The Future of the Arab Gulf Monarchies in the Age of Uncertainties

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THE FUTURE OF THE ARAB GULFMONARCHIES

IN THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTIES

Mohammed El-Katiri

June 2013

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FOREWORD

Upheavals in the Arab world over the last 2 yearshave altered the political and security landscape in themonarchies of the Arab Peninsula in an unprecedentedway. Evolving political and social processes pose anew set of challenges to Arab Gulf rulers. Inspiredby Arab revolts, citizens of the region are increas-ingly calling on their governments to broaden politi-cal participation and to be accountable, receptive, andresponsive to their demands.

In this monograph, Dr. El-Katiri argues that thechanges that are sweeping across the Arab world areunlikely to leave the Arab Gulf monarchical regimesintact, and that the leaders of these states should ini-tiate genuine and profound policy reforms towardgreater political openness and inclusiveness, in order

to avoid the scenarios of regime change experiencedby other Arab countries during 2011.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute and

U.S. Army War College Press


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MOHAMMED EL-KATIRI is a Senior Advisor at theUnited Kingdoms (UK) Conict Studies ResearchCentre (CSRC) and Senior Researcher at The HagueInstitute for Global Justice. Before working for CSRC,Dr. El-Katiri was a Research Fellow at the UK DefenceAcademy, and later covered North Africa as a Politi-cal Risk Analyst at Eurasia Group. With more than10 years of regional experience, his research interestsinclude political and economic security in North Af-rica and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states,North African relations with the European Union,and security policies around the Mediterranean.Dr. El-Katiri has published numerous internal and ex-ternal UK Defence Academy reports, including refer-ence reports on national and regional security issues

in the GCC and the Mediterranean. He is a frequentcommentator in international media including theBBC, the Financial Times, andAl-Jazeera.


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SUMMARY

Seismic cultural and political shifts are under wayin the Arab Gulf monarchies. The political upheav-als and transitions that have swept through the Arabworld over the last 2 years have not toppled the ArabGulf rulers, but did not leave them untouched either.Rulers of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) statesface heightened internal and external challenges anduncertainties. Pro-democracy protests and calls areextending from Bahrain to other oil-rich countries ofthe Arabian Peninsula. The expectations of GCC citi-zens, particularly the educated youth, are increasinglymoving from socio-economic demands to politicalones. They are now not only asking for jobs or wageincreases, but also for more political participationand accountability.

Chief among internal challenges is the resurgencein several GCC countries, particularly Bahrain andSaudi Arabia, of a decades-long sectarian rift betweenthe Sunni regimes and their Shia subjects. The Gulfregimes already tense relations with Iran have wors-ened on the basis of alleged Iranian interference in-aming sectarian tensions in Bahrain and across thebroader region.

In this monograph, the author assesses the chal-lenges facing the regions rulers, and proposes mean-ingful political reform as a means of mitigating them.


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THE FUTURE OF THE ARAB GULFMONARCHIES IN THE AGE

OF UNCERTAINTIES

At rst glance, the member states of the GulfCooperation Council (GCC),1 with the exception ofBahrain, appear to have weathered the storm of theArab uprisings with little visible disturbance. A closerlook at the region, however, suggests that its perceivedstability may very well be threatened in the longerterm. This is because many of the regions govern-ment policies that are intended to appease their localpopulationsspecically the expansionary budgetsand generous welfare and employment packages ofthe past 24 monthsare intrinsically short-term solu-tions to wider and longer term social, economic, andpolitical grievances that characterize the GCC

economies as a whole.In particular, GCC citizens expect long-term insti-

tutional reforms and more political freedom. Voicescalling for more good governance, transparency,and an inclusive political system are increasing andspreading across the region. There are also concernsover the sustainability of many economic policies inthe region, which raises the question of how sustain-able current living standards will be.

The repercussions of the uprisings in several Arabcountries in the Gulf region are multiple. They includethe reviving of democratization demands, the poten-tial of setting precedents of democratic models, andthe weakening of Egypt as an important security part-ner. It would therefore be misleading to believe that

the Arab Gulf monarchies will remain resilient inde-nitely to the political awakening in several Arab coun-tries. The GCC states also face various other regional


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and geopolitical challenges that further threaten thewider regions stability. For this reason, the Gulf mon-

archies current equilibrium may well be of a short-term nature.

INTRODUCTION

Political upheavals across North Africa and theMiddle East in 2011-12 brought seismic shifts in thegeopolitics of the Arab world and in the internal poli-tics of the entire region. The GCC countries, with thenotable exception of Bahrain, succeeded in largelyavoiding mass protest movements as observed inmany other parts of the Arab world. But the Gulfmonarchies nevertheless did not remain unaffected;small protest movements appeared in Kuwait, Oman,and other GCC states and managed to create a near-

political crisis in Bahrain in early 2011. Many of theGCC states have since handed out generous welfareand employment packagesin many cases on top ofalready extremely generous welfare state functionsin order to appease demands by the populace for agreater share in their countries wealth.

But the GCC states constitute a mosaic of countriesfacing much underlyingand until now unresolvedsocial, geopolitical, and economic conict potential,including both domestic and external threats to theirlong-term stability. Internally, a combination of eth-nic, political and economic factors is threatening thefuture of the political regimes in some GCC countriesmore than others. On the economic front, the regionneeds to create nonhydrocarbon sources of economic

growth, which could translate into creating job op-portunities for millions of young job-seekers acrossthe GCC states. The inux of foreign labor over the


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economic boom years has contributed to the economicdevelopment and prosperity of the GCC countries,

but many nationals continue to fail to match job re-quirements, while the disproportionate number ofrootless foreigners has become a source of concern tothe regions small states.

Sectarian tensions have been a concern to the GCCstates for many decades. In recent months, accusa-tions of an Iranian role in inciting sectarian tensions inseveral GCC states have been dominating headlinesand public discussions across the GCC countries. Re-gardless of the accuracy of such accusations, the GCCSunni regimes have increased their surveillance ofthe Shia population, while Bahrains Shiite majoritymade a determined statement early in 2011 regardingtheir expectations of future access to the micro-stateswealth and political power. The media war is height-

ening tensions between Shia and Sunni populationsin Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and affecting other GCCcountries. These tensions, if not contained, could posea threat to the social fabric and the regions stability.

Iran also remains the main external threat to the ter-ritorial integrity and interests of most GCC countries.Iranian-GCC tensions have had a long history, reach-ing back to the rst two Gulf wars, and have arisenanew in recent years over a variety of issues includingterritorial disputes between the United Arab Emirates(UAE) and Iran, Qatars and Irans shared gas eldin the offshore Gulf, and Irans ongoing conict withthe West over its nuclear program. In the event of amilitary confrontation between Western states andIran, the GCC states, which share Irans main access

route for its oil and natural gas exports, the Straits ofHormuz, would be exposed to signicant disruptionsof their main trade route regardless of whether theywere involved in the conict.


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Of the several distinct challenges that are facingthis part of the Arab world, internal problems remain

the most difcult. The people of the region are increas-ingly demanding a change in the current conservativepolitical systems. For decades, GCC rulers escaped in-troducing substantial political and economic reformsthat could reduce their broad political powers.

Several initiatives have been announced by a num-ber of GCC states at both national and regional levelsto strengthen GCC security and resilience. For ex-ample, Saudi Arabia sees the establishment of a unionamong all the six members of the GCC as a strategicresponse to the growing assertiveness of Irana viewthat is not supported by all GCC members.

