The Historical Making of Collective Action: The Korean Peasant Uprisings of 1946

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The Historical Making of Collective Action: The Korean Peasant Uprisings of 1946Author(s): Gi-Wook ShinSource: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 99, No. 6 (May, 1994), pp. 1596-1624Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2782585 .

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The Historical Making of Collective Action:The Korean Peasant Uprisings of 1946'Gi-Wook ShinUniversity f owa

This article presents historical iew of collective ction with pe-cial attention o the role of protest xperience. t argues that prioraction develops a consciousness hat becomesa resource n future

action. However, this enhanced consciousness must be mobi-lized through protest rganization or action to occur. Data on123 counties n South Korea show that peasant uprisings n 1946were functions f the degree of peasant experience n protest-particularly enancy disputes n the 1930s-and the effectivenessof mobilization y people's committees. hese findings emonstratethe relevance of resource mobilization heory n an authoritarianThird World context.

In From Mobilization o Revolution, harles Tilly proposes hat he nextagenda for heories f collective ction nd social movement, articularlyresourcemobilization heory, s to build a historical model.According oTilly, the agenda should show "how a contender's ollective ction atone point n time changes he conditionswhich are relevant o the nextround of action," or more specifically, how the form, ntensity, ndoutcome f the action affect he contender's nterests, rganization, ndmobilization" 1978, pp. 229-30). Scholars of social movements avesince responded o his call: his own (1979) concept of "repertoires fcontention," arrow's 1988, 1989) "cyclesof protest," Golden's 1988)role of "historical memory," nd Taylor's (1989) argument or "socialmovement ontinuity" xemplify fforts o provide historical erspec-tive on collective ction and social movement.

l Earlier ersions f his rticle werepresented t the nnual meeting f heAmericanSociological ssociationAugust 992, Pittsburgh) nd at the emiannual meeting fthe Korean ociological ssociationJune 993, Ch'unch'6n, orea). am very rate-ful o Daniel Chirot, ruce Cumings, erbert . Costner, ae-On Kim, Charles W.Mueller, tephenG. Wieting, cott liason,EdwardLawler, nd theAJS reviewersfor heir elpful omments n earlier ersions. also thank Ko Jong-Wook orhisassistance.A professional evelopment und rom he Center or Asian and PacificStudies t the University f owa aided this project. Direct ll correspondenceoGi-Wook hin, Department f Sociology, niversity f owa, W140SSH,IowaCity,IA 52242.

? 1994by The University f Chicago.Allrights eserved.0002-9602/94/9906-0006$0 .50

1596 AJS Volume 99 Number 6 (May 1994): 1596-1624







Uprisings f 1946

This article further laborates he role of prior protest xperience nlater action. While generally greeing with resourcemobilization heory

that protest movements equire organization nd mobilization f re-sources, emphasize how prior collective ction contributes o move-ments by developing onsciousness whether lass, political, or collec-tive). Legitimate ritiques charge the theory went too far in nearlyabandoning the social-psychological nalyses" Klandermans 1984, p.584) and that t tends to confine he range of resources o external nessuch as "money, ccess to the media, and support rom owerful rgani-zations" Turner nd Killian 1987, p. 235). Emphasizing he historicalprocess of developing onsciousness nd the key role this consciousnessplays in collective ction mitigates uch weaknesses without etreatinginto arlier sychological pproaches uch as mass-society heory Arendt1951; Kornhauser 959), collective ehavior heory Smelser 1963), andrelative deprivation heory Davies 1962; Gurr 1970). The recently ub-lished book Frontiers n Social MovementTheory Morris nd Mueller1992) strongly uggests similar direction n future tudies f collectiveaction and social movement.

I use county-level ata on the 1946 Koreanpeasant uprisings o empiri-cally test this historical iew. Statistical nalysis hows that outbreaksacrossthe regionwere ndeed functions f peasants' degree f experiencein protest nd resistance movements uring the colonial period, sug-gesting great ontinuity n peasant activism.Yet peasant consciousnessraised through olonial protest xperience till neededto be mobilized ya protest rganization o inflame prisings, earing out the usefulnessof resource mobilization heory-heretofore largely onfined o liberaldemocratic egimes" Jenkins 983, p. 549)-in a Third World authori-tarian polity. My study demonstrates hat ny comprehensive nalytical

framework f collective ction and social movement must nclude boththe historical ormation f consciousness nd its organization nd mobili-zation for protest ction.

THE ROLE OF HISTORICAL CONTEXTResourcemobilization heory as been criticized or positing hat discon-tent nd collective nterests old fairly onstant ver ime McAdam 1982;Mueller 1987; Jenkins 1983). McCarthy and Zald state that resource

mobilization heorists assume that there s always enough discontent nany society osupply hegrass-roots upport or movement" 1977, p.1215)and then focus on the mportance f resources r outside help toorganize discontent or development f collective ction. For instance,Jenkins nd Perrow claim that "discontent s ever-present ordeprivedgroups, but .. collective ction s rarely viable option because of ack

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AmericanJournal f Sociology

of resources. . . When deprived groups do mobilize, t is due to theinterjection f external esources"1977, p. 251). Because resourcemobi-

lization heorists ake collective nterests nd discontent or granted, heprocessby which collective nterests nd discontent re defined r con-structed ppears nonproblematic nd thus goes unexamined. he theoryhelps correct arlier heories' e.g., Davies 1962; Smelser 1963)overem-phasis on psychological motivations ut fails o recognize hat collectiveinterests re defined ollectively nd that he ubjective meanings eopleattach to their ituations an vary. As McAdam points ut, "The prob-lem would seem to stem from he failure o distinguish bjective ocialconditions rom heir ubjective perception. . . Segments f societymay very well submit o oppressive onditions nless that oppression scollectively efined s both unjust nd subject to change. n the absenceof these necessary ttributions, ppressive onditions re likely, ven inthe face of increased resources, o go unchallenged" 1982, p. 34; Mc-Adam's emphasis). Marx called the ransformation f objective osubjec-tive interests he process of becoming real class or "class-for-itself"(Balbus 1971);this ransformation ustpredate ny collective ction. nKlandermans's 1984) words, "consensus mobilization" hould precede"action mobilization" p. 586). Piven and Cloward's (1977)study of"poor people's movements" n the 20th-century nited States, Mc-Adam's (1982)of black insurgency rom 1930 to 1970, Klein's (1984,1987)of U.S. and West European women's movements, nd Hirsch's(1990) ofthe 1985 ColumbiaUniversity rotest or ivestment rom outhAfrica ll show the mportance f consciousness n fomenting ocialpro-test movements.

The crucial question, then, s What set of conditions est facilitatesthe development f consciousness? nswering his does not require re-

course to earlier theories e.g., Smelser 1963)that focus on irrational,magical beliefs ostudy he role of consciousness. nstead, the historicalprocesses hat hapeconsciousness re critical. . P. Thompson, Britishsocialhistorian, itespast political xperience s a keyfactor: People ..experience xploitation, . . identify oints f antagonistic nterest, .[and] commence o struggle round these ssues. . . In the process ofstruggling hey discover themselves s classes, they come to know thisdiscovery s class-consciousness. lass and class-consciousness re al-ways the ast, not the first, tage n the real historical rocess" 1978, p.

149; emphasis dded). For Thompson, lass consciousness snot tructur-allydetermined y classposition, s structural arxists uch as Althusserargue, or to be raised by the elite, as Leninists laim, but historicallyand collectively onstructed hrough olitical xperience. ewell's 1980)study of the emergence f a French working-class onsciousness ndBonnell's 1983) comparable tudy f the Russian working lass support

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Thompson's conception f class and class consciousness. Morris 1992),criticizing revious tudies of class consciousness n America as being

"ahistorical nd divorced rom ealgroup truggle," rges us to examineit as emerging s a social historical rocess n the context f class confron-tations.

