The Hijaz, Abdulhamid II & Amir Hussein, 1877-80

8/9/2019 The Hijaz, Abdulhamid II & Amir Hussein, 1877-80

1/26

The Hijaz, Abdulhamid II and Amir Hussein's Secret Dealings with the British, 1877-80Author(s): Ş. Tufan BuzpinarSource: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Jan., 1995), pp. 99-123Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283701 .

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2/26

The

Hijaz,

Abdulhamid

I

and

Amir

Hussein's

Secret

Dealings

with the

British,

1877-80

$. TUFAN BUZPINAR

The

vilayet

of

the

Hijaz

enjoyed

a

unique religious significance,

as

the

birthplace

of

Islam,

the site of the two

Holy

Cities

of

Mecca

and

Medina,

and

the

object

of the annual

hajj

pilgrimage by

Muslims from around

the

world. Its

possession

was of

great

importance

to the

religious legitimacy

of

the Ottoman

Sultans,

who

since

assumingsovereignty

over the

Hijaz

in

1517 had

styled

themselves 'Servant

of the

Two

Holy

Places'

(Khadim

al-

Haramayn

al-Sharifayn).

Above

all,

the

possession

of the

Hijaz

under-

pinned

their

claim to be

considered

Caliphs

as

well as

Sultans,

and

thereby

guaranteed

the

loyalty

of their

Muslim

subjects.

As Abdulhamid

noted:

what is

desired

is the

endurance

of

the

state. This

depends

on four

things:

first,

protection

of our

religion,Islam;

second,

endurance

of

the

Ottoman

dynasty;

third,

preservation

of Mecca

and

Medina and

finally keeping Istanbul as our capital.'

Furthermore,

the fact that

the

Hijaz

had

religious significance

for non-

Ottoman

as

well

as

Ottoman

Muslims,

and

that

thousands of

non-Ottomans

visited

it on

the

annual

hajj,

served

to raise

the

Sultan-Caliph's prestige

among

Muslims

throughout

the

world,

and

offered

him

an

opportunity

to

spread

his

influence and the notions of

Muslim

solidarity

and

unity

generally

characterized as

'pan-Islamism',

among

non-Ottoman

Muslims.

The role of

the

Hijaz

in

the cause of

pan-Islamism

was

discussed

in an

anonymous

article in the Tercuman-iHakikat in 1881.2The

author,

who

mentions

that

he lived

in

the

Hijaz

for more

than seven

years,

and

was

well

acquainted

with

pilgrims

from

every

part

of the

Muslim

world,

suggested

that Mecca should

be used as a

distribution centre for

pan-

Islamic books and

pamphlets.

This,

he

argued,

could

easily

be achieved

through

a

pan-Islamic

society,

the

headquarters

of

which would be in

Istanbul.

Even before the

publication

of

this article

in a

semi-official

newspaper,

the Ottoman authorities had

made

attempts

to

use the

Holy

Cities for propaganda purposes. In late 1877 the Grand Vizier Ethem

Pa§a

was

instructed

by

Abdulhamid to send

several hundred

copies

of a

book

by

Ibn

Nuhas

Mashari'al-'Ashwaq

ila

Masari

al-'Ishaq

(The

Paths

of

Longing

to

the

Battleground

of

Lovers

[of

God])

and

an

anonymous

pamphlet

called

Mushir

al-Gharam

(Guide

to the love

[of

God])

to the

Middle

Eastern

Studies,

Vol.31, No.1,

January

1995,

pp.99-123

PUBLISHED BY FRANK

CASS,

LONDON


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3/26

MIDDLE EASTERN

STUDIES

Hijaz

for distribution

mong

hat

year's

pilgrims.

The fact that

the

book is

a detailed

exposition

of

jihad

(holy war)

in Islam

would

explain

n

itself

why

the Sultan

had ordered ts distribution n the

Hijaz. Although

the

pamphlethas not been traced, t could be concluded hat the authorities

had

found

he contents

of

both

publications atisfactory

or the

purpose

of

enlisting

Muslim

upport.3

However,

the

Hijaz's

nternational

ignificance

as a centre for world

Muslimscarried

risks

as

well

as

benefits

for the Ottoman

government.

t

attracted

he attention

of

foreignpowers

and,

above

all,

of

those

European

powers

whose colonial

expansion

had

brought

hem substantial

umbers

of Muslim

subjects:

Britain, France,

Russia and

Holland. All of

these

countriessent largenumbersof Muslimpilgrims o Meccaandheld the

Ottoman

government

esponsible

or theirwelfare.The Ottoman

govern-

ment was

prepared

o

accept

their interest

n

the

pilgrims

as

legitimate

and

co-operated

with

the

powers

n

drafting egulations overning

rans-

port, hygiene

andothermatters

affectingpilgrims

n

the

Hijaz.

However,

the

Ottoman

government

was

nevitably

oncerned est this nterest

n

the

welfare of the

pilgrims

develop

into an

attempt

to exercise

political

influence

n

the

Hijaz.

From ime to time

it

felt

obliged

o

complain

about

the attemptsof the Europeanconsuls nJeddato meddle n hajjaffairs,4

and,

as will

be

seen,

it had some reasonto fear that

Britain n

particular

might attempt

to undermine he

loyalty

of the

Amirs of

Mecca

upon

whose

co-operation

he maintenanceof Ottoman

authority

n

the

Hijaz

depended.

Yet

if

the

religious

mportance

of

the

Hijaz

is

set

aside,

the

vilayet

exhibited none of the

characteristics

f the

Ottoman

Empire's

'inner

circle'

of

provinces

those

provinces

whichhad been

fully

ntegrated

nto

the centralizedadministrative nd militarysystemdevelopedsince the

1830s.5

t

was remote from the

capital, poor

and

thinly

populated.

No

censushadbeen taken

there,

but

the best

guess

s thatthe total

population

of

three

major

cities, Jedda,

Mecca and

Medina,

was a little

more

than

100,000.6

This

population

was almost

entirely

Muslimand

Arabic-

speaking:

he

only

exceptions

were

a

number

of

non-ArabMuslimswho

resided

n

the

Holy

Citiesof Mecca

and

Medina,

anda few

foreign

raders

and

consuls

established

n

Jedda,

the

vilayet's

main

port.

The

Hijaz

had

no particular trategic importance:at the beginningof Abdulhamid's

reign

there were nc

more than a few hundred

egular

roops

n

the entire

Hijaz,

and their

numbernever rose

above

a few

thousand.

There is no

evidence that the

province

was

regarded

n

Istanbulas a

candidate or

economic

development. Financially,

t

was a

burden

upon

the

central

government.

For

example,

in

1884-85

the

total income of the

province

was

25,518,905

kuru§,

of which

only

1,533,934

kuru,

came from

locally

100




4/26

ABDULHAMID

II,

AMIR

HUSSEIN AND THE

BRITISH

raisedrevenue.

In

effect,

the central

government

was

obliged

to

dispurse

large

annual

ubsidies

o

the

Hijaz,

one thirdof

which

was drawn rom

he

revenues of

the

Ministry

of Pious

Foundations

and

the

remainder

rom

the FinanceMinistry.These subsidies upportedhe localadministration,

police

and

armed

orces,

but

in

addition

hey

covered

donations,

salaries

and

allowances

paid

to

Hijazi

notables,

sums

paid

to

bedouin

chiefs as

an

incentive o desist from

raiding,

undsfor

the

purchase

of food and

basic

commodities

or

the

population,

and

monies

devotedto the

upkeep

of

the

Holy

places.

