, were all part of awiderwarwhichcouldnotberestricted to the fighting onland.

So it was that when theHundred Years War began,althoughboththeFrenchandthe English kingdoms hadparticular naval objectiveswhich they needed to furtherfor military reasons, neither

could be said to havepossessed a proper navy. Upto that time the maritimeneeds of the two countrieshadnotbeenverydemanding.PhilipIVwasthefirstFrenchkingtotrytopursueanactivenaval war against England.Before his time no king hadneeded many ships, least ofallshipsondemand;thegreatexpensebothofbuildingandof maintaining them,

procedures which requiredspecial and costly facilities,had deterred kings fromshipbuildingona largescale.Furthermore,theorganisationassociated with the wide useofamajorarmwaslacking.ItwastothecreditofPhilipIVthat he laid the foundationsfor a dockyard at Rouen,while only a few years laterinEngland,EdwardII,whosefatherhadbuiltsomegalleys,

was to possess a smallsquadron of ‘royal’ ships.Looking back, we may saythat the years around 1300were to attain somesignificance in this domain.But to argue that suchdevelopments markedanything more than abeginning would be to over-estimate the significance ofwhatwasdone.

When required for use in

war, large numbers ofmerchant vessels wereimpressed ad hoc. Theprocedures were simpleenough.Royalofficers,underthe charge of admirals, weredespatched to the ports withinstructions to impress orrequisition vessels for theking’s use, whether this wasto transportmen, animals, orequipmentacrossthesea.Theexercise of this right, whose

origins went back manycenturies,couldnotalwaysbeeasily achieved. As in thematterofpurveyance(which,in a sense, the requisitioningof ships was) protests andopposition were frequentlymet, for this kind ofproceduredisruptedtradeandfishing, the two occupationswhich created a permanentneed for ships. Payment wasnevermadeforavesseltaken

from its owner for royalservice; nor wascompensation for loss of aship, or even damage to itsequipment, normally given.In brief, requisitioning wasunpopular, not least since itwas often carried out in theperiod between spring andautumn when trading andfishing conditions mightnormally be expected to bebetter than at other times of

theyear.Nor was that all. Once

requisitioned, vesselsoriginally built forcommercial purposes had tobe adapted formilitary ones.Ashipwhichwas tobeusedmainlyforconveyinganimalsabroad needed work done toits hold: special hurdles, forinstance, were required toaccommodate horses. If aship was intended for

patrollingthesea,ithadtobeequipped to take part inactionagainst theenemy: thebuilding of castles, fore andaft, and, in the fifteenthcentury, the possibleinstallation of cannon on thedeck (guns were placedbelow decks, to fire out of‘ports’, only in the very firstyears of the sixteenthcentury)hadtobecarriedout.The frequent complaint that

ships, once requisitioned,were not actually used forseveral months, therebydenying their owners the useof them in between times,was not always the fault ofthe wind or weather.Shortages of cash to paysoldiers and sailors,insufficiency of crews, andtheslowassemblyofretinuesto be shipped across the seaoftencombinedtodelayships

assembled at ports ofconcentration.

The kind of ships neededon the two sides of theChannel differed a little. Forthe English, the main needwas initially that oftransporting men, horses andweapons to and from theEuropean mainland. Thevesselsbestequippedforthiswere ‘cogs’, ships of highsides well suited for

commercial traffic fromwhich, indeed, most of themwere taken. On the Frenchside,withitsneedswhichdidnot, generally speaking,include the transportation ofarmies or invasion troops, adifferent kind of vessel wasmore suitable: the galley.This, a fast, flat-bottomedvessel propelled by oars orsail, or both, which could,because of its lack of keel,

come very close into land,was essentially a vessel ofinterception, intended tocatch attackers off thecoast.17 But it did serveanother purpose. It couldcross the open sea, and landon the enemy coast smallgroups of men who, in raidslasting perhaps a few hoursor, at most, a day or two,could do much damage toboth enemy property and

morale.Theinhabitantsofthesouthern coastal counties ofEngland sufferedconsiderably in this respect,inparticularinthelate1370s,when several places on thesouth coast experiencedattacks and, in the case ofWinchelsea in 1380, virtualdestruction.

The French, therefore, setabout building galleys, theirprincipal repair yard being

theClosdesGaléesatRouen,which came to be developedinthecourseofthefourteenthcentury, and which saw itsheyday during the successfulwars waged by Charles V inthe1370s.18Bycontrast, theEnglish seem to have hadfewer ships at this period,although Edward III hadsomeroyalships,andvesselswere built for largelydefensive purposes. But for

the English the system ofrequisitioning,togetherwithafew ships which might bebuilt in both inland andseaside ports, and thoseconstructedatBayonne,weresufficient to meet most oftheir needs. The list of someforty ports which provided146vessels,crewedby2,350marinersandsome294boys,toconveyHenryofLancasterandhisarmyfromEnglandto

Bordeaux in 1347, isimpressive.19But itdoesnotsuggestthatanybasicchangein the traditional means oftaking large numbers ofsoldiers to the continent wasyetbeingconsidered.

The beginning of thefifteenth century, however,was to see changes inattitudes and practices.Althoughthesehadseentheirorigin in the reign of Henry

IV, it was to be in his son’sbrief reign that something ofa revolution (whose effects,however, were not to last)took place. Henry V neededtoachievetwothings.Hehadto take action against piratesandsailorswhousedtheportof Harfleur as their mainbase, and who wereencouraged by the Frenchking to carry out raids uponEnglish shipping in the

Channel and the Englishcoast.Healsoneededshipstopatrol the Channel and totransport his armies toFrance.The firstheachievedthrough military means:Harfleur was captured inSeptember 1415 and latersuccessfully defended by thenaval victory won by theduke of Bedford in August1416. The second wasachieved by the creation of

the first significant royalfleet,animprovementonthatof Edward III, which, basedin Southampton under thecontrol of a clerk of theking’s ships, and enjoyingeasy access to the Channel,came to number thirty-fivevessels, some bought, somecaptured,othersstillspeciallybuilt.20WithjusticeHenryVis credited not only withhaving understood, better

than did any of hiscontemporaries, what werethe naval problems whichfaced England in the earlyfifteenth century, but alsowith having done muchtowardsthecreationofafleetof ships, some of them verylarge, almost ‘prestige-type’vessels,whichwouldmakeitpossible for the English totake to sea quickly and thustrytowresttheinitiativefrom

any enemy who might becomingagainstthem.

Unfortunately, whenHenry V died in 1422, hisfleet was already less usefulthan its royal founder hadhoped. In the years whichfollowed, some of his ships(which belonged to the kingpersonally) were sold torepay his debts; others wereleft so long that theyeventuallyrotted.Yet,writing

half a century later, Sir JohnFortescue recognised thatHenry V had been right:‘though we have not alweywerre uppon the see, yet itshalbe nescessarie that thekynge [Edward IV] havealway some ffloute apon thesee, ffor the repressynge offrovers, savynge off owremarchauntes, owre ffishers,and the dwellers uppon owrecostes; and that the kynge

kepe alway some grete andmyghty vessels, ffor thebrekynge off an armyewhenany shall bemade ayen hymapon the see; ffor thanne itshall be to late to do makesuch vessailles’.21 Fortescuesaw what the problem was:the defence of Englishinterests both on land and atsea,whichneededtobeacteduponwithaspeedwhichonlytheexistenceofsomeformof

permanent naval forcewouldallow.Insosaying,Fortescuehad all but admitted thatHenry V had been ahead ofhistime.

1Onthisconcept,seePalmer,‘Waraims’,p.53.

2A.J.Pollard,JohnTalbotandthewarinFrance,1427–1453

(London,1983).3M.G.A.Vale,Warandchivalry.WarfareandaristocraticcultureinEngland,FranceandBurgundyattheendoftheMiddleAges(London,1981),ch.4(I).

4J.E.Morris,‘Mountedinfantryinmediaevalwarfare’,T.R.Hist.S.,thirdseries,8(1914),78.

5M.Prestwich,‘EnglisharmiesintheearlystagesoftheHundredYearsWar:aschemeof1341’,B.I.H.R,56(1983).

110.6P.Contamine,‘TheFrenchnobilityandtheWar’,TheHundredYearsWar,ed.Fowler,p.151.

7TheBrut,II,454.8SeeJ.B.Henneman,‘ThemilitaryclassandtheFrenchmonarchyinthelateMiddleAges’,A.H.R.,83(1978),946–65.

9SeeHale,Renaissancewarstudies,chs.8–10.

10N.A.R.Wright,‘French

peasantsintheHundredYearsWar’,H.T.,33(June1983),38–42.

11TheBrut,II,382.12C.Platt,MedievalSouthampton.TheportandtradingcommunityA.D.1000–1600(London:Boston,Mass.,1973),p.130.

13Hale,Renaissancewarstudies,chs.1–6;H.L.Turner,TowndefencesinEnglandandWales(London,1971);J.H.Harvey,HenryYevele(London,1944)

14OrdonnancesdesroisdeFrancedelatroisièmerace,

XIII(1782),459–61.15SeeHewitt,TheorganizationofwarunderEdwardIII,ch.1;J.R.Alban,‘Englishcoastaldefence:somefourteenth-centurymodificationswithinthesystem’,Patronage,thecrown,andtheprovincesinlatermedievalEngland,ed.R.A.Griffiths(Gloucester,1981),pp.57–78.

16J.W.Sherborne,‘TheHundredYears’War.TheEnglishnavy:shippingandmanpower,1369–1389’,P&P.,37(1967),163–

75.17B.Waites,‘Thefightinggalley’,H.T.,18(1968),337–43.

18A.Merlin-Chazelas(ed.),DocumentsrelatifsauclosdesgaléesdeRouenetauxarméesdemerduroideFrancede1293à1418(2vols.,Paris,1977–8).

19CalculatedfromHewitt,Organizationofwar,app.II.

20S.Rose(ed.),ThenavyoftheLancastriankings:accountsandinventoriesofWilliam

Soper,keeperoftheking’sships,1422–1427(London,1982),pp.28–56.

21SirJohnFortescue,ThegovernanceofEngland,ed.C.Plummer(Oxford,1885),p.123.Ontheimpactofcoastalattacksuponthelivesofcivilianpopulations,seePastonlettersandpapersofthefifteenthcentury,ed.N.Davis,I(Oxford,1971),nos.20and136.

THEINSTITUTIONSOFWAR

CENTRALORGANISATION

One of the most strikingdevelopments in late

medieval European societyproved to be the ability,found at least among themonarchies of England,France, and Spain, to makemilitarypowermoreeffectivethrough proper organisation.Thedemandsof longperiodsofwar,while requiring someresponse, also providedopportunities. All overEurope,inItalyandinIberia,in France as well as in

England, armies, answeringthedemandsmadeofthembyincreasinglypowerfulmasterswho controlled the pursestrings, grew to meet theneeds of the times. In Italy,FlorenceandVenicewere,bythe fourteenth century,dictatingtermsandconditionsof service and pay to thecondottieri,whobroughttheirprivate bands to serve them.In such circumstances,

continuity of organisationwas essential; it had to existin peace time as in war. Itneeded structures ofpersonnel; it needed, too,continuity among decision-makers who had themselvesto be servants of the state,which alone had the right todecide its military policy inthelightofitswiderinterests.Although they did it indifferentways,bothFlorence

andVenice acted together inthe essential task of makingthepursuitofwaramatterofstate,whichbecame, in theseand in other instances, thepaymaster.1

Among themonarchies ofEurope,much the samestorycan be told; the differencesaremainlyonesofdegree.InSpain,itwasthecrownwhichprovided the essentialcontinuity required to pursue

the long war of reconquestagainsttheMoors.InEnglandand in France the HundredYears War soon led to therecognition that war, now ofever-increasing complexityand expense, needed to beadministeredfromthecentre.This could only be doneeffectively through thegradual development and useofmilitary institutions.Manyof these were at hand at the

beginningofourperiod,butitneeded long years of war tobringthemtoafruitionwhichwouldbeasimportantforthedevelopment of the state’sinstitutions as it was for theorganisation of its militaryendeavour.

RECRUITMENT

Thehistoryoftherecruitmentof armies, from the MiddleAges to modern times, has

passed through three mainphases. The first was thefulfilment, through militaryservice, of the feudalobligation to take part indefence.Thesecondwasthatwhich made military servicevoluntary;menservedmainlybecause they wished to, orbecause some otherobligationcompelledthemto.The third phase was that ofconscription, obligatory

service in the name of thestate. By the time that ourperiod begins, the first ofthese phases was ending.Soldiers were coming toserve largely because theychosetodoso;sailors,ontheother hand, were enlisted byconscription. The period is,therefore,oneofchange.

In1327,inwhatmayhaveappearedasa retrograde stepgiven that the trend, in

England, was stronglytowards a paid army, ageneral summons to thefeudal levy was issued. In1334, however, the Scottishcampaign of Edward III wasto be based on a paid army,no general feudal servicebeing demanded, althoughsome mounted troops stillgave obligatory service until1336. In the following year,when the theatre of war

moved to France, the largelyvoluntaryelementinthearmyprevailed.Therewasnownogeneral feudal summons,although certain individualswere called upon to providetheir obligatory service.Persuasion, rather thanobligation, was winning theday. At local meetings,magnates had the king’sneeds explained to them;recruiting agents were sent

round the counties to raisefoot soldiers throughcommissions of array;emphasis was placed uponthepayand thepossibilityofmaterial benefits to bederived from war. The daysof the feudal army were allbutover: after1385 itwouldbeathingofthepast.2

In France the trend wasmuch in the same direction.Yetitshouldberecalledthat,

in broad terms, Frenchmenwere being called upon tofightadefensivewar,theaimof which was to thwartEnglish military ambition.The country’s defensiveneeds meant that the moretraditional,feudalformoftheFrench king’s army mighthavealongerlifethanhaditsEnglishcounterpart.Sincethebeginning of the fourteenthcentury, the king of France

had had a relic of the feudalarmyavailableintheformofthe arrière-ban, a call tothose between the ages ofeighteenandsixtytoserveintimes of dire necessity. Thisessentially defensiveinstitution was called out onat least seven occasionsbetween 1338 (when thewaragainst England effectivelybrokeout)and1356(theyearof the defeat at Poitiers).

Mainly associated with theinteriorregionsofthecountrybest controlledby thecrown,its services could becommutedforthepaymentofmoney (as country districtsoften did), or, as in the caseof towns, forservicefulfilledbycertaincitizenspaidforbyatown.Norwasthistheonlyform of service demanded.The nobility, sometimescalled out separately, joined

in when the arrière-ban wascalled; the towns providedurban militias, notablycrossbowmen; while theChurch, normally forbiddenan active role in war,contributed carts or,sometimes,cash.

Such was the basis ofFrance’s defensive potentialin the early fourteenthcentury.Itwasasystemwithbuilt-in deficiencies which

could not effectively live upto the rapidly developingneeds of the French crown,faced with attack fromdifferent directions. Thesystemlackedbothreliabilityand uniformity and, in thecase of the service due fromfeudalvassals,itwasdifficulttoimposeandorganise.Mostimportant of all, it could notbesummonedquicklyenoughto meet emergencies which

weredevelopingasaresultoftheEnglishwar,sothatmuchof the onus for local defencewas left in the hands of thelocalities themselves, whichweremaderesponsiblefortheguard of castles and towns,largelythroughthesystemofwatch and ward (guet etgarde), as genuine anexampleof feudaldefenceasonecouldfind.

In the first half of the

fourteenth century bothEngland and France weremoving away from theirhistoric reliance uponobligation towards avoluntary system to providethemwithanarmy.But sucha system had to be paid for;money had to be found.Traditionally, this had beendone through scutage, a finepaid in lieu of service, andother fines. In essence, this

tradition was carried on. InFrancemuchallegedlyfeudalservice was compounded forbypaymentoffines,whileinEnglandecclesiastics,suchasabbotsandpriors,andwomenwhoheldfromtheking,paidmoney in place of personalservice. Such a system,however, was unreliable andthe sums paid were notalways realistic. The resultwas that it became apparent

that the financing of war,bothoffensiveanddefensive,could only be properlycarried out if large sums ofmoney became available,sums which could only befoundthroughtaxation.Therewas an additional factorwhich encouraged thisgeneral development in bothcountries.Warwascomingtobe regarded as necessary forthecommongood, forwhose

defence each country neededthebestavailablearmy,readyto fight for the commonutility. In both countries, thelevying of taxationnationwide was both asymbolicandapracticalwayof getting all the kings’subjects to provide for thesearmies.

The instrument whichtypified the new system wasthe indenture, perhaps the

mostimportantadministrativedevelopment in the EnglisharmyinthelateMiddleAges.The earliest indenture datesfrom the last years of thereignofHenryIII,but itwasnot until the fourteenthcentury that it assumed itsnormal form. The militaryindenture was a bindingagreement, formalisingconditionsofservicebetweenthe king (as the employer)

and his captains (usuallymembersof thenobility)andthose captains and their sub-contractors of lower rank, intimeofwar.Thetermsoftheagreementweresetout twiceonparchment, thencutalonga wavy or ‘indented’ (i.e.tooth-like) line, each partypreserving one copy. In anycase of dispute, the two‘halves’hadtobeconfrontedto see if they fitted; if they

did not, accusations of fraudcould be brought. The termsof the English indenturenormally specified the sizeand composition (men-at-arms,mountedarchers)oftheretinue to be brought; thetime and place of service;wages, and any bonuseswhich might be paid; thedivision of the ‘advantages’of war, including specialprovisions regarding

prisoners; details regardingtransport; and, especially inearly indentures, whatcompensation would be paidfor the loss of that mostexpensive animal, the warhorse.

In France and England alettrederetenueor indenture(the former not normally sodetailed as the latter) was acontractbetweenthekinganda commander (in Italy the

contract, or condotta, wasmade for a period whichmightbesixmonthsorayear(ferma)withthepossibilityofanextension (debeneplacito)between the state and theleader of the group beingemployed) to raise troops.The commander’s first task,then, was to ensure therecruitment of sufficientsoldiersofadequatestandard,eitherfromhisownestatesor

those of others, perhapsthrough the dying feudal‘network’. His indenturewhich, more than anythingelse, symbolised the new,paid, and centrally organisedarmy, also gave him rights,forhiscopywasanauthorityto raise a retinue, while theking’scopywassenttothoseresponsible for theadministration of paymentsfor war. It is important to

appreciate that the extensionofwaratthistimealsomeantthe development ofinstitutions which dealt withits administration. In Venicethesupervisionoftherapidlydeveloping system ofrecruiting, supervising andpaying soldiers was in thehands of collaterali andprovveditori, whose task itwas to see to the day-to-daycontrol of soldiers in thepay

of the state. The proper andregular payment of soldierswas but one very importantaspect of the development ofa machinery for war muchwider than that provided bythefightingforcesalone.Theindenturewastoprovetobeadocumentofvital importancein the long history of warfinance which was beingrapidly developed duringthese years. Its importance

mustnotbeunderestimated.Whilethemannerinwhich

armies were recruitedremained reasonably static inEngland after the changes ofthe 1330s, the same was nottrue of France. There thearrière-ban provedunsatisfactory; it becameunpopular and mistrusted, apolitical stick with which tobeat thecrown,andwentoutofuseafter1356.Theresoon

followed, underCharlesV, amajor restructuring ofrecruitment. Although thecrown’s vassals were calledout on three occasions whenEnglish expeditions causedmoments of crisis, the mainobjective of regaining landlost to the English wasaccomplished through thecreationofamoderatelysizedarmy, based almost entirelyupon volunteers, and bound

to theking through lettresderetenue. The emphasis wastowards an army whoserecruitment was organisedcentrally,whosecommanderswere appointed by the king,and whose military andorganisationalstructureswerecreated to meet the primeneed of the day: reconquest.Above all, the king insistedon keeping firm control bothof his captains and of those

who served under them. Itwas to be verymuch a royalarmy, properly disciplinedandproperlycontrolled.

If the reign of Charles Vwitnessedaconsciousattempttomakethearmymoreofaninstrumentofstatethanithadbeenbefore,thedeathofboththe king and du Guesclin in1380, and the growingpolitical disorder of thefollowing decades, led to a

decline in the militaryeffectiveness of the Frencharmy. With the return topower of the princes, thelocal force, carrying out itstraditional role, came onceagaintothefore;thenobility,too, reclaimed its traditionalplace in the leadership; and,after 1410, the old arrière-ban, virtually excluded sincethe disaster of Poitiers,reappeared. The political

divisions of the daymanifested themselves veryclearly in the organisation ofwar. The projected invasionof England of 1386 failed –and not merely because ofadverseweather. In 1415 thelack of unity showed itselfagain;theresultwasdefeatatAgincourt. At no time is aunified command morevaluable than in a defensivesituation.Thefatesufferedby

French armies during theseyears underlines the truth ofthatobservation.

An aggressor, however,above all one not concernedwith total conquest, canafford to give hiscommanders a freer hand.The result of this was that,although well organised, thearmies of Edward III andRichard II were seldomcentrallycommandedaswere

those of Charles V. By themiddle of the fourteenthcentury, the system ofrecruiting a volunteer armythrough indentures was wellestablished and changed butlittle.Captains,someofthemsons of Edward III, othersmen of high military repute,served under the king onthoseoccasionswhenhewentto war in person. On otheroccasions they led

expeditions of their own,recruiting from their estatesorfromamongthosewhohadservedunderthembefore.Onthewhole, these armieswerea powerful force ofdestruction in those parts ofFrance inwhich theymoved;however,intermsofsecuringmilitary advantage it isdoubtful whether theyconstituted the threat which,in theory, it was in their

powertopose.England’s changing war

aims under Henry V and hisson(conquestandthedefenceofthatconquest)meant,first,that the short, sometimesrelatively profitablecampaigns of the previouscenturybecameathingofthepast. Now, with both fieldarmies and garrisons beingrequired, men notinfrequently returned to

France on several ‘tours ofduty’. By the time that thewar ended, the number ofEnglishmen who had seenservice in France couldprobablybecalculatedintensofthousands.

It was from the hands ofthese men and their captainsthatKingCharlesVII had toprisecontroloftheduchiesofNormandyandAquitaine.Hisreign was notable in more

thanoneway,notleastfortheattempt, more than partlysuccessful, to restore royalcontrol over the compositionand discipline of the Frencharmy.AsunderCharlesV, itwas realised how essential itwas for the crown tonominate the army’s leaders:the days of the princes mustbe ended. In 1445, havingalready taken practical stepsto bring this about, the king

issued an ordinancereestablishing royal controloverthearmy.Fromnowon,the crown would designatethe leading captains andwould provide the moneyfromwhichthey,andtherestof the army, would be paid.Three years later, in 1448,Charles announced thecreation of a new force, thefrancsarchers who,representing every

communityandcommitted toregular training in the use ofarms,wouldformthecoreofthepermanent,national armywhich the king wished tocreate. The crown of France,moresothanthatofEngland,had stamped its influenceupon the recruitment of thenew-styledarmy.

SUPPLIES

ThesoldierofthelateMiddle

Ages was in receipt of awage. There was, therefore,no obligation upon hispaymaster, the crown, toprovide him with the foodand drink which he wouldneedoncampaign.Yet,ifthetaskoffindingprovisionswasleft to the soldiersthemselves, the results couldbe disastrous, for the menmightbecomemore involvedwith that preoccupation than

withtheirprimeconcern,thatof making war. Disciplinecould suffer. Moreover, theymight take it out on thepopulation of the countrythrough which they wereadvancing: Henry V had toissue orders that all foodconsumed by his army inNormandyshouldbepaidforon the spot, so that the localpopulation should not beantagonised. There was the

added, and very serious,danger that food would runout; a scorched earth policywas, after all, intended tomake life as difficult aspossible for those whoexpectedtobeabletoliveoffthe land. Not without reasonithasbeenclaimed that ‘fewproblemsfacinggovernmentsinthepre-industrialagecouldhave been as difficult as thatof providing sufficient food

foranarmyinthefield.’3There was a close

relationship betweenproviding an army with itssubsistence and that army’ssuccessasamilitarymachine.Feeding an army was oneway of making it efficient.Provisioning was, in itself, atest of efficiency. Castles,outlying garrisons, and shipsat sea had all to be cateredfor. Calais, for instance, was

almosttotallydependentuponEngland for its food, itsmunitions, and the othermaterials required for itsdefence as a bastion ofEnglish power on thecontinent. In the fourteenthcentury its large garrison (upto1,000menormoreintimeof war) was provided withfood as part payment of itswages under a systemorganized by the Keeper of

the King’s Victuals. Theimportance of maintainingsuchplaceswithall that theyrequired was underlined inMarch1416when theearlofDorset,captainofHarfleurinNormandy, which was beingblockaded by the French byboth land and sea, had tomakewhatturnedouttobeavery dangerous sortie tosecure food which was fastrunningout.

Everything pointed to thefact that, in time of war,provisioningcouldnotbeleftto hazard. In this respect theproblemsfacedbytheFrenchand English crowns were alittle different. Fightingmainly in their own country,theFrenchwerelesslikelytomeet opposition to thecollecting of victuals andother provisions than theEnglish, the enemy fighting

in a foreign country, woulddo.Theycouldprobably relyongreater co-operationwhenbuying on the spot; theycould more easily anticipatethe needs of their armies bysendingagentsaheadtoseetothe levy of provisions in theareas throughwhichanarmymight pass; and they mightalso, with greater ease,organisemerchants(towhomsafeconductswouldbegiven)

toprovidefortheneedsofthearmy at certain pre-arrangedplaces.All thiswas essentialif a degree of efficiencywastobeestablishedbyavoidingtheneed for the army to liveoffthelandandprotectingtheinterests of the civilianpopulation.

When they fought inFrance,andtoacertainextentinScotland,theEnglishcouldnot count upon the

advantages of fighting ‘athome’. Basically thisinvolved them in a systemwhich was an extension (atleastinscale)ofthewaytheyprovided for theneedsof theCalaisgarrison,forevenifanarmy could live off the land,itwasnonethelessadvisablefor it to have easy access tothe everyday provisionswhichitrequired.Inawarofsieges, an army seeking to

starveoutagarrisonhadtobefree of such practicalproblems as providing itsown food, so that during thelongsiegesofCalaisin1346–7 and of Rouen in 1418–19,bothEdwardIIIandHenryVhad supplies speciallyshipped to them fromEngland.

In both England andFrance the systems used toprovide for the country’s

military needs had much incommon. In France theprisewasthenormalwayofraisingprovisions, from bothindividuals and institutions.An official of the royalhousehold, called thePanetier du Roi, had charge,designatinghispowers to theregions, sometimes tobaillis,sometimes to royal captainsand others. Under Philip VIthose responsible were

divided into three maingroups: those who collectedcereal products, those withresponsibility for raisingwine, and those who soughtthe large quantities of fodderrequired for the horses andother animals. The work ofthese people was, militarily,of the very greatestimportance, but the systemwasopentoabuse,withmanydisputes arising out of acts

committed by over-zealousofficials against,significantly, exemptionsfrom the prise, ending up inthecourts.

In England the system ofpurveyance, as it was called,wastobecomeamajorcauseofdisputebetweenthecrownand its subjects. ‘Purveyors’,wrote William of Pagula,‘weresenttoactinthisworldasthedevilactsinHell’.The

financial difficultiesexperienced by Edward I ledhim to try to exploit thecrown’sclaimstothefull,butwith only moderate success.The issue between king andsubjectswas both a financialone (was it right that thosewho had already paid taxesshould have to contributesubstantially towards theupkeep of the army byproviding it with cheap

food?) and a constitutionalone, for the crown, byextending the idea that theking’s army, in T. F. Tout’swords, ‘was essentially thehouseholdinarms’whichthecountrycouldbecalleduponto provide for, wasdemanding help to feed thatnow greatly extendedhousehold of, perhaps,several thousand men.However, opposition to this

had reached its limits byabout themiddleyearsof thefourteenth century, andthereafter, with royal agentsacting more reasonably,purveyance became muchless of an issue betweencrownandpeople.

Unpopular though it was,the system none the lesshelped to make England’sfighting forces abroad moreefficient. In its least

objectionable form it enabledthe sheriff to compel thepurchaseofprovisionswhichhe had been ordered tocontribute towards a generalrequisition which was goingon all over, or in most partsof, the country at the time.Allwere liable to contribute.Monasteries, with theproduceoftheirestatesstoredin barns and granges, wereparticularly vulnerable,

although some, the rich orlocally influential, mightpurchaseexemptionsfromtheneed to contribute; somecounties, on the other hand,had demands made uponthem more frequently thanothers.During the first yearsof thewaragainstFrance thetask of raising provisions forthearmywashandedover tomerchants who, with anetwork of subordinate

agents, combed thecountryside exerting pressureonall tocontribute.Obtainedat rates usually below thecurrentmarketprice,andpaidfor in a way which oftenmadeitdifficultforthesellerto obtain the money owedhim, the produce of land(essentially bread,meat, beeror wine), together with fish,but little or no fresh fruit orvegetables (a dull diet at

best),andoatsforhorses,wastaken away to sustain thearmy or, as on someoccasions, to stores anddepots.

Theregularsupplyofarmswas also becomingincreasingly important at thisperiod. It was accepted that,when leaving his county, theEnglish soldier raised bycommission of array wouldbe adequately armed, his

locality having assumedresponsibilityforthepaymentof his weapons. The cheaperand simpler weapons couldbe demanded from thelocalities: bows, arrows, nottoforgetthesixwingfeatherswhich, in 1417, the sheriffswere ordered to obtain fromevery goose in theirjurisdiction at a low price,could all be demanded fromthe country at large. But in

both France and Englandweapons needed to beprovided by the crown, too.Bows could be lost; arrowswould certainly be used up,even if they were sometimesretrieved and used again, asthe evidence of manuscriptillumination suggests theywere. In this essential workthe English king’s privywardrobe, a vital part in hishousehold,playedtheleading

role.ItscentrewastheTowerofLondonwhere,inthereignofEdward III, theKeeper oftheKing’sArmshadhisbasefromwhich he organised thework of purchasing, storing,and finally distributing armsto armies, garrisons, andships. In1360, the storeheldover 11,000 bows and some23,600 sheaves, eachholdingtwenty-four arrows. By 1381there were less than 1,000

sheaves left, an indication ofthe need for constantreplenishmentofstock,aboveall in timeofwar.But itwasnot only bows and arrowswhich were kept in this, thenearest which the MiddleAges had to a nationalarmaments depot. Otheressentials had to bemaintained: tents for thesoldiers; saddlery; crossbowsand bolts; shields; lances;

heavy siege-engines; all hadtobeprovided.

The provision of cannonwas to require radicalmeasures. InFrance, thecostof manufacturing artillerywas borne almost entirely bythe crown, and, in this way,cannon became essentially aweapon of state which nowtook on an increasinglyimportant role in providingtheequipmentforitsarmies.4

The argument can besupported by noting that inboth England and Francethose who were maderesponsible for the foundingof cannon, their distributionand use did so under royalauspices, holding theirposition by authority of thecrownandbeingpaiddirectlybyit.Theirswasaspecialist’swork,whichsometimesraninfamilies. In 1375 Milet de

Lyon succeeded his father,Jean, as head of the Frenchking’s artillery, while inEngland, at about the sametime, four men of the BykerfamilyservedEdwardIIIandRichard II in the work ofproviding slings and, finally,smallironcannon.

Thetrendcontinuedinthefifteenthcentury.Theworkofthe Bureau brothers, whosereconstruction of Charles

VII’sartillery trainplayedsoconsiderable a part inbringing about the defeat ofthe English, is well known.ButtheFrenchkingswerenotaloneindevelopingtheuseofartillery. James II ofScotland,whodiedofinjuriesincurred when one of hiscannon, ironically called‘Lion’,explodedin1460,hada royal gunner. Before him,Henry IV of England was

said to be interested incannon. His son, Henry V,certainly was, and used theweapon to good effect in thesieges of his campaigns inFrance between 1415 and1422. Henry took the matterof the organisation of hisartillery very seriously: hehad no real choice, forcannonwereessential tohimifhewas tobringhiswarofsieges to a successful

conclusion. He kept officialsbusy, ordering cannon to beshippedtohimfromEnglandwhile he was in France andarranging forgunstones, ‘saltpietre, cole and brymstoon’,stored at Caen ‘in ye howseof oure ordennance’ and atHarfleur, to be sent to thesiege of Meaux in March1422 (theMusée de l’Arméein Paris still shows pieces ofartillery left by the English

after their successful siege).OnHenry’sdeath,John,dukeof Bedford, established anorganisation under the‘maistredel’artillerieduroy’which carried out theunspectacular but vital workof ordering the constructionand repair of cannon, largeandsmall,thepurchaseoftheingredientsofgunpowder,thetransport of weapons (sincetheywereheavyanddifficult

to move, this was done asoften as possible by water)from one siege to another,andtherenderingofwhatwasbecoming increasinglyprofessional advice on theproblemsofhowtoplacethepieces of artillery to achievemaximum effect. Thegrowing professionalismrequired tomake themostofthis relativelynewweapon isemphasised by the fact that

those who had charge of theEnglish artillery in France inthe fifteenth century were atthe head of retinues whichconsisted of specialists whostayed together in teams,sometimesforyearsatatime,thereby adding a strongelement of cohesion to theireffortswhichwereoftenwellrewarded.

Whatofthehorses?These,as we have seen, were very

expensive. ‘Hors flesche’,wrote William Paston fromLondoninFebruary1492,‘isofsucheapricehere thatmypurce is schante able to byeonhorse.’5Inthewar’searlyphases,atleast,aknightwhoprovided a horse might, if itwere injured or killed, claimcompensation under the oldcustom of restor (frequentlyinvoked in Frenchindentures). For this purpose

horseswerevaluedbyexpertsbefore a campaign, rather astoday’s knight of the roadvalues his vehicle inagreement with his insurers.In addition to a horse, aknight would also beexpected to provide himselfwith armour, the nature ofwhich was changing frommail to plate by the mid-fourteenth century. Thenotionthataman,evenunder

contract, should provide hismount, his armour, and hisweaponsdiedhard.Thehighsocial ranks armedthemselves; in return, itshould not be forgotten, theyreceivedmorepay.

There must have been agreat variety in the clothingwornby,andthearmscarriedby,armiesofthisera.Yettheachievementofacertainlevelof standardisation of dress

and armament was slowlybeingintroduced.Thiswastobeaccomplishedintwoways.The first was the result ofmusters,atwhichwerenotednot only the absences ofindividual soldiers, but alsothefailureofthosepresenttokeep themselves properly inarms and armour. The otherway was the gradualintroduction of the uniform.This, in themodernmeaning

oftheword,wasyettocome,but in 1340 the town ofTournai provided Philip VIwith 2,000 foot soldiers ‘allclothed identically’, while,from the mid-fourteenthcentury onwards, otherscoming from Cheshire andNorth Wales were oftendressed in green and white‘uniforms’.

The provision andtransport of weapons were

increasingly organisedcentrally. Bows and arrowsmadeinthecountryweresentup toLondon to be stored inthe Tower (in Paris weaponswere kept in the Louvre andthe Bastille) from where,packed in chests togetherwith spare bowstrings,feathers and arrowheadsspecially manufactured inareas such as the Forest ofDean (where iron was

worked), they weredespatched when required tothe ports, such as Sandwichor Southampton, forforwarding to armiesoverseas. When all wasready, time was often spentwaitingforafavourablewindtoblow,duringwhichperiodsoldiers had to be fed andtheir morale maintained, asthosewholivednearportsofembarkation realised,

sometimes to their cost. Onecannot but wonder that thedeparture of a transport fleetbearing an army and itsequipment was an eventwhich amounted to aconsiderable managerialachievement, reflected incertain chronicles assomething of which mencouldbeproud.

TAXATIONANDFISCAL

INSTITUTIONS

It was a characteristic of allgovernments of the MiddleAges to grow in size andscope. Since no governmentcan exist without financialsupport, as personnel grewanddocumentationincreased,so government became moreand more expensive. Withinthose rising expenses thecosts of war can be seen tohaveplayedamajorpart.The

demands of war, nowbecoming more frequent andmore prolonged, rose fromthe late thirteenth centuryonwards, to the point when,twocenturieslater,warmightaccount forbetweenhalf andtwo-thirds of public receiptsandexpenditure.

It is undeniable that notonly in France and England,but in other parts of Europesuch as Spain and Italy, the

graph of public militaryexpenditureroseverysharplyintheclosingcenturiesoftheMiddle Ages. In somerespects there was nothingnew in this. In England, forinstance, the need to providesome paid troops had beenrecognised in themid-twelfthcentury; more had beenprogressively spent on warever since the beginning ofthe thirteenth century, which

had witnessed fiscalinnovations in the reign ofKing John, whose financialresources for the task ofsaving Normandy werealreadyinadequate.Butitwasthe final quarter of thethirteenth century which, inbothFrance (involved inwarin Aragon, Flanders, andAquitaine) and in England(taken up in conflict inFrance,Wales,andScotland),

witnessed an increase in wartaxationonanunprecedentedscale. InEngland, this rise inexpenditure was part of awider difference betweenEdward I and his greatnobilityonthematteroftheirobligation to render himmilitaryserviceabroad;whileinFrance, intheyears1302–4, Philip IV raisedconsiderable taxation fromhis subjects in commutation

for their obligation to servehim in the defence of thecountry. Generally speaking,the English king had anadvantage over his Frenchcounterpart at this period.France had been involved inrelatively few wars in thecourse of the thirteenthcentury; England, on theotherhand,hadbeeninvolvedinbothWalesandScotland,apractical experience, both in

the raising of troops and insecuringmaterialpaymentforthem, which was to proveinvaluable in the early yearsoftheHundredYearsWar.

Weneedtoknowwhyandhow such historicallysignificantdevelopmentstookplace.InFrancethethirteenthcentury had witnessed agradual advance inwhatwasregarded as a vassal’sobligation, from defence of

his lord(theking) todefenceof the crown (the corona)and, by the end of thecentury, defence of thekingdom (the regnum).6 Inthe last case the kingdomcouldmeanbothaphysicallydelineated areaof landandaconcept,thecommonwelfareof those who inhabited it.Both meanings wereimportant, but, perhapsbecauseitwasarealitywhich

could be expressed inconceptualterms,morecouldbemade of the notion of thecommon welfare. Emphasiswas placed upon the generalobligation to contribute,either directly throughpersonalserviceorindirectly,through taxation, to thedefence of that welfare. Inexceptional circumstances,suchas inmomentsofattackfrom without, the king,

responsible for theprotectionof those under his charge,could demand help whichnone, either privileged orexempted,couldrefuse.War,or threatened invasion ofterritory, came to constitutean emergency, whichnecessitated an immediateand unsparing response.When the king judged that astate of common peril hadbeen reached, his subjects,

concerned for the commonwelfare, were expected tofulfil their obligation, bothtowards it and towards theirruler, by giving unstintedassistanceinwhateverformitmightreasonablybesought.

The lord who issued thesummons or demanded thetax was the king acting ascurator of the kingdom as awhole.But thisdidnotmeanthat the best interests of the

kingdommightnotbeservedat a local level. It was theking of England who calledout the local ‘reservists’ tocounter an attack upon themaritime lands; likewise theking of France mightauthorise a local tax, asCharlesVIdid inApril1383when he ordered the peopleof Perigueux to taxthemselves for three years ata rateof5percentongoods

soldwithin their jurisdiction,the money raised to beemployed towards the repairand improvement of thedefences of the town, at thatmomentinanareathreatenedby the English. Furthermore,thetextreveals,theraisingofsuch a tax had been carriedout locally for some timewithout royal approval: inpardoning the people thistechnical offence, the king

made it clear that over-alldirection of matters ofdefence, even at a very locallevel, should be carried outunder royal supervision.When, in March 1441, thepeople of Dieppe soughtpermission from Charles VIIto tax their commercialactivities in order to pay fortheirtown’sfortification,theyemphasised to him that theydared not do this without

royal permission, and thataccounts of the sumscollected would be madeavailabletotheroyalcaptain.Local defence was thus seenin the wider context of thedefence of the country as awhole, and as amatter to becontrolledby the crown.Theimplications of this wereclear. War, even its localramifications, was becomingamatterofstate.

In France, what hadhappened under Philip IV tomake the nation responsibleforgivingallassistancetotheking, his lieutenants andofficials in times ofrecognisable peril to thecommunity came to beaccepted during the first halfof the fourteenth century asthe norm, in spite of a shortperiodofprotest in1314and1315 when the newly-

evolving doctrines clashedwith local interests andprivileges, especially inNormandy.Butoneimportantmatter was not yet clear.What would happen if therewere a period of norecognisable peril, not tospeak of a truce or peace?Could taxes, justified in timeof war, be imposed inchanged circumstances? Andif imposed and collected, but

not yet spent, what wouldhappen to them if hostilitiesceased? The question wasfirst formally raised in 1298by Pierre d’Auvergne whoarguedthatoncethecauseforlevying taxes had passed,thentheyshouldnolongerberaised, since the cause fortheir being raised no longerexisted or applied (‘Cessantecausa, cessare debeteffectus’).7 Impliedherewas

the notion that taxes wereexceptional,andwereonlytobe raised in emergencies.What constituted anemergencywas something totrouble the conscience of thekingandhisadvisers.Butonething, already clear by theendof the thirteenth century,became even clearer by theend of the next generation:theking’ssubjectswouldpaytaxes only in time of real

militarycrisis(hencetheneedto declare war formally) andtheycametodemandrefunds(whichtheyreceivedin1302,1304, 1313, and 1314) whentaxes paid were not usedbecauseofanearlycessationofhostilities.Notsurprisinglythecynicalarguedthatitwasbestnottopayuntiltherewaspeace:thentherewouldbenoreasonforpayingatall!

Under the Capetians

prolonged war wasexceptional. The conflictbetween Valois andPlantagenet, however,changed all that. From thetime in, say, 1325 when theprinciple of ‘cessante causa’was still applied, itwouldbeonly some thirty years or sobefore another principle,momentous in itsimplications, would quietlywin acceptance: the right of

the ruler to raise permanentand general taxation. Therecanbelittledoubt that itwaswar and its needs whichconstitutedthemajorcauseinbringingaboutthischange.InFrance the war againstEngland led to a great andprobably unforeseenextension in the financialdemandsmade by the crownupon the country. Mostinfluential was the need to

raise the ransom promised tothe king of England by theterms of the treaty ofBrétigny. The financialmillstone which the ransomrepresented(somesixtyyearslater Henry V was stilldemanding that it should bepaid off in full)was the firstand most important factor injustifying the French crowninthelogicaldevelopmentofits fiscal policy, the making

permanent over a period ofyears,andinpeacetime,ofatax raised to satisfy a majorexpense of war, theransomingoftheking.