Golden 1988) similarly rgues that talian workers ave been able tomobilize continually n the basis of a radical socialist radition ver aperiod of time, s "historicalmemory" f protest ept radical aims alive.Drawing on an analysis of various forms f protest n Owens Valley,California, Walton says that "historical xperience, articularly hen tis about previous struggles, . . . is elaborated in legend and historical

memory . . . and can become an important resource in its own right formobilizing articipation" 1992, p. 326). Mueller's analysis of women'srise to public office lso shows that previous ocial movements rovideresources or future mobilization, ne of the most mportant esourcesbeing "development f collective onsciousness" 1987, p. 90). Taylor(1989) says that n important onsequence f postwar women's ctivism,though not then uccessful ue to "nonreceptive olitical nvironments,"was to provide hecontemporary omen'smovementwith resource fmovement ontinuity, collective dentity." imilarly, McAdam'sexam-ination f the "biographical onsequences" f the 1964 Mississippi ree-dom Summer roject reveals hat xperience n it "initiated n importantprocessof personal hange and political esocialization" hat "in turn sa strong predictor f the subject's activism between 1964 and 1970"(1989, pp. 753-54). Although Gurr's 1968) now classic cross-nationalstudy f civil strife s largely ased on relative eprivation heory, t tooagrees hat past strife acilitates ttitudes hat result n subsequent oliti-cal conflict. s these tudies vince, ttention o the historical ormationof consciousness hrough rotest xperience romises o correct weak-ness of resourcemobilization heory i.e., neglect f the role of conscious-ness)without etreating nto classical theories f collective ehavior.2

This historically onstructed onsciousness an help a subordinategroup define ts situation s unjust or oppressive. Yet attention o thehistorical ormation f consciousness oes not contradict ut supplementsthe central rgument f resourcemobilization heory. s discussed bove,the key explanatory ariable for he theory s the organization f discon-

2 I am not claiming that development of consciousness s the only possible outcomeof previous political action. Such experience may influence uture ollective action bychanging political opportunity tructures McAdam 1982) or by providing "activistnetworks" McAdam 1989; Taylor 1989) or "repertoires f collective action" (Tilly1979). Some scholars conceptualize the relationship of past protest to future actionas "cycles of protest" Tarrow 1988, 1989). Also, experiences n the workplace andfamily an raise the (gender) consciousness needed for mobilization Buechler 1990).

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tent, hat s, the extent o which a subordinate roup s able to developprotest rganization Gamson 1975; McAdam 1982; McCarthy nd Zald

1977;Tilly 1978). Accordingly, ven enhanced onsciousness, f not effec-tively organized and mobilized, does not necessarily ead to collectiveaction. Studies f peasant protest nd rebellion lso prove he mportanceof organization nd mobilization f peasant consciousness Paige 1975;Popkin 1979). Klandermans oints ut that consensusmobilization oesnot necessarily o together ith ction mobilization, . . [though] ctionmobilization annot do without onsensus mobilization" 1984, p. 586).At issue is not which s more relevant ut how historically onstructedconsciousness ombineswith mobilization fforts f social movement r-ganizations o produce ollective ction. Neither onsciousness or orga-nization alone suffices or collective ction, rather heir combination.What earlier ross-national tudies f political iolence e.g., Gurr 1968,1970; Gurr and Duvall 1973) failed to specify s the way consciousnessand organization nteract o produce ollective ction. As Morris rgues,consideration f both factors s necessary or a comprehensive xplana-tory ramework f collective ction" 1992, p. 372).

In summary, propose that protest xperience an facilitate uturecollective ction by providing crucial resource, aisedconsciousness,be it class, political, or collective. Yet raised consciousness lone doesnot suffice or ctual action; t must be mobilized hrough rotest rgani-zation. Before mpirically esting hisproposition ith heKorean data,I will briefly iscussKorean peasant activism n the first alfof the 20thcentury.

PEASANTPROTEST AND RESISTANCE INCOLONIAL KOREA

Although ot raren

Korean history, easant protests nd uprisings eresporadic and short-lived n traditional orea (see Song et al. [1988]forthe 1862 peasant rebellions nd Lew [1990]for he 1894peasant wars).However, the first alf of the 20th century, specially fter 1920,wit-nessed more frequent nd sustained rural conflict nd protest hat af-fected more of the rural population, peasants and landlords like. Ofparticular mportance ere tenancy isputes etween 1920and 1939,the1930s red peasant union movement, nd "everday forms f resistance"during he war years, 1940-44.3

First, tenant protests gainst andlords n the 1920sand 1930s pre-vailed in southern ommercialized reas, becoming constant henom-ena" in rural ociety, n the words of the colonial government. olonial

3 I confinemydiscussion f colonial easant rotest nd resistance o the South.

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government ecords eport total of 140,969 disputes, nvolving 97,281tenants nd landlords from 1920 to 1939, more than 85% occurring n

the South (Ch6sen sotokufu 1934, 1940a). Rent reduction nd securetenancy rights were the major tenant demands. Forms of disputationvaried from imple verbal arguments o individual aw suits to radicalprotests nvolving iolence nd arrest. While he haracter f the disputeschanged over time e.g., more offensive n the early 1920s and after heearly 1930s,more defensive n the ntervening epression ears; ee Shin1990, 1993), they primarily prang from enants' rowing onsciousnessof their nterests, specially fter 1933 see Chosen sotokufu 940a, pp.6-7), and often owered rental ates nd secured enancy ights. A colo-nial government urvey hows that from 1933 to 1938 rental rates de-creased an average of 2% in the South, with he disputes major mpe-tus, signifying change in authority elations n rural Korea (Chosens6tokufu 940b;Shin 1993). Furthermore, s Mueller 1987) argues, pro-test movement utcomes hould be evaluated n terms f their elation-ship to future movements; n that sense, as is now well recognized, neimportant utcome of 1920s and 1930s tenant protest movements wasthe development f participants' olitical onsciousness Kang 1989;Shin1993).

The red peasant union protest movement rom 1930 to 1939 differedfrom enant rotests n character, egional nd class base, and demands:it involved mall andowners o heavilyburdened with taxes and publicdues that heywere on the verge f becoming andless enants, speciallyduring he depression years of the early 1930s. They confronted ocalgovernment fficials irectly, emanding hanges n tax policy nd pro-testing olice nterference n village ffairs, uch as raids on night chools(Shin 1991; Yoo 1974).Protests rganized by red peasant unions were

more radical, often ntailing violence and arrest. For instance, whenin March 1932 about 300 union members n Yangsan county f SouthKy6ngsang ttacked he policestation, ne member was killed and 200arrested. adicalization f the red unionmovement nvited evere epres-sion by the colonial government, articularly f unions n southern om-mercialized reas, considered he "front ine of communist hought" ythe government Yoo 1974, p. 270). Unions were commonly estroyedby the police in an early stage of formation. mong the 123 southerncounties onsidered ere, 2 organized ed unions. Whilemost edunions

met colonialpolice repression nd their protest movementswere forcedunderground uring he war years, many union eaders came to figureprominently n the organization f postwar easant unions nongmin ho-hap) and people's committees inmin wiwonhoe or PCs; see An 1990;Ch6ng 1988; Cumings 1981).