One third of

the

subsidies were

allocated to the

surres,

donations

paid

annually

or

the benefitof

the

Holy

Cities,

he

hajj

caravan,

and

the bedouinchiefs who

controlled he caravan

oute.7

Governmentauthority n the Hijazwasweak, at least if authority s

interpreted

n

the

Tanzimat

ense as

centralized

administrative ontrol.

The

province

urnishedno

conscripts

nd

few

taxes,

and

aws and

regula-

tions

issued

from

Istanbulwere

by

no

means

fully

implemented

here.

Various actors

accounted or

this.

In

the

first

place,

the

Hijaz

was

not

a

settled

region.

Much of its

population

had a

tribal

organization,

many

being

nomadic

bedouinswho

lived at

least

partlyby

raiding.Fights

and

disorders

were not

infrequent,

and law and

orderwas

precarious

utside

the chief towns. Regrettably ittle is known about the complextribal

politics

of

the

region,

but these

undoubtedly

nfluenced

the central

government's

willingness

o

tolerate a form

of

dual

power

in

the

Hijaz,

underwhichthe

authority

of

its own

officialswas

qualified

by

that of

the

indigenous

Amirsof

Mecca. In

the

second

place,

the

Hijaz

was

poor:

the

vilayet

acked

he

financial

esourceso

sustain

an

efficient

administration

and a

large

garrision.

Finally,

the

strong

religious

conservatismof

the

Hijaz's

population,

reinforced

by

the

province's

dependence

on

the

annualhajj,distanced tsomewhat romtheOttomangovernment.From

the

start,

the

Hijazis

displayed

considerable

antagonism

owards

the

Tanzimat

eforms,

nd n

the

1850s he Amir

of

Mecca

Sharif

Abdulmuttalib

had led

an

unsuccessful evolt

against

them,

alleging

that

the

Ottoman

government

was

adopting

Christian

ways.

In

general,

the

central

govern-

ment seems

to

have shied

away

rom

nnovations n

the

Hijaz;

t is

striking

that

the

authorities hose to

collect

taxesfrom

he

wealthier

ribes

around

Medina

under

the

traditional

eligious

name

zekat

legal

alms).8

The

Ottoman

government

operated

a

unique system

of

dual

authority

in

the

Hijaz.

Like other

provinces,

the

Hijaz

was

administratively

ub-

ordinatedto

a Vali

who

served as

the

Sultan's

representative

and

was

appointed

and

recallable

by

the

central

government.

But in

practice,

he

Vali

was

obliged

to

share

authority

with

the

Amir

of

Mecca,

who

was

101




5/26

MIDDLE

EASTERN STUDIES

similarly

considered

to be the Sultan's

representative,

and was selected

by

the

Sultan

from

among

the

Sharifs,

he

descendants

of

the

Prophet

who

resided in Mecca.

The

institution

of

the Amirate

predated

the

Hijaz's

submission o

Ottoman

rule

in

1517,

and had been

maintained

hrough

three centuriesof Ottoman

rule

and the brief

period

of

Egyptian

rulein

the

Hijaz

n the

1830s.

Fromthe

1830s

onwards,

however,

t became the

custom

to select

the Amirs

from

only

two Sharifian

amilies,

the

rival

houses of Zawi Zaid and Zawi Awn. This

practice

had

been initiated

during

he

period

of

Egyptian

ule,

but hadnoformal

egal

basis:aslate as

1880 some Ottoman statesmen took the view

that the Sultan was not

obliged

to

limit his choice

to the Zaids and

the

Awns,

but was free to

select amemberof

any

Sharifian

amily.

But

the

reality

wasthatthe Zaids

and

the

Awns were the

two most

powerful

amilies,

and the

practice

of

conferring

he

Amirate

on

either

was a

useful

means of

pursuing

he

politics

of 'divideand

rule',

and

limiting

he

power

of

both. The

problem

was

that

the

rivalry

between the

Zaids

andthe Awns was

a

permanent

source of tension and

conflict n the

Hijaz,

and this

in

turncreateddiffi-

culties

for

the Valis

andfor the central

government.

Both familieshad

theirlocalclients

and

tribal

supporters,

and

the

reigning

Amir,

whether

Zaid or

Awn,

would

use

every

availablemeansto curb

he influenceand

undermine he

incomeof the

rival

house.

Valis found

t

difficult

o

main-

tain

good

relations

withboth

families,

andfound

themselves

easily

drawn

into local conflicts. As

will be

seen,

Abdulhamidwas more than once

obliged

to recallValis

who had

fallen foul of

the Amirs.

To

complicate

matters

further,

the

prerogatives

and duties of

the

Amirswerenowhere

ormally

defined

andthere

wasno

clear

demarcation

between the

authority

of

the

Amir and

that

of the Vali.

By

custom,

the

Amirsmaintained heir

own small

military

orce,

called

al-Bisha,

consist-

ing

of

approximately

00

men,

and

employed

heir

own

military

ides-de-

camp.

They

employed

secretaries

o

correspond

n Arabic and

Turkish,

appointeddeputies

to serve them

in

Jedda

and other towns n the

Hijaz,

and certain subordinate

officials who

dealt with

financial,

udicial

and

religious

matters.

They

also

enjoyedrights

of

adjudication

n

certain

egal

disputes,especially

hose

between

pilgrims

and

local

bedouins.9

From the availableevidence

it

may

be inferred

hat in Abdulhamid's

reign

central

government

ooktheview thatthe Amir'sdutieswere

first,

to

remain

oyal

to the Ottoman

Sultan-Caliph

nd

to

support

ndto

spread

his

influence

n

the

Hijaz;

second,

to

ensure

the

safety

and

property

of

pilgrims

nd

merchants;

nd

finally,

o distribute he surres

andother

gifts

and

subsidies

sent

to the

Hijaz,

and

to

do so

justly.

The

extent

of the

Amir's

other

powers

and

obligations

was left

unclear.

Indeed,

it was

not

even certain

whetherhis

authority

xtended

o

the whole

Hijaz

or

whether

102




6/26

ABDULHAMID

II,

AMIR HUSSEIN

AND THE BRITISH

it was

confinedto

Meccaand its

immediateenvirons.

In

certain

circum-

stances he central

government

was nclined

othe latterview: or

example,

it stated

that

the

jurisdiction

f the chief Kadi

of Meccawas

co-extensive

with that of the Amir, but addedthat this consistedof Meccaand its

dependentvillages.

But

on the other hand the

central

government

was

willing

to

accept

that

the

Amir'sde

facto

influenceextended far

beyond

Mecca,

andwas

quite

happy

o usethis influence or its

own

purposes,

or

example,

in

subjugating

roublesome

tribal sheikhs elsewhere

in the

Hijaz.

Indeed,

Abdulhamid

n

particular

ppears

o have

believed

that

it

was

the Amir's

duty

to

spread

he

influenceand

authority

f

the

Ottoman

state

among

the bedouins

of the

Hijaz.