To this a second factorcame to make its owncontribution. Although thedecade 1359–69 may appearas a period of relative peacein France, it was also theperiod in which theCompanies showed

themselves most active,resultingintheurgentneedtoraise funds required to builddefences against this newsocialscourge.Inthiscase,ifthe authorisation to raisetaxes came from the centre,the levyandexpenditurewaslargely local.The importanceof this, however, liesprimarily in the fact thatwhole areas of France werecontinuously subject to

demands for greater sums intaxation. It might be someconsolation that monies thusraised would probably bespent locally, for thisundoubtedly encouragedpeople in theirwillingness topay, in some placesconsiderably more than intime of openwar against theEnglish. What seems certainis that the meeting of suchregular demands, together

with the raising ofcontributions towards theroyalransom,graduallymadepeople accustomed both tothe idea and the practice oftaxes raised for the commongood.

In England the story wasnot radically different. Asalready suggested, the warsagainst Scotland hadaccustomed thepopulation tothepaymentoftaxesforwar.

Itwasafact,too,thatEnglishpeople had for some timebeen used to paying directtaxation on moveableproperty and that from aboutthe time the war againstFrancebeganinEdwardIII’sreign such subsidies,standardisedinvaluein1334,with each local communitypayingasumwhichitdividedamong itself, were regularlygranted by Parliament. In

England, as in France, the1360s (paradoxically theperiodofrelativelyrestrainedmilitary activity) witnessedthe most tellingdevelopments. In 1362 and1365 to save the king’s‘estateandhonour’(infacttohelp pay for the defence ofCalais, Aquitaine, and theScottish border) Parliamentvoted a wool subsidy,followedin1368byafurther

two-year subsidy, again onwool. In 1369, inspired byfears of possible attacks onCalais and English coastalcounties, the lords andcommons jointly authorisedyetanother,thistimeathree-year, levy on wool, in effectthe imposition of an indirecttax tomeetanallegeddeficitin the royal finances. It isclear that such decisionsconstituted a recognition of

general obligation to pay forthe country’s defence inpeacetime. Thus bothEngland and France werereaching a broadly similarstage in the development oftheir respective taxationsystems at much the sametime.

One great differencebetweentheMiddleAgesandlater times was that themedieval state scarcely used

the credit system to startwars. A ruler, wrote theEnglish Dominican, JohnBromyard,about1360,oughtnot to embark upon a warunless he could reasonablyexpect to pay for it, a viewwhich would have beenwidely accepted at the time.From thevery first steps, thepractical need to have cashreadily available imposeditself. The custom of paying

indentured soldiers a ‘prest’(or prêt or imprestanza), anadvance on their wages toenable them to pay for theirequipment, placed aconsiderableburdenupon theking. Such an exampleunderlines the need to raisemoney quickly, and in partexplains the great difficultiesexperienced by Edward IIIwhen his cash resources ranout in1341.What, then,was

available to a ruler bent onwar? He could farm out thecollectionofa taxwhichhadbeen authorised: this had theadvantage of bringing themoney in quickly, thedisadvantagethatthefarmingsystemwasopentoabuseandwas consequently unpopular.Thegrantofaloan,initselfaform of taxation since theruler had use of the moneyfor what was sometimes an

indefinite period, was also acommon practice: for this towork,theking’scredithadtobegood,sothatevensogreatagrantorofcreditasCardinalBeauforthadoneofhisloanstoHenryVformallyrecordedin the Roll of Parliament toensure repayment. Thepractice of ‘advancing’ thedate by which a subsidyshould be collected was alsoemployed: Parliament had to

askHenryV not to continuedoing this when, half waythroughhisreign,hisneedformoney suddenly grew.Finally,therewasthepracticeofdebasementcarriedoutbyprinces whose prerogative itwas to decide the value ofcurrency.By1295Philip IV,in urgent need of cash, wasusing this method which heundertooktoendby1306,butonlyinreturnforthepromise

of a subsidy. Suchmanipulations of currency,which were not difficult toarrange, were particularlyunpopularamongthenobilityand clergy whose revenuescame largely in prearrangedsums from landed sources;the bourgeoisie, on the otherhand, especially those whoderived their wealth fromcash sources based on trade,were less alarmed. None the

less, for all its short-termadvantages to the crown,debasement was a divisivefactorinsociety,aweapontobe used only in times ofextreme crisis. As might beexpected, the practicegradually disappeared asother resources of royalrevenuebecamemorewidelyandpermanentlyestablished.

Taxation was basically oftwo kinds. Direct taxes were

thoseraisedonanassessmentof sources of wealth, bothfixed and moveable. InEngland, mainly since thereign of Edward I, suchtaxation had been grantedwithregularitybyParliament.In France, the practice ofdirect taxation did not comeinto being until the reign ofPhilip IV, Edward I’scontemporary. On a numberof occasions during his reign

subsidieswere raised in timeof war or threatened war, in1295attherateof1percent(centième), in1296atdoublethe rate (cinquantième), thelevies being regarded asalternatives to militaryservice, thereby linkingtaxation closely to war. Ahearth tax (fouage), whichtownspeople paid at a higherrate than their countryneighbours,andtherichmore

than the poor, was alsolevied;in1355itwasdecidedthat 100 hearths should payfor a man-at-arms and anarcher. The tax, however,bore heavily on the people,and in his last years CharlesVtriedtograntremissionsorreductions to communitiesknown to him to havesufferedparticularly fromthewar.Oneofhisverylastacts,as he was dying, was to

abolishitaltogether.In both France and

England the clergycontributed to nationaltaxation. In the last years ofthe thirteenthcenturyclericaltaxation had become a causecélèbre between PopeBonifaceVIII,PhilipIV,andEdward I: should the clergycontribute to royal taxation?By the early years of thefourteenth century, however,

the obstacle of clericalimmunity had been largelyovercome and the clergycontributed substantial sumswhenaskedtodoso.

It was, however, throughindirect taxationthat thewar,both in France and, inparticular, in England, waschiefly to be funded. InFrance the need to raisemoney in1341 led,ata timeof trucewhen direct taxation

could not be justified, to theestablishment of the salt tax(gabelle), which was to lastuntil the French Revolution.Ifeveryoneneededsalt,othertaxes on consumption,principally drink (themedieval value-added tax)were unpopular among thepoor who could less wellafford than could the richerclassestaxeswhichallhadtopay and which were most

easily collected in towns, inwhichtheycontributedahighproportion of urban taxation,six times more in 1360 thanin 1292. Loans, too, were aformoftaxationwhichmightbe extracted from bothindividuals and institutions.In England, for instance,royal officials were onoccasion expected to foregotheir salaries which werewithheld as contributions

towards seeing thegovernment through afinancialcrisis.Onadifferentscale were the loansoccasionally demanded fromtownsand,inparticular,fromthe city of London to helppay for the war. For if warwere to lead to economicadvantage, the better pleasedand more enthusiastic thetowns – and principally theports–wouldbe.

The ports, much morefirmly under royal control inEngland than in Francewhere, for most of the war,thekingdidnothave regularaccess to his own coastline,were the collecting points ofwhat was to prove the mostlucrative of all forms ofindirect taxation, customsdues. Here, the contrastbetween England and Francewas very marked. France,

more self-sufficient thanEngland, depended less thandid her rival upon importtradethroughherports,anditwas to be only in thesixteenth century that Franceimposed duties on incominggoods,althoughexportsweretaxed in the fourteenthcentury,especiallyafter1360,whentheneedtoraisemoneyto pay for King John’sransom began to make very

great demands upon thecountry. In England,however, the situation wasdifferent, taxes being leviedon both incoming andoutgoingtrade.Eversincetheend of the twelfth centuryEnglish kings had beenmaking sporadic, butincreasing,useofwoolasthebasis foranexport taxwhichwas becoming moreprofitable and which, after

1275, came firmly under thecontrol of the crown. By thefourteenth century, perhapsone third of the Englishking’srevenuecamefromtheexport tax, chiefly on wool,wool hides and skins, whiletunnage and poundage, thetax on wine and othermerchandise raised toprotecttrade, was becomingincreasingly regular andlucrative by the end of the

century.WemayfeelthattheFrench king had, to a certainextent, missed anopportunity; certainly thekings of England must haverejoiced at the contrast inpractice which brought themsuch advantage over theirFrenchcounterparts.8 Indeed,had it not been for the largesums raised from trade,England’s smaller populationandmore restricted resources

could not have supported aforeignwarforsolong.

Taxes voted to the crownhad to be collected andmanaged. New taxes wouldrequire new methods oforganisationtomakethemostof what was coming to beincreasingly regarded aspublic money, or ‘la pecunepublique’. Under the Valois,attempts were made toimpose a degree of

centralisation upon fiscalmeasures, particularly in the1370s. New offices werecreated. Salt was placed inthehandsofgrenetiers,manyof whom farmed theirposition;after1355éluswereappointed to élections,districts in which they actedas assessors of taxes; for thesettlingofdisputesarisingoutof demands for indirecttaxation, a special cour des

aides was established in1390; while a trésorier desguerres oversaw the generalproblems of handling warfinances, in particular thepaymentofarmies.

In England the system,which had already proveditselfinwar,wastobelessinneed of radical innovation.Theaccountingsystemwhichhascomedowntousthroughthepublic recordsshows that

while expeditions under thecommandofroyallieutenantswere normally financedthrough theExchequer, thoseled by the king himselfwereorganisedbyadepartmentofthe royal household, theWardrobe, whose work wasto be, in Tout’s words, ‘theexecutive agent in the field’.Sometimes assisted byanother householddepartment,theChamber,the

Wardrobe, with an expandedstaff, ordered the levy oftroops, the purchase ofhorses,storesandequipment,and was, in addition, closelyinvolved in the diplomaticbusiness of the king, as wasappropriate for a body soclose to the royalpersonandmembers of his council staffwho, together, wereresponsible for decisionsregardingwar.

Butweshouldnotthinkofthe English war machine, inits financial aspects, ascompletely traditional andunreformed. The publicationbyEdwardIIIinJuly1338ofthe so-called ‘WaltonOrdinances’ was an attemptto make efficient thegovernment of England, andthat included theadministration of war. Theemphasis was on saving, on

‘valueformoney’,andontheuse of the audit to controlexpenditure in both war anddiplomacy, as theappointment of a specialtreasurer for war wasintended to show.9 Timewould prove that the systemwas not always reliable andwas open to abuse.None theless, the use of essentiallyhousehold departments tofinance and organise war,

traditional as they may haveseemed,enabledthekingandhis councillors to keep inclose touch with thoseresponsible for the hugebackground effortwhichwarrequired,andwhichisalltooeasily forgotten. That such asuccessful soldier-king asHenryVshouldhaveusedtheWardrobe as his basicfinancial and administrativeunit in organising and

fighting war speaks a gooddealforatleasttheefficiencyof the system, howeveruninnovativeitmayappear.

In both England andFrance,wemaybe sure,wargave a great boost to thedevelopment of centralisedinstitutions and to the royalauthority. Equally, it shouldbe emphasised that not allpublic expenditure related towar was the direct result of

centralised intervention orinitiative. French historianshave, of late, stressed theimportant factor that in theircountry there existed twofinancial systems, onenational, the other local,which worked side by side,and which were built uptogether. This should causeno surprise, given theimportance of the region orprovince in the French

politicalstructure.Oppositionto the raising of taxes whichmightbespentinanotherpartof the kingdom militatedagainst involvement in awarbeing fought perhapshundreds of miles away.Equally, only when theirregion and, consequently,their common profit wasthreatened,werepeoplereadyto act. Indeed, it can bearguedthatthepiecemealand

local nature of war dictatedby both the English (theenemy fromwithout) and bythe Companies (the enemyfrom within), to say nothingof thevery localcharacterofthe civil war whichdominated so much ofCharles VI’s reign,encouragedpeopletoseewarin local, rather than national,terms, and that this lednaturally to the need for the

reaction to come from localinitiativesandtobebasedonlocalwealth.

The system which wasdeveloped in the second halfof the fourteenth century fitsinto this pattern. In someplaces rudimentary localtaxation already existed by1340.Whatwas lackingwastheabilityandauthoritytolayhands upon sufficientfinancial resources to build,

repair, and maintain localdefensive systems(principally walls) whichconstituted the onlyreasonableformofdefenceinthewarwhichtheenemywaswaging. How were theseneedstobemet,andwhowastopay?Theanswersemergedfairly quickly. Generallyspeaking, the regions wereleft to organise their owndefence within an over-all,

national plan. As to whowouldpay,theanswerwastobe broadly the same: theregionsand,inparticular, thetowns.This led to significantdevelopments. Meetings orregional estates voted sumswhich, by royal authority,couldbe spent in those sameregions. On occasions thecrown presented towns withgifts of money to help in aparticular crisis: sometimes a

local lord did the same. Butusually such a royal giftwasonly the paying over of partofalevyalreadycollectedfortheir own defence to thosewho had paid it. In a word,although this seemed likeoutside help, such sums, likethat granted to the people ofRodez in 1367, were onlyhelping the citizens to helpthemselves.

In large measure, money

spent on local projects ofurban defence had beenraised locally. Loans soughtfrom both town-dwellers andthosewhohadpropertythere,but lived outside the walls,frequentlyraisedconsiderablesums: almost 2,000 écus atToursandsome4,500écusatReimsin1358.Butthemajorcontribution (some 61 percent at Tours in 1358) camefrom the imposition of local

taxes (aides) upon a varietyofgoodsandservices:onsalt,on wine, and on rents raisedonproperty in the towns, therate being 10 per cent atTours in1364,20percentatDijon in 1412, the greatersum being levied uponabsenteelandlordswhomightnot otherwise contributetowardstheneedsofdefence.

InEngland,too,therewereexamples of local measures

beingemployedinadditiontonational ones. Of thesemurage,firstraisedin1220ata timeof threatened invasionfrom France, was theprincipalone.Thistax,leviedupon the sale of goodsentering a town, wasauthorised by the crown andwas collected andadministered locally,accounts being submitted totheking.AsinFrance,inthis

casebyraisingalevyonlocaltrade,anattemptwasmadetoforce contributions from thewider community. As inFrance, too,adirectsales taxsuch as murage was not theonlyformoflevyimposedforthe building of walls. In thefourteenth century taxes onlocal property were raised:likewise thekingcouldremitwhatwasowedtohiminfee-farm,customsdues,orprofits

ofjustice.In1382thepeopleofColchester, in their searchfor saving on communalexpenditure, obtainedexemption from sending arepresentative to Parliamentfor the next five years (anexemptionlaterreneweduntil1410), the savings thusmadebeingspentonthebuildingofwallsaroundtheirtown.10

In both France andEngland it is clear that help

wasgiven toencourage localinitiatives. It would be amistake to think that thewarwas directed from and paidfor by Paris or Westminsteralone.Thereverseofthecoinshouldnotbeforgotten,foritshowed that local autonomy,energy, and initiatives wereall exercised for the bestpurpose, the defence of thecommongooditself.

ORDERANDCONTROL

As we have already noted,people of the late MiddleAges appear to haveaccepted,withacertainsenseof fatalism, the destructiveenergiesreleasedbywar.Wehavealsoseenthattheperiodwitnessed an increasingawareness of what suchdestruction meant to thosewho experienced it: moralshockandmaterial loss.Was

this desirable, either in termsof the physical violencewhichwar appeared to breed(‘there is no good warwithout fire’), or of theeconomic loss (sometimeslong-lasting)whichitcaused,or (a point increasinglyaccepted) of the militaryeffectiveness whichcommanders sought toachieve?Theevidenceseemstosuggestnot.

It has become fashionabletoseewar in termsofarmiesravaging the enemy’scountryside, in order todeprive him of material andeconomic resources, ratherthanasaseriesof ‘set-piece’confrontationsorbattles.Theenemy, Vegetius had taught,should be brought to hiskneeswithaslittlerisk,effortandexpenseaspossible.Thisrequiredthatwarbefoughtin

a relatively disciplined andordered manner. We musttake note of how thesechangestookplace.

The late Middle Ageswitnessed a development inthe formalisation of war’sactivities. Some writers haveseen this as satisfying thewell-knownmedieval loveofsymbolicaction:thegivingofhisrightglovetoSirDenisdeMorbecque symbolised John

II’s act of surrender at thebattle of Poitiers, while thevery formal surrender of thekeys by its leading citizensrepresented the capture ofHarfleur by Henry V inSeptember 1415. Likewisethe raising of unfurledbannerssignalledtheopeningofhostilities,justasthefiringofacannoncametomarkthestart of a siege. Thesociologist may choose to

interpretsuchactsintermsofplay or game, and thatelement cannot be totallyruled out. Yet of far greatersignificance is the fact thatsuch acts were not onlysymbolic but were alsoregarded as creatingparticular legal situationswhich could have effectsupon decisions taken in thecourts of law.Disputes as tothe legal status of a soldier

claimed by another as hisprisoner could hang on thecircumstances in which theman was captured or themanner in which he wastaken.Whoseprisonerhewasmight depend to whom hehadformallysurrendered,andhow. A knight might takeanother prisoner and assumethathewasnowhis ‘master’(withallthatthiscouldmeanin legal terms); but if the

‘givingoffaith’ tothecaptorbythecapturedwerenotdoneproperly and formally, thenthe ‘capture’ might beregarded as invalid and opento challenge in a court oflaw.11

Thehistorical significanceof this form of evidence(which may appear to bemerequibblingoveramatterof military custom) ispreciselythatitshowsusthat

recourse to the law wasencouraged as a means ofbringing fairly widely-heldconventions to bear upon theconductofwar,andthatthesewere being applied judiciallyin courts such as theParlement of Paris or themilitaryoradmiraltycourtsinboth England and France.12In such courts a number ofdifferent traditions, somemore formally legal than

others,were brought to bear.One was local custom, builtup over decades and evencenturies, upon which manydecisions in suits overmerchandise taken in wartime were based. Another,more difficult to define withprecision,wasthetraditionofthe chivalric code, whichgave guidance and,sometimes, laid downprinciples for the conduct of

theknightlyclassinwar.Butprobably most important ofallwasthestronginfluenceofthe ‘written law’, and inparticular of the specificallymilitary law ofRomewhich,much modified by morerecently promulgated canonlaw, sometimes formed thebasis of judgements handeddown in, for instance, theParlement.Heretheinfluenceof the fourteenth-century

Italian school of jurists, oneof whose tasks was to makethelawofRome,andthelaterlawofJustinian,relevantandapplicable in their own, verydifferent, century, wasconsiderable. In Italiantradition law was one meansof achieving the commongood.Lawmustbepractical,otherwise its influence andeffectiveness would bediminished. Significantly it

wastotheItalianuniversitiesthat Charles V of Franceturned in 1368–9 for adviceas towhetherhehada causefor resuming the war againstthe English in Aquitaine.Equally significant, it was tothe same widely acceptedprecepts of Roman law thatthose who sought to findsolutions to legal problemsarising out of war betweendifferent peoples also turned.

Thelawwas‘international’inallbutname.

Appeal to the old-established law,albeit anup-dated one, was a way ofbringing a measure of orderto war’s activities. Anotherwas the introduction of newor restated regulationsconcerning the conduct ofboth armies and individualcombatants in timeofwar. Itwas the final quarter of the

fourteenth century whichwitnessed increasinglyoutspoken criticism of theway contemporary war wasbeing fought; the works ofHonoré Bouvet and Philippede Mézières are among ourprime witnesses to this. Thecalltodefendthecivilian,hisperson, and his property, areactionagainst thegenerallyaccepted ways of makingwar, was beginning to be

heard. It is no coincidencethat the best-known attemptto control the excesses ofEnglish armies, theordinances drawn up byRichard II at Durham in1385, should date from thistime. In these regulations, anumber of important mattersare dealt with. The militaryjurisdiction of the constableandthemarshalofthehostisclearly established, and

punishments for specificoffencesaresetout; theneedfor soldiers to act only withauthority of superior(‘chevytaignes’) isemphasised; order within thearmyis tobemaintained; therights of civilians are to beobserved; and specificregulations regarding thecapture and ransoming ofprisoners are set out. Agenerationlater,inHenryV’s

day, another, rather longer,set of ordinances was to beissued, ‘the whiche…thinketh the Kyng to benedefull to be cried in theoste’fromacopytobegivento all commanders, ‘so thatthay may have playnknowlegeandenfourme theirmen of thiez foresaideordinauncez & articlez’.13 Itwas not sufficient for theordinances to be made; their

contentshad tobepublicisedso that all serving or presentin the king’s army shouldknow what they might ormightnotdo.Therecouldbenodoubtregardingtheking’sfirm intention to exercisedisciplinewithinhisarmy.

The practical ability totranslate that determinationinto reality was increased bythe development of themilitary indenture, one of

whose major contributionswas that it established ahierarchy of authority andcommand,andmadeallthosewithinthesystemliabletothetaking of orders and theacceptance of discipline. Intheory, if not always inpractice, authority in bothEnglish and French armiescame to be exercised in thenameoftheking,orofoneormore nominated to act in his

name.Furtherdown,captainswho did not have lieutenantsassigned to them oftenappointed such menthemselves, the relationshipbeing formalised through thedrawing up of indentures. Inthis way the chain ofcommand came intoexistence, and could be seento exist. When it was aquestion of applying thatcommand,thiscouldbedone

in different ways. Captainsexercised a measure ofdisciplinary authority whichthey could use to counter oreliminate specificallyunauthorisedactivities,andinthistheyhadtheassistanceofthemarshalsandof thecourtof the constable of the host.Standardsof competenceandequipment could bemaintained by musters, andthenbyregularreviews,when

soldiers under a particularcommander were regularlyassembled (often once amonth in time of war) to becounted,inspectedandpassedassuitableforservice(‘armezentiers’),theinspectionbeingusually carried out at thecommand of the highestauthorityby two independentpersons, one of whom wassometimes a civilian.14 Itwas only after such an

inspection that the crown’sfinancial agents wereinstructed to make paymentto the captain, and then onlyfor those men who werepresent and had ‘passedmuster’.

The application of such astructured system had greatadvantages, as was clearlyappreciatedwhenaformofitwas introduced into theFrench army in 1351 as part

ofapackageof reforms.Thequality of troops, and notmerely their quantity, couldthus be maintained. In thisway the men themselves, iffulfilling what was requiredofthem,wouldexperiencenofinancial loss throughpenalties; nor would theirleaders suffer reproach forproviding soldiers who didnot come up to standard, aswas sometimes the case.The

inspection system had theadvantagethat itheldnofearfor those who fulfilled theirobligations, while it couldexposethosewhodidnotandwho, thereby, not onlydiminished the efficiency ofthe force in which theyserved, but also laidthemselves open to‘correctionbythepurse’.

Thewithholdingofwages,the basic source ofwealth to

most soldiers, for thebreakingornon-fulfillmentofan indenturewasperhaps themost effective way ofapplying and maintainingmilitary standards within anarmy. Important, too, werethe attitudes of the crown’smilitary officers and of thecourts to militarymisdemeanours.Forasoldiernottobeadequatelypreparedfor war (lacking proper

weapons, for instance) wasbad enough; for him to beabsentwithoutleave(‘nomandeparte fro[m] the stale[army] withoute leve &licenceofhislordormaister’,as Henry V’s ordinance putit)15 was coming to be seenas not merely theinfringement of a privatecontract to which he wasparty,butassomethingmuchmore important and

significant, little short oftreason itself.This changeofemphasis was coming aboutin the second quarter of thefifteenth century. In 1433,when Robert Stafford wasinvolved in a suit before theParlement of Paris, accusedof having negligently failed,through absence, to preventthe capture by the French ofLa-Ferté-Bernard, of whichhe was captain, he sought

(successfully,asitturnedout)todefendhis‘honneur’andtohave the sentence ofconfiscation of propertypassed against himoverturned.Atthesametime,and in the same court,ThomasOvertonandSirJohnFastolf were locked in legalcombat over a complexfinancial case which wasconcerned, on the one hand,with a matter of personal

honour, on the other, andmore significantly, with howmoney, collected in the formof taxes, should be spent.16How far, the question wasbeing asked in these years,wastheobligationoftheking(and, by implication, that ofsoldiers inhispay) todefendthe public welfare the all-important considerationgoverning military conduct?A soldier, having agreed by

indenturetoservethekingorhis representative in returnfor the promise of pay, wasnow coming to be seen asaccepting pay from publicfunds, so that the obligationto serve the public welfare(expressed in terms such as‘la chose publique’ or ‘ladeffense du pais’) imposeditself with greater moralweightuponhisshoulders.In1439 the English Parliament

movedwiththetimeswhenitpassed legislation makingdesertion, evenwhen nowarwas being fought, thebreaking not simply of aprivate contract betweensoldierandcaptainbut,moreimportant, the breaking of aformal undertaking in whichbothsoldierandcaptainwerethe servants of a greater,public good. In suchcircumstances, andwith such

ideas in the air, it is scarcelysurprising that every effortpossible should have beenmadetoachieveandmaintainproper authority over everysoldier in an army. WithParliament asking questionsabout the spending of fundspublicly voted, it becamemorallyincumbent,aswellasmilitarily desirable, forcommanders to imposediscipline from the top.Very

slowly the idea of publicaccountability for moneyspent (or ill spent) wascomingintobeing.17

DIPLOMACY

The delicate relationshipbetweenEnglandandFrance,based since 1259 upon thetreaty of Paris, needed verycareful handling. None tookmore care than did the

English who, in the secondhalfof the thirteenthcentury,began to build thefoundations of a diplomaticservice and record-keepingsystem so efficiently that, inthe mid-fifteenth century,Jean Juvénal des Ursins,impressed by its workings,drewhissovereign’sattentiontoitasanexampletofollow.That servicewas based upontwo essential factors: a

suitable personnel, and anarchive system. With regardto the first, there was anincreasingly conscious efforttoenableenvoystodevelopaspecialism (for example,knowledgeoftheproblemsofone country) with the resultthat the same persons weresent time and again to helpnegotiate treaties or breachesof truce with that country.There were advantages,

particularlythatofcontinuity,in such a system: HenryV’senvoyswerenotimpressedin1418 when they found thattheir French counterpartswere not familiar with theterms of the treaty ofBrétigny (which the Englishwantedtoapply)norwiththeFrenchmen’s evident lack ofexact geographicalknowledge. The growingprofessionalism of English

diplomats was furtherreflectedinthelegaltraining,particularlyincanonandcivillaw, which many hadreceived.Inaworldinwhichtreaties were drawn up andnegotiationsoftencarriedoutin accordancewithprinciplesderived from these legaltraditions, experts in suchmatters could have animportant part to play. Noembassywithpowers to treat

could be without its legalexpert, and, if the gatheringweretobeasignificantone,anumber would be inattendance. The increasingpopularity of civil law as asubject of study at Oxfordand Cambridge in the lateMiddle Ages, and thefounding, by Edward II, ofthe King’s Hall, Cambridge,as an institution many ofwhosemembersweretotrain

in law before entering theroyal service, is evidence ofthe universities being awareof society’s developingneeds, and of their wish tosupply the state with thesuitablyqualifiedpersonnelitneeded.

Alongwith this expansionof personnel went thedevelopmentofanarchiveordepartmental file. In 1268,JohnofStDenishadalready

been namedKeeper of PapalBulls by Henry III in anattempt to bring order to asituation in which essentialdocuments were subject todispersal.Agenerationlatera‘Keeperof theProcessesandother royal recordsconcerning the duchy ofAquitaine’wasappointed,hisfirst task being to collect,sort, andstoreawidevarietyofdiplomaticdocuments,and

to provide royal envoyswithboth the necessary recordsandadvicewhichwouldhelpthem in their work. Theimportanceofwhatwasbeingdonewasunderlinedwhen,in1294,theEnglishlostmostoftheir records concerningAquitaine when these weredumped on the island ofOléron by a mutinous crew,only to be seized by theFrench when they later took

the island. Such anadministrative disaster led tothe compilation, between1320and1322,ofacalendarof a wide variety ofdocuments touching theduchy of Aquitaine ‘in orderto have a fuller memorythereof in the future’,18 thedocuments having alreadybeendividedintoanumberofclasses for the sake ofconvenience, an index

permitting ease of access towhat was being sought. Acollection of diplomaticdocumentswithanessentiallypractical value had beencreated.

The organisation ofdiplomaticpracticewasbeingdevelopedinaccordancewiththeneedsofthetime.Thedayof the permanent embassyhadnotyetdawned; itwoulddoso,underItalianinfluence,

onlyinthesecondhalfofthefifteenth century. In themeanwhile, the most had tobe made of the existing adhoc system, by whichembassiesweredespatchedtofulfilaparticularmissionandthenreturnhomeonce itwascompleted. None the less,therecanbenodoubtthatthestatusof theambassadorwasrising. Envoys wereincreasingly chosen not

merely for their social status(althoughthatwasimportant)but for their experience and,in some cases, for theiroratorical and linguisticskills. A knowledge of thelaw could have an importantcontribution to play in anembassy’swork:anabilitytospeakgoodLatin(asThomasBekynton,oneofHenryVI’sleading ambassadors,possessed) was also highly

regarded, particularly amongthe English who mistrustedthose, such as the French,whopreferred tonegotiate intheir own language. Latin, itwas felt, was a languagewhich was generallyunderstood, and in whichambiguitiescouldbeavoided.

The growing importanceattributed todiplomacycouldbe seen in other ways. Thesacredness of the diplomat’s

work(‘Blessedarethepeace-makers’) was underlined bythe scene chosen for thesolemnsealingoftreaties:theAnglo-Portuguese alliance ofMay 1386 was sealed in thechapel royal at Windsor,while that of Troyes wassealed on and proclaimedfrom the high altar of thecathedralon21May1420 inthepresenceofHenryV, theEnglish using the same seal,

with change of name, asEdward III had used for thetreatyofBrétignysomesixtyyears earlier. Adherence tothe terms of so solemn anagreementcouldnotbeeasilyrenounced: Philip, duke ofBurgundy, had to seek papaldispensation from theallegiance which he hadgiven to Henry V on theoccasion just cited. Theimmunities and privileges

accorded to envoys on theirtravels (privileges whichmany abused, claimedPhilippe de Commynes,whoregarded ambassadors aslegalisedspies)werealsopartofthegrowingrecognitionofthe work of ambassadors,whichoughttobecarriedout,as far as was possible,without fear of harm beingdonetothemontheirtravels,particularlyinthelandsofan

enemy. Rulers generallyrecognised this. Far fromwishingtoharmenvoys,theyoftenmadeapointofmakingexpensive presents to them,perhaps as a sign offriendship, more probably inthehopeoftherebyobtaininga favourable report of theirown country at the court ofanother.

The more important andinfluential diplomacy

became, so the need toorganise it with greaterefficiency came to berecognised. We have notedthatoneimportantfactorwasfor envoys to have easy andreasonably well-organisedaccesstopapers,whichmightinclude instructions given to,andmemorandadrawnupby,former ambassadors. Thisenabled diplomacy to becarried out with continuity:

envoys could see what theirpredecessors had said anddone, what offers had beenmade – and perhaps rejected– by both sides, knowledgewhich was intended tostrengthen the hand of newnegotiators.Anotherfactorofimportance was that theinstructions of new envoysshould bear relation to theactualwarsituationandtotheviews of those who

formulated policy. Untilabout themiddleyearsof thefourteenth century, theEnglish chancery issued themajor formal documents,such as procurations andletters of credence, whicheveryembassyneededbeforeit could treat; the samedepartment,too,wasthemaintraininggroundforthosesenton diplomatic missions. Butthe war brought change, a

move towards more directroyal participation indiplomacythroughthegreateruse of the Chamber, to storeincoming documents, and ofthe Wardrobe, with its closeproximitytothepersonoftheking. This tendency, to someextentparalleled (aswehaveseen)infinancialandmilitaryorganisation, led to a greatercontrol by the king and hiscouncil of the diplomatic

process through documentsissued under the privy sealand, under Richard II, theking’s own signet. Such asystemhadtwoadvantages.Itenabled documents to beprepared close to the sourceof authority fromwhich theyemanated; while such adevelopment also enabled ameasure of flexibility, even,if need be, of speed to beintroduced into thesystem.It

became clear thatnegotiations with foreignstateswerebeingorganisedinamannerwhichmadeforthegreatest degree ofcompatability between thecomplexities ofadministration and the desireof the king, and thosewhoseadvice he sought, to maketheir influence upondiplomacy properly felt. Thepractice of an embassy

reporting back to the king(and probably to his council,too) either when its missionwas completed or when itsought further instructions,and the frequent presence ofthe clerk from the royalhouseholdamongmembersofan embassy, reflect clearlyhow the newly developingprocedures were being builtaroundtheofficeoftheking.In thismanner of proceeding

lay the greatest hope of co-ordinatingwaranddiplomacyatthecentre.

1M.E.MallettandJ.R.Hale,Themilitaryorganisationofarenaissancestate.Venice,c.1400–1617(Cambridge,1984).

2Forthecontroversyregardingthismatter,seethebibliography

forch.4,subLewis,N.B.andPalmer,J.J.N.

3C.S.L.Davies,‘Provisionforarmies,1509–50:astudyintheeffectivenessofearlyTudorgovernment’,Econ.H.R.,secondseries,17(1964–5),234.

4Contamine,Guerre,étatetsociété,p.299.Seealsohis‘LesindustriesdeguerredanslaFrancedelarenaissance:l’exempledel’artillerie’,R.H.,550(1984),249–80,andD.H.Caldwell,‘Royalpatronageofarmsandarmour-makingin

fifteenthandsixteenth-centuryScotland’,Scottishweaponsandfortifications,1100–1800,ed.D.H.Caldwell(Edinburgh,1981),pp.72–93.

5Pastonlettersandpapers,I,no.414.

6J.R.Strayer,‘DefenseoftherealmandroyalpowerinFrance’,Medievalstatecraftandtheperspectivesofhistory(Princeton,1971),pp.293–4.

7E.A.R.Brown,‘CessantecausaandthetaxesofthelastCapetians:thepolitical

applicationsofaphilosophicalmaxim’,StudiaGratiana,15(1972),567–87.

8Onthetaxationofinternationaltrade,seeB.Guenée,StatesandrulersinlatermedievalEurope(Oxford,1985),p.99.

9T.F.Tout,ChaptersintheadministrativehistoryofmedievalEngland,IV(Manchester,1928),69–80,143–50.C.Given–Wilson,Theroyalhouseholdandtheking’saffinity.Service,politicsandfinanceinEngland1360–1413

(NewHaven:London,1986),pp.121–30.

10Turner,Towndefences,p.42.11‘Siaucunprentunprisoner,qilpreignesafoy…’,BlackBookoftheAdmiralty,ed.T.Twiss(R.S.,London,1871),1,457.

12SeeKeen,Lawsofwar,ch.2,and‘Jurisdictionandoriginsoftheconstable’scourt‘,pp.159–69;R.G.Marsden(ed.),Selectpleasinthecourtofadmiralty(SeidenSoc,6,London,1894).

13BlackBook,I,453ff,471.

14Asimilarpracticewascarriedoutinfifteenth-centuryFlorence.

15BlackBook,I,466.16AllmandandArmstrong(eds.),Englishsuits,pp.220–30,231–68.

17A.Curry,‘ThefirstEnglishstandingarmy?MilitaryorganisationinLancastrianNormandy,1420–1450’,Patronage,pedigree,andpowerinlatermedievalEngland,ed.C.Ross(Gloucester:Totowa,1979),pp.205–6.

18QuotedinAGasconcalendarof1322,ed.G.P.Cuttino(Camdenthirdseries,70,London,1949),p.viii.

WAR,SOCIALMOVEMENT,AND

CHANGE

It has become increasinglyaccepted over recent yearsthat the economic effects of

war upon European societymayonlybeseenintheirtrueperspective when studied inthe context of the long-termdevelopments of the lateMiddle Ages. This approachto history sees the thirteenthcentury as a period of fairlygeneral expansion andprosperity, when populationsgrew and the land needed tosustain them was developed.Althoughinmanyplacesboth

populationandprosperityhadceased to grow by the lastyearsofthecentury,therapiddecline which occurred inmuch of Europe in the firsthalfofthefourteenthcenturyshocked contemporaries. Itmusthaveseemedthatnature(or was it God manipulatingnature?)hadturnedonmantopunishhim.

Between 1315 and 1317prolonged rains and

unseasonal weather in manypartsofnorthernEuropeleadtodearth,lackofseedcorn,ashortageof salt (whichcouldnot be properly dried whenthe sun failed to show itselfforlongperiods),followedbyepidemics of murrain amongsheepandcattle.Theseyearsof famine which, in someplaces, recurred in 1321 and1322, are now regarded bymanyhistoriansastheturning

point in the history of theperiod. For these disturbedyears led to greater numbersliving on the poverty line, toanincreaseincrime,afurtherdecline inpopulation (thatofFlandershaddecreasedby10per cent in 1315–16),uncertainty in England aboutthe wool trade and, veryimportant, a marked rise inthe surrender of landholdings, clear indications of

a crisis and of little hopebeingplacedintheimmediatefuture. In France, bad andirregular harvests in thedecade1340–50weretohaveconsiderable effects uponproduction. No wonder thatthe weather appeared as arecurring theme in the briefrecordoftheseyearsgiveninLa petite chronique deGuyenne.

Then, in 1348 (following

severeflooding insouth-westFrance in the previous year)therecame theplague,whichhitmuchofEuropeandnevercompletely disappeared,recurring again, in Englandfor example, in 1361, 1369,and 1375. The effects weresudden and catastrophic.Mortality rates ranged fromabout one-eighth to two-thirds,with longtermadverseresults. Prices rose, as did

wages, when less land cameundercultivation.Populationsbecamemoremobile.Forthelandowning classes suchdevastation could bedisastrous. If some largeestatessurvivedand,inafewcases,becameeven largerbythe purchase of surplus land,the troubles were to affectmore modest landowners,especiallythosewhoseestateslay insparselypopulatedand

already less prosperousregions.

Other kinds of changeswere taking place elsewhere.By the end of the thirteenthcentury the economy ofFlanders was on thedownward slope, affected bythe commercial enterprise ofItaly, the development of thecloth-making industry inEngland, the need to importlarge quantities of cereal,

mainly from the Baltic, tofeed a dense population, andby selfinflicted wounds ofpolitical rivalryandwarwithFrance. Flemishmanufacturing and tradepatterns were changing, andwith these so did those ofother countries, notablyEngland. It is against such abackground of change thatwar and its effects can beseen.

How did such factorsaffect those who lived inurban communities? Plaguehit towns more dramaticallythan it did the countryside.Furthermore, in time of war,townsfolk were in anunenviablesituation.Withoutwalls they were defenceless,at the mercy of evenrelatively small forces ofsoldiers or freelance troops.Not unnaturally,many towns

chosetobuildwalls,butinsodoing involved themselves incruel expense: Rouen spentabout a quarter of itsmunicipal budget on thebuilding and maintenance ofits defences during theseyears.Oncebuilt, itmightbethought, walls providedsecurity for those livingwithinthem.Yettheyproveda powerful attraction torefugees fleeing before

armies, whilst the changedcharacter of the war meantthat they attracted thosewhose aim was not merelyraiding,butconquest.

The close link betweentown and countryside wasevidentbothinmilitaryterms(the town was both a refugeandaplacewhereagarrison,intended to protect thesurrounding ‘plat pays’, wasstationed) and in economic

ones. The countryside mightrelyonurban-basedindustriesfor certain of its needs; butmore so the town dependedupon the rural population toprovide it with some of thebasic necessities of everydaylife, notably the bulk of itsfood.Onehasonlytoreadtheaccount given by the‘Bourgeois de Paris’ of freshfood arriving in Paris, oftenby river, to appreciate the

significance to the town-dweller of having ready andeasy access to regularsupplies, sometimes fromnearby, sometimes from faraway. The Parisians countedupon peace inNormandy forfish from the Channel ports,particularly Dieppe; andwhen Chartres, some fiftymiles from the capital as thecrowflies,felltotheforcesofCharlesVIIinApril1432,the

immediateeffectwasasharprise in the price of bread inParis,sincemuchof thecornrequiredwasgrowninanareanow vulnerable to theattention of enemy soldiers.The bitter language used bythe ‘Bourgeois’ against those(usually Armagnacs) whodeliberatelydestroyedParis’ssourcesofsupplyshowshowfar towns were reliant uponthe countryside for many of

their everyday needs, andhow truewas the saying thatthe quickest way to take atown was to ravage thecountryroundabout.

Tradeandcommercewereamong the first to feel theeffects of war. At Caen, inNormandy, the amount paidfor the right to farm taxes inthe port in 1326 was 2,800livres; by 1368 it had fallento1,650livres,whileby1413

it had sunk to a mere 1,100livres. The trade of the townwas clearly contracting. InEngland, the decline ofWinchelsea, in Sussex, wasfinally settled by the Frenchraidof1380, fromwhich thetown never recovered;Yarmouth was to feel theeffects of war at sea andincreasing competition fromFlandersinthesecondhalfofthe fourteenth century; while

on the Dorset coastMelcombe Regis, which hadonce been a centre ofshipping and had contributedvessels to the fleet, but hadtwice been burned in thereigns of Edward III andRichard II, was in rapiddecline by the beginning ofthe fifteenth century, thecustoms post beingdiscontinuedin1433.

Yet if many small ports

suffered from the effects ofwar, large ones did notnecessarily do so. Thehegemony of London amongEnglish ports and townscontinued. So did theprosperity of Bristol, eventhough its imports of winefrom Gascony were never tobehigher than theyhadbeenin the time of Edward I. Soeven Bristol’s trade was tochange.Itdependedformuch

of its wealth upon the linkwithBordeaux,towhichwentcloth and other everydaycommodities in exchange forwine.The availability of thatwinedependeduponpoliticaland military good fortune,especiallyinthe‘HautPays’,Bordeaux’shinterland. In theyears of active war inAquitainethevolumeoftradedeclined, only to rise againwhenmilitaryactivityceased.

