The Great Patriotic War - Miami-Dade County Public Schoolsteachers.dadeschools.net/dblackmon/IB...

IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon

Operation Barbarossa

My attempt to describe the war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union 1941-1945 in a few pages is laughablein its inadequacy. The attempt, however inadequate my time, scholarship, and ability to convey human experiencemay be, must be made.

The war is the largest, bloodiest, most savage war fought in human history.

Fundamentally, Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany were defeated in Russia, not in North Africa, Italy, or France.

The result of that war shaped the map of Europe for 40 years.

The experience of that war profoundly shaped Soviet foreign policy during that time period.

The real heroes of what the Russians call The Great Patriotic War are the people of the Soviet Union. TheRussian peoples were faced with a race war of annihilation. They responded to terrible privation, suffering, andmisery with epic courage, endurance, tenacity, and determination.

I. Origins of the WarA. Once Adolf Hitler became Führer, there was no question whether he would attack Russia, but merely

of when.1. This section will discuss Hitler's fundamental motivation, which are ideological rather than

economic or political. The next section will take up the question of timing: why did heattack Russia when he did?

B. Lebensraum1. Hitler was quite open about his desire for "living space" in

the east. All of the following quotations are from MeinKampf, written while in Landsberg prison and published in1925. Please bear in mind the date at which Hitler wrotethis. Then compare his ideas with what he actually did.

2. "One blood demands one Reich. . . . Only when the Reich borders include the

very last German, but can no longer guarantee his daily bread, will the moralright to acquire foreign soil arise from the distress of our own people. Theirsword will become our plow, and from the tears of war the daily bread of futuregenerations will grow." (Hitler 3)

3. "What form must the life of the German nation assume in the tangible future . . .?" (131)

4. "Germany has an annual increase in population of nearly nine hundred thousandsouls. The difficulty of feeding this army of new citizens must grow greater fromyear to year and ultimately end in catastrophe, unless ways and means are foundto forestall the danger of starvation and misery in time." (Hitler 131)

5. ". . . anyone who wants to secure the existence of the German people by a self-limitation of its reproduction is robbing it of its future." (Hitler 133)

6. "Without doubt the productivity of the soil can be increased up to a certain limit. But only up to a certain limit. . . . " (Hitler 133)

7. ". . . only those races are stricken with such suffering [hunger] which no longerpossess the force and strength to secure for themselves the necessary territories in

IB Contemporary World History Mr. BlackmonOperation Barbarossa

this world. For . . . there are . . . immense areas of unused [sic] soil, only waitingfor the men to till them. But . . . Nature as such has not reserved this soil for thefuture possession of any particular nation or race; on the contrary, this soil existsfor the people which possesses the force to take it and the industry to cultivateit." (Hitler 134)

8. "No one can doubt that this world will some day be exposed to the severest

struggles for the existence of mankind. In the end, only the urge for self-preservation can conquer." (Hitler 135)

9. "The acquisition of new soil for the settlement of the excess population possessesan infinite number of advantages. . . the possibility of preserving a healthypeasant class as a foundation for a whole nation can never be valued highlyenough. Many of our present-day sufferings are only the consequence of theunhealthy relationship between rural and city population." (Hitler 138)

10. "It must be said that such a territorial policy cannot be fulfilled in theCameroons, but today almost exclusively in Europe. . . . .If this earth really hasroom for all to live in, let us be given the soil we need for our livelihood. True,they will not willingly do this. But then the law of self-preservation goes intoeffect; and what is refused to amicable methods, it is up to the fist to take."(Hitler 138-9)

11. "For Germany, consequently, the only possibility for carrying out a healthyterritorial policy lay in the acquisition of new land in Europe itself." (Hitler 139)

12. "The talk about the 'peaceful economic' conquest of the world was possibly thegreatest nonsense which has ever been exalted to be a guiding principle of statepolicy." (Hitler 143)

13. "Never yet has a state been founded by peaceful economic means, but always andexclusively by the instincts of preservation of the species. . . . " (Hitler 153)

14. "Here ["the relation of Germany to Russia"] perhaps we are dealing with the mostdecisive concern of all German foreign affairs. . . ." (Hitler 641)

15. "The foreign policy of the folkish state must safeguard the existence on this planet ofthe race embodied in the state, by creating a healthy, viable natural relation betweenthe nation's population and growth on the one hand and the quantity and quality ofits soil on the other hand." (Hitler 643) [italics have not been added; they areHitler's]

16. "Only an adequately large space on this earth assures a nation of freedom ofexistence." (Hitler 643)

17. ". . . in addition to its importance as a direct source of a people's food, anothersignificance, that is, a military and political one, must be attributed to the area of astate." (Hitler 643)

18. "If the National Socialist movement really wants to be consecrated by history with agreat mission for our nation, it . . . must find the courage to gather our people andtheir strength for an advance along the road that will lead this people from its presentrestricted living space to new land and soil, and hence also free it from the danger ofvanishing from the earth or of serving others as a slave nation." (Hitler 645-6)

19. "The National Socialist movement must strive to eliminate the disproportion betweenour population and our area--viewing this latter as a source of food as well as a basis


for power politics. . . . And in this it must remain aware that we, as guardians ofthe highest humanity on this earth, are bound by the highest obligation, and themore it strives to bring the German people to racial awareness, . . . the more itwill be able to meet this obligation." (Hitler 646)

20. "The demand for restoration of the frontiers of 1914 is a political absurdity of suchproportions and consequences as to make it seem a crime. Quite aside from the factthat the Reich's frontiers in 1914 were anything but logical. For in reality they wereneither complete in the sense of embracing the people of German nationality, norsensible with regard to geo-military expediency. They were not the result of aconsidered political action, but momentary frontiers in a political struggle that was byno means concluded; partly, in fact, they were the results of chance." (Hitler 649)

21. "Today it is not princes and princes' mistresses who haggle and bargain over stateborders; it is the inexorable Jew who struggles for his domination over the nations."(Hitler 651)

22. "we National Socialists must hold unflinchingly to our aim in foreign policy,namely, to secure for the German people the land and soil to which they are entitledon this earth." (Hitler 652)

23. "The soil on which some day German generations of peasants can beget powerfulsons will sanction the investment of the sons of today, and will some day acquitthe responsible statesmen of blood-guilt and sacrifice of the people, even if theyare persecuted by their contemporaries." (Hitler 652)

24. "State boundaries are made by man and changed by man." (Hitler 653)25. "Much as all of us today recognize the necessity of a reckoning with France, it

would remain ineffectual in the long run if it represented the whole of our aim inforeign policy. It can and will achieve meaning only if it offers the rear cover foran enlargement of our people's living space in Europe. For it is not in colonialacquisitions that we must see the solution of this problem, but exclusively in theacquisition of a territory for settlement, which will enhance the area of themother country, and hence not only keep the new settlers in the most intimatecommunity with the land of their origin, but secure for the total area thoseadvantages which lie in its unified magnitude." (Hitler 653) (emphasisadded)

26. "The right to possess soil can become a duty if without extension of its soil a greatnation seems doomed to destruction. And most especially when not some littlenigger nation or other is involved, but the Germanic mother of life, which hasgiven the present-day world its cultural picture. Germany will either be a worldpower or there will be no Germany." (Hitler 654)

27. "And so we National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath the foreign policy ofour pre-War period. We take up where we broke off six hundred years ago." [theDrang nach Osten, a surge of colonization eastwards againstSlavic peoples and other groups, like the Prus--who gavePrussia their name--who were exterminated. The drive wasultimately blunted by Alexander Nevsky's victory over theTeutonic Knights. It left a very large German population in

what is now Poland and the Baltic states] (Hitler 654)


28. "If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russiaand her vassal border states." (Hitler 654)

29. "Here Fate itself seems desirous of giving us a sign. By handing Russia toBolshevism, it robbed the Russian nation of that intelligentsia which previouslybrought about and guaranteed its existence as a state. For the organization of aRussian state formation was not the result of the political abilities of the Slavesin Russia, but only a wonderful example of the state-forming efficacy of theGerman element in an inferior race. . . . For centuries Russia drew nourishmentfrom this Germanic nucleus of its upper leading strata. Today it can be regardedas almost totally exterminated and extinguished. It has been replaced by the Jew. Impossible as it is for the Russian by himself to shake off the yoke of the Jew byhis own resources, it is equally impossible for the Jew to maintain the mightyempire forever. He himself is no element of organization, but a ferment ofdecomposition. The Persian empire in the east is ripe for collapse. And the endof Jewish rule in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a state. We have beenchosen by Fate as witnesses of a catastrophe which will be the mightiestconfirmation of the soundness of the folkish theory." (Hitler 654)

30. "Our task, the mission of the National Socialist movement, is to bring our ownpeople to such political insight that they will not see their goal for the future in thebreath-taking sensation of a new Alexander's conquest, but in the industrious work ofthe German plow, to which the sword need only give soil." (Hitler 655)

31. "An alliance whose aim does not embrace a plan for war is senseless and worthless."(Hitler 660)

32. "The present rulers of Russia have no idea of honorably entering into an alliance, letalone observing one. Never forget that the rulers of present-day Russia arecommon blood-stained criminal; that they are the scum of humanity." (Hitler660)

33. "In Russian Bolshevism we must see the attempt undertaken by the Jews in thetwentieth century to achieve world domination." (Hitler 661)

34. "The fight against Jewish world Bolshevism requires a clear attitude toward SovietRussia. You cannot drive out the Devil with Beelzebub." (Hitler 662)

II. Immediate Origins of the German Invasion of the Soviet Union

A. Josef Stalin and the Marxist-Leninist View of Foreign Policy1. There is a very high degree of coherence to Soviet foreign policy under Stalin. There is

strong continuity between Stalin's foreign policy in the 1930s prior to the Nazi-SovietNon-Aggression Pact, to his policies between the Pact and Operation Barbarossa, andto his foreign policy following Barbarossa to his death. The extent of that continuitydoes not seem to have been appreciated by many Americans who should have knownbetter: diplomats and revisionist historians.