0

Thepowersof the Valiwerescarcelybetterdefined.Intheory,the Vali

was

the

Sultan's

epresentative, mpowered

o

direct

and

supervise

ll

sub-

ordinate

Ottoman

officials: he

Kaymakams,

Miidirs,

Shaykhulharams,

officials

of

the

Prophet's

mosque

in

Medina,

and the

Muhafiz,

garrison

commanderof Medina. But he was

not

allowed to

appoint,

dismiss

or

transfer hese officials

on

his

own

authority.

Nor did he

have

any

clear

authority

ver

the

Amir,

though

he

Valis

were nstructed

n

general

erms

to

watch

over

the Amirs

and

ensure

they

actedwithin

reasonable

imits

a vagueenoughprovision,whichcoveredeverything romabusesof the

population

o acts

of

treason

against

the

Ottoman

Empire.

In

practice,

the main

duty

of the

Vali,

like

that of the

Amir,

was to

uphold

Ottoman

authority

n

the

Hijaz,

and to

protect

the

honour and

prestige

of the

Ottoman

Sultan-Caliph

n

the

eyes

of

the

Muslimsof the

world

-

the

pilgrims

who

came

on the

annual

hajj,

and

the

Indian,

CentralAsian and

Javanese

Muslims

who

choose to settle

in

Mecca for

religious

reasons.

Practically,

his meant

assuring

he

security

of the annual

pilgrim

aravans

and protectingpilgrims romdisease and othermisfortunes.It maybe

noted

that

the

only

formal

regulation

promulgatedby

the Ottoman

government

n

respect

of

the

Hijaz

was one

concerning

he

pilgrimage:

t

coveredsuch

mattersas the

transport

and

hygiene

of

pilgrims.1

Given

the

lack of

institutional

arrangements,

he achievement

of

the

Ottoman

government's

objectives

in the

Hijaz

depended

upon

close

co-operation

between the

Valis

and the

Amirs,

a

point

which the

Porte

repeatedly

impressed upon

the

Valis. In

practice,

however,

this

co-

operationwasrarely orthcoming.Either the Validominated he Amir,

or the Amir

dominated he

Vali. In

either

case the

aggrieved

party

was

loud in

his

complaints

o

Istanbuland in

demands or the

dismissalof

his

opponent.

Personalitiesand

connections

decided who

dominated: The

deciding

actor n the valis'

successor failure n

maintaining

heir

power

depended

to

a

great

extent

on the weakness

or the

strength

of

character

of

either

the Vali or

the

sharif

and

the

support

each

possessed

at

103




7/26

MIDDLE

EASTERN

STUDIES

Constantinople'.12

n

general

t

wasthe

Valis

who

were the losers.

Central

government

was

far more

willing

to remove a

Vali

than to

dismiss

an

Amir,

chiefly,

it

appears,

because

of a

reluctance o offend either the

Zaids or theAwns. Onlywhenan Amir's oyaltyto theOttomanEmpire

had

been

brought

nto

question

was the Sultan

willing

to

act,

as in

1880,

when

he

transferred he

Amirate from

the

Awns

to the

Zaids,

and

in

1882,

when

he

restored

t to

the

Awns.

Given all

this,

it

might

reasonably

be asked

why

the Ottoman

govern-

ment

tolerated the Amirate and

why

it did

not establish he Vali as the

sole

authority,

or at

least

produce

a

clear definition

of the

respective

powers

of the Amirand he Vali. In

1882

he Vali OsmanNuri

Pa§a

pointed

out that conflictsbetweenValis and Amirswere inevitableaslongasthe

powers

of the Amirs remained

undefined,

but it

appears

hat his

appeal

for aclear

regulation

f the issueremained nanswered.13Themoreradical

solution

of

abolishing

he

Amirate,

and

giving

all

power

to the

Vali,

was

canvassed

by

some

of

the Sultan'sMinisters

and

military

advisers

n the

mid-1890s.

Abdulhamid's

esponse

was

revealing:

he

argued

hat

in the

absence

of

the Amirate the Ottoman

government

would be

obliged

to

maintain

permanently

full

Army

Corps

n the

Hijaz

n order o

maintain

orderandits own

authority.14

Abdulhamidhadno love for the Amirate,

nor,

as

will

be

seen,

for the

Amirs,

but he

recognized

hat

they

offered

him a formof

government

n the

cheap.

His sole concernwas to

keep

the

Amirs

loyal.

This could

be achieved

by depriving

hem of

pretexts

and

opportunities

or

disloyalty.

Onthe one

hand,

conflictshadto

be

avoided

where

possible

and obstructiveValis

were

removed;

on the

other,

the

Sultan could

gradually

build

up

his

garrison

n

the

Hijaz,

introducing

smallnumbersof

additional

roops

on harmless

pretexts

and n

a manner

calculated not to raise fears. Each newly-appointedVali or military

commander

brought

with

him a small addition to the

Hijaz

garrison,

making

it

progressively

more difficult for the Amirs to

contemplate

revolt.

The

troops

were followed

by

the

telegraph:

a line

between

Jedda

and

Mecca was

established

in

May

1882.

Ultimately, they

would be

followed

by

the

railway.

Abdulhamid

governed

the

Hijaz

n accordance

with the

'characterand

disposition'

of its

inhabitants;

but in the

longer

term

he

sought

to

impose

centralization

y

stealth.

In

late

1877 the

Hijaz

was

effectively

under the control of the

Amir,

Hussein

Pa§a.

Hussein

Pa§a,

hen

president

of the civil servicedivisionof

the Council of

State

in

Istanbul,

had been

appointed

o the Amirate

n

July

1877

after

the

death of the

Amir Abdullah

Pa§a,

of the same

Awn

family.'5By

that time the

prestige

and the

popularity

of the Amirate

n

general,

andof the

Awn

family

n

particular,

were

to

some

extentrestored.

104




8/26

ABDULHAMID

II,

AMIR

HUSSEIN

AND THE BRITISH

Thiswasdue to almost

two

decades

of

successful enure

by

the lateAmir

Abdullah

Papa,

whose mild

and

co-operative

character eft a

positive

impression

on

the Ottomanauthorities

n

Istanbul:hence

the

decision o

appointhis brotherHusseinPa§a o the Amirate.

6

By

the

time he becameAmir of

Mecca,

Hussein

Pa§a

was

already

well

known n

Istanbul,

hanks o his service

n

highgovernment

ffices,

which

included

a

period

as a

member

of

the Councilof

State.17Withina monthof

his

appointment

o

the

Amirate,

he was awarded he

order

of

the

Murassa,

first

class.18

hus

equipped

with

mperial

avour,

andwith

familiarity

with

high-ranking

Ottoman

statesmen,

together

with the

inherited

prestige

and

popularity

of

the amirateand of his

family,

Hussein

Pa§a

was in

a

goodpositionto imposehisauthorityover the wholeHijaz.

He lost

no time in

doing

so. Within

a

few monthsof his

appointment,

Hussein

Pa§a,

backed

by

his brother

Awnurrefiq,

he defterdarof the

Hijaz

Ahmed

Majid,

and some

other

high

ranking

officials n

the

area,

had

requested

the

removalof

the

Vali

Takiyeddin

Pa§a

or

alleged

mis-

deeds.

