The Great Democratic Experiment: Two American Republics Guided by Montesquieu and Hume

7/28/2019 The Great Democratic Experiment: Two American Republics Guided by Montesquieu and Hume

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e Political Science Standard

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it paradigmatically. Yet as the silent canons of time

wore on, the decentralization Montesquieu advocated

seemed to be the root of the problems undermining

governance under Articles of Confederation.

In contrast to Montesquieus theory on small

republics, David Hume asserted republics can be sta-

bly and fruitfully constructed to unite vast, diverselands under a centralfederalist-republican regime (D.

Hume & Haakonssen, 1994). In his seminal work on

this subject, Idea on the Perfect Commonwealth,

Hume wrote that republican regimes should be di-

vided into a hundred counties, and that each county in

turn be divided into one hundred parishes, making in

all ten thousand minor districts in the state in order

to protect from internal divisions (Ibid). This paper ar-

gues federalism in the United States began as a great

and adventurous experiment in political thought that

was guided by Humes thesis on broad federalist re-

publics.

Purpose

Volumes of analysis have been written about

the philosophicalforces that provoked the Founding

Fathers to adopt sweeping constitutional federalism(e.g., see (Cohen, 1995; Eidelberg, 1968; McGuire &

Ohsfeldt, 1984), so this paper shall not attempt to con-

tribute to that extent. However, as of this writing, there

seems to be no explicit analysis of how early Ameri-

can political theory interacted with Montesquieu and

Humes theses as practical theories of regime struc-

ture. Thus, this paper will analyze why and to what

extentHumes thesis on the broad republic thorough-

ly eclipsed Montesquieus rpublique fdrative in

American regime theory and early political thought.

This paper examines: rst, an overview of Montes-

quieu and Humes ideas on democracy; second, why

Montesquieus thesis dominated republican thought;

third, what factors provoked Humes thesis to eclipse

Montesquieus; and nally, how Montesquieus thesis

in the American context faired over time.

Defnitions

In this paper, federalism will refer to a struc-

ture of government whereby there is a division of sov-

ereign power between state and federal authorities

with local sovereignty inferior to centralized, federal

authority and regulation. Confederalism will refer to

a structure of government whereby state sovereigntiespossess sovereign power superior to that of federal au-

thorities. Republicanism will refer to a structure of

democracy whereby citizens wills are embodied and

acted upon by representatives they elect to a central

government. And nally, federalist-republicanism (or

republican federalism) will refer to a tiered structure

of representative government whereby there is a cen-

tralized republican regime that reigns over lesser state

republics.

ExpErimEntAl BEginnings

Though Montesquieu and Hume were most notably

philosophers, they both offered complex rationally

and empirically based theories of republican regime

structure. Hume was particularly noteworthy in 18th

century political philosophy for his belief in politica

empiricism, which, he claimed, allowed one to under-stand the applicability of political principles. In line

with Scottish Enlightenments tenets of realism but in

contrast to most Enlightenment philosophies, Hume

argued empirical lenses of impressions and ideas

should be used to derive rationalist regime theories that

nd the elusive balance between efcacy and moral-

ity (Werner, 1972). Montesquieu also believed empiri-

cal and historical considerations should be considered

when discerning constrains on the nature of law (C

Montesquieu & Richter, 1977). However, Hume and

Montesquieu similarly believed regimes should not be

institutors of morality in their societies, for inherent

structural constraints limited the viability of philoso-

phy, religion, and natural law in governmental activity

The American framers presupposed the desir-

ability of democracy. Their main debates were over


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argued, enjoys the interior advantages of republican

government and the exterior force of Monarchy

(Ibid). As to the domestic advantages, Montesquieu

embodied many contemporary political philosophies,

which reasoned republican government makes repre-

sentative government feasible and satisfactory to soci-

ety. He concluded monarchys greatest societal benetis its ability to effectively maintain its nations mili-

tary, which he described as the only universally shared

interest one which monarchies pursued to spring

their pride (Bruno, 2010). Drawing from Hobbes so-

cial contract, Montesquieu thought monarchies could

be tyrannical since citizens interest in safety normally

outweighs their need for social contentment (C. Mon-

tesquieu & Richter, 1977). Thus, Montesquieu assert-

ed republics gain the normative benet of monarchies

while avoiding monarchical tyranny. The revolution-

ary framers (here referring to the framers of the Ar-

ticles of Confederation who zealously held to revo-

lutionary ideas) chose to incorporate Montesquieus

beliefs in the Articles of Confederation, for a primary

role of its central authority was to maintain a defense

alliance between the several states.