2. That foreign policy has two important components: historic Russian expansionismand Marxist-Leninist ideology. Orthodox Western historians of the Cold Warwill tend to emphasize the latter; Revisionist historians a bizarre form of the former (asyou may possibly have guessed, it so happens that I don't agree with the Revisionists). The two strands cannot, actually, be separated. Stalin was more powerful than any Tsarand he pursued a foreign policy that any Tsar would recognize; he was also a Communist


and his view of the world is determined by Communist ideology.a. There is an argument about Stalin's real commitment to Marxism-Leninism. He

never hesitated to flip flop ideological arguments in order to gain an advantage. Some Marxists believe that Stalin betrayed the Revolution. It is unnecessary forme to try to answer that argument here. Whether Stalin was a true believer or acynical power mad dictator, he certainly interpreted the world using the thoughtstructures of Marxism-Leninism, and that conditions all of his decisions.

3. "Soviet foreign policy was founded on the basis of Marxism-Leninism which propoundedthat capitalist and communist systems and states were incompatible and could notpermanently endure side by side, a collision between the two being inevitable andresulting in a final and complete victory for communism. The capitalist nations were tobe hastened to destruction by subversion and propaganda intended to discredit theirgovernments and social systems and sap the morale of their peoples. Differencesbetween capitalist countries were to be accentuated and fomented in order to weakentheir resistance and to establish communist states on their ruins. The Soviet Unionwas both the stronghold of communism and the springboard for the launching of worldrevolution and, as it later transpired, new foreign communist states as they emergedwere to be subjected by Moscow to strict and rigid control over both foreign anddomestic affairs." (Seaton 2) (emphasis added)a. The above quotation is not much in vogue in the halls of academe today, filled as

they are with Political Correctness. It sounds like an apologia for J. EdgarHoover's The Masks of Communism, which used to be required reading in thebad old days of the Evil Empire. It (my quote) is however, an extremely accuratedescription. Its defense is that it is true. And it should be obvious that, if it istrue, then a Cold War was inevitable regardless of whatever policy the U.S.might or might not have pursued. It was inevitable because Stalin was alreadyfighting it. George Kennan understood that perfectly, and pointed it out in the

Long Telegram.4. Lenin was forced to mute this hostility to the capitalist world in the mid-20s because he

needed Western assistance to rebuild his shattered country (sound familiar?)

5. Fifteenth Party Congress 1927a. Stalin returns to the classical line, saying that the "period of peaceful coexistence

between the Soviet and the capitalist states was coming to its end." (Seaton 2) Stalin established two important principles:(1) "The first was that the Soviet Union, as the foremost communist state

and bastion of the movement, was to be kept strong and intact ready tooverthrow tottering capitalism." [a fairly obvious rationale for Russianexpansion and imperialism]

(2) "The second aspect was the confirmation of expansionist aims bysubversion and the spread of communism, although the USSR wasunlikely to embark on direct aggression if this involved any risk toitself." (Seaton 2) (emphasis added)

(3) These policies must be borne in mind when evaluating Western attitudestowards the USSR in the 1930s. Western diplomats tended to regard the

Communists as a species of adder. As we all know, "Just becauseyou're paranoid doesn't mean that they aren't out to get you!"


B. Josef Stalin1. It is my opinion that Josef Stalin is among the top three candidates for the dubious title

of "Most Evil Man in History." I tend to put Hitler first, with Stalin second. The fullstory on Stalin is not known. Perhaps, after the fall of the Soviet Union, it will beknown, but my guess is that much has been irretrievably lost.

2. "[There is no possible doubt that Stalin was in complete and undisputed control of thegovernment within the Soviet Union and that he alone formulated all important policy,taking a close and personal interest in its execution." (Seaton 4)a. Stalin possessed a persecution complex that was pathological. He saw enemies

everywhere.b. He was profoundly deceitful in all relationships, even within his immediate

circle.c. Stalin possessed the kind of "brutal will-power" that Hitler admired.d. Stalin was cunning, devious and intelligent.e. Stalin was dogmatic and narrow on economic, political, or social matters.f. Stalin was capricious, obstinate, and malicious.g. His immediate entourage lived in constant terror. (Seaton 5)

C. A Chronology of Events Up to Barbarossa

1. The Munich Crisisa. Hitler's point of view has already been dealt with. Stalin's policy seems to have

been pious, and duplicitous. Stalin made assurances of support toCzechoslovakia which could not have been fulfilled (the USSR had nocontiguous border with Czechoslovakia). Those assurances were deliberatelyvague. He apparently was hoping to embroil the capitalists in internecine strife. Later on, Stalin successfully portrayed himself as having sought collectivesecurity against Hitler with Great Britain and France only to be disillusioned bythe weak-kneed policy of appeasement. This supposedly forced him toreconsider his options. A collective security agreement with capitalists againstanother capitalist would however be out of keeping with his ideology. A closeexamination of Soviet diplomacy supports this skepticism.

2. The Eighteenth Party Congress March 10, 1939a. "Stalin spoke out clearly and unequivocally when he confirmed that at all costs

he was not going to involve the USSR in war for the benefit of others. Thispolitical line was taken up by the Soviet press which said even more explicitlythat the USSR was not going to be dragged into a war against Germany by themachinations of Great Britain and France." (Seaton 7) (italics added)

3. March 15, 1939 Germany absorbs Bohemia and Moravia whileSlovakia becomes a German puppet state. (Bell 250)

4. March 23, 1939 Lithuania is forced by Germany pressure tocede Memel. (Watt 157, Bell 250)

5. April 15, 1939 Talks begin between the British Ambassador to Moscow and RussianForeign Minister Litvinov. Stalin however begins parallel talks in secret in Berlin

6. May 3, 1939 Stalin provides an opening for Hitler by replacing Maxim Litvinov, whowas a Jew, with Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov.

7. May 1939 Japanese troops from the radical Kwantung Army crossed the Manchurianborder at Khalkin Gol into Soviet territory. This is their second major incursion. The


campaign is largely unknown in the West (although recently a study has been published). The Japanese forces seized territory and dug in for a defensive battle, forcing the RedArmy to come to them. Forces available give a slight advantage to the Soviets--35 riflebattalions, 20 cavalry squadrons, 500 tanks and 500 aircraft to 25 rifle battalions, 17cavalry squadrons, 180 tanks and 450 aircraft. The rule of thumb is that an attackerneeded a 3:1 advantage; the Japanese felt confident.

8. August 11, 1939 Hitler discusses the Polish situation with Jacob Burckhardt, the Leagueof Nations high commissioner for Danzig. Hitler told him that he planned to destroy

Poland quickly. He then added, remarkably, "Everything that I undertake isdirected against Russia; if the West is too stupid and too blind to grasp this, Iwill be obliged to come to an understanding with the Russians, to defeat theWest, and then after its downfall to turn my assembled forces against the SovietUnion." (Rich 126) (emphasis added; note the date; as with his statement to Edenprior to the Night of the Long Knives, Hitler has already made up his mind as to hiscourse of action)

9. August 20, 1939 Hitler forces the pace, sending Foreign Minister JoachimRibbentrop to Moscow with powers to sign a nonaggression pact and an economicagreement.

10. August 20-31, 1939 Future Marshall Georgi Zhukov launches a double envelopment ofthe Japanese at Khalkin Gol, inflicting casualties in a ratio of 4:1, and driving theJapanese across the border. (Messenger 122)

11. August 22, 1939 At the Berghof Conference, Hitler collected his generals and toldthem of the imminent Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. "Now we can strike at the heartof Poland--I have ordered to the East my Death's Head units [of the SS] with the orderto kill without pity or mercy all men, women, and children of Polish race or language.. . . [The speech was interrupted at this point by Göring leaping upon a table to dance inLederhosen ] There is no time to lose. War must come in my lifetime. My pact wasmeant only to stall for time, and, gentlemen, to Russia will happen just what I havepracticed with Poland--we will crush the Soviet Union." (Clark 25) (emphasis added) The recorded reactions from the generals include disapproval of Göring's antics but notof Hitler's declared policy.

12. August 23, 1939 Announcement of the Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact. a. If either became involved in a war, the other would

remain neutral. Secret provisions divided Poland intohalves. Russia received a free hand in Finland,Estonia and Latvia; Germany in Lithuania. Russianinterest in Rumanian Besserabia was recognized;Germany declares that it had no interest in Rumania and the Balkans.

b. The economic agreement provided that the USSR would supply grain, oil, cattle,coal, lead and zinc. These provisions would go far toward reducing Germany'svulnerability to British blockade. In addition, Russia could prove a conduit forother vital materials, such as rubber, which Russia itself did not supply.

c. Stalin must have been well-satisfied. He expected that Germany would nowbecome embroiled in a war with France and Great Britain, which he expectedwould be long and bloody. In the meantime, he could exert Russian control overthe Baltic. Furthermore, the economic provisions would tend to make Germany


an economic dependency of Russia, which Stalin could revoke at will. As itturned out, Stalin was so unprepared for Barbarossa because he simply couldnot believe that Hitler would attack his economic life-line while he was stillinvolved in a war in the West.

d. Hitler, however, was also well satisfied. He had ordered Ribbentrop to paywhatever was necessary. Once he had accomplished his immediate goals, Hitlerwould simply break the agreement. Hitler had cleared his front of the Russianthreat for the moment, and genuinely believed that, with Russia out of theequation, Great Britain and France would not fight for Poland at all.

