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The geopolitical economy of social policy in the Philippines: securitisation, emerging powers and multilateral policies

Citation of the final article: Reid, Ben 2016, The geopolitical economy of social policy in the Philippines: securitisation, emerging powers and multilateral policies, Third world quarterly, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 96-118.

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Third world quarterly on 23 Dec 2015, available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2015.1089165

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The Geopolitical Economy of Social Policy in the Philippines: Securitisation, emerging powers and multilateral policies

Recent geopolitical and economic changes have altered global social policy formation. Bretton Woods multilateral development agencies (MDAs) have selectively incorporated ideas that have emerged from developing country states and decision makers. Recent years have witnessed an increased acceptance of social transfers as part of renewed efforts at poverty alleviation policies based on social risk management. There has been an instance in the use and promotion of conditional cash transfer (CCT) policies by MDAs. One case is the Philippines. CCTs were a product of the emergence of a neostructuralist welfare regime (understood as an ideal type) in Latin America. There was an attempt to reconcile neoliberal strategies of development with aspirations for guaranteed minimum incomes. The Bretton Woods and regional development bank MDAs have facilitated the adoption of CCTs in other developing country contexts. In the Philippines, a combination of actions by national political actors and MDAs resulted in the implementation of a securitised and compliance-focused version of CCTs derived from the Colombian security state. Although poor households welcome income assistance, CCTs have acted to enforce further state monitoring without altering the national-based political and economic processes that replicate poverty.

Keywords: poverty, social policy, cash transfers; Latin America; Asia; Philippines

Dr Ben Reid is Senior Lecturer in International Development Studies, Deakin University, Australia. ben.reid@deakin.edu.au

2

Introduction

There have been many recent attempts to create frameworks for social protection in

developing-country contexts. 1 The suggested policies forms reflect both alterations in the

relationships between developed and developing economies and the role of international

organisations. There has been a shift in global social policy (GSP) formation towards a new

geopolitical economy of social policy (GESP) making.2 Multilateral development agencies

(MDAs) have both helped facilitate these developments (especially United Nations MDAs) or

selectively incorporated (Bretton Woods MDAs) ideas that have emerged from developing

country states. There has been a de facto increased recognition by the latter of direct social

transfer payments for achieving poverty alleviation goals. One of the most widespread forms

of social transfer payments are cash transfer and conditional cash transfer (CCT) projects that

now operate in over thirty countries and cover millions of beneficiaries. CCTs were pioneered

by some middle-income countries in Latin America - in the late-1990s and early-2000s. They

entailed targeted cash grants for impoverished households in return for meeting mandatory

requirements concerning children’s (and parental [mostly mother’s]) attendance at educational

and health services.3

These initiatives in Latin America took place in the context of a modest shift in economic

development policy towards neostructuralism. The term neostructuralism is defined here as

“the prevailing narrative that has sought to replace “market fundamentalism” and humanise the

“savage capitalism” imposed by neoliberal dogmatism.” 4 It was one reflection of alterations

in the global geopolitical economy that led to higher rates of growth for some Latin American

economies. The partial nature of the shift was reflected in the limited policy changes that

neostructuralism entailed. The market-based approaches to economic development contained

in the Washington consensus (WC) remained hegemonic. Neostructuralism endeavoured to

selectively re-incorporate some of older industrial structuralist policy themes into the WC. The

3

scope of neostructuralism mostly concerned issues of economic growth and industry policy:

seeking a “high road to globalisation”. Classical structuralism, however, had entailed particular

approaches to social policy: a “Latin American welfare regime.” The transition from

structuralism to the high –point of the WC and back again to neostructuralism entailed changes

to the Latin American welfare regime. After an initial shift towards abandonment due to the

WC and its associated conservative fiscal policies, there was a subsequent shift back towards

limited forms of social provision, including social transfers. There was, however, considerable

variation in their occurrence with different types of programs being established. CCTs have

been a major part of these newer initiatives, although not all of the programs are the same.

Moreover, the shift towards limited social protection led to “feedbacks” into international

development policy making via MDAs. The spread of CCTs has emerged as a major facet of

developing social protection regimes supported by the World Bank (WB) and other MDAs.

One example is the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) in the Philippines. It

commenced operation in 2007 and covered up to three million households by the end of 2013.

The Philippines provides a vantage point from which to assess why CCT programs were

adopted. It has been characterised by high levels of poverty and inequality, despite its nominal

status as a middle-income country. The implementation of 4Ps was one way to redress these

issues. The form of CCT that was adopted, however, was heavily supported and funded by

MDAs. It also reflected powerful political pressures and existential threats upon the

government of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001-2008).

Moreover, the spread of CCTs demonstrates an alteration in the GSP process towards GESP.

There are instances, on the one hand, of policy experimentation emerging in some developing

country contexts. The influence of MDAs, however, mediated the diffusion of similar policies

in other developing country contexts. The MDA-sponsored approaches have been

accompanied by a focus on ensuring poor people's compliance and increasing the security of

4

the state through a greater presence in and surveillance of the population. CCTs have become

components of an increased securitisation of development policy.5 One facet of their operation

was their use of women as vital conduits for the distribution of funds as the micro-scale.

Effectively a form of “governance feminism” has combined legitimate concerns for women’s

empowerment and independence with explicit goals of monitoring household compliance to

meet funding conditionalities.6 The human-capital forming, gender empowering and poverty

alleviation focus of CCTs blended with goals of the containment of the existential threats.

The methods involved range across three spheres. First, a conceptual model is developed that

combines an analysis of GSP with geopolitical economy. These are combined with a

comparative historical approach to conceptualising the neostructuralist welfare regime. Second,

the themes these provide are integrated into the analysis of key policy documents, combined

with insights from focus groups conducted in Mindanao in 2014. The study outlines how the

securitisation of social protection policy occurred through the selective diffusion of Latin

American approaches to social welfare. It uses the case of 4Ps in the Philippines as a case study.

The hegemony of MDAs, however, has meant that particular forms of CCTs have been adopted

that emphasise high conditionality and reliance on external finance. This is especially the case

in the Philippines. Section one examines the evolution of GSP and the emergence of GESP.

The second section outlines both the Latin American origins and international diffusion of

CCTs. The third part assesses the experience of the Philippines.

From Global to Geopolitical Economic Social Policy

The trends towards the adoption of social transfer payments reflect an evolution in the process

of GSP making. A tempering of the GSP’s focus on “globalisation” is needed that recognises

the enduring role of nation states and partial changes in international political power.

5

The GSP approach emerged during the peak influence of globalisation centred discourses that

emphasised the uniformity of neoliberal policymaking. 7 The resulting agency, structure,

institution and discourse method focused on the main features of the early to mid-2000s. There

was the continuing hegemony of the WC (augmented by limited governance and social

protection measures); the competing priorities of different MDAs and donor states; and the

emergence of transnational social movements and international non-government organisations

(NGOs).8 Recent reflections by GSP researchers has re-emphasised the impacts of colonialism

and the role of political actors from within the developing world. 9 Developing-country

governments played a significant role in creating policy innovations. This included CCTs and

other facets of social policy in Brazil, for instance.