During the war years 1940-44) overt and collective rotest ecame

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difficult. n efforts o mobilize esourceshuman nd material) or totalwar," the colonial government dopted very repressive olicies nd out-

lawed collective rotest Eckert 1994). It also attempted o exact cropsfrom he peasants to supplement he army food supply. Faced with themilitarist olonial regime, Korean peasants resorted o "everday formsof resistance," o use Scott's 1985) term, uch as hiding rops, changingcrops into nonextractable nes, or expressing heir discontent hroughfolk ongs. n 1944,for nstance, 0% of households n a village of Hae-nam county f South Ch6lla province uccessfully id half of their ropsin collection voidance Kim 1981). Although hese kinds of covert ndnoncollective esistance went argely nrecorded n written ocuments,a 1942report y the U.S. consul general n Seoul supports laims thatrice collection esistance was widespread n the country Quarton 1942).The report lso indicates these everyday orms f resistance nurturedKorean peasants' "spirit f resistance." urthermore, easants' experi-ence of landlord collaboration with Japanese war mobilization ffortsprovoked trong ationalist eeling,which emerged s a prime factor npostwar adicalism. Thus, peasant resistance uring hewar years offersa critical bridge between colonial activism nd postwar radicalism. nTaylor's usage, the war years were a period f "abeyance, . . a holdingprocessby which movements ustain hemselves n nonreceptive oliticalenvironments nd provide continuity rom ne stage of mobilization oanother" 1989, p. 761).

Peasants' experience n various forms f protest nd resistance uringthe colonial period nfluenced he course of peasant organization ndsubsequent mobilization nto postwar uprisings. n particular, enantprotests nd the red peasant union movement n the 1930s increasedparticipants' olitical onsciousness, hich was kept alive through as-

sive forms f resistance uring he war years and then contributed opostwar ctivism. t is no coincidence hat ssues and targets f colonialperiod protest nd resistance eemerged, hough n more radical andviolent forms, n postwar peasant uprisings.

DECOLONIZATIONANDKOREAN PEASANTSN POLITICSWith he Japanese defeat n August 1945,Koreanpeasants, ikepeasantsin most other postcolonial ocieties e.g., Lai, Myers, and Wei 1991),

sought part n forming new social and political rder. They organizedpeasant unions nd PCs from hecounty nd district evels down to thevillage level and dominated ocal politics n many regions. One reportcounts peasant unions n 188 counties, 1,745 districts, nd 25,288 vil-lages, with a total membership f 3,322,937 by November 1945, lessthan three months fter iberation Pak 1987, p. 382). Although erhaps

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Uprisings f 1946

exaggerated, hese figures uggest that an average of one person perpeasant household oined the unions. Yet no national organization o-

mented his apid growth; easant unionswere ocalized nd their rgani-zational strength nd radicalism aried greatly. Radical unions quicklytried o dispossessJapanese nd Korean andlords. ome members venbeat and then ailed landlords, ormer olicemen, nd government ffi-cials who had collaborated with the Japanese. Moderatesworked o re-form enancy elations, ents, nd the ike.

Peasants also became active n PCs, a major grass-roots olitical rga-nization n liberated Korea. Immediately fter iberation, ationalist ndcommunist eaders headed by Y6 Unhy6ng rganized the Committee

for the Preparation f Korean Independence Chos6n k6n'guk chunbiwiw6nhoe) to preserve peace and order" and "prepare for ndepen-dence" (Cumings 1981, chap. 3). In September he committee rans-formed nto the Korean People's Republic Chos6n nmin kongwhaguk),with PCs an important uborganization hat dominated ocal politics nmany parts of the country n the fall of 1945. PC class composition aseclectic; hough most members were peasants, workers nd even a fewlandlords belonged An 1990). PCs and peasant unions collaborated, f-ten sharing members r even offices n common.Most PC leaders wereof local origin, with colonial period experiences n social and politicalmovements uch as the March First ndependence movement, easantprotest movements, abor movements, tudent nd youth movements,and the Sin'ganhoe An 1990, pp. 102-5; Ch6ng 1988, pp. 37-44). Au-tumn 1945saw PCs organized n all but seven counties n the South.Yet, as with unions, rganizational trength aried greatly, hich loselyrelated o outbreaks f uprisings year ater, s shown below. Accordingto Cumings 1981), among the 123 counties onsidered ere, even hadno PC, 55 a nongoverning ommittee NGPC), and 61 a governing ne(GPC).4In countieswithout PC or with NGPC, former overnmentofficials nd landed elites till trongly nfluenced ocal policies.For in-stance, in Chong-up f North Ch6lla province nd Miryang of SouthKy6ngsang province landed elements" emained powerful nough toprevent he emergence f strong GPCs (see Cumings 1981], chap. 9 fordetails on the committees).

In sharp contrast, n counties with a GPC, the PC functioned s ade facto government ollecting axesand maintaining ocial order. For

instance, South Ch6lla province peasant union representative t theopening onvention f the National Leagueof Peasant Unions Ch6n'guk

4 Figure in Cumings 1981) ists he counties n which Cs assumed overnmentalfunctions. umings lso details hefate f PCsin the South see chap. 9). Regardingsuchcommitteesn the North, ee Kim 1989).

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nongmin hohap ch'ong y6nmaeng) n Seoul,December , 1945, reportedthat province peasants refused istrict fficials' rders nd obeyed only

the PC's (Kim 1974, 2:158-59). He also said peasants controlled mostpolicestations. An American military overnment fficial n the provinceagreed that "all governmental gencies became powerless," and thatPCs "preserved he peace and collected necessary axes," preventing"looting, bloodshed, and rioting" Meade 1951, pp. 56-71). Some PCseven "took a census," assembled other vital statistics," nd had armeddefense units, posing a "threat to military overnment" U.S. Army[1948] 1988,3:250). These observations f ocal politics n iberated Korealimn Charles Tilly's conception f a "revolutionary ituation": previ-ously cquiescent members f that population ind hemselves onfrontedwith strictly ncompatible emands from he government nd form nalternative ody claiming ontrol ver . . . or . . . to be the govern-ment. . . Those previously cquiescent people obey the alternativebody" 1978, p. 192). Again, this describeswell the political cene of theareas PCs governed.

But upon American ccupation, ocalpolitics hanged. The Americanmilitary overnment n Korea suppressed hesepolitical roups, ccusingthem f Soviet-backed orth Koreanmanipulation. t declared ll politi-cal organizations, ncluding Cs, dissolved nd required hem oobtainnew legal permission rom he military overnment. ften PC memberswere fired rom overnment ositions nd even arrested; or nstance, nNovember 15, 1945, n Namw6n county f North Ch6lla province ivePC leaders were arrested, nd in March 1946, the county xecutive fHaenam county n SouthCh6llaprovince, PC member, was fired y themilitary overnment. uch suppression rovoked trong eactionfromcommitteemembers, s in Namw6n where 14-15 thousand eopledem-

onstrated gainst the arrest f their eaders, with three killed by policefire. Yet such protest was just a foretaste f coming prisings.While suppressing opular organizations uch as PCs, the military

government ept the Japanese governmental ramework nd even re-stored government fficialswho had served under the Japanese. TheJapanese economic agencies the Oriental Development Company andChosen Food Distributing ompany were revived as the New KoreaCompany NKC) and Korean Commodity ompany, respectively U.S.Army 1988, 3:142-43). About 85% of the notorious Korean policemen

who had "records of brutality n arresting nd torturing heir fellowcountrymen" ere retained nd continued o abuse their power underAmerican uspices Henderson 968, p. 85). Korean peasants, of course,regarded estoration f the colonial ystem nd reappointment f collabo-rators o key positions s unjust nd illegitimate. y the fall of 1946, ustbefore he October uprisings, he South alone saw 81 policestations nd

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Uprisings f 1946

23 government genciesraided. These were also the main targets uringthe uprisings.