13. The Kremlin then assured Poland of its benevolent neutrality and promised assistance inthe event of war. Such duplicity could only have been aimed at encouraging Polishresistance and bringing about a general war. (Seaton 10)

14. September 16, 1939 A truce is signed between the Soviet Union and Japan. Japan isshocked at the Nazi-Soviet Pact. After Khalkin Gol, the Japanese are extremely wary ofchallenging the Red Army. This has long-term effects. a. Hitler failed miserably to coordinate his strategy with Japan with regard to

Russia. A simultaneous attack by Germany and Japan in 1941 might havetoppled Stalin. Instead, Hitler did not even inform his nominal ally of hisdecision. For their part, the wing within the Japanese military which advocatedexpansion toward the south and east (Indochina, Dutch East Indies, China,Philippines) won the fierce debate with those who saw Russia as the great enemy(China and Manchuria). In other words, Japan turned their attention in thedirection of the United States and its interests.

b. However, the Japanese Army maintained very large forces facing the Russiansthroughout the war--among them their best Army divisions, thus making themunavailable to face the United States. They began transferring these units late inthe war (to the Philippines and Okinawa), and then found that their loss ofcontrol of the sea made it difficult to transfer them at all.

c. Furthermore, the Japanese refused to interfere with the shipment of suppliesfrom the United States (with whom Japan was at war) to Russia (with whom theywere not at war) via Vladivostok. This is despite the fact that Japan'sgeographical position would have made it very difficult to use that route. ThePacific route proved to be the most reliable supply line for Lend-Lease toRussia.

d. Russia, for their part, began transferring much of their Siberian Army to face theGermans once they were convinced that the Japanese would not attack. TheseSiberian units were decisive in the defense of Moscow in 1941-42.

e. Hitler's diplomacy toward Japan is grossly mishandled.15. September 17, 1939 Stalin orders the Red Army to invade Poland. Germany and Russia

complete a partition of Poland along the line of the Bug.16. October 10, 1939 Russia imposes treaties on the Baltic States, forcing them to grant

military basing privileges to the Red Army. (Calvocoressi 593, Liddell Hart I 43)17. The Kremlin places pressure on Turkey to grant joint-control of the Bosporus and the

Dardanelles. Stalin will return to this following World War II; it will precipitate theTruman Doctrine.

18. November 30, 1939 Stalin demands a "mutual aid pact" of Finland similar to those ofthe Baltic States. Specifically, he demands the Karelian Isthmus (which placed the


Finnish border within artillery range of Leningrad), the Finnish shore of Lake Ladoga,transit to the nickel mines at Petsamo, and basing privileges at Hangö on the Baltic. a. At the risk of defending a man like Stalin, a close examination of the demands

leaves little to fault him with, provided that we assume that he is brutallyinterested in defending the USSR without regard to the tender sensibilities of hisneighbors. The bases and the Karelian border are rationally related to thedefense of Leningrad. In particular, the new proposed border for Karelia left the

Finnish Mannerheim Line intact. Stalin offered territorial adjustments thatwould actually lead to a net gain in Finnish territory (albeit mostly swamp andforest).

b. The Finns, however, rejected the demands. They are deeply suspicious of theRussians, with good reason. The USSR invades.

c. The first campaign is a disaster for the Red Army. The Finns proved themselvesto be superb soldiers. Fighting in their own swamps and forests during winter,the Finns prove to be without equals. Although hopelessly outnumbered in menand equipment, they cut the Red columns to pieces.

d. The Red Army learns from the disaster. Greater forces are deployed, and muchmore attention given to proper preparation. The Red Army attacks in meat-grinder fashion in hopelessly overwhelming force. Despite their heroism, theFinns are beaten. On March 6, 1940, the Finns sue for peace.

e. Stalin increases his demands to include all of Karelia as well as additionalterritory. He does not push it as far as he might have. He is glad to release1,000,000 soldiers from the front when danger threatens in Poland. (Liddell HartI 46)

19. June 22, 1940 France's capitulation shocks Stalin. He realizes that the USSR is now inreal danger.

20. Mid-June 1940 Russia occupies and absorbs the BalticStates: Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. This included partof Lithuania that had previously been assigned to Germany.(Rich 133)

21. June 27, 1940 Russia seizes Bessarabia and NorthernBukovina from Rumania. Bessarabia had been covered by theNazi-Soviet Pact; Bukovina had not. To make things worse,Hitler was unaware that Ribbentrop had declared Germany's

"disinterest" in the Balkans. Bukovina placed the Ploesti oilfields in Rumania, threats to which Hitler was extremelysensitive, within reach of the Red Air Force.a. The combination of these actions placed Stalin in a position to threaten Hitler's

access to Petsamo nickel and Swedish iron ore, both of which were vital toHitler's war effort. They could also threaten the Ploesti oil fields. Rumaniaproduced 7 million tons of oil out of Germany's war-time requirement of 12-20million tons. (Rich 182)

b. Other economic interests potentially threatened were 23% of world bauxite fromYugoslavia and Hungary, 20% of world chrome from Turkey, 10% of worldantimony plus copper and lead from Yugoslavia, plus cotton, flax, wool and foodfrom the region in general. (Rich 182)

22. June 30, 1940 German Chief of Staff Franz von Halder records that Hitler spoke of


turning to the east. (Seaton 36)23. July 22, 1940 Halder's diary outlines a Russian campaign. (Seaton 36)24. Late July 1940 Hitler tells his generals "Russia need say no more to England than

that she does not want Germany to be great. Then the English, like a drowningman, will have reason to hope that things will be entirely different in six to eightmonths. Should Russia, however, be smashed, then England's last hope isextinguished. The elimination of Russia would also eliminate Britain's othergreat hope, the United States, because the Americans would then be left alone toface the enormously increased power of Japan in the Far East." (Rich 209)

25. July 29, 1940 At the Bad Reichenhall conference, Chief of Staff of the German High

Command of Armed Forces (OKW) Alfred Jodl quoted Hitler as having decided on apreventive attack on Russia. Formal planning begins. (Seaton 36, Clark 24)

26. August 1940 Hitler secures an agreement with Finland to allow transit to and fromnorthern Norway, and to quarter German troops in Finland.

27. August 30, 1940 The Vienna Award. Hitler solves a long standing territorial disputebetween Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania by awarding part of Transylvania to Hungary,Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria, and guaranteeing Rumania's borders against all furtherincursions. German troops transit Hungary to enter Rumania to secure the oil fields. Russia, despite consultative clauses in their pact, is not consulted or informed. Hitlerignores their protest.

28. September 27, 1940 Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan is signed. Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis is now formed, which the Kremlin regards as aimed at them. Stalin is not unduly perturbed however, since Hitler is doing what Stalin expected him todo and what he, Stalin, would do in Hitler's place: duel over control of Finland and theBalkans. He did not believe Hitler would attack him until the war in the West was settledbecause Hitler was economically too dependent upon Russia. (Seaton 13)

29. October 26, 1940 Stalin occupies islands at the mouth of the Danube. This could onlyhave been seen as a provocation.

30. October 28, 1940 Mussolini invades Greece. Hitler did not know of this plan, and wasvery unhappy about it. The Greeks stop Mussolini cold, but request aid of the British,who are more than eager to offer it. This will place the RAF potentially within strikingdistance of Ploesti. Hitler describes that prospect to the Duce as "terrifying." (Rich 197) Hitler must now take steps to secure his southern flank. Hitler is still an evil man; in thisinstance, however, he would have greatly preferred to have maintained indirect controlover Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Yugoslavia. He had no desire to invade Greece; itwas a rational defensive response to events. German occupation in Yugoslavia andGreece was especially brutal.

31. November 1940 Hitler issues Führer Directive No. 18 confirming orders alreadygiven verbally "irrespective" of negotiations with Molotov. (Clark 24)

32. November 12, 1940 Molotov goes to Berlin to talk to Ribbentrop. He ignored Germanproposals to turn Russian attention to the Persian Gulf. He responded with "a longmonologue in which he repeated the well-known Soviet aspirations in Finland, SouthernBukovina and the Dardanelles Straits. Molotov wanted German troops out of Finland,and Japan to renounce her concession rights to coal and iron in North Sakhalin. Hefurther proposed that the Soviet Union should issue a guarantee to Bulgaria, similar tothat given by Germany to Rumania, with the additional right to set up bases capable of


controlling movement through the Turkish Straits. . . . [Later that night] Molotovrevealed his secondary spheres of interest, which included Greece, Yugo-Slavia,Hungary and Poland and the control of the Baltic Sea." (Seaton 13) (italics added)

33. November 1940 Rumania signs the Tripartite Pact.34. January 9, 1941 Hitler tells his generals, "The Russians promise to supply us with the

quantities of nickel required, but only so long as they please." and "Russia can turn theRumanian oil fields into an expanse of smoking debris . . . and the life of the Axisdepends on those oil fields." (Rich 206-7, 211)

35. March 1, 1941 Hitler forces Bulgaria to sign the Tripartite Pact as an ally. Germantroops enter Bulgaria.

36. March 25, 1941 Hitler forces Yugoslavia to sign the Tripartite Pact.37. March 27, 1941 A coup d'etat in Yugoslavia overthrows the government and installs a

military regime hostile to Germany. Russia signs a Treaty of Friendship with the newgovernment, making assurances of military assistance.

