Green Economy Policy in Japan: After East Japan Disaster and Fukushima Nuclear Accident
The Future of Nuclear Power in Japan(3/2014)
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Transcript of The Future of Nuclear Power in Japan(3/2014)
The Japan TimesTuesday, March 11, 2014
3/11, Three Years On: Death toll: 15,884 people from 20 of Japan’s 47
prefectures. A total of 2,636 people from the three hardest-hit
prefectures (Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima) remain officially unaccounted for.
Over 300 people have been officially recognized as having died from post-disaster related stress or other causes.
About 267,000 people remain evacuated in 1,200 cities, towns and villages nationwide. About 97,000 from the above three prefectures continue to live in temporary housing.
Japan’s Post-Fukushima Energy
Policy
Eric JohnstonDeputy Editor, The Japan Times
A Nuclear Past or a Non-
Nuclear
Future?
Characteristics of Japanese Energy
1. Japan imports 90 percent of energy needs.
2. Due to geopolitical problems, limited amount of nearby Russian oil and LNG comes to Japan.
3. Much Oil and LNG is imported from Africa, Middle East, Southeast Asia, and coal comes from Australia. Huge transportation costs and, in the case of oil, political uncertainties, add to the price.
4. U.S. is exporting shale gas in small quantities to Japan, which will increase in coming years. But political issues in US Congress are creating uncertainty of supply. Alaska wants Japan to help build an LNG pipeline.
JAPAN’S ENERGY MIX
2009 2010 2011 20120
20
40
60
80
100
120
RenewablesHydroOilLNGCoalNuclear
29.3 28.6
10.7
1.7
24.9 25.0
25.0
27.6
29.3 29.3
39.5
42.5
7.1 7.5
14.4 18.3
8.5 9.0 8.4
1.1 1.1 1.4 1.6
8.3
Figures for Electricity Sources (%)
Electricity Prices For Fossil Fuels (yen/kWh)
Coal Oil LNG Nuclear0
5
10
15
20
25
20122013
5 yen
20 yen
11 yen
13 yen
1 yen
4 yen
16 yen
Nuclear Pre 3/11 Before March 11, 2011, there were 54
commercial nuclear reactors in Japan. Each reactor generated between 540
megawatts electricity (MWe) and 1.3 gigawatts (GWe).
1,000 megawatts = 1 gigawatt.
The four Fukushima Dai-Ichi reactors that were damaged had a total capacity of about 2.7 GW. Officially, there are now 50 reactors but the other two undamaged reactors at Fukushima Dai-Ichi (about 1.8 GW) will be scrapped.
Also, four undamaged reactors at Fukushima Dai-Ni (4.4 GW). Politically impossible to restart.
Why Did Japan
Go Nuclear in the first place?
A Brief (very brief) History
The End of WWII and the Occupation
Japan went to war at least partially to secure oil and gas reserves for its growing domestic industries. The dream of being ``self-sufficient’’ in energy production had haunted the country since the late 1800s, after Japan opened to the outside world following two and a half centuries of isolation.
The U.S.-led Occupation of Japan (1945-1952) made the country a U.S. ally in the Pacific against communism. It also gave Japan access to fossil fuel sources from U.S. allies, but the independent energy dream never died.
1953: A Chance Meeting At Harvard
Yasuhiro Nakasone Henry Kissinger
Dec. 1953: Atoms For Peace
Concerned about other nations, allied or otherwise, pursuing their own nuclear technology programs, President Dwight Eisenhower announces in the United Nations the ``Atoms for Peace’’ program, the practical result being that the U.S. supplies nuclear knowhow and technology to friendly nations like Japan wanting it for ``peaceful purposes.’’
In March 1954, Nakasone manages to get the first-ever budget for nuclear research passed in parliament, - the beginning of Japan’s road to nuclear power.