One question that emerges is to what degree have established patterns of policy making altered.

Changes in the geopolitical economy and the impact of so-called “rising developing powers”

had material and ideational components to consider. The material factors consist, for the most

part, of an uneven political and economic strengthening of some late industrialising

economies.10 One facet of the process has been a reiteration the “materiality of the state” in the

process of uneven and combined development on a global scale. In contrast to some of the

more exaggerated claims of early 2000s globalisation literature, the capability of the state has

been central for engendering successful economic development outcomes. The consolidation

of China as an export market since 2000 has resulted in some positive flow-on of effects for

many developing economies.11 One has been the emergence of a global commodity price cycle

that has been advantageous for resource exporting economies.12 Although the resilience of this

economic expansion is questionable, one medium-term consequence has been the emergence

of a more stable fiscal environment for some developing states. The resulting economic

situation allowed for some expansion in investments in social policy measures. Again Brazil is

a case in point, with revenues from mineral exports allowing for the expansion of social

6

expenditures (see below). Of course, there is considerable unevenness in the extent of the

weight of the developing country powers and the developed economies remaining dominant.

There were additional factors. One was the cumulative effects within developing countries of

class, gender and ethnic-based political mobilisation across the 1990s. Social-movement

mobilisation produced either pressure upon or new governments committed to implementing

more extensive social policies. There were different expressions of these processes, ranging

from the emergence of both left-of-centre or technocratic reforming governments in Latin

America.13 Second, both United Nations and Bretton Woods MDAs themselves had begun to

debate ways that the WC could be altered to include “social protection” measures, especially

in the wake of economic crises in the 1990s.14

GESP also reflected an uneven shift in the ideational dimensions of power that matched the

material change. The GSP literature tended to emphasise the competing roles of national

governments, MDAs and international non-government organisations in setting policy

agendas, while recognising the overall hegemony of neoliberal policy. There was a

comparative “BRICisation” of policymaking personnel, evident within the Bretton Woods

MDAs and perhaps most notably the WB.15 These appointments did not comprise substantive

challenges to the hegemony of the established developed powers over policy-making.

Developed economy donors, however, were willing to accept personnel and ideas from

developing country contexts: provided they did not stray too outside ideational limits of what

Cammack referred to as “global liberalism.” 16 Recent analyses have also identified the

existence of influential layers of policy makers from the developing world in concerned with

sectors such as international trade.17 Of course, the perspectives of these experts vary. Some

are closer to the established WC than others. One emerging facet of policy analysis has

therefore become detecting the ways international organisations selectively incorporate the

ideas of developing country policy making experiments. Particular experiences from

7

developing economies tended to get greater influence and promotion over others. In other

words, the WC remained hegemonic, albeit with selective and ad-hoc adaptation to emerging

policies of some developing countries.

Therefore, GSP has evolved towards a GESP process. First, the old institutions (global finance;

developed country donors; developed-country dominated Bretton Woods MDAs) remain

dominant. They ultimately allocate resources for programs and have effective veto rights over

policy-making through both formal control (voting quotas, for example). There is also their

continued role as the principal donors. Second, developing countries have gathered

considerable experiences in policy innovation and development. These have been promoted by

an emerging cadre of development and social policy experts from developing states. One

source for the dissemination of these policies has been “South-South aid”, although the quantity

of this remains small in comparison to official bilateral and multilateral flows.18 The social

policy consequences of China’s aid in Africa, for instance, are unclear.19 Third, the other source

of dissemination has been through the selective incorporation of both policies and decision

makers into existing MDAs.

Indeed, the adoption of CCTs as a mechanism of direct social transfers is very illustrative of

the GESP process. The dominant MDAs, however, largely determined the interpretation and

implementation of these experiences were elsewhere.

Latin American Policies and Internationalisation

The introduction of social protection systems over the past decade has reflected these newer

patterns of the GESP. An interaction existed between national-based social reform innovations

and selected adoption by MDAs. One significant trend was the emergence in Latin America of

what can arguably be termed a neostructuralist welfare regime.

8

Social Policy: A Neostructuralist Welfare Regime?

One way of understanding the appearance of CCTs and other similar social protection and

policy measures is through the concept of the welfare regime. The welfare regime allocates

different national and regional welfare states into ideal-type categories to describe historical

experiences.20

Figure 1 demonstrates a schematic overview of the history of welfare regimes in Latin America.

A schematic indication is given of the periods of economic development and their associated

social policies. First, there was a classic “Latin American welfare regime” that emerged in the

early twentieth century.21 It was the redistributive component of the hegemonic structuralist

and import-substituting policies of industrialisation and development. Classic structuralism

reflected the reconciliation of nationalist political and development aspirations with insertion

within the international division of labour.22 Elites within developing Latin American nation-

states maintained power in part through hegemonic alliances with sections of middle and

working classes. The resulting welfare regime entailed a predominantly conservative and

informal policy-mix that emphasised: health and education expenditures; employment

protection; price controls; and contributory social insurance. Direct social transfer payments

were rare and high levels of labour market informality effectively limited the coverage of

contributory schemes.23

Figure 1: Latin American Welfare Regime: Stages of Transition

Period Development Strategy Redistributive Strategy Characteristics

1900-1980s

Structuralism/ Import Substitution (Protected national industry and oligarchic governing blocs)

Conservative-Informal mix Contributory social insurance; price controls; subsidies

1980-late 1990s

High-point of the WC (Crisis, stabilisation, restructuring and export-oriented industrialisation)

Retreat and dismantling of measures

Privatisation and wind-back of state- based measures; marketisation.

9

Late 1990s Neo-structuralism (A limited break from the WC: ‘High road to globalisation’)

Notional commitment to universal social rights combined with varying degrees of targeted social transfer payments

Social transfer payments; poverty expenditures; contributory social insurance.

Second, even these conservative-informal measures were eventually curtailed in the aftermath

of the economic crises of the early 1980s and the dominance of the WC. As the second row

indicates, the existing welfare policy-mix was attacked for allegedly having “distortionary”

effects on markets.24 Simultaneously many of the governing regimes in Latin American states

faced increased political pressures for democratisation and social reform.25 There was - as a

result – generally considerable conflict between substantial fiscal constraints imposed by the

WC and demands for greater social protection.