38. March 30, 1941 Hitler addresses senior commanders and tells

them they would wage a "race war without pity." "The war

against Russia will be such that it cannot be conducted in a knightly fashion; thestruggle is one of ideologies and racial differences and will have to be conductedwith unprecedented, unmerciful and unrelenting harshness. All officers will haveto rid themselves of obsolete ideologies. I know that the necessity for such meansof making war is beyond the comprehension of your generals but . . . I insist that my orders be executed without contradiction. The commissars are thebearers of ideologies directly opposed to National Socialism. Therefore thecommissars will be liquidated. German soldiers guilty of breaking international law .. . will be excused. Russia has not participated in the Hague Convention andtherefore has no rights under it." (Keegan Second World War 186)(emphasis added) "The responsibility for the occupiedterritories was to be handed to the SS, and order was to bemaintained by the deliberate spreading of terror. This wasto be achieved by mass murder, torture, deportations andconfiscations irrespective of sex or age. . . . [Hitler's]intention was to prepare his commanders psychologically forthe new pattern of ideological war, complete in itstotality, a war which would be fought by both sides withoutcompassion or mercy, without honor or decency. . . . [Theseorders were followed by others ] forbidding the surrender ofLeningrad and Moscow, and ordering the encircled cities tobe razed to the ground by shell fire and bombing. Thefemale population of Stalingrad was to be transported andthe males destroyed." (Seaton 54-5) (emphasis added)

39. March 1941 Plans were well along for the economic exploitation of the Soviet Union,under the direction of Göring, Rosenberg, and Himmler (all of whom fought each otherviciously for turf). Göring's plans envisioned short-term economic benefits, with anemphasis upon rebuilding necessary transportation, and restoring oil and grainproduction. No other reconstruction was to be undertaken. "According to the estimatesof German economic experts, it was quite possible that as a result of the proposedGerman economic policies in the Soviet Union millions of Russians would starve to


death. This was an eventuality which the Nazi leadership was evidently perfectlywilling to face." (Rich 217) (emphasis added)

40. April 5, 1941 Russia backs away from their pledges of military support.41. April 6, 1941 German troops invade Yugoslavia and bomb Belgrade. Yugoslavian

resistance disintegrates. The campaign is a "military promenade." The Yugoslavianarmy surrenders on April 17. (Rich 194)

42. April 1941 The Soviet Union, in accordance with their treaty obligations, deliver200,000 tons of grain and 90,000 tons of petroleum to Germany. (Seaton 15)

43. Beginning of June 1941 The US embassy in Moscow delivers intelligence to theKremlin of an impending German invasion of Russia.

44. June 10, 12, 13 The British brief the Russian Ambassador on three occasions of theGerman build-up in the East.a. Stalin dismisses the warnings (including, as well, extremely accurate reports

from Richard Sorge, his spy in Tokyo). "Stalin, cautious and doubtful,continued to appraise the situation coolly and logically. The mistake he madewas to put himself mentally into Hitler's place and view the European and worldsituation through his own communist eyes, rather than to study the Germandictator's mentality and appreciate what he, the Führer, was likely to do in agiven set of circumstances. Stalin could not bring himself to believe that theGermans would defy all reason and enter into a war on two fronts. . . . Hiscommunist logic told him that the obvious salvation of the British lay inprovoking a war between Germany and the Soviet Union by intrigue and lies."(Seaton 20-21)

III. The LeadersA. German Leaders

1. The Russian campaigns are dominated to a very high degree by Adolf Hitler. By theend of the war, Hitler was maneuvering platoons.

2. Other important leaders include:

a. Chief of the Army General Staff Franz von Halderb. Chief of Staff German High Command of Armed Forces (OKW) Alfred Jodlc. Col. General Heinz Guderian, commander of the Second Panzer Group.

Guderian is the architect of the Blitzkrieg, the one man in Europe whounderstood armored war the best, and whose strategic views provided Germany'sbest hope for victory.

d. Field Marshall Gerd von Rundstedt, Commander in Chief, Army GroupSouth. Rundstedt was regarded by his peers as the epitome of a German soldier.

B. Russian Leaders

1. Josef Stalin completely dominated his generals as well, and took a detailed interest inoperations. We do not know the full details. He evidently made a lot of mistakes, as didHitler. However, surviving Russian generals were more than reluctant to criticize him intheir memoirs. It is clear, however, that Stalin established a more realistic and competentrelationship with his generals than did Hitler. The fact is, that after the initialcatastrophe, the quality of Russian strategic operations was much better (usually) thanthat of the Germans' at the same level. German superiority lay at the operational andtactical level. Had Hitler given a free hand to Guderian, Manstein, Rundstedt, Höppner,or Kleist, etc., it might have been different. On the other hand, had Stalin given a free


hand to Zhukov, Rokosovsky, Vatutin, or Chuikov, it would have balanced out. At anyrate, Stalin was as incapable of giving his generals free rein as Hitler was.

2. Marshall G. K. Zhukov, who is used as Stalin's fireman. If the won-lost record is atest of a general's greatness, then Zhukov is the greatest soldier of World War II. Henever lost a battle, and he was sent where it was hottest--Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad. A difficult personality (great soldiers often are), he displayed a consistently high degreeof skill, iron nerve, and a profound understanding of the nature of his weapon: the RedArmy and the Russian soldier.

IV. Balance of ForcesA. The Wehrmacht

1. In 1941, the Wehrmacht was the finest army in the world, and stood at its greateststrength vis a vis potential enemies. It was not, however, invincible, and there wereweaknesses within its structure.

2. Strength:a. In June of 1941, the field army consisted of 180 infantry, 12 motorized, and 20

Panzer divisions.b. Total strength of the army was about 5,000,000.c. Total strength of the Luftwaffe was 1,700,000d. The Navy absorbed 400,000 men

e. The Waffen SS stood at that time at 150,000 men.f. 25% of all German males were in uniform (Keegan Second World War 173-4)

3. Experiencea. This army had experienced unbroken and spectacular success in Poland,

Scandinavia, France, Yugoslavia, and Greece. To its superb training had beenadded invaluable combat experience.

b. Down to the lowest levels, German units displayed great skill, daring andinitiative.

c. The officer corps and noncommissioned officers in particular were of a very highquality.

d. Casualties to date had been quite low: 17,000 dead in Poland, 3600 inScandinavia, 45,000 in France, 151 in Yugoslavia, 5000 in Greece.(KeeganSecond World War 173)

4. Weapons and Equipmenta. German weapons were generally of outstanding quality. In some areas, their

equipment was not bettered by the Allies.b. The mainstay of the tank force was the Pz Mark III, now up-gunned to a 50 mm

L42 (it had, however, not been mounted with the long 50 mm L60 Hitler hadordered; this cost the Pz III its technical edge by 1943;. there is no explanationfor the use of the shorter gun). It mounted 50 mm of frontal armor, laterincreased by 29 mm of spaced armor. It was a very good design, and a fine allaround tank. (Seaton 72)

c. The other German tank generally used was the Pz Mark IV. By 1943, thisbecomes the mainstay tank. Larger, and also a fine design capable of numerousimprovements to the chassis, it mounted a 75 mm L24 gun that gradually becamelonger and more powerful--to 43, 48, and 70 calibers (one factor in the range,accuracy, and penetrative power of a tank gun is the length of the barrel. A 75


mm L43 possessed a barrel 43 x the length of its diameter.) It mounted 60 mmof armor. The Pz IV was more or less a match for the Sherman tank, which hadnot yet been designed.

d. All German tanks carried radios. Formations were controlled by division, corpsand army commanders in mobile field headquarters through special commandvehicles.

e. German tank crews were beyond all question the best in the world, and remainedthe best in the world throughout the war.

f. The German light machine gun was probably the best of its type during the war. Mounted on a bipod, it was a light MG. On a tripod, it was a medium MG. Itprovided great firepower in a highly mobile form for the infantry.

g. The Schmeisser machine pistol was also the best of its type, and the forerunnerof all the machine pistols being used to massacre your fellow citizens in thestreets today.

h. The assault rifle was invented by the Germans for their paratroopers. Itcombined the rate of fire of a machine gun with the range of a rifle. (Thedisadvantage of a machine pistol is poor range. You need to get really reallyclose to Bambi before you can hit him. The NRA likes this because itencourages the development of stalking skills in all the sportsmen who love tohunt rabbits and deer with Uzis and Rugers.)

i. German artillery was plentiful, very accurate, and extremely flexible in firecontrol. This last became critical after 1943 as they defended ground withartillery since they didn't have enough infantry.

j. The "potato masher" hand grenade was better than the ones used by the Allies. Itcarried a larger charge, and the stick permitted better leverage for throwing.

k. The quick-firing 20 mm FLAK gun (sometimes in quad configuration) was notonly good for its intended purpose, but also quite good against infantry andunarmored vehicles.

l. The famous 88 mm FLAK gun was the finest weapon of the war. A heavycaliber, high velocity anti-aircraft gun, Erwin Rommel desperately turned itagainst the British counter-attack at Arras, since German anti-tank guns couldnot defeat the Matilda tank. He discovered the supreme tank killer of the war. In range, accuracy, and penetration, the 88 mm was simply unmatched. A well-sited 88 could massacre a massed tank attack. The famous German Pz Mark VI"Tiger" tank mounted the 88 in its turret.