Furthermore, he military overnment gnored peasant demands forland reform nd instead reestablished he hated Japanese rice collectionpolicy, upposedly o support he urban population. his collection olicydeepened peasant grievances. As a peasant n Kangw6n province aid,"Since we went through he terrible ears under he Japs, we have beentrying obe patient with the current ituation.... But how ong shouldwe stand this poverty?" Hansong lbo, June 24, 1946). Police involve-ment n rice collection urther xacerbated easant discontent, s peas-ants complained ice was exacted much n the same [way]as under heJapanese," but "treatment eceived was much worse." Many peasantsbelieved that their rice quota was unfair nd that rice collectionwascontrolled nd manipulated y reactionary andlords nd collaboratorswith police support. Peasants often refused o yield rice to collectionofficials nd police: n 1946only 12.6%of the cheduled ice was collected(Hwang 1987).

ClearlyKoreans n general nd peasants n particular ad much boutwhich to complain: eestablishment f the old Japanese ystem, elay nsocial and land reform, ontinued buse of police power, rice collection,rice rationing, nd so on. Peasants expressed heir iscontent nd griev-ances in disputes with andlords, pposition o rice collection, nd raidson government gencies, ll familiar orms f contention hroughout hecolonial period. Then in the fall of 1946 they xploded nto the majoruprisings f 20th-century orea.

THE 1946 UPRISINGSThe uprisings egan on October 1, 1946, when about 300 railroad work-ers in Taegu, a major city n central outh Korea, went on strike, e-manding ncreased rice rations.5 ometime hat day the police killed astriker. n the morning f October , a crowd f more han 1,000carriedthe body of the slain striker hrough he city nd raided the city policestation, apturing 0 policemen.By October6, 38 Taegu policemen adbeen killed; martial aw was declared nd American anks patrolled hestreets.

The sparks from aegu ignited lsewhere, articularly n the country-

side. In Y6ngch'6n ounty, earTaegu, for nstance, n estimated 0,000protesters ttacked he county olice station, illing hecounty xecutive

5Although sporadic oodprotests n the pring nd summer nd a general trike yrailroad workers t the end of September rupted n Pusan, convention laces theonset f uprisings t Taegu in October s described ere.

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and many other fficials nd policemenwho had served under Japaneserule but retained heir positions ue to the Americans. They also killed

some 20 "reactionaries nd evil landlords" Cumings 1981, p. 358). Asdiscussed bove, mostKoreansdeemed hese ormer fficials nd collabo-rative andlords unjust and illegitimate. ccordingly, he major targetsof attack were big landlords, police stations, ocal government ffices,and rice collection gencies such as the NKC. About 5,000 protestersseized county government ontrol t Uis6ng; another 2,000 raided theWaegwan police station, illing hepolicechief nd wrecking hehomesof 50 police and county fficials. lso, 400protesters t Hwanjung over-ran the NKC warehouse, urning ll records f rice nd grain ollections.

The protesters ere primarily ocal peasants, most of them ffiliatedwith peasant unions and PCs. For instance, he Uisong policechief re-ported hat of the nine eaders n the Uis6ng protest, ivebelonged othelocal PC, two to the People's Party branch, one to the county peasantunion, and one was an unaffiliated chool teacher Cumings 1981, p.358). Peasants often randished ticks, arming mplements, nd clubs,as well as rifles nd pistols onfiscated rom aidedpolicestations U.S.Army 1988, 3:347-64).

Although heurban trike n Taegu initiated he ction, peasants rans-formed hestrike nto major uprising.6 evolt pread nto the country-side n North Ky6ngsang rovince, hen n South Ky6ngsang, outh andNorth Ch'ungch'6ng, y6nggi, nd South and North Ch6lla provinces.By the end of 1946 some 40 counties, r about 30% of South Koreancounties, witnessed easant uprisings. here was little ndication f na-tional organization ehind the disturbances, xcept perhaps n the earlystages of the Taegu outbreak Ch6ng 1988; Cumings 1981). Major de-mands and issues stressed ocal problems, uch as "the authority f colo-

nial police,brutal grain ollection olicies,hoarding f grain by andlordsand rich peasants, and the systematic uppression f the ocal people'scommittee tructure" Cumings 1981, p. 367). No accurate ount of par-ticipants r casualties xists, ut estimates uggest bout 2.3 million mostof them peasants) engaged n the uprisings, bout 1,000 protesters nd200 policemenwere killed, nd another 0,000 protesters ere arrested.The 1946 uprisings were the argest nd most ignificant rotest move-ment of Korean peasants since the 1894Tonghak peasant wars; theyclearly howedthe urgent eed for ocial and political eform, specially

land reform.6 To be sure, the uprising nvolved mass of workers nd students n a generalpopulation evolt gainst rocolonial orces hrivingn postcolonial orea.However,becausethe majority f protesters erepeasants nd because much f the data forcities re unavailable r ncompatible ith ural ata, this tudy nalyzes nly uraluprisings.

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Uprisings f 1946

How can we explain uch massive nd violent mobilization f Koreanpeasants nto the uprisings? ow were their discontent nd grievances

organized nd mobilized nto political protest movements? n line withthe historical iew of collective ction dvanced above, hypothesize hatthe forementioned olonial xperience n protest nd resistance rovidedpostwar activism a crucial resource, hat is, enhanced consciousness,which PCs then mobilizedfor the uprisings y organizing rotests. obe sure, some previous works on postwar Korean peasant radicalism(e.g., Ch6ng 1988; Cumings 1981; Kang 1989) make similar points, butno rigorous mpirical est has been done. For instance, Cumings 1981),still the best work on this ssue, simply resents bivariate orrelationbetween red peasant union presence n the 1930s and postwar PCstrength, ith some supporting nstances. Such a crude method s notonly iable to produce a spurious relationship ut omits nother rucialprotest xperience: enancy isputes. n the rest of this article employa multivariate tatistical nalysis f county-level ata on peasant ctivismand related socioeconomic ariables n colonial and postwar Korea totest he historical roposition etailed bove.

RESEARCH DESIGN ANDMEASUREMENTThe analysis draws upon county-level ata collected by the Japanesecolonial government Chosen sotokufu) nd American military ntelli-gence primarily ompiledby Cumings 1981]). County-level ata is sig-nificant ecause the county kun) n Korea has historically een an impor-tant administrative nit and even today remains an "economic,socio-cultural, nd political unit" Kim 1990, p. 63). Also, red peasantunionsof the 1930sand peasant unions nd PCs in the postwar ra were

organized t the county evel. Furthermore, he county s a much morehomogeneous nit with an average population of 138,000 people percounty n 1945, excluding eoul) than the nation-state, unit frequentlyused in comparative tudies of rebellions nd revolutions BoswellandDixon 1990; Gurr 1968; Muller 1985;Russet 1964; Walton and Ragin1990),and thus mitigates common roblemwith ggregate ata: spuri-ous ecological orrelation. analyze 123 counties n the South, omittingonly few without elevant ata available;cities re also excluded incemy analysis s confined o rural uprisings the appendix ists ncluded

counties).