Third and accordingly, the high phase of WC dominance eventually gave way to some modest

and incremental changes in policies. At the international scale, there were piecemeal

modifications, with an increasing focus on institutions, governance and poverty alleviation.26

Within Latin America, neostructuralism emerged as a policy model. Another synonymous term

in Latin America was neo-developmentalism, although neostructuralism had a stronger

association with the explicit positions of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the

Caribbean.27 These regional-body sponsored policy proposals attempted to reconcile a limited

revival of traditional structuralist themes with the WC and its associated focus on the

disciplinary constraints of international capital.28 The WC, therefore, continued as a hegemonic

project, although now accompanied by limited interventionist themes of human capital

development and industrial policy. The social policy innovations that emerged around the same

time have received less attention. These tried to resurrect and surpass some of the themes of

the older Latin American welfare regimes within a context of the substantial fiscal constraints.

One innovation was the greater use of targeted and direct social transfer payments.

10

Therefore, there was a gradual evolution from the WC towards limited acceptance of

neostructuralist themes. One component of this was arguably the emergence of a

neostructuralist welfare regime that corresponded with the limited re-introduction of broader

economic interventionism. This entailed increased acceptance of direct social transfer

payments such as CCTs.

Variations in Policy

Brazil and Colombia are two national case studies that effectively illustrate these differences

across the general influence of neostructuralism and associated welfare measures. CCTs

emerged as keystone social policies in both instances.

First, neostructuralism in Brazil was embedded in a form of cross social class based “coalition

for economic growth”. The Bolsa Família program is probably the most well-known example

of a CCT program that became a central policy-reducing measure. It is the program that has

the least stringent conditionalities and sanctions. The raised expectations generated by labour

and social movement mobilisations helped drive the process of democratisation and social

policy reforms. The re-democratising constitution, adopted in 1988, had nominally guaranteed

social rights to citizens. The predominant focus on fiscal consolidation and adjustment by

governments before 2002, however, meant few significant new social expenditures occurred.

However, the constitution’s decentralisation provisions granted more autonomy to sub-national

state and municipal-level governments to experiment with policies. 29 Such experimentation

occurred - especially with administrations led by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) which

adopted the first limited programs.30 The election of the PT’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as

President in 2002 resulted in the national consolidation of the existing limited and fragmented

set of payment programs. These were amalgamated into the Bolsa Família in 2003 and 2004

11

under the control of a new Ministry of Social Development. By 2012, Bolsa Família’s coverage

had extended to 12 million households.

Bolsa Família’s emergence in Brazil was an explicit expression of a social policy of the

neostructuralist welfare regime. In the broader economic development sphere, the Lula

government was somewhat influenced by the “high road to globalisation” and other themes of

neostructuralism. There was no significant disruption of the previous administrations’

emphasis on compliance to global market forces, although a limited revival occurred of

intervention in industry policy and other areas. 31 Social protection policy, accordingly,

operated within accepted tight fiscal constraints and with a somewhat targeted set of

beneficiaries.32

However, Brazil designed and implemented its policies with considerable autonomy from the

Bretton Woods MDAs. There was, on the one hand, political pressure from mass social

movements and the experiences of the sub-national governments. Brazil also experienced

higher levels of economic growth between 2002 and 2010 than in previous decades. 33 The

economic expansion was in large part due to the impact of the global commodities price cycle

and the resulting boom in mineral exports. Government and social expenditures could,

therefore, expand without affecting capital and higher-income earners. Bolsa Família’s

coverage could also increase without significant fiscal implications and with minimal financing

from donors. Brazil’s overall public spending remained steady at around 20.3 percent of GDP

between 2002 and 2010. 34 The amounts consumed by Bolsa Família were comparatively

modest. Its annual expenditure of $8 billion in 2010, for instance, was equivalent to 0.6 percent

of GDP and was financed by domestic taxation revenue. The WB’s total contribution was only

$500 million in 2004.35

12

The small level of Bretton Woods MDA support had important implications for Bolsa

Família’s operation. There were significant differences between it and other CCT programs.

First, there was the much lighter use of conditionalities (as Brazil used self-declared income

rather than much-promoted proxy means tests). Local municipal bodies did implementation

and evaluation. As Soures and Silva note:

The response to any lack of compliance with conditionalities is another feature that distances Bolsa Família from a typical CCT. The programme incorporates a system of repercusão gradativa (gradual repercussion), (this) is used because the objective of the programme is not to punish families but to help them to comply with the conditionalities. In fact, the design allows for the waiver of conditionalities in the case where this can be justified (e.g. illness of a child, threat of violence at school, etc). Social services at municipal level are responsible for the case management of non-compliance episodes.36

Second and accordingly, the comparative priorities within CCT programs between the longer-

term objectives of human resource development and the immediate issue of poverty alleviation

was resolved in favour the latter.37 Bolsa Família also had other adverse effects, such as

purportedly reducing political and social mobilisations in favour of redistributive land

reform.38 There was, however, a high-level of “country-ownership” of the program. Although

it is uncertain how much is attributable to CCTs, it is clear that poverty levels declined, and

there was a marginal decrease in income inequality.39 The role of minimum wage standards,

pension reforms and other labour market measures, complementary to Bolsa Família, were

clearly also important.

Colombia’s experience, on the other hand, with its CCT program contrasted significantly with

Brazil’s use lighter conditionality-based approach with high country ownership. In terms of

broader economic development policy, the influence of neostructuralism on Colombia was

remarkably similar to Brazil’s.40 Overall, however, there were notable differences with Brazil,

such as a highly militarised and conflict-prone society and high levels of MDA intervention.

There were, as a result, big differences in social policy. The focus of poverty reduction emerged

13

as a response to “existential” threat to the state and elites’ security, and there was an integration

of the resulting CCT program into counter-insurgency measures. 41 In many ways, Colombia’s

Familias en Acción emerged as the most “securitised” form of CCT with high levels of MDA

and foreign support.

The historical, political and economic context of Colombia consisted of limited democratic

reforms in the 1990s and fleeting attempts to end several decades of civil conflict. The inclusion

of nominal social rights in the new 1991 constitution intended to entail an eventual guaranteed

minimum income for citizens.42 The new constitution’s emphasis on social reform and ending

the political conflict, however, failed as the political system continued to be exclusionary and

marked by endemic violence.43 There remained at least two major insurgencies and ongoing

conflicts over narcotics production.44 The formal political system remained dominated by elite-

driven and ideologically conservative political parties. Colombia’s rate of economic growth

was also lower than Brazil’s: the average annual growth of GDP per-capita was only one

percent between 1990 and 2001 and 2.5 percent between 2002 and 2010. Annual government

expenditures represented just 16 percent of GDP since the late 1990s.45 It was, therefore, a

poorer economy with more limited fiscal capacity.

