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7/23/2019 The General - Volume 11, Issue 2
1/34
Jul Aug
974
Vol. 11 NO
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7/23/2019 The General - Volume 11, Issue 2
2/34
GENERAL
PAGE
1 1 AvuZon
H8ZZ
PhiCosuphly
art
45
The
Game
Players
Magazine
The Avslon r l i l l
GENEHAL
is
dedicated
to the otese
r ion
ol
aurhcr~ tat~velticles on the rtratogv. rst t~cs and
~?.rl3tion f Avalon Hlll games 01
StmlaQY.
Hi5turica l arthcles
are illclurlud only ~ n r u n u e h3s they provide usetul back-
urourld lnforrnation
on
currenr Avslon Hill
tirlcrr.
THE
GENERAL is ~ u b l ~ s h o dy rho Avalor~Hill Company solely
b r he cultur.gl ed~ficat~ont ?he serious came ofic~onado,
II
the hopes
of
improving rhe ~ 0 1 0mnsr'l pmfioiency o f play
and providins
wwloes not
ntherwrm mallable t o r k
Avalon
Hill same
huft.
Pub:icetiou
ih
bi monthly
vrith
rna~linqsmdde clom lo The
middle of Januery,
March. May.
July. Soptclmbsr
drld
N o v e n ~ b rAl l sdrtorial
~ n d
nelat mail should be sent t o
e Avslon Hill Company. 4517 flarford Rd Br l t~more,
arv ls r~d
1
714
One
year 6 ~ssuel ubscriptions are $5.00.
earn scatd chocks or money ordors only. N u t rewonsthle :or
art2 lost in translt. Al l srkbscriptrcns sent vro thi rd c l os mall.
Alrmoil and Flr51Claas deliwry nlurt prearrangM . w t h he
ubscription depaltment a t edditionsl ccsl. ho paid sdverlir,
nu
o f
ar;y type is accented. However, nevus of impormnc
ha wargaming
commurtlly
ra pranted
free
of charge A
P
ticles f rom subhcrimrr are corrsi&red tor nublkcat iol~ t
Ircretion of
rnjr
edltortal staff. Arriclss
should
he
rlrten, doublo.loacea, and embrace the tenets
of
good
I u ~ g e here is no l lmjf to ward lenglh. Accompany-
examples
and
diaglams should
be
~:earlv
orw
in hlack or
ink. Photogra~hr hould
have
captlon and c rs d~ t irm
Iren on back. H~jected r t i c les i l l
bc
r e r u r n d denwe r
ougble.
I n anv and all
cases.
Ava urt Will accepts no
ewonslhl l lw for unsolicbmtl rnoier~al.Authors u f published
riclns which tOt@lve a w r d b l e remonse f roln the rsodenllio
wi l l be remucerucsd wl th f ree morcharldile of
tlteir
chorce
Back issurr are available lor 1.00
aDisce.
Al l
but
loilowbng out ot qtock issues arc nuallable:
All Vo lume 1. Vol
2 No ?
1 . 5 6.
Vol
3
No's 1.2, V01.4. No s
3 . 4
5,Vol 5.Nn 1:VoI 6,N0'54,5,6:Vc~l 8.N0'5P.t i .VoI
9. U S 1. 3
EDITOR: Dooeld J Greenwood
GRAPHICS:
Randal Reed, Scott % ?ores. A l
Z ~ 4 e r .
l ~ l
Hal r> l lon
EOlTORlAL
STAFF:
H
Anton.
F.
Revma.
0
Bu~dlck
T.
Ruvniskl. J.
Dav ~ r
S Uvncnn,
R.
Ensto?.
R.
Garhrwh, G:
Gygax,
R.
Harmot;. C.
Kndbw, C.
1-ane, 8 L t ~ b v , 3
Llvs8morc. D. Lowrv, L. F.tcAnenv, D, Milltlr. 1 Oi~son,G
Phlll~es.I :nsky.
R . Plock, J. Pournelle.
L
Pulsrphor. U.
RoLcris. M.
Sahr,
B. Sin~qagllo.
Tollen.
L. Zncrhl
CONSULTING EDITOR: Tholnas
N. Shabt,
CARTOOAHSTS:
7 Smilw, S. Hsrchrrk
To facilirale r-orrespondence.
we
suggssrtl~st ll envelt~pes
Pu:cheses of the G E N E R A L : Subscr~ptionD w t .
-
Gertrude
tombto
PUG
Asa>
f Games, play-by-mail kitr mid
game
parts: Order
Derrt.
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Chriny
Shm
O~pgfionsC ~ n c e t ~ i ~ n play: Flewarch & Deaian
Department.
Kotu- all questions should be rh rou~ h l v laqrammd N o
questions
wil l be
a n w e r d
that are not sccorrlpobied by
a
slamwd. *If-addresred enveloDa Only questions rewqdkon
Brochursl, nnd Readers Hsrponse P?wsubmlsdons: '~dirortal
D w t . - Oonald Greenwood
Photograph Credits
Photo File. Aualon, Callfornra
Tyooucrurlg
Coionidr
Pr~rl l insMonarch O f f
Cover Art:
11 Zygior
Response to the firs t
34page
edition uft he
i n as many aswecou ld. Int hefu ture, prior
GENERAL
was
mixed
as
could be expected.
wi ll be given to people look ing for opponen
Generally speaking, you either loved
it
or and discontinued games. Other ads will
hated
it
depending on what
games
you printed on a space available basis. For mo
owned.
F e w
people rated t between a 3or
7.
on this subject, refer to he Letters page
a
Because of th e unusual format necessitated
let us know what you think on the Surv
by
last issue's double feature article card.
premise, we actually covered only two
games i n anydetail-PANZERBLITZ and D-
DAY.
If you didn't own those games, you
were probably quite naturally disappointed
in he startof thevolume 1 1series. This was
due primari ly to our decision to go with the
Normandy Anniversary motif, campounded
by
he Playing Aids secondary feature, and
an unusually long Series Replay. It was
something w e had been planning for
a
long
tim e and, i n our opinion, quite
a
worthwhile
venture-even though th e issue itself polled
only a combined
3.16
from the readership,
whi ch although still quite good was not the
outstanding success we had hoped for. We
aregetting
a
lot of requestsfor morediversity
i n the magazine and now that we have the
Playing Aids extravaganza out of our
system, th is shouldn't beto o hardtoachieve.
In he uture we shouldn't haveanydifficulty
giving in-depth coverage to
a
minimum of
6
games per issue plus the usual features,
without getting into a rut
of
offering the
same old thing every time (which sthe main
reason we experimented with the Playing
Aids article). By the way, the individual
article ratings on our 600 point maximum
scoring scale for the last issue looked like
this.
0-DAY-VARIATION
&
PLAY.. .....................411
A
COMPENDIUM OF
PLAYING
AIDS
..............
87
PANZERBUn SERIES REPLAY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W
BEACH BY BEACH
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
84
AVALON
HILL
P~ILOSOPHY...................... 14
The PANZERBLITZ Series Replay was a
disappointment. It ranked far lower than we
had hoped; especially considering he lackof
many other articles for competition. This
makes two PANZERBLITZ Series Replays
which have not come up
to
snuff.
PANZERBLITZ is a tough
game
to portray in
the Series Replay format.
It
is one of those
games which requires that every move be
shown, rather than every turn. Such
a
presentation is, of course, out of the ques-
tion due to space limitations. But there are
other solutions. Graphically, we learned
a
lesson from the last replay which should
enable us o improve our visual presentation
in
futu re matches. We'll probably give PAN-
ZERBLln another shot next year. We
already have a finished
game
in the
files
whic h i s much more exciting than the con-
servatively played draw used in t he last
issue.
A
sharp increase i n circulation hasflooded
the Opponents Wanted page with
more
requests than
it
can possibly handle. We've
h d to do
a
lot
of
judicious editing so as to it
Speaking
of
floods, w e were totally
u
prepared for th e virtual flood of Ietterswhi
came i n response to last issue's Loyal
Su
scri ber Deal. Literally hundreds
of
you wro
i n requesting that
we
include your name
t h e
drawingsf or th os efew dozen collecto
items.
One
guy even stated that he'd
b
every game in the list-including all
copies of
BASEBALL
STRA TEGYl
We hat
to disappoint so many people though sa
w
tried to restrict the winners of the drawin
to one game per person. We even look
around for people whowa nte d to rade the
own copies for new games so that
w
wouldn't have to disappoint so many of y
but unfortunately we sti ll hadt o return ma
of
your letters with our condolences. On
the sports
games
were left and even the
went to people placing multiple order
Apparently nostalgia is runn ing high amo
the readership.
We have word
of a
miniatures conventio
to
be
held rom 1 to
9 pm
Saturday, Sept. 7
and from noon to
5 prn
the foll owing day
Buffalo,
NY.