Dependent VariableThe dependent variable, UPRISE, measures whether county had a1946 peasant uprising. Cumings assessespeasant radicalism by giving

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"2 units for a non-governing eople's committee, for a red peasantunion n the 1930s, 6 for GPC, 8 for vidence f uprising n the autumn

uprisings n 1946, and 10 for counties udged particularly ebellious"(1981, p. 453). Besides its arbitrary nd subjective cale for particularpolitical ctivities e.g., Why ix units or GPC and eight or ccurrenceof uprising?), xistence f a red peasant union n the 1930sand a PC in1945 should be conceptually nd empirically eparated rom prisings n1946 (see also n. 13). Accordingly, treat red union experience s aseparate predictor nd a PC as a variable affecting he mpact of pastpolitical experience in either tenancy disputes or red peasant unionmovements) n uprising. decomposeCumings's radicalism ndex andassign values to the variable UPRISE by giving 1" for evidence of a1946 uprising nd "O"for no uprising n a given county, ince no otherprecise ounty-level nformation n the uprisings, uch as the number fcasualties, s available.

Independent VariablesTwo indicators measure he degree f past experience n protest: 1) DIS-PUTE, the number f tenancy isputes from 933 to 1939 recorded ythe Japanese olonial government Ch6sen otokufu 940a) and 2) RADI-CAL, a radicalism ndex of red peasant unions n the 1930s.7 Since noquantitative ata exist o measure he scale of red peasant union protest(e.g., number f casualties), created he radicalism ndex by assigninga value of "O" for no union existence, 1" for mere existence f a redpeasant union, "2" for evidence of protest, nd "3" for protest withviolence.8 his information omesfrom apanese ourt nd policedocu-ments such as Shis6 ih6 and Shiso geppo) s well as newspapers for heindex see Shin [1991], app. 1). A large number f disputes nd a highvalue on the radicalism ndex ndicate high proportion f peasantswithprotest xperience uring he colonial period. A low correlation oeffi-cient between he two measures r = -.01, NS) indicates hey epresenttwo distinct ypes f colonial protest xperience f Korean peasants. Due

7Tenancy isputes ccurred rom 920 o 1939, ut data on the number rior o 1933exist nly t the provincial evel. Since a similar eographic istribution f tenancydisputes ppeared hroughout he1920s nd 1930s, owever,mymeasure hould notdistort he overall attern Shin 1990).Othermeasures f the disputes, uch as scaleor ntensity, re also unavailable t the ounty evel. n addition, ecause ew writtenrecords epict he degree f "everyday orms f resistance" uring he war years,theseyearsmust e omitted rom nalysis. his omission oes not eem o distort hefindings resented elow.8 An analysis ot reported ere hat used an index based solely n the xistence f ared peasantunion n the 1930syielded imilar esults.

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Uprisings f 1946

to its nonlinear elationship ith the dependent ariable, convert IS-PUTE into a logarithmic cale.

Intervening ariableAs the PC was the main form f protest rganization o mobilize easantsfor he 1946 uprisings, use its trength s a variable ffecting he mpactof dispute and protest xperience n uprisings.9 s discussed above,counties fall into three categories: hose with no PC (N = 7), with aNGPC (N = 55), and with GPC (N = 61). In countieswith NGPC,landed elites trongly nfluenced ocal politics, endering he PC power-less as a protest rganization. nly n counties with GPC could the PCbe a force n the uprisings. lso, no significant ifference btains betweenthe first wo types n terms f other variables ncluded n this analysis.For these reasons, collapse the first wo categories, eparating hemfrom he third."0 hus, the variable GPC has the value "1" for countywith GPC and "0" otherwise for he data on PCs as well as populationchange, tenancy ates, nd paddy fields, ee Cumings 1981, app. D]).

Control VariablesI introduce postwar era population change as a control variable(POPCHG), since some claim its positive ffect n the 1946 uprisings.Using Karl Deutsch's 1961) theory f social mobilization, or nstance,Cumings 1981) argues that Korean peasants who migrated o Japan,Manchuria, nd northern ndustrial reas were exposed o "leftist deolo-gies" and experienced process of "social mobilization." These mi-grants, pon return o home villages fter iberation, gitated heupris-

ings. Revising Cumings'smeasure i.e., population hange from 944 to1946), assess the mpact f ocial mobilization y subtracting opulationchange n the 1930-40 period from opulation hange n the postwar ra(1944-46). Population hange seems a good measure of social mobiliza-tion since the nearly 20% increase n population within ne year afterliberation s well above a natural ncrease.

Tenancy rate TENANCY) is controlled ince it allegedly nfluences

9 To include peasantunion trength n the analysis would be interesting. nfortu-nately, etailed nformation n county-level easant nions s acking, hough e cansafely ssume, s discussed bove, hat C strength n general eflected easant nionpower n a given ounty seeCumings 981).10Were here ufficient ounties ithout PC, comparison ocounties ith n NGPCand with GPC would be useful. he small number f cases N = 7) makes uchcomparison f ittle meaning.

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peasant ctivism. ome argue hat tenancy ystem rovokes evolution-ary peasant movements Paige 1975; Stinchcombe 961; Zagoria 1974).

According o Paige 1975),the harecropper r tenant ossesses haracter-istics conducive o class conflict hat are similar o those of the workingclass:weak ties to the and, occupationalhomogeneity, nd work groupinterdependence. n contrast, Alavi (1965), Wolf 1969), and Hofheinz(1977)view middle peasants s revolutionary, ecause the existence f atenancy ystem ndicates strong anded power that might hinder heorganization nd mobilization f the tenant lass into a protest move-ment. The extent f the tenancy ystem s measured by the percentageof arable land leased in both paddy and dry fields n 1945.

Market ncursion nto peasant villages s also often onsidered o bepartly esponsible orpeasant uprisings Hobsbawm 1959; Migdal 1974;Scott 1976;Wolf 1969).Thus, I include n my analysis the spread ofcapitalist market orces nto griculture, s denoted by the percentage ftotal rable and used n 1945 as paddy fields PADDY)-site of the maincommercial rop n colonialKorea, rice from 931to 1940,37.2% of tsyield was exported o Japan); most ubsistence rops such as beans andwheat were cultivated n dry fields Suh 1978).1"

Modernization heorists rgue that rising iteracy promotes oliticalparticipation y breaking down traditional worldviews Levy 1966),whereas Scott (1976)and Wolf (1969)claim that peasants with such"entrenched recapitalist alues" (i.e., low literacy) ecomerebellious.Chirot nd Ragin 1975) argue that neither ow literacy or commercial-ization but their combined ffect osters ebellion: nly where marketforces re strong but peasants remain traditional s rural unrest high.The literacy ate LITERACY) ismeasured y the percentage f peasanthousehold members who can read Korean. Since no literacy ate dataare available for

1945,Japanese olonial government 938data are used(Chosen sotokufu 940b); assume no significant hange from 1938to1945.

The dichotomous ature of the dependent variable uprising s. nouprising) iolates the assumptions f ordinary east squares regression,thus requiring se of ogistic egression nalysis Hanushek and Jackson1977).Table 1 presents he variables' means and standard deviations.

ANALYSIS RESULTSTable 2 presents he results f ogistic egression f the variables. Model1 shows the ogistic egression oefficients f UPRISE on the structural

1"Sincefew ropswere ommercializedn 1945 nd 1946, hismeasure etter eflectsthe degree f commercializationn the prewar eriod.

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Uprisings of 1946

TABLE 1

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES

Variable Definition Mean SD

DISPUTE ................ Number of tenancy isputes, 1933-39 864 714POPCHG (%)........... Population hange 1944-46 - population 15.5 8.8

change 1930-40TENANCY .............. Percentage f arable and leased, 1945 68.5 9.6PADDY ................ Percentage f arable and used as paddy 59.3 11.5

fields, 945LITERACY (%)........ Literacy ate, 1938 30.9 10.8RADICAL ............... Index of red union movement n 1930s .37 .72GPC ................ Governing eople's committee n 1945 .50 .50UPRISE ................ Peasant uprising n 1946 .33 .47

NOTE.-N = 123.

variables (i.e., POPCHG, TENANCY, PADDY, and LITERACY)without he two earlier xperiencemeasures i.e., DISPUTE and RADI-CAL). This step shows whether he variables measuring xperience reindependent f the conditions dentified n other heories f peasant pro-test nd rebellion. Model 1showsthat TENANCY has a highly egativeeffect n UPRISE, being statistically ignificant t cx = .01, and theeffect of PADDY is positive and significant t cx = . 10. These findingsalone seem to support he middle peasant thesis nd commercializationtheory: he existence f a strong anded class hindered mobilization fpeasants for uprising whereas commercialization romoted t.