The commerce in wine,therefore, was closely linkedtoconditionsinsouth-westernFrance: the relatively lowyears of 1348–9, 1355–6,1369–70, and 1374–6coincided with years ofplague and war. After theFrench reconquest ofAquitaine in 1453 the winetrade with Bristol suffered asharp decline. Although itwastoberevivedsomeyears

later, Bristol had alreadylearned the vital lesson. Likeotherports,itwastodiversifyitsactivitytotradewithSpainand Portugal; and, as theauthor of the Libelle ofEnglyshe Polycye wrote c.1437, Bristol was one of theports from which the fishingtrade with Iceland was to becarriedout.

The conveyance ofproduce was as much a part

of commerce as was itsmanufacture, since itgenerated wealth for othersthan producers or growers.War had the effect ofdislocating maritime activity.We have seen howmerchantships were regularlyrequisitionedforthetransportof men, horses, andarmamentsforwaracrossthesea.The long list ofNormanports fromwhich ships came

to join the French navy atSluys in the spring of 1340suggeststhat theremusthavebeen a major effect oncommercial activity in theChannel, normally vital tolocalprosperity,during thosemonths which the losses inboth men and vessels,suffered at the hands of theEnglishinthebattle,canonlyhave compounded. Piracy,sometimes carried out under

theguiseofwar(theoppositewas also true) made furtherinroads upon trade. It waswar and piracy which forcedup the costs of wine bycompellingmerchants to addsignificant freight charges,whichrosefrom8shillingsatun in 1300 to 12 or 13shillings in 1350, for winebeing carried from Bordeauxto England, those sumshelping to pay for protection

at sea; in 1372–3 the BristolGracedieu carried a crew offifty instead of twenty-sixprecisely for that purpose.1The admiration of the authorof theLibelle for Edward IIIwas largely based upon themeasureswhichthatkinghadtaken for the protection ofEnglishtradeagainstBretons,‘the gretteste rovers and thegretteste thevys that havebeneintheseemanyayere’.

How was the countrysideaffected by war? Itsimportance in the life ofFrance was well understoodby contemporaries. ‘If thecountryside is destroyed’,wroteJeandeCourtecuissein1413, ‘all the estates of thekingdom will experiencepoverty.’ Such was theopinion of one sensitive andcareful observer, an opinionwhich has received much

supportfromtherecentstudyon the subject. Armies, withthe insecurity which theirpresence all too easilyimplied, often did little goodto rural economies. Beingwhat they were, militarytactics meant that the mostvulnerable targets were thesources of production in thecountryside:themill,thebarn(preferablyfullasitwouldbein the summer), the field of

uncut corn (how far was itappreciated that a burnedcrop could fertilise theearth?), the fruit trees in anorchard, the vineyard on avalleyside.Allthesecouldbedestroyed quickly and withlittle cost or risk to thesoldiery, for most weredifficult to defend, althoughvillages, churches, farmbuildings, and even millscould be fortified, albeit at

some expense. Yet if theland’s produce could bereapedbutnot sold, andas aconsequence rent could notbe paid, both lord and tenantwould suffer. The tenantwould be the first to have toact. Having exhausted hisseed-corn to feed his family,itwouldnotbelongbeforehewas forced to restrictcultivation to only a part ofhis holding, the remainder

becoming ‘marginal’: thefinalstepwastoabandonthelandaltogether,sothatitsoonfell out of cultivable use. Insuch conditions, those whonormally made their livingfrom land either moved to anearby town in order to ekeout an existence as best theycould or, in times of activewarandmaximuminsecurity,joined that desperate class ofpersons who took to the

woods and added their ownelementoffearandinsecuritytoa societyalreadysufferingat the hands of the nationalenemy.‘Seeifyourwoesareequal to mine, you who livein towns and castles’, wroteHugh, prior of a religioushouse destroyed by theEnglishin1358.Hewasonlyexpressing what defencelessmen and women all overFrance must have been

feelingatthattime.Armies destroyed

property;theyalsofrightenedpeople. In 1418, on theapproach of the English, thefamily of Thomas Basin, thefuture bishop and chronicler,left its home in Caudebec,near Rouen, and, after somewanderings, settled briefly inBrittany, whence it returnedoncethetreatyofTroyeshadrestoredameasureofstability

to Normandy. Others fromthe duchy moved furthersouthwards: a group founditself in Poitiers where itchosetoliveintheobedienceof the dauphin, Charles. Thelands and propertiesbelonging to such people,confiscated by theLancastrian kings, wereregranted to those, bothFrench and English, whosupportedtheinvader.Inlater

years it would take time toresolve the legal problemsarising from attempts torestore to their originalowners the lands which theyhadabandoned in the faceoftheenemy.

Thepicturewhichemergesis of French rural societyaffected by natural disastersand, inmany places, notablytheIledeFrance,Normandy,Champagne, Auvergne, and

the Rhône Valley, muchtroubled at certain times bywar. It should be stressed,however, that the effects ofwar were irregular both intimeandextent. In theIledeFrance, although there werebad years between 1337 and1342, years affected by thebeginnings of greatlyincreased royal taxation andthe effects of debasementpractised by the crown, the

arrivaloftheEnglishin1346broughtthefirstactivewartotheareaforalmost200years.The years until 1365 weredifficult, with not only theplague but political problemsand theCompanies never faraway. The next twogenerations, between 1365and 1410, saw peace in theregion, but after that thirtyyearsofcalamitiessetinuntil1441 so that, in all, in a

periodofjustunderacentury,nearly half the years werefreeofwar. In theBordelais,too, the periods of war werelimited: 1337–40, 1345–7,1374–9,1405–6,1438,1442,and 1449–53, a small totalindeed for a period of welloveracentury.Normandy,onthe other hand, experiencedsome periods of war in thefourteenth century and aperiodofover thirtyyears in

the fifteenth century underEnglish rule. It was duringthese years, after somerevival at the end of thefourteenth century, that veryadverse natural conditionsand plague caused economicdecline to set in. Between1415 and 1422, it has beensuggested, a crisis in foodsupplies, the recurrence ofplague, and the flight of thepopulationbeforetheEnglish

army, conspired to halve thepopulation of the duchy.After 1422 there came aperiod of relative politicaland military calm whichhelped to restore thedemographic decline; butbetween 1436 and 1442Normandy, along with muchof north-western Europe,suffered again from badweather and disease whichkilled about one-third of the

population,anHiroshima-likeeffect, as one writer has putit. The result was that, inNormandy,thevaluesofrentsreceived in certain parts oftheduchyfellbyaboutahalf,in some places by more. Byaggravating economic andsocial conditions alreadyrendereddifficultastheresultof unfavourable naturalconditionsanddisease,armedmen in both large and small

numbers brought tension,fear, andmaterialdestructiontothecountryside.Intimeofwar there was littleconfidenceinthefuture,littleincentiveormoneytorebuildorevenrepairpropertywhichhad been damaged ordestroyed.

The fiscal demands madebywarcame,inbothEnglandand France, at a time whenthey could only aggravate

what were already difficulteconomicconditions,yearsoflow production,unemployment,andgenerallydeclining revenues. In bothcountriesitwasthe1330sand1340S which witnessed theformation of the wareconomy, when publicexpenditure suddenlyincreased and measures hadto be taken to make thelevying of indirect taxation

possible. In France, grenierswere built to house the saltwhich would be a source oftaxation,whileinEnglandthesystem of ‘staples’, for thechanneling of wool throughcertain ports, thus enablingthe raising of dues by thecustoms services (themselvesa product of late thirteenth-century beginnings beingfullydevelopedtomeetrisingneeds),cameintoplay.

On both sides of theChannel kings demandedmoney which, since itrepresented strength, theyneeded quickly. But in bothkingdoms money was short,andtheinstitutionsforraisingit, in particular in France,were only gradually cominginto existence. So recoursehad to be had to artfuldodgery. When a militarycrisis occurred, the king

would coax hoarded (andusually good) metal intocirculation by demandingtaxes and then, havingremintedand,ashappened inFrance more often than inEngland, possibly debased it,the metal would be issuedagainascoinatalowervaluethan before, the kingpocketing the difference. Itwas such a need whichcompelledEdwardIIItoplay

with fire in his unsuccessfulventure of trying to obtaincontrol of the entire exporttrade in wool in 1338–9, aventure which backfired andleft him almost penniless in1340. The king had beendesperate to make a largeprofit in a short time, for hehad foolishly spent £130,000oncontinentalalliesinsearchof their help against France.But Edward soon found that

neitherthemethodswhichheused,norhisassociationwithspeculators, Italian bankersand monopolists, nor theeconomic condition of thecountry, would allow him tomakemuchprogress.

In France, although therewas no scandal of the kindwhich broke out in England,the early attempts by thecrowntoraisemoneyforwarmet with resistance. It has

been calculated that thesubsidy demanded inNormandy in the winter of1347–8 cost the agriculturalworker, living on hismodestsmallholding in thecountryside,theequivalentofabout thirty days paid work.Not surprisingly, the taximposed in 1348 in Rouenwas cancelled after violentopposition had beenexpressed; in 1351 further

anti-fiscal riotsoccurred, andin1355thepeopleofthecityrefused to pay the subsidiesdemanded by the king. InFebruary 1382 Rouenwitnessedtherisingknownasthe ‘Harelle’; among itsnumerous causes was atactlessattempt to raisea taxgreaterthanthatvotedbytheNormanestates.Therecanbeno doubt, if one includes thenotorious example of the

English poll taxes raised atthe end of the reign ofEdward III and at thebeginning of that of RichardII,thattheneedsofwarwerethe cause of veryconsiderable social unrest inthese years, in England aswellasinFrance.

Not least among those tosuffer from the adverseeconomiceffectsofwarweremembers of the landowning

class. From the first decadesof the fourteenth century,before theAnglo-Frenchwarhadeverbegun,theclasshadbeen feeling the pinch.Nature,intheformofadverseclimatic conditions anddisease, was causingperceptible decline inrevenues derived from land.In the north of England theeffects of Scottish raids(which led to the systematic

levying of protection moneyto buy off the raiders) addedto the toll of difficultiesexperienced by thelandowners of the region inthe late 1310s and 1320s.Vacancies in the NorthRiding occurred in greaternumberasaresultofScottishraids: men could no longerafford to pay their rents, andthe lesswealthy landlords, inparticular, suffered from the

troubles, a position notunknown to many Frenchlandowners in areas ravagedby war. In France,inflationary tendencies werereflected in monetarymanipulations which, begunabout 1290, continued, onand off, for years thereafter,so that the currency lost itsaccustomed stability. Theeffect of the bad weather onharvestsalsobegantotell.On

estates which dependedlargelyuponthesaleofcerealfoods,theeffectsuponprofitscouldbemarked,thevalueofsome leases falling by abouthalf in the second and thirddecades of the fourteenthcentury. It is clear that theprocess of economicfluctuation, already referredto above, was having anadverse influence onseigneurial revenues by the

time thewar betweenFranceand England began, and thatthe pressure of taxation wasverysoonfelt.

Because the records ofsome have survived, we canwork out how the greatinstitutional, andpredominantly ecclesiastical,landlordsfacedtheirfinancialproblems. We know lessabout the experiences ofsecular landlords, yet more

thanenoughtoknowthat,formany, entry into the serviceof the greatest of allemployers, the crown, wasthe principal way by whichthey might save themselvesfrom financial decline. Theirservice could take a numberof forms but, in thecircumstances, it was oftenconnected with war.Employment in war had theadvantage that it helped

members of the traditionalfighting caste to maintaintheir honour (by serving awar) and their rank (bymaking up for what was inmany instances a rapidlydwindlingincomefromland).Once in royal service, manyreceived wages whichcompared favourably withtheir landed revenue, so thatwe need not be surprised, assomecontemporarieswere,at

thewillingnessof theFrenchnobility, for example, to jointheking’sarmyforpay.Warservice under the crownenabled many of theseigneurial class to recoup inthis way what their tenantshadcontributedintaxation.

There is much to be said,then, for the argument thateconomic factors encouragedthe nobility to support theirkings in active war.Military

service in theageof thepaidarmy gave manyopportunities to those whochose to serve. Wages, evenfor those with large landedrevenues, were reasonablygenerous. Other sources ofrewards (or profit, in themoremodernmeaningof theword) were also open to thesoldier; but these wererewards which were notcontinually available, and

whose winning requiredinitiative on his part. Thepossibility of making afinancial ‘kill’ was anessential element in securingsupport for any militaryenterprise. At the top end ofthe scale, the sums involvedcouldbehuge.TheransomofJohn II was fixed at3,000,000 gold crowns(£500,000 sterling) in 1360,some five or six times what

the English crown mightreceive from its ordinaryrevenues, including the woolsubsidy,togetherwiththelayand clerical subsidies, astaggeringsumevenwhenwerecognisethat,intheend,lessthan half of it was paid. Aransom of this size wasexceptional, as was that of100,000marks(£66,666.135.4d.) demanded (only some£13,333 of which was

received) from the Scots fortheirking,DavidII,capturedat Neville’s Cross, makesclear.Furtherdownthescale,much more modest sumswere demanded. Renaud leVicomte, taken prisoner in1358, ransomed himself forthevalueoftwotunsofwine;while some knights, forexample, Jean de Meudon,obtained licences from thecrown giving them

permission to trade so as toraise even the modest sumsneeded to pay their ransomswithout losing their noblestatus.

In addition to prisoners,plunder and booty could beprofitable. Evidence of theimportanceof suchprofitsofwartothesoldiercomestousin the manner in which thedivision of spoils wasformalised. Armies and, as

one English chroniclerreports, even ships, had men(butiniers) speciallyappointed to collect andassess the value of bootytaken inwar.Thepurposeofthis was to ensure anequitable, indeed a lawful,division of spoils. Inevitably,thematterraisedthequestionof who was the ultimateowner of such spoils. At theendof the fourteenthcentury

Honoré Bouvet argued thatsinceanarmywasin thepayof its prince, all the bootyshould be his. Although alawyer’spointofview,itdidbearsomeresemblancetothereality of practice, sinceconvention had it that asoldier ceded a third (inCastile,afifth)ofthevalueofhis gains to his captainwho,inhisturn,gaveathirdofhisgains,andathirdofwhathad

beenpassedontohimbyhissoldiers, to the king. Thepractice thus ensured areasonably fair andwidespread division of theprofitsofwar;acertainroughjusticeappearedtohavebeendone, and, what was more,successful expeditions wentsome way towards financingthemselves.

With the fifteenth-centuryphase of the war, the profits

available to Englishmenchanged somewhat. Fightingthere still was. But with theestablishment of the landsettlement and a permanentEnglish presence in much ofnorthernFrance,thenatureofwar altered perceptibly.Instead of active war,garrison duty became themain task of manyEnglishmen serving inFrance,aformofwarwhich,

while it lessened the risks ofdeath or capture, alsodiminished the opportunitiesof making the traditionalprofits on campaign. Themain sources of profit werenow tobegrantsof land, theapplication of the feudalrights of lordship, and theremuneration due to theholder of office or otherposition in the royalorducalhousehold. Such ‘unmilitary’

sources of benefit confirmedanother important factor, thatthewarwagedbytheEnglishin France brought advantagetoboth themilitaryclassandto others, administrators andclergy, who followed in thewakeofarmiesreadytoserveinthenewly-wonterritories.

Centuries later, we canstill tell how important theprofit motive was to thosewho, in one way or another,

became involved inwar.Theopposition to the idea ofpeace expressed by Thomas,duke of Gloucester, about1390 when faced with theproblem of what to do withmenwhoknewnowayoflifeotherthanwar,orbythelordof Albret who spoke of therestricted opportunities ofplunder in peace time, isrevealing. Even more so isthe legal evidence of suits,

civil and criminal, heardbeforecourtsinbothEnglandand France, inwhichwe seelitigantssuingoneanotherforwhat were very often thesources of monetary gain,stolen or confiscated by oneside and reclaimed by theother. The dispute betweenJohnHotonandJohnShakellover the ransomof the countofDenia,aSpaniard,notonlyoccupied the Court of

Chivalry between the years1390 and 1395 (it was notsettled until well on into thenextcentury)buthadalreadyproved to be a causecélèbreat the Gloucester Parliamentin 1378, leading to themurder in sanctuary ofShakell’ s brother-in-arms,RobertHawley.Therecordofthis suit, and others, manyheardbeforetheParlementofParis, emphasises the long

and frequent delays towhichlitigants were often subject,reminding us of theconsiderable expense whichsuch suits could entail. Thetenacityandhopewithwhichsome litigants pursued theirends emphasise theimportanceoftitles,revenues,and,sometimes,ameasureoflocal influence which theprofits ofwarmight bring tomenwhospentmuchoftheir

lives at war, and for whosedefencetheywerepreparedtoincur considerable costs andeffort. Early in the fifteenthcentury the poet, JohnLydgate,putitthisway:

NowofdaysmenYerneanddesirenaftermucksosoreThat they goodfaimehavleyd…To wynneworldly tresourandrichesse.

Wasitallworthit?Wasit

all gain? To a fortunate few,war became a source ofpersonal wealth. Sir RobertKnolles, a valetwho becamean influential knight, madehis fortune in France andSpain partly as a freelancesoldier, partly in the serviceof the crown. At the time ofthePeasants’Revolt in1381,he was reported by Froissart

to have been in London‘guarding his treasure withover six score fighting menall in readiness’, a factconfirmed by anotherchronicler, ThomasWalsingham, who describedKnolles’s fortune as havingreached almost royalproportions. In the fifteenthcentury Sir John Fastolfachievedfortunefromwar inFrance,whencehesenthome

money to be invested inland.2 Others made use ofwar’s opportunities indifferent ways. It was notonly soldiers who did well.Sir JohnPulteney, four timesmayorofLondon,wasnottheonly Englishman to benefitfrom his ability andwillingnesstoadvancemoneyto Edward III. The recipientofgrantsoflandsinanumberof counties and of an annual

sum of 100 marks for hisbetter support in theorderofknighthood to which he wasraised in1377,Pulteneydieda richman. The provision ofmoney also advanced theHullmerchant,Williamde laPole,whosefamilyrosefromcommoner to duke in fourgenerations, although, as thePastonfamilycorrespondencesuggests, not all wereimpressed by this rapid

promotiontonobility.InFranceJacquesCoeuris

themostfamousinstanceofaman who attained greatwealth as a supplier of armstoCharlesVII,andwhobuiltwhat has been termed‘virtually a palace’ atBourges, still open to thevisitor today. War also gavePierre Bailie his opportunity;he rose from being ashoemaker’s assistant to the

heights of fiscaladministration as treasurer ofMaine, and then ofNormandy, for the Englishafter 1436. The family ofPerrote,whocame fromnearCaen,constitutedanexampleof a different kind, that of afamily which made good bybuying lands and rentscheaplyfromotherswhohadfallen upon hard times. In1460 Colin Perrote, recently

ennobled,drewupacartulary(orinventory)ofcopiesofthedocuments which concernedthe lands acquired by hisfamily.3 It is a modest, butsignificant, memorial to anachievement largely madepossiblebyastateofwar,aninstance of persons with theability of finding readymoney to purchase a chanceof advancement when itpresented itself.By the same

token we may see thosewhose lands they bought asexamples of persons againstwhom the wheel of fortune,in the form of war, hadturned.

Ifsomegained,otherslost,for confiscation of estateswas the political andeconomic pricewhich had tobe paid for being on thewrong side. Worse (since itcould mean long years of

detention) was to fall intoenemy hands, for thepurchase of liberty could beruinous, and involve othersthantheimmediatefamily,asGuillaume de Châteauvillainand Jean de Rodemackdiscovered to their cost. Nordid the thousands ofEnglishmen who served inFrance during the war allreturn home much better offthanwhentheyleft.Eventhe

English crown, the largestowner of lands in Franceacquired by conquest andconfiscation, found itselfconsiderably in debt andhaving to borrow to pay forthe war. On paper, the valueof its lands lookedimpressive. In practice, theseconstituted a diminishingasset: revenues from mintswere down; those fromforests, now often under the

controlofenemies,werealsodown;tollsandfairs,becauseof the adverse effects ofwarconditions upon trade, wereless than they should havebeen. There were no greatriches tobemade from thesesources in such difficulttimes.

Such a view may appearpessimistic, to some, indeed,evenpartial.Agenerationagoa famous academic debate

took place between twoleading historians, K. B.McFarlaneandM.M.Postan,over the question of who, ifanybody, benefited from theHundred Years War.4McFarlanewasoftheopinionthat,byandlarge,theEnglishcrown did well out of thewar; he could point to thehuge sums – at least£8,000,000–raised in taxationinEnglandbetween1336and

1453, a large proportion ofwhich,heargued,camefromthe pockets of foreigners inthe form of indirect taxationonwool, fells and hides. Fortheir part, too, ransomswereimportant in furnishing theking with large sums ofmoney, for he was able toobtain those of the moreimportant prisoners who hadbeen obliged to pay highsumstosecuretheirfreedom.

Certain members of thenobility, and others whoservedthem,alsodidwelloutof English militaryenterprisesinFrance.

Sotheargumentran.YetitfailedtoconvincePostan,andmore recently views of thesubject have, on the whole,notsupportedMcFarlane.Itisby no means certain that thehigh taxes on wool exports(so profitable to the English

crown)werebornebyforeignmerchants who boughtEnglish wool; it seems morelikely that the growersthemselves paid in the formoflowerpricesobtainedfromthe sale of their products.What of the other argument,that war brought in moneyfrom abroad and that themilitary effort was beingsubsidised by the enemythemselves? In this we may

bemoreconfidentlyassertive.While a case for this can bemadeforthefirsttwoorthreedecades of the war,McFarlane himself chose tobase much of his argumentupon the remarkably well-documented case of Sir JohnFastolf. But the more weknow about the fifteenthcentury, the better werecognisethatFastolf’scareerwas exceptional, if not

unique. If we look at otherswhom Fastolf will haveknown in France (althoughfew will have been therelongerthanhewas)wedonotfind his story repeated. Wemust recognise Fastolf’sexceptionalbusinessacumen,as well as his military skill.The England of his day wasnot full of men like him,flauntingtheirwealthwonthehard way in the war against

France.Onthecontrary,mostof the signs (admittedly theyare seldom much more thanthat) suggest that few cameback significantly richer thantheywentout.Thisbeingthecase, France did not losemuch bullion to departingEnglishmen (if anything, themovement of cash, in theform of payments to armies,may have been the otherway); nor was England

notably enriched by thewealth entering from abroad.The financial advantages ofwarcameirregularly;thefewfortunes which war didprovide for Englishmen (atthecostoftheforeigner)wereexceptional.Thatisnottosaythat they should be ignored;they should not be. It is asense of proportion which isatissue.

Perhaps, indeed, in

employing the word ‘profit’when describing themotivation behind so muchEnglish military activity inFrance, historians have beenusing the wrong word, orhave attributed too strong ameaning to it. Profit impliesloss. When Sir HughCalveley came home withsufficient profit to build atBunbury in Cheshire, orFastolf to build at Caistor in

Norfolk, they did so becausethey had, indeed, ‘robbed’France of part of herwealth.But of the thousands ofEnglishmen who went toFrance in the fifteenthcentury,manyweretoremainthere for years at a time,sometimes marrying,sometimes settling into localcommunities. The wordwhichismoreappropriateforthem, one which they

themselves used, was not‘profit’ but ‘livelihood’, notthe winning of moveableriches which could be takenaway to England in anemergency,buttheearningofeveryday revenue whichenabledthemtoliveouttheirlives in new surroundings. Itistheattitudeofthesepeople,nowbetterunderstood,whichshould be appreciated. Forthey represent an attitude to

war different to that of thesoldier who set out in thehope of hitting the jackpotbefore returning home. In avery real sense these peoplerepresent war without theglitter. In practice theirexperience of war withoutwhat we would today term‘capital gains’ was thatshared by the majority ofthosewhomade theirway toFrancein thehope, ifnot the

expectation, that DameFortunewouldonedaysmileonthem.

In short, we have tounderstand that the normalmilitarycareerpursuedbyanEnglishman in France wasunlikely to lead to greatwealth. Much of the warfoughtinthefifteenthcenturywas, in fact, the guarding oftowns, castles, and otherstrategicpoints.Contactwith

the enemy was, for longperiods, limited; so,consequently, were theopportunities for suddenwealth. Not surprisinglymany soldiers turned theirattention to the robbing andransoming of the civilianpopulations. Such activitymight relieve frustration, butit did not lead to riches. Itmustberecognisedthat,otherthan on days of exceptional

good fortune, war was littlemore profitable, and often agood deal more dangerous,thanlivingathome.

Yet the sun did shine onsome. In the structuringcharacteristic of medievalsociety, it was possible formen tomovefromonegradeto another, to move up and,sometimes,down.Theycouldimprove their social andmaterial standing in society

through, for instance,education, connection andservice. War was also animportant way of achievingsocial distinction andadvancement. If birth couldmake a man noble, so couldwar. In this process,reputation mattered a greatdeal. The desire to enhancehis name in the eyes ofsociety, and principally inthose of his equals and

superiors, gave an incentiveto a soldier’s life. Honour,fame, and renown, the desiretoshine,wereallfundamentalto the ethos of chivalry.Fighting in wars was clearlyoneway,perhapsthebest,ofearning respect andreputation. To merit amention in Froissart’schronicle was the equivalentof receiving a medal today.Jean de Bueil, over half a

century after Froissart, wroteinanotdissimilarway–butwith a difference. For himwar was fought moreexplicitlyforthepublicgood.Thesoldiermustnotbeafraidofthesweatandtearsofwar.Ifhehadfightingskillswhichhedevelopedandthenusedtogood purpose, he would beamong those ‘esteemed byboth God and the world’.Knighthood exercised for the

common good was one waytoeternalsalvation.

On this side of eternity,too, reputation could earn itsrewards. But reputation hadto be won, and this meanttaking an active part in war.The more action, the greaterthechanceofrenown.Actsofheroism abound in the‘chivalric’ chronicles of theperiod. Sir Hugh Calveley’srefusal to take command of

the rearguard at the battle ofAuray in September 1364,and the duke of York’srequest toHenryVtoaccordhimthehonourofleadingtheEnglish vanguard against theenemy at Agincourt reflectthefactthatitwasbettertobeseen in the van than at therear. York, one of a handfulofEnglishmentolosehislifein this battle, earned thecommendations of the

chroniclers for what he haddone.

Reputation was one formof recognition for action inwar. There were moretangiblerewardstobewonaswell, although, as the poetGuillaumedeMachautwroteinthemid-fourteenthcentury,noamountofrichesweretheequal of honour. Yet SirEustache de Ribemont couldfeel well satisfied after his

encounter with Edward IIIoutside thewallsofCalais in1348, for it led to him beingawarded a diadem of silverand pearls by the king inrecognition of hispraiseworthy conduct. ThegallantryofSirJamesAudleyon the battlefield of Poitierswas brought to the notice oftheBlackPrincewhomadeapoint of visiting Audley,recovering from his wounds,

to tell him of the honourwhich his conduct hadbrought him, and to informhimthathewasretaininghim‘forevertobemyknightwith500marksofyearlyrevenue’,which sum Audley, ‘withgreatnobleness’,immediatelybequeathedtofouresquiresinhis own service, the incident(recalled by Froissart)underlining both Audley’sgenerosity (an act of true

nobility) and the fact thatfeats of war could lead torecognition expressed inmaterialterms.

OntheFrenchside,whereknights and esquires weresometimes given importantmilitarypositions,ithasbeenremarked that a career inarmsinthesecondhalfofthefourteenth century mostcertainly encouraged, andindeed accelerated, social

advance, so that esquiresbecameknights-bachelor,andthese rose to the rank ofknights-banneret. The mostfamous instance of suchadvanceisthatofBertrandduGuesclin, who betteredhimself by receiving thecounty of Longueville fromthe hands of Charles V in1364,thatofTrastamarafromHenry of Trastamara in thefollowingyear,andtheduchy

of Molina in 1368. Hisappointment as Constable ofFrance in 1370, on anoccasion when, according toFroissart,heexpresseddoubtsregarding his worthiness togive commands to men ofinheritednobility,wasbuttheculminationofacareerwhichhad brought this man ‘degrantentreprise’tothetopofthecommandstructureandtothelevelofnobilitywhichall

acknowledged. When duGuesclindiedin1380,hewashonoured, as none had beenbefore,bybeingburiedattheabbey of Saint-Denis, theroyalmausoleum,asuresignof recognition that he hadserved his king and hiscountry with success. Itshould be noted, however,that the astonishing socialpromotion of du Guesclinwas entirely exceptional.

Perhaps the nearest to himmay have been JohnHawkwood, whose career asaleaderofmercenariesendedin the service of theFlorentinerepublicandburialin a place of honour in thecathedralthere.

SomeEnglishmen,too,didwell out of militaryachievement. We havealready noted Sir RobertKnollesandSir JohnFastolf.

SirJohnChandos,knightedin1339 and one of the originalknightsoftheGarter,becamelord of Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte in Normandy in1360;SirHughCalveleywonboth a wife and a castle inSpain, although neither, itmust be said, brought himmuch comfort; while in thefifteenthcenturyWalter,LordHungerford, liked to stylehimself ‘lord of Heytesbury

and Homet’, the first titlebeing English, the secondFrench.All fivewere amongthose Englishmen who hadprivately-appointedheraldsorpursuivants,5 a socialphenomenon upon whichNicholas Upton commentedin c. 1440when hewrote ofthosewhohadbecomenobleby virtue of their skill, hardwork,andcourage,aswellasthrough other virtues which

mightennobleaman.Examples of individual

advancement could bemultiplied. Nobility, thehighestsocialleveltowhichaman might aspire, could beachieved in a number ofways, but in all an essentialelement was the approval ofothers. As has been wellnoted, theyearsat theendofthe Hundred Years Warformed a specially critical

period when talent couldmorethanmakeupforalackof birth.6 Thus a numberachieved advancement bymeritandpersonalacceptanceofthefactbytheirequalsandsuperiors. Such was inherentin the very concept ofadvancement. Froissartrecounts the telling story ofCrockart,whocametoFrancefrom Germany, and becamethe leader of a group of

freelance soldiers. Havingmade much money from hisactivities of taking andransoming towns inBrittany,hewasofferedaknighthood,awife,andapensionbykingJohn II, all of which herefused. Returning to thescenes of his early life, heflaunted the wealth whichwar had brought him. But,Froissarttellsuswithasenseofapproval,thenobleswhom

hehadonceknownwerenotimpressed. Crockart failed tofind acceptance from thosewhoserankshehadhoped tojoin. Inhiscase,warhadnotwon him what he mostdesired: advancement in theform of recognition that hisactivities and achievementsmeritedadmissiontotherankof nobleman. The pointshouldnotbelostonus.7

1OnthecommerceofBristol,seeA.Crawford,Bristolandthewinetrade(Bristol,1984).

2K.B.McFarlane,‘TheinvestmentofSirJohnFastolf’sprofitsofwar’,T.R.Hist.S.,fifthseries,7(1957),91–116.

3ArchivesdépartementalesduCalvados,Caen,F.1650.

4K.B.McFarlane,‘War,the

economyandsocialchange.EnglandandtheHundredYearsWar’,P&P,22(1962),3–13;M.M.Postan,‘ThecostsoftheHundredYearsWar’,P&P,27(1964),34–53.TothesemaybeaddedP.Contamine,‘LecoûtdelaguerredecentansenAngleterre’,Annales,20(1965),788–91;andA.R.Bridbury,‘TheHundredYearsWar:costsandprofits’,Trade,government,andeconomyinpre-industrialEngland.EssayspresentedtoF.J.Fisher,ed.D.C.ColemanandA.H.John(London,1976),

pp.80–95.5SeethelistinThecompletepeerage(London,1949),XI,app.C.

6Contamine,Guerre,étatetsociété,p.417.

7Froissart,Chroniques,V,227–9:Allmand,Societyatwar,pp.88–9.

WAR,PEOPLE,ANDNATION

A notable feature of thehistory of both France andEnglandinthefourteenthandfifteenth centuries is amarked increase in public

participation in war. In eachcountry, as events in the late1350s in France and in thelate 1440s in England amplydemonstrated, the conflictand its many implications,social, political, andeconomic,provokedreactionsof deep intensity, especiallyinFrance,where the elementof civilwar provoked deeperfeelings than in England.Questions about the war, in

particularregardingitshumanand financial commitment,wereaskedquiteopenly.Wasthe cost of the commitmentworthit?Whatadvantagedidit bring?Who, the nation ormerely individuals, benefitedfrom it all?The commitmentofHenryIV’sfoursonstothewar is seen by the fact thatthree of them died in Francein the service of the Englishcrown. This was natural

enough, since the war wasregarded as a strugglebetween rival kings over thecrown of France. Accordingto the traditional view takenof their place in society, thenobility would have beenexpectedtosupporttheirkingin the furtherance of hisclaim. Yet in England noblesupport was not alwayswhole-heartedly forthcoming.There is somethingof this in

the reminder given byWilliam de la Pole, duke ofSuffolk,toHenryVIin1450,that his own father had diedat the siege of Harfleur, hisbrother only a few weekslater atAgincourt,while twoof his relatives hadmet theirdeathatJargeauin1429.Thissuggests that Suffolk wasproud of his family’s warrecord;butitalsohintsatthefact that therecordmayhave

beenexceptional.1Whatwasneededwas an awakening ofa conscious and continuousinterest in the affairs of thewar among the differentelementsofthepopulation.

The sustaining of publicinvolvement was rapidlybecomingpartofthegrowingartofthemanagementofwar.Although the word‘propaganda’ did not comeinto use until the mid-

nineteenth century, we maynone the less use itconveniently to describe anumber of activities whichhad one aim in common, toencourage and secure thewidest possible involvementof a nation in war. As wehave seen, wars neededjustification on legal andmoral grounds. Just asdiplomats providedthemselveswiththeevidence,

often of an historical nature,to sustain their demands andnegotiatingpositions,sosuchmaterialcouldbewoven intotracts to support or rebut aclaim such as that ofsuccessive English kings tothe crown of France. Theseworks, often written by thelearnedandwell-informedforpeople of their own kind atthe urging of their royalmasters, had but a limited

effect: their form (frequentlylegal andoftenpedantic) andlanguage(all toooftenLatin)scarcely made them easyreading; it is likely, moreoftenthannot,thattheywereread by the converted, andthat few were brought ‘outeof doute’ or over to theirauthor’s point of view as aresult of their reasonedarguments.Yetsuchtracts(ofwhich it is probable that

many more were written inFrance than in England),although formal in characterand unlikely ever to haveenjoyed more than a verylimited circulation, serve toemphasise how important itwas to have defenders of acause who could justify theneed to pursue or defendclaimsthroughwar.

Such claims, even whenpitched in legal language,

were often based on historyoraparticularreadingofpastevents. As the Florentineswrote their history in thefifteenth century underhumanistic influence to showthemselves to be the heirs ofRome,ortheHabsburgsusedgenealogies to justify theirclaims to beheirs bothof anhistoricempireandtheduchyof Austria, so the latemedieval kings of France

sought to bolster theirpositionby a claim tobe thetrueheirsofClovisandeven,as somewouldhave it, tobetheclaimantstothethroneofEngland as heirs toWilliam,duke of Normandy and kingofEngland!Onceagain,suchhistory was only for theliterate, indeed for the well-educated.

There were other ways,however, of conveying a

relatively simple messagemoredirectlyandinamannermore likely to appeal to theunlearned andunsophisticated. From avariety of sources we learnthat the door of the parishchurch often served as acommunal notice-board. Itwas for display on churchdoors innorthernFrance thatthe English preparedillustrated genealogies,

accompanied by verses, tostresstherightofHenryVItobe king of France, throughdirect descent from St Louisin both the male and femaleline.Toanageaccustomedtotheuseandmeaningofsignsand symbols, thejuxtapositioning of the armsof England and Francewitnessed by the crowdspresentatHenryVI’sEnglishcoronationin1429,andathis

return to London after hisFrench coronation early in1432,wasaneasyandnaturalwayofusing the languageofheraldry and armorialbearings to make a politicalpoint. In January 1450, afterthe reconquest ofNormandy,the French council orderedthearmsofEnglandfoundinthecastleandpalaceatRouento be removed, since theyformed visible memorials of

theEnglish usurpation of theduchy.BythefollowingMayglaziers and stone masonshad got to work, and theoffendingsignsoftheEnglishpresencehaddisappeared.

Propaganda could also beused to awaken people’sconsciousness of the eventsof war, to publicise these(particularlywhen theycouldbe interpreted favourably) inthe hope of giving

encouragement and liftingmorale. The return of theBlackPrince toLondonafterhis victory at Poitiers,bringingwithhimthekingofFrance as his prisoner, wasthe occasion for triumphantcelebrations. In October1416, Henry V ordered theclergy of his chapel tocommemorate the firstanniversary of his victory atAgincourt; while in 1450

Charles VII, perhapsinfluencedbyItalianpractice,ordered the striking of amedaltorecordthesuccessesrecently achieved against theEnglish.Theadvantagestobegained from bringing beforethe publicmindmemories ofnotable victories were notmerely to recall success.Victories were the supremejustification of title, anexpressionof thedivinewill,

the way, as the Englishchancellor told Parliament in1377, that God honoured acountry, as he had honouredIsrael,hisownheritage,atitlewhich England could nowassume.2Followingthistrainofthought,itisnotsurprisingthat Bishop Brinton ofRochester could remindcongregations in 1375 and1378 that God had usuallybeenEnglish.Itwastherefore

right that Englishmen shouldfightfortheircountry.3

But, as the bishop added,ifGodcouldhonourapeople,he could also withdraw hissupport to punish it for itswaywardness. To remedythis,men andwomen shouldturn to prayer, as kingsordered the clergy to exhorttheirpeopletodoinmomentsof special need. In one largeEnglish diocese, that of

Lincoln,specialprayerswererequested over fifty timesduring the course of theHundred Years War, and ontwo-thirds of these occasionsthe intention was linked,directly or indirectly, withwarorpeace.4Asallrealised,the power of the pulpit wasconsiderable, particularlywhen a patriotic sermonwaspreached in English by aneffective speaker. In 1420,

Bishop Fleming of Lincolnordered that an Englishversionofhisthoughtsonthethemeofwarshouldbemadeavailable, and a copy affixedtothedoorofeverychurchinhis diocese. Episcopalrecords, extant for Englandbut, sadly, not for France,enable us to see how thingsweredone.The faithfulwerespecially encouraged to actsofgoodworks,tofastingand

penance, to attendance atMass, and to participation inthat communal act ofreligious devotion socharacteristic of this period,the procession. We may besure that the age, with itsbelief in divine interventioninwar and in the efficacy ofprayer, quickly saw howEngland’s fortune couldadvantageously be affectedbythesincerityofprayer.

Requests for participationin such acts of devotion hadanother side to them. In anagelackingmeansofmoderncommunication, the task ofthepriest inhispulpitwastoinform, making availablenewsabouteventsbothinsideand outside the country.News was always welcome,particularly in time of war.And since good news wasdoubly welcome, English

commanders sent home fromFrance and elsewhere reportsoftheirsuccesses(whentheycould) for these to becirculated not only throughmeetingsofthecountycourtsandatmarkets,butalsoalongthe ecclesiastical network ofchurch pulpits and places,such as St Paul’s Cross inLondon, which served asimportant centres of open-airpreaching and, hence, of

publicity. There can be nodoubt that theChurchhadanimportantroletoplayinwhathas been described as ‘arudimentary publicity systemwhich was particularly usedfor spreading militarynews’,5 as well as forcreating a sense ofcommunity feeling throughtheuseitallowedtobemadeof its personnel and facilitiesto publicise and support a

nationalwar.Public opinion also

expressed, and wassometimes consciouslyencouraged to express, itselfthrough other uses of theword, spoken and sung. Theoldtraditionofrecallingfeatsof arms in song and versepersisted. The Welsh, Adamof Usk reported, recountedthe deeds of Sir EdmundMortimer in song at feasts;6

whileinFrance,aslateasthereign of Louis XI, itinerantsingers were encouraged forovertly political reasons.Writers who have rightfullyachieved literary reputationalso contributed to thecreation of this kind ofpolitical literature. Many ofthe ballads of EustacheDeschamps, for instance,hadwar (or its effects) as theirtheme,orexpressedthesense

of national consciousnessgrowing in France in thefourteenth century; while inSpainboththecivilwarsandthose of reconquest againstthe Moors proved a fertileinspiration for verses andballads of a political naturecomposed by minstrelsserving in the army. The‘AgincourtCarol’hada longandhonourableancestry.

Battles, in particular, lent

themselves well to accountsin dynamic language, thewordsplayingonthegloriousdeedsandcourageofonesideand the inevitable defeat ofthe other. The language ofpoliticalliteratureneedstobeemphasised. It helped tojustify action, to boostmorale,toencourageahostileattitude towards the enemywho, since he usually lostbattles,wasgiven the roleof

whipping-boycaughtinawarof words, to be taunted,abused, slandered, andridiculedthroughtheuseofaspecialvocabularyofemotionand of hostility. Strangely,the French (and some Scots,too) thought that the Englishhadtails(‘Engloizcouez’,astheBalladecontrelesanglaisof1429putit);7theyactedin‘an arrogant manner’(‘orgouilleuse maniere’) and

had come to France falsely(‘faucement’) to take thecrownofFrance.Ontheotherside, the French wereregarded as usurpers of thatcrown, a people who acteddeceptively, broke truces towhich they were bound, a‘stiff-necked people’ whorefused to see when thejudgement of God had goneagainst them. The languagewas very different from that

of an earlier age (and eventhatof the spiritofFroissart)in that, contrary to chivalrictradition, it gave little creditto the loser or the enemywhenitwashisdue.Ratheritwas a language applied inblanket terms. HenceEnglishmen had a curiouspropensity for killing theirkings: Frenchmen wereeffeminate and deceitful. Inthiswayawholepeople,seen

by an outsider, wascondemned in a few words.Their very separateness,identity, and characteristicswere recognised by otherswho, in their turn, hadanother identity imposeduponthem.Thewayanationwas seen by another had apart in creating the sense ofnational consciousness ofeach.