Although there will
be n
organized competition in board games, a
area will be set aside for their pla
Diplomacy and miniatures will be the ma
attraction. For further details, we sugge
you wr ite: Richard Kohlbacher,
410
Lind
Ave., Buffalo, MY 14224.
The brief mention i n he last philosophy
updating rules has brought i n many nquiri
and this is
a
good place to answer them
Rather than taking the easy (and cheape
way
out of issuing errata sheets
w e
plan
issue completely n ew sets of rule s for all
th e old flat-box games. These won't chang
the games; they'll just try t o eliminate a
ambiguities or contradictions which mig
have existed before.
The
first game to u
dergo the face lift wil l
be STALINGRAD
Th
rules remain basically the same except fo
suggesting
a
4-5-6 replacement rate for th
Russians and outlawing an Hungaria
Italian entry in Finland. Thereareo ther sm
points but those are the main changes. T
ne w rules wil l be available for the nomin
fee of 25C plus
25C
shipping costs.{Note: h
shipping w up on in th e GENERAL is good
games only). Next on the list will b
WATERLOO. Here
the
clarifications shou
have a bit of an effect on play-balanc
Partial hexes will
no
longer be playabl
bringing on reinforcements
by
column w
bespecifically outlawed, and hoseannoyin
river rules will be clarified and made le
restrictive. The net effect should be to i
A H
PHIU3SOPEY
Continuedon Page
Colum
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7/23/2019 The General - Volume 11, Issue 2
3/34
THE
GENER L
The Invasion
A ultural Strategic
By Mark
Saha and Mark
off Russia
Analysis
lrwin
When the German General Staff received
instructions to begin preparations for the inva-
sion of Russia
in
the coming spring of 1941, it
was no real surprise. It was probably quite a
shock, to realize that at last the time had wme.
The
very
size of the operation was sobering,
enough to stagger the imagination and shake the
confidence of even the most fearless of these
recent conquerors
of
France. So it must have
been quite a shock, yes but hardly a sur-
prise.
The
fact
is that Hitler had made it quite clear
to his generals since the time
of
his wining to
power in 1933(and, to many, even before that)
that he was turning
his
eyes to the east-and
Hitler
w s
Germany.
He
followed his words
with actions: he suspended the warm relations
that had existed with Russia in the 1920's and
initiated
a
secret ten year rearmament program
calculated to climax in a Russo-German war
sometime in 1943 or 1944-at latest, 1950
Meanwhile, efforts were made to promote
peaceful relations with France and England,
and
the unfortunate "bumper states" between
Russia and Germany were slowly and
methodically swallowed up into the "new"
Germany in preparation for the great dash. It
always frustrated and enraged Hitler, right to
the very end, that England and France never
grasped his intentions; and that, as aresult, the
war came at the wrong time and under cir-
cumstances much different than
had
been an-
ticipated.
The
roblem
of
ermany
But Hitler's coming t o power in 1933
was
in
itself on1y theculmination of yet anothertrend-
the rise
of
Prussian, and finally, German
militarism. This must also be understood,
because in a sense there is an almost Hegelian
historical necessity in the rise of this new
military power. First, Germany was
a
relative
newcomer
in
the family of European nations,
having united its various independent provinces
slowly and painfully over the centuries. Second-
ly, from an overall strategic standpoint, Ger-
many was (and still is) militarily indefensible; it
is
her bad luck to
be
geographically located in a
militarily hopeless situation. Consider, if you
will: France, protected
by
mountains and
sea;
Italy, the same; England, an island fortress;
Russia, limitless space for retreat. Germany,
alone,
of
the major European powers,
was
surroundd on all sides by potential enemies;
and these enemies had time and again nibbled at
her borders on various sides over many long
centuries.
So it becomes quite reasonable and un-
derstandable, really,
on e
you see this, that
Germany should require a larger standing army
than the rest of the nations of Europe. Sh e had
more borders to defend and it
was
really as
simple as that. The rest becomes a bit more
complex, in that it includes
a
cultural and
economic acceptance
of
this condition, but it
nonetheless also followed quite naturally: the
dashing young cavalry officer, in the romantic
literature of the period, who brags of his
exploits and makes
the ladies swoon; the rise of
industralism with a n emphasis on weaponry and
armaments; the reserve system, which made
possible the calling to arms of large numbers of
trained men o n short notice.
. .
Finally . two other things followed quite
naturally, although they were not so obvious at
the time. (1) If Germany had a standing army
large enough to defend all her borders at once,
that same army could with
little difficulty crush
any on neighbor by massing an overwhelming
force against it. 2) This point is
a
little more
subtle but unfortunately also true: it is afact of
human nature that if you place a n instrument in
a man's hands, he's goingto
be
strongly tempted
to use it-if only to "see if it works."
The
Francc-Prussian war of 1870 demonstrated for
all the world t o see that Germany had perhaps
the finest and most sophisticated military
machine of the time. Can you not imagine the
frustration of the men in command of
so
magnificent
a
machine when told they must
simply
sir
on it? The career men especially, who
realized all too well that power and influence
and promotion come quickly in war, but slowly
if at all
in
peacetime The restlessness of tha t
dashing young cavalry officer, flirting with the
ladies, anxiously looking forward to the day
when he will lead his first charge?
The glamor of the Napoleonic Iegend was far
from forgotten, a nd as it was in Germany so it
was in most of Europe. It was the romantic
thing
then to be
a
soldier, especially an officer, just as
i n
later times it would become the fashion to
be
novelist, or a movie star, or
a
rock singer. Th
nineteenth century was th e time of the dashin
young cavalry officer; even looking back today
the era has not quite lost its romantic luster.
Unfortunately, none of this was to diminishi
any degree the point already made-that despit
her dash, dar ing, spirit , and military excelleno
the situation of Germany always was an
remains strategically hopeless. This
wa
dem onstr atd with dramatic force in the war o
19
14-18; cut off from t h e rest of the world by th
British naval blockade and the Russian fron
Germany was already starving as early as 191
6
Black erstaz butter made from coal tar
was
i
common household use; coffee and chocolat
simply disappeared from the market; an
soldiers
had
no rubber for waterproofing
o
boots or tents. T he plain
fact w s
that German
was not a self-supporting country, and had t
import such basic commodities as butter, egg
and grain t o feed her population and if wa
closed her borders for any length of time, sh
would collapse. Germany at war is in th
position of a wind-up clock. The clock coul
only
run for a
cert in
length of time, windin
down an d growing weaker by the hour, until i
stopped. Germany at war must always
win
bold and swift decision
.
or lose slowly an
surely and with great pain and suffering. Th
failure of the -Schlieffen plan in 1914 dictate
that the war would
be
a long on e. and i
1918 the clock ran out.
Why
Russia
This, then, was the problem of Germany, an
it was the problem Hitler set upon himself
solve when he came to power in 1933. Hitle
knew,
as
did most people, that if Germany wa
ever to rise again
as
a world power, she
us
have enough land and resources t o make herse
self-supporting as a nation indefinitely. Tha
acc omp li shd, she would be immune to a Britis
blockade, and could pursue
a
war with a
enemy for as many years as complete victor
might require. The question, then,
was wher
was
this additional land t o come from? Franc
might seem a likely candidate, but Hitle
rejected that for good reason: the French ha
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7/23/2019 The General - Volume 11, Issue 2
4/34
GENER L
P GE 4
a na t i on fo r cen tur ie s , and n o
force could ever get her t o accept
f conquered . E ngland was not
an d
thi rd ra te power anyw ay (and his tory
en him exact ly correct ) .
But in th e East . things were very different: the
not
popular , and that vas t
ortan tly, Hitler predicted (again correctly)
s t r a l i zd and co nv er t 4 these r e sources in t o
mi l it a ry power t ha t woul d mak e he r among
ongest o n ea r t h . E urope was on t he
jus t now awakening. Hi t ler knew that
bered, i t must
be
done qu i ck ly ; and s o he
ten
year rearmam ent plan and hoped
st r ike as early as
1943
o r 1944.
He
probab l y
lly believed it-he was qu ite sincere-
he refer red to himself a s the las t hope an d
Western civil ization.
Thus, d espite the man y poli t ical intrigues and
s , and the m any immed iate tact ical
ct ives , the g fan d s t ra tegic pat tern
of
t h e
of Hi t ler 's Germ any f ro m 1935-39 i s
r-always he is mo ving east , abso rbing the
s tates and moving into posi tion for the
. while Germany's unemployed
to work i n i llegal manufacture of
nts for the day of invasion.
Unfor tunately for Hi t ler, the West was not d l
anxious t o wi tness Germany's swif t (and
a world power-not
y 1914-18 s t ruggle they had
; bu t Germa ny was af ter a ll in the hear t of
so,
t he more i mmedi a t e t h r ea t .
r num erous a t t empt s t o con t a i n Germany
ion; England and Franc e took a
1 1939-and, to his utter
nt , three days la ter England a nd then
d war o n him.