This analysis aims to answer the key question onthe future of the Arab Gulf Monarchies in the face ofthese increasing internal and external challenges and

threats. It is based on several months of research, in-cluding in the region itself, and includes the valuableinput of more than 20 interviews conducted with deci-sionmakers both within and outside the region. Giventhe socio-political differences that persist among theGCC countries, an in-depth discussion of each coun-trys domestic politics would be desirable; but in thelight of space constraints, this monograph focuses onselected political issues that are common to the ma-jority of GCC countries. However, the analysis willplace more emphasis on Saudi Arabia given its sizeand inuence in the region. What happens in SaudiArabia matters in the rest of the GCC states, and un-doubtedly, changes in Saudi Arabia are more likelyto have repercussions on the rest of its GCC neigh-

bors. The discussion will show that concerns about thefuture of the GCC monarchies are not an exaggera-tion. It would be misleading to believe that the Arab


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Gulf monarchies will remain resilient to the politicalawakening across Arab countries. To prevent a rep-

etition of uprisings seen in early 2011 in Tunisia andEgypt, it is essential that GCC states adopt substantialpolitical reforms.

This monograph is divided into two main sections:the rst covering internal challenges to GCC stability;and the second covering external challenges to thesecurity and stability of the Arab Gulf countries over-all. A conclusion reviews the potential impacts onU.S. interests.

PRECARIOUS STABILITY AT HOME

Threats from within remain the main concern tothe stability of GCC regimes. This is not a noveltyin the region. Over recent decades, the most serious

threats to regime stability and security have been in-ternal. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 remainsthe only serious external threat to any GCC regime inrecent history.

The political upheavals of the last 2 years in theArab world have introduced new challenges andbrought dormant tensions to the fore. The list ofthreats to GCC regimes is wide-ranging, includingfactors affecting the cohesion of the social fabric ofthe GCC societies such as terrorism and demands forconstitutional reform.

Increasing Calls for Democratization.

The GCC monarchies have not faced strong popu-

lar demands for democracy during their years of exis-tence. Calls for democratization, at least in Saudi Ara-bia, have been on the agenda only for a limited circle


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of reformist elites. For the small rich countries, democ-racy has been an alien culture. For decades, the vast

majority of GCC citizens were uninterested in theirpolitical systems or political participation in them.Only a tiny educated minority was involved in anykind of political activism. In countries such as Bahrainand Kuwait, where the political systems allowed lim-ited formal political participation, a small number ofyoung nationals showed interest in civic and politicalactivities. But all this is now set to change.

Economic, educational, and technological advancesover the last decades have rapidly changed how GCCnationals see their rulers and the management of theirpublic affairs. The internet and social media have al-lowed GCC nationals to access information and politi-cal analysis to an extent that has never been allowedby local media and academia. The spread of demo-

cratic concepts across the region over the last decadethrough education and access to information has fun-damentally altered assumptions and preconceptionsthere. An increasing number of people, mainly youth,sees in democratic political systems the most appro-priate forms of government. A survey conducted inMarch 2011 showed that 60 percent of the GCC youthwho took part in the survey considered democracy tobe their top priority.2

At the time of this writing, political freedoms re-main restricted in the region. All GCC regimes banpolitical parties, with the result that there are none inany GCC countries, including in Kuwait, which hasa political system that resembles most closely somefeatures of Western democracy. Kuwait and Bahrain

have held parliamentary elections, but have politicalassociations rather than political parties. Both coun-tries allow women to vote and stand in elections.


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Their parliaments have limited powers to oversee theexecutive body, which is dominated by members of

the ruling family. Both parliaments possess blockadepowers, but limited legislative power.

Despite some differences that characterize theformal politics, there are several key commonalitiesamong the Arab Gulf monarchies. A distinguishingfeature is the lack of any check and balance controlon the powers of the Gulf monarchs. Another distin-guishing feature compared to other Arab countries,including the monarchies of Jordan and Morocco, isthat the GCC sovereigns rule as a family. Their familymembers are appointed to key positions and benetfrom many privileges. The result is an increased sus-ceptibility to political volatility, with the risk of un-predictable successor regimes. Although the systemof government practiced by Jamal Mubarak in Egypt

differed from that of the GCC states, at the time of thiswriting, Egypt provides a case in point demonstratingthe potential complications of regime change.

The events of the Arab uprisings that started inDecember 2010 have revived demands for more in-clusive and transparent politics in the GCC. Days ofRage were announced in almost every GCC country,emulating the calls to mass protests in North Africa.Bahrain and Oman are the countries that have seenlarge and continuous protests since early 2011. Bah-rainis and Omanis, inspired by upheavals elsewhere,were the rst to take to the streets to demand jobs, ac-tion against corruption, and other social and politicalreforms. In Bahrain, the political crisis was extremelycomplex, and political dialogue between the Sunni

government and Shiaa opposition groups has sofar failed to break the deadlock.3 In Oman, politicalchanges and promises by Sultan Qaboos following the


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2011 protests managed to calm the anger for a while,but without addressing the underlying problems:4 in

2012, protests erupted again with demands for em-ployment and political reform.5 In Saudi Arabia, theSaudi government used its ofcial religious establish-ment to stop mass protests on March 11, 2011. Ofcialreligious scholars issued a fatwa denouncing protests.Imams from mosques across the main cities called onpeople not to destabilize the country.6 This Saudi strat-egy has contained the Sunni population, but SaudiShia citizens continued to protest throughout thefollowing 1 1/2 years.

Saudi Arabia and other GCC states reacted byoffering cash handouts and subsidies to their owncitizens in order to restrain the transformation ofeconomic malaise into a serious political crisis. KingAbdullah of Saudi Arabia cut short his medical reha-

bilitation stay in Morocco and returned to Riyadh toannounce a number of nancial packages intended tocontain the spread of protests across the country. InFebruary 2011, 19 Royal Orders were announced, in-cluding a range of nancial support measures such asunemployment benets, increased wages, a programto build 500,000 housing units, and the writing-off ofa series of loans. The total cost of all these social mea-sures over the coming years is estimated to amount toU.S.$130 billion. The unemployment benet is indica-tive of the generosity and cost of the measures taken:in an effort to appease the anger of its unemployedyouth, the government now provides a years salaryfor job-seeking Saudi citizens.7

Other GCC states announced similar measures.

Bahrain issued a one-off cash transfer of 1000 BahrainiDinars (approximately U.S.$2,660) per family. Ku-wait also gave its own citizens cash handouts of 1000Kuwaiti Dinars (U.S.$3,500).8


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Buying legitimacy through public employment,grants, increase of wages, or any other rent distribu-

tive tool has proved temporarily effective in somecountries, but is unsustainable in the long term, bothnancially and politically. The rich GCC countries stillhave a margin of time to keep using the same tactics,because there are abundant nancial resources to bemobilizedwith budget surpluses accumulated overthe last few years, these states still have room formaneuver. But less prosperous Bahrain and Omancannot continue with this approach at a similar scaleto their neighbors. Their populations are aware of thisfact, and this is a contributing factor to the continu-ing protests in these countries, notably absent in thericher states.

But the Story Is Still Unfnished.

The Gulf region has entered a new era. Whatstarted as the voicing of socio-economic grievances inGCC states has transformed into a growing politicalquest for liberties. Local activists are calling for politi-cal reforms in almost all countries across the region.