The Councilof

Ministers

ccepted

he

Amir's

request.Takiyeddin

Pa§a

was recalled o

Istanbul;

Halit

Pasa,

a senator

n

the

upper

chamber

of the

parliament Ayan),

was

appointed

Vali in

his

place.19

Knowing

what had happenedto his predecessor,Halit Pa§achose co-operation

ratherthan confrontation

with the

Amir,

at

the

expense

of

leaving

the

initiative

o

the latter.

Hussein

Pa§a

soon

showed

himself to be an

extremely

clever and

ambitious

man,

who dared

to

pursue

a

bold but

delicate

policy

in

the

Hijaz.

While

outwardlypresenting

himself

as

a

loyal

Amir

who

protected

Ottoman

nterests,

Hussein

Pa§a

ecretly

worked o

undermine

Ottoman

authorityby

spreading

anti-Ottoman

views,

and

by

collaborating

with

foreign

representatives,

hiefly

with the

British.

Indeed after

seeing

the

dispatches

rom the Britishconsul

Zohrab,

one

gets

the

impression

hat

the

ambitious

Amir

succeded

n

influencing

ot

only

the Ottoman

officials

in

the

area,

but

British

officials

at

Jedda

as well.

In the

followingpages

the

Amir's

success

n

this

respect

will

be

explained

n

detail.

There is no

reason to

believe that

Hussein

Papa's

ecret

disloyalty

o

the Sultan's

government

and

his

attempts

to

cultivate the

British

were

grounded

n

particular

rievances

against

Ottoman

rule in

the

Hijaz.

As

already

ndicated,

his

relationswiththe

Ottoman

government

were

good,

andhe waspermittedandevenencouragedo exerciseconsiderableocal

authority.

Rather,

the

grounds

or

his

disloyalty

appear

o

have been in

part personal

ambition,

but

also a

belief,

not

uncommon

among

senior

Ottoman

unctionaries,

hat the

Ottoman

Empire's

prospects

of

survival

were

questionable.

From

his

position

at

the

centre of

government

n

Istanbul,

he had

personally

witnessed

he

protracted

eries

of

upheavals

and

crises,

domesticand

foreign,

which

had

culminated n

the

disastrous

105




9/26


10/26

ABDULHAMID

II,

AMIR HUSSEIN

AND THE BRITISH

the tribesof

Khaybar

had

been sheltered

by

him

and declared hat the

Shammaris

had

always

been

loyal

to the Ottomans and fulfilled

their

duties in the JabalShammar rea.

Ibn Rashid

addedthat

the

Anaze

and

othertribes nKhaybar adnothing o do withtheShammaris,whocould

be

neither

for nor

against

hose tribes. He

added

that since those

tribes

hadbeen

brought

under he

controlof the

Ottoman

tate,

his

predecessors

had

not

been

able to

penetrate

nto

that area.23

Ibn Rashid's

vague

response

satisfiednone of the

parties

concerned.

According

to

Sabri

Pa§a,

Ibn Rashid was

telling

one

thing

and

doing

another.

The Muhafiz

hought

that the

only

means to end Ibn Rashid's

misdeeds

and to make

him

pay

the

outstanding

ekatwas to

take some

strongaction:he askedthe Amir's consentfor a planto intimidate he

Shammari

sheikh

by sending military

units from

several directions:

Baghdad,

Basraand Medina.24

There were

several obstaclesto such a

military

expedition.

First,

the

authority

o

mountsuch

an

expedition

was

beyond

he

power

of

the

Amir

andthe Vali. Thismeant hat

they

hadto

refer he

proposal

o the

Sublime

Porte,

and in

the absence of an

efficient communications etwork

such

correspondence aturally

ook

quite

a

time.

There was also the

question

of the local climate.This was such thatmilitaryoperationswerepossible

for a limited

period

only, mostly

n winter.

Furthermore,

uch a

military

actionwas

inexpedient

romthe

financial

point

of view.

According

o

the

estimates

of

the authorities n

the

Hijaz,

the

money

that

they

hoped

to

obtain n

taxes fromthe

tribesunder he controlof

Ibn

Rashidwould

not

have

paid

the cost

of

the

proposedexpedition.

Despite

these

objections,

the

Vali and

the Amir

jointly

proposed

to

the Sublime Porte a

plan

for

military

action

against

Muhammad bn

Rashid.Accordingto the plan, forces of anti-Shammariribessuchas

Utaibah,25

abiigh,26 agoom,27

nd

Bilhaarith,28

ould

be

used,

in addi-

tion to

regular

roops

from

Medina and

Mecca and

local

troops

called

Aakil,

who

were recruited

rom

central Arabia and

served as

cavalry

guards

and

messengers

n the

Medina-Yanbu nd

Medina-Mecca

oads.

The aim

of the

expedition,

as

explained

n their

despatch,

was

either to

subjugate

Ibn

Rashid or to

remove him

from his

post

as sheikh of

the

Shammaris nd

install

one

of his

brothers.29

The Porte'sresponseto the proposalreflected the difficultieswhich

exercised

he authorities n

Istanbul. t

noted

that

because

of

the

delay

n

communicationshe hot

weatherhad

already

arrived,

andtherefore he

time for such

a

military

xpedition

had

been

missed:

For

such reasons . . .

the

question

of

punishing

[the

Shammari

shaykh]

would be decided on

later after

corresponding

with

[you].

107




11/26

MIDDLE

EASTERN

STUDIES

For the time

being

what s needed s to

make

necessarypreparations

anduse

peaceful

meanssuchas

advising

hem

[to obey

the Ottoman

government]

n

orderto

preventbrigandages.30

Another

area

where

the

Amir

Hussein used his

influence

to

protect

Ottoman nterests

directly

or

indirectly

was

the

heartof

the

Hijaz;

namely

theareabetweenMeccaandMedina.The

security

of this

part

of the

Hijaz

was

absolutely

essential or

hajj

observanceand

for

transportation

f

the

annual

surre,

presents

and basic commodities.Thereforeit was in the

interestsof the local

authorities,

as

well

as

those in

Istanbul,

to

ensure

that the

hajj

routes between the

two

holy

cities were

protected

and that

annual ubsidies o theHijazisweredulydistributed.Failure o distribute

the

latternot

only

causedbedouinraids

on the

pilgrim

aravansbut also

threatened

publicsecurity

n the

Hijaz.

The

1878-79

hajj

seasonoffereda cleardemonstration

f the

problem.

At the time when the

Syrian

hajj

caravan,

ogether

with other

pilgrims,

had

gathered

in

Medina,

the Muhafiz

of

the

city

Sabri

Pa§a

received

intelligence

hat sheikh

Huzeyfe, Shayhulmeshayikh

f the

Bedouins

of

Medina,

and sheikh

Fahd,

the leader

of

the Fadla

tribe,31

ere

going

to

attack the pilgrimson theirway to Mecca.The Muhafizrespondedby

changing

he

pilgrims'

oute

from

Tariq

al-Sultani o

Tariq

al-Fari'32nd

escorted

hem

with

regular roops

fromDamascus

o

Meccaand

Medina.

Despite

this,

the

pilgrims

were attacked

by

the

followers

of

the

afore-

mentionedsheikhs

at a

place

called

Madraj.33

Fortunately

or

the

authoritiesand the

pilgrims,

the Bedouins

were

defeated

by

the

escorting roops,

backed

by

additional

orces sent

from

Medina.