Stal in had actual ly been qui te as a larmed as
swift r ise and expa nsion,
was m uch relieved t o see Hi t ler now at war
o move. But Stalin's rel ief was short-
ed; for, in th e Sp ring of 1940, before th e eyes
f a n as tonished wor ld, France col lapsed under
Cur iously, i t was here that the German
General Staff was discovZred to have made i ts
first big mistake-and a stran ge on e fo r them.
The
last sor t of thing you'd expect to
catch
t h e
German s on; for , if they 're known f or anything,
i t is the thoroughness of their staff work. They
plan for every contingency and i t 's difficult to
present th em wi th a surpr i se once they go into
action. But they missed som ethin g when they hit
France. The plain t ru th
is
t ha t t hey were j us t as
astonished-if not more-as the rest of the
world when France s imply col lapsed. They
had
no cont ingency plan for thi s event . . a n d , a s a
result, had absolute1y
no
i dea wha t t o do about
it They might have invaded Englan d, bu t they
had n o special forces or am phib ious vessels
ready and wai t ing for thi s purpose. Fran co
offered them free passage throu gh Sp ain to take
Gibraltar,
but Hitler declined on the ground
that th e war was over anyway. When England
failed to surrend er, Hitler reconsidered
. but
b y
then Franc o reneged, saying they could have
passage o n commenoement of the invasion of
England (af ter which Gibral tar would no longer
matter anyway).
Thus, what should have been a great victory
t u rned ou t t o be a victory in the w rong direction,
and a l a rge pa r t o f t he German a rm y was
absorbed in the occupat ion of Denmark,
Norway. Belgium and France. Further, Hitler
n o w f o u n d t h a t h e was hav i ng t he mos t t roub l e
with, of all people, his own allies Fra nc o would
not give hi m passage t h rough S pa i n t o
Gibral tar , and Mussolini insi s ted on th e hono r
of kicking t he Brit ish out of Africa himself (with
German y supplying planes and tan ks for I ta l ian
soldiers, of course). Both Fr anc o and Mussolini
wanted French ' t er r i tory on the cont inent o r
Algeria, which Hitler was reluctant to gran t
s ince i t would dr ive the Vichy government r ight
i n t o t h e a r m s
of
Churchil l . Astonishingly, Hitler
was prevented by his ow n all ies fro m bringing
ope rat ion s in th e W est to a swif t and decis ive
conclusion-and with friend s l ike these.
Momrwcre unlts played a very lrnpwtam role In the eastern
csrnpalgn.Their
aremmoblllty
usually
meant
thatthey
hadto
bear
the brunt of Soulet breakthroughs Usually a a c k troops the
Germans had to relymore andmoreheav~lyonhese reconunitsto
stuff gaps torn in German lanes
by
Ru s s ~ a n
ffensives
Una ble to d eal with his friends, Hitler return-
ed
atten tion t o the last and greatest of his
enemies . Russia . True, condi t ions were not
what he had anticipated: (1) i t was st i l l two to
f ive years before Germany was ready for the
. pianrae Rm- man war d111943.58 2)
ast
por t ions o f his ar rnieswere absorbed in Western
occupat ion dut ies , and
3)
he was s t il l a t
war
with England . But Germany's s i tuatio n was
rather unpleasant, and could get desperate-
because as long as hosti l i t ies continued in the
West, Hitler was almo st wholly depend ent o n
Russia for crucial supplies of food and essential
raw materia ls . S tar in had his hand o n the water
faucet ; he could shut off the water
any
t i m e h e
pleased especially if temp ted to d o so
b y
Churchil l. And this only reveals an add it iona l
h a z a r d t o a German assaul t on Russia: H i t ler
would be in effect attacking
his
0oI.v
rem ining
source of
suppl,~ learly, he could not afford
th e planned Russo-German war what he
musr
have i s another bl i tzkr ieg l ike the one that
brought Fran ce to ruin. Anything less than that ,
any degenerat ion of
a
bli tzkrieg attack into
a
prolonged war, would simply set the wind-up
clock of I914 to t icking again.
all Barbarossa
So t a k e o u t y o u r S T L l N G R D
gameboard, andlet ' s have a look at the problems
confront ing the O K H staff in planning the
over throw of Russia , and the reasons for the
par t icular solut ions they ar r ived at . Surpr i s ing-
ly, f ind the
STALIA GRA
D boa rd m ore useful
for thi s pu rpose th an most geog raphy maps, if
only because i t oversimplifies and sets in high
profi le most of the features
of
military interest .
S tar t wi th
Moscow;
being the capital, its
capture would be of great poli t ical and
prop aga nda value. Ho wever, notice it 's also the
rai l center of the cou nt ry;
so
l ong as M oscow is
in Russian p ossession, they have th e effect of
interior l ines.
If
Moscow falls, i t is the G ermans
who have this advantage. True, the Russian
railroads were of wider gauge tha n standard
European track, but even this could be to
German advan tage ; f o r ,
as
they adv anced, i t was
only necessary for Germ an sappers to move one
rail , in a l i t t le closer t o the other and cut off the
extra length of crosstie. If the Germa ns should
ever have to re t reat , Russian sappers in turn
would h ave t o replace every s ingle cross tie to
again widen the track. So the rai lroads were
important, especially in
a
count ry of such
abomin able roads . Mosc ow was
of
greater
mi l i tary value now t ha n in N apoleonic t imes.
Leningrad was al so of propaganda value
since i t was named after the founder of the
Bolshevism that Hitler so bit terly detested. If for
no other reason, Hi t ler was determined tha t the
city should be utterly razed. But there were also
any numb er of reasons for mak ing t a legit imate
mili tary objective: th e R ussia n Balt ic fleet was
based there; i t was a center of a rmament
manu facture; i t was th e ma in rail l ink to the ice
fiee por t of Murm ansk. F inal ly, Leningrad was
an i dea l spo t f o r t he Russ i ans t o anchor t he
northern flank of their l ine; as a glance at the
game boa rd reveals, the Moscow-Leningrad l ine
consists mo stly of rivers, swamps, lak es, an d the
rough terrain of the Valdai hills ideal defen-
s ive ter rain. Th e fal l of Leningrad would neatly
out f lank this l ine to the nor th, a nd there i s no
really goo d place for the Russians to ever again
anchor a f lank. At the sa m e t ime, Leningrad
would give the German s
n
excellent anch or fo
thei r own f lank, a s wel l as a por t to sho r ten thei
supp ly l ines. Leningrad, then, was definitely
another major mili tary objective.
StaIrngr-ad; in th e a m h , w s u n o rea
i mpor t ance
i n
itself, but because a decisiv
batt le occurred there i t may
be
t aken to sym
bolize the m any things of mili tary and econom i
value in the area. First, the en tire region of th
Donets basin, including the city of Stalingrad
was a major center of industrial and mili tar
manufac turing. Seco nd, th e Volga river was
main a r tery of r iverboat t raf fic throu gh whic
suppl ies f rom England a nd America could b
shipped al l the way to Moscow; al though thi
fact was not ful ly appreciated at the t ime o
planning, i t became obvious la ter in the cam
paign. Third , Rostov-gateway to th
Caucasus, and Russia's only overland rarl l in
via
Persian Gulf) with Great Britain. Finally
what was perhaps mosr obvi ous a t t he t i me o
planning, the valuable oi l fie lds a t Batum an
Grozny i n t he Caucasus , whi ch woul d f a l l o h
Germ ans by default if they advanced to th
Volga.
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THE GENERAL
AGE
There were other objectives of value not so
obvious on the gameboard which should also be
pointed out. First the Ukraine-roughly the
area just south of the Pripyat marshes, between
the Prut and Dnepr rivers-the so-called bread
basket of Russia that would assure Germany a
plentiful supply of grain for the dura t ion of any
war. Sevastopol and the Crimea were not so
important as was thought a t the time, but Hitler
was
anxious that they should be seized as
quickly as possible. Sevastapol was a major
fortress
and port
for
the Russian fleet in the
Black Sea; the Crimea itself Hitler described as
an
unsinkable aircraft carrier f r o m which
bombers could be launched against his precious
oilfields at Ploesti (about 20 miles f rom
Bucharest). Finally, Hitler believed the fall of
the Crimea would be a st rong political induce-
ment for Turkey t o enter the war o n the side of
Germany.
distance was rendered even shorter by the
presence of the Pripyat marshes i n the very
center of operations. Fortunately, much of the
Russian army happened t o be d e p l o y d right o n
or
very near this border. It was here, then, the
best chance for a
quick
and decisive victory was
to be found. The Germans were looking fo r jus t
that sor t of lightning armored breakthrough
and envelopement that had worked so brilliant-
ly in France.