In Saudi Arabia, different political groups (liberals,Islamists, and female groups) are now calling for deeppolitical reforms and liberties. The upheavals acrossthe Arab world have revived calls for a constitutionalreform that would transform the Saudi Kingdom intoa constitutional monarchy. The constitutional reform-ists, as they are known, are made up of academics,writers, businessmen, and other professionals of dif-ferent ideological backgrounds ranging from liberals

to pan-Arab nationalists including members of the Is-lamist Sahwa.9 Their political reform agenda seeks tocurtail the excessive powers held by the King and the


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royal court. The monarch, according to the Saudi BasicLaw, has the power to nominate and dismiss minis-

ters, as well as to dissolve the Consultative Council.He is also the head of the armed forces. AlthoughKing Abdullah has set economic and political reformsas priority since his ascent to the throne in 2005, littlehas changed in political terms. Political reforms weretoo slow and insubstantial to noticeably change theform of government. In one sense, these were cos-metic reforms, such as a cabinet reshufe, a change ofthe head of religious police or the appointment of therst female in the states history as a deputy minis-ter.10 The most recent reforms announced by the King,once again intended to undermine any mass build-upof political discontent, are symbolic but once again donot amount to major change: in March 2011, Saudi citi-zens were granted a right to elect half of the members

of municipal councils. Later in the same year, KingAbdullah granted women the right to participate infuture municipal elections.

There are many conservative forces that opposemeaningful reform in Saudi Arabia, just as they havedone successfully in previous decades under the ruleof late King Fahd. At the time when King Fahd intro-duced the rst constitution in 1992, several groupsvoiced opposition for a range of different reasons. Theconservative religious establishment saw in the con-stitution a challenge to the legal order that is based onthe Quran. Another opposing group was made up ofinuential conservative princesses, who did not wantto cede any political powers to other institutions. Theirmain concern was that the adoption of a constitution

could set a precedent, and open the door for more sub-stantial political concessions toward a participatorypolitical system.11 King Fahd was against the organi-


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zation of free elections in his country, saying that ourpeoples character and way of life are different from

the ways and traditions of the democratic worldfree elections are not suitable for our country.12 Theseconservative forces are still shaping policy-making inthe royal court.

It is not only secular groups that are calling for rep-resentative politics; some Islamist groups and activistsare now joining the call. The proponents of democracyin Saudi Arabia call for a change from the current po-litical system based on patronage, where princes ofthe family of Al-Saud dominate key central, regional,and sectoral positions. More signicantly, criticism ofthe current situation and calls for democratic reformare now coming from within the Al-Saud family itself.The old reformist princes are now demanding demo-cratic reforms, and calling on Saudi leaders to initi-

ate reforms to avoid the destiny of deposed leaderselsewhere in the Arab world. For instance, the currentKings brother, Prince Talal bin Abdel Aziz, urged theintroduction of substantial political reforms to avoidmass uprisings among Saudis.13 Princess Basma bintSaud bin Abdul Aziz voiced criticism of the entourageof the King for exploiting the authoritarian politicalsystem to repress protestors.14 Turki Al-Hamad, aSaudi author and novelist, eloquently summarized thereform demands in a prologue to a newly publishedbook, titled The Alternative Saudi: Features of the FourthState, written by Ahmad Adnan, a Saudi journalistbased in Beirut. He urged the ruling elite to reformin order to avoid being forced to change, adding thatcalls for reform are not a luxury demand, but rather

a necessity.15The current political situation in Bahrain is far more

complex. The political tensions between the ruling


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elite and opposition Shia forces have reached a stale-mate. Shia riots continue at the time of writing. The

failure of political dialogue is a consequence of a lackof a united opposition front on the one hand, and of adivided ruling family on the other. A wide gap existsbetween opposition groups on the scope of ambitionfor the political reforms wanted for the country.16 Themain opposition group, Alwefaq, is hoping to alter theruling system by empowering the parliament. On theinstitutional front, Alwefaq demands a constitutionalamendment that gives more powers to parliament toscrutinize all government policies. Some oppositiongroups have gone further, asking for the removal ofthe long-serving prime minister, Sheikh Khalifa Al-Khalifa, as a key part of any political settlement. TheSheikh is considered by the Shia population to be ahardliner and an opponent of any political dialogue or

concessions.17

Even more radical groups have calledfor a total change of the state system, from a monarchyto a republic.

Even in the rich UAE, an opposition Islamist group,the Reform and Social Guidance Association (hereafterAl-Islah), has emerged to call for democratic reforms.In 2011, Al-Islah issued a petition to introduce morepro-democracy reforms. This group has asked for leg-islative powers to be assigned to the Federal NationalCouncil, and for voting rights to be given to all citi-zens. Alarmed by this political development, the UAEgovernment reacted rmly and arrested several activ-ists,18 primarily Islamists. In addition to their calls forthe democratization of the system, these Islamists ap-pear to espouse a social project centered on preserving

local traditional and conservative culture. A growingnumber of Emiratis are unsatised with the indecentbehavior of expatriate residents and tourists in public.


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In June 2012, the Federal National Council proposeda dress code law to the cabinet.19 But the authorities,

particularly in Dubai, are concerned about the growthand spread of any moralization discourse within thecountry, as a trend of this kind would challenge thecore of Dubais business model as a tourist and inter-national business hub. Frequent media statements byDubai police chief Dahi Khalfan reects the anxietyamong Dubais leadership about the rise of the Islamicpolitical discourse. Meanwhile, a Dubai-based Emiratiacademic has noted that while these movements havesurprised the leadership, they are unlikely to consti-tute any threat to the political system.20 In his view,given the lack of political activism combined with ageneral satisfaction with the socio-economic condi-tions among nationals, Al-Islah or any other opposi-tion group will only achieve limited support.21

Fear of the Rise of Political Islam.

The political transitions in Egypt and Tunisia havebrought in new challenges for the GCCs conservativeregimes. They have changed the political landscape inthe region by democratically bringing political Islaminto power. The victory of the Muslim Brotherhoodin Egypt, in particular, was perceived as an unwel-come development. The GCC rulers are alarmed bythe potential inuence of the Egyptian democraticexperience on their own societies. The horrifying sce-nario for the GCC rulers is if the Egyptian governmentled by the Muslim Brotherhood decides to spread itsinuence regionally by empowering other Islamist

groups. Abdulakhaleq Abdullah, an Emirati politicalscientist, notes that the GCC are part and parcel of theArab world, and they cannot escape the inuence of


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the revolutions and the political transitions that fol-low them.22 For instance, the UAE, as with other GCC

countries, remain concerned about possible links be-tween their local Islamist groups and other Islamistsin power in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt.

Such fears about a pan-Arab Islamist nexus orinuence are not groundless. During a visit by thechairman of Al-Islah, Sultan bin Kaid al-Qassimi, tothe Moroccan ruling Islamist Party of Justice and De-velopment, Al-Qassimi stated that the aim of his visitwas to learn from Moroccos unique experience of Is-lamist government in the Arab region.23

Sectarian Frictions.