Much of this propaganda

literature, inparticularthat inverseform,mustbeplacedinthe category of ‘authorunknown’. Yet the HundredYears War saw the activeencouragement inEnglandofa group of writers whoproduced verse to order,much of it of a stronglynationalist character.Laurence Minot, aYorkshiremanwhowrotethatEdward III had attacked the

Frenchking in1340 ‘to shachimby theberd’,wasamanwith theability tousesimplelanguage to striking effect,whose lively commemorativeverses reflect a deliberateattempt to whip up anemotionallysatisfyingfeelingagainst the disdained enemy,Frenchman or Scot. ThomasHoccleve,whoworkedinthePrivySealofficeformuchofhis life, could make his

position regarding England’senemiesquiteclear: ‘IamanEnglyssh-man&amthi foo.’The Benedictine monk, JohnLydgate, in the course of along career as a writer ofpolitical and patrioticliterature, composed versesformanypurposes, includinga dynastic poem, The Kingsof England, in which hestressedthelonghistoriclinkbetween France and

successive kings of England,a prelude to the statement oftheir claim to that country’scrown.IfLydgate’sstylewasfar removed from that ofMinot, their intentions werenot so far apart. Togetherwith their masters, bothmenknew that verses had theirrole to play in creating anatmosphere favourable toEnglishaspirationsintimeofwar.As thewordswhich the

author of the Vow of theHeron put into the mouth ofEdward III indicate,warwasfoughtelsewhere thansimplyon the battlefield: ‘I willmake war upon him [PhilipVI] both in deeds and inwords’(‘Jeleguerrerayetenfais et en dis’).8 Propagandawaspartofthatwarofwords.

Whatmakes a nation?What,inparticular,madetheFrench

nation in the last twocenturiesoftheMiddleAges?A glance at the widerEuropean setting will revealthat this was an age whichwitnessed the death of old‘universal’ values, whetherpapalorimperial,andtheriseof ‘national’ ones in theirplace. If there were still along road to be travelled inItaly and Germany,developments would occur

more quickly in France,England,andIberia.

InFrance,inparticular,theideaofnationandnationhoodtook a notable step forwardduringtheperiod.Theuseofa phrase such as ‘MotherFrance’ (‘Mère France’), asAlain Chartier used it in1422,doesnotmean that theideathatallFrenchmenhadacommon mother wasgenerallyaccepted.Historians

haveemphasisedthattheideaof nationhood grew onlyslowlyduringthisperiod;thatin legalmatters local customruled, and that even theParlement of Paris (France’ssupreme court dispensingjustice directly for the king,whose body membersclaimedtocarrytoitsburial)functioned in such a way asto emphasise the verylocalism of French society.

Legal particularism was onething; another was the closeconnexion between the titlesof the great feudatories, theareas from which they tookthem,andtheexerciseofrealpower which they enjoyedwithin them, facts whichhelped to develop a localpatriotism at the expense ofthenationalone.

Particularism wasfurthered by the practice of

encouragingmeetingsoflocalestates, whose continuedexistence can be read as arecognition of the desires ofmost French people to seethem dealing with localmatters, especially taxation,which could then beemployed in the furtheranceof local defence. There was,too, the very size of thecountry and the physicallocation of the capital, well

‘off-centre’:Pariswasa longway from Bayonne or Brest.Inevitably,distancesmilitatedagainstthehegemonyofParisandthecourt;inevitably,too,forthatveryreasononeofthemain themes of Frenchhistory has long been to seethecentrestrugglingtoassertitselfagainst theperiphery inan attempt to gain politicalcontrol. The process,although successful, was a

slowone.Muchmodern writing has

stressed the significance ofthe conscious encouragementofprovincialloyaltiesandthegrowth of autonomy incertain areas of France. Thedevelopment of theBurgundiandominionwasanextraordinaryexampleofthis.There were other areas, too,which were not insignificantin this respect. One factor

which enabled the kings ofEngland to win favour andexercise a measure ofeffective control overNormandy in the fifteenthcenturywas their appeal to asense of local patriotism, inthis case based largely on arevival and defence ofNorman institutions whichhadallbutdisappearedintheyears following the conquestof the duchy by the French

kinginthethirteenthcentury.Brittany constituted an evenmoredramaticinstanceofthereluctanceof apays to allowitself to be forced intosubmission.AttheendoftheMiddle Ages the sense ofBreton identity was verymarked. It was found in theworks of local writers; in asenseof theduchyhaving itsownrootsandhistoryand,ofcourse, its ducal house,

againstwhich itwaspossibletocommittreason;initsownmarch or frontier which, inthe east, was the riverCouesnonwhichrunsintothesea near the Mont-Saint-Michel, thus marking theborder of the duchy with itsneighbouring one ofNormandy. This wasprovincialism in the strictestmeaningof theword. Itwas,atthesametime,oneofthose

factors which militatedstrongly against the creationofaFrenchnation.

What factors couldweaken these tendencies?Basically, they were three innumber: monarchy, history,andwar.Monarchy, in everysense a truly livinginstitution, provided thecountry’s leadership. Morethan any other institution, itcame to symbolise the unity

of France. The thirteenthcentury had seendevelopments which wereimportantinthisrespect.Thereign and person of St Louis(1226–70) haddonemuch toadvance the cause of royalprestige and power. Louis’spietyandpersonallife,whichwere to lead to hiscanonisation in 1297, weretakenasbeingaclearsignofdivine approval of the

monarchy of France, a pointunderlinedwiththeplacingofa reliquary containing thenewly canonised monarch’sskullintheSainteChapelleinParis which Louis himselfhad founded to receive therelics fromChrist’s crownofthorns. Then, about 1300, aspartofagreatpublicitydriveassociated with the reign ofPhilip the Fair (1285–1314)Guillaume Nogaret had

writtenofthatking’spersonalpiety which made him intothe ‘principal pillarsupportingtheRomanchurchand theCatholic faith’,whilethe Dominican friar,Guillaume de Sanqueville,almost transformed Philipinto a Christ-figure, or aleaderforallFrenchpeople.

What, in our own time,Marc Bloch was to call thereligionofmonarchytookoff

even more strongly in thereignofCharlesV(1364–80).One of the motifs prominentin much of the art of theseyears was that of monarchy.This can be seen inmanuscript illuminations ofthe crowned king receivinggifts,orintheking’ssceptre,a magnificent piece toppedwithafigureofCharlemagne,enthroned, holding his ownsceptre and orb, the whole

placedinanopenfleurdelys,and including an inscriptionwhich begins ‘Saint Charlesthe Great…’ (‘SanctusKarolus Magnus…’). Thesceptre was one of the itemswhich Charles V bequeathedtotheabbotofthemonasteryofSaint-Denis,northofParis,toformpartoftheregaliaforthe coronation of futureFrenchkings.Thecreationofa new ordo, or order of

service, for Charles V’scoronation, which placedmuchemphasisuponboththepowerandtheresponsibilitiesofmajesty,underlinesthefactthat kingship was a politicalthemeofmuchimportanceatthistime.9

We noted earlier in thischapter the importance ofarmorial bearings as symbolsof a political claim. The agealso attributed great

significance to the outwardsymbols and trappings ofmonarchical authority. Theroyal entry (entrée royale)into towns other than Pariswas a development of thesecond half of the fourteenthcentury. In October 1389Charles VI made his formalentry into Lyon, walkingunderacanopysimilartothatwhich protected the Host inCorpus Christi processions,

essentially a mark of respectto him who walked beneathit.When, inNovember1449,Charles VII took possessionof the recently re-conqueredcityofRouen,hedid so inamanner intended to impress,ridingahorsedrapedinclothof goldworkedwith fleurdelys, his sword borne beforehim, his party preceded by awhite palfrey, symbol ofsovereignty.Suchceremonies

were important, reflecting, astheywereintendedtodo, theneedoftheking’ssubjectstoseetheir lord, thechiefagentof unity within the country,and the need of the king toasserthislordshipinfarflungparts of his kingdom.10 Thefleurde lys referred to in theRouenentréewasthesymbolof the monarchy and ofFrancewhich allwould haveunderstood, especially since

Charles V had taught that ithadoriginallybeensentdownfrom heaven as a sign ofdivineapprobation.

A further sign was thesacred banner (oriflamme)which might accompany thekingtowar,keptat theroyalabbey of Saint-Denis, whichbecame the royalmausoleumand something of a mysticalcentre of royalty (St Louishad decreed that only kings,

notmembersoftheirfamilies,mightbeburied there,givingadded significance to theburial of Bertrand duGuesclin among this royalcompany). Nor should weforgettheclaimofthekingofFrance to be regarded notmerely as a king but as anemperor:‘thekingisemperorinhiskingdom’(‘rexinregnosuo est imperator’), as themuch-quoted tag went. To

emphasise this the figure ofCharlemagne on Charles V’ssceptre (the twomen, it willbe noted, shared a name)wore not an open, royal,crown but a closed, imperialone, andwas flanked by twoimperial eagles. The cult ofCharlemagne at the Frenchcourt in the late fourteenthcentury, in which the oldemperor was shown with ahalo, suggests very strongly

that everything was beingdonetohintthatthekingwasbeingimbuedwithsomethingof the former imperialauthority.

‘There is no nation’, one ofFrance’s leading historianshas recently claimed,‘without a nationalhistory’,11 thereby stressingthe political value whichcouldbeattachedtomakinga

peopleawareofitshistory,orcommon experience. Not forthefirsttime,thestudyofthepast in the lateMiddle Agesbecame a means ofexpressing, channelling, anddeveloping a sense ofnational consciousness, inthiscaseanawarenessofhowFrance had arisen anddeveloped,whatshewas,andwhere she might go. If itcould be shown that France

(and not simply parts ofFrance) had a natural,indubitable, and historic pastwhichcouldberecorded,thenthe study of that past couldmake a considerablecontribution towards thecreationofthepresentandthefuture. Paris (the man) hadbeenthesonofPriam,kingofTroy:throughthetribeoftheParisi hehadgivenhisnameto the capital of France – or

sothestorywent.TheTrojanlegend had slowly developedsincetheseventhcentury,andin the course of the MiddleAgesfewcountriesrefusedtobe associated with it or withthe figure of Brutus whosetravels,afterhehadleftTroyand gone to Greece, broughthimtoGaulandthen,finally,toAlbion,where he foundedTroja Nova, the New Troy,which became London. The

Trojan origins were seizedupon at different times, butthe late Middle Ages usedthemtocreateanancientandrespectable stock fromwhichnations had since descendedinGermany,Wales,Scotland,Brittany,EnglandandFrance.InEnglandtheTrojanoriginshad been dealt with byGeoffrey of Monmouth in1135; inFrance itwas in theHistoria regum francorum,

written well over half acentury afterwards, that thestory resurfaced; it was onewhichwasmaintainedwelltothe fore of French historicalwriting for a long time tocome.

If one traditionwas basedonTroy,anotherwasfoundedon Rome and, in particular,on the imperial past. Thistradition, as we have seen,was not limited to France,

althoughinFranceitwasnotthe people who owed theirbeing to the Romans (Troyhadbeenresponsibleforthat)but rather their rulers, whowere descended from theemperors of Rome. Theemphasisondescentwasalsoto be seen in the interestwhich men had ingenealogies and pedigrees.The Middle Ages werefamiliar with Christ’s

genealogy as found in theTreeofJesseofIsaiahandinthe pedigrees traced in thegospels of Matthew andLuke.Theestablishmentofalineofkingsgaveancestrytothemost recent ofmonarchs,as well as providingcontinuity to their people. Inthe Declaration of Arbroathof 1320, due importancewasgiven to the 113 kings ofroyalstockwhohadruledthe

Scottish nation in lineunbroken by a singleforeigner. In France, whenthe dynasty was beingchallenged by the English, itwas essential to provelegitimacy through ancestry.As Jean Golein wrote at theendofthefourteenthcentury,popes and emperors wereelected, but the kingdom ofFrancebelonged toherkingsby inheritance through male

heirs, the descendants of aholy and sacred lineage. Thetracing of ancestry was notsimplyafamilyaffair.Inthiscase it was concerned withtheroyalofficeandthewiderfamily,thenation.Ithadthusbecomeamatterofstate.

Legitimacy and theinheritance of an unbrokensuccession was one thing.Thewholematterhadanotherdimension which has been

stressedinrecentwriting;thelongChristiantraditionofthecountry called France towhich thewords of St Peter,‘a chosen race, a royalpriesthood, a consecratednation, a people set apart’ (1Peter 2) might be said toapply. In the Declaration ofArbroath,theScotswereableto refer to themselves as a‘holy people’ confirmed byan apostle, Andrew. The

English, in their turn, couldclaim that Christianity hadbeen brought to them byJosephofArimathea;thatthegreatConstantine,throughhismother, Helena, was agrandson of King Coel, andthat he had been born inYork; and that England hadmore parishes than hadFrance.12

Yetallthiswasnothingincomparison with the proud

boastoflatemedievalFrenchkings to be descended fromClovis, said to be a saint aswell as the firstMerovingianking; from Charlemagne,Frank, emperor and saint (hehad been canonised in 1165,four years after Edward theConfessor); and from StLouis, paragon of the royalvirtues,allthisgivingasenseof thecontinuityofChristianrule and holy blood going

back almost one thousandyears. The influence of thiswayofseeingmatterswas tobe well illustrated in LouisXI’s decision, taken in 1469,to declare a feast of‘monseigneur Saint Charles,notrepredecesseurcommeroide France’, with a publicholiday to commemorate it.Therewereotherpatrons,too,of whom France had anotable series: St Denis,

third-centurybishopofParis,but also something of anhistoric, even mythical,creation; St Louis, of happymemory; and St Michael,archangel, appropriately asoldier, first brought toprominence in the fourteenthcentury, and finally assignedanorderofchivalrybyLouisXI. With such protectors,how could the nation or itsdynastyfail?

Themonarchywould thushave powerful reasons forensuring that history bewritten and used to goodpurpose. TheHistoria regumfrancorumwas already beingcomposed at Saint-Denis latein the twelfth century, andthis tradition continued untilthe end of theMiddle Ages.In themid-fourteenthcenturyRichard Lescot, monk of theabbey, styling himself

‘historiographer royal’,wrotean historical treatise againstEngland and another on theexclusion of the female lineuponwhichtheEnglishclaimto the crown of France wasbased. By the fifteenthcentury the Grandeschroniques de France,written with royal approval,werebeing cited almost as ifthey were the Bible itself;while it was in the same

century that anothermonkoftheabbey,JeanChartier,wasstyling himself‘historiographer of theFrench’, which suggests thathe was producing work of acertain kind, in all likelihoodto order. In this way the oldDionysiantraditionofwritinghistory favourable to themonarchy and its role as theleader and unifier of Frenchsociety was continued. But

thiswasnotlefttothemonksalone. Members of the royalentourage were also activelyencouraged to partake in thisexercise. Charles Vpersuaded his chancellor,Pierre d’Orgemont, to writethe history of both himselfandhisfather,JohnII.UnderCharles VII, the royalchancellery continued toprovidehistorians,whenNoëlde Fribois andNicoleGilles,

both royal notaries andsecretaries, each produced asuccessful history of Franceinwhich,grantedthepositionof the writers and the accessto documents which theirwork at the centre of poweraccorded them, they wereable to make use ofdocumentationtakenfromtheroyal archives. The virtualinvention of the Salic Lawoccurred in the mid-fifteenth

century when, on the ordersof CharlesVII, a searchwasinstigated at Saint-Denis,Reims, and elsewhere fortexts upon which a treatise,the Grand traité, could becomposed with a view todiffusing a myth whichexcludedanybuttheexistingroyal line, descended, as itwas, through the male, fromthethroneofFrance.

It is arguable that it was thelongwarwithEnglandwhichwas the most influentialsingle factor to contribute tothe growing awareness ofFrench nationhood in thisage.Withthecountryopentoattack from the English, theneedsofdefencecamebeforeallothers.Tomeetthethreat,whichcamefromanumberofdirections, the French crownhad, in the face of strongly-

heldfeelingsof local loyalty,to create a national effortwhich would both dependuponandreflectadevelopingsense of nationhood. Yet,over aperiodof a centuryormore, this was achieved.First, it was necessary toemphasise the inclusivenessof the word ‘Francia’ todescribe the whole kingdom,and not simply those areasruledbythecrown.Thiswas

already being done in thethirteenthcentury, and itwasin that century, too, that theidea of the communis patria,themotherlandwith the kingat its head, came to beincreasingly employed. Fromthe same inspiration, that ofRoman law, there emergedtheideaofthecommongood(res publica) embracing, inthis case, all French people,with the king as their head

(caput). This notion of respublica (translated variouslyas ‘la chose publique’, ‘lebien publique’, ‘l’utilitépublique’, or ‘le biencommun’) beloved oflawyers,doubtless influencedthegreatcanonist,GuillaumeDurand (d. 1296), when hewrotethatallshouldbereadyto contribute ‘to the defenceofthecountryandthecrown’(‘pro defensione patrie et

corone’). Similarly, thepopularity of the late-Romanwriter, Vegetius, was partlyduetothestresswhichhehadplaced upon communalresponsibilityfordefenceandtheneedtoservethecommongood.

The threat of externalattackplayedacrucialroleinobligingFrance to take stockof her defensive needs, inforcingher to face them in a

communal way, and increatinganawarenessthatallFrench people belonged tothe same nation, or patria,owing allegiance andobedience to the same king.But this was not enough. Atthis stage we should insistupon another factor (alreadystudied in an earlier chapter)which formalised this new-found unity, namely thedevelopment of institutions,

and principally those whichemerged fromwar, the armyandthenationalfiscalsystem.As we have seen the periodwitnessed the creation of aroyal army, owing itsexistence, its pay, and itscommand structure to theking, but increasinglyregarded as the defender ofthe good of France as awhole. The growth of thearmy as an instrument of

state, its development as theeffective symbol of thecountry’s strength, controlledand sometimes led in personbytheking,markstheriseofan institution which directlyreflects the growing sense ofFrench unity. When CharlesVII instituted the francs-archers in 1448, he decidedthat every community shouldprovide onemanwhowouldrender military service in

return for exemption fromcertain taxes. The essentialpoint is sometimes forgotten;through the francs-archersthe French army wouldrepresent the whole nation,seen now as a geographicalexpression, since (in theory)every community was to berepresentedinit.

Complementary to thebuilding up of the new armywasthecreationofanational

taxation system, recognitionthat the army’s needs had tobemet:notaxation,noarmy;no army, no defence. If thecommon good came underattack, thecrowncalleduponnecessity to justify theimpositionof taxationwhich,after the publication of anordinance by Charles VI inOctober1383,establishedtheprinciple that all, wherevertheylived,werehenceforthto

pay aides, ignorance of theordinance not excusing anyperson from its terms. Evenroyaldecreescouldbeusedtoeducate men in the needs ofFranceasawhole.

Two further factors mayalsobe taken into account. Itwas during the fourteenthcentury that the two greatprivileged bodies, nobilityand clergy, came to beincluded(albeitslowly)inthe

everwidening circle of thosewho paid taxation and who,like other members of thelarger community, becamemore closely subject to itspractices. Secondly, wecannotignoretheinfluenceoftheneedtocollecttheransomof John II upon the growingsense of political unity. Forthe ransom had the effect ofmakingitnecessarytocollecttaxation with regularity over

many years throughout thecountry, and thereby rallyingthe whole people around thekinginhisneed,asymbolicaland practical sign of theinvolvement of the nation inachieving the release of itshead and leader, honourablycaptured in battle whileseeking his country’sdeliverance from enemyattacks.

What was the connexionbetween war, the growingsense of French nationalism,and treason? In spite ofattempts by lawyers in theroyal service to establish aclear-cutdefinitionoftreasonwhich would securecondemnationbeforethelaw,‘there was never any precisedelimitation of the crime.’13Yet one thing remains clear.Treason grew out of

particular political situations,and was regarded as apolitical offence against bothking and people. For thisreason, some brief remarksmustbemadeaboutithere.

Termed lèse majesté, orthe injuring of majesty,treasonwasaconceptwhich,in the late Middle Ages,could be used to defend thecrown both in time of warand social unrest, and in a

period when there might beoppositiontotheextensionofits theoretical and practicalclaims.Buttreasonwasmorethanthat.Itwasalsoseenasacrime against the commongood of society as a whole,which might suffer from astab in the back whichtreacherous acts such asgiving information to, orplotting with, the enemycouldconstitute.Treasonwas

thus an act which threatenedboth the king and the bodypolitic.

The time of war againstEngland marked the pointwhen men began to beprosecuted for treason. In1343 Olivier III de Clissonwas tried and executed ‘pourpluseurs traïsons et autrescrimes perpetrez par luicontreleroyetlacoronnedeFrance,etaliancesqu’ilavoit

faites au roy d’Angleterre,anemi du roy et du royaumede France’ (‘for several actsof treason and other crimescarriedoutbyhimagainstthekingandthecrownofFrance,and alliances which he hadmade with the king ofEngland, enemy of the kingand the kingdom ofFrance’).14 Three years laterone Simon Pouillet met thesame fate for uttering public

supportfortheEnglishking’sclaim to be king of France.Thus began a long line oftrials of those who plottedagainst the king.Wedowellto remember that the quarrelbetween the French andEnglish kings wasfundamentally a quarrel overa matter of succession, andthat it was precisely thiswhich had prompted Pouillettospeakthewordswhichcost

him his life.We should alsonotethatthecommongoodofFrance was beingincreasingly associated withthe well-being of the personof the king and of the officewhichheexercised.Anattackonhim,aslord,wasanattackon the people; if heprospered,sowouldthey.Itishardlysurprising that insuchcircumstances consorting orplotting with the ‘anciens

ennemis’ would be regardedastreason.

Attitudes towards treasoncouldbeharsh.Yetitisclearthat the situation resultingfromthewaragainstEnglandallowed for much discretionin the matter. Individualsmight be prosecuted andpunished.But insituations inwhich territorial borders andspheres of political influenceweresubjecttonotinfrequent

change resulting frommilitary campaigns andtreaties, it was difficult toaccuse the populations ofwhole areas of disloyalty ortreason. French legal recordsof the period contain muchevidenceoftheproblemsthuscaused. Both the transfer oflarge areas, particularly insouth-western France, fromoneobediencetotheotherbyvirtue of the treaty of

Brétigny, and the Englishconquest of large parts ofnorthern France in thefifteenth century, broughtaboutclashesofloyaltyinthemindsofthepeopleinvolved,creating situations in whichcertainactsmightberegardedas treasonable. This wasparticularly liable to happeninareasadjacent to frontiers:the friend of one day mighttechnically have become an

enemy by the next, and allrelationshipwithhim(orher:lovers were separated byliving in opposingobediences) construed astreason. In the language oftheday,Francewasacountryof ‘war and divisions’(‘guerre et divisions’),symbolised by those whowore thewhite cross, the redcross and the cross of StAndrew(Valois,English,and

Burgundian supportersrespectively).Theelementofcivilconflictinthewarledtofeelings of great bitternessandthetakingofextremeandsometimes very violentmeasures against those whowere political, rather thannational enemies, with theeffect that accusations oftreason were frequentlyhurledbyonesideagainsttheother.

There were, in addition,other problems. Could allFrenchpeoplebecertain thatthe English king had nolegitimate claim whatever tothe crown of France? God,afterall,hadappearedtobackhimbyhelpinghimtovictoryon the battlefield, a viewwhich undoubtedly causedmany to accept English rule,albeit with resignation.Further, there were those,

Jean Juvénal des Ursins,Thomas Basin, and theanonymous ‘Bourgeois deParis’ among them, who feltthat English rule comparedfavourably with that of theValois. Not surprisingly, attheendofthewar,desUrsinswas to urge Charles VII totake a lenient view of actswhichhadarisennotoutofaconscious desire to betrayhim but rather out of

circumstances which hadobliged men, in a dividedFrance, to live outside thejurisdiction of him whoseclaim to legitimacy, deniedby the terms of the treaty ofTroyes, had recently beenspectacularly vindicated bythe expulsion of the English.Consequently, although alargepartofthepopulationofNormandy appeared to have‘collaborated’ with the

English by living under theirrule, it was not prosecutedwhen thosewhohad lived inthe Valois jurisdictionreturned to the duchy after1450. As if in reply to theidea that traitors were thosewhofailedtoresisttheenemy(as surrendering a castlewithout resistance wasregarded as treacherousconduct) the argument thatFrench people had been

forcibly subjected to Englishrule in spite of themselveswasgenerallyaccepted.Now,the pursuit of the commongood demanded the re-establishment of social peaceas soon as possible. Besides,one of the attributes ofkingship, as desUrsinsmorethanonce reminded theking,was the exercise of mercy,which the texts of letters ofpardon pronounced to be

preferable to the rigours ofjustice. The strict applicationof penalties for technicaltreason in what had been aformofcivilwarwouldhavebeen to have taken asledgehammer to crack thenut.Attheendofthewar,thecause of the common goodand of the unity of Francewould best be furthered by apolicy of reconciliation. Thealternative was still further

division.Aftersomanyyearsof ‘guerre et divisions’, nonewouldwantthat.

1OnthismatterseeN.Saul,Knightsandesquires:theGloucestershiregentryinthefourteenthcentury(Oxford,1981),ch.2,andS.M.Wright,TheDerbyshiregentryinthefifteenthcentury(Derbyshire

Ree.Soc,VIII,1983).pp.8–11.2Rotuliparliamentorum,II,362.3SermonsofThomasBrinton,I,47;11,339.

4A.K.McHardy,‘LiturgyandpropagandainthedioceseofLincolnduringtheHundredYears’War’,Religionandnationalidentity,ed.S.Mews(Oxford,1982),pp.216–17;R.Barber,ThelifeandcampaignsoftheBlackPrince(Woodbridge,1986);Hewitt,Organizationofwar,pp.158–66;J.R.Maddicott,‘The

countycommunityandthemakingofpublicopinioninfourteenth-centuryEngland’,T.R.Hist.S.,fifthseries,28(1978),34–5,38.

5A.E.Prince,‘AletterofEdward,theBlackPrince,describingthebattleofNajerain1367’,E.H.R.,41(1926),417.Suchlettersweresometimesincorporatedintothechronicles.SeeTheAnonimalleChronicle,1333–1381,ed.V.H.Galbraith(Manchester,1927;repr.1970),p.xxxv;and

A.Gransden,HistoricalwritinginEnglandII:c.1307totheearlysixteenthcentury(London,1982),indexunder‘newsletters’.

6ChroniconAdaedeUsk,A.D.1377–1421,trans.E.M.Thompson(2ndedn,London,1904),pp.77,247.

7Ed.P.Meyer,Romania,21(1892),50–2.

8PoliticalpoemsandsongsrelatingtoEnglishhistorycomposedduringtheperiodfromtheaccessionofEdward

IIItothatofRichardII,ed.T.Wright(R.S.,London,1859),1,7.

9R.A.Jackson,‘TheTraitedusacreofJeanGolein’,ProceedingsoftheAmericanPhilosophicalSociety,113(1969),305–24.

10B.GuenéeandF.Lehoux(eds.),Lesentréesroyalesfrançaisesde1328à1515(Paris,1968);D.StylesandC.T.Allmand,‘ThecoronationsofHenryVI’,H.T.,32(May,1982),28–33.

11Guenée,Statesandrulers,p.58.

12J.-P.Genet,‘Englishnationalism:ThomasPoltonattheCouncilofConstance’,NottinghamMedievalStudies,28(1984),67–8.

13S.H.Cuttler,ThelawoftreasonandtreasontrialsinlatermedievalFrance(Cambridge,1981),p.1.

14M.LangloisandY.Lanhers(eds.),ConfessionsetjugementsdecriminelsauParlementdeParis,(1319–1350)(Paris,

1971),p.151.

WARANDLITERATURE

What can be learned byturning to contemporarywritingswhich,inonewayoranother,touchedonthethemeofwar?Ifweregardliterature

as amirror, we see reflectedin it something of thegrowing awareness of whatwarwas,whatitwasdoingtosociety, andhowchangewascoming about.1 It wasthrough literature thatsocietythoughtaloud,commentedonchanging moral and politicalvalues, and reacted todevelopments of which itdisapproved. No one writercould be the common voice

on all matters whichconcerned the public; hisimportance might lie in himbeing a voice in thewilderness. But some noticeof what people wrote, how,and when they did so, cangive the historian an idea ofreactions to events anddevelopments.

There are at least twoways of recounting the sameevent:inwarthesereflectthe

pointsofviewoftheattackerand of the attacked.Chroniclers (like footballcorrespondents today) tendedtodescribe the eventsofwarfromthepointofviewof theattacker, but for whom therewouldhavebeennoactiontoreport.Itwasuponactionthatthe greatest of the latemedievalwarcorrespondents,JeanFroissart,depended.Notover-concerned with seeking

explanationsforthecausesofwar,Froissart’sprimeinterestwas to report action in termswhichwouldevoke the spiritof chivalry among hisreaders, making them wishthat they themselves hadtaken part in the actionsdescribed. Seen through hiseyes,andthroughthoseofhissuccessors who wrote not sowellbutinasimilarchivalrictradition, war was noble

because it brought out thebest in those men, mostlyknights,whoseexploitscameto fill his pages. Courage,honour, perseverence, andloyalty were among themilitary virtues to whichFroissart wished to drawattentionthroughhiswritings.He was less concerned withthe outcome of a battle thanwith the way in whichindividuals or groups fought.

This was so because hispurpose was didactic: hewantedtheepisodeswhichhedescribed to serve asexamplesforotherstofollow.

Froissart’smessagecaughton. ‘One good man’, wrotethe anonymous recorder ofthedeedsofJeanleMaingre,dit Bouciquaut, about 1410,‘iswortha thousandwhoarenot’, his stated aim being topraise chivalry by describing

thelifeandmilitarycareerofone such man.2 BothFroissart and the Bouciquautauthorwerewriterswho sawwar through the eyes of theindividual whose deeds(‘Faits’ or ‘Gesta’) were inthe mainstream of chivalricliterature.Hardly less sowasthetextofthedeedsofHenryV, written by a clericalmember of his household. Inthis work the king, striving

for justice through war, isconfronted by the forces ofevil (the heresy and socialdangers of Lollardy, and thetreasonofsomeofhisclosestassociates) over which hetriumphs(theveryvocabularyusedhasamilitaryringaboutit) before winning an evengreater victory at Agincourt.Adjectivessuchas‘epic’and‘heroic’ are not out of placeindescribingthisapproachto

the reporting of war seenthrough theactionsofoneormoreindividuals.

Froissart excelled in thedescription of the large-scalemilitaryencounter, thebattle.But he was also aware thatwar had its other side, lessnoble and less admirable, inwhich those who had notchosentofight,buthadnonethe less got involved, werecaught up. France (it was

natural that it should beFrance, on whose land thewar was mainly fought)producedanumberofwriterswho depicted that less-than-admirable side of war. Onesuch was Jean de Venette,who could not refrain fromdescribing the campaignsfought in the war’s firstdecades in terms of thephysical sufferings imposedupon society by unlicensed

soldiery. The priest inVenettesawmanyoftheactscarriedoutundertheguiseofwar as little other than sin;what sticks in the reader’smind is the bitterness behindso much of what thechroniclerwrote.

There was bitterness, too,in the personal record ofeventskeptbyananonymousParisian clerk for almost thewhole of the first half of the

fifteenthcentury;butitwasabitterness which differed alittle from that of Venette inthat it reflected a deepdisappointment at thepoliticalfailureofthoseatthehead of French society tosave their country from theunfavourable effects of war.In other ways the warreflectedthroughthepagesofthis disillusioned Parisian isofverygreatinterest.Hewas

not concernedwithanalysingpolitical events, which hemerely recorded as havingtaken place, although hesometimes added a commenton their consequences andeffects. The real importanceof the work lies in otherfields. The author had muchsympathy for those whosuffered the physical andmoral effects of war (heunderlined the futility of

wholesale destruction ofcrops and property, and theeffects of this upon the poorin days of rising prices), buthe was also mindful of thedegrading effects which warhad upon the soldier. It wasone thing for men from onecountry to fight those fromanother.ButthewarinFancewas a civil war, an act oftreasonbyone sectionof thecommunityagainstanother,a

point of view which madehim reflect that while thenobility might have wishedforwar, the common people,desiring only peace, hadnever done so. It was herethat his criticism of thenation’s leadership wasexpressed most vigorously;far from uniting the country,ithadonlydividedit.

The historian, then, cansearch the textsofchronicles

for reflections of opinionregardingwarandwhatitwasdoing to society. But moreuseful, and certainly moresignificant, are those works,difficult to place in aparticular category, writtenmore specifically ascontributions to an on-goingpublic debate about theeffects of war, particularlyuponFrenchsociety.By1390thewar, after half a century,

had seen the growth toadulthoodoftwogenerations.It is not surprising that themostsignificantworksofthisnature should have beenproduced during the longgenerationwhichbeganinthe1380s and ended in the1410s. Between them, theseworks represent some of theworries and concerns ofliterate people who lookedabout them and did not

whollylikewhattheysaw.Nor are the views of

certain well-knownEnglishmen withoutsignificance in this respect.To John Wyclif war was anevil thing. To hiscontemporary, John Gower,the poet, it was motivatedlargelybygreedandwasnotproperly justified even ifwaged against the Saracens:howcouldamankillanother

whose very face his ownreflected?3 GeoffreyChaucer,althoughnopacifist,expressed doubts about thewar which, by the latefourteenthcentury,hadlastedso long with seemingly solittle result. Two generationslater, in 1436, when theconflictstillseemednonearerbeingresolved,JohnLydgate,one-timecourtpoetandmonkof Bury St Edmunds, who

was not in principle againstwar (‘withouten werre be-forn as I yow told /Wemaynat save nor keepe wele ourright’) could none the lessplead that ‘alwer&striffbesett a-side’. In hisDebate oftheHorse,GooseandSheep,adisputebetweenthethreeastowhichwasthemostusefuland important, the horseemphasised his role in war.So did the goose, as the

provider of feathers forarrows. The sheep, bycontrast, has appeared tocriticsastherepresentativeofpeace.4 That is so. But aninterpretation of the poemalso allows us to see in thesheepLydgate’svisionofthemeek and uncomplainingnon-combatant who is thechief sufferer in time ofconflict, and whose enemiesarethemoreaggressivehorse

andgoose.Whathad thepoets to say

on the subject ofwar?Therewas nothing new in the factthat, like the troubadours,poets should comment uponwar as they might upon anymatter of public interest.Their task was to enquirewhat was wrong with theworld, to express theirfeelings with truth, and thustoimprovethelotofmankind

ingeneral. Justaspoets suchas Guillaume de Machaut,Eustache Deschamps, andGeoffreyChaucer(inhisTaleof Melibee) wrote about theproper exercise of power bythe ruler, so they alsovoicedcriticisms (often those of anincreasinglyvocalandliteratemiddle class) against warwhichcanbeseenaspartofawiderliteratureofcomplaint.

Two themes, particularly

in French poetry, stand out.One was the need to pursuethe war with vigour andproper organisation, so as toprotectthepeoplefromdeath,a frequent and favouritetheme in the poetry of theday. In this way there couldbepeace,andthepublicgoodcould be achieved. Thesecondwascriticismofthosewho ignored or abandonedtheir responsibilities to that

good, and of the consequentneedofthekingtotakeafirmlead to ensure theachievementandmaintenanceof peace. As Lydgate wrote,‘Rem publicam ye must ofriht preferre / Alweyconsideryng that pees is betthanwere’.5

How were the themestreatedinliteratureotherthanpoetry? There can be nodoubt that, by the late

fourteenth century, a generaldesire for peace wasmanifestingitselfveryclearlyin both France and England.John Gower, Christine dePisan, John Lydgate, andAlain Chartier all wroteworks in which the word‘Peace’or ‘Paix’appeared inthe title, while in 1395Philippe de MézièresaddressedapleatoRichardIIto bring the war against

France to an end. Half acenturylaterJeanJuvenaldesUrsins could urge hissovereign,CharlesVII,alongthe ‘road to peace’ (‘la voyede paix’); the war againstEngland, he claimed, hadgone on for too long. Howdid these men envisagepeace? All wanted thefighting to stop; at the sametime all recognised that, initself, such a cessation of

hostilities would notnecessarily bring true andlastingpeace.WhatMézières,Pisan, and des Ursins had incommon (besides theirFrenchness) was theirrecognition that it was theresponsibilityofthecrowntoachieve peace. It is evidentthat to thempeacemeantnotmerely an absence of war; itinvolved a proper balance inthe social structure, the

abolitionofabusesbothlegaland fiscal (critics still had averylongwaytotravelalongthis particular road) and thecurbingof the tyrannyof thesoldier whose activitiesneither the crown noranybody elsewas any longerabletocontrol.Inhispleaforpeace,Mézièresdescribedhisvision of an orchardsurrounded by a wall, calledTuition,akindofEdenruled

by a King of Peace (‘rexpacificus’) who ‘stood forauthority and the commongood… so loved and lookeduptothathemighthavebeenthe father of each and all’.6To Christine de Pisan, too,the need for good rule wasparamount;itwouldbringtheorders of society together inharmony and peace (‘wellioyned and assembled all in

on[e]’).7 To des Ursins,writinginthewar’sdecliningyears, something must bedone (the fact that he stillneededtowriteonthisthemeshows how unsuccessfulearliereffortshadbeen);evenif it required the making ofterritorial concessions, thecalamities of war must beendedso that thepeople (desUrsinswroteasabishopwithexperience of a diocese on a

‘frontier’ area) should sufferno more. Justice and peace,he exclaimed in the vein ofthepsalmist,shouldembrace;as theattributesofGod, theywere a king’s best gift to hispeople.8

Lydgate’sotherthemewasthat of the res publica, orcommongood.Appeal to theconcept went back a verylongwayintheMiddleAges,in particular in works on

government, in which it wasoften placed against that ofthe particular interest, ortyranny. Whom did men ofthe fourteenth and fifteenthcenturiesregardastyrants?InEngland and France it wasnot the king (whatever couldbesaidofRichardII)but thesoldier who was seen as themain public malefactor, whosought the fulfilment of hisowninterestatthecostofthat

ofothers.Howhadthiscomeabout?

The most importantattempt to face up to thisquestion,withitsimplicationsforallgroupsofsociety,wasundoubtedly that of HonoréBouvet, prior of Selonnet, aBenedictinemonastery in thesouth of France, who wrotehis Tree of Battles in the1380s. Bouvet had a goodworking knowledge of civil

and, inparticular, canon law,and itwas to the law that heturned for a solution to theproblem.War,heargued,wasnot wrong when used forlegitimate ends, nor when itwas initiated and controlledby a prince. It was wrong,however,whenitdegeneratedinto a private affair foughtwithout proper authority, aswas too often the case at atime when the Companies

roamed in France, and inparticular the south, seekingtheirprivateadvantage.Itwasthis development in warwhich Bouvet condemned sostrongly.Theknight,withhisloveoftheindividualexploit,whowas,atexactlythesamemoment, receiving the praiseofFroissart, also came in forcriticism. So, too, did themerchant who, attacked anddeprived of his cargo upon

thehighseas,procuredlettersofmarquefromhissovereignwhich enabled him to seekcompensation by seizing thelawful property of a fellownationalofhisattacker,eitheratseaorinport.Accordingtothelawofarmsandcommonpractice, such acts ofretribution were legitimate.Yet, Bouvet argued, was itjust that an innocentmerchant, whose only

association with the originalmiscreant was a sharednationality, should suffer theconsequences of another’sillegal act?Was the cause ofjusticeandpeacewellservedif such a practice wereallowed to continue, for theissueof lettersofmarquedidlittle more than legalisepiracy?

Aware of the implicationsof his criticisms, Bouvet

asked what rights the non-combatant, whether woman,child, farmer, priest, orstudenttravellingtohisplaceofstudy,hadin timeofwar?The purpose of discussingsuch questions was obvious.Bouvetwastryingtolimitthephysical effects of war tothose who actively took partin it; as far as possible thebystanders should remaininnocent of those effects. In

his view, the soldier wasallowed too much freedom,and was too little subject tothedisciplineof the law.Forthe law under which thesoldieracted,thelawofarms,although intended to givesomeprotectiontoallparties,nonethelessgavethesoldiera privileged position byemphasising his rights overthose of others. A soldiermust be within society, not

outsideit.Bouvet,‘oneofthefirstto

argue for the rights of non-combatants’,9 was standingup for the overwhelmingmajoritywhommany saw asthevictimsof the soldiery. Itwas their good which heequatedwiththepublicgood,the good which knighthoodshould be defending, notabusing under cover of thelawofarms.Onlytheperson

who exercised sovereigntyover both the soldier and thegeneral community shouldapplythelawsofwar:andheshould do so with vigour, tosee justice done in the nameof the public interest. Theemphasis which emergesfromBouvet’sTree is of thelaw being stronglyadministered by the ruler forthe benefit of all, not simplyfor a few, and of a vision of

thesoldierasaservant,notasa master, of the community.In this way, as Lydgatepleaded,andasMézièreshaddonebeforehim,thecommongood (‘le bien du peuple’)would be preferred to aparticularone.

In essence what Bouvetwasadvocatingwasnotnew.‘The name of knight is anhonour, but it involves hardwork’, JohnofSalisburyhad

writteninthetwelfthcentury,andsomethreehundredyearslater his view was to bequotedwithapprovalbyJeanJuvénal des Ursins.10 Acountry’s chivalry, he wrote,must defend its othermembers, and even its king,in the name of the publicgood. The knight and, byimplication, even thecommon soldier, was theservant of that good; both,

too, should be ready tosubmittothedisciplineofthelaw.The alternativewas thataparticularinterest,aformoftyranny, might prevail. Thefirm attitude of the Romansof old was much read aboutand praised at the end of theMiddle Ages. TheBouciquaut author stressedhow far Jean leMaingre hadapplied the rules anddiscipline of chivalry as the

ancients had done, and Jeande Waurin was to praiseHenry V’s discipline in thevery same terms. Medievalsociety felt it had much tolearn from the ancient worldinmattersmilitary.