Selling Nuclear To A Skeptical NationSHORIKI MATSUTARO
Yomiuri Shimbun owner, friend of Nakasone, convicted war criminal, CIA agent, and The Godfather of Japanese Pro Baseball and the Japanese Nuclear Power Industry
Zensaku Azuma``Japan’s Charles Lindbergh’’, extremely popular with the
public, promoted eating uranium-laced food, extolled nuclear power (and cigarettes), died of cancer.
The Three Electricity Laws: Payoffs to the Provinces
By the early 1970s, Japan had built its first commercial nuclear reactors using American, British, and French technology and knowhow. But as the dangers of nuclear power, and concerns about nuclear weapons, grew, and following the 1973 Middle East oil shock, Japan’s leaders realized that in order to overcome antinuclear sentiment and build more plants, local governments where the power plants were located needed to be financially compensated.In the mid-1970s, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s government passed three new laws that provided funding to any locality that agreed to host a nuclear power plant. Thus was born the ``nuclear power village’’ of national government officials, utilities, and local governments and businesses that we know today.
How Much Official Funding Do Local Governments Get?
Model Case: Construction of a 1.35GW nuclear power
plant.Assumptions (1) Environmental Impact Study takes three years(2) Construction takes seven years(3) Plant Operates for 40 yearsOver a 45 year period from beginning of environmental assessment to the 35 th year of the plant’s operation, the local government hosting a plant can receive
121.5 billion yen, or almost 1.2 billion dollars under the Electricity Laws. This does not include additional donations from the utility or other official forms of assistance.
TOTAL AMOUNT A LOCAL TOWN OR VILLAGE RECEIVES FOR HOSTING A NUCLEAR
POWER PLANT: Nobody Really Knows.
Ye Olde Nuclear Village
For over four decades, the nuclear power village has kept opposition to nuclear power at bay. Three years after 3/11, though, a powerful struggle between the powerful village and renewable energy proponents, and the Japanese public, has threatened the village as never before.
RENEWABLE ENERGY: Talkin’ `bout a
Revolution!
Post-3/11 Developments
X
The Nuclear Village Under Seige
In the months after 3/11, polls showed that up to 90 percent of Japanese wanted out of nuclear power.
Seizing the opportunity, renewable energy advocates pushed hard to win political and financial support. For months, the nuclear village was under attack by the media, politicians, and the public at large as the nation asked itself fundamental questions about why it had embraced nuclear to begin with, and how it could move out of nuclear power and into renewables.
Renewable Energy advocates pushed hard for a Feed-In Tariff after 3/11. The (then) ruling Democratic Party of Japan favored the FIT, especially Prime Minister Naoto Kan. It was
strongly opposed by the Nuclear Power Village but passed at the end of August, 2011– the day
Kan resigned over his handling of 3/11. The new tariff went into effect on July 1st, 2012:
The New Tariff means businesses in five different renewable energy industries can sell their power at a guaranteed fixed rate over a fixed period of time.
THE NEW FEED-IN TARIFFS
SOLAR POWER
Output Range ABOVE 10 KW BELOW 10KW
Basic Tariff (per
kilowatt/hour)(new rate as of 2014)
42 yen/kwH(37.5 yen/kWh)
42 yen/kwh(38 yen/kWh)
PERIOD 20 years 10 years
THE NEW FEED-IN TARIFFS
WIND POWER
Output Range ABOVE 20 KW BELOW 20KW
Basic Tariff (per
kilowatt/hour)
23.10 yen/kWh
57.75 yen/kWh
PERIOD 20 years
THE NEW FEED-IN TARIFFS
GEOTHERMAL POWER
Output Range ABOVE 15 KW BELOW 15KW
Basic Tariff (per
kilowatt/hour)
27.30 yen/kWh
42 yen/kWh
PERIOD 15 years
THE NEW FEED-IN TARIFFS
MINI-HYDRO
Output Range
1mW-30mW 200kW-1mW Under 200kW
Basic Tariff(per kilowatt
hour)
25.20 yen/kwH
30.45 yen/kWh
35.70 yen/kWh
PERIOD 20 years