Another internal source of political fragility in sev-eral GCC states is the Shia-Sunni split. Shia popula-

tions are an integral part of the GCC societies. Withthe exception of Bahrain, where Shiites account foralmost 70 percent of the population, in the rest of theGCC states Shia constitutes an important minority.Despite their signicant size and centuries of theirexistence in the region, most of the current Sunniregimes perceive Shiism as a threat to their politicalstability and to social cohesion. This has manifested insystematic discrimination against Shia citizens in mostGCC countries by the state apparatuses; Shiites areoften treated as second-class citizens. According toone study on the subject, Shia has not enjoyed properrepresentation in the civilian or military institutions inthe majority of GCC countries. Even in countries thatallowed the participation of Shia citizens in managing

the states affairs, they have never breached the ceilingthat separates them from the Sunni elite.24


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There is a wide conviction that the Saudi govern-ment has a deliberate policy of discrimination against

its Shia subjects. The Saudi authorities deny theirShia subjects the freedom to practice many of theirreligious ceremonies. Statements by Saudi Sunni cler-ics that overtly incite discrimination and intoleranceagainst Shia are not prohibited or punished. A 2009report by Human Rights Watch listed a few examplesof institutional discrimination against the Saudi Shiaminority, including the dominance of Sunni tribunalsover the only three Shia courts and the fact that Saudischools only teach Sunni Islam to pupils.25

The fall of Saddam Husseins regime in Iraq and theempowerment of Iraqi Shia politicians have broughtnew dynamics into the region, potentially no less im-portant than the impact of Irans Islamic revolutionin 1979. This change fundamentally altered the geo-

political environment, giving much room to Iranianinuence in the Middle East, and the reemergence ofShiism across the Gulf and Levant regions. Iraniansupport of Shia factions in Iraq over recent years hasonly given weight to the already existing perceptionthat Iran is extending its inuence across the region.The concern for the GCC regimes is to once again faceoutbreaks of Shia revolts, similar to the ones experi-enced after the Iranian Islamic revolution. A study ofpolitical violence related to Shiism notes that sincethe revolution of 1979, Shia politics and activism inSaudi Arabia has typically been characterized as in-spired, inuenced and even directed by Iran.26 Thisaccentuates a common perception among Sunnis inthe region that Shia groups of the Gulf are Persians

(Aajams) who retain allegiance to Iran. The reality isdifferent; the majority of the GCCs Shia populationsare Arabs.


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The study cited above suggests that sectarianrivalry will lead to a deteriorating situation:

In the coming years, Shias and Sunnis will competeover power, rst in Iraq but ultimately across theentire region. Beyond Iraq, other countries (even asthey embrace reform) have to cope with intensify-ing rivalries between Shias and Sunnis. The overallSunni-Shia conict will play a large role in deningthe Middle East as a whole and shaping its relationswith the outside world.27

It appears that GCC rulers are taking this dangerentirely seriously. Saudi Arabia is leading Arab-Sunnigovernments in a war against a Shia invasion ofthe GCC and the rest of the Middle East. This stancechosen by Saudi Arabia is driven by both geopoliticsand ideological factors. On the religious front, the Al-

Saud regime is committed to this policy as a resultof the great inuence of the ofcial religious institu-tions on policy making. Given the important status ofWahhabism in the Saudi political system, anti-Shiismis built into the structure of political and religiousauthority and has become pervasive in cultural andsocial institutions. The Saudi education system, forexample, has historically preached intolerance forreligious views that diverge from core Wahhabi tenets.

The continued alienation of Shia citizens withinmost GCC societies has structurally damaged thepolitical legitimacy of the rulers and the socialcohesion. The magnitude of this sectarian rift has beendescribed eloquently:

Shia-Sunni conict . . . has been far more importantin shaping the Middle East than many realize or ac-knowledge. And it has become deeply embedded in


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popular prejudice, as stereotypes of the plebeian Shiasand their wrongheaded view of Islam have denedhow many Sunnis have seen their kinsmen. In Leba-non, popular lore has held that Shias have tails; theyreproduce too prolically, are too loud in express-ing their religiosity, and, given Lebanons debonairself-image, are ridiculed for their low-class, tastelessand vulgar ways. Despite the political popularity ofHezbollah, Shias face discrimination and are dis-missed as provincial, uncouth, and unt for their loftypretention of representing Lebanon. In Saudi Arabia, it

is said that Shia spit in their fooda slander no doubtmeant to discourage even socialization over meals be-tween Sunnis and Shiasand that shaking hands witha Shia is polluting, necessitating ablutions.28

The Sunni-Shia rifts are most acute now in Bah-rain and Saudi Arabia. This has been the case for bothcountries for decades; both have seen several bouts of

religious upheaval since the Islamic revolution in Iranin 1979. The religious divide has become even morepronounced in the two countries over the last 1 1/2years, and the local authorities appear to be strugglingto address it. By contrast, other GCC countries haveadopted a conciliatory approach toward Shia groups.

Succession Issues.

Another threat to internal stability lies in the in-ghting within the ruling families for positions of in-uence in most GCC countries. Such confrontationsare exacerbated by a lack of clear rules for successions,and the complete absence of strong democratic insti-tutions. The succession in Saudi Arabia, for instance,

remains uncertain, and this is perceived as a poten-tial source of political instability by many observers.Recently, the death of two crown princes, Sultan and


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Nayef, in less than a year brought to the fore questionsover the regimes stability in the mid and long term.29

The vagueness of the succession system introduced byKing Abdullah in 2006 leaves the matter unresolvedonce the aging and unwell sons of King Abdul Azizdie. There are dozens of contenders among the grand-sons for the throne, with the strong possibility offactional disputes.30

Even in other GCC countries that have clearerstipulations for selecting successors, political sys-tems characterized by family rule precipitate politicaluncertainty. The competition for senior positions iserce. A recent example to illustrate how confusingand risky the situation could be is the succession dis-pute in the Ras Al-Khaima Emirate of the UAE. Whenthe late Sheikh Saqr Al-Qassimi died in October 2010,two of his sons, Khalid and Saud, contended for the

throne with their competition causing a political crisisin the UAE as a whole.31

EXTERNAL THREATS TO GCC STABILITY

A Dangerous Neighbor: Mounting Tensionswith Iran.

Arab Gulf countries have several concerns aboutIran. First, they suspect that Iran is directly support-ing Shia minorities, which is considered as direct in-terference in their domestic affairs. Second, Iran hascontinually criticized the strong ties between someArab governments and the United States. Iran isanxious about the U.S. presence in the region,32 and

the presence of foreign forces in the Gulf region hasconsequently increased other states fears of Iran.33Third, there are territorial disputes with several GCC


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members, and Gulf rulers remain concerned about ex-pansionist intentions of the Iranian regime.

There is also a deeper and broader underlyingsource of animosity. Irans desire to become a regionalpower constitutes a source of fear to its immediateArab neighbors and other world powers. Accordingto a 2011 study:

Iran believes that it ought to play a major role in worldaffairs and that, as the defender of the interests of all

Muslims and the guardian of Irans national interests,it should be treated as a beacon for revolutionary Is-lam throughout the world. Finally . . . its leadershipsbelief [is] that Iran is geographically optimally situatedto become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf.34

The mistrust of Iran by GCC countries has deep-ened over the last decade. The U.S.-led war on Iraq

in 2003 profoundly changed the regional balance ofpower: Iran emerged as the dominant force in theregion following the collapse of Saddam Husseinsregime. Since then, as mentioned earlier, the GCCcountries have been alarmed over pro-Iran Shiitesgaining power in post-war Iraq and threatening to ex-tend Shia inuence across the region. In fact, the rise

of Shia in Iraq has encouraged other Shia minoritiesin the region to aspire to greater prominence in theirrespective countries. But it is important to note thatthe underlying enmity stretches back decades. Thetensions between Iran and most GCC countries havehistorical, ideological, and geostrategic roots, whichmake their animosity a structural feature rather than acyclical one that depends on the ascendancy of hard-

line political factions in the Iranian politics or the ac-cession to power of a new Arab monarch.