Nowhereisthisbetterseenthan in the popularity in thisperiod of the late fourth-centuryhandbookonwar,theDe re militari of Vegetius.The twelfth and thirteenth

centuries had witnessed anincreasingly intellectualapproach to war: the knightmustbenotonlyafighterbutathinkerendowed,aboveall,with foresight (‘prudence’).Hemust alwaysbe ready forwhatever might happen, inparticulartheunexpected,andhe could prepare himself forthisinseveralways.Hecouldreadaboutthescienceofwarin a work such as that of

Vegetius,whichtoldhimhowto organise a fighting force,how to succeed in certainsituations suchas sieges, andhow, through training, tomake himself ready to fight.The popularity of Vegetius’smanualwasundoubted,manymanuscript copies survivingtothisday.11BeginningwiththatmadeintoAnglo-NormanforthefutureEdwardIinthemid-thirteenth century,

translations were made intothe growing vernacularlanguages, Italian, German,French (four), Catalan and,finally, English. Some havechosen to regard the De remilitari primarily as ahandbook forwar, tobekeptwithinreachforeaseofrapidconsultationinbattleorsiege.Bethatasitmay,theworkismuchmorethanthat.Itistheexpression of a basic

philosophy on the waging ofwar, intended as much asfood for thought as directiveto action. Not only do theworks(military,philosophicalandreligious)withwhichitisbound tell us something ofhow itwas regarded by menof the Middle Ages; thenames of thework’s owners,which include those ofbishopsandmonks,aswellaskings, princes and soldiers,

reveal to us who may havereaditandbeeninfluencedbyitscontent.

WhatdidVegetiushavetoteachthelateMiddleAgesonthe waging of war? Ratherthan thedetailsof techniquesororganisation,weshouldbeseeking generalities andprinciples; it is these whichwere important. Crucial wasthe understanding that warwas fought to achieve a

political end. The need toachieve victory was,therefore, paramount, so thata soldier’s value was to bejudged by his effectivenessrather thanbythefinedeeds,however notable, which hecarried out. Victory, too,should be won in as brief atime as possible, with aminimum of effort and theleast possible loss of life.Advance information of the

enemy’s plans andmovements would enablecommanders to act withforesight, and if spies couldtellthemwhattheyneededtoknow, then they should beused, a point endorsed byPhilippe deMézières.12 It isclear that, in the systemadvocated by Vegetius, thecommander who planned inadvance, and who used hisexperienceofwar to thebest

effect, would be at anadvantage over the enemy.HenryVwasadmiredfortheelaborate preparations whichhecarriedoutbeforeinvadingFrance. Equally, and to thecontrary, Philippe deCommynes criticised thefailure of Duke Charles ofBurgundy to captureBeauvais in the summer of1472notbecauseGodwasonthe side of the defenders

(whichCommynesthoughthewas)butbecauseCharleshadcome to the siege withladderswhichwere too shortfor scaling the town’s wallsand with an insufficiency ofcannon shot with which hecould easily have battereddown the defences. AsCommynes commentedwryly, the duke ‘had notcome prepared or equippedfor such an eventuality’, so

that success was rightlydeniedhim.13

Nor would numbersnecessarily ensure victory.Men had constantly beforethem the success in battle ofJudas Maccabeus, who didnot rely on the size of hisarmy to defeat the enemy.What mattered were otherfactors. One was the qualityof leadership.The recurrenceof the theme of the Nine

Worthies (great militaryleaders of the past, ofwhomMaccabeus had been one)serves as a reminder of theimportance attached to thisfactor. As we saw earlier,men were coming torecognise that the ability tolead was not always anattributeofbirth.Authorityinan army, commented theBouciquautauthor,shouldbegiven to only the most

sensible, the most expert inarms, and the mostexperienced (‘les plus sageset les plus expars aux armeset les plus acoustumez’).14Theintentionwasnottodenythe nobility its traditionalposition of command, butrather to ensure a reasonablechance of victory throughhaving armies led bymenofabove-averagemilitaryabilityto exercise effective

disciplineandleadershipoverthem.

To present a commanderwith at least a sportingchance, the army placedunderhimmustbecomposed,as far as possible, of troopswho were properly preparedto fight. Training, animportant theme in theRomanwarcanon,couldleadto the soldier facing battleboth better prepared in the

use of his arm andpsychologically at anadvantageoveranenemylesswelltrained.TheinsistenceofEdward III that Englishmenshould train at the buttssuggeststhat theteachingsofVegetiuswere in the processof taking effect. WilliamWorcester, writing in themid-fifteenth century, hadclearly learned the message(which he probably got from

ChristinedePisanwho,inherturn, had taken it fromHonoré Bouvet) when hewrote ‘that there is noneerthely thing more forto beallowed than a countre orregion whiche be furnisshedandstoredwithegoodmenofarmes well lerned andexercited’,bywhichhemeanttrained.15 Indeed, in anotherpassage in the same work,Worcester attributed the

English loss ofNormandy tothefactthatthearmywasnotproperly prepared to face theFrench who, in suchconditions, were the naturalvictorsinthecontest.

One final, and allimportant, lesson was to belearned from Vegetius andother classical writers. Sincewar was waged for thegeneralgood,defence shouldbe a common obligation. In

Italy, notably in Florence inthefirstyearsof thefifteenthcentury, theclassicalviewofcivic obligation in matterstouching the commonwelfare, which stressed thecitizen’sdutytohelphisstatein moments of danger, wasgaining ground. With itsimplied rejection of themercenary, the soldiertemporarily hired fromoutside to fulfil a particular

military objective, and itsstress on the need for self-sufficiency,theviewwasalsoto find greater acceptancenorthoftheAlps,particularlyinFrance.Thestory,recalledby Alain Chartier in hisQuadrilogueinvectifof1422,of the women of Rome whohelped in the defence of theCapitolbyallowingtheirhairto be cut and twisted intoropes ‘to help the public

necessity’ had its broadparallel in the roleplayedbythe women of Beauvaisagainst the Burgundianbesiegers in 1472, a rolewhichwastowinthemsocialand civic privileges from theking.16

Inthecontextofagrowingawareness of nationalconsciousness, the obligationto take part in the protectionof a town or city was easily

extendedtothedefenceofthewider common interest, thecountry. Taxation for war,afterall,hadbeenjustifiedbythat very argument, andconstituted one form ofnational response to amilitarycrisis, theseverityofwhichwouldbejudgedbytheking.‘Ifyouaskyourpeoplefor money for reform’, JeanJuvénal des Ursins toldCharles VII in 1440, ‘they

will vote it very willingly’(‘tres voulentiers le vousoctroyent’). Des Ursins wascertainlynotagainsttaxation;far from it.Theking,hewastowriteafewyearslater,cantake part of his people’spossessions required tomaintain the public good,since theraisingofmoney tosatisfy public necessity islegitimate. But as bothPhilippe de Mézières and

JeandeMontreuilbeforehimhad emphasised, no morethan was really necessaryshould be demanded, andtaxesleviedforwarshouldbeusedforthatpurposealone.17Mézières’s comments onroyalfiscalpracticeshowhimtohavebeenmuchconcernedwith contemporarydevelopments. Taxes, hewrote more than once, werehigh,ifnotinsupportable,and

were having a devastatingsocial and economic effect,draining the country’s well-being. At a period of truce,when God had temporarilyceased to punish his people,the king should also showmercy. The invitation not toimpose taxation during thatperiodwasalltooobvious.

Although the anonymousauthor of the poem Againstthe King’s Taxes (c.1340),

takingthepartof theEnglishruralcommunity,hadstressedthe evil effects of taxation,whatemergedfromtheworksof these commentators wasnotoppositiontotaxationbutdeep hostility tomisappropriation andmisuse.IntheEnglandof1340itwasbeing said that ‘not half thetribute raised in the landreaches the king’.18 Fiftyyears later in France,

Mézières could voice muchthe same criticism: moneywas not being properlycollected, but was beingdiverted into the wronghands.Whathemeantbythisis clear. Writing like afourteenth-century Jeremiah,Mézièrescouldpointoutthatthelifeofluxurybeingledatcourt was swallowing up themoney intended for defenceandreconquest,inawordfor

the public good. Gifts,pensions,buildingsandotherforms of expensive livingwere draining the fundsneeded for war. The themewas thus already familiarwhenitwastakenupbyJeanJuvénal des Ursins in 1452.Inamoraltonehepointedouthow John II may have beenpunished (by defeat andcapture) in 1356 becausewrongful use had beenmade

oftaxes,athingwhichaking,in all conscience, should notallow to happen. Morerecently, he admonishedCharlesVII,moneyraisedforwarhadbeenusedtopayforjousting and luxury in aperiod of truce, somethingwhich was bringing noadvantage to the publicwelfare. Both critics wereindignant about aphenomenon developing

before their very eyes, butwhichtheywerepowerlesstostop, namely the levying oftaxeswhen therewasnowartojustifythem.

A second matter troubledthem. Mézières, Montreuil,anddesUrsinswereunitedintheir indictment of thegrowing body of royalofficialsneededtoadministerthecollectionandexpenditureof public money. Describing

them as extravagant upstartswhose corrupt ways andpractices enabled them tobecome rich to the pointwhen they could buy thelandsofknightsimpoverishedby the rising costs of war,Mézières denounced theirabuses and demanded thatthey should give properaccount of their stewardship.Thethemewasagaintofindaplace in the writings of des

Ursins: money, he wrote,which had been raised forpurposes of war was beingspent on high living andbuilding by royaladministrators who were, inany case, far too numerousand grossly overpaid frompublic funds which, verysignificantly, he termed the‘bloodofthepeople’(‘lesanedupeuple’).

Reform was needed. Let

royal officers, bothMézièresand des Ursins wrote, bemade regularly accountablenot tooneanother,but to theking himself. Mézièresfavoured a large measure ofdecentralisation in thecollection and redistributionofwartaxes:peoplewouldbemore ready to pay if theyknewthatcollectorshadbeenchosen locally and if theycouldseehowthemoneywas

being spent. Besides, thenumberofofficialscouldthusbe considerably reduced.And, in order to re-establishpublic confidence, eachlocality should appoint asuitable person to heardisputesregardingthelevyingofsuchtaxeswith,ofcourse,right of appeal from hisdecisions. Such proposals,Mézièresthought,wouldfindgeneral approval; the only

persons to object would bethe royal officers and a fewothers who had hithertocontrolled the use of taxes,and who stood to lose fromanychangetoasystemwhosedevelopment they had turnedto their advantage over aperiodofhalfacenturyorso.

Someliteraturecouldbeavehicle of criticism andcomplaint, intended to showwhat was wrong with a

society heavily involved inwar over a long period ofyears.Otherliteraturewas,inthe widest meaning of theword, didactic: it was a spurto action, a guide to ensurethat things were done – andwell done – for the good ofsociety. Victory in battlemight be won with divinefavour; equally, God helpedthosewhohelpedthemselves.There were ‘reasonable’

lessons to be consideredabout the conduct of warwhich, at worst, could helpavoid defeat, at best, mightbring victory. Man waslearning to break out of afatalistic spirit and to makehis own contribution toevents more positively andpowerfully.

Themilitaryandhistoricalliteratureoftheperiodhelpedhim do this. Just as the

Bouciquaut author wrote (inmuch the same vein asFroissart and others haddone) ‘to recall to mind theactsofgoodmensothattheymay give courage andinspiration to noblemen whohear them to try to followthemanddo likewise’, so hereportedthatJeanleMaingreliked to hear readings frombooks about God and thesaints ‘andfromtheFaisdes

rommains and authentichistories’.19 This work,which dated from the earlythirteenth century, and hadoriginally been planned as ahistoryofRome,provedtobea best seller, drawing uponsome of the main historicalwriters of Rome, andpresenting history as a seriesof deeds with, as might beexpected of a work intendedfor a chivalric audience,

warlike action taking thelimelight. Three other worksconcernedwithwarwerealsopopular. The Facta et dictamemorabilia of the first-century writer, ValeriusMaximus, like the Fais desrommains,wasmuchusedasa source of good stories anddidactic points; while theStratagemataofFrontinus,ofthe same period, was acompilation of military

maxims illustrated byreference to historical eventsculled from a wide group ofclassicalwriters.Thelastand,as has been suggested, themost influential wasVegetius’sDe re militari ofthelatefourthcentury,abookwhosephilosophicalmessagewas at least as important asitsmilitaryone.

All four works weretranslatedintothedeveloping

vernacular languages, andthus came to be read in theirown right. Jean Gersonrecommended that thedauphin should have copiesof Valerius Maximus,Frontinus,andVegetiusinhislibrary, while rulers such asEdward I, Edward III, andCharlesVownedmanuscriptsofVegetius.The firstFrenchtranslationwascommissionedlate in the thirteenth century

by the knight, Jean deBrienne,countofEu,andtheEnglishonewaspreparedforThomas, Lord Berkeley, in1408;while among the othermilitaryownersofVegetius’swork were Sir John Fastolfand Antonio da Marsciano,the fifteenth-century Italiancondottiere, who had a goodcollection of militarybooks.20

Butitwasnotnecessaryto

own theworks themselves toappreciate the main pointsthey were making. In thetwelfth century John ofSalisbury,whoownedacopyofVegetius,hadincorporatedsubstantial extracts from hiswork into his ownPolicraticus; Vincent ofBeauvaiswastodothesame,and their example wasfollowed by Giles of Rome,whose De regimine

principum,written late in thethirteenth century, wasperhaps the most popularcontribution to the large andstill developing ‘Mirror’ (or‘How to be a Good Prince’)literatureoftheMiddleAges.As Aquinas had pointed out,a ruler had to defend hispeople; to do so he must beableandreadytofight,anditwasintheprovisionofadviceas how best to fulfil this

obligation that the work ofGilesofRomewassouseful.When Christine de Pisanwrote her Livre du corps depolicie in the same traditionearly in the fifteenthcentury,she also quoted ValeriusMaximus and Vegetiusfrequently, while in her verypopular Livre des faisd’armes et de chevalerie,destined to be translated intoEnglish by William Caxton,

she relied on the same twoauthors, adding to themFrontinus and, mostsignificantly,HonoréBouvet,whose ideas thus reached awiderpublic.

In thiswaywar literature,whether of ancient or morerecent times, whether itconsisted of whole texts or‘moralised’ ones, in whichthe distilled wisdom of pasthistorians or writers on war,

significantly termed ‘theseyng of the masters ofphilosophie’, wasincorporated into updatedworks, came to have apractical influence. In allcases the aim wasunashamedlydidactic:peopleread or were read to (asCharles the Bold, in campbefore Neuss in 1474, hadread to him, ‘ValeriusMaximus,Livyorsomebook

aboutAlexander theGreatorof battles’) partly fordistraction, partly for whattheycouldlearn.21

Learnwhat?About theartof war? It has to berecognised that since theexamples which they readcame from the very distantpast, it was more thegeneralities of militaryexperience than the nicetiesof military art, the general

rather than the particular,whichtheycouldobtainfrombooks. But since, too, thepopular form of didacticliterature for princescontainedmuchadviceontheplace of war in the polity,therewere things herewhichthe ruler, as well as thesoldier, might usefully learn.Much of this literature wasultimately about the good ofthe state, its rule, and its

defence against outsideenemies. It was ‘les chosespourfitables pour le royaumeetlachosepubliqued’icellui’whichconcernedwriterssuchasMézièresand,inparticular,Bouvet.The titleofBouvet’swork, the Tree of Battles,suggestsamore thanpassinginterest in war. Yet, in thefinal analysis, his greaterconcern was with peace, apeace in which the soldier

was not allowed to practiseviolenceforhisownend,butusedhisstrengthandtrainingfor the good of the wholecommunity.

1SeeL.R.Muir,LiteratureandsocietyinmedievalFrance.Themirrorandtheimage,1100–1500(London,1985).

2LelivredesfaisdubonmessireJeanleMaingre,ditBouciquaut,mareschaldeFranceetgouverneurdeJennes,ed.D.Lalande(Paris:Geneva,1985),p.238.

3Gower,Confessioamantis,trans.Tiller,p.148.

4MinorpoemsofJohnLydgate,ed.H.N.MacCracken(E.E.T.S.,London,1934).II,539–66.

5Ibid.,II,556.6LettertoKingRichardII.A

pleamadein1395forpeacebetweenEnglandandFrance,ed.andtrans.G.W.Coopland,(Liverpool,1975),pp.54–6.

7ThemiddleEnglishtranslationofChristinedePisan’s‘Livreducorpsdepolicie’,ed.D.Bornstein(Heidelberg,1977),p.165.

8EcritspolitiquesdeJeanJuvénaldesUrsins,ed.P.S.Lewis(S.H.F.,2vols.,Paris,1978–85),II,166.

9R.L.Kilgour,ThedeclineofchivalryasshownintheFrench

literatureofthelateMiddleAges(Cambridge,Mass.,1937),p.168.

10Ecritspolitiques,ed.Lewis,II,240–1.Seealso‘istenomenmilitisestnomenhonorisetlaboris’(SermonsofThomasBrinton,ed.Devlin,I,167).

11C.R.Shrader,‘AhandlistofextantmanuscriptscontainingtheDeremilitariofFlaviusVegetiusRenatus’,Scriptorium,33(1979),280–305.

12J.R.AlbanandC.T.Allmand,‘Spiesandspyinginthe

fourteenthcentury’,War,literatureandpoliticsinthelateMiddleAges,ed.C.T.Allmand(Liverpool,1976),pp.73–101.

13PhilippedeCommynes,Memoirs.ThereignofLouisXI,1461–83,trans.M.Jones(Harmondsworth,1972),p.208.

14Bouciquaut,ed.Lalande,p.402.

15WilliamWorcester,TheBokeofNoblesseaddressedtoKingEdwardIVonhisinvasionofFrancein1475,ed.J.G.Nichols(RoxburgheClub,

1860),p.27.16Quadrilogueinvectif,ed.Droz,p.31;R.Vaughan,ValoisBurgundy(London,1975).P-156.

17Ecritspolitiques,ed.Lewis,I,320–1:PhilippedeMézières,Lesongeduvieilpèlerin,ed.G.W.Coopland(Cambridge,1969),II,66;JeandeMontreuil,Opera.II.L’oeuvrehistoriqueetpolémique,ed.N.Grévy-Pons,E.Ornato,andG.Ouy(Turin,1975),220/424.

18J.Coleman,Englishliterature

inhistory,1350–1400.Medievalreadersandwriters(London,1981).

19Bouciquaut,ed.Lalande,pp.410,416.

20M.Mallett,‘Somenotesonafifteenth-centurycondottiereandhislibrary:CountAntoniodaMarsciano’,CulturalaspectsoftheItalianRenaissance.EssaysinhonourofPaulOskarKristeller,ed.C.H.Clough(Manchester:NewYork,1976),pp.202–15.

21CitedbyR.Vaughan,Charles

theBold(London,1973),p.163.

CONCLUSION

How to conclude? After along period of war, bothEngland and France had torecover from the ordeal. InEngland itwas themonarchywhich was, to allappearances, the loser, itsclaim to rule France

unceremoniously repelled.The contrast with thetriumphant years of EdwardIII and Henry V could nothave been greater, as anyonereading the very differentaccountsofeventsinLondonin1415and1450willquicklyrecognise. On the second ofthese occasions betrayal, aswell as the bitter sense ofdefeat, hung heavily in theair. Englishmen who had

lived, worked, or fought inNormandy felt let down.Even the pride of those whohad never seen France hadsufferedastheresultofrecentreversals of fortune, forwhich Sir John Fastolf, whohad left France ten yearsearlier, had to bear some ofthe odium of the Kentishrebels who attacked LondoninJuly1450.

Before long, the losses in

France would be turned toanother purpose, a call toarms in support of thedynastic ambitions ofRichard, duke of York, whohadtwiceheldhighcommandin Normandy under HenryVI, during which time hiseldest son Edward (whowould assume the royalmantle in 1461) had beenborn in Rouen. The linkbetween thosewho had been

with York in France andthose who supported him inhis quarrel with Henry VI isnot,inallcases,clear.Butthefact remains that whenconflictbrokeoutinEnglandin 1455, many of those whocame out in York’s supporthad fought in France in thepreviousgenerationorso,andwere ready to put theirexperienceathisservice.

Likeafootballpitchatthe

end of a long season, Franceneededmuchcarefultending,in particular in certain areasofthatpitch.

Quant AngloysfurentdehorsChascun se mistenseseffortsDe bastir et demarchanderEt en bienssuperabonder.1

(OncetheEnglish

hadgoneAll tried veryhardTo build and totradeAnd to produceallmannerofgoodsagain.)

By a happy coincidence,which probably had little todowiththeendingofthewar,the economy of France,which had seen so manycrises in the past 150 years

(and not least since 1430 orso), began to improve. Theweathergotbetter;theeffectsof recurring epidemics werediminished;andameasureofgreater stability (the resultofpeace) returned to thecountry. Yet it would bewrong to imagine that allbecame normal againovernight; it did not. Nonetheless,onawiderEuropeanlevel economic historians

have observed a distinctmove in the direction ofrecovery characteristic of theperiodc. 1450 to c. 1480. Inthis, an upsurge incommercial activity was toplay an important part.Admittedly, trade betweenFrance and England, a pawnof politics, had come almostto a standstill in the 1450s;but in the 1460s, givenofficial encouragement, it

began to recover. The treatyof Picquigny of 1475was tobe dubbed the ‘merchants’peace’becauseofthepositivehelp which it gave tointernational commerce,which itself reflected twofactors in France’s recovery:confidence in the futurewhichwasseeninthecapitalinvested in commerce andagriculture; and the greatersecurity to be found on

France’s roads and rivers,whichmadetheconveyingofgoods a less riskyundertaking. It was in these,much more favourable,economic and socialconditions that the Frenchpopulation, which had fallenby about two-thirds in thepastcenturyandahalf,begantomarkaconsiderablerise.

The decade or so after1450 also saw the resolution

of another major problem,that of the restoration ofproperty confiscated by theLancastrian kings and givento their supporters who had,by now, largely left forEngland. By goodmanagementandtheadoptionof a flexible approach to thelaw (the matter was onewhich might have given risetomany disputeswhich bothlegal claims and emotional

memories could easily havefuelled), this potentialproblem was soon defused,and a major step in the ‘re-establishmentofsocialpeace’in a country so recentlydivided was successfullycarriedout.2

Linked to these steps torestore the economy and thesocial order were otherdevelopments,theproductsofa century or so, which were

greatly to influence thefuture. One such was theevolutionofthearmy,anditsplace within society. TheHundredYearsWarhadbeenthe cause of greatdevelopments in this regard,the most significant onesoccurring in France. If, in1350, the French army was,institutionally, less advancedthanthatofEngland,by1450the reverse was certainly the

case. This was due to anumber of factors.As eventsin1449–50showed,France’sability to rid her territory oftheenemydependeduponherarmy; England had neverexperienced this need, andhad therefore not developedsuchaforcewhich,inFrance,was an arm of the growingFrench state, under thecontrol of the crown,benefitting from a primitive

form of career structure. Bythe time theEnglish came tobe driven out, France hadtaken her first, active stepstowards the creation of apermanentarmywhichwouldexist in periods of both warandpeace.

NorwasFrancealone.Thedukes of Brittany employedsoldiersonapermanentbasisfrom the mid-fifteenthcentury,while in the1470sa

seriesofordinancesissuedbyCharles, duke of Burgundy,established in detail theorganisation of the newpermanentducal armywhosemembers,whennotneededinwar, could serve in garrisonsand in the service of thedevelopingartillerytrains.Bycontrast,Englandhadnotyetadvanced down the roadtowards the establishment ofa permanent army; while

Scotlandhadnopaidcontractarmies at all, relying on theservice of able-bodied menfreelygivenintimeofcrisis.3

Costs of maintaining anarmy were high. Taxes wentup by leaps and bounds, thetaille increasing threefoldbetween 1470 and 1484.There appeared to be goodreasonsforthis.Wageshadtobe paid, and training costmoney. Weapons had to be

provided:cannon,whichonlythe state could afford, had tobe forged, and gunpowdermanufactured. The army hadto be fed and billeted,whichmeant the erection of newbuildings or themodificationof existing ones. These wereonly beginnings, yet theywereexpensiveones.And,asin all organisations, abureaucracy had to be set upwhich,inevitably,contributed

its share (some thought toogreat a share) towards thegrowing cost of employing apermanentarmy.

Itwasthelawyer,SirJohnFortescue, who emphasisedthedifferentstylesofmakinglaws and raising taxeswhichcharacterised France andEngland in the fifteenthcentury.France, he said,wasruled with regal authority(‘dominiumregale’),England

in amanner tempered by theconsent of the ruled(‘dominium politicum etregale’). To what extent didthesetraditionsaffectanotherfactorcloselyassociatedwithwar, the development oftaxation?

Recent work has shownwhat was happening inEnglandinthefirsthalfofthefourteenth century. Taxationtomeet theneedsofwarhad

to be voted if the needwereproved. That much wassettled early in the period.Taxation was raisednationally,anditwasspentasthe king wished to spend it,althoughadviceonthemattermightbegiven.Inthemiddleyearsofthecentury,in1356,the wool subsidy was votedfor the coming six years, thesumraised tobeusedfor thedefence and safeguard of

trade. This vote was animportant one, for it wentbeyondimmediateneeds,andshowed that therepresentatives who met inParliament were appreciativeof developments which,before long, would maketaxespermanent, albeitvotedinParliament.

It is important to stressthat the demands of war didnotalwaysleadtoasituation

of ‘confrontation politics’between king and people,eventhoughParliamentswerefrequently haunted by theproblems arising out of theneed to provide money forwar. In practice, the nation’sperilwasnormallyrecognisedand its obligation to respondin fiscal terms was met,something which was helpedbythepresenceinParliamentofmenwhofoughtinthewar

and were able to give anactive lead in the voting oftaxes. It was only in othermatters, those whichconcerned the country’sbroader welfare, and whichweredealtwithafterthoseofdefencehadbeenconsidered,that differences of opinionbetween king and peoplemight arise. But seriousbargaining,andthemakingof‘political’concessionsbyone

sideortheotherovermattersregarding war did not takeplace. Both king andParliament, in their differentways, reflected the unity ofthe nation. If the unity werethreatened, they acted inconcert. The traditionalEnglishviewofParliamentasa meeting place where theking struck deals with hispeople, who thereby forcedhim to rulewithconsent (the

‘constitutional’ argument)needssomemodification.4

InFrance,bycontrast,twodifferent traditions haddeveloped. One was thegeneral manipulation of thecoinage by the crown whichenabledcertainkings,notablyPhilip IV, Charles IV,Charles VI, and Charles VIIto debase coinage in theirfavour. Such methods wereunpopular; but for short

periods they worked. Theother traditon was that ofraising taxes through thevotes of assemblies, not,normally, assemblies on anational scale as was thecustom in England, butmeetings convened atprovincial level, at whichlocal interests often had thebetter of national ones. Incontrast with the situation inEngland, theweaknessof the

Frenchestatesiswellknown,so that the monarchy foundrelatively little difficulty inobtaining the sums which itsought.5 When combinedwith the undoubted authorityof thecrown in thematterofmoney supply (whatRichelieuwouldonedaycall‘puissance du prince’) thismadeforasituationinwhichthe effective power of thecrown to obtain money for

war, in particular in times ofjustifiablenecessity,wasveryconsiderable.

Not surprisingly, then,although Philip IV onceexperienced opposition whentaxesvotedhimfortheneedsof defence were notreimbursed when thenecessity which had justifiedtheroyaldemandhadpassed,some fifty years later theclimate had so changed that

taxation in France hadbecome all but permanent.The causes of thisdevelopment are not difficultto find: a state of almostcontinuous war had, as itscorollary,permanenttaxation,while the need to raise theransom of King John II, andcombat the routiers whothreatened the internalstability of France (bothevidence of grave necessity),

led to regular taxationwhichfewopposed.When,nearlyacentury later, Charles VIItook the further step ofcreatingapermanentarmy,atatimewhenthecountrywas,oncemore,under threat fromfoot-loose soldiers, he did soknowing that, inanhistoricalsituationwhichhadlongbeendeveloping in favour of themonarchy, he could safelycountonraisingthemoneyto

support it. Jean Juvénal desUrsins might chide him forraising taxes ‘sans leconsentement de vos troisestas’: but even des Ursinsmust have known that hisprotestwouldhavenoeffect.

What such developmentsinFrancemightleadtowasamatter over which opinionsdiffered. In themind of JeanJuvénal des Ursins, theyprovoked a distinct sense of

unease,althoughheconcededthat an army might bringorder to a divided society,with beneficial results to theeconomy. The cost, infinancial terms, would be ahigh one. To Fortescue, anarmyofthiskindcouldbeaninstrument of tyranny, boththrough the unbridledbehaviourofthesoldieryandthe cost of taxation requiredto support them. Thomas

Basin was inclined to agree;inhisview thenobility itselfprovided the king with asufficiently adequate army.As for Philippe deCommynes, he emphasisedthat what people had againsttheconceptof thepermanentarmywasnot itspermanencebut its cost, which causedgreathardshipandadramaticriseintheleveloftaxationinthe third quarter of the

fifteenth century. Tyrannythere might be; but it wouldbefiscalratherthanmilitary.

War and its needs – thejudgement of historians isalmost unanimous – madehuge and ever-growingdemandsuponthefinancesofnations. Indeed, it may beargued that the developmentof public finance was toprovetohavebeenoneofthemajor changes caused by the

Hundred Years War. But ithad some unforeseen andundesirable results. MézièresanddesUrsinswerenotalonein voicing their complaintthat it was the extension ofthe state’s ability to tax, onthe grounds of the needs ofwar, which led to the lavishpatronageofthecourts,royaland princely, to which menattached themselves in thehope of winning work,

favour, andmaterial rewards.As des Ursins told CharlesVII,money raised to pay forthepublicgoodbutthenspenton other things, such asluxury goods, should restuneasily on the royalconscience.

The Hundred Years Warmay have been neither aturningpointnorawatershed,but it did have importanteffectsuponthesocietyofthe

time, not least in the socialand economic fields. Thosewhohavearguedthatthewarwasprofitabletoonesideandloss-causingtotheotherhavenot gained much support.Certainly, individuals gainedfromwar.Butwholegroups?Thatisfarlessevident.Nonetheless,somehistorianshaverecently tended to theargument that war caused a‘redistribution’ of wealth in

France and England, inwhich, for instance, theclergy,bowing topressure tocontributetothecostsofwarand, inparticular, to thoseoflocal defence, foundthemselves paying verysubstantial sums in directtaxes, thereby placing theirwealth at the disposal of thewidercommunity.

Taxation, then, was aprime means of

‘redistribution’. In time ofwar, not only did royaltaxation increase,butso, too,did royal expenditure. Andsinceexpenditureonwarwasvery varied (involving, forinstance,boththepurchaseofmaterials and food in largequantities,andthepaymentofwages on an even biggerscale),manycametobenefit,in one way or another, fromthis increase in public

spending.Becauseitgavethecrowns of both France andEngland control of greatlyincreased sums of money,war also gave them morepower and influence in thepatronage which they couldexercise. Having receivedmoney to meet a militaryemergency, kings had noformal legal obligation toaccount for it.None the less,this was a very sensitive

matter and, in 1377, theCommons insisted on theappointmentoftwotreasurersfor war to help allaysuspicionofmis-spending.InFrance,inthemeanwhile,thecriticisms made on howmoney was spent make itevident that there was muchjockeying and in-fighting atthe court to ensure that,however it was spent,whether on the financing of

militaryexpenditureoronthewages of the burgeoningnumberofadministratorsandoffice-holders, those withinfluence should get theirshare.

Money was power, andmen struggled for possessionofit,thecourtsofkingsbeingthe principal focal points ofthat struggle. The nobility,often in economic difficultyas a result of declining

revenuesandthehighcostofgoingtowar,turnedtoanewmeans ofmaking endsmeet,war in the service of thecrown, with whom thenobility, particularly that ofFrance, now entered a newrelationship.EveninEnglandmembersofthenobilitywereunlikely to protest toostrongly against the taxeswhich both they and theirtenants had to pay for war.

Forthatverysamewarwouldensure that money wouldcomebacktothem,forsomein larger sums than they hadpaidoutintaxation.

War providedopportunities to the nobilityof the two countries. Therewouldbechancesofwinningbooty, ransoms, and othermaterial benefits. War gavemembers of the nobility theopportunity of achieving

reputation, both among theirequals and others. Itpresented them, too,with thechanceoffulfillingoneoftheroles which justified theirveryexistenceandprivilegedposition: the task ofdefendingapeopleintimeofimminentdanger.Andallthiswas to be done at thecountry’s expense, throughtaxation,much ofwhichwasreceivedbythenobilityinthe

formofwagesorpensionsforthefulfilmentofmilitaryandadministrative duties. Onecan understand why warmight be popular amongthose who fought it undersuchconditions.

Equally, one canappreciate the disgust ofthose who felt let down (asmany did in France in 1356)whenthenobility,paidoutofpublicfunds,alloweditselfto

be defeated by the English.The widening gap, apparentinthesocialcommentariesofthe late fourteenth century,between the fighting nobilityand the growing army ofoffice-holders, on the onehand, and the ‘ordinary’people, on the other, showshow war could become adivisive factor in latemedievalsociety.

‘Redistribution’ and

change did not stop at thelevel of the nobility. Theincreasingly wideinvolvement of many groupsand occupations in war alsomeant that their membersstood to lose and gain fromwar’s activities. We knowthatwholecommunitiesdied,or at least declined, as thedirect result of the effects ofwar upon their main,economic, activities, which

might be trade or fishing.Others, including some largeones, had to redirect theircommercial enterprise inresponse to political changescaused by war. For someyears after 1453 the winetrade of Gascony wasvirtually denied to theEnglish,sothataportsuchasBristol began to seek othermarkets. Likewise theGascons, still leftwithwines

to sell, began to supply awider market than before, totheir evident advantage.There is good reason forthinking that war had apositive effect in broadeningoutthetradingpatternsoflatemedievalEurope.

War was also anopportunity to those whoused the conditions arisingout of war for their ownprofit. These were the early

entrepreneurs, the purveyorswho supplied the armies, orthe builders who, like thosewho helped Edward I toconstruct his castles in northWales, made considerableprofits out of war and itsneeds.Others tookadvantageofdepressedpricestobuyupland.As France recovered inthe years after the defeat ofthe English, royal employeeslivinginParis(theyoftenhad

the money) bought up landand properties going atknock-down prices in someof theregionsadjacent to thecapital. These were the menwho wanted to register theiradvancement by investing inland in the country, aphenomenon which has beennotedasoccurringinEnglandas well, as the careers ofseveralwar captains, such asSir John Fastolf and Sir

William Oldhall, clearlyshow.

Finally, we may note thatFrenchhistoriansofour timehaveincreasinglyemphasisedthe effects which war hadupon the growth of themodern state. For France aconvincingcasecanbemadein this respect. There is nodoubt that the period ofconflict against Englandwitnessed a growing

awarenessofwhatconstituted‘France’, her nationalidentity, her growingterritorial integrity, and theauthority which her rulerscould exercise over her.France was now a nation,whose king was no longer afeudal lord but the ruler of aregnum, with subjects ratherthan vassals. Therequirements of nationaldefence could now be

imposeduponallFrenchmen,in whatever part of thekingdomthey lived:somuchwas implied by theestablishment of the francs-archers in 1448. The waragainst England had becomea national war, directed bythe state which becamevisibleandpersonified in themen who, appointed by theking, institutionalisedwar byorganising,co-ordinating,and

channelling the nation’seffort.

Was thewaras influentialinthisrespectinEngland?Asalready suggested,6 there isgood reason for saying thatthe administrative systemwhichtheEnglishkingsusedto organise war againstFrancewasfundamentallythesame as that created wellbefore Edward I began hiswars against the Welsh, the

Scots, and the French in thelate thirteenth century. Whatisimportantandimpressiveishow this system, based uponthe Exchequer and theWardrobe, was made toexpand, but without itsoriginal characterexperiencing fundamentalchange. Equally, we mustrecognisethatEnglishsocietyhad a homogeneity which,becauseitcanbedatedtothe

legal and administrativedevelopments of the twelfthcentury, already existed longbefore the Hundred YearsWarbegan. It is true that thegrowth of Parliament as aninstitution in the fourteenthcentury was accelerated bythe opportunities which thewar (in particular itsmismanagement) presented.Yet little could have beenachieved in this respect had

the fundamental basis ofparliamentary power andauthority, the fact that, insomeway, it represented thenation, not already beenestablished in the reigns ofEdwardIandEdwardII.

‘Whether one likes it ornot,warhasplayedforbetteror for worse a fundamentalpart in the whole process ofhistorical change.’7 Nonewould dispute the general

validity of this opinion. Butin comparing two societies,even two neighbouringsocieties, over a period oftime, we must be ready tonotenotmerelycomparisons,butcontrasts,too.Historyandgeography both had a vitalrole in deciding how thekingdoms of France andEngland would develop. Inmorethanonerespect,inlawand institutions, for example,

England established a goodlead over France. Even thedevelopments which tookplace in thirteenth-centuryFrance were not effectiveenough, or of the kindneeded, to counter thepowerful English thrusts ofthe early phase of theHundred Years War. Francelacked that sense of unitywhich England, a smallercountry, already possessed.

She lacked thewill to act asone, and, as a consequence,themachinerytodothisinanemergency was lacking, too.It is to the credit of theFrenchmonarchy that, in thevital half-century spanningthe years c. 1330 – c. 1380,the will to create a warmachine with the ability towork both in low gear(without the need to bestarted‘fromcold’everytime

war was undertaken) and inhigh became a reality.Originally at a disadvantage,theFrenchnationjoinedwithitsmonarchytoplaceitselfona war-footing. Since theconflictwassettledlargelyinitsterritory,onemaysaythatthe French people had littlechoice but to react in thisway.Bycontrast,theEnglishemployed more traditionalmethods to galvanise and

organise themselves for war.Was it because the Frenchmoved more with the timesandemployedmethodswhichlookedmoretothefuturethatthey had the last laugh?Perhapsso.

1CitedbyM.Mollai,Lecommercemaritimenormandà

lafindumoyenâge(Paris,1952),p.75

2A.Bossuat‘There-establishmentofpeaceinsocietyduringthereignofCharlesVII’,TherecoveryofFranceinthefifteenthcentury,ed.P.S.Lewis(London,1971),pp.60–81.

3M.Jones,‘L’arméebretonne,1449–1491:structuresetcarrières’,LaFrancedelafinduxvesiècle:renouveauetapogée,ed.B.ChevalierandP.Contamine(Paris,1985),pp.

147–65;Vaughan,CharlestheBold,ch.6;A.Grant,Independenceandnationhood.Scotland,1306–1469(London,1984),p.34.

4SeetheworkofG.L.Harriss,King,ParliamentandpublicfinanceinmedievalEnglandto1369(Oxford,1975),andhis‘WarandtheemergenceoftheEnglishParliament,1297–1360’,J.Med.H.,2(1976),35–56.SeealsotheappreciationbyJ.-P.Genet,‘Lesdébutsdel’impôtnationalenAngleterre’,

Annales,34(1979),348–54.5P.S.Lewis,‘ThefailureoftheFrenchmedievalestates’,P&P,23(1962),3–24;reprintedintheauthor’sEssaysinlatermedievalFrenchhistory(London,1985),pp.105–26.SeealsoA.R.Myers,‘TheEnglishParliamentandtheFrenchestatesgeneralinthemiddleages’,AlbumHelenMaudCam.Studiespresentedtotheinternationalcommissionforthehistoryofrepresentativeandparliamentaryinstitutions

XXIV(Louvain:Paris,1961),pp.139–53

6Ch.4,pp.108–9above.7M.Howard,Thecausesofwarandotheressays(London,1983),p.151.

SELECTBIBLIOGRAPHY

Thelistofworkswhichfollowsisnecessarily selective. The interestsof the English-speaking readerhave been the first andmain onesto be considered. Thosewhomaywish to take their reading furthershouldbe referred to the excellentbibliographies contained in P.

Contamine, War in the MiddleAges (Oxford, 1984) and B.Guinee, States and rulers in latermedievalEurope(Oxford,1985).

ITHECAUSESANDPROGRESSOFTHEHUNDREDYEARSWAR

Allmand,C.T.,HenryV(London,1992;rev.edn.,NewHaven:London,1997)

LancastrianNormandy1415–1450.

Thehistoryofamedievaloccupation(Oxford,1983)

Buchan,A.,JoanofArcandtherecoveryofFrance(London,1948)

Burne,A.H.,TheCrécywar(London,1955)

TheAgincourtwar(London,1956)

Chaplais,P.,‘ThemakingofthetreatyofParis(1259)andtheroyalstyle’,E.H.R.,67(1952),235–53

‘LetraitédeParisde1259etl’inféodationdelaGascogneallodiale’,M.A.(1955),121–37

‘Leduché-pairiede

Guyenne:l’hommageetlesservicesféodauxde1259à1303’,A.M.,69(1957),5–38

‘Leduché-pairiedeGuyenne:l’hommageetlesservicesféodauxde1303à1377’,A.M.,70(1958),135–60

‘LasouverainetéduroideFranceetlepouvoirlégislatifenGuyenneaudébutduxivesiècle’,M.A.(Livrejubilaire,1963),449–69

‘Lesappelsgasconsauroid’Angleterre

souslerègned’Edouard1er’,Economiesetsociétésaumoyenâge.MélangesoffertsàEdouardPerroy(Paris,1973),pp.382–99

[Theabove-listed

articlesarereprintedintheauthor’sEssaysinmedievaldiplomacyandadministration(London,1981)]

‘EnglishargumentsconcerningthefeudalstatusofAquitaine’,B.I.H.R.,21(1948),

203–13

Contamine,P.,Laguerredecentans(Paris,1968)

Curry,A.,TheHundredYearsWar(Basingstoke:London,1993)

ThebattleofAgincourt.Sourcesandinterpretations(Woodbridge,2000)

‘LancastrianNormandy:Thejewelinthecrown’,EnglandandNormandyintheinthemiddleages,ed.D.BatesandA.Curry(London:RioGrande,1994),pp.235–52

Cuttino,G.P.,‘TheprocessofAgen’,Speculum,19(1944),

161–78

‘Historicalrevision:thecausesoftheHundredYears’War’,Speculum,31(1956),463–77

Fowler,K.A.,TheageofPlantagenetandValois(London,1967)

Grant,A.,Independenceand

nationhood.Scotland,1306–1469(London,1984)

Griffiths,R.A.,ThereignofkingHenryVI(London,1981)

Hughes,M.,‘Thefourteenth-centuryFrenchraidsonHampshireandtheIsleofWight’,Arms,armiesandfortificationsintheHundredYearsWar,ed.A.CurryandM.Hughes(Woodbridge,1994),pp.121–43

Jacob,E.F.,HenryVandtheinvasionofFrance(London,1947)

Thefifteenthcentury,1399–1485(Oxford,1961)

Jones,M.C.E.,DucalBrittany,1364–1399(Oxford,1970)

‘Warandfourteenth-centuryFrance’,Arms,armiesandfortificationsin

theHundredYearsWar,ed.A.CurryandM.Hughes(Woodbridge,1994),pp.103–20

‘RelationswithFrance’,Englandandherneighbours,1066–1453.Essaysin

honourofPierreChaplais,ed.M.C.E.JonesandM.G.A.Vale(London:Ronceverte,1989),pp.239–58

Keen,M.H.,EnglandinthelaterMiddleAges(London,1972)

Kicklighter,J.A.,‘FrenchjurisdictionalsupremacyinGascony:oneaspectofthe

ducalgovernment’sresponse’,J.Med.H.,5(1979),127–34

‘EnglishBordeauxinconflict:theexecutionofPierreVigierdelaRousselleanditsaftermath,1312–24’,J.Med.H.,9(1983),1–14

Labarge,M.W,Gascony,England’sfirstcolony,1204–1453(London,1980)

Lander,J.R.,‘TheHundredYearsWarandEdwardIV’s1475campaigninFrance’,Tudormenandinstitutions:studiesinEnglishlawandgovernment,ed.A.J.Slavin(BatonRouge,1972),pp.70–100;reprintedintheauthor’sCrownandnobility,1450–1509(London,1976),ch.9

Leguai,A.,Laguerredecentans(Paris,1974)

LePatourel,J.,‘EdwardIIIandthekingdomofFrance’,History,43(1958),173–89

‘ThePlantagenetdominions’,History,50(1965),289–308

‘Thekingandtheprincesinfourteenth–centuryFrance’,

EuropeinthelateMiddleAges,ed.J.R.Hale.J.R.L.Highfield,andB.Smalley(London,1965),pp.155–83

‘Theoriginsofthewar’,TheHundredYearsWar,ed.K.A.