Beyond appealing to reticence of military de-fense, Montesquieu, in large part, persuaded the revo-

lutionary framers that small confederated republics

maximized governments connection to the public

good, which he framed as an aggregation of local-

ized interests (Bruno, 2010). Although the concept of

the public good was revised later after Montesquieus

republicanism lost its primacy, American revolution-

aries adopted Montesquieus notion that the public

good was better felt, better known and lies nearer

each citizen when republics encompassed societies

of naturally small scale (C. Montesquieu et al., 1989).

This, he argued, allowed authorities to experience lo-

cal hardship themselves, and thus actualize the origin

and solution of the impediments to public good. Revo-

lutionaries further beheld his belief that this political

closeness supported greater accountability, for there

were less government layers to hide governmental

failures (Bruno, 2010). On a national level, since the

single universal interest of defense and all local in-

terests were being satised, the holistic picture of the

general public good seemed almost ideal.

Montesquieus rpublique federative seemed

to answer the considerable diversity of the states withadequate political exibility to fulll regional inter-

ests. Sectarian disparities between the states further

belied centralization and served to preclude consid-

eration of substantial centralization, and this friction

continued to bubble up even after Montesquieuian re-

publicanism was no longer heeded. Regional econo-

mies and localized political concerns, such as slavery

seemed impossible to politically generalize, as was

necessary under any federalist unity.

Democracies contemporary with the Articles of

Confederation gave ample evidence to early American

political theoreticians that a confederated republic was

the ceiling of functional democracy. San Marino, the

Netherlands, Switzerland, Venice (Levy, 2006) and to

some extent Poland and Denmark were the only extant

democracies; this instigated a presumption, that since

democracy had not naturally spread beyond the limitsof rpublique federative it most likely could not do

so stably (Levy, 2006). Additionally solidifying Mon-

tesquieus claim before the Constitution, the Greek

city-states irtations with democracies seemed to fail

to mature into large representative systems once their

boarders were lengthened. If Germany and Italy could

not centralize their states under strong authoritarian

regimes, which were widely known as most effective

at political consolidation, it seemed implausible the 13

states could under more volatile republican principles

Yet perhaps the greatest ammunition for rpublique

federative historical arguments laid in ancient Rome

where broad-based republican authority had been at-

tempted disastrously. The relatively swift withering of

the republic into the Caesars correlated closely with

Romes republican expansion; as such, Montesquieu


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and others perceived the failure of Roman republican-

ism as a twofold warning for 18th century republican

ambitions (Levy, 2006). First, it led the revolution-

ary framers to believe that expanded republics do not

structurally last due to inherent administrative and de-

fense logistics. Second, it ominously suggested that

such systems were vulnerable to usurpation stemmingfrom over-centralization and megalomania, as Julius

Caesars authoritarian reign and the ensuing centuries

of dictatorship seemed to foreshadow. Hence, the rev-

olutionary framers found history substantiated Mon-

tesquieus rpublique federative concept.

However, the nation began to question the for-

merly unquestioned Montesquieuian rpublique fed-

erative conceptonce the Union under the Articles of

Confederation weakened. Although states discovered

modest success in their independent republican struc-

tures, factionalism began to gouge a rift between the

states; the lack of central executive power also proved

fatal. Toward the close of the decade, consensus was

building that Montesquieus thesis was needlessly

limiting, and that America could not subsist without

a realignment of the sovereignty structures. This is

when the American political theory plunged into un-charted waters.

