The Good Citizen in the Second Century a. d.

L’Antiquité Classique

THE GOOD CITIZEN IN THE SECOND CENTURY A. D.Author(s): Adelaide Douglas SimpsonSource: L’Antiquité Classique, T. 16, Fasc. 1 (1947), pp. 59-78Published by: L’Antiquité ClassiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41642998 .

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THE GOOD CITIZEN

IN THE SECOND CENTURY A. D. (i;

by Adelaide Douglas Simpson

In the second century the Roman Empire was at the height of its dominion and influence. In 117 under Trajan the eagles were carried to the Persian Gulf and Rome extended from that eastern frontier to the Atlantic, and as far north as Britain and the Rhine- Danube limes . In later years there were withdrawals, especially in the East, and serious difficulties on various frontiers, but Rome was everywhere great, powerful and magnificent. Living was com- fortable and even luxurious, not only in Rome and the famous centers of the Mediterranean world, but in the numerous small provincial cities of regions as remote as Britain and the African frontier. The good citizen might live in any one of these communities, usually anonymous so far as we are concerned, but busy and useful in his own circle. It is easy for us to visualize the public buildings with which he was familiar, temples, market-places, baths, theatres, aqueducts and bridges ; we can picture the mingling of tribes and races which resulted from war, colonization and trade ; inscriptions and papyri and literary evidence enable us to compile long lists of exports and imports, which extend from wheat and other staples of living to animals for the amphitheatre and the costliest luxuries ; we are even informed about private and public benefactions and works of charity (2). In short we

(1) This study deals with a small group of writers who present, officially or unofficially, the ideas and practices of the Sceptic, Stoic and Epicurean schools, and of Christianity. No attempt is made here to consider the rhetoricians, historians and other literary men of the period.

(2) Cf. a most useful collection of sources, An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome , ed. by Tenney Frank, (Baltimore, 1933-40) ; 6 vols ; also, Pauly- Wissowa, art, limes.



60 A. D. SIMPSON

have a wealth of knowledge about the external life of the good citizen ; can we know anything of his mind and his temper, his ideas and his ideals in this age of expansion, of change and of enlightenment ?

In its standards of living, its control of natural resources, its concept of « One World », then called impérium Romanům , the second century is very close to our own age. We are deeply interested therefore to find that the men of this time were concerned with that « freedom from fear » which is one of our most urgent problems. Ataraxia , originally a word used largely by the Epicu- reans, in this century was in general philosophic use and represented the contemporary « freedom from fear ». It is true that its connota- tions were chiefly though not always subjective, and that it more often referred to inner security than to social security, but perhaps our own enthusiasms, directed divergently at psychology and at economics, have caused us to emphasize a dichotomy which is more apparent than real. At any rate ataraxia in the second century represented an idea of considerable importance.

Sextus Empiricus (*), a physician who practiced and wrote at Athens and at Alexandria in the second half of this century, lays much emphasis on ataraxia . He was a thorough-going Sceptic of the tradition of Pyrrho, holding that truth cannot be known, that knowledge, which comes only from sense-impressions, cannot even approach ultimate reality but at best reaches only a balance of opinions. Ataraxia was to be attained only by the man wise,

enough not to seek unattainable truth, and content to win that reasonable probability which comes from the refusal to strain after ultimates. There are in the world things which seem good, such as health, wealth, pleasure, wisdom, virtue, etc. ( Eth ., 45-

89) and things which seem evil, folly, pain, deprivation and the like (ib., 90-95). None of these however is by nature or in essence

good (ib., 89) or evil (ib., 95). Therefore men should not disquiet themselves to acquire the things believed to be good or to avoid others believed to be evil, because that disquietude is the root of unhappiness in living (ib., 112-113). His argument is apparently directed in part against scrupulosity, although he does not use the word, and indicates a contemporary prevalence of anxious

(1) Ed. by Rf H, Bury (London - New-York, Loeb, 1933-36), 3 vols.



THE GOOD CITIZEN 61

and excessive conscientiousness which a physician would quite naturally regard with disapproval. In discussing such a concrete evil as the presence of actual pain, he makes three divisions (ib. 152-155) (x) ; first are those pains which are slight because easily remedied, - here he cites cold, hunger and thirst ; second are those which are intense and frighten by their violence ; these being violent pass quickly, like lightning. The third type includes forms of moderate and long-continued pain ; these give us times of rest and respite, and do not necessarily cause much turmoil.

According to the Sceptic, then, the good citizen lives a quiet life, suspending judgment on all things commonly accepted as good and evil, and he is therefore unconcerned either to pursue or to avoid them. Such trouble and pain as he suffers involuntarily he takes with tranquillity, as existing necessarily whether he wishes it or not ( ib.9 157). The Sceptic goal, in short, was ataraxia in matters of opinion and attitude, and moderate suffering (ftexQLO- TtáOsia) in matters of necessity ( Hypost ., 1, 25).

The two great Stoics who lived in this age are universally known.

Epictetus was a Greek slave who lived at Rome and studied Stoic

philosophy there under Musonius Ruf us towards the end of the first century. He was exiled when Domitian banished all philosophers from Rome, and is therefore presumed to have attained freedom and some recognition in philosophy by that time. He settled in Nicopolis, that Victory City founded by Augustus to commemorate his defeat of Antony and Cleopatra, and taught there for the rest of his life, that is, until about 120 A. D. He lived in extreme simplicity and seems to have written nothing for publication ; his teachings have come down to us from the notes of a pupil, Flavius Arrian, the historian. The Discourses

(AiatQißai) and the Manual ÇEyxeiQÍôiov) are composed in the

Hoivrj, the common, non-literary language of the Greek world, familiar to us as the language of the papyri and of the New Testament.