m. German optics were the best in the world. This allowed German tanks andgunners to stand off and destroy the enemy at ranges at which the enemy couldnot reply.(1) Properly used, this is an advantage that can be devastating. In the Gulf

War, the US faced the Soviet T-72 for the first time in direct combat. The T-72 was, until recently, the first-line battle tank of the USSR (it hasbeen supplanted by the T-80) and was touted as the equal of the USM1A1 Abrams. The T-72 mounts a 125 mm gun with a higher muzzlevelocity than the gun mounted by the Abrams. This suggests greaterrange. However, the targeting system of the T-72 is quite inferior to thatof the Abrams. It could neither see nor hit a target much beyond 1700meters. In Iraq, the US 1st Armored Division first engaged the


Tawakalna Republican Guard division at a range of about 2700 meters. At that range, rounds from the Abrams were passing completely throughthe T-72, even through frontal armor. Typically, the T-72 had the turretblown off and the engine blown out when internal ammunition and fuelexploded. Evidently, US tank crews hit their target with extraordinaryfrequency (up around 90%). The terrain in the desert accentuates suchan advantage, but superior optics contributed very significantly to themassacre. 1st Armored lost 2 Abrams' and 4 Bradleys for 440 Iraqitanks and 485 armored personnel carriers.

5. Doctrine and Practice

a. I have already discussed Blitzkrieg. The Germans really invented it, andeveryone starts by studying them.

b. The German Army displayed amazing operational flexibility. German soldierswere usually trained to perform the job one grade above their own. This allowedthem to put together ad hoc units which then fought with great skill and tenacity,or allowed units to maintain coherence even after the loss of many officers. Someone else just stepped up. The fact is that a company of clerks and cooksoften fought as well as any elite unit.

c. The so-called "Battle Group" was a common feature. The Germans wouldassign units to a temporary battle formation. These often consisted of whatevermauled or fragmentary units were available. They were named after whoeverwas put in charge. Kampfgruppe Schmidt would therefore be such an ad hocformation whose commander was named Schmidt.

6. Weaknessesa. The army was still two-tiered. Most of the Wehrmacht relied on its feet to move

and on horses for transport. The cutting edge of the army was small incomparison to the total force. That armored fist was now 20 divisions, but thiswas achieved by reducing the tank regiments in half. The result was to dilute thepunching power (a violation of Guderian's principles) while increasing theadministrative component--weakening the ratio of "teeth to tail." To compoundmatters, the armored divisions relied on wheeled transport rather than all-terraintransport on caterpillar treads (300 tracked vehicles to 3000 wheeled vehicles)(Liddell Hart I 158)

b. War production was inadequate. Hitler will pay for having prepared Germanyfor short wars rather than long ones--breadth rather than depth. The Germanarmed forces were ill-prepared for a war of attrition. For example, Germanyproduced 5,664 Pz IIIs and 8000 Pz Ivs during the war; the US produced 49,320Shermans and the Russians produced 40,000 T-34s, the finest tank of World WarII. Germany produced about 25,000 tanks in the war; Great Britain 28,000, theUS 76,000, and the USSR 83,000. (Wheal 358,464, 468,)

c. Despite the size of the Wehrmacht, it was not large enough for the task setbefore it. The spaces of Russia were huge. The Wehrmacht was committed onother fronts. Eventually, manpower losses bled it white.

B. The Red Army1. The Red Army in 1941 was an unknown quantity. In the end, Hitler and his generals

grossly underestimated it.


2. The Red Army in 1941 was the largest in the world.a. Its strength stood at about 4,200,000 (Seaton 17) It possessed about 24,000

tanks, the largest tank park in the world. Those troops were divided among 230-240 rifle divisions, 50 tank divisions and 25 mechanized divisions. (KeeganSecond World War 178)

b. The Red Air Force was also the largest in the world, with 10,000 aircraft.(Keegan Second World War 179).

3. Weaponsa. Russian small arms were generally of good quality, and comparable to German

counterparts.b. Soviet artillery was of very good quality, received the best recruits, and was used

with great effectiveness. The Soviets kept large parks in reserve. In pre-plannedbarrages, it could be very deadly. The Katyusha multiple rocket launcherbecame both famous and feared by the Germans (the "Stalin Organ"). Katyushaswere still in use in the 6 Day War.

c. Tank design(1) By Barbarossa, the Russians were introducing 2 very formidable tanks

which made all German models obsolescent.

(2) The T-34 is the first and most important. It weighed 28 tons andcarried 45 mm of sloped (60 degrees) armour (giving the equivalentprotection of 90 mm of unsloped armor) and a 76.2 mm gun. The turretmounted 100 m of armour, also sloped. It had very wide tracks, whichlowered the ground pressure per square inch and provided superior off-road agility--a very important quality in Russia. It was not built forcomfort, but was easily the best design in the world at the time. It waseasy to produce and maintain, rugged and reliable, agile, fast, well-gunned, superbly armored, and had a low profile. Later versions addedan 85 mm gun. This is the finest tank of World War II, and as aweapon rivals the 88 mm as the finest of the war.

(3) The KV-1 and KV-2 was a heavy tank of 48 tons with a 76.2 mm gunand even heavier armor. Later up-gunned with an 85 mm gun.

(4) Enormous numbers of these tanks were produced, especially the T-34. The T-34 is the premier tank of World War II.

4. Weaknessesa. Not only Hitler but his top generals believed that the Red Army was of poor

quality and could not fight a modern war.b. The Red Army and Air Force was very seriously deficient in communications

equipment of all kinds. Radios were in severely short supply and of poorquality. This has a crippling effect on all operations, especially tanks, artillery,and air force. (1) For instance, in the Air Force, only squadron leaders possessed a radio.

Planes could not communicate with each other, with base, or withground troops. (Seaton 87)

(2) This same weakness prevented flexible fire from artillery. Barrageswent into pre-arranged targets regardless of whether anything was thereor not.

(3) Tanks could not communicate with each other. Only the lead tank had


radio. This helps explain the ability of the Germans to ambush Russiantanks so successfully.

c. Lack of good command and control cannot be overemphasized as aweakness. US doctrine today stresses attacking command and control. Without it, an army may be huge but is uncoordinated.

d. Much of the equipment was obsolescent or obsolete. About 80% of the AirForce was obsolete. (Seaton 86) Almost all of the tanks actually in service at thetime of the invasion were as well (only 1500 T-34s and KV-1s in June) (Seaton93).

e. Effects of the Purge(1) "Where Hitler had tamed his officer caste, Stalin had killed his."

(Calvocoressi 188)(2) Stalin shot 3 of 5 Marshalls, all 11 Deputy Commissars for Defense, 75

of 80 members of the Military Soviet, all commanders of his militarydistricts, 13 of 15 army commanders, 57 of 85 of the corps commanders,110 of 195 division commanders, 220 of 406 brigade commanders and20-40 % of officers below brigade level. (Calvocoressi 189, Clark 34,Keegan Second World War 175) The first to go was Tuchachevsky,chief architect of the Red Army. Most of the generals who conductedthe court martial were also shot. It was a massacre that exceeded war-time losses. For ruthlessness and thoroughness, I cannot think of anyparallels. To have done this in 1937-38, with the threat from Hitlergrowing is practically suicidal.

(3) To say that the Purge was disruptive of doctrine, organization andtraining is putting it very mildly. Tukhachevsky's death led to arepudiation of his doctrine of Blitzkrieg. The Red Army reverted toinfantry tactics. They drew the wrong conclusions from theirexperiences in Spain (Gen. Pavlov, the tank expert, noted that Italianarmored assaults failed to dislodge infantry and relegated tanks to apurely supportive role; the German observers merely noted that theItalians were incompetent. Stalin shot Pavlov in 1941 for cowardice, bywhich he meant failure.)

(4) The Fall of France led to a frantic reorganization of the Russian tankforce. The reorganization was botched. Training was very poor,doctrine confused. The reorganization had not been completed by thetime the Germans invaded.