Most significantly, there were much larger-scale armed conflicts in Colombia. Its military

expenditures averaged 17 percent of central government outlays, compared to just 6.5 percent

in Brazil throughout the 2000s. The formal statistics on battle deaths averaged 737 per year

between 1989 and 2009 in Colombia. Brazil, in contrast, had no deaths registered.46 While the

immediate pretext for the implementation of Familias en Acción was an economic crisis in

1999, it was also aimed at undermining the basis of armed insurgencies’ support amongst

sections of the population. The CCT program was, therefore, initiated by Andrés Pastrana

Arango’s conservative government as part of attempts to create a political settlement with rebel

groups. These conciliatory policies gave way to the heavily militarised approach of the Plano

14

Colômbia policy (adopted after 2000). The subsequent Álvaro Uribe Vélez’s administration

extended Plano Colômbia’s operation, and with Familias en Acción integrated within it. 47

Also, Familias en Acción was almost entirely funded by Bretton Woods MDAs. Colombia’s

overall official development assistance reliance was higher in comparison to the other two

cases, with net per capita inflows averaging $16 between 1990 and 2010, compared to just

$1.45 in Brazil.48 Familias en Acción’s total annual budget of approximately $1 billion had

resulted in the program’s coverage extending to 1.7 million households by 2007. External

financing, therefore, comprised 85 percent of overall funding. The Familias en Acción program,

therefore, involved even heavier intervention by MDAs. 49 The program was subject to

intensive monitoring and evaluation.

The use of proxy means tests and similar punitive measures indicated there was substantial

intervention by program personnel in beneficiaries’ lives. Familias en Acción relied upon a

rigorous screening process for identifying beneficiaries that and was integrated with

Colombia’s identity card system. 50 Then there was intensive intervention by program

personnel in recipient households with community workers monitoring and implementing the

program. On the whole, there was greater direct involvement by state personnel with

beneficiaries associated with securitisation of the program. The high levels of militarisation in

Colombia were, therefore, matched by a social component based on monitoring of poor

households.

These two cases in Latin America suggest the emergence of CCTs reflected inter-linked

processes within the GESP. There was an ideational shift towards the adoption of forms of

social protection that consisted of (understood as an ideal type) neostructuralist welfare regime.

The restructuring of many economies after the crises of the 1980s constrained the ability of

states to expand social expenditures. The eventual way institutions placated demands for

15

greater social protection was through the introduction of heavily targeted programs such as

CCTs. There was, as with the broader neostructuralist turn in economic development policy,

considerable variation in these processes. In Brazil, CCTs were pioneered and expanded upon

by a centre-left political party as a mass system of payments with light conditionalities. The

Colombian approach reflected conditions of an exclusionary polity and highly militarised civil

conflict. Colombia’s program was more heavily securitised and supported by the Bretton

Woods MDAs. There was, therefore, even considerable variation in policy design within the

overall framework that emphasised the adoption of heavily targeted payments.

CCTs and the Internationalisation of Social Transfer Payments

The Bretton Woods MDAs – especially the WB – subsequently played a considerable role in

promoting CCT programs on an international scale. They now operate in over thirty countries.

Significant changes to WB policy on social protection underpinned the spread of CCT

programs. Previously, the WB’s primary approach was embodied in its Social Risk

Management (SRM) policy framework. The emergence of SRM reflected a broader

reorientation of WB policy rhetoric towards “poverty reduction” while maintaining the

principal components of the WC framework.51 There was accumulating evidence of failures to

reduce income poverty or protect against the impacts of economic crises. A search for suitable

social “safety net” mechanisms had begun in the 1990s.52 The WB subsequently adopted its

SRM framework and codified it in the 2000-1 Attacking Poverty World Development Report.53

SRM placed primary emphasis on contributory social insurance with little role reserved for

direct social transfer payments. The social policy boundaries of SRM, therefore, reflected

continuity with the market-oriented WC.

However, eventually a greater acceptance of social transfer payments emerged that helped to

facilitate the promotion of CCTs (albeit remaining subsidiary to contributory programs). The

16

WB and other donors became aware of shortfalls in meeting Millennium Development Goal

(MDG) targets in many countries. CCTs became particularly appealing as they notionally

addressed different “dimensions” of poverty such as income, education and health while

retaining strict beneficiary targeting.54 One focus became selectively incorporating the minor

reforms implicit in the neostructuralist welfare regime into systems that were as compatible

with the WC as possible.

Donors were willing to fund forms of social transfer payments, such as CCTs (and also some

non-conditional cash transfer programs), providing they adhered to policy boundaries. Most

notably, the emerging plans entailed very limited expenditures. The WB’s position was later

expressed in policy documents such as the “joint communiqué” with the IMF in 2012. The

document explicitly endorsed the Mexican CCT program (Oportunidades) as the most efficient

approach to minimum social protection. The scale of social transfers should comprise no more

than 0.5 percent of GDP. 55

Taken together, the international emergence of CCTs reflected modest changes in GSP towards

a GESP-based processes. They reflected the material and ideational interaction between

emerging developing powers, United Nations and Bretton Woods MDAs and donors. First, the

overall directionality of hegemonic power and interests remained: the WC continued to frame

strategy and policy. Second, the implementation of the WC had come into conflict, however,

aspirations for social protection. One consequence was the emergence neostructuralism as a

slightly altered version of the WC with its associated welfare regime. The chief outcomes were

targeted payment systems to assumed slightly different forms. There was, for example, Brazil’s

low-conditionality based CCT system and Colombia’s higher-conditionality and MDA-

supported approach. Third, these policy experiments were fed back into the Bretton Woods

MDAs. These assimilated aspects of the CCT experience and promoted their interpretations.

17

Fourth and finally, the Bretton Woods MDAs sponsored similar programs in other national

contexts from the mid-2000s.

CCTs: Security, Poverty and Political Crisis in the Philippines

Indeed, in the Philippines both the influence of MDAs and the government of President Gloria

Macapagal Arroyo’s attempts to contain existential threats were the main elements that shaped

the adoption of CCTs. CCTS became as a key plank in an evolving social protection framework

and broader social policy. The process of GESP formation, therefore, appeared in the context

of national-based political crises and Bretton Woods and regional development bank MDA

policy hegemony. 4Ps’ local-level implementation experiences also reflect this.

Poverty, Politics and MDA hegemony

There were four main historical factors that contributed to the political crisis that led to the

adoption of CCT adoption in the Philippines. These combined with the GESP processes to

create 4Ps.

On the one hand, the first historical factor was colonial history and the subsequent United States

hegemony over the state and policy making. These ensured “Western-inspired” ideas and

approaches framed development strategies.56 One implication was the early abandonment by

the Philippines of any residual import-substitution based and limited version of structuralist

development policies in favour of export production in the early-1960s. The oligopolistic

structure of land ownership, however, resulted in low rates of capital accumulation and

economic growth. 57 The failures to implement substantive land reform measures further

consolidated the socially exclusionary pattern of development. From the 1970s, in particular,

there was an expansion of MDA-sanctioned borrowing and hegemony. The resulting sovereign

debt defaults – associated with dollar appreciation and an economic recession - and political

upheavals of the early 1980s intensified these exclusionary processes. All subsequent

18

governments (beginning with Cory Aquino in 1987), moreover, have complied with MDA-

imposed conditions and reliance on external finance. There were, therefore, some parallels with

the political environments that allowed for the emergence of neostructuralism in Latin America.