Sextus Empiricus laid emphasis on ataraxia , because he felt that inner tranquillity was the result of suspending judgement, of holding all things in a balance and neither seeking nor avoiding

(1) Plutarch ascribes to Epicurus a similar but twofold division of pain ; cf. De Poet. Aud ., 14; Plutarch, ed. by G. N. Bernardakis (Teubner, 1895). Cf. also Epicurus, ed. by C. Bailey (Oxford, 1926), KYPIA1 AOSAI, 4.



62 A. t>. SIMPSON

them as inherently good or evil. Epictetus (}) also stressed ataraxia but not by itself. With it he once grouped fearlessness and freedom ( Discourses , 2, 1, 21) ; again, reverence, faithfulness, lof- tiness, lack of dismay, lack of passion (ib., 2, 8, 23) ; again, faithfulness, reverence, nobility (ib., 2, 8, 27) ; elsewhere steadfastness (ib., 2, 5, 7), serenity (ib., 2, 18, 28), stability (ib., 3, 26, 13) and independence (ib., 4, 4, 36). All result from a right relationship, a relationship to oneself and to the Divine, whether called Zeus, Daemon or Tyche (ib., 4, 4, 39-40). This is what philosophy and the philosophers teach. The relationship to oneself and the relationship to the Divine are virtually identical, for the self is a fragment ( anoanaofjia :) of God, possessing a portion of Him (ib., 2,8, 11). This mystical consciousness of a fundamental oneness between the self within and ultimate external Reality is at the bottom of all that Epictetus taught. For practical living one must submit to the laws of the universe as good citizens submit to the laws of the state, for « we cannot change the underlying principles of things and it is better that we cannot », (ib., 1, 12, 17). Slaves should be treated as brothers, as equally with yourself the sons of Zeus (ib., 1, 13, 4). Rulers should be allowed to exercice their claims to power ; let them take your life, your property, your kinsmen, for they can do that by force, but they cannot take your principles (ôôy/uara) and have no authority over them, for you moral purpose (TiQoaÍQsaiç) is conquerable only by itself ; moral purpose is stronger than physical force, - it is a law of God that the better prevails over the worse (ib., 1, 29, 9-13). Respect the rights of others (ib., 3, 7, 21 ; 2, 4, 1-3) ; do your duty as a worshipper of the gods, as son, brother, father, citizen (ib., 3, 2, 4 ; 3, 7, 26) ; hold office, judge uprightly, keep away from other people's belongings (ib., 3, 7, 21) ; contribute to the common good because in so doing you contribute to your own good (ib., 1, 19, 13-14) ; above all, act first as a human being and second as the kind of man you are, whether dancer, philosopher or carpenter (ib., 3, 23, 5). Epictetus saw and shrewdly estimated the dangers of power ; he held that

great power was risky always for the beginner (ib., 3, 13, 20), and in effect that power over other men gives its possessor a mistaken idea of his own authority, for the tyrant has the power of exile,

(1) Ed. by W. H. Oldfather (London New- York, Loeb, 1926, 2 vols).



THE GOOD CITIZEN 63

Confiscation and death, but no power at all to coerce the man who has no fear of these things (ib., 4, 7, 1-5) ; indeed, the tyrant can lose his own head (ib., 4, 7, 31). He even consoled those who chose philosophy as a goal and then were troubled because the rich and powerful pitied them (ib., 4, 6, 36-37), asking if the former had not what they sought, while the latter held office by flattery and by maliciously condemning one person to please some one else (ib.f 4, 6, 31-33). Persons who advanced in power, who became senators or high officials, were under the control of those who

put them there ; they were slaves in a beautiful, rich slavery (ib., 4, 1, 40). « If we love and want wealth or power, if we fear to lose what we have, then we exalt those who control such things and make them our masters and ourselves their slaves. We even worship them as gods, for that which has the power to give the

greatest advantage we think is divine » (ib., 4, 1, 60-61). This last quotation is an interesting commentary on the deification of the emperors and on emperor worship ; it implies general recognition of the fact that the emperors were worshipped because they gave good gifts or had the power to do so. We have to remember that Epictetus was banished from Rome by the tyrant Domitian, to whom the title Divus was denied, despite the attempt of the

soldiery to confer it on him after his death, and despite his own

assumption during his lifetime of the even more august designa- tion dominus et deus (x).

Very different from Epictetus in externals is the other great Stoic of the century, the Emperor M. Aurelius Antoninus. M. Au- relius had every advantage denied to Epictetus, freedom, wealth, position, opportunity, power, but he lacked the one thing which was most precious to Epictetus after his manumission, that is, the leisure to live as a philosopher wishes. M. Aurelius was adopted at seventeen by the Emperor Antoninus Pius, and spent the rest of his life as heir to the purple or as himself Emperor. For over forty years he lived a public life, and the book of meditations written to himself near the close of his life shows how fundamen-

tally uncongenial he found it (2). He had a strong sense of social

(1) Suet. Dom ., 23, 1 ; 13, 2 ; Martial, 5. 8. (I owe the Martial reference to my colleague Prof. J. Hammer).

(2) Ed. by C. R. Haines, (London - New York), 1930.