5. The Russian Soldier--the real hero of the Soviet Uniona. No one who has fought the Russian soldier has anything but respect and praise

for him. Clark writes about "primeval love of 'Mother Russia'" and "fatalism,and that readiness to accept terrible sufferings that are essential Russianqualities." (42) Keegan writes "The fighting potential of a Russian army--Red ortsarist--was never in doubt. Russian soldiers had proved brave, hardy, andpatriotic fighters. . . . As artillerymen they stuck to their guns--and the quality ofRussian artillery material had always been excellent. As infantrymen they weretenacious in defence and aggressive in attack. Russian armies, when they hadfailed, had done so not because their soldiers were poor but because theirgenerals were bad." (177) Seaton writes that Russian soldiers were "tenacious,"


"usually patriotic with a strong love for native land," "he had no great love forthe life of a soldier, which he endured with patient stoicism." (Seaton 97)(1) In order to be balanced, Seaton also criticizes them, stating that unless

forced, they had poor military efficiency and "became dirty,indisciplined, and unruly or apathetic." Their performance was erraticand subject to violent mood changes. They "tended to be slow-witted,ponderous and cautious, and they suffered from the age-old curse ofpassivity and the lack of originality and initiative." (97)

(2) The perspective of German Maj. Gen. F. W. von Mellenthin, who foughtin Poland, France, Yugoslavia, Greece, North Africa, Russia, andNormandy, is worth noting. Von Mellenthin is a German general and hisviews reflect assumptions that we would reject. They also are based onextensive and intimate experience fighting them. It is apparent to methat he wrote his memoirs in large part to provide a textbook for theWest on how to fight the Red Army. He is a certifiable expert in panzerwarfare. He refers to them as "Asiatics" and asserts that no Westernercan understand them. (349)He notes their tendency to swing from oneextreme to another. "He is patient and enduring beyond imagination,incredibly brave and courageous--yet at times he can be a contemptiblecoward. . . . He is essentially a primitive [I don't have the German text,he probably used the prefix Ur- in a compound; a student of Germanliterature will recognize the influence of Friedrich Schiller's Naive andSentimental Poetry here, and that he doesn't mean here quite what heseems to mean] being, innately courageous, and dominated by certainemotions and instincts. His individuality is easily swallowed up in themass . . . A feature of the Russian soldier is his utter contempt for life ordeath [I disagree here, and will return to this] so incomprehensible to aWesterner [this is from the viewpoint of an officer in the army of NaziGermany!] For him life holds no special value; it is something easy tothrow away. . . . With the same indifference the Russian soldier endurescold and heat, and the pangs of hunger and thirst. Unheard of hardshipsmake no impression on his soul." (350) Mellenthin notes that prisonersoften showed distrust and hatred of the Communist Party, but notes thatStalin had given the Russian army "unshakeable discipline." [which iscertainly true] Mellenthin is very emphatic on one thing: "The Russiansolider is a past master of camouflage, of digging and shoveling, and ofbuilding earthworks." (352) Elsewhere he stresses the Russians' abilityto infiltrate lines and the phenomenal speed at which field works couldbe constructed and concealed. Bridgeheads had to be attacked instantlyand violently or else entrenchment and reenforcement would make themtoo strong to dislodge. He thought they showed aptitude for technicalwarfare. He notes, like Seaton, "dullness, mental rigidity, and a naturaltendency towards indolence" but notes that they constantly improved.(352) He thought highly of the top command: "They became adaptable,energetic, and ready to take decisions. Certainly in men like Zhukov,Koniev, Vatutin, and Vassilevsky Russia possessed army and armygroup commanders of a very high order."(352-3) Junior and middle


commanders showed the effects of the Purge, were clumsy, lackingoriginality and initiative [the Red Army system continued to crushinitiative in officers; rigid obedience to the plan was the law]. Hecontrasts the strengths of "the Western soldier lies in his personalqualities, his moral and mental training, his initiative and his highstandard of intelligence." (353) He believed that the Red Army HighCommand knew the weaknesses of its army very well and took them intoaccount. His overall portrait is of a terrible opponent.

b. Seaton addresses the issue of the Russian contempt for life, and I think he iscertainly correct. "The Soviet soldier might have been careless of the lives ofprisoners of war or even of those of the population of occupied territories, butthere is no doubt that he valued his own. It was Stalin and the members of thegovernment organ of the Soviet Union who viewed life so cheaply. Millions ofRussian and Soviet lives had been sacrificed during the Civil War and at thetimes of the enforcement of collective agriculture, merely in order to achieve apolitical aim." (90) (italics added)

c. The Soviet Union, Seaton notes, did not sign the Geneva accords and regardedPOWs from a purely utilitarian point of view. They were used in the slave laborcamps that were so essential to Stalinist Russia. Few German POWs returnedfrom the war.

d. Stalin was equally uninterested in the fate of Russian POWs. He regarded all ofthem as traitors. The Germans were even more brutal toward their prisoners thanthe Russians. They captured a total of 5,700,000 Russians, of whom 3,300,000died in captivity. (Keegan Second World War 187)

e. Stalin "held the soldier's family as hostage for his conduct in battle. Therelatives of those taken prisoner could be, and in many cases were, sentenced tolong terms of imprisonment." (90)

f. Hitler looked at the various weaknesses of the Red Army, and told Gerd vonRundstedt, "You have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure willcome crashing down." (Clark 43)

V. The PlanA. The German plan of attack went through several variations. One problem was that it provided

only very loose objectives: the destruction of the Red Army and a geographic line Archangel tothe Caspian. (Clark 46) This reflected strategic indecision at the highest levels.

B. Hitler deployed about 3,000,000 men, 3300 tanks, and 7000 guns for the actual attack. (KeeganSecond World War 184)

C. Army Group North: Field Marshall Ritter von Leeb, with 4th Panzer Army (under Höppner),and 23 Infantry, 3 Panzer and 2 MotorizedDivisions. This Group invaded along the historic routeof Germanic knights, the Baltic coast (Manstein and Guderian were descended from BalticGermans) aiming at Riga and Leningrad.

D. Army Group Centre: Field Marshall Fedor von Bock, with 2nd Panzer Army (under Guderian)and 3rd Panzer Army (under Hoth), including 32 Infantry, 9 Panzer, and 5 Motorized, and 1 Cavand 1 SS Regiment. This Group provided the main thrust, as its weight shows. It was to advancealong the axis used by Napoleon: Minsk- Smolensk toward Moscow.

E. Army Group South: Field Marshall Gerd von Rundstedt with 1 Panzer Army (under Kleist) and3 Panzer divisions, 32 Infantry divisions, plus a Panzer Reserve of 2 Panzer, 2 Motorized and 2SS Panzer divisions and 33 Allied infantry divisions (Rumanian, Hungarian, and Italian) (Clark


12) This group was separated from the others by the 40,000 square miles of the Pripet Marshes,which is impassable for modern mechanized operations. It would advance into the Ukrainetoward Kiev. The Ukraine provided the best tank country.

F. The German commanders were in sharp disagreement about the best strategic approach. Somewanted to fight a series of great encirclement battles to destroy the Red Army. This was theorthodox solution. Guderian wanted a very deep penetration toward Moscow, at least until theDnieper before turning. This is more Napoleonic, promised a more sudden and dramatic victory,but carried a greater risk that the spearheads would be cut off. The advocates of this plan wereconvinced after the war that this is what they should have done, despite its risks and difficulties. I am inclined to agree. The Germans had to overcome space by time, and to do that, they had torun some substantial risks. You will remember that the Manstein plan that defeated France was asimilar deep thrust, and similarly was extremely risky. This should (in my opinion) have beenthe same sort of thing, on a much larger scale.

G. Russian Deployment1. Stalin's deployment was absolutely idiotic. The Red Army had constructed an

incomplete line of fortifications in European Russia. When Stalin occupied the BalticStates and Poland, he moved his army forward. Then he insisted on defending everytwist of the border. Formations were packed forward tightly.

2. Stalin refused to believe indications that the attack was imminent. The Red Armywas in a state of total unpreparedness when the storm struck. The Germansachieved absolute tactical surprise.

VI. Operation Barbarossa: June 22, 1941A. Initial Stage: The Break Through

1. The German attack punched holes in the Russian lines at will. The Luftwaffe caught theRed Air Force on the ground and destroyed 1200 aircraft in the first day. Russianresponse was panicky and uncoordinated (Moscow provided no guidance whatever) Reserve units advanced blindly to the front only to be caught in march by the Luftwaffe.The Panzers smashed through with shocking speed.

2. Army Group Northa. Leeb's drive was not especially well handled. There was steady friction between

himself (trained in an earlier era and conservative in outlook) and Höpner, histank commander, who was much bolder and who understood the new weapon.

b. More serious was the terrain--a mixture of swamp and forest with few roads andfewer maps. The Germans had failed to study the topography adequately(inexcusable, since so many Baltic Germans were available to them.) The terrainnegated tank advantages and enhanced the effect of rear guard actions. Evensmall numbers of resolute defenders could hold up the advance. Even so, thetanks quickly outstripped the infantry. But this meant that, even when thePanzers forced the Dvina river, they were incapable of holding the Russianinfantry in a net. For this, infantry was needed. Therefore, the Panzersadvanced slowly, and the Red Army though beaten, escaped. (Please note thattanks alone are inadequate; also note that terrain can negate tanks.)

c. Hitler also interfered with the tactical deployment. He had no comprehension ofactual conditions. Coupled with the existing argument between Leeb andHöpner, the result was wasted time and indecisive axes of advance (whichsounds like a technicality, but modern armies live and die on logistics, which


must pass over the axis of advance.)d. It was not clear to Leeb, Höpner, or Manstein (commanding 56 Panzer Corps),

the three leading personalities in the group, whether the first priority was thedestruction of the Red Army in the Baltic, or the capture of Leningrad. This iscrazy.

e. Leeb continues to try to close the ring on Leningrad. The Finns apply pressurefrom the north, but they refuse to cross the original Russo-Finnish border. Theyhave no desire to provoke the Russians any more than necessary. Hitler tried toemploy pressure to coerce them, but the Finns were impervious. In Finland, theFinn was superior to the German soldier. Hitler had little leverage on them.

f. Stalin sends Zhukov to conduct the defense of Leningrad from September 11 toOctober 8. Resistance stiffens.

g. Leningrad remains in perilous straits. The supply line to the city must run overLake Ladoga, as Leeb succeeded in cutting the rail line (until a new one waslaid). The sufferings of the people of this city (1,000,000 citizens died) is one ofthe great and tragic epics of the war.

h. On the other hand, Leeb's spearheads were never strong enough to seize the cityby assault. With its numerous canals and built amidst a swamp, Leningrad'sdefenses are inherently stronger than most cities'. The Panzers could not haveheld the city against infantry infiltration. Only infantry can hold ground. Leebwas never strong enough in infantry to storm the city properly. Leeb could onlywin by siege.