According

to Sabri

Pa§a,

at

the end of

fierce

fighting

which

lasted for abouthalfan hour the Bedouinshadlost more than 50 killed

and

over 150

wounded. The

troops

had lost seven killed and 10

slightly

injured.34

one the less the authorities emained

wary

est the Bedouins

seek

revenge

by

mounting

urtherattacks

and took

a numberof extra-

ordinary ecurity

measures.35s a

result,

the

pilgrims

were able to travel

safely

in the

Hijaz

and

to return

to

their countries.36

n

addition the

authoritieswere able

to

bring

stocks of commercial

goods,

which

had

been

waiting

or some

time

at

Yanbu',

up

to Medina.37

This ast measurewas mportant, inceoneof the authorities' rincipal

methods

of

deterring

Bedouin raids

on the

pilgrims

was

to distribute

annual

presents

andbasiccommodities

uchas

corn,

rice

and

wheat

to the

Bedouin

tribes,

before

and

during

he

hajj

ceremonies.

The distribution

was

organized

n

Rabigh

by

the

Vali

and the Amir's ocal

representative

Abdullah

Pa§a,

while

they

were

escorting

the

pilgrims

rom Mecca

to

Medina.38

ot thatthis method

of

pacification

uaranteed

uccess:

heikh

108




12/26

ABDULHAMID

II,

AMIR

HUSSEIN

AND THE BRITISH

Huzeyfe,

who had

participated

n

the attack

on

the

pilgrim

aravan,

had

in fact been

given

his annualshare

before the

pilgrimsdeparted

from

Medina.39

Withthe

exception

of the aboveincident,the

hajj

seasonof 1878-79

passed

peacefully,

but this did not mean

that

enduring

ecurity

had been

achieved

in

the

Hijaz.

The authorities

still

feared

that the

peace

was

temporary,

and that unless

raiding

Bedouins

were

punished

severely,

they

would

continue

to

threaten aw and

order in

the area. As a result

both the Vali

and the

Amir

asked

Istanbul

or

permission

o use

military

force

to

subjugate

he Bedouin

ribes nvolved

n

the

attack.40he

Council

of Ministers

xpressed

ull

support

or this

proposal

anddrew he

Sultan's

attentiono along-term anger:heystated hat fshaykhsikeMuhammad

ibn

Rashid and

Huzeyfe

were

permitted

o

behave

in

the

way they

did,

they

would

gain

the

support

of

other

tribes,

and cause

a

serious

problem

like that

posed by

the Wahhabis

at the

beginning

of the

century.41

he

Council

of

Ministers'

recommendation

was

presented

to

the Sultan

on

25

April

1879.

Abdulhamid's

esponse

to

some extent

reflectshis

policy

towards

he

tribalelements

n the

Hijaz.

He

declined

o endorse he

use of

military

orceand

argued

hatuntilsuch

imeas conditionswere

favourable

foramilitary xpedition,presents,decorations ndothermeansofpeace-

ful

persuasion

hould

be used instead.42

pecifically,

he noted

that there

were

only

two

understrength

attalions

Tabur)

n Mecca and

Medina,

each of 300 soldiers.

Thiswas

hardly nough

o

keep

the

main

routes

safe,

let alone

subjugate

ribes

in

the

interior.

Moreover,

if the

troops

were

sent

into

the

interior,

the caravan

routes

would

be

left

without

any

protection

while

a

good

half

of

the

troops

were

likely

to

perish

as a

result

of

the

harshclimateand terrain o

which

they

would be

exposed.43

The Sultandid not ruleout a military xpedition n thefuture,buthe

warned hat this

would

require

careful

planning

and

preparation,

ndthe

appointment

f

an

able commander:

To

achieve such

a

goal

Ferik

General)

Halit

Pa§a

should

be called

to

the

military

ffice

[sic]

to benefitfromhis

knowledge

of

the

area,

and

in

the

light

of his

(Halit

Pa§a's)

experience

and

observations,

a

plan

shouldbe

workedout and

accordingly

reparations

houldbe

completed.Whenall of themarecompleted,

not

to

face

any

diffi-

culty

and

get

the

benefit of

facilitating

conditions,

a

favourable

season should

be

chosen

for

sending

the

army

units.

Because

hot

weather s

dominating the

life]

in

the

Hijaz

now,

it is not

expedient

to send soldiers

after this time. Therefore

the

mattershouldbe

decided

n

the

future n accordancewith the needs

of

the

time.

Yet at

precisely

his

ime,

when he

Sultan ndhis

ministers

ere

considering

109




13/26

MIDDLE

EASTERN

STUDIES

the Amir's

proposal

to

strengthen

Ottoman

authority

in

the

Hijaz

through

military

action,

the Amir

himself was

secretly making

his

first overtures

to

the British. As far

as can be

discerned,

the

immediate stimulus for this

approach

was not a local matter

concerning

the

Hijaz,

but rather the war

which had broken

out

in

late

1878

between the

government

of British

India and the

ruling

Amir

of

Afghanistan,

Sher Ali.

The first

professional

consul

of the

British

government

at

Jedda,

J.

Zohrab,

entered into his

duties

on

1

March

1879.45After less than two

weeks,

on

12

March

1879,

he

received

a

secret

message

from the Amir

Hussein

Pa§a

offering

to

act as an

'intermediary'

between the

Afghans

and

the British. The

message

was

conveyed by

Zohrab's

dragoman

Yusuf

Kudzi

Efendi.46Hussein Pa§atold Kudzi that prior to the war in Afghanistan he

had

received

a

letter

from the Amir of that

country,

Sher

Ali,

who had

asked

him

whether the Indian Muslims would be

justified

in

taking

up

arms

against

the

British to

support

Afghanistan,

seeing

that the

govern-

ment

of India ill-used and

oppressed

the

Muslims. The Amir added that

he had

replied

that

'England

was

humane

and

just

in

her

rule over

Hindustan

.

..

[therefore]

he could not

credit

assertions

to the

contrary'.47

In his

message

Hussein

Pa§a

cleverly

prepared

the

ground

for

British

apprehension by saying that:

the

state of

Mussulman

feeling

in

India,

throughout

Asia and in

Egypt

is such that a

slight

event

might

create wars and

raise

revolt in

all Muhammadan

countries.

Suspicion,

mistrust,

doubt,

and irrita-

tion have

taken

deep

roots

in

the hearts of

the Mussulmans

and

these

sentiments can

only

be

gradually

eradicated

and

confidence

restored

by

the

exercise of

great

prudence

and

delicacy

and

by

avoiding any and every measure which might excite fanaticism.48

Against

the

background

of such a

supposed

state

of

Muslim

feeling

the

Amir further stated

that 'he would

be

happy

to

give

his aid to

[the

British

government]

in

any

question

in

which his sacred

position may

be of

any

use,

so

long

as such aid will not

prejudice

the

Sultan'.

As

for

the

Afghan

Amir,

Sher

Ali,

Hussein

Pa§a

suggested

that

in

order

to

pacify

him,

Sher

Ali's son

Yakub Khan and

other

chiefs in

Afghanistan

should be used.

If

the

British

government

entered into a

dialogue,

the Amir 'offers to

act as

intermediary, not officially but privately as if of his own accord'.49

Hussein

Pa§a's

timing

was not

right.