64 A. Ď. SÍMPSOK

responsibility ; men are born for the sake of one another (To Himself , 8, 59 ; 11, 18 ; 9, 1) ; social acts deserve as much attention as a craft or a profession (ib., 5, 1, 2) ; do not waste time thinking about others unless you can do it for some common good ( ib , 3, 4, 1) ; whatever I do alone or with someone else must be for the common interest (ib., 7, 5). He reminded himself constantly to think of himself as a member of society ; nothing, not praise of public office or wealth or pleasure should prevail rightfully against reason and the civic good (ib., 3, 6, 2) ; the mind should be such as is suitable for a rational and civic being (ib., 3, 7) ; be free, look at things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, as a mortal (ib., 4, 3, 4). Court life meant little to him ; he said that where there is living, there is the possibility of living well ; but his living was at court ; then it was possible to live well at court (ib., 5, 16) ; he warned himself not to become Caesarified (oqa ¡urj a7toHaiaaQ(údf¡Q ; ib., 6, 30), but instead to honor the gods and save men (ib., 6, 30), and reflected that court life and philosophy were to him step-mother and mother, and that philosophy made the court endurable to him and him endurable to the court (ib. 6, 12). His ideal for himself was a lonely one ; « let the god in thee be ruler of a being that is manly and of ripe age and civic and Ro- man and governing, who has taken his position as a man should, who waits the summons from life as a glad release, not needing an oath or a man as witness ; in thee be cheerfulness and independence of aid from outside and independence of the ease which others give » (ib., 3, 5). However he would accept needed aid, saying : « Be not ashamed of being helped » (ib., 7, 7). The stress on independence is undoubtedly due to the changed circumstances of his later life. Earlier the burdens of public existence were relieved in part at least by his affectionate family life ; in his correspondence with Fronto, his former Latin tutor, he speaks often of his children, his pullulli, as eleven of them were born to him. He maintained a warm and even emotional friendship with Fronto until the death of the latter in about 166. Moreover, he shared the imperial power with Lucius Verus until 169, but from the death of Verus, he was increasingly alone.

M. Aurelius gives no systematic presentation of Stoic philosophy but his book, which is the solitary musing of a man whose thoughts were often his only close companion, offers an intimate picture of a Stoic who was a good citizen by desire and intention, while



The good cítižeisí 65

holding supreme authority in the Roman state. On the subject of ataraxia , which was so important to the professional philosophers Sextus Empiricus and Epictetus, M. Aurelius had virtually nothing to say ; he used the word apparently only to refer to freedom from external disturbance (ib., 9, 13) and preferred apatheia to designate that calmness which is the true sign of strength in man (ib., 11, 18, 10). Despite great differences in presentation, the Emperor and the former slave gave a similar picture of the good citizen ; the practical identity of their ideals, despite their remoteness from each other in the social scale and in all wordly things which are supposed to influence men's thinking, says much for the universal appeal of Stoicism. The good citizen as they picture him is serious, simple in his tastes, reverent to the gods, upright, faithful and dutiful in all the details of living, obedient to the laws of the State and of Nature, conscious of universal brotherhood and of individual responsibility, for the common good. It should be added that neither of the two great Stoics shows any saving touch of humor or gaiety, or of appreciation of the beauty and splendor of their own age ; the magnificence of Rome was a matter of perfect indifference to Epictetus and was to Marcus only the burden which he must carry through life.

The Epicurean philosophy is presented to us by two men of the century, both of them, like the Stoics and the Sceptic, writing in Greek. Lucian, the brilliant writer of satiric dialogues and one of the great wits of literature, may or may not have been an Epi- curean himself, but he has left us an amusing and friendly picture of contemporary Epicureans. Lucian was in himself an interesting person and in a sense typical of the age. He was born in Samosata on the banks of the Euphrates (that is, in moderne Irac) of Syrian- speaking parents who set him to learn from an uncle the trade of

stone-cutting (x). He managed to escape from this and to train himself in Greek and rhetoric, and seems to have practiced law for a while in Antioch, but achieved fame as a professional rhetori- cian and appeared successfully in places as distant as Gaul and

Italy (2). Later he settled in Athens, removing his father and

family there (3), and developed the type of satiric dialogue which

(1) Lucían, Somnium 1-4, ed. by G. Jacobitz, (Teubner, 1887-93). (2) Bis Accusatus, 27. (3) Alexander , 56.

5



66 A. £>. SÎMPSON

is always connected with his name (A). Finally he went to Egypt and there held a well-paid position under the imperial govern- ment (2), and there presumably he died. He found little to admire and much to ridicule in the other contemporary philosophic schools, but he seems to have had a genuine respect for the Epicureans. In his account of Alexander the False Prophet he drew a vigorous picture of the Epicureans as a group ; they had no patience with current and local superstitions, but tried to expose and drive away from the community all who tried to profit by the credulity of the people. They joined with other men of intelligence against Alexander and his new oracle ; indeed, the prophet claimed that the whole country (Pontus) was full of atheists and Christians, both of whom were banished from the cult ( Alexander , 25), The ritual was prefaced with the formula, pronounced by the prophet, « If any atheist or Christian or Epicurean has come as witness of the mysteries, let him begone », and when the prophet shouted, « Away with the Epicureans », the mob was to respond, « Away with the Christians » (ib., 38). Alexander tried hard to root out the Epicurean doctrine ; he discovered a copy of the KYPI/ 1 A05AI of Epicurus and in very modern fashion burned it in the marketplace and scattered the ashes in the sea. He hated the Epicurears because his appeal to popular credulity was constantly thwarted by their efforts ; he was quite right to hate them. From his point of view they were complete atheists, for they had no belief in the god he had invented and did their best to uncover the falsity of his promises and performances.