Model 2 introduces wo major ndependent ariables, DISPUTE andRADICAL, into model 1. This model shows the effects f these two

experiencemeasures on

UPRISE, controllingor

POPCHG,TEN-

ANCY, PADDY, and LITERACY. Both measures, DISPUTE andRADICAL, have weak positive ffects n UPRISE; the former mpactis significant t cx = .10, the latter at cx = .15. Also, model chi-squaresignificantly mproves fter dding these two experiencemeasures; hedifference n modelchi-square s 5.4 (df = 2)and statistically ignificantat cx = . 10. The effect f TENANCY on UPRISE remains highly nega-tive in model 2 but the commercialization ffect ecomes statisticallynonsignificant.

To see whether he strength f a protest rganization s measured bya GPC mediates ny, even f weak, effects f past experience n uprising,this factor s introduced nto he third model. f the relationship etweenpast experience measures nd uprising s entirelymediated hrough xis-tence of a GPC, logistic oefficients f both measures would reduce tonearly ero after ntroducing PC as an additional predictor ariable.

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Also, coefficients f past experiencemeasures n GPC wouldbe expectedto be significant nd the coefficient f GPC on UPRISE tobe significantly

positive. Model 3 and table 3 present he results.Existence f a GPC doesnot eem to mediate he effects f past experi-ence measures on uprising. First, ogistic oefficients f both measures(DISPUTE andRADICAL) becomestatistically onsignificant t cx=.10 and cx = .20, respectively, fter ntroducing he organization ari-able. As expected, GPC also shows a significant ositive ffect n UP-RISE. However, measures f past protest xperience ave no significanteffects n GPC, as table 3 shows. These findings uggest hat effects fpast political experience n uprising re at best accounted for but notmediated by a GPC.

TABLE 2

LOGIT COEFFICIENTS DESCRIBING PREDICTORS' EFFECTS ONUPRISE

Model 1 Model 2 Model3 Model4

Constant .......................... 3.668 .704 .838 6.103

(1.667) (2.192) (2.249) (5.052)DISPUTE (log) ................. . . . 1.371* 1.322 -.471(.804) (.840) (1.328)

RADICAL ...................... . . . .446 .383 .024(.294) (.307) (.737)

POPCHG ......................... .013 .014 .019 .077***(.013) (.014) (.015) (.029)

TENANCY ...................... -.097*** -.099*** -. 100*** -.124(.032) (.034) (.036) (.040)

PADDY ....................... .042* .027 .019 .016(.023) (.025) (.027) (.071)

LITERACY ...................... -.020 -.024 -.024 -.041(.021) (.022) (.022) (.133)

GPC .......................... ... ... .972** - 7.801

(.473) (4.759)DISPUTE (log) X GPC ....... ... ... ... 3.720*

(1.703)RADICAL x GPC .......... ... ... ... .586

(.832)POPCHG x GPC ............. ... ... .. . -.093*

(.034)PADDY x LITERACY

...... ... ... ... .001(.002)2 ........................... 24.3*** 29.7*** 34.1*** 48.6***

NOTE-SEs in parentheses; = 123* P < .10.

** P < .05.*** P < 01-all one-tailed

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Uprisings f 1946

My foregoing heoretical easoning olds that lthough rotest xperi-encesraise participants' onsciousness, uch consciousness lone may not

foment prising. he contribution f consciousness urns upon whetherit s effectively rganized nd mobilized y a protest rganization. hus,we should find ffects f interaction etween past experience measuresand the existence f a GPC; only when protest xperience s mobilizedthrough protest rganization would it contribute o collective ction.

Model 4 in table 2 presents he results f a logistic egression f UP-RISE withpossible nteraction erms. include four nteraction erms nthe equation: DISPUTE x GPC, RADICAL x GPC, POPCHG xGPC, and PADDY x LITERACY.12This nonadditive model offersbetter pecification han the additive one (model 3); the difference nmodel chi-square s statistically ignificant t cx = .01 (X2 = 14.5, df =4). Also, if we examine ndividual nteraction erms model 4), of thetwo protest xperience measures, ISPUTE has a statistically ignificantpositive nteraction ffect with GPC on UPRISE (coefficient f 3.72, P< .05) but RADICAL doesnot. Also, POPCHG has a statistically ig-nificant nteraction ffect ith GPC, though t is negative coefficient f-.093, P < .01). No interaction ffect btains between PADDY andLITERACY.

These results upport the claim that tenancy dispute experience nthe 1930s contributed o the 1946 uprising when mobilized by a protestorganization, GPC. Red peasant union movement xperience oes notshow the same result. Such an insignificant ffect f red peasant unionmovement s not too surprising, owever, iven hat his movement re-vailed in the North see Yoo 1974). t is also perhaps related o the factthat red peasant union movements uffered evere colonialgovernmentrepression; his chilly memory f repressionmay have impeded postwar

peasant organization nd mobilization. s Scott's tudyf

peasantrebel-

lion n SoutheastAsia of the 1930s points ut: "The tangible nd painfulmemories f repression must have a chilling ffect n peasants who con-template ven minor cts of resistance. t may wellbe that he experienceof defeat or ne generation f peasants precludes nother ebellion ntila new generation has replaced it. . . . The memory of repression is oneof the principal xplanations or the absence of resistance nd revolt"(1976, pp. 226-27). Similar memories f uppression mong Koreanpeas-ants may be responsible or the insignificant ffect f the red peasant

union movement n the uprisings seeMuller 1985],Muller nd Seligson[1987], and Gurr 1968] for general xplanation f repression's nhib-iting ffect n political violence).

12 The rationale o nclude OPCHG x GPC is discussed elow.

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TABLE 3

LOGIT COEFFICIENTS DESCRIBING

PREDICTORS' EFFECTS ONGPC

Variable Coefficient SE

Constant ................. -2 .622 1.951DISPUTE (log) .......... .887 .637RADICAL ................ .297 .2 76POPCHG ................. -.014 .012TENANCY .............. -.025 .02 7PADDY .................. .037* .022LITERACY .............. -.009 .019

2x............... 9.0

NOTE.-N = 123.* P < .10.

Other features f the findings elate oprevious tudies. First, popula-tion change exerts no significant ffect n either uprisings see models1-3 in table 2) or PC strength see table 3), contradicting umings's(1981) argument.13 et it has a strong negative nteraction ffect withGPC on uprisings see model 4 in table 2): this ndicates hat the effectof population hange s weaker for ounties with GPC than for ountieswithout. pecifically, xamination f the POPCHG coefficients or epa-rate subsamples of counties with and without GPC shows that theeffect f population hange spositive nd significant or ounties withouta GPC but is negative nd nonsignificant or ountieswith GPC (thisis also seen by deviating he interaction oefficient rom he POPCHGcoefficient n table 4).