If
they should fail t o reach such a
decision on or near the Soviet frontier, they saw
as clearly as you that there would be problems:
as you advance deeper into Russia, the front
quickly widens and youeven lose the shortening
effect of the Pripyat. I t could quickly and easily
open u p to 2,500 miles or more, and O K H was
fully aware they had not nearly th e
troops
to
maintain a continuous front across such a
distance. Hopefully, then, a military
or
political
decision could be forced before such a situation
I l ~ t . k-orgot lc
Objective
L7rsnlr Sea
01
ansk
\'
Leningrad
- - -
. . -*
:
There
was one other obj~ctlwf rna]or mi i i t a~vmpartwca
Ithat
Hihr
almost
werlcoked
and
which,
iMd.
~sn'teven
shown on the STAUNGRADhod-the pMI d M u r m a w k It
j l ~ e s i n he
k r wth rethe
rail Ilnefrom
L u n i n g r d c w s
Ithe Svjr and appears oft
h
h a r d
The
r~npw38m
f
~ ~ u r m a m k d e r im f r ~ m a ~ h e r m a~ e f l u k e d n a tu w : i t k t h e
farthsstnonhef~lAusdaopwt6
.. W.p~~admdCslly.t(& he
only p r
around
ice ree DM
n
alld northern
Russia,
a n d m
wntiouero r M v s shipswhenportg
muchfarther
m t h
ueh
as Archangel have
f roan
sdid he wlanat'kn fw thlr
d d l y
can
be
more
e ly s n
un the acarmpanyiw map then
exp4ained: Ihe
warm
waters of
theGuIf
Siram make a
long
and
graceful journey around the W o r t h Cape of Narnwy to
Mur-
man* am3
keep the
erw
free
d i c e
. but by the urns
they
hay.
dB@ ~uuth to
A r c h a ~ e l r h w ' u ~ c o o t e d a a a i n
othe
lrsrezing
point.
Mvrmansk
therefwe. la unique and bas a
dietlnet
mithary importam.
Of courser
a
tRwt war
wrwr
beingconsemplmed sp w
pan
~ u l drdinatily havebeen werlodred, Hitler's anentim W s
drawn to n for
t h e
wrong reason Hurmanak u s a
bars
i x t y
miles from the prwiws nick3 mlrtas of W m u (In
Einlnndl . .
thwa
mines were d
dtal
imwrfenrs
to
the
. . .
German sreol
~nauery.
nd9taltnMlong ndh fseyea tben r
Hlr.cr
waswell awareatIhlssnddendngthatthebmMoe(enwi
is a
wed
offense,
instructed
M(H
h t
an
erp ditiOn from
ersamo
to capture
Wiurmansk shovld
be M n i l e
pan
of
Q@ra#ian8arbarossa.
Planning & Operations, 1941
S o much for the objectives. Now comes the
problem of planning andexecut ion of a military
operation best d e i g n e d t o seize these objectives
in a quick and decisive fashion. Of course,
inherent in any such opera t ion is one further
objective: destruction of the enemy armed
forces. How to best bring this about?
Again, a glance a t the gameboard reveals
something that came t o the immediate attention
of the O K H planners: what was soon to be the
.'frontw would be its shortest length right a t the
Russian border, where it was a bare
930
mil=
f rom the Baltic to the Blacksea . Moreover, this
arose.
But where, then, t o strike? Where o n the 930
miles of frontier to concentrate
the
main effort?
Needless to say, plan after plan was discussed
and considered and reconsidered, and last
minute changes continued t o be made right up
to and (unfortunately) after the
d a y
ofinvasion.
However, much detail and trivia can be filtered
out, and the evolution of the final plan of
invasion traced through three basic proposals:
If
you're an avid S T L I N G R D player,
you're probably already familiar with the
earliest since it's likely the one you use yourself.
This plan
was
submitted by the
OKH
taff, and
consisted mainly of a major effort in the
Ukraine, south of the Pripyat. There were many
reasons for
th is
recommendation, but one was
outstanding: the flat, open terrain of the south
was ideal for panzer operations and hence
offered the best chances for success of the
contemplated armored thrust and
envelope-
ment. Moreover, the greater part of Stdin 's
army was deployed along this border, and so
offered the opportunity for the greatest catch.
(Ironically, S t d i n had deployed here because he
also recognized the Ukraine as panzer country
and wished the strongest possible defense.)
Finally, a n attack here would yield a n im-
mediate gain of the Ukranian bread basket.
Hitler rejected this plan for what he con-
sidered good reasons. First,
as
you can see, the
att i tude of Hungry was still uncertain at this
time, so the attack would have t o be brokeninto
two parts-one f rom Rumania , the other f rom
Poland. Furthermore, the attack f r o m Rumania
would run into a series of rivers across its front,
and
a
possible reverse and counterattack here
would again threaten Hitler's precious oilfields
at Ploesti (Bucharest). Finally, it would be far
more difficult t o supply a major effort in the
sou th rather than center o r north (a point Hitler
was to forget the following year). Thus, Man-
stein was later to lament .
. .
how run-down
our Panzer Corp had become in country which
was most unsuitable for armored t roops . . .
while the Ukraine down sou th
. . .
was ideal
tank country, but unfortunately
(we)
had no
tanks.
The next plan, offered by Halder, w n s i s t d
mainly of a direct thrust t o center. The thrust t o
be composed of two coordinated armored
prongs , and they were t o penetrate and
envelope all major Russian forces in the area in
a
series of pockets. All resistance was to have
been crushed by the time they reached
Smolensk. Then it would be a straight drive
a long the
so-called
Orsha-Smolensk land brid
(the dry w a t e r s h d area between Divina/Vol
a n d Dnepr; especially hexes
S-24
to S-27
Moscow. But again Hitler
was
not satisfied. H
was
afraid the Russians would fight stubborn
t o hold the Mtics--digging in behind t
Divina-and launch a counterattack o n h
flank and extended supply lines. He did n
relish the thought of
a
Napoleonic defeat
Moscow, and anyway (although this is n
generally known) Hitler was never througho
the war particularly excited about capturi
Moscow. He placed a much higher priority
many of the other objectives mentioned; an
indeed, Russia was
a
land so huge and rich w
tempting military objectives that one scarc
knew where to begin.
The final plan, as it was eventually hammer
out and adopted, was really quite good in
m
opinion, and if it had been strictly adhered
probably offered the best chance of success.
was actually in many ways
a
sophistication a
embellishment
of
the second plan, in that aga
the main armored thrust was t o be made in t
center a t Smolensk-although it was n
definitely decided the drive would contin
f rom there to Moscow.
German heavyartillery
such
as this15crngunwereohsnal
the Germans
OOL d use on
penelralongRu66
an
forces from t
bypassed strongpolnts
The crucial key to th i s plan, the one thing t
made it indeed intelligent and workable
a
methodical approach to the dismembermen
the Soviet Union, was that i t recognized
limitations of what the quantity and quality
German forces at hand could realistically
expected t o achieve. All the military objecti
outlined above simply could not be seized
once, simultaneously. Therefore, they
wo
have t o be taken individually one after anoth
in a carefully
worked
ou t sequence according
a crucial timetable of events thsrt would resul
the conquest
of
Russia before the onset
winter. Moreover, it was the gr du lfritteri
w y
a n d dtimaie
loss
o sequence I shall try
show, tha t was really more fatal (since i t was
error of the highest strategic level) t han
any
o
specific decision made in this campaign (such
whether o r not t o drive on Moscow, and when
The plan called for three main thrusts to
made into Russia, by Army Groups Nor
Center, and South. Start ing a t the top, Ar
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GENER L
P GE
No r t h was
under the comm and of Fie ld
Leeb. Serving under h im was
essful invas ion of France an d w as to ga in
igned to ad vance
u p
th e Baltic coast, break-
position of the Divjna at Riga and,
ble, take the va luable bridge at Daugav-
s intact. Th en,
a
l ightning s t r ike a t L eningrad
and agreed to enter the
e Leningrad from the north . Th e
t o n the c i tade l would probab ly be
h arm ored re inforcements from
by
then be avai lable .
th e clearing of th e Baltic and fall, of
ny possible threat '
of a
Russ ian countera t -
the no r th on Ge rma n f la nks (b )
give
rman f lank a sol id ancho r a t Leningrad
Finnish t roop s re leased b y the fa l l of
on the port i t se l f.
often
found in the
front
lines in his armored Scout
w a s
the
principle
bsckar
of
the German wlntar drive on
His forward units
managsd
to reach the citv's suburbs.
miles
f rom
the Kremlin.
But the main Germ an effor t was to be m ade
the c omma n d
of
Marshal von Bock.