Lucian wrote elsewhere about the Epicureans, sometimes answe- iing their critics with laughter as in Parasi tus, 11-12 ; here Simon

proves to his own satisfaction that pleasure (ró r¡óv) concerns

parasites but not Epicurus, for pleasure is first tranquillity of body and second the freedom of the soul from disturbance and trouble. Epicurus had however all the anxiety and trouble of working over and arguing about his philosophy, so his soul could not be free from trouble, and either he earned his own living, in which case he had no tranquillity of body, or he was a parasite, in which

(1) Barbara P. Mc Carthy, Lucian and Menippus (diss. Yale Univ., no date), presents very lucidly the arguments for and against Lucian's originality in satiric dialogue, and decides in his favor.

(2) Lucían, Apologia , 12.



The good citizen 67

case he was no philosopher. Even in Lucian's two bitterest attacks on the philosophers, the Epicureans come off fairly well. In the Vitarum Audio Epicurus brings a modest figure, with the highest price paid for a joint figure of Socrates and Plato and the next

highest for Aristotle, while Stoics and Pythagoreans each form a syndicate to buy up Chrysippus and Pythagoras respectively. In Piscator 43 the Epicurean is not enough interested in gold to

struggle for it ; his attention is fixed on cakes and figs. In one

passage, however, Lucian spoke of Epicurus in terms which carry the earnestness of conviction ; this is in the Alexander 61, and it is possible to conclude that as Alexander is the typical False Prophet, so Epicurus is the True Prophet. He is said to be truly holy and divine in nature ('EmxovQœ r ijlmoqcov, âvÔQÎ œç âXrjdœç iegco Kal 6 sanea ico x r¡v cpvatv) ; he alone knew the True and the Good and handed them on ; he was a liberator of those who associated with him. His KYPIAI AOSAI , which Alexander had burned, not

knowing how much good it had done, and how much peace and freedom from fear (ataraxia) and liberty it had conferred, developed intelligence and truth in men, and purified the mind by straight- forward thinking as well as by truth and frankness (ib., 47).

The other exponent of Epicureanism in this age was very different from the brilliant and epideictic Lucian. In the Greek city of Oenoanda in Lycia, a man named Diogenes had a long inscription carved on a colonnade (x) ; probably he built the colonnade also, for he said that he preferred this to building a theatre or baths

(Frag. 1, col. 3). It was a memorial for himself, as he was on the

point of death from heart disease (ib. 66), and wished to set forth

publicly the medicine of salvation (ib., 2, cols. 5-6 rà rfjç aœrrjQÏaç (páQixana). The largest part of the fragments forms a treatise on the Epicurean atomic theory (ib. 1-14) ; there is a letter to a friend

Antipater at Athens, discussing the Epicurean doctrine of the

infinity of worlds (ib. 15-21) ; also, an ethical treatise (ib. 22-41), and a number of the KYPIAI AOEA1 of Epicurus (ib. 42-61), including one on acute pain (ib, 58) (2). A letter to his mother has the happy phrase õre [aèv yàq ôfiolœç roïç Oeoïç

XaÍQOjjLEv (ib. 63-64 ; presumably it was designed as a letter of

consolation, like Seneca's Ad Helviam). Another letter addressed

(1) Diogenis Oenoandensis Fragmenta, ed. by I. William, Teubner, 1907. (2) supra.



68 A. D. SIMPSON

to « dearest Menneas » (ib. 65) is too fragmentary to show the subject, and there is a very broken essay on old age, adressed of course to the young. We know of Diogenes nothing more than we can gather from this inscription ; namely, that he was rich enough to pay for a long inscription and probably also for the colonnade ; that he was in middle life, since he left a letter to his mother and an essay addressed to the young, and that he regarded the Epicurean system of science and ethics as so dear and valuable that he was impelled to share its blessings with his own world (ib. 1, col. 2 fin.). He must have been a member of one or more groups of friends such as characterized the Epicurean school ; his letter to Antipater suggests that Diogenes was in touch with such groups at Athens, Chalcis and Thebes. He gives us a pleasant picture of cheerful living, affectionate relationships and burning enthusia m for his chosen philosophy, which he wished to share with everyone, that they too might be saved by the « medicine of salvation ».

The second century like most others produced outspoken criticism of the Epicureans. Interestingly enough, the grounds of criticism vary from age to age, and in this period the emphasis is chiefly on the unsocial or antisocial attitudes of the Epicureans. It is true that Lucian's Alexander called them impious and atheist (Alex. 46), but this was the standard charge against them and had been answered by Epicurus himself (x). Some Epicureans undoubtedly denied the existence of the gods (2), but the orthodox doctrine was that the gods were immortal and blessed and un- troubled (K. A. 1). However, the second century waived the charge of atheism or put it down to ignorance on the part of the accuser, as Apuleius did (3), and was concerned rather with Epicu- rean indifference to social and political activity. Epictetus rebuked their stand vigorously ; « your doctrines are wicked, subversive of the State, harmful to the home, not even suitable for women »

(Discourses 3.7.21). Plutarch, who was approximately contem- poraneous with Epictetus, followed on one philosophic school rather than another, but censured the Epicureans for their lack of public conscience, « Who of the Epicureans was ever a tyrannicide

(1) Epicurus, Ad. Men . 123. (2) Lucían, lup . Trag. 4 ; Minucius Felix, Octavius , 19. 8. (3) Apuleius, Apologia 27, ed. by R. Helm, Teubner, 1913.