A basic assumption f social mobilization heory uggests why this sso: social mobilization an influence hepolitical ehavior f people"wholive in areas in which the mass of population re largely xcludedfrompolitical participation," y bringing with t "an expansion f the politi-cally relevant trata f the population" Deutsch 1961, p. 499). The dataconfirm hiseffect. bserve that countieswith GPC in 1945 had peas-ants much more active n politics n the 1930sthan those without. Forinstance, ounties with GPC averaged960 tenancy isputes er countyfrom 933to 1939, whereas ounties without veraged 770disputes; hedifference s statistically ignificant t = 1.48, P < .10). Similarly, he

13 This is not surprising, s almost all PCs were organized before most migrants eganto return to their home villages (Trewartha and Zelinsky 1955). Cumings (1981),combining PC strength with the occurrence f rebellion to create an index of peasantradicalism, cannot separate the effect f population change on each. This flaw alsorecommends my dependent variable measure above Cumings's.

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Uprisings of 1946

TABLE 4

COMPARISONBETWEENKY6NGSANGANDCHULLAPROVINCES

Tenancy CountiesUprising Rate with Uprising

Province N Started (%) (%)

North Ky6ngsang ............... 22 Early October 57.9 82South Ky6ngsang ............... 17 Mid-October 61.8 35South Ch6lla ..................... 20 Late October 72.2 30North Ch6lla ..................... 13 Mid-December 81.1 15All counties analyzed .......... 123 68.5 33

NOTE.-N indicatesnumber f counties nalyzed; bottom ow includes data not ust for Ky6ngsangand Ch6lla provinces ut for ll counties ncluded n this tudy see appendix for ist).

difference n the radicalism ndexof the red peasant union movement fthe 1930sbetween ountieswith and without GPC is statistically ig-nificant t cx= .10 (t = 1.43). Going one step further, t seems plausiblethat, n countieswithout GPC and where peasants had relatively ittlepolitical experience uring he colonialperiod, returning migrants whohad experienced social mobilization" provided "politically elevant"strata or heuprisings. n this manner he existence f a significant ffectof social mobilization measured by relative population hange) only ncountieswithout GPC makes ense. Model 4 in table 2 shows logisticregression oefficient f 077 [P < .01]for ountieswithout GPC [i.e.,GPC = Q].)14

In a secondfinding hat bears on previous tudies, enancy ate consis-tently xerts highly egative ffect n uprising, tatistically ignificantin both additive nd nonadditive models see table 2). This finding on-

tradicts he class conflictmodelprediction hat tenancy ystem s morelikely to provoke revolutionary movements Paige 1975; Stinchcombe1961) and instead upports he middle peasant thesis Alavi 1965;Wolf1969).Given that n Korea the tenancy ate was high n areas with biglandlordswho controlled substantial mount f and, a high ate proba-bly ndicates strong anded class. One can suppose that n such areasthe anded class could hinder heorganization nd mobilization f peas-ants for uprisings Cumings 1981).

Yet the persistence f a highly egative ffect f tenancy ate on up-

rising annot merely e attributed o strong anded power. For, if so,it should have wielded a similarly ignificant egative effect n PCstrength. hat is, existence f strong anded class should have hindered

14 This also illuminates Cumings's insufficiently xplained finding that populationchange is responsible for rebellions nly n 41 counties. See Cumings 1981), table 12.

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PCs from btaining overning ositions; lthough negative, ts effect snot statistically ignificant see table 3). The highly negative effect f

tenancy ate on uprising ut not on PC strength uggests hat the effecton uprisingmay imply ndicate regional ifference etween he Ky6ng-sang and the Ch6lla provinces.15 prisings did not erupt nationwidesimultaneously; gniting n Taegu in North Ky6ngsang rovince, heyspread nto other reas such as the Ch6lla provinces ver approximatelythree months. Because the 1946 uprisings tarted n Taegu, they preadmost widely n North Ky6ngsang nd only weakly n Ch6lla.

To examine he effect f this differential pread, compare he extentof uprising articipation nd tenancy ate among Ky6ngsang nd Ch6lla(both North nd South)provinces.As table 4 shows, as uprisings preadfrom North Ky6ngsang n early October to South Ky6ngsang n mid-October, oSouth Ch6lla in late October, nd finally oNorth Ch6lla inmid-December, prising articipation ubstantially eclined from 2%to 35% to 30% to 15%). Tenancy was historicallymuch higher n theCh6llaprovinces han n the Ky6ngsang rovinces. hus, the decreasinguprising articipation may have coincidentally oined with n increasingtenancy ate to produce a highly negative orrelation etween he two(see table 4). The present ata cannot determine hether he persistentlystrong egative ffect f tenancy ateon uprising eflects heexistence fa strong anded class or simply differential pread effect; indings re-sented bove indicate hat perhaps both factors perate.

Finally, neither ommercialization, or iteracy ate, nor any nterac-tion effect f the two shows a significant ffect n uprising see table 2).This result s not unexpected, owever, ince penetration f market orcesinto the villages was not a major issue in the 1946 peasant uprisings.Were the uprisings response o market orces hat undermined easant

interests, e would expect a significant ommercialization ffect. heywere, rather, political protests gainst the military overnment, ocalgovernment fficials ho also served during Japanese rule, and collabo-rative ocal elites uch as landlords. That the commercialization easurehad no direct ignificant ffect n uprising, owever, hould not be inter-preted s invalidating he commercialization hesis ltogether. ommer-cializationhad a significant ositive ffect n uprising n model 1 beforeintroducing rotest xperiencemeasures see table 2) and a significanteffect n the strength f PCs (seetable 3), and thus had an indirect ffect

on uprising hrough GPC.There are a number f reasons or his ndirect ffect. irst, disappear-ance of a significant ffect f PADDY on UPRISE in the second model

15 I am grateful o an AJS reviewer or uggesting his ossibility.

1616







Uprisings f 1946

in table 2 seems due to its high correlation ith DISPUTE (r = .37).Although o causal claim about the effect f commercialization n ten-

ancy disputes can be made since the former s a postwar measure andthe atter prewar one, if we assume that the percentage f arable landused for paddy fields eflects he extent f commercialization n the pre-war period, especially he 1930s, we can state that commercializationwas related o tenant ctivism. n fact, previous tudies how that com-mercialization as highly esponsible or enancy isputes n the 1920sand 1930s see Shin 1990, 1993). Accordingly, he tenancy ispute num-ber perhaps mediates he commercialization ffect.

Also, the ndirect ffect f commercialization n uprising hrough PCsuggests ts effect n peasant activism s more complex han argued nprevious heories f peasant protest nd rebellion. Most previous heoriestend to target he disruptive Scott 1976; Wolf 1969) or opportunistic(Popkin 1979) effect f commercialization n the peasant economy sprovoking rotest ction. Yet in Koreanuprisings, s shown bove, mar-ket forces were not a major ssue. Nevertheless, market orces may haveinfluenced prisings y changing he rural occupational tructure, spe-cially fter hey became a major factor n the rural economy nd society(in Korea they were n full orce y the 1920s nd 1930s). n other words,increasing ommercialization ould increase differentiation mong peas-ants that would n turn break their ies to tradition nd to longstandingwork patterns nd make them vailable for newforms f activity, nclud-ing political participation" Cumings 1981, p. 347; see also Paige 1975).In fact, Cumings's 1981) analysis f 15 countieswith elevant ata showsa significant ositive elationship etween C strength nd a morediffer-entiated ccupationaldistribution. hat is, PCs were strong n countieswith a low percentage n agriculture nd high percentage n skilled nd

unskilled ccupations, tudents nd professionals, nd school graduates"(p. 348). Also, of the 14 counties excluding Puk Cheju with no dataavailable),the even with high ccupational ifferentiation howedhighercommercialization han the seven others 64%of and in paddy fields s.52%). These data suggest ommercialization ontributed o uprising yproducing differentiated ccupational tructure ith workers, tudents,and intellectuals ho would play a key role n protest rganizations ikeGPCs in postwar Korea. Also, that peasants' protest xperience ad nosignificant ffect n the existence f a GPC (seetable 3)but needed to be

mobilized or prising y the GPCsuggests hat substantial art ofGPCleadership erhaps ame from ther han the peasantry, s is the case inmost ther easant uprisings nd revolutions Migdal 1974;Wolf 1969).6

16 Overall oormodel pecificationfPCstrengthn table also uggests need oincludenonagrarian ariables n the model o reflect he role of workers, tudents,and intellectuals n organizing nd mobilizing easants nto n uprising.