AmEricAn rEpuBlicAnismturnstohumE

As the confederated states became restless to expand

and rule of law received declining respect as Shays

Rebellion illustrates, Montesquieus thesis on the r-

publique federative soon lost its persuasiveness. Af-

ter living under a Montesquieuian style republic for a

mere six years, political thought quickly sought new

inspiration for a national regime. In the mid-1780s,

American political theorists increasingly found their

questions concerning where to take American republi-

canism answered by David Hume.

There were several evolutions in Americas

political atmosphere that lifted the founders philo-

sophical stricture on considering Humes republi-

can structure. First, as revolutionary fervor receded

American political leaders became less idealistic and

more pragmatic about government (Smith, 2011). Sec

ond, the publics fear of tyranny, although equally as

strong as during the revolution, had shifted from fear

ing monarchial and minority tyrants to fearing faction

and majority tyrants (Ibid). Third, states were alreadyestablishing tiered republican institutions, which cre

ated governance layers within each state republic tha

utilized representation from the county to the state

level. Along with other forces, these internal develop

ments set the political environment under which the

founders became willing to deliberate on Humes con

cept of republicanism.

As the revolutionary fervor that deterred the

revolutionary framers from considering Humean

structure was calmed by time, the door opened for

the constitutional framers(i.e., not the revolutionary

framers but rather those who framed the Constitu

tion) to contemplate democratic structures beyond tha

which Montesquieu offered. Naturally, Humes realis

and empirical approach to structuring republics did no

initially elicit support from American revolutionarie

eager to establish a republican structure as idyllic andideally democratic as possible. As Montesquieu gave

credence to mans virtue, his republican philosophy

was more appealing to idealistically driven revolu

tions than Humes empiricism, which seemed stodgily

skeptical of human virtue and pure rationalism. Al

though the Articles perhaps did achieve an idealistic

respect for local interests, the Articles lack of coor

dinated rule of law on the national level rendered the

government, as Hume predicted, impossibly pursuan

of philosophies that were impractical (Werner, 1972)

After the Articles more idealistic republic had no

produced the accord Montesquieu suggested it would

the founders became hesitant to again enshrine virtu

ous principles in government (Smith, 2011). By the

late 1780s, the Constitutional framers constellation o

political vision had become increasingly aligned with


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Humes prophetic republican thesis.

One founder pointedly illuminates this align-

ment: James Madison, Americas foremost disciple

of Humes federalist-republican arrangement (Adair,

1957; Spencer, 2002). Renown as a most vociferous

federalist and realist, Madison was greatly inspired

by the Scottish Enlightenments embrace of empiricalperception (Adair, 1957; Branson, 1979). Along with

many of the Constitutions founders, Madison was

familiar with the eras avant-garde realist, whose sci-

entic political approach rejected political rationalism

and upset Lockes social contract. Madison observed

with great interest Scotlands schism with the Crown;

the schism historically paralleled the American Revo-

lution, and it was philosophically sped by empiricist,

disparate with Americas largely idealist revolutionary

framers. Hume was so decisive in the Scottish move-

ment, modern historians of philosophy brand Scotland

during this time as living in the Age of Hume (Wer-

ner, 1972). Madisons warmth toward Humes feder-

alist-republic was stoked further by Humes strong

enthusiasm towards constitutional governments, in

which, Hume argued, nations could best typify their

empirical and operational principles (Branson, 1987).This made Humes regime structures seem compatible

with Americas avid constitutionalism.

Madisons keen attention to Humes political

ideas led Madison to apply Humes thesis as an inte-

gral guide to create the new American regime. Humes

essay Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth stimulated

Madison, where he extracted two central justications

for why America should embrace Humes federalist

format (Hume, 1910). Madison perceived: that rst,

Americas condition was ideal for creating a federal-

ist republic; and second, the federalist-republic solved

for destructive political factionalism, a fundamental

national impasse.