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The full complexities of the relationships betweenIran and its Arab Gulf neighbors cannot be covered

exhaustively in a monograph of this size, but a briefreview can be given of some specic issues and howthey are linked to the ongoing tensions in the region.35Arab Gulf countries have perceived Iran as a threatsince before their independence. The enshrined senseof superiority among Iranian nationalists since thetime of the Shahs stokes this animosity. This sense ofsuperiority, which contrasts with the relative modestyof Arab neighbors, is based on Persian glorication oftheir pre-Islamic era.36 The overthrow of Shah RezaPahlavi in 1979 fundamentally altered the regionsgeopolitical landscape for the Arab countries andother external Western powers. For the Arab coun-tries, the change of regime brought a clerical systemthat was hostile to the Sunni regimes and monarchies

of the Gulf region. For the United States, the Islamicrevolution removed a key ally in the region.

Irans territorial disputes with its Arab neighborsin the Gulf also go back to before the Islamic revolu-tion. Iranian claims on Bahrain in particular date backto the British announcement of withdrawal from theGulf region in 1968.37 Calls from leading Iranian po-litical gures and public opinion formers, but not thegovernment, to annex Bahrain have intensied overrecent years. Irans opposition to any deep integra-tion among Arab Gulf countries only reinforces thesefears. In July 2007, Hossein Shariatmadari, the editorof Kayhan, a daily newspaper that is known to be closeto conservative political circles, revived Irans claimto Bahrain. His comments sparked a diplomatic crisis

in Bahrain.38 Again in 2009, Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri,a prominent politician and a member of Irans Expe-diency Council, alluded to such claims.39 The Iranian


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government has always distanced itself from suchprovocative statements and claims. In May 2012,

Iran was alarmed by Riyadh-Manama talks over thepotential establishment of a political union, and sawin this initiative a potential game-changer that couldchallenge its inuence and leadership ambitions inthe region. The Saudi announcement intensied awar of words between Iranian and GCC institutions.The Iranian parliament voiced its disapproval of theproposed closer political relationship, and the sugges-tion by Ali Larijani, speaker of the Iranian parliament,that if Bahrain should have any merger at all it shouldbe with Iran provoked a strong Bahraini ofcial reac-tion.40 Bahrains foreign ministry summoned the Ira-nian Charg dAffaires to complain against what theydescribed as Iranian interference in Bahrains internalaffairs. This is not the rst time that Iranian claims on

Bahrain have collided with a desire for political inte-gration: Iran opposed Bahrains attempts to join theTrucial States Federation in the early 1970s, and thensuccessfully opposed Bahrains accession to the UAEfederationin both cases because of the view thatBahrain is properly Iranian territory.41

The UAE have not relinquished their claims onthree islands(Abu Musa and the Tunbs) that were an-nexed by Iran in 1971, following the British departure,and have continued to reassert their claim to them atUnited Nations (UN) meetings ever since. The Iranianargument is that these islands had belonged to Iranbefore falling into the hands of the Arab Sheikhs of RasAl-Khaima and Sharjah with the help of Britain.42 TheUAE government stance has not changed, maintain-

ing a call on the Iranian authorities to either negotiatebilaterally or refer their dispute to the InternationalCourt of Justice. Iran is disinclined to negotiate overthe sovereignty of the three islands.


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Maritime delimitation between Kuwait and SaudiArabia also remains a pending issue. The disputed

maritime territory is rich in hydrocarbon resources,which increases its geopolitical importance. TheArash, also known as al-Dorra, an offshore gas eldshared between Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, isbelieved to possess substantial reserves estimated at200 billion cubic meters. In addition to the potentialnatural resources, extending the territorial water ofIran means maximizing its powers as a coastal statein a vital sea passage, as vessels departing the regionwould have to report to the Iranian authorities. Iranwould acquire more powers to apply its environmen-tal laws and restrict the movement of external militaryforces. In recent months, the dispute over maritimespace and the joint eld resurfaced when Iran an-nounced in January 2012 its intentions to unilaterally

develop the al-Dorra eld. Given the need to increasegas production, all three countries are keen to developthe joint-eld as soon as possible. But the possibility ofjoint exploration and development depends rst uponthe demarcation of maritime borders and furthermoreon the regional political situation.

For all these factors listed above, Arab Gulf-Iranian relations have experienced many instances oftensions and hostilities over at least the last 5 decades.Not surprisingly, these tensions may intensify in theimmediate future.

The Iranian ThreatNuclear Issues and Blockade.

Irans aspiration to develop a nuclear capability

is an additional specic issue that adds to tensions inthe region. Concerns about real Iranian nuclear planshave alarmed the GCC states and Western powers.


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Despite Irans continuous assertion that its aim is todevelop civilian nuclear capability, GCC governments

remain skeptical about its genuine goal. Irans obscureattitude on the nuclear issue only reinforces anxietyamong the Arab countries and across the world. Of-cial statements suggest that the GCC leaders haveopted for a conciliatory approach on Irans nuclearissue. In December 2011, Dubais ruler and the UAEPrime Minister Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, in an interview with CNN, played downfears over Irans plans to develop nuclear weapons.He said that Iran is a Muslim country, and [W]ehave lived next to each other for thousands and thou-sands of years. I dont believe that Iran will develop anuclear weapon. Public opinion on the issue amongGCC leaders is almost unanimous. Their core messageis a desire to curtail Irans nuclear program in a peace-

ful way. They call on the international community touse dialogue and diplomacy, not military strikes, tohandle the issue. Their views are well-presented in aGCC Secretariat General statement that followed theGCC Supreme Council meeting in 2009. The state-ment reiterates the aim of the GCC leaders to have anuclear-free region, and further reads that:

The Supreme Council hailed international effortsaimed at solving the Iranian nuclear crisis throughdiplomatic means, and expressed hope that all con-cerned sides would reach a political settlement thatwould eliminate the fears and doubts on the nature ofthis dossier, [and] bring about peace and stability inthe region.43

However, although GCC ofcials are overtly lessconfrontational on the Iranian nuclear program com-pared to Israel and Western powers, they remain


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concerned about the repercussions of a nuclear Iran.The statements of semi-ofcials may be an indica-

tion of GCC countries private views on the issue.The Saudi Prince Turki Al-Faisal, who leads the KingFaisal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies, hasfrequently commented on the issue since he left hispost as Ambassador to Washington. In January 2012,Turki Al-Faisal warned the world that any failure tostop Iran from developing nuclear weapons couldlead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, whichwould make a volatile region even worse. Given anuclear Iran, countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq,and Algeria among others would prefer to possesstheir own nuclear capabilities as a deterrent againsttheir neighbor.44 In 2008, Sami Al-Faraj, director ofthe Kuwait Centre for Strategy Studies and a formergovernment advisor, expressed support for an Israeli

attack on Irans nuclear facilities.45

A nuclear-armedIran would have enduring ramications for the stabil-ity of the GCC political regimes and balance of powerin the entire Middle East. But support for the use offorce against Iran by Western or Israeli forces on thepart of actual GCC leaders is likely to be tempered bythe likelihood of Iranian reprisals against U.S. militaryand other facilities in their own countries, with thestrong likelihood of collateral damage.