THE GOOD CITIZEN 69

or a prince or a lawgiver or a ruler or a king's adviser or president of a democracy or tortured or killed for the just? Which of your philosophers has travelled overseas for his country or gone as ambassador or spent money on it? Where has your civic achieve- ment been written up?» ( Colotes 33). To a Roman of the time it would have seemed true that Epicureans could not match the figures of Seneca, tutor and minister to Nero, and the Emperor M. Aurelius, but a glance at history would have showed that the Epicurean Cassius was a much rvQavvoxtêvoç as the Stoic Brutus, and Caesar himself had leaned towards Epicureanism, and with him a group of prominent men who held public office, including the consulship, and were in their own day distinguished in the law and in the State (x). Fashions in philosophy changed as wel as fashions in politics. Critics did not have the perspective to see that Epicureans who did not conform to the political pattern made famous by. Seneca in the first century, and by M. Aurelius in the second, yet contributed to the public welfare in two distinctive and interesting ways.

First, the Epicureans resolutely opposed all current superstitious endeavors to penetrate the future. The Stoics were committed to an acceptance of Fate as the dominant or determining power in existence ; to render Fate more acceptable, less paralyzing in its effects, they allowed various forms of divination, from the

spectacular vulgarity of Alexander's tame snake oracle (2) to the

pseudo-science astrology. The intimate connection of Fate and

astrology was indicated by Suetonius (3), when he said that the

Emperor Tiberius was addicted to astrology and full of conviction that all things were done by Fate. M. Aurelius in a letter to Fronto assumed that oracles were an ordinary part of existence and condoned their ambiguity : Ea res - verum dicere - prorsum deis hominibusque ardua : nullum denique tam veriloquum ora- culum est, quin aliquid ancipitis in se vel obliqui vel impediti habeat, quo imprudentior inretiatur, et ad voluntatem suam dictum opinatus captionem post temp us ac negotium sentiat. Sed ista

(1) For the group of Epicureans around Caesar, cf. Tenne y Frank, Vergil , New York, Henry Holt, 1922, pp. 51, 77 ; for Roman Epicureans in general, cf. N. W. De Witt, « Roman Epicureanism », Proc. & Trans, of the Royal Society of Canada , ser. 3, section 2, vol. 39 (1945), 31-41, esp, 32-35,

(2) Lucían, Alexander passim. (3) Suetonius, Tiberio 69,



70 A. D, SIMPSON

res lucrosa est et plane mos talia tantum pio errore et vanitate excusare (x).

This letter is to be dated possibly in 139 ; another a few years later shows how Marcus accepted the vagaries of the cults without any apparent hesitation, for in a birthday letter to Fronto he prayed to all the gods « qui vel somniis vel mysteriis vel medicina vel oraculis usquam iuvant atque pollent » (2). Epictetus ( Discour- ses 2. 7) told how divination should be used, arguing against the indiscriminate use of it. Those who use it to avoid misfortune or to gain advantage he called cowards, because they cannot bear uncertainty about the future ; he said that many consult diviners at unsuitable times, thereby implying that there is a suitable time, and added that we should go to diviners without excitement or revulsion, that is, without hope or fear. The Stoic doctrine of « sympathy », which implied an exact coordination of earthly and heavenly events, and was the basis of belief in astrology as well as of other forms of divination, was developed by Epictetus in accordance with the belief that the universe, Nature, God and our bodies and souls are all one. Plants and our bodies are bound up with the whole and « sympathize » with it ; our souls are bound up with God as parts of himself (ib. 1. 14. 5-6). Sextus Empiricus also gives evidence of the Stoic belief in divination by citing an argument in which divination is given as proof of the existence of the gods, and by attributing this argument apparently to the great Zeno, « if there are no gods, there is no divination, which is the visible and explanatory knowledge of signs, given by gods to men, and then there is no divine possession, no astrology, no reading of entrails, no interpretation of dreams. But it is ridiculous to take away such an amount of evidence already accepted among all men ; therefore there are gods. » ( Phys . 1, 132).

The attitude of the Epicureans toward divination was the result of their insistence on free-will. Epicurus had held that human free-will was a necessary outcome of the atomic swerve ; he was completely opposed to the doctrine of Fate and said that it was better to follow the myth about the gods than to be a slave to

(1) Marcus Cornelius Fronto, ed. by C. R. Haines (Loeb Classical Library) London & New York, 2 vols., 1919-1920 ; vol. 1, p. 16 ; cf. S. A. Naber, M. Cornelii Frontonis et M. Aurelii Imperatori $ Epistulae , Leipzig, 1867, Ad, M. Caes, et invicem 3. 12.



THE GOOD CITIZEN 71

Fate (!). Epicureans therefore opposed divination because of its close connection with Fate, and also because of the follies and superstitions which accompanied it. Lucian's Alexander has the clearest statement of their position, for Alexander is made'to say (Alex. 25), « If a man is a sorcerer and a friend of soothsaying and most hostile to truth, whom should he fight more justly than Epicurus, who investigated the nature of things and alone knew the truth in them? And Epicurus was hard-hearted - he called himself so - and justly most hostile, placing all these things in laughter and foolishness. » Plutarch also told the Epicurean side (2) « They deny divination, » he said, « and say there is no foreknowledge of the gods, and that the sun and moon are without life, despite the fact that all men sacrifice and pray to them and worshipe them. »