Madison convinced the framers Americas po-

litical conditions were unusually opportune to insti-

tute Humes federalist-republicanism. Hume wrote:

If this controversy were xed by the univer-

sal consent of the wise and learned, in some

future age, an opportunity might be afforded

of reducing the theory to practice, either by

a dissolution of some old government, or by

the combination of men to form a new one, in

some distant part of the world? (Ibid.)

Humes suggested conditions for a federalist republic

could not have been more similar to Americas situa-

tion in 1787: America was witnessing the dissolution

of its revolutionary regime and conducting a gather-

ing of minds to form a new constitution. Moreover

Humes suggestion of a distant part of the world

heralded to Madison that the New World was a prime

location to launch a Humean regime (Capaldi and

Livingston, 1990). Hume explained novel republics

needed time to solidify their governance mechanisms

and internal civil unication in order to withstand

later foreign pressures (Hume, 1910). The geographic

isolation of the US from contemporary superpowers

gave America some short term solace from constant

foreign harassment. Hence, Madison pointedly argued

that Americas conditions were ideally suited to buildHumes republican regime.

Furthermore, Madison shrouded several of his

arguments asPublius in Humes logic. Madison per-

suaded the framers Humes theory that a federalist-

republic would structurally allay a persistent national

problem the governments internal factionalization

Humes Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth equipped

Madison with one of his most persuasive and prophet-

ic justications for an American federalist republic

(Adair, 1957). In this essay, Hume casually disposed

of Montesquieus limits on the republic, writing,

The falsehood of the common opinion, that

no large state could ever be modeled into a

commonwealth, but that such a form of gov-

ernment can only take place in a city or small

territory.Though it is more difcult to form a


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republican government in an extensive coun-

try than in a city; there is more facility, when

once it is formed, of preserving it steady and

uniform, without tumult and faction! In a

large government, which is modelled with

masterly skill, there is compass and room

enough to rene the democracy, from thelower people, who may be admitted into the

rst elections or rst concoction of the com-

monwealth, to the higher magistrates, who di-

rect all the movements. At the same time, the

parts are so distant and remote, that it is very

difcult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or pas-

sion, to hurry them into any measures against

the public interest? (David Hume, 1910)

Comparing MadisonsNotes on the Confederacy and

famedFederalist Paper 10 to Humes excerpt above

illuminates the great degree to which Hume spurred

Madisons reasoning. InFederalist Paper 10 Madison

wrote:

The instability, injustice, and confusion intro-

duced into the public councils, havebeen

the mortal diseases under which popular gov-ernments have everywhere perished; as they

continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics

from which the adversaries to liberty derive

their most specious declamations The ques-

tion resulting is, whether small or extensive

republics are more favorable to the election

of proper guardians of the public weal; and it

is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two

obvious considerations. (Publius, 1787-1788)

He continued, observing that: rst, larger republics

embrace a proportionally diminished representation

of factions; and second, the representatives will be

chosen from a greater number of citizens, and thus the

adopted representation will be less likely to have been

selected by harmful minority factions (Ibid). Humes

speculation that federalist republics can absorb fac-

tions inuence helped Madison defeat the Anti-Fed-

eralists Montesquieuian accusations (Flaumenhaft

1992), which held vast republican governments are

uncooperative and either stagnate or destabilize or

both (Levy, 2006). Republics of scale, Hume argued

create salubrious and probable schisms; splinteringthe power locus amongst myriad interest blocs im-

pairs radical or minority cabals ability to dominate

national politics (David Hume, 1910). Supplemented

with the Constitutions separations of powers, the new

federalist-republic sheltered the public against major-

ity tyranny.

The Constitutions original removal of Sen-

ate elections from the general electorate was also a

suggestion from Hume. Humes specic suggestion

for a territory-based, more elite and executive Sen-

ate was embraced by Madison as an additional check

against the popular currents and tides (D. Hume &

Haakonssen, 1994); while not wholly attributable to

Hume, Humes Senate construction certainly forward-

ed support for a indirectly elected upper house that

could declare war and peace and approve executive

appointees. As Madison argued, a federalist-republicstructurally quelled factions through a multi-layered

protection from radical, minority, and majority rule

(Hamilton, Madison, & Jay, 1787). Yet Humes re-

publican theory touched more framers than just James

Madison.