The Philippines had similar experiences with a post-authoritarian polity and an extended period

of MDA hegemony. Was less able to adopt policies that made any substantive adaptations to

the WC.

Second and accordingly, the low levels of economic growth and resulting high inequality had

considerable implications. The deep contraction in the economy in the early 1980s – associated

with the end of the boom in external financing - meant that per capita income did not recover

to its 1982 level until 2004. The average annual per capita income growth was consistently low,

averaging 1.5 percent between 1960 and 2010.58 GINI index measures suggest inequality

remained high, reaching a peak of 46.3 in 1997 and 43 in 2009. The proportion of the

population experiencing income poverty fell during the 1990s from 40.6 percent in 1994 to a

low point of 25 percent in 2003. It then increased again to 26.4 and 26.9 percent in 2006 and

2009.59 There were similar indicators for non-income poverty measures of poverty. 60

Third, these trends in poverty and development were reflected in the Philippine polity and the

ideational basis of institutions. The Philippines had notionally-democratic and republican

institutions introduced by its former colonial power and these operated after the end of the

Pacific war (except for Ferdinand Marcos’ dictatorship between 1972 and 1986).61 In some

ways the Philippines, however, represented a notable instance of superficially “electoral

democracy”: elite clan interests monopolised state institutional power. 62 There was the

widespread operation of clan-based political mechanisms that are exclusionary and entail the

considerable use of violence.63 There was, therefore, a combination of unequal income and

asset distribution; political institutions mostly controlled by these wealth appropriating elites.

19

Combined with long-term reliance upon MDAs, one consequence was a permanent fiscal crisis

in the Philippine state that restricted new spending. 64

Fourth and finally, there were at least two main long-running armed insurgencies. There was

the Communist Party of the Philippines-aligned New People’s Army. This insurgency

remained an ongoing source of conflict for the state, despite declining in recent decades. There

are also separatist movements (mostly in Mindanao). Added to this is ongoing violence and

disappearances in many localities linked to elite-based political conflict.65

On the other hand, the immediate context was a profound political crisis whereby poverty

alleviation policies became even more heavily securitised. The Philippines had begun to

develop an anti-poverty strategy late in the term of Fidel Ramos’ administration (1993-1998)

as a complement to its technocratic “Philippines 2000” program of achieving newly

industrialised country status. These measures were followed by an expansion in clientelist

expenditures during Joseph Estrada’s short time as President. Estrada traded on his reputation

as a former movie star and developed a semi-populist pro-poor rhetoric to attract a base of

support amongst the countries poorer population and as an alternative to Ramos’ technocratic

discourse. His government quickly became embroiled in series of controversies, and there was

an acceleration of the conflict in Mindanao with Bangsamoro separatist groups.66 The issues

of poverty became a central part of political discourse. There remained lingering sympathy for

the Estrada’s government’s pro-poor (rhetoric rather than real policy) stance amongst poorer

constituencies. Any subsequent political regime’s viability – all based elite clan alliances -

would need to take measures to placate them.

While Arroyo’s government had come into office as a result of a popular uprising against

Estrada, her government lacked a base of support amongst the countries’ urban and rural poor.67

The security and survival of the government, therefore, was always faced with countering the

20

existential threat posed by indifference/ opposition of the country’s impoverished population,

armed insurgencies and elite-based opposition groups. Arroyo had already implemented some

MDA-sponsored social programs in the areas of poverty and participation, although not on a

scale that would make substantial inroads into these problems.68 The increased level of income

poverty recorded in 2006 made it clear that additional poverty-alleviation measures were

needed. The Philippines’ performance in millennium development goal targets, such as primary

education and maternal health, was also failing. 69 Other factors would also make the

introduction of CCTs more urgent.

Indeed, the Arroyo regime became increasingly embroiled in various controversies over

electoral irregularities, corruption and violence. These added a sense of panic in the

administration and predilection for taking any measures necessary for survival. 70 In 2005

revelations emerged of Arroyo’s large-scale cheating in the 2004 Presidential election. Many

of the reformers within the government responsible for social policy development resigned.

The government survived threats from mass political protests and military rebellion. A cascade

of further crises also occurred over economic cooperation projects with China.71 The regime

hung on to power, however, despite record negative approval ratings for Arroyo.72

The deepening political crises (and related pressure to address stagnating levels of poverty and

human development) provided the context for the influence of the newer GESP. The WB and

other MDAs had played already played a central part in the design and operation of community-

driven development projects in the Philippines. These also exhibited some evidence of selective

incorporation of ideas from Latin American contexts.73 In the case of CCTs, MDA support

resulted in leading staff from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)

attending the WB’s Istanbul conference on CCTs in 2006. 74 These key personnel then

formulated a proposal that went to Arroyo’s cabinet in March 2007. Arroyo became

enthusiastic about the program, especially given the political pressure the regime faced. Her

21

economics training also purportedly made her enthusiastic about the human resource

development component of the CCTs. The result was the implementation of a pilot program

for 6000 beneficiary households in two provinces in 2007. Coverage expanded to 320000

households in 2008. Bilateral and Bretton Woods MDA donors increased support providing

evaluation and technical feasibility assistance to expand 4Ps to one million households starting

from 2009.75

In the meantime, Arroyo’s presidential term ended after the election of Benigno Aquino in

2010. While he was the son of former President Corazon Aquino and part of an established

political clan, his campaign nevertheless presented a moderate program of political and social

reform. An important section of non-government organisation (NGO) activists and Akbayan

(a left-of-centre political party) supported his presidential campaign. It was organised

according to both conventional Liberal party (LP) and non-conventional (non-LP)

components. 76 Aquino’s manifesto – the Contract with the Filipino People – primarily

emphasised governance and anti-corruption measures. There was very brief mention of poverty

and the need for “well-considered programs that build capacity and create opportunity among

the poor and the marginalised…”77 Aquino appointed some activists both from Akbayan and

development NGOs to his cabinet after the election, including Corazon Solomon as Secretary

of the DSWD. Soliman had previously been head of DSWD in the early part of the Arroyo

administration.78

“Well-considered” or not, the Aquino administration inherited Arroyo’s poverty alleviation

policies. The already established infrastructure of 4Ps largely ensured that it became the

centrepiece program. Tatsulo became an overall poverty reduction framework. It encompassed

4Ps and two other livelihood and community-driven development programs.79 The largest

component, however, was 4Ps. It continued to expand the number of recipients to one million,

22

and subsequently a third phase of expansion was established. It was, notably, the “reformers”

within the government that would take on the implementation of the program.