Another example that encapsulates the diplomaticdissimulation practiced by some GCC regimes towardIran is a public statement by a senior UAE diplomat in2010 that provoked a row between Iran and the UAE.Youssed Al-Otaiba, the UAE Ambassador in Wash-ington, was quoted in a conference suggesting that a

preemptive military strike on Irans nuclear facilitieswould be cheaper than living with a nuclear Iran inthe future. The UAE Foreign Ministry reacted imme-


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diately asserting that the UAE governments stanceremains unchanged, supporting a peaceful solution to

the Iran nuclear issue.46

With the nuclear question notfeaturing in talks between GCC countries and Iran, itwould appear that the GCC leaders have left the issueto other members of the international community todeal with.

Irans secrecy and lack of constructive engagementwith the international community have failed to fostercondence over its intentions. A report by the Inter-national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2011 raisedconcerns that undisclosed Iranian nuclear activitiessuggest that Iran is developing the technologies toacquire nuclear weapons.47 The report supported thewidely-held view that Iran is deceiving the interna-tional community about its nuclear plans.

Less dramatically, but potentially of equal signi-

cance, Iranian threats to disrupt free passage throughthe Strait of Hormuz have intensied over the lastfew years. With most of the regions oil and liqui-ed natural gas (LNG) exports passing through theStrait, the threats aim to pressure both the Arab Gulfcountries, and the major economies that import theirenergy from the region. In fact, over one-third of allpetroleum traded by sea globally passes through theStrait.48 Any blockade of the Strait of Hormuz wouldconstitute a serious threat to the GCC economy andstability, not only because of oil exports, but becausethe region also depends on imports of food, and anyobstruction of shipments could rapidly lead to severefood shortages and internal instability.


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IranGCC Policy.

The GCC countries have no unied foreign policytoward Iran, despite their common anxiety about theIranian aspirations for regional hegemony. There aredifferent foreign policy stances. Saudi Arabia has fol-lowed a confrontational policy toward Iran, at leastsince the 1979 Islamic revolutions, when the late Aya-tollah Khomeini had been hostile toward the Saudiruling family, publicly inciting Saudis to overthrowthe Al-Saudi family. The hegemonic competition overinuence in the Arab world is another explanation forSaudi Arabias confrontational stance; both countrieshave been engaged in proxy conicts in Lebanon,Iraq, and currently Syria. Bahrains relationship withIran suffers from enduring tensions as a result of theIranian sovereignty claims on Bahrain. Relations were

also further damaged by Irans continuing commen-tary on Bahrains Shia situation, which is perceivedby the Bahraini regime as interference in its internalaffairs. Other GCC small countries have opted fora pragmatic approach in their relations with Iran,with foreign policies driven by national interestsrather than by any ideology or hegemonic ambitions.Unresolved territorial disputes have not stopped UAEand Qatar from maintaining good economic relationswith Iran.

Oman in particular follows a different approach inits relations with Iran, attaching great importance tostabilizing and strengthening ties. Positive relationsbetween the two countries pre-date Irans 1979 revo-lution, with Sultan Qaboos expressing gratitude for

the military support of Iran (along with Britain) dur-ing the Dhofar war in the mid-1970s.49 Omans foreignpolicy vis--vis Iran is driven by its national interests


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and by no means follows the stance of Saudi Arabiaor any other powers. The fundamental assumptions

driving this stance are that rst, Oman does not sharethe hegemonic ambitions of Saudi Arabia, and second,Oman sees Iran as a natural security and economicpartner because of its geographic proximity and eco-nomic size. The fact that both states are littoral coun-tries to the Strait of Hormuz naturally gives rise tocommon interests in regional security cooperation.

Over the years, both countries have invested indeveloping their relations in all sectors, and during avisit to Tehran in 2009, Sultan Qaboos signed a num-ber of economic and security agreements. Iran is animportant trade partner for Oman50in 2011, Iran wasthe third largest importer of Omani exports.51 Bilateralrelations extend into strategically signicant spheres.Under an agreement signed in August 2012, Oman

plans to import natural gas from Iran to meet its grow-ing demand. The two countries hold regular militarymeetings and exercises, and Oman has committed torefuse to engage in military alliances against Iran. InFebruary 2012, the Omani-Iranian Military Commit-tee convened its tenth meeting to discuss regionalsecurity and cooperation.52 Another example of thehealthy state of relations is the Oman Foreign Min-istry handling consular issues for the closed Iranianembassy in London.53

It is important to note that these differences inforeign policy across the GCC toward Iran show abalance between tactical priorities and a desire toprotect the regions territorial integrity and long-terminterests. A failure to back the Saudi approach in deal-

ing with Iran may not be well received in Riyadh,but has not been a cause of any public rift, so far,among ofcials.


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GCC Stability: Implications for the United States.

The GCCs geographic location, hydrocarbon, andnancial wealth are and will remain of great strategicimportance to U.S. interests and security. The GCCcountries have abundant oil and natural gas reservesthat are of great importance to U.S. economic pros-perity and security. Continuing high oil prices foralmost a decade now have allowed GCC states to ac-cumulate in aggregate almost U.S.$1 trillion in foreigncurrency reserves.

The United States has been the main guarantorof stability and security in the Gulf region since theearly 1970s, following the withdrawal of the Britishfrom east of Suez. During this period, a number ofGCC countries have established security cooperation

agreements with the United States, leading to basingrights for Army and other U.S. military units. In addi-tion to basing and transit, U.S. forces regularly carryout joint exercises with and offer training to GCCmilitary forces. To counter the increasing challengesposed by Iran in the region, the U.S. Army is plan-ning to strengthen its presence in Kuwait and deploymore ground forces there and potentially to otherGCC member countries.54 These bilateral security tiesbetween the region and the United States are to be thesubject of a further monograph to be published by theStrategic Studies Institute in 2013.

Undoubtedly, potential Iranian dominance in theregion is a threat to U.S. national interests in the GCCarea and the remainder of the Middle East. The cur-

rent Iranian regime aspires to extend its inuence bothwithin the region and beyond. Irans threats emanatefrom its ideological beliefs, which not only contradict


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but also aim to undermine U.S. values and interests inthe region and beyond. Iranian revolutionary clerics

have openly asserted their objective of extending theIslamic revolution throughout the Middle East andNorth African region as well as to counter perceivedAmerican imperialism around the world.

U.S. interests are best preserved by a balance be-tween different power centers amongst GCC statesand in the wider Middle East. A monopoly of ex-cessive power by any one country would not be adesirable outcome. The rise of a sole regional powercould risk the regions stability and consequently U.S.national interests. The United States and Western al-lies should aim to prevent the fall of the regions oiland gas reserves under the inuence of any singlehegemonic power.

The two key benets for the United States for

peace and stability in the region are the security ofenergy supply and freedom of movement for the U.S.military. From an oil market perspective, the sparecapacity of GCC major oil producers, Saudi Arabia,Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi, is critical for world oil sup-plies and prices. During the Libyan civil war in 2011, itwas the increased output of three GCC countries thatcompensated for Libyas disrupted production. TheStrait of Hormuz is vital both for the GCC and for theworld economy, with 90 percent of Middle Eastern oiland LNG exports passing through the Straits. Free-dom of movement and an unchallenged presence inthe region are key for a range of ongoing tasks for theU.S. Army and other services. Sudden regime changecould occur in any GCC state due to internal political

turmoil, and this could replace current regimes sup-portive of U.S. presence with a far less well-disposedenvironment. An unexpected shift in support from


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the GCC states could increase the cost of presence andpotentially limit options for supply and transport in

and out of the U.S. militarys theater of operations aslogistical plans are forming for post-2014 withdrawalof U.S. combat troops from Afghanistan. In a worstcase scenario, political instability leading to suddenregime change to an unfriendly or even hostile regimecould cause severe disruption in U.S. plans for widescale drawdown of U.S. troops and equipment, oreven potentially pose a new and direct challenge tothe U.S. military in the Gulf.