He
had the largest
or a nd the services of the
r leader, Heinz Gud erian,
que ror of France. Their initial assignment
same as in the second
ody of the R us s i a n a rmy was t o
es between the front ier an d Smolensk.
send
tein 's addi t ional a rm or and , depending on
a
final decision about
, however, tha t at the mom ent
this decision the German position would
s a
g i n a cons iderably shortened
Final ly, there was Army G roup So uth , the
weakest of th e three, und er th e distinguished
von Runs tedt. He was t o a t tackj us t south of the
Pripyat marshes , a long tha t s t r ip of c lear te rra in
I refer to on the ga me boa rd a s t he Ukra in i a n
slot to Kiev; fro m there, he
was
to p lunge
downward to the sea, encircling all Russian
forces in the Ukraine . The Rum anians were a lso
t o a t tack f rom the ir o wn coun try , l ight ly re in-
forced by th e Germans, an d advance a long the
coast to O dessa. If they took Odassa Hitler
promised tha t Rum ania could have i t . But th is
was
l i t t le more than
a
pinning opera t ion,
insignificant i n the overall scheme of things.
These, then, were the objectives of the initial
thrust, after which it was thought Stalin's
governme nt would surely fall . If i t did not, there
seemed l i t tle doubt the G ermans could eas ily fan
ou t t o wha t c a me to be ca ll ed the AA
(Astrakhan-Archangel) l ine. This would leave
them in occupat ion of the grea ter port ion of
Euro pean Russ ia ; the countr y beyond th a t was
so primitive it was hard to believe that a hostile
arm y of an y size could con tinue to exist there,
much less carry ou t military operations. Even if
have to use sixty divisions (along the
' A N
l ine), Hitler rema rked in conversation, that
will be less than 1 now require a long the Pol ish
frontier. And it would place the resources
of European Russia at his disposal.
This was the overall historical plan for
Opera t ion Barbarossa as i t was finally decided
upon. The main objec t ion has a l ready been
noted-tha t panzers were k i n g concentra ted in
the Center and
North ,
where terrain was most
unfavorable for the i r use. However, i t must
remembered tha t jus t because the te rrain was
unfavorable ma de them a l l t he mor e unexpected
there-as they had been unexpected in the
Ardennes in France . Once again , they would
gain surprise
by attacki ng in th e wrong place.
Moreover , an a t tack here had the advantage of
shorte r supply lines-and the recent conquest of
Greece further reassured Hitler tha t his panzers
could handle the roughest of terrain. Most
imp ortant , th is p lan assured tha t they would be
everywhere in sound position with flanks
secure. Th e German s would never let their
arm ies become lost in the vast expanses
of
R u s s i a and s u b j e c t t o N a p o l e o n i c
defea ts provided only tha t they adhered
s t r ict ly to sequence and t imetable , and d id not
le t ear ly success go t o the i r heads
Invasion
Th e invasion of Russia began a t H-hour
03
15,
Jun e 22nd, 1941; with the firs t l ight of dawn o n
the longest
day
of the year, German artil lery
opened up fr om concealed pos it ions behind the
f ron t i e r . a nd the ope n ing ba r ra ge ro ll ed
southward a long the
930
miles of frontier with
the dawn. The Russ ians were caught a lmos t
everywhere by surprise. M any of the bridges
a long the bo rde r were seized by s hoc k t roops
before the Soviet guards could react
and
where there
were
no bridges, crossings
were
forced y assault boats an d rubb er dingies, and
engineers quickly threw together emergency
bridges . German arm or was in ac t ion on Sovie t
soil in
a
matter of hours, often brushing past
pickets and unmanned defenses to dr ive in to
Russ ian t roop assembly areas .
The German surprise remains controvers ia l
to th is very day. I t' s hard t o imagine tha t they
could have assembled three mil l ion t roop s a lon g
the frontier without detection; one gets th
impression that the only people in the worl
unaware of the impending assaul t were th
Soviet frontier guard. Stalin had been warne
repeatedly by the British and Americans, an
a l though he did not t rus t them, h is ow
considerable intelligence service verified thes
reports aga in and again . Apparent ly ,
h e
was s
terrified of the im pend ing attack- like
a
rabbi
of a snake,
as
Krushchevrec alls-that he dared
not alert his frontier for fear o provoking th
Germans . Even when the German barrag
opened, he refused permission t o return the fir
in a las t desperate hope tha t i t was all a mistake.
There was
no
mis take . Sta l in
was
so para
lyzed with fear tha t he was unable to d
anything, and went in to h iding and was no
heard from b y the Russ ian popula t ion fo
several weeks.
The
initial confusion at th
border was taken advantage of b y Sovie t radi
a nd p re ss to a nnounc e to the pe op le tha t t h
Fascist band its have
b x n
knocked on the head
and there was talk of retakin g Brest and drivin
into Poland. But such optim ism was short l ived
German spearheads quickly overran t he front ie
a lmos t everywhere, and fan ned out in to Russi
in a ser ies of the mos t br i l l iant and fantas t i
military operations of all t ime.
Success
Since this is
a
strategic and not tactical s tudy
we will be concerned with tactical battles onl
insofar as they influenced strategy-especially
the s t ra tegic t imetable and sequence of t h
Barbarossa p lan
we've
alread y referred to .
A
firs t , this t imetable went like the fines
c lockwork-except in the south . The mos
spectacular gains were made in Center, wher
the twin prongs
of
Guderian's and Hoth's
panzer armies encircled four Soviet armies i
the Minsk pocket and drove ahead to captur
Smolensk by 16th July . Jus t
as
in France
Guderian was the dr iver , the pusher , press in
fo rwa rd so ha rd a n d fa s t t ha t Ge rm a n in fa n tr
was soon left far behind. I t was a darin
maneuver , fo r he was opera t ing far behind
e ne my l ines a n d if fo rc e d to s top fo r fuel o r a n
other reason he could immediately be surro und
ed and
annihilated
by dv ncing
Russian
reserves.
But
there was method t o h is madness : he wa
able t o d r ive a ga in a nd a ga in in to a s s e mbly
areas fo r new Soviet defense lines and penetrat
them before they had been comple ted. You
opera tions always hang by a silver thread, th
unhappy Kluge moaned but invariabl
Guderian bad his way.
A
despera te Sovie t countera t tack to re tak
Smole ns k
was
smashed, and by 26th July Arm
Gr ou p Cente r had ach ieved it 's initial objectiv
in record time: all Soviet resistance in the are
had
been crushed between the frontier and
Smolensk; there was now nothing o
significance between them an d M oscow, a lit t l
more tha n
200 miles away. Sho uld they now
drive o n the capi to l , or sho uld re inforcement
be sent to Leningrad firs t , as planned?
M e anwhi le , t h in g ha d gone so well with
Army Group North tha t the promised re in
forcements were not even needed. Subs tant ia
Sovie t forces had been t rappe d before Rig
(where the br idges had been blown prematurely
and des t royed. And, what was even more
important , the imposs ible had been achieved
t h e bridges at D augapils , 155 miles fr om th
frontier, had been captured intact by
a
cleve
ruse and held until add itiona l forces could
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THEGENERAL
AGE 7
advance to secure it.
The
road t o Leningrad was
now open.
But the opportunity that this presented, on
a
silver platter
as
it were, was promptly frittered
away in a series of tactical blunders, high
command bickering, a nd delays. Basically, what
it came down to was that OKH had a preor-
dained plan fo r the taking of Leningrad by first
flanking it to th e southeast, but th is approach
bogged down against heavy Russian resistance
in the swampy lower
Luga.
Nonetheless, the
swift German advance had so surprised the
Russians that Leningrad itself was virtually
undefended, and a n opportunity pre se nt4 itself
to drive straight into the city.
Few peeple realize the importance
mvalry
held
as la te as
the
1940's. Horse-drawn transport remained essential to thm Wehr-
macht throughout the war,
especially in
winter
when
lorrieswere
often useless.
Above,
SS csvslw
advanass
in the Ukraine.
The
German high command insisted on
adhering to their original plan, and it was many
weeks before permission could be obtained for
this adjustment. Then, just before the assault
was
to be made, the Russians counterattacked
south of lake llmen and achieved
a decisive
breakthrough. The assault on Leningrad was
postponed, and Manstein sent to thelake where
he delivered a shattering attack on these Rus-
sian forces and annhilated them. He then
reassembled for the final assault on
Leningrad-which the Russians had by this
t ime
managed to fortify and reinforce. There
seems little doubt the attack would have
succeeded anyway, but at the last minute-on
September 17th-Hitler called it off, and
ordered
Manstein south for "operations
elsewhere."
Sequence Lost
The
decision not to take Leningrad just at the
moment when it was ready to fall into his
hands-after weeks of frustrat ing maneuver-
was probably the
most
single fatal decision that
Hitler made in the first year of the war. The
damage it caused to
the
overall operations in
Russia was even greater than the prior strategic
studies had indicated: (a) for the remainder of
war, the German northern flank was left
an area difficult for them to
easy
for the Russians to supply for
y counterattacks;
b)
The use
of Leningrad as a port to shorten the desperately
h and inadequate German supply lines
c)finnishforces were pinned in the
promised thei r efforts to cut the Murmansk
an
Murrnansk
Petsamo(0peration Platinum Fox]
was
a
n it got underway, it was discovered
maps
of the
itive terrain were not secondary roads but
were
no roads ); (d)
finally, heavy German forces were pinneddown
here in siege, which dragged out until broken by
the Russians in 1944. These troops were
desperhtely needed elsewhere.