THE NEW FEED-IN TARIFFS
BIOMASSSector Methane Gas Unused
Wood Products
General Wood
Waste-related Biomass
Recycled Wood Product
s
Type Sewer Sludge Gas
Household
Waste
Unused Wood Products
General Wood
Solid General Waste
Solid Sludge
“
BasicTariff(per kwH)
40.95 yen 33.60 yen
25.20 yen
17.85 yen 13.65 yen
Period 20 years
RENEWABLE ENERGY TYPE
Before FIT
After July 2012 FIT (as of Dec. 1st 2013)
Amount before July 2012
July 2012-March 2013
April-November 2013
SOLAR (residential) 4.7 GW 969,000 kW 953,000 kW
SOLAR (Non-residential) 0.9 GW 704,000 kW 3,632,000 kW
WIND 2.6 GW 63,000 kW 9,000 kWMINI-HYDRO 9.6 GW 2,000 kW 3,000 kWBIOMASS 2.3 GW 30,000 kW 88,000 kWGEOTHERMAL 0.5 GW 1,000 kW 0TOTAL 20.6 GW1,768,000 kW 4,685,000 kW
6,450 million kW OR 6. 45GW
The Current Situation with Renewable EnergyTOTAL RENEWABLE ENERGY CAPACITY AS OF Dec. 1st, 2013Solar (residential) 6.62GWSolar (non-residential) 5.23 GWWind 2.67 GWMini-Hydro 9.60 GWBiomass 2.41 GWGeothermal 0.50 GWTOTAL : About 27 GW
The Good News: Photovoltaic (Solar)
SystemsAccording to the Yano Research Institute, thanks to the 2012 Feed In Tariff, Japan will rank first in the world in terms of installed Solar PV power generation by April 1st, 2014.
Japan’s market for PV system in 2012 was worth 1.32 trillion yen, or nearly 13.5 billion dollars – an 80 percent increase over 2011.
Residential PV systems (rooftop solar panels, etc.) account for about 80 percent of total installed PV systems.
Unofficial estimate of how
much power solar energy could ``feasibly’’ generate:
100-150GW
The Good News: Offshore Wind Power
A 2 megawatt offshore wind power facility was built off the coast of Fukushima prefecture, almost within site of the crippled nuclear power plant.
Operation commenced in November 2013. This will be followed by two 7 MW offshore wind turbines, which will be installed by next March.
Studies show Fukushima and Japanese coastal areas are ideal for offshore wind farms. No concerns about noise complaints, and there is a wider area of potential establishment than land-based wind farms, which means they can be located closer to the grid.
Japan’s potential offshore
wind power capacity: 1,600GW
But It’s Not All Good News
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES TO REALIZING A RENEWABLE FUTURE
CHALLENGE A: The Grid System
Grids to Major Urban Centers (electricity users) are located far away from rural locations best suited for renewable energy projects, particularly large-scale solar farms and wind farms.
Japan is divided into 60 Hz grids (for western Japan) and 50 Hz grids (for eastern and northern Japan), meaning one nationwide renewable grid is not commercially feasible.
CHALLENGE A: The Grid System
CHALLENGE B: Regional Utility
Monopoly System 10 major utilities largely control the generation,
distribution, and sale of electric power in Japan. They set prices in general agreement with each other, and new players to the energy market have to deal with them if they want to get connected to a piece of the national grid.
Utilities, at present, have nearly total control over which electricity generation sources they send down to the grid to customers, and their motto is always the same, ``Safe, Stable, and Secure’’ electricity supply, at a fixed price.
CHALLENGE B: Regional Utility Monopoly System
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES: SOLAR POWER
Rapidly improving solar technologies makes Japan’s highly conservative electricity industry cautious about installing solar power technology now that will be out of date in one or two years.
Worries about securing a ``safe and stable’’ electricity supply during cloudy nights, at night, etc.
Battle between Large Solar Farm proponents and Small Solar Products/Residential Area proponents over direction of industry.
Nuclear lobby’s anti-solar campaign (``nobody wants solar farms in their backyard’’, ``it’s still too expensive’’ is working.