This opposition to divination provided a healthy reaction against determinism and the resultant superstition which flourished in all parts of the Empire, and it was a real contribution to public good which was occasionally recognized in its own time, and which deserves better knowledge today. The other Epicurean contribution was to train men for community living. Every philosophical school had its teachers and pupils, of course, but in general all schools

except the Epicurean seem to have been conducted on what may be called a non-resident basis. The Stoics, as is shown by Adrian's account of Epictetus's teaching, lectured, answered questions and conducted discussions ; this seems to have been the general pattern from the time of the Sophists on. The Epicureans however had

experimented with community living from the time of Epicurus himself and the house in the garden ; they trained one another to live socially. The evidence for Epicurean groups, called contu- bernio. in Silver Latin and ovvôtaycoyal in Greek, is derived chiefly from remains of the works of Philodemus, the famous Epicurean teacher of the first century B.C.; these have come to light in the excavations at Herculaneum. The evidence derived from the half- burned rolls can be supplemented from other, usually literary, sources, so that we have a fairly clear picture of what the Epicurean communities were like. The community was apparently called oí 9 Emxovqov êraÏQOL (Lucian gives us the phrase, Alex . 25), and was organized in ranks which have been compared to those

(1) Epicurus, Ad. Men. 134. (2) Plutarch, Colotes 27.



72 A. D. SIMPSON

of an academic community today (*). Beginners were called naraa- xevaÇó (.levo i ; then came avvrjdeïç ; next xarrjyrjreïç ; then (pi- KoXoyoi ; then (piXóaoçpoi and finally ô aócpoç. The head of the school was not called Master, contrary to the usual practice ; he was KQeirrwv and that was all. Probably this was the plan at the large and influential school of Philodemus ; we may suppose that other schools may not have had all the various ranks represented. Instruction was provided in physics, which to the Epicurean meant the atomic theory, and which was applied to psychology (including « canonic »), and theology also, just as other schools trained their students in logic, physics and ethics. But the distinctive contribution of « the companions of Epicurus » was in social adjustment through the practice of correction. The word for frankness, parrhesia, is ordinarily coupled with truth, but the Epicureans adopted it to describe their method of training character as well as of educating the mind (2). Considerable fragments of Philodemus' essay tzsqI naqQrjOÍaç (3) have been preserved, enough for us to be able to reconstruct the technique. Parrhesia was designed to correct faults whether of opinion or of character, and to forestall the development of others. It was employed by advanced members of the school in helping beginners, and was also used among friends, presumably outside the school as well as within. The procedures were about as follows : to comment on the faults of others rather than on those of the person whom one was correcting (Philodemus, liegt IlaQQrjoíaç. fr. 8, 9), - obviously to draw attention to the fault as shown objectively rather than to the person ;to avoid all sharpness and irritation on either side (it. 58) ; to include oneself in the admonition ( ib . 26), apparently to prevent any development of a « holier-than-thou » attitude among the correctors ; on some occasions to use apophtegms and proverbs (Col. VI) ; in difficult cases to use irony ( fr . 26, 27) ; always to be courteous, cheerful and kind, not looking for a chance to criticise, not quarrelsome or bitter (Col. II). In using correction

(1) N. W. De Witt, « Epicurean Contubernium, » Trans. Amer. Philological Ass . 67 (1936), 55-63 ; « Organization and Procedure in Epicurean Groups, » Class. Philology 31 (1936), 205-211.

(2) For parrhesia cf. De Witt, op. cit. and « Parrhesiastic Poems of Horace », Class. Phil. 30 (1935) 312-319, and A. K. Michels « IIAPPHZIA and the Satire of Horace, » Class. Phil. 39 (1944) 173-177.

(3) Philodemus, JJcqI JlaQçrjaíaç ed. by A. Olivieri, Teubner, 1914.



THE GOOD CITIZEN 73

there is a right kind of disposition which Philodemus calls ãareta as opposed to a wrong kind fAO%0r)Qá (Col. I). No doubt the method varied with the teacher, but in essence it associated teacher with student, the more advanced with the less advanced in a relationship where advice and correction would be taken willingly, or at worst received less unwillingly because given without any appearence of superiority on the part of the adviser.

This was very far from the method of the Cynics, who had the reputation of reviling everyone they met (*), and was not too close to the methods of the other schools, where the Master seems to have been regarded, and to have regarded himself as on a distinctly superior level to the student. There is a good example of the method used by Epictetus which illustrates this ( Discourses 3. 1). An overdressed young man with elaborately arranged hair visited his lectures and was made the subject of a discourse on the superiority of paying attention to one's moral purpose rather than to one's person. It is done with kindness and tact, but never at any point does Epictetus give any sign of associating himself with the young coxcomb, who may have been converted to philosophy, but who seems more likely never again to have visited a philosopher. The Epicurean method was a genuine development of the Socratic spirit, for Socrates always reminded his listeners that it was he who was ignorant and sought their wisdom and not the reverse (2). Thanks to this training the Epicureans possessed the ability to criticise themselves and possessed also a procedure of advice which had some chance of success. The combined emphasis on ataraxia and parrhesia seems to have produced in the Epicureans persons characterized by good sense, good manners and good fellowship. When joined with independence of thought and personal courage, this makes a pleasant picture of good citizenship. They remained faithful to Epicurus's injunction to live inconspicuously (frag. 86 Mde ßicboag), although they became thereby conspicuous, especially in contrast to the Stoics. This was the reason for the charge of unsocial behavior, for the Stoics interpreted social responsibility as activity in the field of practical politics and office-holding, though Epictetus seems much closer

(1) Gf. Epictetus, Discourses 3,22,50 ; the charge is refuted in the following sections.