In
fact, a second
attempt by Manstein to take Leningrad had t o
be called offin 1942when Paulus was trapped at
Stalingrad.
Thus omething very subtle but of highest
s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e h a d
happened
. . .
sequence and
iimetlable
of Bar-
barossa had been violated; the northern flank
was not secured, and Army Group North was
not released to join Center for concluding
operations of the campaign.
Decision:
Moscow
Meanwhile, remember, Army Group Center
had seized Smolensk almost two months earlier,
on July 26th. Since North was doing quite well
at the time. reinforcements were not sent there.
About two weeks were spent in emergency
repairs and overhauling of engines, and the
question was raised: what next? There was
no
doubt in the minds of Guderian and Bock-
Moscow They could not believe it when they
learned Hitler had other plans, and precious
weeks of good campaign weather were lost in
bitter and fruitless argument. And, although
there was almost nothing left between them
and
the capital to
oppose
them, they ultimately
followed orders and pursued a different
objective-Kiev.
Von
Runstrd
was
glwn
ma
weakestforae
(Army
Group Southl
with
which tofaeetheRussian'swrongasttroopwncentrations.At
Httler's
orders, emphasis
was
mltched to the
gouth
to reinforce
hlm, granting
ths
defenders
of
Leningrad an 1
h
hour reprieve.
The problem sprang from the desultory
performance and misfortunes of Army Group
South .
The highly capable but unlucky von
Runstedt had the dubious honor of command
ing the weakest of the three army groups-
against t h e strongest conrentration of Soviet
force, including most of their armor. He was
so
badly outnumbered that his assigned
"breakthrough" was impossible, and in the first
ten days of invasion had pushed the Soviets
back a
bare sixty miles. Progress after that
was
described as "slow but sure," but losses were
heavy and he was under constant countera ttack,
especially by Soviets that withdrew into the
Pripyat until
he
passed and then st ruck at his
flank and rear. Worse yet, this desultory
l b ood News
and
Bad Omens
FIwY
couldHltler navemade such
r mdmrous
b f u d r
as
capture oi
tmrlgrad
at
the
Iesi
m e n t ?
h
least p r t l y m bs h u n d i hrs charamc, andan
radually
devekQedin as1hmkmQ
sthe gmpa~
itler
hadproven
himse%tuba highly
unontmdu
nnau8llve
militwthinker but astrrnapass
an
+weaslog
tendency
to repeat
himK--t
tRe3es60nsd p a s t ~ c c l s ~ s a r $ d f a i l u r ~ $ ,nne
pons whew the lessonsddnd apply
Thus. when
h e g
Romml
dnd
called
off
he
~mas~onl Malta.w m a m
hat
after
Crefe
ha
had
no
Smsch
for
or
opemtlon
w m
Rugsia, n
sSkBlyrhatthbrau%RtIss~andefwr&
R~rnweh todoM~adng ten ing ra~
hevh&
&add a l w
o
ths
b t
mm.
or lmost
tw
e. rnvasren,
and
infllaad friphtful
losses
on
th
&her
ramnu.
ot
taurse.
Hnler hadheard th
belnghe8nIy rnlnedz d
mby-trepped,
so th
to take
theciw
would be
Mw r r to
b n a
And
th
cooperate with a cwrnnatedassauh from th
GOmb h Y t t M
df
alT
these
considerations
e
e that the u y w l d h l i quidxly
und
IS iar
too Irhpoltanl
an
objealw repmUt
fairness.
there
we18 soma moregeneral an
ratiwa, inMMtn
W
the s p d f f l g v e n
we
at thrs time we6 u o d
a l m m
a r m @ ,
We were B l m soma d~rmOman8 ndicauons that
were
not
brougnttoa w f t mdu8lcn.there w f
hereahtisthaGermanmw3tanlzedWmy
hudbee
~esmm Seursmberof
t
939.and aher twaw r s
as equipment wasbqnniry l toweer orrt.Thetro
o ~ r i m l t i wRussia
dld much to
sccut~rateh
he
dutd
and
plma
did
h u t a t
dumagemtank
andtruc
alike, whlch werhear&
and
troze
up:
llters m
wrth dirt
and
dl wnsumparon became sa
hem
asmutd
notkaep
up wlthdamsnd
Asearly asJuly,
r
wdo
to
command that
tW
I
of armeredfwhtin
ties
have naw reached 8
o
70
mr~erm f
our
nom~
wth and thlr war
due
mostlvtotueakdmws n~+ene
Meenwhl[e. Russlnn rmatance had been
unexpctd
a nd fanalical: rheIncrdentaiB r a was only
one
exawe
surmQedRusgan
unlrs iten
fought
tothe
death rerh
n
surrender, to
M a y
the
edvanoe
as b n g
4s
m b [
reolrf+r.the Souiets
hsdwwn
blown u l e r m m l yeensplere
epwstronldarn
ontheDneplcIar~wfntRewwldsndpr
Rumsla.
l hcsc m e
ot awd
omehs ot he dtttml
dlaas
weapurs
n7 had &red fo
dream
erristed.Whenm
Stalin 's
organs were usad
on the m r a
Bma
tb5 duafaning
wmne
and emsom
thetrmpsaiboth sldesto
pantc
endrun.
B
n nasrlsr hrorrse
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harm
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during
a
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Gsrmen
a n k
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mum lm umd sparlr& Al t s amsm m n t A d
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t h e s h d l . H e a m d y ~ w e m . ~ i o o k w m r
whstauar. two.
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ken
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tanks o
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In
ws im here
-
7/23/2019 The General - Volume 11, Issue 2
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E GENER L
ogress delayed the expedition from Rumania,
ich was not supposed to start until Runstedt
s well under way. Needless to say, he was also
first to encounter the dreaded T-34s.
Hitler's decision to turn away from Moscow
clean up the situation in the south has often
en described as the worst mistake of the
r. It may very well have been a mistake:
decision, and the subsequent abandonment
Leningrad threw the entire operational plan
g and logic of Barbarossa to the winds. But,
the same time, there were some very sound
litary grounds for the decision:
(1) Guderian's lightning advance in center
d outrun the f1ank protection of both North
d South, as well as his own infantry. If he were
owed to further extend this exposed position
th a drive on Moscow, the sizable armies in
Kiev area would be sitting right on his f1ank
a counterattack to smash his supply lines
d put him out of business. It would be
ecially dangerous in the coming winter, to
ve such an army in your rear-and Runstedt
not seem capable of dealing with it.
(2) Guderian and Hoth argued that the
ssians would rally to save Moscow and so
ng on the showdown battle of the cam
ign. They may have been right. But Hitler was
o going after a sizable army; and, if this is the
terion, you can't argue with the result. The
ttle of Kiev was probably the greatest military
tory in the history of warfare. If that failed to
n the war, it's diff icult to imagine what would
ve been required at Moscow.
If Hitler's decision can be criticized, I think it
more for grand strategic reasons; the really
clincher, to me, was the subsequent
ptember 17th abandonment of Leningrad.
quence and timetable were forgotten, and
denly Hitler had his armies splitting up and
ambling for objectives everywhere. Especial
he seems suddenly to have changed his mind
ut things and shifted emphasis of the entire
asion from north to south. Suddenly he was
ing Guderian that capture of Sevastopol, the
mea, and Rostov (gateway to the Caucasus)
s more important than Moscow ... and that
political and economic reasons these must be
en before the onset of winter. Overall, he
ms to have overreacted to Runstedt's foot
gging in the Ukraine.
Finally, one last point has occurred to me in
playing of FR N
t~
1940-I'd like to offer
s a hypothesis worth thinking about. If you
pen to have the game, open up the board and
e a look. Imagine the Ardennes to be the
pyat, Seden to be Smolensk, and Paris as
scow. And Guderian, of course, sitting at
en/ Smolensk with his panzer army. Well,
at do you do? Do you drive straight ahead for
capitol-or swing down and right to encircle
main enemy force from their rear? Now, I'm
saying Kiev was a deliberate and conscious
actment, on Hitler 's part, of the campaign in
nce. Nonetheless, the resemblance is
king ... and it certainly seems to fit with his
wing tendency to repeat the lessons of past
Moscow
Stalin not only refused to let Soviet armies ir
Kiev area withdraw-he actually reinforced
m The result was that, when the trap closed,
er a million men and thousands of pieces of
ipment were taken. It was, beyond a doubt,
e of the great military victories of all time.
This accomplished, many of the German
generals wanted to call it quits for the season; it
was high time, they felt, to start digging in for
the winter and bring up supplies of blankets,
heavy clothing, anti-freeze .... And Hitler was
not opposed to the idea. It was Bock, Hoth, and
Guderian who continued to press most forceful
ly for a final drive on Moscow. They felt there
was still time, and this one last effort would be
the blow to bring about the collapse of Russia.