U.S. policymakers should therefore consider theimplications and options listed below for fosteringcontinued stability in the region and preemptinginternal and international developments that couldthreaten the current balance of power.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS ANDRECOMMENDATIONS

There are several policy implications and recom-mendations that proceed from this analysis.

The Arab Spring has brought fundamentalchanges to the GCC geostrategic landscape.The transformation is still unfolding, and thestrategic consequences for GCC societies andregimes could be far reaching. This in turn hasimportant implications for regional stabilityand hence for key U.S. interests in GCC states.

Political volatility, including that caused by theSunni-Shia divide, affects support for U.S. in-terests and presence in the region.

The U.S. Army requires freedom of movementin the Gulf for a range of purposes, includ-ing logistical support to deployed forces, asa primary training and forward deployment


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hub, and to support withdrawal from Iraqand Afghanistan.

The option of use of the GCC region for reversetransit from Afghanistan both before and after2014 is especially important for reducing reli-ance on the Northern Distribution Network(NDN), including for the withdrawal of sensi-tive cargoes, which it would be inappropriateto ship by ground transport through CentralAsia and Russia. Loss of freedom of movementin the GCC area would render the withdrawalprocess hostage to political goodwill in NDNtransit countries.

In light of increased tensions and threats to thestability of the region, the U.S. Army should in-crease its training programs to strengthen andmodernize the kinetic capabilities of the GCC

militaries. These training undertakings arenot one-sided; frequent contacts with GCC of-cers strengthen communication between U.S.and local Army forces. The U.S. Army couldalso share essential nonkinetic skills with theircounterparts in the GCC countries, in particularto strengthen their capabilities in dealing withchemical, biological, and nuclear containments.

Political change toward more participatory de-mocracy and accountability in the region is anirreversible process. The GCC regimes shouldbe encouraged to adopt substantial changes totheir political systems as a whole, rather thanlimit themselves to topical or cosmetic changesfor populist effect, in order to avoid the danger

of mass upheavals and an uncontrolled transi-tion of power that risks the arrival of an unpre-dictable successor regime unfriendly to U.S.interests and presence.


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Maintaining U.S. presence across the region iscrucial not only to U.S. interests there, but also

for the GCC states themselves. U.S. presencenot only guarantees the security of GCC statesagainst external threats such as Iran or otherglobal emerging powers, but also provideseach small GCC state with protection againstSaudi hegemonic ambitions in the region.Shared U.S. and GCC interests in an enduringU.S. presence provides the United States notonly with a range of strategic options for assur-ing U.S. interests in the region, but also withthe additional benet of exibility and leveragein relations with individual GCC states in theinterests of maintaining strategic balance andgood relations.

CONCLUSION

As time passes, calls for participatory governanceand greater transparency will increase and spreadamong broad segments of the GCC societies, includ-ing the small prosperous Gulf monarchies. There area number of intertwined factors that serve as sign-posts toward this socio-political development. First,increased education and political awareness amongthe populationparticularly the youth, the growingnumbers of whom have attended Western universi-ties, mainly in Anglo-Saxon societies, and thus havebeen exposed to the democratic values and institutionsof Western societies. Although this does not mean thatthey will become militant for political change in their

own societies immediately, this is knowledge and ex-perience that will shape their thinking and politicalaspirations. Second, the wave of political transforma-


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tion that is sweeping across the region has been farfrom unnoticed in the GCC societies. Once the politi-

cal transitions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have crys-tallized into dened, institutionalized, and function-ing models, the way will be shown for GCC states andsocieties to follow suit.

ENDNOTES

1. Formally the Cooperation Council for the Arab States

of the Gulf (CCASG), comprised of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Jordan and Morocco are underconsideration as potential members.

2. ASDAA Burson-Marsteller, Third Annual ASDAABurson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey, March 15, 2011, avail-able from www.arabyouthsurvey.com/2010/les/AYS2010_Top_10_Findings_Top_5_Findings_2011.pdf.

3. Jane Kinninmont, Bahrain: Beyond the Impasse,Chatham house, June 2012, available fromwww.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/les/public/Research/Middle%20East/pr0612kinninmont.pdf.

4. Omanis Protest in Sign of Renewed Discontent, GulfNews, July 2, 2012, available from gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/omanis-protest-in-sign-of-renewed-discontent-1.1043396.

5. Oman: Waking up Too, The Economist, June 23, 2012,

available from www.economist.com/node/21557354.

6. Madawi Al-Rasheed, No Saudi Spring: Anatomy of aFailed Revolution, Boston Review, March/April 2012, availablefrom www.bostonreview.net/BR37.2/madawi_al-rasheed_arab_spring_saudi_arabia.php.

7. Ulrike Freitag, Saudi Arabia: Buying Stability? MurielAsseburg, ed., Protest, Revolt, and Regime Change in the Arab World:

Actors, Challenges, Implications, and Policy Options, SWP ResearchPaper, Berlin, Germany: German Institute of International and Se-curity Affairs, February 2012, available from www.swp-berlin.org/leadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2012_RP06_ass.pdf.


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8. James Calderwood, Kuwait Gives each Citizen DH13,000 and Free Food, The National, January 18, 2011, availablefrom www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/kuwait-gives-each-citizen-dh13-000-and-free-food.

9. Madawi Al-Rasheed, Mashrua Thadith al-hukm al-saaudi (Project of Reforming the Saudi Government),Al-Mustakbal Al-Arabi Magazine, No. 368, October 2009,pp. 102-133.

10. Ana Echague, Saudi Arabia: Supply-Side Reform?FRIDE, Policy Brief No. 15, July 2009.

11. Rashed Aba-Namay, The Recent Constitutional Reformsin Saudi Arabia, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly,Vol. 42, No. 2, April 1993, pp. 295-331.

12. Rashed Aba-Namay, The New Saudi Representative As-sembly, Islamic Law and Society, Vol. 5, Issue 2, 1998, pp. 235-265.

13. Mourad Haroutunian, Saudi Prince Says Protests MayMove to the Kingdom, BBC Arabic Says, Bloomberg, February 18,2011, available from www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-18/saudi-prince-says-protests-may-move-to-kingdom-bbc-arabic-says.html.

14. Cahal Milmo, The Acton Princess Calling for Reform inSaudi Arabia, The Independent, January 30, 2012, available fromwww.independent.co.uk/news/people/news/the-acton-princess-calling-for-reform-in-saudi-arabia-6284225.html.

15. Ahmad Adnan, Adawla Al-saudiya: malamih al-daw-la al-rabiaa (The Saudi State: Features of the Fourth State),Beirut, Lebanon: Altanweer Press, 2012, pp. 10-16.

16. Reza H. Akbari, Bahrains Triangle of Conict, ForeignPolicy, May 17, 2012, available from mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/17/bahrains_triangle_of_conict.

17. Roula Khalaf, West Urged to Back Change in Bahrain, TheFinancial Times, December 13, 2011, available from www.ft.com/cms/s/0/45bef9d2-2595-11e1-9c76-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1kH189PLn.