3. Army Group South Rundstedt ran into a very good general in Kirponos (his commissarwas Nikita Khrushchev, and one tank commander was the really exceptional K. K.Rokossovsky). Kirponos applied the absolutely correct response--attack the spearheadsby pincer attacks. Especially stubborn was 5 Army under Potapov, which fell backagainst the Pripet Marshes and attacked the flanks. The attacks could not be coordinatedhowever, and the Germans destroyed them in detail. Ewald von Kleist, commanding 1stPanzer Army, Rundstedt's armored fist [this is the same von Kleist quoted in your DBQon the Night of the Long Knives] drove to Lvov and continued relentlessly to drive onKiev. Kirponos counted on further support as he fought his armies to pieces and foundhimself in an enormous potential trap. Soviet resistance in this sector is fierce, and thefighting often confused as well as bitter. Ultimately, one feels a bit sorry for Kirponos. Hampered by the collapse of communications, using a weapon that was not capable offollowing his directions, ultimately betrayed (it appears) by Stalin's incompetence, hehandled his men as well as anyone could have done.

4. Army Group Centrea. The Russian line jutted westwards into the German line, forming a natural

salient. Field Marshall Fedor von Bock, commanding the bulk of the armoredforces, chose the obvious solution of breaking through above and below thesalient. When the armored jaws closed around Minsk, 250 miles from theborder, the Red Army would be trapped. Stalin had assisted by idiotically

pushing the mass of his forces into the salient. Bock's Panzers were led by Col.Gen. Heinz Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army and Col. Gen. Hermann Hoth's 3rdPanzer Army.

b. June 24, Pavlov, the tank "expert" from the Spanish Civil War, orders his


reserves into the salient, thereby running still more troops into the noose. (Stalinhad him shot on June 30).

c. By June 25, Bock was fighting 3 separate "cauldron battles,"--(1) at the fortressof Brest-Litovsk (2) Bialystok (3) Volkovysk. A 4th cauldron was formed byJune 29 behind Minsk, trapping 15 divisions against the Berezina River. ThePanzers had advanced 300 miles. (Keegan Second World War 186, Liddell HartI 163-4)--a staggering distance.

d. The Panzers were advancing 50 miles a day, but the infantry following behindcovered less than 20. For the "poor bloody infantry," the advance was worsethan Kluck's in 1914: Keegan notes that 12th Inf. Div. marched 560 miles in thefirst week, carrying 50 lbs. in the broiling sun. This yawning gap becomes aserious problem for the high command. This is in high summer. As the seasonadvances, the agony of the infantry will escalate into epic suffering--from mudand rain, hunger, exhaustion, lack of sleep, shelter, or rest, then the terribleRussian winter.

e. July 10 The pincers opened again to swallow up the next Russian line. Technically, the deployment has weaknesses, with the armored spearheadsspread out over 200 miles, violating Guderian's dictum of concentration. Summer storms periodically turned the dirt roads into quagmires, slowing theadvance. Guderian breached the Dnieper River and raced to encircle 25divisions at Smolensk. The trap closes on July 16. However, Bock had tocommit armor to cleaning up the pocket since his infantry were now 200 milesbehind. Resistance inside the pocket continued until August 5. 300,000prisoners were taken. (Seaton 130)(1) The significance of reaching Smolensk is that it controls a "land-bridge"

to Moscow.(2) At this point, Army Group Centre has driven 500 miles into the Soviet

Union and achieved the initial goals. It stood 250 miles from Moscow. (3) Both Guderian and Hoth wanted to completely bypass the Red Army in

the rear and continue a ruthless drive on Moscow. But Hitler now ordersa halt for the best summer campaigning months.

f. By August 8 Stalin had once more asserted control, consolidated even morepower in his hands, and shaken up his government and staff. His State DefenseCommittee (GKO) consisted of himself Beria, Voroshilov, Molotov, and

Melenkov. His military staff, (Stavka) consisted of himself and Molotov,Voroshilov, Budenny, Shaposhnikov, and Zhukov. Victory or defeat would beintimately associated with his personal survival.(1) Stalin ordered 9 senior generals shot.

g. Stavka actually did a good job of collecting units and hurling them into thebattle desperately. They are consumed like chaff before a furnace. But therewere always new units forming up in front of the on-coming invaders.(1) By July 8, OKH figured it had destroyed 89 of 164 Russian divisions.

Army Group Centre had already destroyed 2500 tanks, 1400 guns, andtaken 300,000 prisoners. The surrender of Smolensk on July 19consumed another 310,000 prisoners, 3200 tanks and 3100 guns. Theseare figures of unbelievable proportions. (Keegan Second WorldWar 191)


B. The Crisis: July 23-August 24, 19411. Hitler botched the invasion at this point, abetted by the deep philosophical divisions

within his officer corps. Make no mistake however, the decision was Hitler's.a. He tended to be mesmerized by the thought of huge cauldron battles. He also

liked to see big chunks of Russian territory devoured on the map.2. July 23, 1941 Hitler ordered the Panzers to divert and mop up Smolensk.

a. Guderian is furious. His tanks had covered 440 miles in 6 weeks and stood only220 miles from Moscow with the last dry weather before them prior to theautumn rains. (Keegan Second World War 193) Guderiandeliberately involved himself in close action aroundRoslavl, then argued that disengagement wasimpossible.

b. A series of confusing debates, orders, and counter-orders ensued. Halder andBrauchitsch both disagreed with Hitler but could not stand up to him directly. Bock agreed with Guderian, but used him as a stalking horse, although he wasthe superior officer. Guderian flew to face Hitler personally (there were only 3generals who ever did this with any success--ever). Hitler rejected Guderian'sarguments, insisting on economic objectives.

c. When movement started again, a decision was made to turn the Panzers ofArmy Group Centre south to assist in encircling Kiev and north to helpLeeb before Leningrad. Only then would then would they resume the driveon Moscow.

d. A number of participants as well as historians belief that the campaign was losthere. I am inclined to agree.

3. By this stage, the Germans were beginning to see what was in store for them in Russia. Surprised, outmaneuvered, suffering from poor low level commanders, poorly trained,the Russian soldiers resisted fiercely if chaotically. Previously, enemy troops hadsurrendered in large numbers when the military situation was hopeless. The Russianshad to be beaten in individual battles.

C. The Kiev Cauldron1. Kirponos was in a dangerous position, having stayed in position and fought it out long

after he should have withdrawn. His reason was that he expected support. Russianaccounts of what occurred in the cauldron are not to be considered reliable, sincereputations were at stake in post-war memoirs. It appears however that Kirponos saw thetrap and wanted to withdraw in good order, and that Stalin or Stavka (the same thing)refused).

2. Stalin sent in a counter-offensive with two armies into the region. This simply increasedthe potential bag.

3. Guderian's Panzers fought their way south 150 miles east of Kiev and met Kleist'sfighting their way up to encircle 5 Russian armies and 50 divisions--665,000 Russiansoldiers, the largest encirclement in history. The trap closed on September 16. Kirponoswas killed in the battle.

4. Guderian was now too far south to take the role in the next stage that he should havetaken.

D. Operation Typhoon, the Drive on Moscow1. Bock tried to reorder his forces for Typhoon. He retrieved Hoth from Leeb, and took

Höpner's Panzers as well. He tried to replace casualties and refit the infantry.


2. These gains are balanced by frantic Russian work. Stalin collected whatever forces hecould to defend Moscow, and used hundreds of thousands of civilians (50% to 75%women) to dig enormous field fortifications in two lines, the Vyazma line and Mozhaiskline.

3. The Germans now face three enemies: the Red Army and Generals Mud and Winter. In late September or early October, the fall rains stop all military movement as roadsdisappear in bottomless mud. Snow usually falls in early December.

4. September 23 The first hoar-frost appeared.5. September 30 Bock launched the offensive, catching Stavka by surprise, and breaks

through for a double envelopment of 650,000 Soviets around Vyazma on October 7. There is another great cauldron battle.

6. It is not over until the end of October, however, and the German troops are reaching theend of their tether in physical endurance. On October 6, the first snow falls. It is twomonths earlier than usual. The snow melts, and turns to mud. All mobile operationscome to a halt. (Seaton 181) After October 9, rain fell incessantly. German survivorshave strained their vocabulary to describe the Russian mud to those who have neverexperienced it. Infantry tried to march in knee high and often waist high mud. Calf-length jack-boots were sucked off of feet. Boots disintegrated in the wet. Wheeledtraffic was impossible. Only tracked vehicles could move, and only at exorbitant fuelcosts. Fuel could not be brought up. Poor weather restricted air supply. All logistics--food, fuel, ammunition, medicine, evacuation of wounded, clothing--came to a suddenhalt, except for horse=drawn peasant carts. The horses died off in thousands due toexposure, overwork, and lack of fodder.

7. On October 7, Zhukov was recalled from Leningrad to command the defense of Moscow. He had about 90,000 men immediately available, and was given wider control than Stalinusually permitted.

8. On October 14, Hitler ordered that Moscow be invested but not occupied, and that alloffers of capitulation were to be rejected. The people of Moscow were to die ofstarvation. (Seaton 186)

9. The October weather gave Zhukov the much-needed breathing space. The Red Air Forcechallenged the Luftwaffe in the air. He organized 9 field armies in front of the Germansand began thinning out the Far Eastern forces in Siberia.