There was no question the country was reeling;
the Soviets were no longer capable of main
taining a continuous front anywhere, and the
idea of ending it now was tempting. Finally,
Hitler gave in; the assault on Leningrad was
called off and Manstein reassigned to Army
Group South (which was to attempt, un
successfully, its original objectives of Rostov
and Sevastopol before winter). The con
siderable forces deployed for the Leningrad
assault were now recalled to Smolensk for the
last big push-on Moscow.
The Ge rmans got their first taste of the Russian weather when
mud made unpassable morass out of the few secondary roads
wh ich primitive Russia had to offer.
The result of the last great German drive of
the Barbarossa campaign is history. Certainly,
the Germans were still strong enough to do
the job, especially since there were only
remnants of Soviet forces to oppose them.
Distance was the enemy; distance, especially,
for battered and worn-out equipment on mis
erable roads from Leningrad and Kiev to
assembly in the Smolensk area-where they
kicked off for Moscow. Even this they ac
complished. But then came mud ... and then
snow. The effect of these was to limit the
German drive to very narrow frontages on the
few passable roads (basically a Smolensk-to
Moscow assault, with encircling thrusts at
Kalinin and Tula). Meanwhile, Stalin had
learned from his informer in Japan that the
Japanese planned to attack America, and not
the Russian rear. He gambled desperately that
this information was true, and stripped his
Pacific frontiers of Siberian troops and poured
them in at Moscow. These last minute arrivals,
and the weather, and the narrow frontages of
the German assault, just barely proved to be
enough.
Winter Disaster
And it was the Germans who now had to pay,
for another gamble that failed. The collapse of
the weather brought with it collapse of overex
tended supply lines that the German had already
outrun anyway. Worse, they had absolutely no
provisions of any significance for the sudden
sub-zero temperatures. Infantry lost fingers and
toes by the thousands to frostbite; guns would
not fire because Iubricants froze; planes and
trucks had to have their engines heated by blow
torch, in an often vain attempt to make them
st art.
P GE
The 3 .7 em PAK wa s greatly und erg unned in compa rison tath e
Soviet heavy tanks th ey were e xpected to deal with. The small AT
weapons often n eeded seve ral hits at point bla nk rang e to stop an
advancing T34. Only the inexperience of Soviet tank crews
prevented complete disaster the early years of the war.
Stalin saw in this catastrophe a chance forthe
sudden and total victory that Hitler had sought.
He deployed his experienced Siberian troops fo
a badly coordinated but nightmarish counterat
tack intending nothing less than destruction o
the entire German Army Group Center. There
was no longer a question of a German front;
they were restricted to the few roads that were
passable, and outposts sometimes watched in
horror as Russian ski troops in the distance
swept gracefully and silently past their positions
toward the supply depots in the rearward areas.
The harshness of this brutal winter for both
sides is brought home in a fantastic episode that
occurred to a German unit snowed in on
narrow road; they looked up, and saw Russian
cavalry on the rise, ready to charge. They were
lost, for they knew there was nothing they could
do to defend themselves ... but the cavalry
waited for more than an hour, and did no
attack. Finally, they could bear it no longer, and
some of the men climbed to the top of the rise
They discovered, to their astonishment, that the
entire cavalry detachment-men and horses
alike-had frozen solid like statu'Cs, while
preparing for the charge. An attempt was made
to photograph this bizarre spe'ctacle, but not
even the camera shutter would work in the
intense cold.
I t is said that Hitler 's hair turned white during
these trying months. Nonethcless, he remained
ever afterwards convinced that his standfast
order had prevented a disasterous Napoleonic
defeat and saved the German army. There i
good reason to suppose he was right, for if
retreat had been attempted under such cir
cumstances a fatal panic was extremely likely.
Bythe t imethe Russian winter offensives struck German panzer
uni ts were pract ical ly w it hout opera tiona l t anks . Only assau lt guns
like the above Stuk 40 L/48 shown above were available to dea
with Russian armor. The knee deep snow shown above was
actually light in comparison to other areas of the front where
tempera tures d ipped below 50 degrees centig rade.
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TH GENERAL
However , once again , the lessons of this
cost ly defensive victory were t o be even ma re
expensive in the com ing years. wh en Hit ler
w ou ld t r y t o app l y t hem to other, inappropriate,
c i rcumstances. Fo r examp le , th e sucoessful
air l i f t ing of supplies t o 100 000 t r oops i n t he
Demyansk pocket (about tw o hexes nor thwes t
of Kalinin) would lead
him
t o k l i e v e h e c o ul d
supply 300,000 t roop s in the Sta l ingrad p ocket
the fol lowing year. And , mo re disasterously, he
w s o ins i st on th e sam e hedgehog defense of
Army G rou p Ce nter on ce again in 1944-this
t ime in summer.
But those hor rors
lay
yet i n he
future;
and the
winter of
1941
142 was caviar ,
in comparison,
t o
what was yet t o come.
T h e S p r i n g t h aw
of
1942 b r ough t a n end
t o
he Russian counteroffensive, but i t also
r evea led t ha t t h e vaun t ed G e r m an W ehr m ach t
hadvirtually ceased to
exist.
The t w o and a half
years of cons t an t w a r fa r e , t he t hous an ds
of
h a r d
miles over bruta l terrain, the weather, and fierce
Russian
resistance
had
f ina l ly ground them
dow n to a
mere
t ravesty of the i r form er might
and glory. Nonetheless, in the process, they had
managed t o do m uch t he same to most of their
enemies, and there
was
n o
real
a r m y o n t h e
cont inent to oppose them. St il l , Opera t ion
Barbarossa had
failed.
G er m any and R us s i a
were now a t war , and Russia had i n add i t ion t o
her own cons iderable resources the indus t r ia l
might of America and Gr eat Bri tian-her new
allies. Now, mo re tha n ever, i t was necessary for
G e r m any t o s om ehow r a l l y s uppor t and
resources for one f ina l e f for t to topple the
Russian giant while i t
was
st i ll dizzy
for the
- Mar k Saha
h'ibtmwaphy
Bullock+
Mter; A Sludy
in
Tyranny
Carell.
Hitter
Movss
Ew?.
1941 -4S
Gehlen, he Service
DeWeer4. Lecturesof HarveyA. Wewe private notes taken by
the
authw in OeWesrd's
classes at UCLA 1883.
Harvey
A.
DeWeerd s a resldent consultam
and
fwrnsr long-tlme mnlor
stafi
member at
RAND. He is a major comrlbutor to
the
Encyclopaadia Britannlca on WW1 and WWLl and hss mn-
tributd
to
othsr scholarly journals. Of eoursa, this is not
to
Imply that he would aaree
with what I
have wrmrm all
statements, opinions, and srrors are my espnsibility alone.
H a q Srrarsgp
iiilter,
HitI8r.s Secret Conversstions
Manstein. ost Vicrories
Guderian.
Panzr Leader
Payne.
Life Dedh of Adolph i t Ier
Ru l, auk8
Pitot
Seaton. The Russo-Germ Wsr. 194145
Speer, Inside tha Third Reich
Mannerheim.
Memarts
Khrusehev,
Khruschev
Remarnbsrs
Defense in
Murk Irwin k article is a throwback lo the d ys
fhe GENERAL
reprinted
the
best articles
other magmines
from
t ime
to
t ime. Although
are not resorting to
that
p o k y w i n ,
we
felt
article merited
Q
Iittle better
graphic
tion than it got in
it s first
printing.
IN STALINGRAD first appeared in
INTERNATIONAL
WAR
AMER. We grate-
acknowledge
their kind
permission
to
the article here.
The
German invaslon
of
Russia fared well until theRussianwhnter
hit.
German troopsweretosuffergreat hardsh~a siromlackof
proper winter equipment. Without winrnr lubrrcants machineguns ammed: without felt bwts thousac lost
toes
and feet to
fmstblts, withom fur helmet Ilners
men
amply froze
to death.
Looting
of
Russlan dead for items
of
wintar apparel m s ccepted
practise. Many didn't even have cemodlage
smocks
a6 worn
by
the trwps shown above.
Why another Stalingrad article?, many of 18 attack factors to make a
3-1 attack
this
you
ask as
you read this title. The main reason is
requiresat least 3 units. If i t is stacked with another
that I do not see enough articles concerning unit and protecting only one square then the
defense for any of the popular
AH
games.
Some
other unit must be
soaked-off
against leaving
only
may feel that Stahgrad
is
too simple a game to two units to attack the
2-3-6.
However,
this
do a major defensive study on. I
will
admit that tactic is to be shunned due
to
the fact that the
4-68 Stalkgrad is
so
imbaIanced that a good form needed to make an attack at slightly lesser
defense is no t needed. also concede that
45-6
odds is so small that the German
can
easily
risk
Stalingrad s still weighted in favor
of
the the loss.