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18. Angela Shah, Emirates Step-up Efforts to Counter Dis-sent, The New York Times, May 30, 2012, available from www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/world/middleeast/united-arab-emirates-step-up-efforts-to-counter-dissent.html.

19. Jay B. Hilotin, FNC Members Seek Penalties for FloutingDress Code, Gulf News, June 14, 2012, available from gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/fnc-member-seeks-penalties-for-flouting-dress-code-1.1035715.

20. An interview conducted by the author in London, UK, onJuly 10, 2012.

21. Mohammed Aaz Al-Aarab, Intikhabat al-majlis al-wataniwa al-Islah al-siyasi al-imarat (Election in the Na-tional Council and Political Reform in the Emirates), Al-AhramDigital, November 2011, available from digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=858878&eid=7887.

22. Abdulkhaleq Abdullah, Repercussions of the ArabSpring on GCC States, Research Paper, Arab Centre for Researchand Policy Studies, May 2012.

23. Mohamed Laghrous, Hiwarmaa Shaykh sultan al-kas-simi, raisjamiyat al-islahwa al-tawjih al-ijtimaI (Interviewwith Sheikh Sultan Al-Qassimi, Chairman of Reform and SocialGuidance), Attawhidwal-Islah Movement, available from alislah.ma/2009-10-07-11-53-04/item/21727.html.

24.Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conicts within Islam WillShape the Future, London, UK: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007,pp. 92-93.

25. Human Rights Watch, Denied Dignity: SystematicDiscrimination and Hostility toward Saudi Shia Citizens,September 2009, pp. 10-12.

26. Toby Jones, Saudi Arabia Assaf Moghadam, ed., Politi-cal Violence: Militancy and Political Violence in Shiism: Trends andPatterns, Florence, KY: Routledge, 2011, p. 136.

27. Nasr, p. 24.


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28. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

29. Abeer Allam, Death Highlights Saudi SuccessionProblem, The Financial Times, June 17, 2012, available fromwww.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c6dba82e-b86d-11e1-a2d6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz25LNBb8ua.

30. The Saudi Succession: When Kings and Princes GrowOld, The Economist, July 15, 2010, available from www.economist.com/node/16588422.

31. Simeon Kerr, Rival in Ras al-Khaimah Throne LeavesEmirate, The Financial Times, October 28, 2010, available fromwww.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/52ca6982-e2c4-11df-8a58-00144feabdc0.html#axzz25LNBb8ua.

32. Mahjoob Zweiri, Arab-Iranian Relations: New Reali-ties? Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, eds., IransForeign policy: From Khatami to Ahmadinejad, Reading, UK: IthacaPress, 2008, pp. 116-117.

33. Mahboubeh Sadeghini, Security Arrangements in thePersian Gulf: With Special Reference to Irans Foreign Policy, Reading,UK: Ithaca Press, 2011, pp. 200-201.

34. Sadeghini, p. 203.

35. Al-Saud, Faisal bin Salman, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf:Power Politics in Transition, London, UK: I. B. Tauris, 2004.

36. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, International Politics of thePersian Gulf: a Cultural Genealogy, Florence, KY: Routledge, 2006,pp. 16-17.

37. Faisal Bin Slaman al-Saud, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and theGulf: Power Politics in Transition, London, UK: I. B. Tauris, 2004,pp. 32-33.

38. Joseph A. Kechichian, Iran has no Claim to Bahrain,Gulf News, July 25, 2007, available from gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/iran-has-no-claim-to-bahrain-1.191112.


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39. Sherine Bahaa, Is Bahrain Another Kuwait? Al-AhramWeekly, Issue No. 936, March 4, 2009, available from weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/936/re62.htm.

40. Habib Toumi, Bahrain Condemns Irans Interferencein its Domestic Affairs, Gulf News, May 16, 2012, availablefrom gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/bahrain-condemns-iran-s-inter-ference-in-its-domestic-affairs-1.1023774.

41. Miriam Joyce, Ruling Shaikhs and Her Majestys Government,1960-1969: Britains Last Decade in the Gulf, the 1960s, London, UK:Frank Cass Publishers, 2003, pp. 117-119.

42. Ahmad Jalinusi and Vahid Barari Arayee, The ThreeIslands: (Abu Musa, The Greater & Lesser Tunb Islands) IntegralParts of Iran, The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XIX,No. 4, Fall 2007, pp. 1-23.

43. Gulf Cooperation Council Secretariat General, TheFinal Communique of the 30th Session, December 14-15,2009, available from www.gcc-sg.org/eng/indexce7c.html?action=Sec-Show&ID=303.

44. Claire Ferris-Lay, Saudi Prince Warns of Middle EastNuclear Arms Race,Arabian Business, January 26, 2012, availablefrom www.arabianbusiness.com/saudi-prince-warns-of-middle-east-nuclear-arms-race-442448.html.

45. Associated Press, Kuwait Analyst for Destruction ofIran N-Plant, Saudi Gazette, March 10, 2008, available fromwww.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20080310295.

46. Ian Black, UAE Ambassador Backs Strikes on IransNuclear Sites, The Guardian, July 7, 2010, available from www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/07/uae-envoy-iran-nuclear-sites.

47. Anthony H. Cordesman, The New IAEA Report andIrans Evolving Nuclear and Missile Forces, Washington, DC:Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 8, 2011,available from csis.org/les/publication/111108_irans_evolving_nuclear_forces.pdf.


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48. Strait of Hormuz World Oil Transit Chokepoints, U.S.Energy Information Administration. December 30, 2011, availablefrom www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?ps=WOTC#hormuz.

49. Al-Qabas, Limadatanfaridu Oman bitaamulmaa IranbiKhila Shakikatiha? (Why Omans unique dealing with Iranis different from its Sisters?), October 26, 2010, available fromwww.gulfsecurity.org/?p=4495. See also MERIP, New IranianOffensive in Oman,MERIP Reports, No. 43, 1975, p. 23.

50. Mohamed Abdulla Mohamed, Umanwa Iran BaadZiyarat Jalalat al-sultan (Oman and Iran After the Visit of HisMajesty the Sultan),Alwasat, No. 2530, August 10, 2009, availablefrom www.alwasatnews.com/2530/news/read/208068/1.html.

51. Central Bank of Oman, Annual Report 2011, June 2011,p. 98, available from www.cbo-oman.org/.

52. Iran-Oman Military Committee Meeting Wraps up:Joint Drills in the Winter., Iran Daily, May 16, 2012, availablefrom www.iran-daily.com/1391/2/27/MainPaper/4234/Page/2/MainPaper_4234_2.pdf.

53. Nasser Krimi, Iran: Tehran and London Agree to Repre-sentation, Bloomberg Businessweek, June 28, 2012, available fromwww.businessweek.com/ap/2012-06-28/iran-tehran-and-london-for-malize-embassy-closures.

54. Donna Cassata, U.S. Plans Signicant Military Presencein Kuwait, The Washington Post, June 19, 2012, available fromwww.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jun/19/us-plans-significant-military-presence-kuwait/.


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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo IIICommandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTEand

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

DirectorProfessor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of ResearchDr. Steven K. Metz

AuthorDr. Mohammed El-Katiri

Editor for ProductionDr. James G. Pierce

Publications AssistantMs. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil


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The Future of the Arab Gulf Monarchies in the Age of Uncertainties

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Transcript of The Future of the Arab Gulf Monarchies in the Age of Uncertainties