At this point, Bretton Woods MDA mediation again occurred within the process of GSP/ GESP

development. The Arroyo government and the main 4Ps MDA donors had already chosen

Colombia’s Familias en Acción program as the model for 4Ps. Neither Aquino nor his cabinet

altered this fundamental decision. The DSWD staff had previously mainly studied Mexico’s

Oportunidades as the chief example of CCT operation - through the WB-sponsored National

Sector Support for Social Welfare and Development Project.80 The central mechanism for the

promotion of Familias en Acción was the recruitment of a Colombian consultant - Tarsicio

Castañeda - as the DSWD’s primary advisor. The WB and the Australian Agency for

International Development funded the consultancy. 81 The central ideational influences,

therefore, reflected the interests of major donors and the key personnel that they would favour.

Amongst the various national approaches of the Latin America neostructuralist welfare regime,

the donors (along with Arroyo and later Aquino) supported the program with higher

conditionalities and level of securitisation.

From Colombia to the Philippines

The selection of the Colombian consultant and Familias en Acción as a model had three

important implications for 4P’s implementation. These were readily apparent both in focus

groups of beneficiaries conducted in Mindanao during 2004 and from examining of the scale

of social expenditures in the Philippines.

First, it cemented the ideational hold of SRM on poverty alleviation policy making in the

Philippines. Castañeda had been a promoter of Chile’s Pinochet-era contributory social

insurance programs as a model for social safety-nets. These policies were an instance of the

original (informal-conservative) Latin American welfare regime, but which operated with

23

comparative success in coverage and outcomes.82 In keeping with the evolution of SRM,

however, Castañeda and other WB-linked policy specialists developed a greater acceptance of

direct social transfer payments. In keeping with SRM, however, these remain strictly residual

to contributory social insurance (this is the case with Colombia’s programs). 83 In the

Philippines, both 4Ps and the broader Tatsulo programs were designed to be residual to

contributory social insurance schemes. The latter mainly included: the Social Security System;

Government Service Insurance System; and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation

(PhilHealth). Their coverage, however, has been and remains limited, extending to only 22

percent of the population.84 Even with over one million households included in 4Ps (which

included access to subsidised PhilHealth benefits since 2012), over half of the population was

not covered by either a transfer payments or contributory programs.

Comments of beneficiaries in Mindanao reflect these trends . Most of the focus group

participants (FGP) in Mindanao were beneficiaries who were either single parents or their

husbands were unreliable or unemployed. The overwhelming response was that while the

payments were welcome, the small amounts provided only limited relief from income poverty.

Limits on the months with payments compounded the sense of how small the amount were.

They only covered ten months of the year. To make matters worse, some payments were said

to be missing which was distressing in the lead up to Christmas new year. Other FGRs

emphasised that it was the PhilHealth benefits that were most valuable as these made medicines

much cheaper.

Second and accordingly, the emphasis was placed on the strict targeting of payments and

enforcement of conditionalities. There was a considerable expansion in the numbers of DSWD

staff and operations for administering the 4Ps program. 85 These DSWD field personnel

implement an elaborate procedure of targeting and identifying recipient households in eligible

localities. There is a complex process of targeting and administering the grants, despite the

24

relatively small amounts being dispersed to each household. A household with three qualified

children receives a subsidy of 1400 pesos ($ 33) a month during the school year or 15000 pesos

($355) annually as long as they comply with the conditionalities. The process comprises eight

steps for appraising the potential beneficiaries. The primary factor was the application of

Colombia’s proxy means test system to the Philippine.86 The identification occurred off the

poorest households in the selected municipalities through the development of a National

Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTSPR) system. The first implication

of the NHTSPR is that there are questions about the desirability of the details of Colombian

test in the Philippine context. There are different patterns and preferences of consumption in

the Philippines. While notionally aimed at identifying the presence of household items of

consumption, the proxy means test also entails surveillance. The use of the evaluation tool

meshes with an overall approach geared towards bringing more involvement by DSWD staff

in poor households.

Moreover, an elaborate set of processes is undertaken by DSWD staff at the local scale aimed

at eliminating any potentially ineligible village members. The culmination is a community

assembly where “shame” is frequently used to discourage ineligible salaried households from

pursuing payments. Following further identity checks, a recipient household representative

agrees to sign a paternalist “oath of commitment”. Amounts are dispersed every two months

after around processing. The main conditionalities involve: ensuring school attendance;

undergoing frequent maternal health checks; and attendance at “family” training sessions. The

implementers concede that the bulk of responsibilities in these areas fall upon mothers and

female household members. The sanctions for non-compliance are similar to Colombia’s and

contrast with the lighter conditions imposed by Bolsa Família.

There was a certain amount of "sideways" glances by the FGP when the issues of selection and

processes were raised. The main issue was the DSWD staff and their perceived lack of

25

knowledge. This made it easier for local authorities to distort the allocation process in favour

of clients. The process was not, therefore, immune from local elite manipulation. In one

instance the process was handed over to a local NGO to administer due to complaints. The

heavy focus on DSWD staff did not seem to reflect a concern for quality. In fact, they were

often seen as in league with political and security elites and sometimes engaged in corruption.

Third, possibly the main aspect of the influence of the Colombian approach – already alluded

to above in the discussion of proxy means tests - is the degree of everyday intervention in poor

household’s lives that was involved in 4Ps. This was a facet of securitisation via increasing the

presence of the state – in the form of DSWD staff - in the everyday lives of the impoverished

population. The Colombian model is unique in comparison to others in the way that social and

community workers intervene in households to negotiate and enforce health and education

targets. Although no association is explicitly made, there is a plausible connection between the

Colombian security state and the role of staff in regulating poor communities’ access to the

program. One of the implicit functions of Familias en Acción was to play a de facto role of

surveillance and provide services and funds to disincentive support or involvement in

insurgencies. There are similar facets to this in the Philippines. There is a strong focus on

making the presence of state agencies apparent in marginal and poorer communities. The

targeting of particular communities coincides with the presence and activity of the two main

insurgencies, especially in Mindanao in the country’s south. There is an ongoing role for

DSWD staff within communities where they conduct family-development seminars and other

programs and monitoring tasks. All of these increase the presence of the state in affected

communities.

FGP regarded the family seminars as somewhat useful but lacking a depth of understanding of

household difficulties. One participant commented that the lessons did not actually offer

26

solutions and instead re-enforced a sense that it was up to beneficiaries to take measures to

escape policy. Nobody particularly like signing the paternalistic "pledge" statements.

The FGPs were reluctant to speak on issues of safety and security at first. It was whispered,

however, that one of the effects of payments was restrictions on movements. It was not possible

to reside in rebel-controlled areas and receive the payments. The municipality was on the

outskirts of a medium-sized urban settlement and had a strong security presence (although they

complained it not enough to deter crime).