Fowler(London,1971),pp.28–50

[Theabove-listedarticlesarereprintedintheauthorsFeudalempires:NormanandPlantagenet(London,1984)]

‘FranceandEnglandintheMiddleAges’,Feudalempires,ch.18

Lucas,H.S.,TheLowCountriesandtheHundredYearsWar,1326–1347(AnnArbor,1929;repr.Philadelphia,1976)

McKisack,M.,Thefourteenthcentury,1307–1399(Oxford,1959)

Maddicott,J.,‘TheoriginsoftheHundredYearsWar’,H.T.,36(May,1986),31–7

Ormrod,W.M.,ThereignofEdwardIII.CrownandpoliticalsocietyinEngland,1327–1377(NewHaven:London,1990)

‘England,NormandyandthebeginningsoftheHundredYearsWar,

1259–1360’,EnglandandNormandyinthemiddleages,ed.D.BatesandA.Curry(London:RioGrande,1994),pp.197–213

Palmer,J.J.N.,England,France,andChristendom,1377–99(London,1972)

‘Thewaraimsoftheprotagonistsandthenegotiationsforpeace’,TheHundredYearsWar,ed.K.A.Fowler(London,1971),pp.51–74

Perroy,E.,TheHundredYearsWar(Englishtrans.,London,1951)

Philipotts,C.J.,‘JohnofGauntandEnglishpolicytowardsFrance,1389–1395’,J.Med.H,16(1990),363–86

‘ThefateofthetruceofParis,1396–1415’,J.Med.H.,24(1998),61–80

Prestwich,M.,ThethreeEdwards.WarandthestateinEngland,1272–1377(London,1980)

Rogers,C.J.,ThewarsofEdwardIII.Sourcesandinterpretation(Woodbridge,2000)

‘TheageoftheHundredYearsWar’,Medievalwarfare.Ahistory,ed.M.Keen(Oxford,1999),ch.7

Russell,P.,TheEnglishinterventioninSpainand

PortugalinthetimeofEdwardIIIandRichardII(Oxford,1955)

Saul,N.,‘HenryVandthedualmonarchy’,H.T.,36(May,1986),39–42

Templeman,G.,‘EdwardIIIandthebeginningsoftheHundredYearsWar’,T.R.Hist.S.,fifthseries,2(1952),69–88

Vale,M.G.A.,EnglishGascony,1399–1455(Oxford,1970)

Theoriginsofthe

HundredYearsWar.TheAngevinlegacy,1250–1340(Oxford,1996)

‘England,FranceandtheoriginsoftheHundredYearsWar’,Englandandherneighbours,1066–

1453.EssaysinhonourofPierreChaplais,ed.M.C.E.JonesandM.Vale(London,1989),pp.199–216

‘ThewarinAquitaine’,Arms,armiesand

fortificationsintheHundredYearsWar,ed.A.CurryandM.Hughes(Woodbridge,1994),pp.69–82

‘FranceattheendoftheHundredYearsWar(c.1420–1461)’,NewCambridge

MedievalHistory.VII.TheFifteenthCentury,ed.C.Allmand(Cambridge,1998),pp.392–407

2APPROACHESTOWAR

Allmand,C.T.,Societyatwar.TheexperienceofEnglandandFranceduringtheHundredYearsWar(Edinburgh,1973;newedn.,Woodbridge,1998)

‘ChangingviewsofthesoldierinlatemedievalFrance’,GuerreetsociétéenFrance,enAngleterreetenBourgogne,xive–xvesiècle,ed.P.Contamine,C.Giry-DeloisonandM.Keen(Lille,1991),pp.171–

88

‘IntelligenceintheHundredYearsWar’,Gospytheland.Militaryintelligenceinhistory,ed.K.NeilsonandB.J.C.McKercher(Westport,Conn.:London,1992),pp.

31–47

‘Thefifteenth-centuryEnglishversionsofVegetius’Deremilitaría,Armies,chivalryandwarfareinmedievalBritainandFrance,ed.M.Strickland

(Stamford,1998),pp.30–45

‘War’,NewCambridgeMedievalHistory,VII.TheFifteenthCentury,ed.C.Allmand(Cambridge,1998),pp.161–74

‘LeproblèmedeladesertionenFrance,enAngleterreetenBourgogneàlafindumoyenâge’,Guerre,pouvoiretnoblesseaumoyenâge.Mélangesenl’honneurdePhilippeContamine,ed.J.PaviotandJ.

Verger(Paris,2000),pp.31–41

Barber,R.,Theknightandchivalry(London,1970)

Barber,R.andBarker,J.,Tournaments,jousts,chivalryandpageantsinthemiddleages(Woodbridge,1989)

Barnes,J.,‘Thejustwar’,TheCambridgehistoryoflatermedievalphilosophy,ed.N.Kretzmann,A.Kenny,andJ.Pinborg(Cambridge,1982),

pp.771–84Barnie,J.,Warinmedievalsociety.

SocialvaluesandtheHundredYearsWar,1337–99(London,1974)

Benson,L.D.,Malory’sMorteDarthur(Cambridge,Mass:London,1976),chs7–9

Bond,B.,‘The“justwar”inhistoricalperspective’,H.T.,16(1966),111–19

Bornstein,D.,Mirrorsofcourtesy(Hamden,1975)

Cameron,S.,‘ChivalryinBarbour’sBruce’,Armies,

chivalryandwarfareinmedievalBritainandFrance,ed.M.Strickland(Stamford,1998),pp.13–29

Contamine,P.,Guerre,état,etsociétéàlafindumoyenâge.EtudessurlesarméesdesroisdeFrance,1337–1494(Paris:TheHague,1972),ch.7

‘L’idéedeguerreàlafindumoyenâge:aspectsjuridiqueset

éthiques’,Comptes-rendusdel’académiedesinscriptionsetbelles-lettres(1979),70–86;reprintedintheauthor’sLaFranceauxXIVeetXVesiècles.Hommes,mentalités,guerre,etpaix(London,1981),

ch.13

‘NotessurlapaixenFrancependantlaguerredecentans’,LaFranceauxXIVeetXVesiècles,ch.14

‘Froissart:artmilitaire,pratique,et

conceptiondelaguerre’,Froissart:historian,ed.J.J.N.Palmer(Woodbridge:Totowa,1981),pp.132–44

Contamine,P.,‘Guerreetpaixàlafindumoyenâge:l’actionetlapenséedePhilippedeMézières(1327–1405)’,KriegimMittelalter,ed.H.-

H.Kortüm(Berlin,2001),pp.181–96

Coopland,G.W.(trans),TheTreeofBattlesofHonoréBonet(Liverpool,1949)

Ferguson,A.B.,TheindiansummerofEnglishchivalry(Durham,N.Carolina,1960)

Gist,M.A.,LoveandwarinthemiddleEnglishromances(Philadelphia:London,1947),chs6–8

Haines,K,‘AttitudesandimpedimentstopacifisminmedievalEurope’,J.Med.H.,

7(1981),369–88Hale,J.R.,Warandsocietyin

renaissanceEurope(London,1985),ch.1

‘WarandpublicopinioninRenaissanceItaly’,ItalianRenaissancestudies,ed.E.F.Jacob(London,1960),pp.

94–122

‘ThemilitaryeducationoftheofficerclassinearlymodernEurope’,CulturalaspectsoftheItalianRenaissance.EssaysinhonourofPaulOskarKristeller,

ed.C.H.Clough(Manchester:NewYork,1976),pp.440–61

‘Warandpublicopinioninthefifteenthandsixteenthcenturies’,P&P,22(1962),18–32

[Theabove-listedessaysarereprintedintheauthor’sRenaissancewarstudies(London,1983)]

Housley,N./ProDeoetpatriamori:SanctifiedpatriotisminEurope,1400–1600’,Warandcompetitionbetweenstates,ed.P.Contamine

(Oxford,2000),ch.9Huizings,J.,Thewaningofthe

MiddleAges(London,1924;repr.1955)

Jarrett,B.,SocialtheoriesoftheMiddleAges,1200–1500(London,1926),ch.7

Johnson,J.T.,Ideology,reason,andthelimitationofwar.Religiousandsecularconcepts,1200–1740(Princeton,1975)

Kaeuper,R.W.,War,justiceandpublicorder.EnglandandFranceinthelatemiddle

ages(Oxford,1988),pts.3and4

Kantorowicz,E.,‘Propatriamoriinmedievalpoliticalthought’,A.H.R.,56(1951),472–92;reprintedintheauthor’sSelectedstudies(NewYork,1965),pp.308–24

Keen,M.,ThelawsofwarinthelateMiddleAges(London:Toronto,1965)Chivalry(NewHaven:London,1984)

‘Brotherhoodin

arms’,History,47(1962),1–17:reprintedintheauthor’sNobles,knightsandmen-at-armsinthemiddleages(London:RioGrande,1996),pp.43–62

‘Englishmilitary

experienceandthecourtofchivalry:thecaseofGreyv.Hastings’,GuerreetsociétéenFrance,enAngleterreetenBourgogne,xive–xvesiècle,ed.P.Contamine,C.Giry-DeloisonandM.Keen

(Lille,1991),pp.123–42:reprintedintheauthor’sNobles,knightsandmen-at-armsinthemiddleages(London:RioGrande,1996),pp.167–85

‘Chivalrousculture

infourteenth-centuryEngland’,HistoricalStudies,10,ed.G.A.Hayes-McCoy(Dublin,1976),1–24

‘Chivalry,nobility,andtheman-at-arms’,War,literature,andsocietyinthelate

MiddleAges,ed.C.T.Allmand(Liverpool,1976),pp.32–45

‘Huizinga,Kilgour,andthedeclineofchivalry’,MedievaliaetHumanística,newseries,8(1977),1–20

‘Chivalry,heralds,andhistory’,ThewritingofhistoryintheMiddleAges.EssayspresentedtoR.WSouthern,ed.R.H.C.Davis,J.M.Wallace-Hadrill,R.J.A.I.Catto,andM.Keen(Oxford,1981),

pp.393–414reprintedintheauthor’sNobles,knightsandmen-at-armsinthemiddleages(London:RioGrande,1996),pp.63–81

Kilgour,R.L.,ThedeclineofchivalryasshownintheFrenchliteratureofthelateMiddleAges(Cambridge,

Mass.,1937)Lassabatère,T.,‘Théorieetéthique

delaguerredansl’oeuvred’EustacheDeschamps’,Laguerre,laviolenceetlesgensaumoyenâge.I.Guerreetviolence,ed.P.ContamineandO.Guyotjeannin(Paris,1996),pp.35–48

Lowe,B.,Imaginingpeace.AhistoryofearlyEnglishpacifistideas,1340–1540(UniversityPark,Pennsylvania,1997)

McFarlane,K.B.,‘Abusiness-

partnershipinwarandadministration,1421–1445’,E.H.R.,78(1963),151–74;reprintedintheauthorsEnglandinthefifteenthcentury(London,1981),ch.8

McNeill,W.H.,Thepursuitofpower(Oxford,1983),ch.3

Mallett,M.,‘Theartofwar’,HandbookofEuropeanhistory1400–1600.Latemiddleages,RenaissanceandReformation.I.Structuresandassertions,ed.T.A.Bradyetal.(Leiden,New

York,Cologne,1994),pp.535–62

Markus,R.A.,‘SaintAugustine’sviewsofthe“justwar”’,Thechurchandwar,ed.W.J.Sheils(Oxford,1983),pp.1–13

Mathew,G.,ThecourtofRichardII(London,1968),ch.13

‘Idealsofknighthoodinlatefourteenth-century

England’,StudiesinmedievalhistorypresentedtoEM.Powicke,ed.R.W.Hunt,WA.Pantin,andR.W.Southern(Oxford,1948),pp.354–62

Porter,E.,‘Chaucer’sknight,thealliterativeMorteArthure,

andmedievallawsofwar:areconsideration’,NottinghamMedievalStudies,27(1983),56–78

Riley-Smith,J.,‘Crusadingasanactoflove’,History,65(1980),177–92

Russell,EH.,ThejustwarintheMiddleAges(Cambridge,1975)

Tuck,J.A.,‘WhymenfoughtintheHundredYearsWar’,H.T.,33(April,1983),35–40

Vale,J.,EdwardIIIandchivalry.Chivalricsocietyandits

context,1270–1350(Woodbridge,1982)

Vale,M.G.A.,Warandchivalry.WarfareandaristocraticcultureinEngland,France,andBurgundyattheendoftheMiddleAges(London,1981)

Wright,N.A.R.,‘TheTreeofBattlesofHonoréBouvetandthelawsofwar’,War,literature,andpoliticsinthelateMiddleAges,ed.C.T.Allmand(Liverpool,1976),pp.12–31

3THECONDUCTOFWAR

MilitaryobjectivesBennett,M.,‘Thedevelopmentof

battletacticsintheHundredYearsWar’,Arms,armiesandfortificationsintheHundredYearsWar,ed.A.CurryandM.Hughes(Woodbridge,1994),pp.1–20

Brill,R.,‘TheEnglishpreparationsbeforethetreatyofArras:anewinterpretationofSirJohnFastolf’s“report”,September

1435’,StudiesinMedievalandRenaissanceHistory,7(1970),213–47

Burne,A.H.,‘JohnofGaunt’sgrandechevauchée’,H.T.,9(1959),113–21

Contamine,P.,WarintheMiddleAges(Oxford,1984)

Delbrück,H.,Historyoftheartofwar,withintheframeworkofpoliticalhistory.III:TheMiddleAges(Westport:London,1982)

Gillingham,J.,‘RichardIandthescienceofwarintheMiddle

Ages’,WarandgovernmentintheMiddleAges.EssaysinhonourofJ.O.Prestwich,ed.J.GillinghamandJ.C.Holt(Woodbridge:Totowa,1984),pp.78–91

TheWarsoftheRoses.Peaceandconflictinfifteenth-centuryEngland(London,1981)

Goodman,A.,TheWarsoftheRoses.MilitaryactivityandEnglishsociety,1452–97(London,1981)

Hewitt,H.J.,TheBlackPrince’sexpeditionof1355–1357(Manchester,1958)

McNeill,W.H.,Thepursuitofpower(Oxford,1983),ch.3

Newhall,R.A.,‘HenryV’spolicyofconciliationinNormandy,1417–1422’,AnniversaryessaysinmedievalhistoryofstudentsofC.H.Haskins,ed.C.H.Taylor(Boston,1929),

pp.205–29Oman,C.,Ahistoryoftheartof

warintheMiddleAges(2ndedn,London,1924)

Palmer,J.J.N.,‘Thewaraimsoftheprotagonistsandthenegotiationsforpeace’,TheHundredYearsWar,ed.K.A.Fowler(London,1971),pp.51–74

Phillpotts,C.,‘TheFrenchplanofbattleduringtheAgincourtcampaign’,E.H.R.,99(1984),59–66

Rogers,C.J.,Warcruelandsharp.

EnglishstrategyunderEdwardIII,1327–1360,(Woodbridge,2000)

‘ThemilitaryrevolutionoftheHundredYearswar’,TheJournalofMilitaryHistory,57(1993),241–78

Vale,M.G.A.,‘SirJohnFastolf’s

“report”of1435:anewinterpretationreconsidered’,NottinghamMedievalStudies,17(1973),78–84

Vaughan,R.,ValoisBurgundy(London,1975),ch.7

Verbruggen,J.E,TheartofwarfareinwesternEuropeduringtheMiddleAges(Amsterdam,1977)

LandforcesAlban,J.R.,‘Englishcoastal

defence:somefourteenth-

centurymodificationswithinthesystem’,Patronage,thecrown,andtheprovincesinlatermedievalEngland,ed.R.A.Griffiths(Gloucester:AtlanticHighlands,1981),pp.57–78

Allmand,C.,‘Newweapons,newtactics1300–1500’,Cambridgeillustratedhistoryofwarfare.ThetriumphoftheWest,ed.G.Parker(Cambridge,1995),ch.5

Ayton,A.,Knightsandwarhorses.Militaryserviceandthe

EnglisharistocracyunderEdwardIII(Woodbridge,1994)

‘Englisharmiesinthefourteenthcentury’,Arms,armiesandfortificationsintheHundredYearsWar,ed.A.CurryandM.Hughes

(Woodbridge,1994),pp.21–38

‘EdwardIIIandtheEnglisharistocracyatthebeginningoftheHundredYearsWar’,Armies,chivalryandwarfareinmedievalBritainandFrance,

ed.M.Strickland(Stamford,1998),pp.173–206

Contamine,P.,Guerre,état,etsociétéàlafindumoyenâge.EtudessurlesarméesdesroisdeFrance,1337–1494(Paris:TheHague,1972)

Contamine,P.(ed.),HistoiremilitairedelaFrance.Desoriginesà1715(Paris,1992),chs.vi,viiiandix

Curry,A.,‘Leserviceféodalen

Normandiependantl’occupationanglaise(1417–1450)’,LaFranceanglaiseaumoyenâge(Paris,1988),pp.233–57

‘Englisharmiesinthefifteenthcentury’,Arms,armiesandfortificationsintheHundredYearsWar,ed.A.CurryandM.

Hughes(Woodbridge,1994),pp.39–68

‘TheorganisationoffieldarmiesinLancastrianNormandy’,Armies,chivalryandwarfareinmedievalBritainandFrance,ed.M.

Strickland(Stamford,1998),pp.207–33

DeVries,K.,Infantrywarfareintheearlyfourteenthcentury.Discipline,tacticsandtechnology(Woodbridge,1996)

Hardy,R.,‘Thelongbow’,Arms,armiesandfortificationsintheHundredYearsWar,ed.A.CurryandM.Hughes(Woodbridge,1994),pp.161–81

Hewitt,H.J.,TheBlackPrincesexpeditionof1355–1357(Manchester,1958)

TheorganizationofwarunderEdwardIII,1338–62(Manchester,1966)

‘Theorganisationofwar’,TheHundred

YearsWar,ed.K.A.Fowler,(London,1971),pp.75–95

Howard,M.,WarinEuropeanhistory(Oxford,1976),chs1and2

Hudson,W,‘Norwichmilitiainthefourteenthcentury’,NorfolkArchaeology,14(1901),263–320

Lacy,K.,‘ThemilitaryorganisationofthereignofHenryVII’,Armies,chivalry

andwarfareinmedievalBritainandFrance,ed.M.Strickland(Stamford,1998),pp.234–55

Lewis,N.B.,‘TheEnglishforcesinFlanders,August-November1297’,EssaysinmedievalhistorypresentedtoF.M.Powicke,ed.R.W.Hunt,W.A.Pantin,andR.W.Southern(Oxford,1948),pp.310–18

Lloyd,S.,‘ThelordEdward’scrusade,1270:itssettingandsignificance’,Warand

governmentintheMiddleAges.EssaysinhonourofJ.O.Prestwich,ed.J.GillinghamandJ.C.Holt(Woodbridge:Totowa,1984),pp.120–33

Lot,E,andFawtier,R.,Histoiredesinstitutionsfrançaisesaumoyenâge(Paris,1958),II,511–35

Lourie,E.,‘Asocietyorganizedforwar:medievalSpain’,P&P,35(1966),54–76

McGuffie,T.H.,‘Thelong-bowasadecisiveweapon’,H.T.,5

(1955),737–41Morgan,P.J.,Warandsocietyin

medievalCheshire,1277–1403(ChethamSoc,thirdseries,33,Manchester,1987)

Morris,J.E.,TheWelshwarsofEdwardI(Oxford,1901)

‘ThearchersatCrécy’,E.H.R.,12(1897),427–36Powicke,M.,MilitaryobligationinmedievalEngland(Oxford,1962)

Prestwich,M.,War,politics,andfinanceunderEdwardI(London,1972),chs3and4

Prestwich,M.,Armiesandwarfareinthemiddleages.TheEnglishexperience(NewHaven:London,1996)

‘EnglisharmiesintheearlystagesoftheHundredYearsWar:aschemein1341’,B.I.H.R.,56(1983),102–13

‘Cavalryserviceinearlyfourtheenth-centuryEngland’,WarandgovernmentintheMiddleAges.EssaysinhonourofJ.O.Prestwich,ed.J.GillinghamandJ.C.Holt(Woodbridge:Totowa,1984),pp.

147–58

Prince,A.E.,‘Thearmyandnavy’,Englishgovernmentatwork,ed.J.F.WillardandW.A.Morris(Cambridge,Mass.,1940),1,332–93

‘ThestrengthofEnglisharmiesinthereignofEdwardIII’,E.H.R.,46(1931),

353–71

‘ThepaymentofarmywagesinEdwardIII’sreign’,Speculum,19(1944),137–60

Schnerb,B.,L’étatbourguignon,1363–1477(Paris,1999),ch.17

Sherborne,J.W.,‘IndenturedretinuesandEnglish

expeditionstoFrance,1360–80’,E.H.R.,79(1964),718–46

‘JohnofGaunt,EdwardIII’sretinueandtheFrenchcampaignof1369’,KingsandnoblesinthelaterMiddleAges.AtributetoCharles

Ross,ed.R.A.GriffithsandJ.Sherborne(Gloucester,1986),pp.41–61

Sommé,M.,‘L’arméebourguignonneausiègedeCalaisde1436’,GuerreetsociétéenFrance,enAngleterreetenBourgogne,xive–xvesiècle,edP.Contamine,C.Giry-DeloisonandM.Keen(Lille,1991),

pp.197–219Vaughan,R.,CharlestheBold

(London,1973),ch.6

ValoisBurgundy(London,1975),ch.7

LeadershipAllmand,C.T.,‘TheBlackPrince’,

H.T.,26(1976),100–8

‘HenryVthe

soldier,andthewarinFrance’,HenryVThepracticeofkingship,ed.G.L.Harriss(Oxford,1985),pp.117–35

Barber,R.,Edward,princeofWalesandAquitaine(London,1978)

ThelifeandcampaignsoftheBlackPrince(Woodbridge,1986)

Contamine,P.,Guère,état,etsociétéàlafindumoyenâge.EtudessurlesarmésdesroisdeFrance,1337–1494(Parisr:TheHague,1972),chs3,6,14,andapp.1–4

‘TheFrenchnobilityandthewar’,TheHundredYearsWar,ed.K.A.Fowler(London,1971),pp.135–62;reprintedintheauthor’sLaFranceauxXIVeetXVesiècles.Hommes,mentalités,guerre,et

paix(London,1981),ch.10

Fowler,K.A.,Theking’slieutenant.HenryofGrosmont,firstdukeofLancaster,1310–1361(London,1969)

Goodman,A.E.,JohnofGaunt.Theexerciseofprincelypowerinfourteenth-centuryEurope(Harlow,1992),ch.10

Haines,R.M.,‘“Ourmaster

mariner,oursovereignlord”:acontemporarypreacher’sviewofkingHenryV’,MedievalStudies,38(1976),85–96

Harvey,J.H.,TheBlackPrinceandhisage(London,1976)

Henneman,J.B.,‘ThemilitaryclassandtheFrenchmonarchyinthelateMiddleAges’,A.H.R.,83(1978),946–65

Hewitt,H.J.,TheBlackPrince’sexpeditionof1355–1357(Manchester,1958)

Jones,M.C.E.,‘EdwardIII’scaptainsinBrittany’,Englandinthefourteenthcentury.Proceedingsofthe1985Harlaxtonsymposium,ed.W.M.Ormrod(Woodbridge,1986),pp.99–118

McFarlane,K.B.,ThenobilityofthelaterMiddleAges(Oxford,1973)

Pollard,A.J.,JohnTalbotandthewarinFrance,1427–1453(London,1983)

Powicke,M.,‘Lancastriancaptains’,Essaysinmedieval

historypresentedtoB.Wilkinson,ed.T.A.SandquistandM.R.Powicke(Toronto,1969),pp.371–82

‘TheEnglisharistocracyandthewar’,TheHundredYearsWar,ed.K.A.Fowler(London,1971),pp.122–34

Prestwich,M.,ThethreeEdwards.WarandstateinEngland,1272–1377(London,1980),ch.5

MercenariesBayley,C.C,Warandsocietyin

RenaissanceFlorence.TheDeMilitiaofLeonardoBruni(Toronto,1961),chs1and3

Bridge,J.C.,‘TwoCheshiresoldiersoffortuneinthefourteenthcentury’,JournaloftheChesterandNorth

WalesArchaeologicalSociety,newseries,14(1908),112–65

BuenodeMesquita,D.M.,‘Somecondottieriofthetrecentoandtheirrelationswithpoliticalauthority’,P.B.A.,32(1946),219–41

Carr,A.D.,‘AWelshknightintheHundredYearsWar:SirGregorySais’,TransactionsofthehonourablesocietyofCymmrodorion(1977),40–53

Chamberlain,E.R.,‘The“English”mercenary

companiesinItaly’,H.T.,6(1956),334–43

Contamine,P.,‘Lescompagniesd’aventureenFrancependantlaguerredecentans’,Mélangesdel’écolefrançaisedeRome,87(1975),365–96;reprintedintheauthor’sLaFranceauxXIVeetXVesiècles.Hommes,mentalités,guerreetpaix(London,1981),ch.7

Fowler,K.A.,‘Thewagesofwar:themercenariesoftheGreatCompanies’,Viajeros,

peregrinos,mercaderesenelOccidentemedieval:xviiisemenadeestudiosmedievalesdeEstella,1991(Pamplona,1992),pp.217–44

Medievalmercenaries.I.TheGreatCompanies(Oxford,2001)

Gaupp,F.,‘ThecondottiereJohn

Hawkwood’,History,23(1938–39),305–21

Housley,N.,‘Themercenarycompanies,thepapacy,andthecrusades,1356–1378’,Traditio,38(1982),253–80

Jones,T.,Chaucer’sknight:theportraitofamedievalmercenary(London,1980)

Mallett,M.,Mercenariesandtheirmasters.WarfareinRenaissanceItaly(London,1974)

‘Veniceandits

condottieri,1404–1454’,RenaissanceVenice,ed.J.R.Hale(London,1973),pp.121–45

Mallett,M.,‘Mercenaries’,Medievalwarfare.Ahistory,ed.M.Keen(Oxford,1999),ch.10

Temple-Leader,J.,andMarcotti,G.,SirJohnHawkwood(L’Acuto).Thestoryofa

condottiere(London,1889)Timbal,P.-C.,Laguerredecent

ansvueàtraverslesregistresduParlement(1337–1369)(Paris,1961),ch.5

Trease,G.,Thecondottierie:soldiersoffortune(London,1970)

Veydarier,R.,‘Uneguerradelayrons.L’occupationdelaProvenceparlescompagniesdeRaymonddeTurenne(1393–1399)’,Laguerre,laviolenceetlesgensaumoyenâge.I.Guerreetviolence,ed.

P.ContamineandO.Guyotjeannin(Paris,1996),pp.169–88

Waley,D.,‘Condotteandcondottieriinthethirteenthcentury’,P.B.A.,61(1976),337–71

Wright,N.A.R.,‘“Pillagers”and“brigands”intheHundredYearsWar’,J.Med.H.,9(1983),15–24

FortificationandartilleryBradbury,J.,Themedievalsiege

(Woodbridge,1992)Brown,R.A.,Colvin,H.M.,and

Taylor,A.J.,Thehistoryoftheking’sworks,vols.1and2(London,1963)

Cipolla,C.M.,GunsandsailsintheearlyphaseofEuropeanexpansion,1400–1700(London,1965)

Clauzel,D.,‘Lilleetsesrempartsàlafindumoyenâge’,Laguerre,laviolenceetlesgensaumoyenâge.I.Guerreetviolence,ed.P.ContamineandO.Guyotjeannin(Paris,

1996),pp.273–93Clephan,R.C.,‘Theordnanceof

thefourteenthandfifteenthcenturies’,ArchaeologicalJournal,68(1911),49–138

Contamine,P.,‘LesfortificationsurbainesenFranceàlafindumoyenâge:aspectsfinanciersetéconomiques’,R.H.,260(1978),23–47;reprintedintheauthor’sLaFranceauxXIVeetXVesiècles.Hommes,mentalités,guerreetpaix(London,1981),ch.5

‘LesindustriesdeguerredanslaFrancedelaRenaissance:l’exempledel’artillerie’,R.H.,271(1984),249–80

DeVries,K.R.,Medievalmilitarytechnology(Peterborough:Lewiston,1992)

‘TheimpactofgunpowderweaponryonsiegewarfareintheHundredYearsWar’,Themedievalcityundersiege,ed.I.A.CorfisandM.Wolfe(Woodbridge,1995),Pp.227–44

‘TheforgottenbattleofBeverhoutsveld,3May1382:technologicalinnovationandmilitarysignificance’,Armies,chivalryandwarfareinmedievalBritainandFrance,

ed.M.Strickland(Stamford,1998),pp.289–303

Eltis,D.,‘TownsanddefencesinlatermedievalGermany’,NottinghamMedievalStudies,33(1989),91–103

Fawtier,R.,‘Documentsinéditssurl’organisationdel’artillerieroyaleautempsdeLouisXI’,EssaysinmedievalhistorypresentedtoT.F.Tout,ed.A.G.LitdeandF.

M.Powicke(Manchester,1925;repr.NewYork,1967),pp.367–77

Finó,J.E,ForteressesdelaFrancemédiévale(3rdedn,Paris,1977)

Gaier,C.,L’industrieetlecommercedesarmesdanslesanciennesprincipautésBelgesduXIIIeàlafinduXVesiècle(Paris,1973)

Hale,J.R.,‘Theearlydevelopmentofthebastion:anItalianchronology,c.1450–c.1534’,EuropeinthelateMiddle

Ages,ed.J.R.Hale,J.R.L.HighfieldandB.Smalley(London,1965),pp.466–94;reprintedintheauthor’sRenaissancewarstudies(London,1983),ch.1

Jones,M.C.E.,‘ThedefenceofmedievalBrittany’,ArchaeologicalJournal,138(1981),149–204

‘L’utilisationdelapoudreàcanonetdel’artilleriedansle

duchédeBretagneavant1400:lapreuvedocumentaire’,Mémoiresdelasociétéd’histoireetd’archéologiedeBretagne,69(1992),163–72

Jones,R.,‘LesfortificationsmunicipalesdeLisieuxdans

leschroniquesetdanslescomptes(premièremoitiéduXVesiècle)’,Laguerre,laviolenceetlesgensaumoyenâge.I.Guerreetviolence,ed.P.ContamineandO.Guyotjeannin(Paris,1996),pp.235–44

Keen,M.,‘Thechangingscene.Guns,gunpowderandpermanentarmies’,Medievalwarfare.Ahistory,ed.M.Keen(Oxford,1999),ch.13

Kenyon,J.R.,‘EarlyartilleryfortificationinEnglandand

Wales’,Fort,1(1976),22–5‘ArtilleryandthedefencesofSouthampton,circa1360–1660’,Fort,3(1977),8–13

‘Earlygunports:agazeteer’,Fort,4(1977),4–6

‘CoastalartilleryfortificationinEnglandinthelate

fourteenthandearlyfifteenthcenturies’,Arms,armiesandfortificationsintheHundredYearsWar,ed.A.CurryandM.Hughes(Woodbridge,1994),145–49

O’Neil,B.J.StJ.,Castlesandcannon(Oxford,1960)

Palliser,D.M.,‘TowndefencesinmedievalEnglandandWales’,Themedievalmilitaryrevolution,ed.A.AytonandJ.L.Price(London:NewYork,1995),pp.105–20

Parker,G.,‘Thegunpowderrevolution1300–1500’,TheCambridgeillustratedhistoryofwarfare.ThetriumphoftheWest,ed.G.Parker(Cambridge,1995),ch.6

Raynaud,C.,‘Défensesannexesetfortificationsdecampagne

danslesenluminuresdesXIVeetXVesiècles.Premièreapproche’,KriegimMittelalter,ed.H.-H.Kortüm(Berlin,2001),pp.197–249

Rigaudière,A.,‘LefinancementdesfortificationsurbainesenFrancedumilieuduXIVesiècleàlafinduxvesiècle’,R.H.,273(1985),19–95

Salamagne,A.,‘LadéfensedesvillesdesPays-BasàlamortdeCharlesleTéméraire(1477)’,Laguerre,laviolenceetlesgensaumoyen

âge.I.Guerreetviolence,ed.P.ContamineandO.Guyotjeannin(Paris,1996),pp.295–307

Smith,R.D.,‘ArtilleryandtheHundredYearsWar:mythandinterpretation’,Arms,armiesandfortificationsintheHundredYearsWar,ed.A.CurryandM.Hughes(Woodbridge,1994),pp.151–60

Timbal,P.-C,LaguerredecentansvueàtraverslesregistresduParlement(1337–1369)

(Paris,1961),ch.3Tout,T.E,‘FirearmsinEnglandin

thefourteenthcentury’,E.H.R.,26(1911),666–702;reprintedinThecollectedpapersofT.ETout(Manchester,1934),11,233–75

ChaptersintheadministrativehistoryofmedievalEngland,IV(Manchester,1928)

Turner,H.L.,TowndefencesinEnglandandWales.AnarchitecturalanddocumentarystudyA.D.900–1500(London,1970)

Vale,M.G.A.,‘Newtechniquesandoldideals:theimpactofartilleryonwarandchivalryattheendoftheHundredYearsWar’,War,literatureandpoliticsinthelateMiddleAges,ed.C.T.Allmand(Liverpool,1976),pp.57–72

Wright,N.A.R.,‘ThefortifiedchurchatChitry’,Fort,9

(1991),5–10

NavalobjectivesFernández-Armesto,F.,‘Naval

warfareaftertheVikingage,c.1100–1500’,Medievalwarfare.Ahistory,ed.M.Keen(Oxford,1999),ch.11

Ford,C.J.,‘Piracyorpolicy:thecrisisintheChannel,1400–1403’,T.R.Hist.S.,fifthseries,29(1979),63–78

Hewitt,H.J.,TheorganizationofwarunderEdwardIII,1338–

1362(Manchester,1966),ch.1

Holmes,G.A.,‘The“LibelofEnglishPolicy””,E.H.R.,76(1961),193–216

Paviot,J.,LapolitiquenavaledesducsdeBourgogne,1384–1482(Lille,1995)

Pistono,S.P.,‘HenryIVandtheEnglishprivateers’,E.H.R.,90(1975),322–30

‘ThepetitionofJacobdeSmet:aplea

forreprisalsagainsttheEnglish,1403’,Bulletindelacommissionroyaled’histoire[Brussels],142(1976),341–51

Prestwich,M.,War,politicsandfinanceunderEdwardI(London,1972),ch.6

Richmond,C.E,‘ThekeepingoftheseasduringtheHundred

YearsWar:1422–1440’,History,49(1964),283–98

‘Thewaratsea’,TheHundredYearsWar,ed.K.A.Fowler(London,1971),pp.96–121

Russell,P.,TheEnglishinterventioninSpainandPortugalinthetimeof

EdwardIIIandRichardII(Oxford,1955)

Saul,A.,‘GreatYarmouthandtheHundredYearsWarinthefourteenthcentury’,B.I.H.R.,52(1979),105–15

Sherborne,J.W.,‘ThebattleofLaRochelleandthewaratsea,1372–5’,B.I.H.R.,42(1969)17–29

Stanford-Reid,W,‘SeapowerintheAnglo-Scottishwar,1296–1328’,M.M.,46(1960),7–23

Warner,G.,TheLibelleof

EnglyshePolyeye.Apoemontheuseofsea-power,1436(Oxford,1926)

NavalforcesCarpenter-Turner,W.J.,‘The

buildingoftheGracedieu,Valentine,andFalconeratSouthampton,1416–1420’,M.M.,40(1954),55–72

‘ThebuildingoftheHolyGhostofthe

Tower,1414–1416,andhersubsequenthistory’,M.M.,40(1954),270–81

Contamine,P.,HistoiremilitairedelaFrance.Desoriginesà1715(Paris,1992),chs.viiandxii(byM.Mollat)

Evans,J.(trans.),Theunconqueredknight.AchronicleofthedeedsofDonPeroNiño,countofBuelna(London,

1928)Friel,I.,‘Windsofchange?Ships

andtheHundredYearsWar’,Arms,armiesandfortificationsintheHundredYearsWar,ed.A.CurryandM.Hughes(Woodbridge,1994),pp.183–93

Hewitt,H.J.,TheorganizationofwarunderEdwardIII,1338–62(Manchester,1966),ch.4

Kepler,J.S.,‘TheeffectsofthebattleofSluysupontheadministrationofEnglishnavalimpressment,1340–

1343’,Speculum,48(1973),70–7

Lot,E,andFawtier,R.,Histoiredesinstitutionsfrançaisesaumoyenâge(Paris,1959),II,536–44

Lyon,B.,‘TheinfrastructureandpurposeofanEnglishmedievalfleetinthefirstphaseoftheHundredYearsWar(1338–1340)’,MaatschappijvoorgeschiedenisenoudheidkindeteGent.Nieuwereeks,51(Ghent,1997),61–76

Mallett,M.,TheFlorentinegalleysinthefifteenthcentury(Oxford,1967)

Nicolas,N.H.,Historyoftheroyalnavy(2vols.,London,1847)

Oppenheim,M.,Ahistoryoftheadministrationoftheroyalnavyandofmerchantshippinginrelationtothenavy(London:NewYork,1896;repr.1961),ch.1

Prince,A.E.,‘Thearmyandnavy’,Englishgovernmentatwork,1327–1336,ed.J.F.WillardandW.A.Morris

(Cambridge,Mass.,1940),1,376–93

Richmond,C.F.,‘Englishnavalpowerinthefifteenthcentury’,History,52(1967),1–15

Roncière,C.dela,Histoiredelamarinefrançaise.II:Laguerredecentans(3rdedn,Paris,1914)

Rose,S.(ed.),ThenavyoftheLancastriankings:accountsandinventoriesofWilliamSoper,keeperoftheking’sships,1422–1427(London,

1982)Runyan,T.J.,‘Shipsandmariners

inlatermedievalEngland’,JournalofBritishStudies,16(2)(1977),1–17

‘Merchantmentomen-of-warinmedievalEngland’,Newaspectsofnavalhistory,ed.C.L.Symonds(Annapolis,

1981),pp.33–40

Sherborne,J.W.,‘TheHundredYearsWar.TheEnglishnavy:shippingandmanpower,1369–1389’,P&P,37(1967),163–75

‘Englishbargesandbalingersofthelatefourteenthcentury’,M.M.,63(1977),109–

14

Tinniswood,J.T.,‘Englishgalleys,1272–1377’,M.M.,35(1949),276–315

Waites,B.,‘Thefightinggalley’,H.T.,18(1968),337–43

4THEINSTITUTIONSOFWAR

CentralorganisationContamine,P.,Guerre,étatet

sociétéàlafindumoyenâge.Etudessurlesarméesdes

roisdeFrance,1337–1494(Paris:TheHague,1972)

‘Lesarméesfrançaiseetanglaiseàl’époquedeJeanned’Arc’,RevuedessociétéssavantesdeHaute-Normandie.Lettresetscienceshumaines,57(1970),

5–33

‘StructuresmilitairesdelaFranceetdel’AngleterreaumilieuduXVesiècle’,DasSpätmittelalterlicheKönigtumimEuropäischen

Vergleich,ed.R.Schneider(Sigmaringen,1987),pp.319–34

Curry,A.,‘ThefirstEnglishstandingarmy?MilitaryorganisationinLancastrianNormandy,1420–1450’,Patronage,pedigree,andpowerinlatermedievalEngland,ed.C.D.Ross(Gloucester:Totowa,1979),

pp.193–214FernándezdeLarreaRojas,J.-A.,

‘CambiosenelsistemamilitarnavarroenlasegundamitaddelsigloXIV,PrimercongresogeneraldehistoriadeNavarra.3.Comunicacionesedadmedia,PrincipedeViana,49(1988),413–23

‘LasestructurasdelaguerraenlaNavarradelsigloXIV.Las

campañasportuguesasde1384.–1385’,Anuariodeestudiosmedievales,19(1989),393–404

Goodman,A.,TheWarsoftheRoses.MilitaryactivityandEnglishsociety,1452–97(London,1981),part2

Hewitt,H.J.,TheorganizationofwarunderEdwardIII,1338–62(Manchester,1966)

‘Theorganisationofwar’,TheHundredYearsWar,ed.K.A.Fowler(London,1971),pp.75–95

Kerhervé,J.,‘LebudgetdelaguerreenBretagned’aprèsl’“estat”de1482–1483’,Guerre,pouvoiretnoblesseaumoyenâge.MélangesenVhonneurdePhilippeContamine,ed.J.Paviotand

J.Verger(Paris,2000),pp.363–92

Mallett,M.,andHale,J.R.,ThemilitaryorganizationofaRenaissancestate.Venice,c.1400–1617(Cambridge,1984)

Monteiro,J.G.,AguerraemPortugalnosfinaisdaidademédia(Lisbon,1998)

Newhall,R.A.,TheEnglishconquestofNormandy,1416–1424.Astudyinfifteenth-centurywarfare(Yale,1924:repr.NewYork,1971)

Musterandreview.AproblemofEnglishmilitaryadministration,1420–1440(Cambridge,Mass.,1940)

Prestwich,M.,War,politicsandfinanceunderEdwardI(London,1972),ch.7

Prestwich,M.,Armiesandwarfareinthemiddleages.The

Englishexperience(NewHaven:London,1996)

Solon,P.D.,‘Popularresponsetostandingmilitaryforcesinfifteenth-centuryFrance’,StudiesintheRenaissance,19(1972),78–111

Vaughan,R.,ValoisBurgundy(London,1975),ch.7

RecruitmentContamine,P.,Guerre,étatet

sociétéàlafindumoyenâge.Etudessurlesarméesdes

roisdeFrance,1337–1494(Paris:TheHague,1972),chs2,5,10and12

Goodman,A.,TheWarsoftheRoses.MilitaryactivityandEnglishsociety,1452–97(London,1981),ch.6

‘ThemilitarysubcontractsofSirHughHastings,1380’,E.H.R.,95(1980),114–20

‘ResponsestorequestsinYorkshireformilitaryserviceunderHenryV’,NorthernHistory,17(1981),240–52

Hewitt,H.J.,TheorganizationofwarunderEdwardIII,1338–62(Manchester,1966),ch.2

Jamieson,N.,‘TheorganisationofmilitaryleviesinBeverley,

1400–1450’,MedievalYorkshire,23(1994),36–41

Jones,M.C.E.,‘AnindenturebetweenRobert,LordMohaut,andSirJohndeBracebridgeforlifeserviceinpeaceandwar,1310’,JournaloftheSocietyofArchivists,4(1972),384–94

Lewis,N.B.,‘Anearlyindentureofmilitaryservice,27July1287’,B.I.H.R.,13(1935–36),85–9

‘Theorganisation

ofindenturedretinuesinfourteenth-centuryEngland’,T.R.Hist.S.,fourthseries,27(1945),29–39;reprintedinEssaysinmedievalhistory,ed.R.W.Southern(London,1968),pp.200–12

‘ThelastmedievalsummonsoftheEnglishfeudallevy,13June1385’,E.H.R.,73(1958),1–26

‘Therecruitmentandorganizationofacontractarmy,MaytoNovember1337’,

B.I.H.R.,37(1964),1–19

‘ThesummonsoftheEnglishfeudallevy,5April1327’,EssaysinmedievalhistorypresentedtoB.Wilkinson,ed.T.A.SandquistandM.R.