Sher Ali

had died

earlier

in

1879,

and the

British

government

was

about to

resolve

peacefully

its differ-

ences with

the new

Afghan

Amir,

Yakub

Khan.

However,

the

British

authorities

appreciated

Hussein

Papa's

offer and

foresaw that his co-

operation

might prove

valuable in the

future. Both

the

Foreign

Office and

India

Office

agreed

that

'it

might

possibly

be turned to

account at some

110




14/26

ABDULHAMID

II,

AMIR

HUSSEIN

AND THE BRITISH

future

ime'.50

ConsulZohrabwas

instructed o inform he Amirof

Mecca

that the British

government

'highly appreciate

the

friendly

feelings

towards hem

. .. and

that

shouldoccasionthereafterarise

for

profiting

by it, they will not forget that His Highness did . . . express his wish to

render hem

such assistance'.51

The Amir's offer

had indeed come as a relief to the

Foreign

Office.

Thiswas

a

time

when

many

British

diplomats

and

officials n

the Ottoman

Empire,

as

well

as

in

India,

were

worried

about

waning

British nfluence

among

the

Muslims

and the

possibility

of anti-British

ropaganda

y

the

Sultan-Caliph.

At

the

same

time,

however,

it

was

argued

that British

influencecouldbe revived f

the

government

ook

appropriate

measures.

Oneof them,assuggestedbyE. Malet,Secretaryo the BritishEmbassy

in

Istanbul,

was the

acquisition

f the

sympathies

f the Amirs

of

Mecca,

along

with

the establishment

of

friendly

relations with

the

ulema,

the

payment

of

subsidies

o

the Turkish

press,

or

possibly

he

setting

up

of a

Turkish

paper

owned

by

the Britishbut

managed

by

Muslims.52n

reply

o

Malet's

suggestion,

the

Foreign

Office noted

that

'a

friendly

feeling

on

his

[the

Amir of

Mecca's

part]

may fairly

be

regarded

as

proved'by

his

offer 'to act

as

intermediary

between us

and

the

chiefs

of

Afganistan'.

As for the questionof thepress,'itmaybe remarkedhat a contribution

from Indian

revenues has

for

some time

past

been

made

towards the

al-Jawaib,

an Arabic

newspaper

of

considerable nfluence

published

n

Constantinople'.

53

This nitial

approach

o the

British

was followed

by

Hussein

Pa§a's

irst

attempt

to

restrict

the

power

of

the

Vali

of the

Hijaz.

The issue

in

question

was the Vali's

place

of

residence.Unlike

the

Amir,

who resided

at

Mecca,

the Vali

was

free

to

resideeither

n

Meccaor in

Jeddaor

in

Taif.

As conceivedin the capital, this freedom of movement was intended

primarily

o

place

the Vali in a

better

position

to watchover local

affairs,

and

possibly

o

deter

the Amir from

any

adventure

against

he

Ottoman

government.

n

an

effort

to

change

his

rule,

Hussein

Pa§a

irst

spread

he

idea that the

proper

residenceof the Valiwas

Jedda,

and that

the

Valis'

preference

or

living

n

the

interior

was

promptedby nothing

more

than

desire or

their

own

comfort.The

logic

wasclear.

Sincethe

government

f

the

interiorand

its

purely

Muslim

population

was in

the handsof

an

able

administrator, amelyHusseinPa§a,whatwere the dutiesof the Valiin

Mecca? On the other

hand,

the

presence

of

the

Vali in

Jedda was

absolutely

necessary,

for

Jedda was

the chief

commercial

port

of

the

Hijaz

and the

foreign

consulateswere located n that

city.

Therefore

he

residenceof the

Vali

ought

to

be

permanently

ixed there. Suchwasthe

view

expressed

by

the

Amirto

Zohrab,

who

promptly

ecommended t to

the

Britishambassador

n

Istanbul.54

111




15/26

MIDDLE EASTERN

STUDIES

The

death

of the

Vali,

Halit

Pa§a,

in

early

June 187955

resented

a

perfectopportunity

or

the

Amir

to

express

hisviews

regarding

he

Vali's

residence

o the

government

n Istanbul.His

telegram

on the

subject

bore

a

striking

esemblance

o those

expressed

by

Zohrab:

Jidda

s in a sensitive

position

and a first

harbour f the

Red

Sea

and

there are

many

consuls

here,

largeships,

mostly

oreign,

come

and

go;

and

so there would

be

many

benefits

if,

instead

of

the

Vali

residing

n Meccaand

Taif,

Jiddawere

to be the

vilayet

centre.56

The

proposal

was discussed

n June 1879

at the Council of

Ministers,

whichconcluded,however,that'accordingo the requirementshe Vali

was free to

choose

Mecca,

Taif or Jidda

as

his

place

of residence'.57

he

Councilalso

proposed

hat

Nashid

Pa§a

be

appointed

he next

Vali of the

Hijaz.58

he

Amir

kept

a low

profile

for

the

remainder f the summer

of

1879

and

nothing

was heard

from him until

the firstweek

of

December.

He

even

delayed

his

response

o the letter

of

appreciation

ent

to him

by

the British

Foreign

Office on

7

August.

It

was

the

outbreakof a second

Anglo-Afghan

war,

n

earlySeptember

1879,whichprompted heAmirto renewcontactwith theBritishConsul

at

Jedda.

Through

Yusuf

Kudzi

and

Hasan

Jahur,

a

British

Indian

subject

who in

May

1880

became

acting

consul

at

Jedda,

he sent Zohrab

a

message

announcing

his

opposition

o

the

Sultan

and

to

Russia:

The

Sultan

no

longer

possessed

that

unbounded

allegiance

and

veneration

which his

exalted

position

and his sacred

character

as

Khalif

demanded.

People

asked

why they

should

respect

and

obey

a

man

who could

be dethroned

by

the

fetwa

of

an

inferior he

shaykh

al-Islamandwhy theyshouldveneratehim as therepresentative f

the

Prophet

when the same

decree

could

deprive

him

of

that sacred

power

and character.

So]

he

can not

be

undisputed

overeign

and

his

right

o

represent

he

Prophet

s

not

divine.Therefore

opposition

to him

is not

wrong

.

.59

The Amir

concluded

his

messageby

reiterating

his readiness

o

help

the

British

cause

whenever

and

wherever

t

might

be needed. 'Under

any

circumstances', e assured he Dragoman, Englandmaydependon me

to do all

in

my

power

to further

her wishes'.6

Barely

two

weeks

later,

the

Amir sent a

letter

to Zohrab

hanking

him

and

the British

government

or their

friendly

eelings

towards

him.

The

Amir stated

that:

It

has

given

me the

greatest

pleasure

and

feeling

of

gratitude

o see

that

the

Ministers

of

Her

Majesty's

government

regard

me with

112




16/26

ABDULHAMID

II,

AMIR

HUSSEIN

AND THE

BRITISH

friendship

.

.

it

is

well

knownthat

my

best wishesand endeavours

are devoted

to the interests of H.I.M's

government.

And

I will

always

use

my

influence

in

advancing

those interests not

only

privatelybut also whenI cando so publicly.6

The

Amir

added

a

note

asking

he Britishconsul o sendhim

n

confidence

a

person

to

discuss

he

question

of

Afghanistan.