More broadly, the modelling of 4Ps on Colombia’s approach reflected the extent of MDA

support for and resulted in influence over the design of the program. As outlined above,

Colombia’s program was also the most heavily reliant on MDA support. The Philippine state

had nominally limited fiscal capacity to implement a direct social transfer payments system.

There have historically been chronic problems of low taxation compliance and revenue

collection by the Philippine state. In part, this is a reflection of the exclusionary polity described

in above. The primary approach taken by various governments was, as a result, continual

increases in indirect taxation. One of the main consequences has been that taxation revenue

averaged just 12.6 percent of GDP between 2000 and 2010. Government expenditures

(excluding interest payments) averaged 9.9 percent of GDP in the same period.87

However, the arbitrary nature of many existing social spending complicated matters further.

The recent controversy of misuse of Priority Development Assistance Funds (PDAFs) has

resulted in increased attention to these issues. Philippine Congress members acquired

considerable discretionary power on (PDAF) expenditures, which became popularly referred

to as the central “pork barrel”. Although intended to support local infrastructure and relief

efforts, they have widely become the primary source of clientelist payments.88 A scandal over

allocations resulted in the Philippine Supreme Court declared the entire PDAF process

27

unconstitutional in November 2013.89 One issue of debate is to the extent that these allocations

are convertible into more non-discriminatory payments.

However, the low-level and arbitrary distribution of social expenditures of the Philippines,

meant that the 4Ps program relied on extensive donor contributions. These came from regional

development bank and Bretton Woods MDAs over its initial five-year period of operation. The

degree of this support was outlined by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The total cost of

the program (including the targeting system and payments) was $1.2 billion: of which $737.8

million (63 percent) was sourced from the ADB and the WB. 90 Overall social protection

(including social insurance) grew significantly – between 2005 and 2010 – from a base of 1.6

to 2.6 percent of GDP. Within this, social assistance increased rapidly from 0.2 to 1.2 percent

of GDP. Some two-thirds of this expansion, however, was provided by external financing. The

ADB argued the Philippine government would be able to sustain this level of expenditure at

around 2.6 percent of GDP in the longer-term. Overall this level of social spending was still

small comparison to other states – Vietnam’s spending is 4.3 percent, and the average for Latin

America is 5.1 percent of GDP.91 The program, therefore, remained based on a residual model

of social protection based on low levels of public expenditure.

There was an awareness of these issues and their implications amongst some government

figures within the Philippines. They gave an indication of the “thinking” within the

administration and the House of Representatives. The former Secretary of Economic and Social

Planning - Cayetano Paderanga - suggested there were two views. The predominant view was

that the 4Ps project had a strict five-year lifespan in line with external funding. The less

prevalent view – that Paderanga held – was that some level of social transfers would need to

be ongoing for sustained reductions in income poverty to occur. There were, therefore, two

barriers to establishing ongoing system of payments: one was the expiry of the “catalyst”

28

external financing. The other was the apparent uncertain political commitment to – or even

comprehension of the need for – an ongoing system of social transfer payments.

In sum, the Philippine government and its main MDA and bilateral donors opted for an

approach that derived from and was heavily influenced by Colombia’s CCT program. Both the

original decision to implement CCTs and the programs design was shaped by the existential

crisis facing the Arroyo government. The moderately reformist Aquino governments took no

drastic steps to alter the design. As a result 4Ps has remained a social transfer payment system

consistent with SRM. There is high-level interventionism in local communities that centred on

the implementation of proxy means tests and use of state personnel to target and monitor

beneficiaries.

The Philippines and the Geopolitical Economy of Social Policy

In conclusion, the adoption of CCTs in the Philippines provides insight into the ways GSP has

evolved towards GESP. The change has impacted on the implementation of social protection

policies. Across the 2000s, there was an emergence of higher levels of economic growth and

political aspirations for social inclusion in some middle-income economies (rising developing

powers). One result was an increased space for social policy development. The diffusion of

these policy innovations to other developing country contexts remained heavily circumscribed

by the Bretton Woods MDAs.

The emergence and dissemination of CCTs reflected these processes in five ways. First, there

was the appearance of what was arguably a neostructuralist welfare regime in Latin America.

The structuralist approach to development and associated Latin American welfare system

declined in the 1980s. These changes came increasingly into conflict with aspirations for

poverty reduction and guaranteed minimum income policies. The somewhat favourable global

economic conditions of the 2000s provided a context for the limited implementation attempts

29

to overcome these contradictions. There was the emergence of a general neostructuralist policy

turn or sensibility in some Latin American nation-states. There had also been the inclusion of

social rights within the new constitutions adopted in democratisation processes or attempts in

places such as Brazil and Colombia. Neostructuralism selectively incorporated older

structuralist themes within a development strategy that remained based broadly on the WC.

Targeted social transfer payments emerged as an important social welfare complement to these

broader economic development policies.

Second and accordingly, CCTs were one of most widely adopted social transfer payment

systems entailed by the neostructuralist regime. The design of CCTs reflected the recognition

of linkages between inter-generational human capital deficits and poverty levels as a source of

market failure. These programs sought to address these shortcomings by providing conditional

payments for children’s school and health service attendance to disincentive the employment

of child labour. The payments would be heavily targeted and constrained by conditions

ensuring compliance by poor households. There were, however, differences in the extent of

coverage, the requirements and their enforcement: with Brazil’s program being much lower

than Colombia’s.

Third, the GESP had a considerable impact on the promotion of these policies elsewhere. On

the one hand, the fragmented attempts to create a safety net in the 1990s eventually coalesced

into a loose international effort to build “national social protection floors”. MDAs such as the

WB adapted their existing SRM framework to incorporate a greater role for direct social

transfers. The considerable shortfalls in many states in meeting poverty-reduction targets

increased pressure for financing of direct social transfers. CCTs were attractive as they

addressed three areas of income poverty, education and health. They were increasingly

promoted from the mid-2000s, although as a residual component subordinated to an emphasis

on contributory social insurance. The examples of MDA-supported and financed CCT

30

programs tended to accentuate the higher levels of conditionality already contained in

Colombia’s program. In the case of Colombia, the targeting and compliance regimes entailed

high levels of intervention and surveillance of poor households.

On the other hand, national governments (such as the Philippines) that faced real or perceived

existential threats came to view social transfer payment programs favourably. CCT programs,

in particular, attempted to engender consent amongst and placate political demands from poor

populations. The emphases of the CCT program in Colombia, however, were integrated into

the processes of the security state and counter-insurgency efforts. It became the case in the

Philippines. The establishment of 4Ps was as a response to the Arroyo government's

unpopularity amongst the country’s poor in 2007. The pattern of targeting and enforcement

were modelled on Colombia’s approach. The Philippine program has expanded rapidly after

2009. However, the geographical and social targeting of the program was heavily centred on

areas that viewed as security threats, especially the southern region of the Philippines. The

targeting and administration of the program focused on increasing the presence of state

agencies in poorer communities through village assemblies and family development programs.