(2) e. g. Plato, Rep. 1, 337 E and Apol, 20 C,



74 A. D. SIMPSON

to the Epicurean point of view than he was willing to admit when he spoke of a higher service to the State than preoccupation with taxes, revenues, peace and war, namely, the service of a Cynic who is concerned with happiness and unhappiness and slavery and freedom (Discourses 3.22.84). In any case, the Epicureans had little or no political ambition, following Epicurus's advice to free oneself from the prison of affairs and politics (Sent. Vat. 58). They saw, perhaps only in a glass darkly, the dangers of the lust for power ; they could not have seen that here lay the beginning of ruin which awaited Rome and which treatened even in this century of her magnificence. They alone of all the ancient philosophical schools understood that the best service of the community may, indeed must, repeatedly be unrecognized because swept into the common good, and that the evil inherent in ambition and the greed for power is so deadly that it slowly but inevitably brings destruction.

One further group remains to be noticed, although in the second century it would have been absurd to consider it along with the

great philosophies. The Christians were by this time present almost everywhere in the Roman world. There were many slaves among them and probably an occasional member of a great family ; the rest were ordinary people, some lawyers, some business men, a few philosophers and a great many others who pursued the businesses of everyday life. From themselves and from a few others we know something of their pattern of living. In the West Christians were likely to be confused with Jews, as the latter had come into prominence through the difficult campaigns in Syria under Vespasian and Titus, which culminated in the burning of the Temple and the fall of Jerusalem in 70. How little was really known about the Jews can be seen from Tacitus's account of them

(Hist. 5. 1-13), but the word was familiar. Moreover the word Christian seems to have been a barbarism ; Tacitus apologized for

using it (Ann. 15. 44), and Epictetus avoided it, using instead Jews or Galilaeans (4. 7. 6), if we are right in supposing that by these terms he meant the Christians. M. Aurelius apparently referred to them without any distinguishing name ; our reason for inferring that these anonymous people were Christians is that the material of his references indicates it, • - he called them an

unreasoning opposition (8. 48 ; 11. 3) and listed familiar charges against them (3. 16), - both of these points will be discus-



THE GOOD CITIZEN 75

sed below - and he mentioned that they were condemned to torture (7. 68 ; 8. 51). Lucian however used the word Christian fairly often ; it was naturally more familiar to the Eastern part of the Mediterranean world, where the disciples were first called Christians at Antioch (O- Lucian' s account of the Christians varies from praise to blame ; in Alexander the False Prophet (25, 38) he grouped them with the Epicureans as engaged in combatting such superstitions as Alexander was trying to introduce, and therefore spoke of them favorably. In his sketch of Peregrinus ( ) he drew a picture of Christian folly and gullibility ; Peregrinus, whom Lucian regarded as a complete imposter, joined the sect and rose to distinction ; he expounded some of their sacred books and wrote many of them ; after his arrest the Christians visited him in prison, took him food and otherwise behaved foolishly.

Others writers called Christianity a novel and evil superstition (Suetonius, Nero 16. 2), and a destructive superstition whose ad- herents were hated for their crimes (Tacitus, Ann. 15. 44). These crimes Tacitus explained only as « hatred of the human race », while Pliny was forced to exonerate the Christians of everything except inflexible obstinacy (Epls. 96. 3. 7). M. Aurelius also spoke of their unreasonable opposition (naQáraÇiç 11. 3) ; it is probable that both he and Pliny referred to their refusal to sacrifice to the Emperor. Marcus had other charges against them ; that they did not worship the gods, that they abandoned and failed their country, and that they acted in great secrecy, - his phrase is « when they have shut the doors » (3. 16). These evidently were standard complaints in the second century and were answered by th^ Christians writh some explanatory detail. St. Justin Martyr who wore the philosopher's cloak because he tried all philosophies and found no satisfaction until he discovered Christianity, said, « We admit that we are atheists of the accepted gods, but not of the most true, the father of justice and self-control and the other virtues; God unmixed with evil» (Apology 1. 6) (3). Connected with atheism was the charge against the patriotism of the Chris- tians. « I do not worship the Emperor but I pray for him, » said

(1) Acts of the Apostles , 11, 26. (2) Lucían, De Morte Peregrini , 13. (3) Justin, Apologiae Duae ? ed. by G. Rauschen ( Florilegiujn Palrißticum),

Bonn, 1911.



76 A. D. SIMPSON

Theophilus (x), another philosopher who retained the professional garb after his conversion to Christianity, while Justin, addressing the Emperor Antoninus Pius, together with M. Aurelius and L. Verus, wrote, « We gladly serve you, acknowledging you as kings and rulers, and praying that you may have prude t judgment along with the royal power» ( Apol . 1. 7). In the same passa e he said that Christians try to pay all taxes and imposts more readily than other men, and again, « We are your helpers and allies for peace more than all men, for we teach that it is impossible to escape the notice of God whether one is an evil-doer or covetous or slave or man of virtue » (ib. 1. 29). The charge of crimes done in secret, as we learn from the Christians' indignant refutations, meant murder and cannibalism, and nocturnal orgies. The first of these derived from the formula of consecration in the Mass, while the other rose from the secrecy and obscurity of Christian meetings. In denying such charges the Christians usually countered with pointed comment on the morality of their accusers, and their cults and myths (2). They also defended their own way of life, which Theophilus said was characterized among other things by temperance, monogamy, respect for justice, regard for law, reverence, truth and peace (Ad Autol. 3. 15). Tatian, a widely-travelled Assyrian who became a Christian and was a pupil of Justin's at Rome, spoke sturdily for himself, « I do not wish to be a king ; I do not desire to be rich ; I decline military command ; I hate fornication ; I am not driven to sea by love of gain ; I do not

compete in the games ; I am free from a thirst for fame... If I am a slave, I bear slavery ; if I am free, I do not boast of my birth » (3). The Athenian Aristides, another philosopher who em- braced Christianity, was outspoker on the subject of Christian morality, « They do not commit adultery or bear false witness or desire other people's property ; they honor parents ; they judge righteously ; they make friends of those who wrong them ; the man who has, shares ungrudgingly with the man who has not (4) ».