10. "German movement for the very first time during the Second World War had beenbrought to a standstill, and it was halted in the second and third weeks of October by rainand by mud. Soviet historians tend to scoff at what they describe as German excuses andmaintain that von Bock was halted by the valor and skill of the Red Army. Red Armyresistance stiffened in late October, and to the west and south of Moscow it was bitter. Yet an examination of the evidence shows without doubt that the German advance,which at first promised to be as rapid and spectacular as any of those of the late summer,abruptly petered out because of the weather and the terrain. In the first fortnight of theTyphoon offensive Army Group Centre destroyed nearly 700,000 of the Soviet defendersat comparatively little cost to itself, and with another three weeks' dry, mild, and clearweather, it would inevitably have been in Moscow." (Seaton 190)

11. The success of Blitzkrieg was predicated upon mobility and firepower. Once mobilitywas lost, firepower was lost as well.

12. Mid-November found the winter setting in. "The autumn and winter of 1941 was


particularly cold. Temperatures of minus 20 and minus 25 degrees centigrade werecommon in daytime and minus 30, even minus 40, by night." (Seaton 219) Vehicleshad to be chipped out of frozen mud with pickaxes. Fires were lit under oil pans and fueltanks to melt fuel and lubricants in order to turn over the engines. Artillery, machineguns, and automatic rifles could not be fired because the lubricants in the recoil systemsfroze. Optical sights became useless. Neither winter clothing nor winter smocks hadbeen provided to the German soldiers. (Brauchitsch refused to allow it since tht wouldimply lack of faith that the campaign would not be over by winter) Frost bite andexposure caused more casualties than the Soviets. By early December, temperatures atnight of -30E C. were recorded [that's -22E F]; men on duty could stand only 1 hourbefore being withdrawn.

13. November 15 the advance continued. The Germans are now fighting weather as much asthe Russians.

14. Zhukov formed 9 more armies east of Moscow and began using them in a series ofcounter-attacks.

15. The evidence of his personal war diary shows that Bock privately faced defeat on Dec. 1,having previously advocated a final surge to seize Moscow rather than fall back for thewinter.

16. The attack ground to a halt 20 miles short of Moscow onDecember 2. On December 3, von Kluge ordered a withdrawal. There was a furtherwithdrawal on Dec. 4, and Bock concedes failure on Dec. 5.

17. Hitler's best chance to defeat the Soviet Union is gone.E. The Soviet Winter Counter-offensive

1. Zhukov now attacked in his turn, using fresh Siberian divisions. These were well-trainedtroops who were well equipped for winter war. The offensive was not a single, massiveblow, but a series of smaller blows that built up in intensity even before the end of theGerman offensive.

2. Hitler issues a "stand fast" order on December 20. Each isolated German unit had tofight where it stood.

3. This was probably the best decision at the time. The Germans should have withdrawn amonth earlier to a defendable winter line, and prepared winter quarters. Instead, theyhad not even collected winter clothing for the men (Brauchitsch forbade it because suchpreparations would imply doubt that they would beat Russia quickly).

4. A retreat under such conditions could easily have turned into a rout.5. For Germans defending a lager, each battle meant the life or death of every single

defender. If they were driven from their miserable winter shelter, they would all havedied in the snow. The fighting is nightmarish and fanatical.

6. Zhukov's conception was perfectly sound: concentric attacks above and below theGerman salient in order to trap Army Group Centre in a cauldron battle in reverse. Thepocket would be 200 miles in depth. He had available 16 armies.

7. The offensive is conventionally dated as beginning on December 5. At weeks' end,Halder recorded the situation as critical.

8. Despite the stand fast order, the Germans are driven back in desperate encounters. Bythe end of January, there was a real possibility of the trap closing on the Germans.

9. In the end, the Russian attacks faltered as a result of the same weather conditions,coupled with supply difficulties, that had stopped the Germans. The Red Army was also


not well trained enough to execute the sound conceptions given it, nor was it mobileenough to sustain an offensive more than 200 miles.

10. The arrival of spring mud in early April brought a final end to the assault. The Germanshad yielded 150-200 miles.

11. The counter-offensive was finally stopped by the shaken Germans. How could theRussians still have the ability to attack?

F. Shake up of the German Command1. Rundstedt had reached Rostov on the Don, but, under the pressure of an effective

counter-attack against his exposed northern flank, asked to withdraw to a winter line. Hitler refused, Rundstedt asked to be relieved, and Hitler complied on November 30.

2. On December 18, Bock reported himself sick and was replaced by Kluge.3. On December 19th, Brauchitsch (who had already suffered a heart attack while dealing

with Hitler and had already tried to resign once) asked to be relieved, and was grantedhis wish.

4. Leeb was relieved when he advocated a withdrawal from Leningrad to a stronger winterline.

5. Guderian was relieved on the day after Christmas for withdrawing some of his troopsunder heavy Russian pressure.

6. On January 8th, Höpner was relieved on the same grounds.7. Hitler takes over direct strategic, operational, and often tactical control of all German

forces in the East.G. The winter of 1941-42 found Hitler locked in a life-and-death struggle of cataclysmic proportions

with the Soviet Union. He had gambled everything on the assumption that he could defeat theSoviet Union in 6 weeks. Now he must fight a war of attrition with an opponent potentiallymuch stronger. Furthermore, he still has Great Britain at his back. 1. He has deliberately involved Germany in that old nightmare--a two front war.2. To make the situation even worse--in fact, to make the situation downright fatal--Hitler

declared war on the United States on December 11, 1941. "By that declaration of warGermany lost finally and irrevocably all hope of winning the war against the SovietUnion." (Seaton 214) (emphasis added)

3. Barring a revolutionary weapon (such as German development of the atomic bombbefore Allied development), Hitler is now caught between two giant mill stones, and willbe ground down to pulp. The only real question is how many millions of lives will besacrificed to his rage and hatred.

4. Could Hitler have won a quick campaign? It is probable that he could have takenMoscow before winter, since von Bock captured Smolensk after only 23 days. But theloss of Moscow, Seaton argues persuasively, would not have meant the defeat of theSoviet Union. (215-6)

5. Hitler lost the campaign because Germany entered it with inadequate resources (inmanpower, vehicles, equipment, economic mobilization, intelligence, and planning).

6. The Soviet Union survived the campaign chiefly because of weather, space, andgeography.a. Seaton is sharply critical of official Soviet histories, which denigrate these

factors in order to extol the superiority of the Communist system.b. Seaton points to Stalin's will-power as a secondary factor: "For Stalin and his

associates no price was too great to pay in terms of lives and resources to ensurevictory and the continued existence of communism. . . . The Red Army man


taken prisoner by the German, whatever the circumstances of his capture . . . wasno longer regarded as a Soviet citizen and for him the end of the war usuallymeant confinement in a concentration camp where he might atone for his guilt. Worse still was the Soviet practice of incarcerating the family or dependents ofcaptured soldiers . . . . In these circumstances, there was little reason for wonderthat the Soviet soldier, apathetic or fatalistic, and often fortified by severalhundred grammes of vodka, climbed over the heaps of the dead and dying andwith apparent indifference strode forward to certain death." (220-1) He sums upthe much-vaunted partisan movement with "The Communist Party's disregard forlife and its contempt for any form of humanity and decency was one of thedecisive factors in the recruiting and control of the partisan movement." (221)

c. Seaton believes that Germany could have beaten the Soviet Union, but only withcomplete mobilization, careful preparation, avoidance of sideshows in WesternEurope, Scandinavia, Africa and the Balkans, and avoidance of war with theUnited States. Furthermore, he believes that Hitler should have cultivated thecaptive peoples of the Soviet empire and utilized the hatred of Stalin. Such apolicy would have been very effective, but the National Socialist state, based asit was upon racial and ideological terms, was fundamentally incapable of such apolicy. For Hitler and the Nazis, the Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe wereUntermenschen, fit only for genocidal exploitation. The tragedy of the commonpeople is that they were caught between Stalin and Hitler--between Beelzebuband Lucifer himself. As evil and murderous as Stalin was, Hitler was still worse.


Works Cited

Calvocoressi, Peter, Wint, Guy, andPritchard, John. Total War: Cause

s andCourses oftheSecondWorldWar. Vol.I,TheWesternHemisphere. Rev.2ndEd. NewYork: PantheonBooks,1989.

Clark, Alan. Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict 1941-45. New York: Quill, 1985.

Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. Trans.Ralph Manheim. Boston: Ho

ughtonMifflin,1971.

Keegan, John. The Second World War. New York: Penguin, 1989.


Liddell Hart, Basil H. History of theSecond World War. 2 Vols. New

York: Putnam,1970.

Mellenthin, F. W. von. Panzer Battles. Transl. H. Betzler. New York: Ballantine,1956.

Seaton, Albert. The Russo-German War 1941-45. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1971.

Wheal, Elizabeth-Anne; Pope, Steven;Taylor, James. Encyclopedia of the

SecondWorldWar. NewYork: Castle,1989.


Works Consulted

Barnett, Correlli, ed. Hitler'sGenerals. New York: William Morrow,

1989.

Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. Constantin Fitzgibbon trans. New Yo

rk: Ballantine,1957.

Manstein, Erich von. Lost Victories. Anthony G. Powell Transl. and Ed.

London: Methuen &Sons Ltd.,1956.

Messenger, Charles. The Art ofBlitzkrieg. London: Ian Allan Ltd

1991.

Perret, Knights of the Black Cross. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1986.

Werth, Alexander. Russia at War: 1941-1945. New York: Avon, 1964.

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