Russians.
But consider an opponent who would
like
to have a G e r m a n ~ e p l a i m e n tate
of
per
turn. Actually, a good Russian player can make a
good fight of this and possibly
win.
However,
there can be no mistakes. As n aside, I have
noticed that in 4-56 Stalingrad the Russian can
afford to make about two bad mistakes which
the German takes
advantage
of. To test your own
perfection, here is a short quiz question:
Is
there any difference between two doubled 7-10-4
units protecting three squares and a doubled
6 9 4
with a doubled 7 - 1 M doing the same?
Well, there is a vast difference. The two 7-10-4
units are not vulnerable to 3-1 attack while a
3-1
attack could be made against the 9-6 while the
7-1@4 is soaked off against. It is this type
of
difference which
can
lose a game. And it is
the
type
of difference that a beginner
will
not realize
for
many
painful defeats.
The
primary
goal
of
a
defensive
line
is to make
a line
of
zones of controI of units which may not
be attacked at 3-1 odds. Any
line
which does not
meet this requirement cannot
be
considered
a
real
defensive l ine, but od y
a
group of doubled un its.
Rather than fall back to such a situation it is
better to use only the portion of the line which
can
be made
3-1 proof and protect the remainder
o f the
line
on open terrain. This applies only
if
you are subsequently going to be able to make
the remainder of
the
line 3-1
proof.
Different units, of course have different capa-
biiities in respect to making a position 3-1 proof
and I intend to expIain these differences. The
2-3-6 can almost be disregarded
for this
purpose
but they can be
used
if the situation calls for it.
A
2-3-6
if stacked with another unit can protect
one
square
from
3-1
attack. The German needs
Although the 4-64 is twice as large as
the
2-3-6, ts general usefulness in
this
role
is
only
slightly larger. The German
only
needs 36 attack
factors for
3-1
and should the 4- 4 be protecting
three
squares
this force can be pure infantry.
With a front of two squares the German must use
a little of his Panzers but very little. Exam ples of
such forces are:
4
5-5-4 s
2
8-8-6's;
3
44-4's
3
88-6 s; 4 8-8-6 s a 4 4 4 ; 3 8-6's 2
6-6-6's.
As
the last
two
examples show, this force
can be mounted using just five units. This means
that
another unit
could
make a soak-off a t g
from one of the attack squares and this means
~ nt l l be attacked at 3-cThee6-4 s
usefulness is in protecting one square which it
can do quite well since even
a 1-1
attack risks
12
factors.
Of
course, situations will a* when the
4- I can protect two or even three
squares
However, extreme care must be taken
when
using
t is tactic. You will be able to use the
4-@I
in
this
capacity only because the
German
is unable
t o bring enough units to bear, but
always
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11/34
PAGE 11
THE GENERAL
vou
allow a 3-1 attack the German will gain a
m o n t h I n addit ion, the German may be repulsed
if he
is
sloppy in his out-flanking maneuver.
s
an
aside,
I
will explain how
y o u
might
be
able t o repulse the German. The German units on
the swamp square will move to
Y-19
t o attack
X-19 in conjunction with forces o n the river.
These units will usually be only infantry because
with the slow progress he has made he will have
sent the Panzers south. If he does n o t p u t more
units in the swamp,
you
have
a
possible ogpor-
tunity. H attacks against X-19 will usually take
the form
of a high odds attack against one 5-7-4
and a soak-off against the other forces (it is often
wise t o add another
5-7-4 to
the stack the thrn
before
he
makes his crossing).
To
give himself
better odds on the soak-off,
he
will usually use
one of the units on
Y-19.
This will leave only
two
units east o f the river and , as stated, they
will usually e weak. If you soak off against the
forces on the river and make
a
strong attack on
the two units east of the river,
the
German will
be
faced with
a 3-1
proof line again
and
will have
lost two months. This situation may not arise
often
b u t when it does, make use
of
it. Be sure
-to add a devilish grin as his mouth falls open.
.
BUG RIVER
The Bug River defense depends on Brest-
Litwsk
and
the defense of Brest-Litovsk depends
on
the delaying action between the Nemunas and
the
Bug as described
in
discussion on defense of
V-19
on the Nernunas. If the first method is
used, that is, delaying units on Y-I 5 and Y-17
then Brest-Litovsk only protects two squares and
is easily defended
by
2 5-7-4's. Th is leaves the
7-10-4 for
V-19.
If the second method
is
used (a
delaying unit on
X-16 ,
then V-19 does not need
the
7-10-4
and it can be used on Brest-Litovsk
where it protects three squares and is
3-1
proofed
by a 4-64 on 2-16, With Brest-Litovsk secure, a
stack of
2
5-7-4's are placed on CC-15 to protec t
the
next two squares. The
Bug
defense does
not
always extend to the end for the initial set-up,
but if
it
does then place 2 46-4's on EE15.
I t
should be
two
rather than one
4 64
ere because
any penetration by the German can be disasterous
and well worth his
risk
of a low
odds
attack. W e
face this same danger in placing a 7-10-4
in
Brest-Litovsk, but whether it is
a
serious threat
or
not depends
o n
relative troops north
and
south
of the Pripyat swamps and whether or not you
use reserves. If you fear a split then
it
is best to
ensure no penetration rather than 3-1 proof the
pogition. Units
on
BB-I
5
would also be doubled
if
you
can
withdraw from Brest-Litovsk into that
square. How far the Bug defense should extend is
dependent on whether or not you delay between
the
Bug and the Hungarkin mountains.
If
there is
no
delay than
it
must be
extended
to the end
in
the manner
I
suggested. If there is a delaying unit
used
at
all,
it
is usually on EE-12. In this case
you need only the stack on CC-IS. When
defending to the end of the Bug it is imperative
that there be those two
4-64s
on EE-15, even
if
you have
2 5-7-4 s
on DD-15. The reason for this
is the German's possible use of an advancing
retreat, which I do not believe has been outlawed
in STALIWGRAD yet. For if you have units on
D D I S
and not on EEl5 , he can s tage
a 1-3
attack against
D D 1 5
and fill all squares to the
west
to
capacity. Then if you have to retreat him
you have no option but to place him behind your
lines
Example
of
a 1-3
advancing
retreat. The ~ e r m a n
has
no where to
go
but forward.
Hungarian M ountains
The defense of the Hungarian Mountains is
very simple in the first turn or two.
To
the nor th
there are two options. If the delay mentioned
in
discussing the Bug is used, then 2 5-7-4 s should
be placed
o n
GG-I I. If it is not used, then they
should be on GG-12. GG-12 closes the
gap
with
the Bug defense. Fo r the delay o ptio n GG-I 1 is
used because it keeps German tro ops from ad-
vancing into
GG-10
which
is
the jump-off point
for troops to at tack
G G I 2
the following turn. In
most
c=s
the
2
5-7-4 s on
GG-I I will have to
withdraw to
GG 12
on
turn
one because
of
a
threat of troops arriving from Hungary. However
if there is no threat and another delay
is
desired
and possible, then they can remain on G G I
I .
The second delaying unit is
placed
on FF-12 or
E L 1 3
and
in
a n y
case the
2 5-7-4 s
only protect
two squares. The possibility of
a
delay depends
on
how
strong your f irst was and
how
bright the
German is.
if you
use a
2 3 6
and
he senses you
will delay again, his
best
move is to at tack i t
from
EE-I 1
and DD-12.
This makes
the
2 3 6
doubled and he gets an advance which mians no
further delays. Therefore, if you hnve two delays
in
mind
you
should use a
4t 4 hich
he dares
not
try
the
same tactic with. When there is
a
serious threat
from
Hungary, GG-12 should only
have
one unit
o n
it because the other will be
caught when the German surrounds the position
and
makes a 3-1 with a soak-off. Therefore if you
use an initial delay,
as
described, do not use
a
2-3-6
as
a
German advance means you
have
no
choice but to
have
two units on
GG 12.
At this
stage
you
should have a good size stack on
HH-12 to force a large soak-off from troops
coming from
Hungary.
In the south, you should
have
2 4-6-4 s
on JJ-12. They need not
be
5-7-4 s,
because any German who places a large
number of Panzers in the so uth is a fool
and
the
defeat of these units is not very important. When
thcsc units are threatened with being surrounded
they should be withdrawn behind the Pru
(north). This is not always possible, however, i
you are threatened a t GG-12 and w ish to place
t ro op s o n HH-12. HH-12 can eas ily be
surrounded by Germans advancing into GG-12
and by an at tack from the
south.
In
this
case
leave
a sacrifice unit on
15 12
(not 11-12).
Prut-Siretul
River
Complex
Defense of this
area
takes two main forms.
Th
first is
the
simplest and i t is to just defend
behind the Prut River. This
cannot
be made
3-1