Werner (1972) traces Humes interest in sup-

port from Americas political theorists to as early as

1768, when Hume said he longed to see America in

full revolt. In 1775, Hume even declared himself an

American in his principles, and he had expressed op-

position to King George III (Werner, 1972). As a ratio-

nalist and empiricist, Hume enjoyed a philosophica

camaraderie with American political theorists who el-

evated the equality of human reason and praised real-

ism. This connection is distinguishable in his relation-

ship with several towering gures of the Revolution.


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Thomas Paines concept of the origins of gov-

ernment perfectly mimicked that described in Humes

Of the Origins of Government. Both identically

claimed government arose out of moral virtues inabil-

ity to govern humanity (Ibid). Paine also drew a degree

of his anti-monarchial rhetoric verbatim from Hume.

Moreover, Franklin, whose political writings scarcelyrelied on Montesquieu (Stourzh, 1969), had an exten-

sive personal relationship with Hume, in which Frank-

lin visited Humes Edinburgh home frequently and the

two maintained an extensive correspondence; Frank-

lin believed Humes ideas were engendered in thought

and reason (Werner, 1972). Humes political thought

is easily visible in Hamiltons writings, in which

Hamilton called Hume a [political] writer equally

solid and ingenious (Flaumenhaft, 1992). Hamilton

directly incorporated arguments Hume made in Of

the Progress of the Arts and Sciences in the apical

Federalist Paper No. 85 (Ibid and Werner, 1972).

The constitutional framers experience gov-

erning a democracy further sprung their caution for

philosophically fashioned structure. When the ideal-

istic government outlined by the Articles of Confed-

eration failed, the framers became more philosophi-cally tempered, wearier of the pragmatist necessity in

government. The framers found in federalism a prag-

matic governance structure that did not host fractious

movements. Because Humes republican construct

did not attempt to incorporate higher law or morality,

his republic was essentially more apt to unite factions

and regions. Although still passionate about their state

identities, the framers were provoked to reconsider the

extent to which state interests were critically intercon-

nected. It was realized that the United States was more

sociologically compatible with Humes concepts of

faction than with Montesquieus ideas of hegemonic

enthusiasm for virtue.

Soon after ratication, observing the virtual

anarchic and overtly violent French Revolution, the

framers fear of a radically philosophical democracy

deepened (Adair, 1951). That if the government was

handed over to radical idealists, functional construc-

tion wasted either into a moral chaos, subject to wil

of zealots like those of La Terreur, or a radicalized

regime whose mechanisms were impractically ab-

stract (Ibid). Although one could interpret Americas

adoption of the unprecedented federalist-republicanarrangement as a radical revolution itself, its novelty

was less philosophical. Hume himself warned that po-

litical conicts suffered from imprudent vehemence

which results from ideological stubbornness and ob-

fuscates pursuits of clear objectives and rational time-

lines (Hume, 1987). However, the framers chose to

overlook this aspect of Humean conservatism in favor

of promoting a Humean republican federation.

vEstigEsofmontEsquiEus rEpuBlicAnism

Although Humes concept of a republic was clearly

victorious in displacing Montesquieus rpublique

federative in the Constitution, resurgences of Montes-

quieus inuence persisted throughout later politica

thought. Anti-federalist arguments are visible at al-

most every point in America history, but only several

prominent instances will be highlighted below.States rights advocates, omnipresent in

American history, are artifacts of Montesquieus the-

sis. Montesquieu gave South Carolinas nullication

arguments signicant repower, for South Carolina

used (perhaps inadvertently) reasoning very paral-

lel to Montesquieus logic that large republics fail to

maintain legislative exibility to meet region-specic

needs. Interplay between Hume and Montesquieus

positions during the Age of Jackson is easily found

in arguments against national banks, where Jackson

vigorously believed these national institutions were

institutions of scal tyranny reigning down from the

federal level. Later, states rights advocates assumed

Montesquieus position on smaller constituencies to

argue slavery should be dealt with on the state level

The debate over slavery is a signicant instance in


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which Humes arguments did not seem to overcome

Montesquieus strong idea of regional rights until the

Civil War.