Powicke(Toronto,1969),pp.236–49

‘Thefeudalsummonsof1385’,E.H.R.,100(1985),729–43;commentbyJ.J.N.Palmer,ibid.,743–6

Lewis,N.B.(ed.),‘Indenturesof

retinuewithJohnofGaunt,dukeofLancaster,enrolledinchancery,1367–1399’,CamdenMiscellanyXXII(Camdenfourthseries,1,London,1964),pp.77–112

Palmer,J.J.N.,‘ThelastsummonsofthefeudalarmyinEngland’,E.H.R.,83(1968),771–5(SeealsounderLewis,N.B.,above)

Powicke,M.,MilitaryobligationinmedievalEngland.Astudyinlibertyandduty(Oxford,1962)

Prestwich,M.,War,politicsandfinanceunderEdwardI(London,1972),ch.2

Prince,A.E.,‘TheindenturesystemunderEdwardIII’,HistoricalessaysinhonourofJamesTait,ed.J.G.Edwards,V.H.Galbraith,andE.EJacob(Manchester,1933),pp.283–97

Timbal,P.-C.(ed.)LaguerredecentansvueàtraverslesregistresduParlement(1337–1369)(Paris,1961),ch.1

Walker,S.,‘ProfitandlossintheHundredYearsWar:thesubcontractsofSirJohnStrother,1374’,B.I.H.R.,58(1985),100–6

SuppliesBurley,S.J.,‘Thevictuallingof

Calais,1347–65’,B.I.H.R.,31(1958),49–57

Contamine,P.,Guerre,étatetsociétéàlafindumoyenâge.LesarméesdesroisdeFrance,1337–1494(Paris:

TheHague,1972),chs4,11andapp.11

Devaux,J.,‘L’alimentationentempsdeguerre;l’apportdessourceslittéraires’,Laviematérielleaumoyenâge.L’apportdessourceslittéraires,normativesetdelapratique,ed.E.Rassart-Eeckhoutetal.(Louvain-la-Neuve,1997),pp.91–108

Given-Wilson,C.J.,‘Purveyancefortheroyalhousehold,1362–1413’,B.I.H.R.,56(1983),145–63

Goodman,A.,TheWarsoftheRoses.MilitaryactivityandEnglishsociety,1452–97(London,1981),ch.7

Hewitt,H.J.,TheorganizationofwarunderEdwardIII,1338–62(Manchester,1966),chs3and4

Jones,W.R.,‘PurveyanceforwarandthecommunityoftherealminlatemedievalEngland’,Albion,7(1975),300–16

Maddicott,J.R.,TheEnglishpeasantryandthedemandsof

thecrown,1294–1341,P&Psupplement,1(Oxford,1975)

Newhall,R.A.,TheEnglishconquestofNormandy,1416–1424.Astudyoffifteenth-centurywarfare(NewHaven,1924),ch.6

Prestwich,M.,War,politicsandfinanceunderEdwardI(London,1972),ch.5

‘VictuallingestimatesforEnglishgarrisonsinScotlandduringtheearlyfourteenthcentury’,E.H.R.,82(1967),536–43

Prestwich,M.,‘Militarylogistics:

thecaseof1322’,Armies,chivalryandwarfareinmedievalBritainandFrance,ed.M.Strickland(Stamford,1998),pp.276–88

Timbal,P.-C.(ed.),LaguerredecentansvueàtraverslesregistresduParlement(1337–1369)(Paris,1961),ch.2

Taxationandfiscalinstitutions

Brown,E.A.R.,‘Cessantecausa

andthetaxesofthelastCapetians:thepoliticalapplicationsofaphilosophicalmaxim’,StudiaGratiana,15(1972),565–87

‘CustomaryaidsandroyalfiscalpolicyunderPhilipVIofValois’,Traditio,30(1974),191–258

Bryant,W.N.,‘ThefinancialdealingsofEdwardIIIwiththecountycommunities,1330–1360’,E.H.R.,83(1968),760–71

Contamine,P.,‘Guerre,fiscalité’royaleetéconomieenFrance(deuxièmemoitiéduxvesiècle)’,Proceedingsoftheseventeenthinternationaleconomiccongress,ed.M.Flinn(Edinburgh,1978),II,266–73

Fryde,E.B.,‘EdwardIII’swoolmonopolyof1337:a

fourteenth-centuryroyaltradingventure’,History,37(1952),8–24

‘ParliamentandtheFrenchwar’,EssaysinmedievalhistorypresentedtoB.Wilkinson,ed.T.A.SandquistandM.R.Powicke(Toronto,

1969),pp.250–69

‘ThefinancialpoliciesoftheroyalgovernmentsandpopularresistancetotheminFranceandEngland,c.1270-c.1420’,Revuebelgedephilologieet

d’histoire,57(1979),824–60

[Theabove-listedarticlesarereprintedintheauthor’sStudiesinmedievaltradeandfinance(London,1983)]

Genet,J.-P.,‘Lesdébutsdel’impôt

nationalenAngleterre’,Annales,34(1979),348–54

Given-Wilson,C.,Theroyalhouseholdandtheking’saffinity.Service,politicsandfinanceinEngland1360–1413(NewHaven:London,1986)

Harriss,G.L.,King,parliament,andpublicfinanceinmedievalEnglandto1360(Oxford,1975)

‘Warandthe

emergenceoftheEnglishParliament,1297–1360’,J.Med.H.,2(1976),35–56

Henneman,J.B.,Royaltaxationinfourteenth-centuryFrance.Thedevelopmentofwarfinancing,1322–1356(Princeton,1971)

Royaltaxationin

fourteenth-centuryFrance.ThecaptivityandransomofJohnII,1356–1370(Philadelphia,1976)

‘FinancingtheHundredYearsWar:royaltaxationinFrancein1340’,

Speculum,42(1967),275–98

‘TheBlackDeathandroyaltaxationinFrance,1347–1351’,Speculum,43(1968),405–28

‘TheFrenchransomandtwolegaltraditions’,StudiaGratiana,

15(1972),613–30

‘Nobility,privilegeandfiscalpoliticsinlatemedievalFrance’,FrenchHistoricalStudies,13(1983),1–17

Hilton,R.N.,‘Resistancetotaxationandtootherstateimpositionsinmedieval

England’,Genèsedel’étatmoderne.Prélèvementetredistribution,ed.J.-Ph.GenetandM.LeMené(Paris,1987),pp.169–77

Lewis,P.S.,‘ThefailureoftheFrenchmedievalestates’,P&P,23(1962),3–24;reprintedintheauthor’sEssaysinlatermedievalFrenchhistory(London,1985),pp.105–26

Lot,E,andFawtier,R.,Histoiredesinstitutionsfrançaisesaumoyenâge(Paris,1958),II,

183–285Maddicott,J.R.,TheEnglish

peasantryandthedemandsofthecrown,1294–1341,P&Psupplement,I(Oxford,1975)

Miller,E.,‘War,taxation,andtheEnglisheconomyinthelatethirteenthandearlyfourteenthcenturies’,Warandeconomicdevelopment.EssaysinmemoryofDavidJoslin,ed.J.M.Winter(Cambridge,1975),pp.11–31

Miskimin,H.A.,Moneyandpower

infifteenth-centuryFrance(NewHaven:London,1984)

Morris,W.A.,andStrayer,J.R.,Englishgovernmentatwork,1327–1336,II(Cambridge,Mass.,1947)

Nederman,C.J.,‘RoyaltaxationandtheEnglishchurch:theoriginsofWilliamofOckham’sAnPrinceps’,J.E.H.,37(1986),377–88

Ormond,W.M.,‘TheEnglishcrownandthecustoms,1349–63’,Econ.H.R.,2ndseries,40(1987),27–40

Prestwich,M.,War,politicsandfinanceunderEdwardI(London,1972),ch.8

‘WarandtaxationinEnglandintheXIIIthandXIVthcenturies’,Genèsedel’étatmoderne.Prélèvementetredistribution,ed.J.-

Ph.GenetandM.LeMené(Paris,1987),pp.181–92

Sherborne,J.W.,‘ThecostofEnglishwarfarewithFranceinthelaterfourteenthcentury’,B.I.H.R.,50(1977),135–50

Spiegel,G.M.,‘“Defenceoftherealm”:evolutionofaCapetianpropagandaslogan’,J.Med.H.,3(1977),115–33

Strayer,J.R.,‘Notesontheorigin

ofEnglishandFrenchexporttaxes’,StudiaGratiana,15(1972),399–421

‘DefenceoftherealmandroyalpowerinFrance’,StudiinonorediGinoEuzzato(Milan,1949),1,289–96;reprintedintheauthor’sMedieval

statecraftandtheperspectivesofhistory(Princeton,1971),291–9

Strayer,J.R.,andTaylor,C.H.,StudiesinearlyFrenchtaxation(Cambridge,Mass.,1939)

Tout,T.E,ChaptersintheadministrativehistoryofmedievalEngland,III,IV(Manchester,1928)

Wolfe,M.,ThefiscalsystemofRenaissanceFrance(NewHaven:London,1972)

OrderandcontrolAllmand,C.T.,‘Warandthenon-

combatant’,TheHundredYearsWar,ed.K.A.Fowler(London,1971),pp.163–83

‘Warandthenon-combatantinthe

middleages’,Medievalwarfare.Ahistory,ed.M.Keen(Oxford,1999),ch.12

Allmand,C.T.,andArmstrong,C.A.J.,EnglishsuitsbeforetheParlementofParis,1420–1436(Camdenfourthseries,26,London,1982)

Armstrong,C.A.J.,‘SirJohnFastolfandthelawofarms’,War,literatureandpoliticsin

thelateMiddleAges,ed.C.T.Allmand(Liverpool,1976),pp.46–56;reprintedintheauthor’sEngland,FranceandBurgundyinthefifteenthcentury(London,1983),pp.123–33

Barnard,F.P.(ed.),TheessentialportionsofNicholasUpton’sDestudiomilitari,before1446,translatedbyJohnBlount,FellowofAllSouls(c.1500)(Oxford,1931)

Contamine,P.,Guerre,étatetsociétéàlafindumoyenâge.

EtudessurlesarméesdesroisdeFrance,1337–1494(Paris:TheHague,1972),chs4,7and16

Coopland,G.W.(trans.),TheTreeofBattlesofHonoréBonet(Liverpool,1949)

Fowler,K.A.,‘LesfinancesetladisciplinedanslesarméesanglaisesenFranceauXIVesiècle’,LesCahiersVernonnais,4(1964),55–84

Holland,T.E.(ed.),JohnofLegnano,Tractatusdebello,derepresaliisetdeduello

(Oxford,1917)Keen,M.H.,Thelawsofwarin

thelateMiddleAges(London:Toronto,1965)

‘Treasontrialsunderthelawofarms’,T.R.Hist.S.,fifthseries,12(1962),85–103:reprintedintheauthor’sNobles,

knightsandmen-at-armsinthemiddleages(London:RioGrande,1996),pp.149–66

‘Thejurisdictionandoriginsoftheconstable’scourt’,Warandgovernment

intheMiddleAges,ed.J.GillinghamandJ.C.Holt(Woodbridge,1984),pp.159–69:reprintedintheauthor’sNobles,knightsandme-at-armsinthemiddleages(London:RioGrande,1996),pp.

135–48

‘RichardII’sordinancesofwarof1385’,RulersandruledinlatemedievalEngland.EssayspresentedtoGeraldHarriss,ed.R.E.ArcherandS.Walker

(London:RioGrande,1995),pp.33–48

Marsden,R.G.(ed.),Selectpleasinthecourtofadmiralty(SeldenSoc.,6,London,1894)

Newhall,R.A.,Musterandreview.AproblemofEnglishmilitaryadministration1420–1440(Cambridge,Mass.,1940)

‘DisciplineinanEnglisharmyofthefifteenthcentury’,TheMilitaryHistorianandEconomist,2(1917),141–51

‘Bedford’sordinanceonthewatchofSeptember1428’,

E.H.R.,50(1935),36–60

Porter,E.,‘Chaucer’sknight,thealliterativeMorteArthure,andmedievallawsofwar:areconsideration’,NottinghamMedievalStudies,27(1983),56–78

Rowe,B.J.H.,‘DisciplineintheNormangarrisonsunderBedford,1422–35’,E.HR.,46(1931),194–208

Squibb,G.D,Thehighcourtof

chivalry(Oxford,1959),ch.1Timbal,P.-C.(ed.),Laguerrede

centansvueàtraverslesregistresduParlement(1337–1369)(Paris,1961),ch.4

Twiss,T.(ed.),TheBlackBookoftheAdmiralty(R.S.,London,1871),vol.I

Wright,N.A.R.,‘TheTreeofBattlesofHonoréBouvetandthelawsofwar’,War,literature,andpoliticsinthelateMiddleAges,ed.C.T.Allmand(Liverpool,1976),

pp.12–31

DiplomacyAllmand,C.T.,‘Documents

relatingtotheAnglo-Frenchnegotiationsof1439’,CamdenMiscellanyXXIV(Camdenfourthseries,9,London,1972),pp.79–149

‘TheAnglo-Frenchnegotiations,1439’,

B.I.H.R.,40(1967),1–33

‘DiplomacyinlatemedievalEngland’,H.T,17(1967),546–53

Autrand,F.,‘Thepeacemakersandthestate:PontificaldiplomacyandtheAnglo-Frenchconflictinthefourteenthcentury’,Warand

competitionbetweenstates,ed.P.Contamine(Oxford,2000),ch.10

Broome,D.,‘TheransomofJohnII,kingofFrance,1360–70’,CamdenMiscellanyXIV(Camdenthirdseries,37,London,1926)

Chaplais,P.,Englishmedievaldiplomaticpractice,PartI(2vols.,London,1982)

‘Règlementsdesconflitsinternationaux

franco-anglaisauXIVesiècle(1293–1377)’,M.A.,57(1951),269–302;reprintedintheauthor’sEssaysinmedievaldiplomacyandadministration(London,1981),ch.9

Clauzel,D.,Giry-Deloison,C.andLeduc,C.(eds),Arrasetladiplomatieeuropéennexve–xviesiècle(Arras,1999)

Cuttino,G.P.,Englishdiplomatieadministration,1259–1339(Oxford,2ndedn,1971)Englishmedievaldiplomacy(Bloomington,1985)

Déprez,E.,‘Laconférenced’Avignon(1344).L’arbitragepontificaleentrelaFranceetl’Angleterre’,EssaysinmedievalhistorypresentedtoT.ETout,ed.A.

G.LittleandF.M.Powicke(Manchester,1925;repr.NewYork,1967),pp.301–20

Dickinson,J.G.,ThecongressofArras.1435.Astudyinmedievaldiplomacy(Oxford,1955)

Ferguson,J.,Englishdiplomacy,1422–1461(Oxford,1972)

Fowler,K.A.,‘Truces’,TheHundredYearsWar,ed.K.A.Fowler(London,1971),pp.184–215

Hewitt,H.J.,TheorganizationofwarunderEdwardIII,1338–

62(Manchester,1966),ch.6Keen,M.,‘Diplomacy’,HenryV.

Thepracticeofkingship,ed.G.L.Harriss(Oxford,1985),pp.181–99:reprintedintheauthorsNobles,knightsandmen-at-armsinthemiddleages(London:RioGrande,1996),pp.223–38

LeBis,I.,‘PratiquedeladiplomaticUndossierd’ambassadeursfrançaissousCharlesVI(1400–1403)’,Annuaire-bulletindelaSociétédel’Histoirede

France(1985–1986),97–215LePatourel,J.,‘Thetreatyof

Brétigny,1360’,T.R.Hist.S.,fifthseries,10(1960),19–39

Lucas,H.S.,‘Themachineryofdiplomaticintercourse’,Englishgovernmentatwork,1327–1336,ed.J.F.WillardandW.A.Morris(Cambridge,Mass.,1940),1,300–31

Palmer,J.J.N.,England,FranceandChristendom,1377–99(London,1972)

‘TheAnglo-Frenchpeacenegotiations,1390–1396’,T.R.Hist.S.,fifthseries,16(1966),81–94

‘Englishforeignpolicy,1388–99’,ThereignofRichardII.Essaysinhonourof

MayMcKisack,ed.F.R.H.duBoulayandC.M.Barron(London,1971),pp.75–107

Perroy,E.,‘Historicalrevision.Franco-Englishrelations,1350–1400’,History,21(1937),148–54;reprintedintheauthor’sEtudesd’histoiremédiévale(Paris,1979)

Queller,D.E.,TheofficeofambassadorintheMiddle

Ages(Princeton,1967)Taylor,C,‘War,propagandaand

diplomacyinfifteenth-centuryFranceandEngland’,War,governmentandpowerinlatemedievalFrance,ed.C.Allmand(Liverpool,2000),pp.70–91

5WAR,SOCIALMOVEMENT,ANDCHANGE

Allmand,C.T.,‘WarandprofitinthelateMiddleAges’,H.T.,15(1965),762–9

Ayton,A.,‘Knights,esquiresandmilitaryservice:theevidenceofthearmorialcasesbeforethecourtofchivalry’,Themedievalmilitaryrevolution,ed.A.AytonandJ.L.Price(London:NewYork,1995),pp.81–104

Beresford,M.W.,NewtownsoftheMiddleAges.TownplantationinEngland,WalesandGascony(London,1967)

Bois,G.,Thecrisisoffeudalism.EconomyandsocietyineasternNormandy,c.1300–

1550(Cambridge,1984)Bolton,J.L.,ThemedievalEnglish

economy,1150–1500(London,1980)

BoultonD’A.J.D.,Knightsofthecrown.MonarchicalordersofknighthoodinlatermedievalEurope,1325–1520(Woodbridge,1987)

Boutruche,R.,‘ThedevastationofruralareasduringtheHundredYearsWarandtheagriculturalrecoveryofFrance’,TherecoveryofFranceinthefifteenth

century,ed.P.S.Lewis(NewYork:London,1972),pp.23–59

BridburyR.,Economicgrowth.EnglandinthelaterMiddleAges(newedn,Hassocks,1975)

‘TheHundredYearsWar:costsandprofits’,Trade,governmentandeconomyin

preindustrialEngland.EssayspresentedtoFJ.Fisher,ed.D.C.ColemanandA.H.John(London,1976),pp.80–95

Carr,‘WelshmenandtheHundredYearsWar’,WelshHistoryReview,4(1968),21–46

‘AWelshknightintheHundredYearsWar:SirGregorySais’,Trans,oftheHonourableSocietyofCymmrodorion(1978),157–81

Carus-Wilson,E.M.,‘TheeffectsoftheacquisitionandofthelossofGasconyontheEnglishwinetrade’,B.I.H.R.,

21(1947),145–54;reprintedintheauthor’sMedievalmerchantventurers(London,1954)

‘Evidencesofindustrialgrowthonsomefifteenth-centurymanors’,Econ.H.R.,12(1959),190–205;reprintedinEssaysineconomichistory,ed.

Carus-Wilson(London,1962),II,151–67

Contamine,P.,Guerre,étatetsociétéàlafindumoyenâge.EtudessurlesarméesdesroisdeFrance,1337–1494(Paris:TheHague,1972)

‘LaguerredecentansenFrance:une

approcheéconomique’,B.I.H.R.,47(1974),125–49

‘TheFrenchnobilityandthewar’,TheHundredYearsWar,ed.K.A.Fowler(London,1971),pp.135–62

[Theabove-listedarticlesarereprintedintheauthor’sLaFranceauxXIVeetXVesiècles.Hommes,mentalités,guerreetpaix(London,1981)]

‘Lecoûtdelaguerredecentansen

Angleterre’,Annales,20(1965),788–91

Crawford,A.,Bristolandthewinetrade(Bristol,1984)

Curry,A.,‘TheimpactofwarandoccupationonurbanlifeinNormandy,1417–1450’,FrenchHistory,1(1987),157–81

‘Bourgeoisetsoldatsdanslavillede

Mantespendantl’occupationanglaisede1419à1449’,Guerre,pouvoiretnoblesseaumoyenâge.Mélangesenl’honneurdePhilippeContamine,ed.J.PaviotandJ.Verger(Paris,2000),pp.175–

84

Favier,J.,‘Occupationouconnivence?LesAnglaisàParis(1422–1436)’,Guerre,pouvoiretnoblesseaumoyenâge.MélangesenVhonneurdePhilippeContamine,ed.J.PaviotandJ.Verger(Paris,2000),pp.239–60

Fawtier,R.,‘Lacrised’unesociétédurantlaguerredecentans.Aproposd’unelivrerecent’,R.H,203(1950),53–8

Fowler,K.A.,‘Warandchangein

latemedievalFranceandEngland’,TheHundredYearsWar,ed.K.A.Fowler(London,1971),pp.1–27

Hatcher,J.,Plague,populationandtheEnglisheconomy,1348–1530(London,1977)

Hay,D.,‘Thedivisionsofthespoilsofwarinfourteenth-centuryEngland’,T.R.Hist.S.,fifthseries,4(1954),91–109

‘Bootyinborder

warfare’,TransactionsoftheDumfriesshireandGallowayNaturalHistoryandAntiquarianSociety,thirdseries,31(1954),145–66

Henneman,J.B.,‘ThemilitaryclassandtheFrenchmonarchyinthelateMiddleAges’,A.H.R.,83

(1978),946–65Hicks,M.A.,‘Countingthecostof

war:theMoleynsransomandtheHungerfordland-sales1453–87’,SouthernHistory,8(1986),11–35

James,M.K.,‘ThefluctuationsoftheAnglo-Gasconwinetradeduringthefourteenthcentury’,Econ.H.R.,secondseries,4(1951),170–96;reprintedinEssaysineconomichistory,ed.E.M.Cams-Wilson(London,1962),II,125–50,andinM.

K.James,Studiesinthemedievalwinetrade,ed.E.M.Véale(Oxford,1971),pp.1–37

Jones,M.K,‘HenryVII,LadyMargaretBeaufortandtheOrléansransom’,KingsandnoblesinthelaterMiddleAges.AtributetoCharlesRoss,ed.R.A.GriffithsandJ.Sherborne(Gloucester,1986),pp.254–73

‘Ransombrokerage

inthefifteenthcentury’,GuerreetsociétéenFrance,enAngleterreetenBourgogne,xive–xvesiècle,ed.P.Contamine,C.Giry-Deloison,andM.Keen(Lille,1991),pp.221–35

Jones,M.C.E.,‘L’arméebretonne1449–91:structuresetcarrières’,LaFrancedelafinduXVesiècle.Renouveauetapopée,ed.B.ChevalierandP.Contamine(Paris,1985),pp.147–65

‘Thefortunesofwar:themilitarycareerofJohn,secondlordBourchier(d.1400)’,Essex

ArchaeologyandHistory,26(1995),145–61

‘Fortunesetmalheursdeguerre.Autourdelarançonduchevalieranglais,JeanBourchier’,Laguerre,laviolenceetlesgens

aumoyenâge.I.Guerreetviolence,ed.P.ContamineandO.Guyotjeannin(Paris,1996),pp.189–208

Keen,M.,Englishsocietyinthelatermiddleages,1348–1500(Harmondsworth,1990),ch.6

Kershaw,I.,‘ThegreatfamineandagrariancrisisinEngland,1315–1322’,P&P,59(1973),

3–50Lewis,P.S.,‘Decayedandnon-

feudalisminlatermedievalFrance’,B.I.H.R.,37(1964),157–84

‘Unedevisedechevalerieinconnue,crééeparuncomtedeFoix?LeDragon,A.M.,76(1964),77–84

‘OfBretonalliancesandothermatters’,War,literatureandpoliticsinthelateMiddleAges,ed.C.T.Allmand(Liverpool,1976),pp.122–43

[Theabove-listed

articlesarereprintedintheauthor’sEssaysinlatermedievalFrenchhistory(London,1985)]

Lucas,H.S.,‘ThegreatEuropeanfamineof1315,1316,and1317’,Speculum,5(1930),341–77;reprintedinEssaysineconomichistory,ed.E.M.Cams-Wilson(London,1962),11,49–72

McHardy,A.K.,‘Theeffectsofwaronthechurch:thecaseofthealienprioriesinthefourteenthcentury’,Englandandherneighbours,1066–1453.EssaysinhonourofPierreChaplais,ed.M.C.E.JonesandM.G.A.Vale(London:Ronceverte,1989),pp.277–95

McFarlane,K.B.,ThenobilityoflatermedievalEngland(Oxford,1973)

“‘Bastard

feudalism’“,B.I.H.R.,20(1945),161–80

‘TheinvestmentofSirJohnFastolf’sprofitsofwar’,T.R.Hist.S.,fifthseries,7(1957),91–116

‘War,theeconomy

andsocialchange.EnglandandtheHundredYearsWar’,P&P,22(1962),3–13

‘Abusiness-partnershipinwarandadministration,1421–1445’,E.H.R.,78(1963),290–308

[Theabove-listedarticlesarereprintedintheauthor’sEnglandinthefifteenthcentury(London,1981)]

McRobbie,K.,‘TheconceptofadvancementinthefourteenthcenturyinthechroniquesofJeanFroissart’,CanadianJournalofHistory,6(1971),1–19

Miller,E.,WarintheNorth(Hull,

1960)Nicholas,D.,‘Economic

reorientationandsocialchangeinfourteenth-centuryFlanders’,P&P,70(1976),3–29

Perroy,E.,‘Al’origined’uneéconomiecontractée:lescrisesduxivesiècle,Annales,4(1949),167–82

‘Grasprofitsetrançonspendantlaguerredecentans.

L’affaireducomtedeDénia’,Mélangesd’histoiredumoyenâgedédiésàlamémoiredeLouisHalphen(Paris,1951),pp.573–80

‘SocialmobilityamongtheFrench

noblesseinthelaterMiddleAges’,P&P,21(1962),25–38

[Theabove-listedarticlesarereprintedintheauthor’sEtudesd’histoiremédiévale(Paris,1979)]

Postan,M.M.,‘Somesocial

consequencesoftheHundredYearsWar’,Econ.H.R.,12(1942),1–12

‘ThecostsoftheHundredYearsWar’,P&P,27(1964),34–53

Powicke,M.,‘TheEnglisharistocracyandthewar’,TheHundredYearsWar,ed.K.A.Fowler(London,1971),pp.

122–34Prestwich,M.,War,politicsand

financeunderEdwardI(London,1972),ch.13

Renouard,Y.,‘L’ordredelaJarretièreetl’ordredel’Etoile.Etudesurlagenèsedesordreslaïcsdechevalerieetsurledéveloppementprogressifdeleurcaractèrenational’,M.A.,55(1949),281–300

Rogers,A.,‘HotonversusShakell:aransomcaseinthecourtofchivalry,1390–5’,

NottinghamMedievalStudies,6(1962),74–108;7(1963),53–78

Saul,A.,‘GreatYarmouthandtheHundredYearsWarinthefourteenthcentury’,B.I.H.R.,52(1979),105–15

Saul,N,Knightsandesquires:theGloucestershiregentryinthefourteenthcentury(Oxford,1981)

Scammell,J.,‘RobertIandthenorthofEngland’,E.H.R.,73(1958),385–403

Sherborne,J.W.,Theportof

BristolintheMiddleAges(Bristol,1965)

Strayer,J.R.,‘Thecostsandprofitsofwar:theAnglo-Frenchconflictof1294–1303’,Themedievalcity,ed.H.A.Miskimin,D.HerlihyandA.L.Udovitch(NewHaven:London,1977),pp.269–91

Tuck,J.A.,‘Northumbriansocietyinthefourteenthcentury’,NorthernHistory,6(1971),22–39

‘Warandsocietyinthemedievalnorth’,NorthernHistory,21(1985),33–52

Vale,M.G.A.,Warandchivalry.WarfareandaristocraticcultureinEngland,FranceandBurgundyattheendoftheMiddleAges(London,1981)

‘Afourteenth-centuryorderofchivalry:the“Tiercelet”’,E.H.R.,82(1967),332–41

‘WarfareandthelifeoftheFrenchandBurgundiannobilityinthelatemiddleages’,

AdeligeSachkulturdesSpätmittelalters.OsterreichischeAkademiederWissenschaften.Philosophisch-HistorischeKlasse(Vienna,1982),pp.169–94

Wright,N.A.R.,‘Ransomsofnon-combatantsduringtheHundredYearsWar’,J.Med.H.,17(1991),323–32

6WAR,PEOPLE,ANDNATION

Barber,R.,ThelifeandcampaignsoftheBlackPrince(Woodbridge,1986)

Barnie,J.,Warinmedievalsociety.SocialvaluesandtheHundredyearsWar,1337–99(London,1974)

Bean,R.,‘Warandthebirthofthe

nationstate’,JournalofEconomicHistory,33(1973),203–21

Beaune,C,NaissancedelanationFrance(Paris,1985):Englishtrans.,Thebirthofanideology.MythsandsymbolsofnationinlatemedievalFrance(Berkeley,1991)

Bellamy,J.G.,ThelawoftreasoninEnglandinthelaterMiddleAges(Cambridge,1970)

Bossuat,A.,‘L’idéedenationetlajurisprudenceduParlement

deParisauxvesiècle’,R.H.,204(1950),54–61

Bryant,L.M.,‘Lacérémoniedel’entréeàParisaumoyenâge,Annales,41(1986),513–42

Contamine,P.,‘Aperçussurlapropagandedeguerre,delafinduXlleaudébutduXVesiècle:lesCroisades,laguerredeCentAns’,Leformedellapropagandapoliticaneldueeneltrecento,ed.P.Cammarosano(Rome,1994),pp.5–27

Cuttler,S.H.,Thelawoftreason

andtreasontrialsinlatermedievalFrance(Cambridge,1981)

‘Apatriotforwhom?ThetreasonofSaint-Pol,1474–75’,H.T.,37(January,1987),43–8

Daly,K.,‘ArareiconographiethemeinaBodleianLibrary

manuscript:anillustrationoftheReditusregniadstirpemKarolimagniinMSBodley968’,BodleianLibraryRecord,11(1982–5),371–81

Duncan,A.A.M.,TheScotsnationandtheDeclarationofArbroath(London,1970)

Edwards,J.G.,‘ThetreasonofThomasTurberville,1298’,EssaysinmedievalhistorypresentedtoF.M.Powicke,ed.R.W.Hunt,W.A.Pantin,andR.W.Southern(Oxford,1948),pp.296–309

Ferguson,J.,TheDeclarationofArbroath(Edinburgh,n.d.)

Fowler,K.A.,‘NewsfromtheIront.Lettersanddespatchesofthefourteenthcentury’,GuerreetsociétéenFrance,enAngleterreetenBourgogne,xive–xvesiècle,ed.P.Contamine,C.Giry-DeloisonandM.Keen(Lille,1991),pp.63–92

Galbraith,V.H.,‘NationalityandlanguageinmedievalEngland’,T.R.Hist.S.,fourthseries,23(1941),113–28;

reprintedintheauthor’sKingsandchroniclers.EssaysinEnglishmedievalhistory(London,1982),ch.14

Genet,J.-P.,‘Englishnationalism:ThomasPoltonatthecouncilofConstance’,NottinghamMedievalStudies,28(1984),60–78

Giesey,R.E.,‘ThejuristicbasisofthedynasticrighttotheFrenchthrone’,TransactionsoftheAmericanPhilosophicalSociety,new

series,51(5)(1961)Gransden,A.,Historicalwritingin

England,II:c.1307totheearlysixteenthcentury(London,1982)

‘PropagandainEnglishmedievalhistoriography’,J.Med.H.,I(1975),363–82

‘TheusesmadeofhistorybythekingsofmedievalEngland’,Cultureetidéologiedanslagenèsedel’étatmoderne(Collectiondel’écolefrançaisedeRome,82,1985),pp.463–78

Grévy-Pons,N.,‘PropagandeetsentimentnationalpendantlerègnedeChairesVI:l’exempledeJeandeMontreuil’,Francia,8(1979),127–45

Griffiths,R.A.,‘EdwardI,ScotlandandthechroniclesofEnglishreligioushouses’,JournaloftheSocietyofArchivists,6(1979),191–9

Grosjean,G.,Lesentimentnationaldanslaguerredecentans(Paris,1928)

Guenée,B.,Statesandrulersin

latermedievalEurope(Oxford,1985)

‘EtatetnationenFranceaumoyenâge’,R.H.,237(1967),17–30

‘LescampagnesdelettresquiontsuivilemeurtredeJeansans

Peur,ducdeBourgogne(septembre1419-février1420)’,Annuaire-bulletindelaSociétédel’HistoiredeFrance,1993,pp.45–65

Haines,R.M.,‘Church,societyandpoliticsintheearlyfifteenthcenturyasviewedfromanEnglishpulpit’,

Church,society,andpolitics,ed.D.G.Baker(Oxford,1975),pp.143–57

‘“Ourmastermariner,oursovereignlord”:acontemporarypreacher’sviewofKingHenryV,MedievalStudies,38,(1976),85–96

Hallam,E.M.,CapetainFrance,987–1328(London,1980)

‘PhiliptheFairandthecultofSaintLouis’,Religionandnationalidentity,ed.S.Mews(Oxford,1982),pp.201–14

Hay,D.,‘HistoryandhistoriansinFranceandEnglandduring

thefifteenthcentury’,B.I.H.R.,35(1962),111–27

Hewitt,H.J.,TheorganizationofwarunderEdwardIII,1338–62(Manchester,1966),ch.7

Huizinga,J.,‘PatriotismandnationalisminEuropeanhistory’,Menandideas.History,theMiddleAges,theRenaissance(London,1960),pp.97–155

Jones,M.C.E.,‘“Monpaysetmanation”:Bretonidentityinthefourteenthcentury’,War,literatureandpoliticsinthe

lateMiddleAges,ed.C.T.Allmand(Liverpool,1976),pp.144–68

‘“Bonsbretonsetbonsfrancoys”:thelanguageandmeaningoftreasoninlatermedievalFrance’,T.R.Hist.S.,fifthseries,32(1982),91–112

Keeny,B.C,‘MilitaryserviceandthedevelopmentofnationalisminEngland,1272–1327’,Speculum,22(1947),534–49

Kirkland,D.,‘ThegrowthofnationalsentimentinFrancebeforethefourteenthcentury’,History,23(1938–39),12–24

Lewis,P.S.,‘Twopiecesoffifteenth-centurypoliticaliconography’,J.WC.I.,27(1964),317–20

‘Warpropagandaandhistoriographyinfifteenth-centuryFranceandEngland’,T.R.Hist.S.,fifthseries,15(1965),1–21

[Theabove-listedarticlesarereprintedintheauthor’sEssaysin

latermedievalFrenchhistory(London,1985)]

McHardy,A.K.,‘LiturgyandpropagandainthedioceseofLincolnduringtheHundredYearsWar’,Religionandnationalidentity,ed.S.Mews(Oxford,1982),pp.215–27

‘TheEnglishclergy

andtheHundredYearsWar’,Thechurchandwar,ed.W.J.Sheils(Oxford,1983),pp.171–8

‘Religiousritualandpoliticalpersuasion:thecaseofEnglandinthe

HundredYearsWar’,InternationalJournalofMoralandSocialStudies,3(1988),41–57

McKenna,J.W,‘HenryVIofEnglandandthedualmonarchy:aspectsofroyal

politicalpropaganda,1422–1432’,J.W.C.I.,28(1965),145–62

‘HowGodbecameanEnglishman’,Tudorruleandrevolution.EssaysforG.R.EltonfromhisAmericanfriends,ed.D.J.GuthandJ.W.McKenna(Cambridge,1982),pp.25–43

Ormrod,W.M.,‘ThedomesticresponsetotheHundredYearsWar’,Arms,armiesfortificationsintheHundredYearsWar,ed.A.CurryandM.Hughes(Woodbridge,1994),pp.83–101

Owst,G.R.,PreachinginmedievalEngland.Anintroductiontosermonmanuscriptsoftheperiodc.1350–1450(Cambridge,1926;repr.NewYork,1965)

Literatureandthe

pulpitinmedievalEngland(Cambridge,1933;repr.Oxford,1961)

Pons,N.,‘Lapropagandedeguerrefrançaiseavantl’apparitiondeJeanned’Arc’,JournaldesSavants(1982),191–214

‘Laguerredecentansvueparquelques

polémistesfrançaisduXVesiècle’,GuerreetsociétéenFrance,enAngleterreetenBourgogne,xive–xvesiècle,ed.P.Contamine,C.Giry-DeloisonandM.Keen(Lille,1991),pp.143–69

‘IntellectualpatternsandaffectivereactionsindefenceofthedauphinCharles,1419–1422’,War,governmentandpowerinlatemedievalFrance,ed.C.Allmand(Liverpool,2000),pp.54–69

Post,G.,‘TwonotesonnationalismintheMiddleAges’,Traditio,9(1953),281–320

Prince,A.E.,‘AletterofEdward,theBlackPrince,describingthebattleofNajerain1367’,E.H.R.,41(1926),415–18

Richardson,M.,‘HenryV,theEnglishchancery,andchanceryEnglish’,Speculum,55(1980),726–50

Rickard,P.,BritaininmedievalFrenchliterature(Cambridge,1956)

Robbins,R.H.(ed.),HistoricalpoemsoftheXIVthandXVthcenturie(NewYork,1959)

Rowe,B.J.H.,‘KingHenryVI’sclaimtoFrance:inpictureandpoem’,TheLibrary,fourthseries,13(1932),77–88

Scattergood,V.J.,Politicsandpoetryinthefifteenthcentury(London,1971),ch.3

Spiegel,G.M.,‘“Defenseoftherealm”:evolutionofaCapetianpropagandaslogan’,J.Med.H.,3(1977),115–33

Stones,E.L.G.,andSimpson,G.G.,EdwardIandthethroneofScotland,1290–1296(2vols.,Oxford,1978)

Stones,E.L.G.,‘EnglishchroniclersandtheaffairsofScotland,1286–1296’,ThewritingofhistoryintheMiddleAges.EssayspresentedtoR.WSouthern,ed.R.H.C.Davies,J.M.Wallace-Hadrill,R.J.A.I.CattoandM.H.Keen(Oxford,1981),pp.323–48

Strayer,J.R.,‘Defenseofthe

realmandroyalpowerinFrance’,StudiinonorediGinoLuzzato(Milan,1949),1,289–96

‘France:theholyland,thechosenpeople,andthemostChristianking’,ActionandconvictioninearlymodernEurope.Essaysinmemoryof

E.H.Harbison,ed.T.K.RabbandJ.E.Seigel(Princeton,1968),pp.3–16

[Theabove-listedarticlesarereprintedintheauthor’sMedievalstatecraftandtheperspectivesofhistory

(Princeton,1971)]

Styles,D,andAllmand,C.T.,‘ThecoronationsofHenryVI’,H.T.,32(May,1982),28–33

Taylor,E,andRoskellJ.S.,GestaHenriciQuinti:thedeedsofHenryV(Oxford,1975)

Tout,T.F.,‘TheEnglishParliamentandpublicopinion,1376–1388’,ThecollectedpapersofT.F.Tout(Manchester,1934),II,173–90

Warner,G.(ed.),TheLibelleof

EnglyshePolyeye.Apoemontheuseofseapower1436(Oxford,1926)

Wright,T.,PoliticalpoemsandsongsrelatingtoEnglishhistorycomposedduringtheperiodfromtheaccessionofEdwardIIItothatofRichardIII(2vols.,R.S.,London,1859–61)

7WARANDLITERATURE

Allmand,C,‘France-AngleterreàlafindelaguerredeCent

Ans:leBokeofNoblessedeWilliamWorcester’,LaFranceanglaiseaumoyenâge(Paris,1988),pp.103–111