On

receiving

he

letter,

Zohrabsent his

dragoman,

Yusuf

Kudzi,

with instructions

just

to listen

to what the Amir

may

have

to

say

but to make no

comment'.62

The

Amir's

overtures

coincidedwith

a

spate

of

reports

of

rising

anti-

Ottoman

feeling

in

the

Hijaz.

The Britishconsulateheard rumours

of

a

secretsocietyin Mecca,whose memberswere said to be dissatisfiedwith

the result

of

the

war with

Russia.

Its

memberswere

reported

to have

seriously

discussed

withdrawing

rom the

Sultanthe title

of head of

the

Muslims.63 onsul

Zohrabwas

continuously

upplied

with nformation

o

the effect that Ottomanrule

in

the

Hijaz

was weak

and that the

political

condition of the

Empire

was so

unstable

that it

might

soon

give

rise to

difficulties

n

the

Hijaz.

Zohrab was

'secretly

advised

by

the

highest

authority

n

the

province

to

request

that a British

ship

of war

may

be

stationed[inthe Hijaz]whilecertainpoliticalquestionswerebeingdis-

cussed

at

Constantinople'.64 cting

on

this advice Zohrab

requested

H.

Burness,

commanderof the British Red Sea

squadron,

to take the

necessary

steps.

In

addition,

several influentialArabsaskedZohrab

if

they

could become British

subjects.

Whatis more

interesting

s the fact

that an unnamedArab

of

high

standing

old

Zohrab

hat 'the time

prob-

ably

was

very

near when

England

would

be

asked

by

the

ecclesiastical

authorities

of the

Hijaz

to

assume he

controlof

allthe

pious

foundations

[Awkaf] in Turkey as the revenues accruingfrom them are grossly

misappropriated'.65

In

the

event,

England

was

not asked

by

the ecclesiastical uthorities f

the

Hijaz

to

assume

he controlof

the

pious

oundations

utwas

requested

to

accept

a

generous

offer

by

the

Amir of

Meccato ease its difficulties n

Afghanistan.

As

indicated

earlier,

in

January

1880

Zohrab had sent

his

dragoman,

Kudzi,

to Mecca

where he held severalinterviewswith the

Amir.

RegardingAfghanistan,

he Amir

blamed the

Afghan

chieftains

for the current roublesandaccused hem of usingthe fanaticalclansfor

theirown interests.He

anticipated

hat

the task of

pacifyingAfghanistan

wouldbe

long

and

difficult,

if

the

religious eelings

of the

people

were not

authoritativelyappealed

to'.66

He offered to send two

emissaries to

Afghanistan.

One

of them

was

to

be one of his own

people,

the other

would be Hassan

Khan,

an

Afghan

who

was

said

to have

been sent

on a

mission o Istanbul

ndto Mecca

by

Sher

Ali

before he war n

Afghanistan

113




17/26

MIDDLE

EASTERN

STUDIES

started.These emissarieswere to be

accompanied y

a

trustworthy

ecret

agent

of the Indian

government,

o thatno doubtwould ariseas to their

sincerity

and rectitude.67 he

Amir

added that

the

emissarieswere

to be

furnishedwith letters to the

Afghan

chieftainsand the

people

in the

following

sense:

The Mussulman

eligionrequires

or

its

support

he aid and

protec-

tion

of

England

.

..

without

[which].

. . the followers of Muhammad

will soon have

to

struggleagainst

orces which

will be

beyond

their

power

to resist

. .

.

therefore all Mussulmans

[were]

to look

upon

England

as

a firmfriendand able

protector

and

any

Muhammadan

opposingher policyor takingup armsagainsther, he [the Amir]

declareshim to be an

opponent

of

the

faith.68

Zohrab seemed

eager

to

accept

the

offer. He

immediately

went to

Cairo and

from

there

informed

Salisburyby telegram

of the Amir's

offer.69

n

a

supportingdespatch

on 9

January

1880,

Zohrab

depicted

he

Amir

as

'the

spiritual'

head

of the Muslims

and

asserted

hat 'the

Sultan

as

Caliph

holds

as

regards

he

faith what

may

be termed the

temporal

power '.

Therefore

any

kind of advice

or counsel offered

by

the

Sultan

will and must be regardedby those for whomit is intendedas biasedby

political eanings

.. andmust ose much

of its

power

and

value',

whereas

'whatever s said

by

the GrandSherif

[would

be] regarded

as

emanating

fromthe true

spiritual

head

of Islam'.70 ohrabadded

hat

he was assured

of

the

Amir's

goodwill,

andthatthe Amirwouldrun

any

risk n

supporting

British

policy,

whatever

t

might

be,

'if he

believed

he

wouldbe

supported

and

protected'.7

Writingprivately

o his friend

Mr

Alston,

Zohrabwas even bolder:

The

time

appears

o have

arrived

when

England

must cease

tem-

porising

with

Turkey

.. we are

bound

to

seize

every

means

[and]

every

weapon

whichwill

give

us firm

ground

o act on and

establish

our

authority

over Mussulmans

. ..

Such

a

weapon,

I

believe,

we

now have to our

hand in the

Hijaz

of the

Grand Sharif.

If we

establish

an

influence

by

a

kindof

protectorate

n the

Hijaz,

we

will

be

able to

govern

the whole

Muhammedan

world.72

Zohrabenvisageda 'tributarytate'in the Hijaz.HusseinPa§awould

be the head of the this state

andwould

be

protectedby

the British

govern-

ment

against

any

attack

by

the

Ottoman

Empire.

It

is natural

to ask

whether

this

revolutionaryprogrammeproposed

by

Zohrab

had

in

fact

been

directly uggested

by

the

Amir

Hussein

Pa§a.

Zohrab

admitted

hat

it

was

not,

but

emphasized

hat

his own

views reflected

he

impression

he

had

got

from

people

with

whom he

had

conversed

every

now and

then.73

114




18/26

ABDULHAMID

II,

AMIR HUSSEIN

AND THE

BRITISH

Be that as it

may,

there was

a

furtherreasonfor Zohrab'sextremism:

Hussein

Pa§a

had convincedhim

beyond any

doubt that the

Sultan

had

concluded

a

secret alliance

with

Russia

against

England.74

he Amir had

givenno details,buthe had assured he consulthatthisreportedalliance

had 'created

hroughout

Arabiaand

Syria urprise,

discontentandexcite-

ment'.75 he Amir

added

that he had seen

numerous etters

fromvarious

parts

of Arabia and

Syria,

which

expressed

anger

and

frustration,

and

showed that 'the Arabs of the two countries

(Syria

and

Arabia)

were

determined

o

oppose

any

alliance

which went

against

the interests

of

England

and France'.76Convincedthat

England

could work with the

Amir,

Zohrab

proposed,

as a first

step,

to

recognize

he Amir's

good

will

towardsEnglandand . .. the serviceshe hasrenderedn variouswaysto

British

subjectsby

conferring

n

him the

Star

of

India'.77

Zohrabwasnotthe Amir's

only

channel.He hadalsosentanunnamed

Arab to

Layard

withthe

suggestion

hat the British

government

should

avail

themselves

of

the

religious

authority

and

prestige

of

the

Grand

Sharif

n

Afghanistan'.