Perhaps the most dramatic reentrance of Mon-

tesquieus arguments into political thought was dur-

ing the Second Revolution, where the South asserted

strongly that the Union had failed due to impossibledivides, which legislatively deadlocked the northern

region against the South. The Civil War represents a

tumultuous rejection of Humes republican theory.

The Second Revolution was eventually decided by

military force; it is crucial to note, that unlike the

framers debates over Hume and Montesquieu, the

Civil War was not decided by pure political re-evalu-

ation. Thus, although Humes thesis that large repub-

lics could remain undivided from faction might have

miscalculated the impacts of divisions over slavery,

Hume was still correct in predicting that a federalist

government was more capable of maintaining internal

military superiority.

Even after the Civil Wars end demonstrated

the strong efcacy of Humes republican principles,

followers of Montesquieus small republic continued

to advocate more rpublique federative-like construc-tion. Montesquieu and Hume seemed to touch, if tac-

itly, Roosevelts New Nationalism and Wilsons New

Freedom. Later, ironically, conservatives began to

embrace Montesquieus concepts of decentralization

despite the conservative nature of Humes republican

concepts. As the nation grew well beyond its size dur-

ing ratication, factions grew more enormous, which

represents a slight aw in Humes prediction that fac-

tions would not proportionally grow when republics

expanded. Indeed, modern factions that are arising

from divergent political rivers are carving a political

canyon among citizens that Hume did not completely

prophesize. The nature of party politics along with

other factors resulted in a consolidation of political

platforms along party lines, which served to broaden

and deepen political factionalism, equipping Montes-

quieuian believers with an empirically based rebuttal

to Humes ideas on faction and federalist-republics

Thus, several wavelengths of republican argument

have used Montesquieus logic throughout American

political development even until today.

humEs Enduring fEdErAlist-rEpuBlicAnvictoryThe tug of war between states and federal authorities

persists to this day. States still draw from Hume in ar-

guing that federal authorities are ideologically distant

and logistically out of touch with local interests, where

federal laws lack regional elasticity. To this extent

the Tea Party movement has clearly favored Montes-

quieus principles; libertarian movements are simi-

larly disillusioned with federal authority on the basis

that is gratuitously encroaches on individual positive

liberties. Yet despite these movements, centralized re

publicanism as Hume saw it held strong against these

conservative factions. Indeed, these groups power

to enact regime change is severely diminished by the

necessity of broad support and inability to surmount

national opposition. Although states regarded their

distinct sovereignties as cornerstones legitimizing

federal power, the implementation of Humes demo-cratic ideas, particularly though Madisons initiative

resulted in lasting permanent establishment of federal-

ism.

In a globalizing world, America is uniting

under its federalist structure even more than it has in

the past. Highly centralized nations are highly com-

petitive with American interests, whether economic

cultural, political, or combinations thereof. Federal-

ist construction has given America the framework

to compete with powerful external forces that have

achieved robust military power and internal politica

and economic efciency. Now, rarely do many argue

that, for instance, California can compete with China

or Florida can compete with South America. Because

national unity is more crucial than ever to Americas

success, Montesquieus adherents have virtually dis-


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Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Pateman, C.Participation and Democratic Theory.

Cambridge University Press, 1975.

Publius.Federalist Papers. Vol. Number 10, New

Uork1787-1788.

Smith, Steven. The Federalists and Anti-Federal-

ists. Yale University, 2011.Spencer, Mark G. Hume and Madison on Faction.

The William and Mary Quarterly 59, no. 4

(2002): 869-96.

Stourzh, G.Banjamin Franklin and American For-

eign Policy. University of Chicago Press,

1969.

Werner, John M. David Hume and America.Jour-

nal of the History of Ideas 33, no. 3 (1972):439-56.


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