‘Entrehonneuretbiencommun:letémoignageduJouvencelauXVesiècle’,R.H.,301(1999),463–81

‘Somewritersandthethemeofwarinthefourteenthandfifteenthcenturies’,KriegimMittelalter,ed.H.-H.Kortüm(Berlin,2001),pp.167–80

Allmand,C.andKeen.M.,‘Historyandtheliteratureof

war:theBokeofNoblesseofWilliamWorcester’,War,governmentandpowerinlatemedievalFrance,ed.C.Allmand(Liverpool,2000),pp.92–105

Barnie,J.,Warinmedievalsociety.SocialvaluesandtheHundredYearsWar(London,1974),ch.5

Bayley,C.C.(ed.),WarandsocietyinRenaissanceFlorence.TheDeMilitiaofLeonardoBruni(Toronto,1961)

Birdsall,J.andNewhall,R.A.(trans.),ThechronicleofJeandeVenette(NewYork,1953)

Blayney,M.(ed.),Fifteenth-centuryEnglishtranslationsofAlainChartier’s(LetraitédeL’espérance’and‘Lequadrilogueinvectif’(E.E.T.S.,London,1974)

Bornstein,D.(ed.),ThemiddleEnglishtranslationofChristinedePisan’s‘Livreducorpsdepolicie’(Heidelberg,1977)

Byles,A.T.P.(ed.),Thebookof

theordreofchyualryofWilliamCaxton(E.E.T.S.,London,1926)

ChristinedePisan,Thebookoffayttesofarmesandofchyualrye(E.E.T.S.,London,1932)

Coleman,J.,Englishliteratureinhistory,1350–1400.Medievalreadersandwriters(London,1981)

‘Apoliticalanalysisofliteraryworks

c.1280–1400:ideologyandperceptionof“TheState”inEngland’,Cultureetidéologiedanslagenèsedel’étatmoderne(Collectiondel’écolefrançaisedeRome,82,1985),pp.433–62

Coopland,G.W.(trans.),TheTreeofBattlesofHonoréBonet(Liverpool,1949)

PhilippedeMézières,Lesongeduvieilpèlerin(2vols.,Cambridge,1969)

PhilippedeMézières,Letterto

kingRichardII.Apleamadein1395forpeacebetweenEnglandandFrance(Liverpool,1975)

Coulton,G.G.,ThechroniclerofEuropeanchivalry(London,1930)

Daly,K.,‘HistoireetpolitiqueàlafindelaguerredeCentAns:l’AbrégédesChroniquesdeNoëldeFribois’,LaFrance

anglaiseaumoyenâge(Paris,1988),pp.91–101

Droz,E.(ed.),AlainChartier,Lequadrilogueinvectif(2ndedn,Paris,1950)

Dyboski,R.,andArend,Z.M.(eds.),Knyghthoodandbataile(E.E.T.S.,London,1935)

Fowler,K.A.,‘Froissart,chroniclerofchivalry’,H.T.,36(May,1986),50–4

Gauvard,C,‘ChristinedePisan,a-t-elleeuuneidéepolitique?’,R.H.,250(1973),417–30

Grévy-Pons,N.,Ornato,E.,andOuy,G.(eds.),JeandeMontreuil,Opera.II:l’oeuvrehistoriqueetpolémique(Turin,1975);III:textesdivers(Paris,1981)

Guenée,B.,‘Laculturehistoriquedesnobles:lesuccèsdesFaitsdesromains(XIIIe–XVesiècles)’,Lanoblesseaumoyenâge.EssaisàlamémoiredeRobertBoutruche,ed.P.Contamine(Paris,1976),pp.261–88

James,T.B.andSimons,J.(eds),

ThepoemsofLaurenceMinot1332–1352(Exeter,1989)

Kaeuper,R.W.andKennedy,E.(eds),TheBookofChivalryofGeoffroideCharny(Philadelphia,1996)

Kilgour,R.L.,ThedeclineofchivalryasshownintheFrenchliteratureofthelateMiddleAges(Cambridge,Mass.,1937)

Kingsford,C.L.,Englishhistoricalliteratureinthefifteenthcentury(Oxford,1913)

Lalande,D.(ed.),Lelivredesfais

dubonmessireJeanleMaingre,ditBouciquaut,mareschaldeFranceetgouverneurdeJennes(Paris:Geneva,1985)

Lewis,P.S.,‘JeanJuvénaldesUrsinsandthecommonliteraryattitudetowardstyrannyinfifteenth-centuryFrance’,MediumAevum,34(1965),103–21;reprintedintheauthor’sEssaysinlatermedievalFrenchhistory(London,1985),pp.169–87

Lewis,P.S.(ed.),Ecritspolitiques

deJeanJuvénaldesUrsins(S.H.F.3vols.,Paris1978–1992)

Muir,L.R.,LiteratureandsocietyinmedievalFrance.Themirrorandtheimage,1100–1500(London,1985)

Palmer,J.J.N.(ed.),Froissart:historian(Woodbridge:Totowa,1981)

Pons,N.(ed.)“L’honneurdelacouronnedeFrance”(S.H.F.,Paris,1990)

Pope,A.K.,andLodge,E.C.(eds.),LifeoftheBlack

PrincebytheheraldofSirJohnChandos(Oxford,1910)

Robbins,R.H.(ed.),HistoricalpoemsoftheXIVthandXVthcenturies(NewYork,1959)

Scattergood,V.J.,Politicsandpoetryinthefifteenthcentury(London,1971)

Vale,M.G.A.,Warandchivalry.WarfareandaristocraticcultureinEngland,FranceandBurgundyattheendoftheMiddleAges(London,1981)

Willard,S.andC.C.(trans,and

ed.),ChristinedePizan,Thebookofdeedsofarmsandofchivalry(UniversityPark,Pennsylvania,1999)

CONCLUSION

Allmand,C.T.,LancastrianNormandy,1415–1450.Thehistoryofamedievaloccupation(Oxford,1983),ch.11

‘Theaftermathof

warinfifteenth-centuryFrance’,History,61(1976),344–57

‘LocalreactiontotheFrenchreconquestofNormandy:thecaseofRouen’,Thecrownandlocalcommunities

inEnglandandFranceinthefifteenthcentury,ed.J.R.L.HighfieldandR.Jeffs(Gloucester,1981),pp.146–61

Bossuat,A.,‘There-establishmentofpeaceinsocietyduringthereignofCharlesVII’,TherecoveryofFranceinthefifteenthcentury,ed.P.S.

Lewis(NewYork:London,1971),pp.60–81

Chevalier,B.,‘TherecoveryofFrance,1450–1520’,NewCambridgeMedievalHistory.VII.TheFifteenthCentury,ed.C.Allmand(Cambridge,1998),pp.408–30

Chevalier,B.,andContamine,P.(eds.),LaFrancedelafinduXVesiècle:renouveauetapogée(Paris,1985)

Harris,R.,ValoisGuyenne.Astudyofpolitics,governmentandsocietyinlatemedieval

France(Woodbridge,1994)Jones,M.C.E.,‘Alcune

conseguenzepolitichedellaguerradeicentanni:lostatoBretoneallafinedelmedievo’,Medievo.Saggierassegne,22(1998),219–32

Keen,M.,‘TheendoftheHundredYearsWar:LancastrianFranceandLancastrianEngland’,Englandandherneighbours,1066–1453.EssaysinhonourofPierreChaplais,ed.M.C.E.JonesandM.G.A.Vale(London:

Ronceverte,1989),pp.297–311

LareconstructionaprèslaguerredeCentAns.Actesdu104econgrèsnationaldessociétéssavantes,Bordeaux,1980(Paris,1981)

Lartigaut,J.,LescampagnesduQuercyaprèslaguerredeCentAns(Vers1440–vers1500),(Toulouse,1978)

Lewis,P.S.,TherecoveryofFranceinthefifteenthcentury(NewYork:London,1971)

Vale,M.G.A.,‘TheendandaftermathoftheHundredYearsWar’,EnglandandEurope,1066–1453,ed.N.Saul(London,1994),pp.151–62

INDEXAgainsttheKing’sTaxes,160Agen,Processof(1332–3),10Agenais,10Agincourt

battleof(1415),28,39,54,62–3,71,95,133,136,138,152

‘Carol’,140

aides,110,148Aigues-Mortes,82Albion,144Albret,lordof,22,129AlexandertheGreat,163ambassadors,117–18Amiens,10Andrew,St,145Angevinempire,7,11,28Angoulême,22Anjou,duchyof,7–8,16,18,28,32–3,57

seealsoLouis;Margaret;René

‘Annales’school,1AntoninoofFlorence,St,41Aquinas,Thomas,St,38,163Aquitaine

duchyof,7–10,12,14,16,18–19,22–3,25–8,35–6,39,58,83,96,102,105,113,

116–17,122

confiscationof,22

dukeof,9,11,25,39

princeof,21

seealsoEleanorofAquitaine;Johnof

Gaunt

Aragon,102archery,practiceof,52‘Archpriest’,the,seeCervoleArmagnac,Jeand’,22Armagnacs,51,122armies,58ff,147,166

arrière-ban,93,95

Breton,166

Burgundian,166

English,59,63,92ff,166

feudallevies,92–3

Flemish,58

French,56,61,63–4,67,69–70,72–3,

75–6,92–3,95–6

permanent,166,168–9

Scottish,32,63,166

Swiss,58

armour,61,66,101

arms

arrowheads,101

arrows,99,101

bolts,99

bows,28,59,61–2,99,101

crossbows,49

feathers,99,101

lances,99

longbows,59

shields,99

siegeengines,77,

99

slings,100

strings,101

seealsoartillery;KeeperoftheKing’sArms

Arras,congressof(1435),34

artillery,28,36,49,66ff,76–7,79–82,86,88,99–100,166

seealsoBureau;Byker;Flavy;Hire,La;‘Lion’

Artois,Robertof,12Arundel,Richard,earlof,46AssizeofArms(1181),52Atlanticseaboard,83Audley,SirJames,133–4Augustine,St,37,40–1

Auray,battleof(1364),20,23,133Austria,duchyof,137

seealsoLeopold

Auvergne,124Auvergne,Pierred’,104Auxerre,treatyof(1412),27Avignon,14,24,78

Baille,Pierre,130baillis,98Balladecontrelesanglais(1429),140

ballads,140

seealsoAgincourt‘Carol’;songs;verses

Balliol,Edward,titularkingofScots,12,64

Balticports,83,121Barbour,John,68Basin,Thomas,124,150,169bastide,9battles,55,60,65

seealsoAgincourt;Auray;Baugé;Brignais;Castillon;Cocherel;Courtrai;Cravant;Crécy;Falkirk;Formigny;HalidonHill;Jargeau;MaesMoydog;Marignano;Montiel;Morgarten;Nájera;

Neville’sCross;Nicopolis;Patay;Poitiers;Rochelle,La;Seine;Sluys;Verneuil

Baugé,battleof(1421),32,57Baux,Amielde,75Bayonne,9,25,89,142Béarn,vicomteof,seeFébusBeaufort,Henry,cardinal,106Beauvais,158–9Beauvais,Vincentof,163Bedford,John,dukeof,28,32–3,

51,71,89,100Bekynton,Thomas,117Benedictinemonks,48,141Berkeley,Thomas,lord,162Berry,Jean,dukeof,27,70Berwick-on-Tweed,12,60,79Biscay,Bayof,82BlackDeath,16,78,121BlackPrince,seeEdwardBloch,Marc,143blockade,16,28,79,84,86,97

seealsotactics;

siegewarfare

Blois,seeCharlesBodiamCastle,82Bologna,22Bonet,seeBouvetBonifaceVIII,Pope,107booty,17,47,50,55,128,170

seealsobutiniers

Bordeaux,8–9,17,21,23,25,27,36,80,89,122–3

Bordelais,125Bouciquaut,seeMaingre

author,152,157,159,162

Boulogne,82Bourbon,Bastardof,66Bourbon,dukeof,27‘BourgeoisdeParis’,the,122,150,152

seealsoParisian

Journal

Bourges,130

treatyof(1412),27–8

Bouteillier,Guyle,47Bouvet(Bonet),Honore’,48,51,53,113,128,155–7,159,163

TreeofBattles,51,

155–6,163

Bradwardine,Thomas,39Brest,14,142Brétigny,treatyof(1360),18–20,23,28,30–1,56,74,83,105,116–17,149

seealso‘GreatPeace’

Brienne,Jeande,countofEu,162Brignais,battleof(1362),20,55

Brinton,Thomas,bishopofRochester,41,53,138

Bristol,122–3,171

seealsoGracedieu

Britain,68Brittany,12,14,16,20,23,25,62,74,82–3,85,124,135,142,145

dukesof,11,23,85,166

seealsoJohnIIIandIV;Montfortists

Bromyard,John,48,106brothers-in-arms,129Bruce,Robert,60,68Bruges,12Brut,The,chronicle,66,80Brutus,144Buckingham,Thomas,earlof,24Bueil,Jeande,43,133Bunbury,132Bureaubrothers,100

Burgundians,30–1,34Burgundy

duchyof,31,33–4

dukesof,11,83

seealsoCharles;John;Philip

BuryStEdmunds,153butiniers,128

seealsobooty

Byker,familyof,100

Caen,15,29,76,78,80,100,122,130

Caesar,Julius,45Caistor,132Calais,16,18,25,28,34,36,47,85,97–8,105,138

siegeof(1346–7),16,61,79,86,98

treatyof(1360),18

Calveley,SirHugh,71,75,132–4Cambrai,80Cambridge,116

King’sHallat,116

cannon,seeartilleryCanterbury,80–1Capetiandynasty,7,11,17,104Cardaillac,Jeande,42n

Liberregalis(1367),42n

Carmelitefriar,48Castile,21,75

divisionofbootyin,128

galleyfleetof,21,23,84

kingof,seePeter

Castillon,battleof(1453),36,58,66

Catherine,queenofEngland,28,30–1

Caudebec,124Caxton,William,163centième,107Cervole,Arnaudde,the‘Archpriest’,75

‘Cessentacausa,…’(principleof),104

Chabannes,Antoinede,76

Chamber,109,118Champagne,124Chandos,SirJohn,134Channel,7,15,25,27,64,83–4,88–90,123,125

Charente,river,25Charlemagne,emperor,143–4,146

as‘SaintCharles’,143,146

CharlesIV,kingofFrance,9,10,168

CharlesV(asdauphin),17–18

kingofFrance,20,22–3,64,70,86,89,95–6,107,113,134,143–4,146,162

CharlesVI,kingofFrance,24,26–7,30,32,103,110,143,148,168

CharlesVII(asdauphin),29–30,33–4,124

kingofFrance,33–6,46,57–8,63,69,72–3,76,84,96,100,103,122,130,138,143,146,148,150,154,160–1,168–9

CharlesVIII,kingofFrance,67Charles,kingofNavarre,17,19–21,23

Charles,countofValois,10CharlesdeBlois,14,16,20

Charles‘theBold’,dukeofBurgundy,66,158,163,166

Charles,dukeofOrléans,27–8Charny,Geoffroide,42

Livredechevalerie,42

Chartier,Alain,3,44,141,154,159

Quadrilogue

invectif(1422),44,159

Chartier,Jean,146Chartres,122Château-Gaillard,76Châteauvillain,Guillaumede,46,130

Chaucer,Geoffrey,25,153–4

TaleofMelibee,154

Cherbourg,29,79,84Cheshire,101,132chevauchée,15,17,22,29,54–6,67,78

seealsotactics

chivalry,41–2,45,48,133–5,157–8

seealsocourt

cinquantième,107

CinquePorts,85Clarence,Thomas,dukeof,27,32ClementVI,Pope,14Clisson,OlivierIIIde,149ClosdesGalées,86–7,89

seealsoships

clothtrade,12,121–2

seealsowool

Clovis(St),kingoftheFranks,

137,146coastaldefence,85

seealsomaritimelands

coastlines,12,14,19,23–5,82–3,89,105,108

Cocherel,battleof(1364),20Coel,king,145Coeur,Jacques,130Colchester,111‘collaboration’,150

collaterali,94commemorations,40,138commissionsofarray,92,99commongood,41,44,52–4,72,77,94,103,105,109,111,113,115,133,147,149–50,154–7,159,163

communispatria,147Commynes,Philippede,55,117–18,158,169

Companies,The,46,48,73–5,79,105,110,124,156

Company,TheWhite,74

seealsocondottieri;‘Ecorcheurs’;mercenaries;routiers

Compiègne,34condotta,94

seealsoindenture;lettrederetenue

condottieri,73,91,162

seealsoCompanies;mercenaries;routiers

ConfessioAmantis,seeGowerconfiscation,9,11–12,19,22,29,31,46,57,115,124,130

constable,50,113–14

ofFrance,134

seealsomarshal;militarycourts

Constantine,emperor,145Contamine,P.,2CoolingCastle,82coronation,138,143CorpusChristiprocessions,143Couesnon,river,142countryside,effectsofwaron,121,123–5

courdesaides,108courtofAdmiralty,112CourtofChivalry,129

Courtecuisse,Jeande,123Courtrai,battleof(1302),58Cravant,battleof(1423),33,57,76

Crécy-en-Ponthieu,battleof(1346),15–17,19,22,39,42,54–5,61–3,65–6,69,78

Crockart(routier),135cross

red(English),150

StAndrew’s

(Burgundian),150

white(French),150

Crotoy,Le,63,84Crusades,6,25,41,74

Dagworth,SirThomas,16,71dauphin,seeCharlesV;CharlesVII;LouisXI

DavidII,kingofScots,12,16,128debasementofcoinage,106,124,126,167–8

Débatdeshérautsd’armes,Le,43,

86–7DebateoftheHorse,GooseandSheep,seeLydgate

DeclarationofArbroath(1320),145

Decretum,seeGratiandefence,24,92–3,103ff,147–8,170

DemiserabilistaturegniFrancie(1357);seeMonte-Belluna

Denia,countof,129Deregimineprincipum,seeGilesofRome

Deremilitari,seeVegetiusDeschamps,Eustache,140,154

deserters,50desertion,115Despenser,Henry,bishopofNorwich,24

Dieppe,35,84,103,122Digest,seeJustinianDijon,31,80,110diplomacy,9–10,14,16,18–19,23,25–8,30–1,34–5,55–6,116–19

discipline,49–50,97,111,113–14,157

seealsoorder

Dominicanfriars,38,48,106,143Dorset,122

Thomas,earlof,97

Dover,16

seealsoStraits

Durand,Guillaume,147Durham,16,113

Ecluse,L’,seeSluys

‘Ecorcheurs’,74Edward,BlackPrince,15,17,19,21–3,41–2,55,68,70,75,78,134,138

EdwardtheConfessor,146Edward,I,kingofEngland,9,12,37,46,59–60,64,87,98,102,107,122,157,162,171–2

EdwardII,kingofEngland,9–10,59,87,116,172

EdwardIII,kingofEngland,10–19,21–3,25,30,39,42,47,52,57,64,70,77–8,85–6,89–90,92,95–6,98–100,105–6,109,117,122–3,126,130,133,140–

1,159,162,164EdwardIV,kingofEngland,90

seealsoYork,Edward,dukeof

EleanorofAquitaine,7élections,108élus,108embassies,117England,enemyattacksupon,16,23,25–6,89,105,122,126

Englishmen,73–4

entréeroyale,143–4epidemics,165

seealsoBlackDeath;plague

Espailly,Jacquesd’,seeForte-Epice

Esplechin,truceof,13estates,regional,110,126,142,168

Eu,seeBrienneEvreux,countof,17

Exchequer,109,172

Factaetdictamemorabilia,seeValeriusMaximus

Faisdesrommains,162Falaise,29,80Falkirk,battleof(1298),59famine,6,16,120Fastolf,SirJohn,47,115,129,131–2,134,162,164,171

Fébus,Gaston,80Ferté-Bernard,La,115‘FinalPeace’(1420),31

seealsoTroyes

fiscalinstitutions,108–11,148

seealsocourdesaides;élections;élus;Exchequer;grenetiers;treasurerforwar;trésorierdesguerres

fishermen,23,90

fishing,12,83,85,88,123,170

boats,83

Flanders,9,12–13,25,46,83,102,120–2

seealsoLouis,countofFlanders

Flavy,Guillaumede,76

cannon,76

fleets,13,21

seealsogalleys;navalforces;navalwarfare

Fleming,Richard,bishopofLincoln,139

Flemings,13,58,73,83fleurdelys,143–4

Florence,74,91,134,137,159

seealsoAntonino

football,52ForestofDean,101Formigny,battleof(1450),36,40,58

Forte-Epice(Jacquesd’Espailly),76

Fortescue,SirJohn,38,90,167–8Forth,river,60fortifications,56,77ff

urban,55–6,77–82,103,110–11,121

castles,80–2

seealso‘villescloses’

Fortune

Dame,132

Wheelof,130

fouage,107francs-archers,96,148,171FrenchRevolution,107Frenchmen,73Fribois,Noëlde,146Froissart,Jeande,15,42–3,47–8,50,65,77,129,133–4,140,151–2,156,162

frontiers,2256,61,63,72,142,149,155

Frontinus,Julius,68,162–3

Stratagemata,68,162

gabelle,107galleys,21,23,87,89garrisons,57,63,84–5,96–7,99,121,128

Garter,Knightsofthe,75,134

seealsoStMichael;Star

Gascons,61,171Gascony,74,122,171Gaul,144Gaunt,Johnof,22–3,25–6,75genealogies,137,145Genoa,82Genoese

crossbowmen,15,33,61,76

galleys,84

ship-builders,83

GeoffreyofMonmouth,145GeraldofWales,62Germans,73Germany,7,13,73,135,141,145Gerson,Jean,162Ghent,12,66GilesofRome,163

Deregimineprincipum,163

Gilles,Nicole,146Gloucester,Thomas,dukeof,129GlynDŵr,Owain,26Golein,Jean,145golf,52Gower,John,25,44,153–4

ConfessioAmantis,44

Gracedieu,The,123

seealsoBristol

Grandtraité,147GrandeschroniquesdeFrance,146

Granville,84,87Gratian,38

Decretum(1140),38

‘GreatPeace’(1360),31

seealsoBrétigny

Greece,144grenetiers,108greniers,125Guesclin,Bertranddu,20–1,24,67–8,71,75,95,134,144

guetetgarde,46,93Guines,negotiationsat,16Guy,countofFlanders,9

Habsburgs,137Hainault,13

seealsoWilliam

‘half-peace’,34,57HalidonHill,battleof(1333),12,60

Handford,SirJohn,46Harcourt,Geoffroid’,15,17‘Harelle’(1382),126Harfleur,28,35,83–4,89,97,100,111

siegeof,28,57,79,83–4,86,136

harvests,120

‘HautPays’,122

seealsoBordeaux

Hawkwood,John,74,76,134Hawley,Robert,129Helena,145Henry,dukeofLancaster,17,89HenryII,kingofEngland,7HenryIII,kingofEngland,8,94,116

HenryIV,kingofEngland,26–7,70,89,100,136

HenryV,kingofEngland,27–33,

36,39,47,51,57,63,65,68,70–1,75,79–80,85–6,89–90,96–8,100,105–6,109,113,115–17,133,138,152,157–8,164

HenryVI,kingofEngland,32–6,39,46,59,65,71,75,96,117,136–8,164

seealsoTrastamara

heraldry,138heralds,43,50,134–5Herefordshire,26

Hewitt,H.J.,2Heytesbury,134Hire,La(EtiennedeVignolles),76

cannon,76

Historiaregumfrancorum,145–6historiographerroyal,146

oftheFrench,146

history,useof,144ffHoccleve,Thomas,48,141

homage,8,10Homet,Le,134honour,41–2,44,48,53,115,133,152

horses,45,58–61,94,101,109Hoton,John,129Hugh,prior,124Hull,130Hungerford,Walter,Lord,134

Iberia,91,141Iceland,123IledeFrance,82,124imprestanza,106

seealso‘prest’;prêt

indenture,94–6,101,113–15

seealsocondotta;lettrederetenue

InnocentVI,Pope,78Isabella,queenofEngland,9–10Isabella,daughterofCharlesVI,26,28

Isaiah,prophet,145Israel,138Italians,73Italy,67,73–6,81–2,91,94,102,121,138,141159

bankersof,126

citystatesof,6,74

juristsof,112

universitiesof,113

JamesII,kingofScots,100Jargeau,battleof(1429),33,136Jeanne(ofBrittany),14Jesse,Treeof,145JoanofArc,33–4,57John,kingofEngland,8,102JohnII,kingofFrance,16–20,28,30,42–3,56–7,69,111,127,135,138,146,161

seealsoransoms

JohnIII,dukeofBrittany,14JohnIV,dukeofBrittany,23JohndeMontfort,14John,dukeofBedford,seeBedford

John,dukeofBurgundy,27,29,31JohnofGaunt,seeGauntJosephofArimathea,145‘just’war,38justice(asacauseforwar),28,38–9,41–2

(Godas),39

Justinian,emperor,38

Digest,38

lawof,112

Keegan,J.,4Keeper

oftheKing’sArms,99

seealsoarms

oftheKing’sVictuals,97

ofPapalBulls,116

oftheProcesses,116

Kent,82

rebelsof,164

king(ascurator),103;(ascaput),147

KingsofEngland,The,seeLydgate

Knolles,SirRobert,22,71,75,129,134

Lalaing,Jacquesde,66Lancaster,seeGaunt;HenryLannoy,Ghillebertde,45law

canon,112,116,155

‘international’,113

military,50,112

seealsomilitarycourts

ofarms,156

ofJustinian,112

ofwar,49–50,156

roman(civil),112–13,116,147,155

leadership,50,52,56,67ff,74,96,158–9

LeopoldofAustria,58Lescot,Richard,146lèsemajesté,148

seealsotreason

LetterofOtheatoHector,seePisan

lettersofmarque,156lettrederetenue,94–5

seealsocondotta;indenture

LewisIV,emperor,13LibelleofEnglyshePolycye,The,85–6,123

Lille,80Lincoln,dioceseof,138–9‘Lion’(cannon),100Livredechevalerie,seeCharnyLivredesfaisd’armesetdechevalerie,seePisan

Livreducorpsdepolicie,seePisanLivy,45,163LlewelynapGruffydd,59Loire,river,33,57Lollards,25Lollardy,152London,18,36,57,101,107,122,129–30,138–9,145,164

seealsoStPaul’sCross;Tower

Longueville,countyof,134Loré,Ambroisede,76Lorraine,33LouisVII,kingofFrance,7LouisVIII,kingofFrance,82LouisIX(StLouis),kingofFrance,8,82,137,142–4,146

LouisXI(asdauphin),36

kingofFrance,

139,146

Louis,countofFlanders,12Louis,dukeofAnjou,70LowCountries,12–13,85Luke,St,145Lull,Ramon,44Lydgate,John,129,141,153–5,157

DebateoftheHorse,Gooseand

Sheep,154

KingsofEngland,The,141

Lyon,143Lyon,Jeande,100Lyon,Miletde,100

McFarlane,K.B.,131Maccabeus,Judas,39,158Machaut,Guillaumede,133,154MaesMoydog,battleof(1295),59

Maine,countyof,7–8,16,18,28,33,35–6,57,130

Maingre,Jeanle,ditBouciquaut,152,157,162

Mans,Le,36MargaretofAnjou,35Marignano,battleof(1515),45maritimelands,103Marsciano,Antonioda,162Marseille,82marshal,50,113–14

seealsoconstable;militarycourts

Matthew,St,145Meaux,siegeof(1421–22),32,100

Mediterranean,6,17,82–3MelcombeRegis,122mercenaries,48,52,73ff,134–5,159

Merovingiankings,146Meudon,Jeande,128Mézières,Philippede,25,44,74,113,154–5,157–8,160–1,163,169

Songeduvieil

pèlerin,44

Michael,St,orderof,48,146military

academy,53,73

courts,50,112,114

seealsoconstable;law;marshal

literature,37

seealsoVegetius

officers,seeconstable;marshal

ordinances,113

Minot,Laurence,140–1mining,79,81minstrels,139

‘Mirror’literature,163Molina,duchyof,134monarchy,142ffMonte-Belluna,Françoisde,44n

TragicumargumentumdemiserabilistaturegniFrancie,43,44n

Montereau,29,31Montfort,Johnde,14

Montfortists,20Montgomery,59Montiel,battleof(1369),21Montpellier,22Montreuil,Jeande,160–1Montreuil,Processof(1306),9Mont-Saint-Michel,63,82,142Moors,7,92,140Morbecque,SirDenisde,111Morgarten,battleof(1315),58Mortimer,SirEdmund,139murage,110musterandreview,63,101,114musterrolls,75

Nájera,battleof(1367),21,67nationstate,11,53,171nationalism,4,7,26,138–41,147–8,171

seealsocommunispatria;‘Propatriamori’;‘Pugnapropatria’

naval

forces,87–90

seealsofleets;galleys

policy,82–7

warfare,13,21,28,82ff

Navarre,21,74

seealsoCharles,kingofNavarre

Navarrese

army,20

party,17

Navarrette,seeNájeranecessity,doctrineof,148,168Neuss,163

Neville’sCross,battleof(1346),16,39,128

news,propagationof,139newsletters,139Nicopolis,battleof(1396),74NineWorthies,The,158nobility,43ff,63ff,69–75,87,135,148,170

Nogaret,Guillaume,143non-combatant(civilian),4,51,55–6,79,97,113,154,156

Norfolk,132Normandy,7–8,12,15,17–21,24,27–9,32–3,35–6,39,51,57,72,74,76,78,80,82–4,96–7,102,

104,122,124–6,130,138,142,150,159,164

dukesof,11,17

estatesof,126

NorthRiding,126Norwich,seeDespenser

Oise,river,84Oldhall,SirWilliam,171Oléron,117order,49,111ff

ordersofchivalry,43,48

seealsoGarter;StMichael;Star

ordinancesofwar,51,113Orgemont,Pierred’,146oriflamme,144Orléans,22,33–4,66Orléans,Charles,dukeof,27–8Orne,river,15Overton,Thomas,115Oxford,universityof,116

Page,John,51Pagula,Williamof,98PanetierduRoi,98papacy,10papalintervention,10,17,23Paris,8–9,11,15,18,24,29–30,32,34–5,82,84,101,111,122,142–3,171

appealsto,8–9

Bastille,101

Louvre,101

Muséedel’Armée,100

Notre-Dame,34

Parlement,3,8,30,47,53,72,112,115,129,141

SainteChapelle,143

treatyof(1259),116

Paris,sonofPriam,144ParisianJournal,51,152–3

seealso‘BourgeoisdeParis’

Parisii,tribe,144Parlement,seeParisParliament,24,65,85–6,105–7,111,115,138,167,172

Gloucester(1378),129

‘Good’(1376),23

Rollof,106

Paston,William,101

correspondence,130

Patay,battleof(1429),33peace,3,20–1,24–6,35,37,55,74,122,129,154–5,163

Peasants’Revolt(1381),24,129Peñafort,Raymondof,38Perigueux,103

Processof(1311),9

Perrote,familyof,130Perrote,Colin,130Perroy,E.,1Peter,‘theCruel’,kingofCastile,21

Peter,St,145PetitechroniquedeGuyenne,121PhilipII(Augustus),kingofFrance,8,82

PhilipIV(‘theFair’),kingofFrance,10–11,78,83,87,102,104,106–7,143,168

PhilipVI,kingofFrance,7,9–10,12–16,19,69,78,83,98,101,141

Philip(‘theBold’),dukeofBurgundy,25,70,75

Philip(‘theGood’),dukeofBurgundy,29–30,34,36,117

Picquigny,treatyof(1475),165Pieri,P.,1piracy,27,85,89–90,123,156Pisan,Christinede,3,33,47,81,154–5,159,163

LetterofOtheatoHector,47

Livredesfaisd’armesetdechevalerie,163

Livreducorpsdepolicie,163

plague,6,16,121–2,124–5

seealsoBlackDeath;epidemics

Plantagenets,104‘platpays’,60,121Poeke,66Poitiers,124

battleof(1356),17,19,22,40,42–3,54–5,62,69,93,95,111,124,133,138

Poitou,countyof,7–8,27–8,46Pole,Williamdela,130

Pole,Williamdela,dukeofSuffolk,136

Policraticus,seeSalisburypolltaxes,126Ponthieu,countyof,82Pontoise,69popes,seeBonifaceVIII,ClementVI;InnocentVI

population,effectsofwaron,124–5

seealsotowns

ports,12,35,82–5,87–9,101,

107–8,122Portugal

alliancewithEngland,117

tradewithEngland,123

Postan,M.M.,131Pouillet,Simon,149prayersforwar,138

‘prest’,106

seealsoprêt’,imprestanza

prêt,106Priam,kingofTroy,144prise,98

seealsoPanetierduRoi;purveyance

prisoners,16,19–21,23,49,55,76,94,111,113,131

PrivySealoffice,141profits(ofwar),47–8,55,94,128ff

propaganda,38,55,137–41

writersof,140–1

‘Propatriamori’,53provincialism,141–2,147provisioning,seesuppliesprovveditori,94public

good,seecommongood

money,52–3,108,115

opinion,58,138–40

‘Pugnapropatria’,53pulpit,useof,138–9Pulteney,SirJohn,130purveyance,88,98–9,171

Pyrenees,7,80

Quadrilogueinvectif,seeChartier

ransoms,46–7,49,113,130–2,170

ofDavidII,128

ofJohnII,18,28,105,108,127,148,168

rebellion,38–9

seealsotreason

rebels,31,38–9recruitment(ofarmies),64,70–1,92ff

Reims,18,34,78,110,147René,countofAnjou,46Rennes,siegeof(1370),79respublica,52,147,155

seealsocommon

good

restor,101Rhône,valleyofthe,20,124Ribemont,SirEustachede,133RichardII,kingofEngland,23–6,28,51,70,75,86,95,100,113,118,122,126,154–5

Richelieu,cardinalde,168Richmond,earldomof,14Roche-Guyon,La,47Rochelle,La,9,82–3

battleof(1372),23

Rochester,seeBrintonRoche-sur-Yon,La,siegeof(1369),79

Rodemack,Jeande,46,130Rodez,110Romans,157Rome,24,137,145

Capitol,159

emperorsof,145

womenof,159

seealsoFaisdesrommains

Rouen,17,24,29,34–5,51,78–80,83,86–7,89,98,121,124,126,138,143,164

seealsoClosdesGalées

Rousselle,Vigierdela,9route,71routiers,18,20,22,46,73,76,168

seealsoCompanies;condottieri;‘Ecorcheurs’;mercenaries

StAndrew,seecrossStDenis,bishopofParis,146

StDenis,abbeyof,134,143–4,146–7

StDenis,Johnof,116StGeorge,48

seealsoGarter

StLuke,gospelof,145StMatthew,gospelof,145StMichael,orderof,48,146

seealsoGarter;Star

StPaul’sCross,London,139StPeter,cited,145sailors,89,92,123Saint-Sardos,9Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte,134

siegeof(1375),79

Saliclaw,146Salisbury,Johnof,157,163

Policraticus,163

Salisbury,Thomas,earlof,33,66Sandwich,101Sanquerville,Guillaumede,143Saracens,51,153Schism,Great,24Schwyz,58Scotland,12,16,52,59–60,63,92,98,102,105,145,166

Scots,9,12,15–16,25–6,62,76,140–1,171

seealsoarmies;Balliol;Baugé;Bruce;

Cravant;DavidII;JamesII;Verneuilscutage,93

Seine,river,28,76,82–4battleofthe(1416),28,84,89

Selonnet,priorof,seeBouvetShakell,John,129Shakespeare,William,41

HenryV,41

ship-building,83,87ships

cogs,88

galleys,88–9

‘royal’,89

crews,89,123

requisitioningof,83,88–9

seealsoClosdesGalées

Shrewsbury,seeTalbotsiegewarfare,16,28–9,33,50,57,66,74,77,86,98,100,112

seealsoarms;

tactics

Sigismund,emperor-elect,16Sluys,battleof(1340),13,40,82,86,123

socialadvancement,129–35,171Soisson,66soldiers,15,17,28,59–67,91–4,101–2

imagesof,39,41,48–9,51–3,72,74–6,115,156–7,163,168

seealsoroutiers;wages

Somme,river,84Songeduvieilpèlerin,seeMézières

songs,139

seealsoAgincourt‘Carol’;ballads,verses

Southampton,80,101

shipyardat,86,90

sovereignty,14,16,18–19,22,35

symbolof,143

Spain,7,21,23,41,73–75,91,102,123,129,134,140

Spaniards,73,129spies,118,158Stafford,John,archbishopofCanterbury,13

Robert,115

‘staples’,125Star,orderof,42

seealsoGarter;StMichael

StatuteofWinchester(1285),52Stirling,castleat,60Straits(ofDover),16,85Stratagemata,seeFrontinusSuffolk,seePole

supplies,96ff,109

seealsoTowerofLondon

Surienne,Françoisde,75Sussex,82,122Swiss,66Switzerland,74Swynderby,William,25

tactics,15,54–63,68,123

Fabian,22,67

guerrilla,60

seealsoblockade;chevauchée;siegewarfare

taille,166Talbot,John,earlofShrewsbury,36,58,66

TaleofMelibee,seeChaucer

taxation,12,19,22,24,56,78,94,102–11,125–7,131,148,160–1,166–70

oppositionto,126

Teutonicknights,7‘thirds’,128Thomas,seeBerkeley;Buckingham;Clarence;Gloucester;Salisbury

Thucydides,6Toulouse,22Touraine,7–8,16,18,28

Tournai,13,101tournaments,43,50,52Tours,78,110

truceof(1444),35–6,74

TowerofLondon,16–17,86,99,101

seealsosupplies

towns,effectsofwaron,121–3

seealsopopulation

trade,85,87,90,122–3,170–1training,44,52,96,159Trastamara,countyof,134Trastamara,Henryof,21,42n,134treason,29,34,38,115,142,148–50,153

seealsolèsemajesté;rebellion;rebels

treasurerforwar,109,170

seealsotrésorierdesguerres

treaties,seeAuxerre;Bourges;Brétigny;Calais;Picquigny;Tours;Troyes

Tredington,Thomas,80TreeofBattles,seeBouvetTremolïle,Charlesdela,45,53Tremolïle,Georgesdela,46trésorierdesguerres,108

Seealsotreasurerforwar

Trojans,144–5Troy,144–5

New(TrojaNova),144

Troyes,30,34

treatyof,30–1,33–

4,57,117,124,150

seealso‘FinalPeace’

truce,26–7,34–5,57Tuition(orchardof),155

uniforms,101Upton,Nicholas,134–5urbancontingents,93Uri,58Ursins,JeanJuvénaldes,116,150,

154–5,157,160–1,168Usk,Adamof,139

ValeriusMaximus,45,68,162–3

Factaetdictamemorabilia,68,162

Valois,Charlesof,10Valois,countof,seePhilipVIValois,dynastyof,15,104,108,150

Vegetius,FlaviusRenatus,37,52,55,68,73,111,147,157–8,

162–3

Deremilitari,37,52,68,157,162

translationsof,37,157,162

Venette,Jeande,48,51,152Venice,91,94Verbruggen,J.F.,2Verneuil,battleof(1424),33,57,

66,76verses,137

seealsoAgincourt‘Carol’;ballads;songs

Vicomte,Renaudle,128victory(asdivinejudgement),28,138

seealsowar

Vignolles,Etiennede,seeHire,La

‘villescloses’,78

seealsofortifications

Vincennes,32Vincent,seeBeauvaisVowoftheHeron,141

wages,64,94–5,114,121,127Wales,16,26,59,61,101–2,145,171

seealsoGeraldofWales

Walsingham,Thomas,129‘WaltonOrdinances’,13,109war

aftermathof,164ff

aspunishment,40,44,138,160–1

ideason,37ff,55,150–1,154,157–8

knightlyattitudesto,41–3,87,157

oppositionto,25,153–4

Seealsovictory

warliterature,51,137,151ffWardrobe,99,109,118,172watchandward,seeguetetgardeWaurin,Jeande,157weather,effectsof,120–1,125–7,165

Welsh,59,139,171

archers,59

Westminster,111WilliamtheConqueror,7,137William,countofHainault,13Winchelsea,89,122

Windsor,royalchapelat,117winetrade,12,122–3,171wooltrade,12,108,120,126

seealsocloth

Worcester,William,159Wyclif,John,25,153

Xaintrailles,Potonde,76

Yarmouth,122Yevele,Henry,80–1York,145

York,Edward,dukeof,133York,Edward,dukeof(EdwardIV),164

seealsoEdwardIV

York,Richard,dukeof,164Ypres,13

Zwyn,river,13

CambridgeMedievalTextbooks

AlreadypublishedGermanyintheHighMiddle

Agesc.1050–1200HORSTFUHRMANN

TheHundredYearsWarEnglandandFranceatWarc.

1300-c.1450CHRISTOPHERALLMAND

StandardsofLivingintheLaterMiddleAges:

SocialChangeinEngland,c.1200–1520

CHRISTOPHERDYER

MagicintheMiddleAgesRICHARDKIECKHEFER

ThePapacy1073–1198:ContinuityandInnovation

I.S.ROBINSON

MedievalWalesDAVIDWALKER

EnglandintheReignofEdwardIII

SCOTTL.WAUGH

TheNormanKingdomofSicily

DONALDMATTHEW

PoliticalThoughtinEurope1250–1450

ANTONYBLACK

TheChurchinWesternEuropefromtheTenthtothe

EarlyTwelfthCentury

GERDTELLENBACHTranslatedbyTimothy

Reuter

TheMedievalSpainsBERNARDF.REILLY

EnglandintheThirteenthCentury

ALANHARDING

MonasticandReligiousOrdersinBritain1000–1300

JANETBURTON

ReligionandDevotioninEuropec.1215–c.1515R.N.SWANSON

MedievalRussia,980–1584

JANETMARTIN

TheWarsoftheRoses:PoliticsandtheConstitution

inEngland,c.1437–1509

CHRISTINECARPENTER

TheWaldensianDissent:PersecutionandSurvival,c.

1170–c.1570GABRIELAUDISIO

TranslatedbyClaireDavison

TheCrusades,c.1071–c.1291

JEANRICHARD

TranslatedbyJeanBirrellMedievalScotlandA.D.M.BARRELL

Othertitlesareinpreparation