The

unnamed

Arab

advisedthe

British

govern-

ment to ask

the

Amir 'to

send

a

representative

r

an

agent

to

that

country

[Afghanistan]

o induce its Mussulman

population

o

enter

into

friendly

relationswithEnglandandpromoteBritishpolicy'.78fterseeingZohrab's

despatches,

Layard

concludedthat

his own informant had

been made

acquainted

with His

Highness'

views

and

may

have

been

authorized o

communicate to

[him]'.79

However,

Layard's

response

was more cautious

and

sceptical

than

Zohrab's.

He

attachedmore

importance

o the

Sultan

han to

the

Amir,

and was

wary

of

encouraging

he

Sultan's

suspicions

of British

designs

upon

the

Hijaz.

Layard

warned

his

government

hat Zohrab'sadviceto

confer the Starof Indiauponthe Amir 'shouldnot be adoptedwithout

very

mature

consideration'80nd addedthat 'we must be on our

guard

n

accepting

all

that

the

Sharif

says

. .

.

and

acting upon

it,

unless

we are

prepared

o

break

with the Sultan

altogether'.81

The Ambassador

ecom-

mended that

Zohrab

should be 'warned

o be

very prudent

and cautious

in his

communications

with the Sharif'.82

However,

Layard'swarnings

came too late to

prevent

some British

action.

Upon

receiving

Zohrab's irst

telegram

of

8

January,

he

Foreign

Office had communicatedts substance o the IndiaOffice,which nturn

referred

t to

the

Viceroy

n India.

Despite

initial

hesitation,

the

viceroy

accepted

the

offer,

with one serious

reservation: The influence

of

the

grand

sharif

might

be

advantageously

xerted

by

letter

and

agent

in

Afganistanagainst

anatics

as

proposed,

but it

very

much

depends

on

the

character,

apacity

and

good

faith of the

agent.'83

This

decision

was

then

communicated o Zohrab

n

Cairo,

and he

was

115




19/26

MIDDLE

EASTERN

STUDIES

given

authority

o

arrange

with

the Amir to

send

the

proposed agents

to India.84

Therefollowed

communications etween Zohrab

the

Foreign

Office

andthegovernment f Indiaas to theidentityandcharacter f theagents,

as well as their

expenses

and

transportation.85

ohrab

immediately

returned o Jeddaandsent

Kudzi

o Mecca o inform

he Amir

hathis offer

had

been

accepted.

The Amir was

delighted

and at

once

began

prepara-

tions. He held

meetings

withKudziand

Hasan

Johur,

andthen with

some

of the ulemaof Mecca.

According

o the

account

given

by

Kudzi,

who was

present

at two

meetings

with

the

ulema,

the

question

of

Afghanistan

was

discussed: the

Afghans

were

blamed

for

the current

troubles,

while

Englandwas praisedas just and generoustowardsthe Afghans. The

dragoman

lso had an

interview

with

one of the most

prominent

ulemaof

Mecca,

Sayed

Ahmed

Dahlan,

the ShafiiKadiof

Mecca.

Sayyid

Dahlan

joined

his

colleagues

n

condemning

he

Afghans,

andsaid

thattheir

duty

was to

accept

the termsthat were offered to

them

[by

the

British]'.86

Backed

by

the

ulema and

encouragedby

the British

acceptance

of

his

offer,

the

Amir

decided

o

come

to

Jedda o have a

finalwordwith

consul

Zohrab.87

Meanwhilehe had

changed

his mindaboutone

of the

proposed

agents,HassanKhan,on the grounds hathe wasintimatelyconnected

with

the Turks. The Amir reasoned that he

might

be influenced

by

the

apparently

ostile

feelings

of the

Sultan owards

England,

and so act with

less

sincerity

and

energy

hanwas

desired.

Instead,

Nahim

Molla

Nawab,

an

Indian who held the

position

of

doctor of

Religious

Law in

Mecca,

should

be sent to

Afghanistan.88

While the

preparations

or

the mission

were

going

ahead n

the

Hijaz,

Lord

Lytton,

the

Viceroy

of

India,

wasstill

expressing trong

reservations

aboutthemission,andasking ormore nformation bout heagents.The

viceroy

ndicated

quite

clearly

hat'Zohrab's

knowledge

of

the

questions

involved

. . .

[was] imperfect'

but

despite

lack of

information

about

the

agents,

'if

you

[the Secretary

of

State

for

India]

are

satisfied,

the

agents

can communicate n

arrival n

Bombay

with F.

Souter,

the

police

com-

issioner'.89

In

the

event,

no

further nformationwas

needed

because the

whole

affairhad

suddenly

become an

academic

ssuethanks

o the

assassination

of the Amir. Theassassinationtself remainsone of themanymysteriesn

the

history

of

the

Hijaz.

It

appears

hat the

Amir

made

his final

prepara-

tions for

the mission o

Afghanistan,

and left for

Jeddaon

13 March

1880

under

he

pretext

of

visiting

he rebuilt

port

and

restored

castle

there,

and

of

discussing

with

the

Vali

some

issues relatedto

Bedouin

affairs.90

On 14

March,

the

Amir,

accompaniedby

the

director

(Miudufir)

f

Harem-i

Sharif Ahmed

Efendi and

some

dignitaries

of

Mecca,

and

116




20/26

ABDULHAMID

II,

AMIR

HUSSEIN AND

THE BRITISH

escorted

by

his

aides-de-camp

nd

his own

soldiers,

entered

Jedda

and

proceeded

towards the residence of his

representative,

Omer

Nasif

Efendi. As he

approached

he

residence,

an

elderly

man dressed as

a

dervishmade a move as if to kiss the Amir'shand,andstabbedhim with

a

rusty

knife

just

below the

heart. The initial

impression

of

the doctors

who

carriedout an

operation

on

the Amir was

that the

wound was not

seriousand that he

would soon recover.But

he died of

internal

bleeding

the

followingmorning.91

The Amir'ssuddendeath

eaves

many

questions

unanswered.

Nothing

is known

about the final

wording

of the

Amir's etters or

the final choice

of

agents.

Why

did

the

Amir

wish to

see the

British

consul

in

person

at

Jedda?The assassinations equally mysterious.Was it because of the

Afghan

mission hat

the Amir

was killed?Was t

simply

because he Amir

made

no

secret of

his

pro-British

tance on

the

Anglo-Afghan

war?

Or

was it the work

of the

rival

family

Zawi

Zaid in

collaborationwith the

Ottoman

government?

It is

easy

to

multiply

these

questions,

but to

provide

a

plausible

answer o

any

of

them

seems to be

inconceivable ntil

further

evidence s

discovered.

During

he

interrogation

f

the

Amir's

assassin,

Seyfeddin

rom

Kabul,

none of the questionsrelated to the killingwassatisfactorily nswered.

Despite

attempts

by

the

special

Mejlis

convened

o

conduct

he trialof

the

assassin,

and

composed

of

members

of

the

mejlisi

temyiz

(council

of

appeal)

and

dignitaries

of

Mecca,

including

Hussein

Pa§a's

brother

Abdullah

Pa§a,

the

acting

Amir,

the

assassin

refused to

answer

any

questions.

He

simply

aid,

'I

dared o

commit uch

a

crime.I

have

nothing

to

say

to

The Hijaz, Abdulhamid II & Amir Hussein, 1877-80

Documents

Transcript of The Hijaz, Abdulhamid II & Amir Hussein, 1877-80