Overall the Philippine example suggests, therefore, that the forms of social programs that have

emerged in many developing countries are being adopted and promoted in particular ways by

MDAs. They retain a focus on social transfers that are residual. There is a focus on targeting

and enforcing conditions of poorer communities that focused on security concerns. They are

often poorly integrated within broader frameworks that exist in places such as Brazil that focus

on more general aspects of vulnerability and poverty. Policy-makers concerned with the

implementation of social protection measures could perhaps be more mindful of the negative

features of MDA measures and the adverse impacts they can have on poor populations and

broader processes of political and economic change.

31

References 1 These attempts at policy consolidation were recently endorsed by the high-level meetings of the IMF and the

WB. See Development Committee. Safety Nets Work. 2 On geopolitical economy see Desai. “Introduction,” 1-44. 3 Hall, “Brazil's Bolsa Família,” 799-822. 4 The definition of neostructuralism used here is derived from Leiva, Latin American Neostructuralism and;

ECLAC. Changing Production Patterns. 5 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde. Security. 6 Halley. Split Decisions, and; Holmes and Jones. Gender and Social Protection. 7 Yeates. Globalization and Social Policy. 8 The Nordic-country donors played a critical role in advancing the GSP agenda. See Deacon et al. Global Social Policy. 9 Deacon and Stubbs. “Global Social Policy Studies,” 20. 10 Desai. “Introduction,” 1-44. 11 Reid. “China's ‘South-South’ Trade”. 12 Erton and Ocampo. Super-Cycles. 13 Petras. Social Movements in Latin America. 14 Tanzi. Globalization . 15 Zoellick. Democratizing Development Economics. 16 Cammack. “The G20, the Crisis,”1-16. 17 Scott. “Role of Southern Intellectuals,” 633-652. 18 Mawdsley. From Recipients to Donors. 19 Urbina-Ferretjans and Surender. “Social policy in the context.” 20 Esping-Andersen. The Three Worlds. The welfare regime ideal involves categorising elements of a given phenomena that do not apply to all of the features of any one particular case. 21 Barrientos. “Latin America,” 121-168. 22 Leiva. Latin American Neostructuralism, 45. 23 Barrientos. “Latin America”, 121-168. 24 Ibid., 125 25 Morales and McMahon. Economic Policy. 26 World Bank. World Development Report 2000/2001. 27 Rojas. “Understanding Neo-Developmentalism,” 65-113. 28 Leiva. Latin American Neostructuralism. 29 There is debate about the “paternity” of CCTs. One account links them to a series of articles by economist José

Márcio Camargo that emphasised the human resource development component of conditional transfers. See Lindert et al. The Nuts and Bolts. Others focus more on the role of leaders - such as Cristovam Buarque - from the PT.

30 Britto. “Brazil’s Bolsa Família,” 6-7. 31 Ban. “Brazil's Liberal Neodevelopmentalism,’ 298-331.; Leiva, Latin American Neostructuralism. 32 Burton. Lula and Economic Development. 33 World Bank, World Development Indicators. 34 Ibid. 35 World Bank. Project Information Document. 36 Soares and Silva. Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes. 37 The focus on spending on the poor has been at the centre of considerable political criticism with Bolsa Familia

being represented as a mechanism for consolidating the PT’s electoral base. Regression analyses, however, suggests the correlation between volume CCT coverage and electoral support for the PT is rather weak. See Bohn. “Social Policy,” 54-79.

38 See Lacerda. Stédile admite. CCT recipients have reported to have been less likely to enagage in land occupations as remaining in the current location is required to meet conditions of school attendance.

39 Lavinas. “21st Century Welfare.” 40 Rojas. “Understanding Neo-Developmentalism,” 65-113. 41 Buzan et al., Security.

32

42 Eslava. “The Constitutionalization of Rights,” 183-229. 43 Moreno. “Whither the Colombian,” 485-509. 44 Leech. The FARC. 45 World Bank, World Development Indicators. 46 Ibid. 47 IEG. Project Performance Assessment Report. 48 World Bank, World Development Indicators. 49 IADB. “CO-L1021 : Multiphase Program,” Overseas Development Institute “Familias en Acción”, World Bank.

“Social Safety Net Project.” 50 DPS. “Ingreso Social.” 51 Fine. “Neither the Washington Consensus,” 1-27. 52 Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler. “Editorial Introduction,” 1-7. 53 World Bank, World Development Report. 54 World Bank. Third International Conference. 55 Development Committee. Safety Nets. 56 Montes and Lim. “Macroeconomic Volatility,” 345. 57 Bello, at al. The Anti-Development State; and Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society. 58 World Bank. World Development Indicators. 59 NSCB. Philippine Poverty Statistics. 60 NEDA. Philippines 2010. 61 Reid. “Historical Blocs,” 1003-20. 62 North, Wallis, and Weingast. Violence and Social Orders. 63 Quimpo. “The Presidency, Political Parties,” 47-72. 64 Bello et al., The Anti-Development State. 65 Reid. “Securitising Participation,” 47-74. 66 Bautista. Readings in Governance, 158-64. 67 Social Weather Station Polls all suggest that Arroyo was deeply unpopular amongst the countries’ “C” and “D” category population in comparison to the “A” and “B” (middle and upper income) segments. See SWS, Satisfaction. 68 Reid, “Securitising Participation.” 69 Cabral. “Keynote Speech.” 70 Reid. "Development NGOs," 4-42. 71 China became a notable source of foreign aid (economic cooperation), becoming the countries’ second largest donor during the Arroyo government. China’s projects bcame mired in crisis, however, and had little evident policy influence. See Reid, New Donors. 72 SWS, Net Satisfaction. 73 The Kalahi community-driven project was mostly derived from an Indonesian example, although some influence of Brazilian participatory budgeting was evident. See Reid, “Securitising Participation.” 74 Cabral. “Keynote Speech.” 75 DSWD. About 4Ps. 76 Villacorta. NoyNoy. 77 Aquino. “ Social Contract.” 78 Reid. “Development NGOs,” 2-39. 79 DSWD, About 4Ps. 80 Ibid. 81 See World Bank. Implementation Status and Results, and AusAID. Philippine Country Program Report. 82 Castaneda. Combating Poverty. 83 Castaneda. The Design. 84 Manasan. Reforming Social Protection Policy. 85 DSWD. DSWD Convergence Strategy. 86 Fernandez. Design and Implementation Features. 87 World Bank. World Development Indicators. 88 Coronel et al. The Rulemakers. 89 RPSC. Decision GR No 208566. 90 ADB. 43263-012: Support. 91 Ibid.

33

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