(1) Theophilus, Ad Autolycum , 1, 11, Migne, Patrol. Graec. tom. 6. (2) e. g. Theophilus, Ad Autol. 3. 3-4 (incest) ; 3. 15 (cannibalism) ; Ta-

tian, Orat. ad Graecos 25 (cannibalism) ; Minucius Felix 22-23 and 31 (lust and incest) ; 31 (cannibalism).

(3) Tatian, Oratio ad Graecos 11, ed. by Ed. Schwartz ( Texte u. Unter- such. z. Gesch. d . altchristl. Literatur ), Leipzig, 1888.

(4) Aristides, Apology , 15. 4, ed. by J. Rendei Harris ( Texts & Studies con- tributions to ßibl . & Patr, Literature ), Cambridge, 1891 1



THE GOOD CITIZEN 77

An anonymous Greek document of the age gives a vivid picture of Christian daily living. « Christians are not different from other men in land of speech or customs ; they nowhere have their own cities or use a strange dialect or practice a conspicuous way of live. They live in Greek or barbarian cities according to their inheritance, and follow local customs in clothing and food and the rest of life, but they do display an amazing and admittedly incredi- ble difference from their fellow-citizens. For they live in their own country as if they were strangers ; they share all duties as citizens and submit to everything as aliens. They spend their time on earth but their citizenship is in heaven. They obey the established laws but in their own lives they transcend the laws. They love everyone and are persecuted by everyone » (x). One other Christian should be cited, Minucius Felix, a Roman lawyer trained in rhetoric and philosophy, who was converted to Chris- tianity and wrote a small book to appeal to others of his class and training. In defense of Christian morality Minucius says, « Nos igitur, qui moribus et pudore censemur, merito malis volup- tatibus et pompis vestris et spectaculis abstinemus, quorum et de sacris originem novimus et noxia blandimenta damnamus, » ( Oc - tavius 37. 11) (2). Elsewhere he defends Christians against the imputations of ignoble origin (de ultima faece , ib. 8. 4) and of sedi- tion, « Nec de ultima statim plebe consistimus, si honores vestros et purpuras recusamus, nec fastidiosi sumus, si omnes unum bonum sapimus eadem congregati quiete qua singuli, nec in angulis garruli, si audire nos publice aut erubescitis aut timetis, » (ib. 31. 6), and shows the innocence of their cult, « Nonne melius in nostra dedi- candus est mente ? in nostro immo consecrandus pectore ? Hostias et victimas deo offeram, quas in usum mei protulit, ut reiciam ei suum munus ? Ingratum est, cum sit litabilis hostia bonus animus et pura mens et sincera sententia... Haec nostra sacrificia, haec dei sacra sunt: sic apud nos religiosior est ille qui iustior, » (ib. 32. 2-3). The picture which Minucius gives is not meant to be complete ; he wrote for those who had no conception of the sacrifice of a troubled spirit, and he obiously had no intention of revealing to uncomprehending pagans the ceremonies wich were conducted « when they have shut the doors ».

(1) Epistula ad Dioqnetum 5, Migne, Patrol. Graec. tom. 2. (2) M. Minucius Felix, Octauius , ed. by A. D. Simpson, New York, 1938.



78 Á. D. SIMPSON

The Christian picture is of quiet, busy people, living lives of mutual help and trustfulness, and like the Epicureans refusing ambition, office-seeking and power. They set themselves against all snobbishness, including snobbishness of the intellect ; « all men, » Minucius said, « whether unlearned, poor or untrained are born with the capacity and use of reason and imagination ; native ability is not the gift of opportunity or the result of application but is generated in the very formation of the mind, » (Oct. 16. 5). In this connection Minucius held, as did other Christians, that the proper performance of civic duties depended on a grounding in science, for the subject-matter of science is the world, which was made by God, and until men have worked out carefully the plan of Divine creation, they will not know how to deal with human creation, that is, with human and civic affairs ( ib . 17. 2)

As we look back at the second century it is not the famous men of letters, historians, poets, orators and jurists that stand out, not the wide extent and power, the comfort and seeming stability of Rome, not even the dominant political idea of Empire, or the philosophical idea of freedom from fear. Rather, the small men appear, uncunted and usually unknown, good citizens who were content without fame and without power, except the power to live pleasantly because they lived wisely and beautifully and justly (x). By such good living their virtues are known, while they themselves remain unknown, and when Rome's greatness in the following centuries cracked and crumbled, these good citizens went on living in the lives of their descendants, adapting themselves to varied and changing conditions, to new ideas, to smaller and smaller communities and rougher lives and old crafts. That great Rome passed, but in a very real sense Rome and the ancient world with it is eternal, as long as good citizens value noble deeds because they spring from virtue (3).

Hunter College of the City of New York .

(l) Epicurus, R. Á.y (2) Aristotle, Eudemian Ethicš , 1. 1215. B., o pev q>iAoao(po<; ßovXstai

71EQÌ (pQÓvr¡oiv eivai xaì rrjv deœglav r r¡v n bqì t rjv áXr¡deiav, ó ôê tioXitikòç Tieg i ràç TiQáÇeiç ràç naXàç (atirai elalv al ânò rfjç âQsrrjç), ô ô'ànoXav - orixòç TieQÍ ráç tfôovàç ràç acojuarixáç.



The Good Citizen in the Second Century a. d.

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