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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Analysisof peasant protest movements n the first alf of 20th-centuryKorea that culminated n the 1946 uprisings hows the mportance f ahistorical erspective n explaining ocial protest movements. he wide-spread peasant radicalism n liberated Korea did not flare up overnightsimply upon removal of Japanese rule. Nor was it either he result ofagitation y the North Korean communists s the official ccount of theuprisings laims see U.S. Army 988, 3:365-71),or as Henderson rgues(1968), merely n "anomic" and "pathological" xpression f the "root-less" mass. It had much deeper historical rigins. Postwar radicalismbuilt n peasant consciousness nhanced hrough articipation n colonialprotest nd resistance. articularly, olitical nd national onsciousnessraised through articipation n tenancy disputes n the 1930s and nur-tured during he war years hrough assive forms f resistance rovideda crucial resource for postwar activism. While destruction f colonialpower no doubt provided structural onditions or the uprisings seeSkocpol 1979), that Korean peasants could have been mobilized ntouprisings n the same way without uch political xperience s doubtful.A protest frame" to use Snow and Benford's 1988] term) reated bycolonialprotest nd resistance haped the ssues and targets f the 1946uprisings, nd these xperienced easants provided crucial resource orthe uprisings, hat s, a potentially mobilizable ody of participants.

Yet, while one cannot deny the role of some key eaders of colonialperiod red union movement n postwar ctivism, t the aggregate evelred union experience id not prove as crucial resource s tenancy is-pute experience. his insignificance ppears primarily oresult rom hefact that the movements nvited evere government epression hat may

also have impeded postwar organization nd mobilization f peasants.Although odirect est an be done with he Korean case, it would seemthat a chilly memory f repression r the presence f repressionwouldinhibit rotest ction seeMuller 1985;Muller and Seligson 1987).

Such varying ffects f different olonial protest xperiences ompelrethinking revious tudies hat ink postwar easant ctivism o colonialprotest xperiences without pecifying he kind of experience. As men-tioned bove, most previous tudies ink postwar ctivism o red unionexperience y examining solated ases (An 1990; Ch6ng 1988; Cumings

1981). Unfortunately heydo not consider enant protest xperience rmount any rigorous mpirical est. The statistical nalysis of colonialand postwar peasant activism dvanced here clearly hows that disputeexperiencewas more crucial to the occurrence f the 1946 uprisings.

While colonial experience n tenancy isputes ontributed o the 1946uprisings, his analysis also shows that this contribution urned upon

1618







Uprisings f 1946

mobilization y GPCs. That is, peasant consciousness nhanced hroughprotest articipation roved crucial to the occurrence f uprising nly

when mobilized through protest rganization. he detection f thisinteraction f past protest with an organization ariable s a substantialadvance over earlier ross-national tudies e.g., Gurr 1968)that argelyfailed to specify he mpact of past conflict n present onflict. urther-more, he political opportunity tructure uch as the power of the ocallanded class, measured y tenancy ate, was crucial for utbreaks. hesefindings ttest to the usefulness f resource mobilization heory n ex-plaining ocial protest movements ven n an authoritarian hird Worldcountry nd suggest hat we should view with caution works hat tressthe spolntaneous haracter f uprising see Cumings 1981). They alsostrongly uggest prisings erenot anomic ymptoms f ocialdisorgani-zation produced by decolonization Henderson 968,pp. 136-47)or sim-ply agitated by Soviet-backed orth Korea U.S. Army 988, 3:347-98).Rather, tatistical nalysis upports Cumings's 1981) claim that upris-ings were the result f effective mobilization f peasants affiliated ithlocal GPCs. Thus, the Korean case clearly howsthat both he historicalformation f consciousness hrough rotest xperience nd its organiza-tion and mobilization orprotest ction must be considered n any com-prehensive nalytical treatment f collective ction and social protestmovements.

Future research n social movements hould focus on the nteractionbetween nternal nd external esources n explaining rotests. Neitherconsciousness or collective nterests hould be assumed to be constantover time; nalyses of collective ctions must nclude the historical ro-cesses n which hey re formulated nd reformulated. lso to be furtherspecified s how historical xperience nfluences ubsequent ction other

than by raisingonsciousness, uch as by developing activist etworks"

(McAdam 1989;Taylor 1989) or by producing repertoires f collectiveaction" Tilly 1978). n addition, xperience ther han political, uch asin the workplace r the family, eeds consideration s a means of rais-ing collective consciousness or developing such networks or reper-toires Bourdieu 1985;Buechler 1990).In any case, history s not to betaken simply s a background or but as an integral art of collectiveaction.

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APPENDIXTABLE Al

GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS ANALYZED

Province Counties

North Ch6lla .................. Chin'an, Kuimsan, Muju, Changsu, msil, Namw6n,Sunch'ang, Ch6ng'fip, och'ang, Puan, Kimje, Okku,Iksan

South Ch6lla .................. Kwangsan, Tamyang, Koks6ng,Kurye, Kwangyang,Y6su, Sunch'6n, Kohfing, os6ng, Hwasun, Chang-hulng, angjin, Haenam, Yong'am, Muan, Naju,Hamp'y6ng, Changs6ng,Wando, ChindoNorth Ky6ngsang ........... Tals6ng, Kunwhi, Uis6ng,Andong, Ch'6ngsong, 6ng-yang, Y6ngd6k, Y6ng'il, Ky6ngju, Y6ngch'6n,Ky6ngsan, Ch'6ngdo, Kory6ng, 6ngju, Ch'ilgok,Kfimch'6n, 6nsan, Sangju, Mun'gy6ng, ech'6n,Y6ngju, Ponghwa

South Ky6ngsang ........... Uiry6ng, Ham'an, Ch'angny6ng, Miryang, Yangsan, Ul-san, Tongnae, Kimhae, T'ongy6ng, Kos6ng, Sach'6n,Namhae, Hadong, Sanch'6ng, Hamyang, K6ch'ang,Hy6pch'6n

Kyonggi ................... Koyang, Yangju, P'och'6n, Kap'y6ng, Yangp'y6ng,Y6ju, Ich'6n, Yong'in, Ans6ng, P'y6ngt'aek, uw6n,Sihfing, uch'6n, Kimp'o, Kangwha, P'aju, Chang-dan, Kaep'ung

North Ch'ungch'6ng ....... Ch'6ngju, Pofin, Okch'6n, Y6ngdong, Chinch'6n, Koe-san, Ums6ng, Ch'ungju, Chech'6n, Tanyang

South Ch'ungch'6ng ....... Taed6k, Yon'gi, Kongju, Nonsan, Puy6, S6ch'6n, Por-y6ng, Ch'6ngyang,Hongs6ng,Yesan, S6san, Tangjin,Asan, Ch'6nan

Kangw6n .................... Kangnfing, amch'6k, Uljin, Ch6ngs6n, P'y6ngch'ang,Y6ngw6l, W6nju, Hoengs6ng,Hongch'6n

NOTE.-N = 123.

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