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES: WIND POWER
FIT needs to be based on wind conditions and location, not a fixed amount of power generation for all locations.Noise: Local communities complain about loud windmillsBirds: Bird strikes and migratory patterns mean strict environmental regulations on wind farm development in places like the area in and around the Kushiro Wetlands. Remoteness: Best Locations for On-Shore windmills often located far from urban centers, necessitating expensive grid connections.
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES: GEOTHERAL POWER
1) Vast majority of Japan’s geothermal resources are in National Park areas: Strict Environmental regulations.2) Many ideal geothermal locations on, or beside,, onsens (hot spring resorts) whose politically-connected owners oppose geothermal development for business reasons.3) Geothermal requires heavy initial investment. High cost to maintain and repair plants. 4) Public fears, aided by pro-nuclear propagandists, that geothermal drilling causes earthquakes.
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES: MINI- HYDRO POWER
Requires rivers and streams with regular flows of water at ideal speeds.
Strict gradation requirements often means construction work is needed, creating further environmental damage.
Remote areas of many ideal mini-hydro spots means increased costs to deliver generated electricity.
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES:
BIOMASS1) Bureaucratic turf wars in Japan means a regulatory nightmare, little cooperation between ministries (Environment, Forestry, Trade and Industry) to promote different biomass forms.
2) Opposition from both the pro-nuclear business lobby and from environmentalists who warn burning biomass for fuel will simply increase greenhouse gas emissions.
3) Lack of government and major corporate interest in biomass, compared to solar and wind.
GENERAL CHALLENGES TO GETTING OUT OF NUCLEAR AND INTO
RENEWABLE ENERGY:
1) Outdated Structure of Established Anti-Nuclear Groups.
a) Traditional anti-nuclear NGO leaders now well into their 60s, 70s, and 80s, and have been protesting for over four decades.
b) They often have limited understanding of, or interest in, modern NGO leadership techniques, media and public outreach strategies, or broad-based public education of their cause.
2) Provincialism
Because anti-nuclear groups have traditionally been local community-based, they can be extremely provincial and suspicious of outsiders. Town A’s anti-nuclear groups don’t talk or care much about Town B’s anti-nuclear groups.
When cooperation occurs, it’s often at the ``let’s exchange information’’ level only, not at the political action level.
3) Group-ismSeniority, deferring to one’s elders, and group consensus cultural traits mean young people (i.e. those under 50 years of age) feel shut out by traditional anti-nuclear groups.
As a result, such groups played something of a secondary role in the mass public demonstrations against nuclear power after March 11, 2011.
4) Divisions Within Anti-Nuke Movement
Factionalism Within Anti-Nuclear Organizations Themselves: For decades, many of the groups in Japan seeking the abolishment of nuclear weapons were actually pro-nuclear power. Even today, most of the main groups that organize the yearly protests against nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki can be reluctant to come out strongly against nuclear power because their members work at utilities.
Problems With Renewable Energy Groups
Bottom Up Versus Top Down: Major NGOs and other organizations promoting renewable energy are Tokyo-based, and generally favor a top-down approach whereby the central government leads and local governments follow.
Local governments often favor a more decentralized, bottom-up approach (localized small-scale renewable energy projects with revised local ordinances to make them happen)
Problems With Renewable Energy
Groups
The Big Guys versus the New Players: Toshiba, Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Sharp, Sanyo, Toyota, Kyocera. . . these are just some of the huge Japanese firms making heavy investments in renewable energy technologies and massive projects. Clearly, the new FIT is tilted in their favor.
Thus, the kind of innovation from small and medium-sized firms like we see here in the U.S., as well as Canada, China, South Korea, India, and parts of Europe is not as high-profile. It’s occurring, but (mostly?) under the media radar.
Problems with Renewable Energy Groups
``Solar? Wind? Geothermal’’?
Competition And Factionalism Within The Renewable Energy Movement Creates Public Confusion and Doubt: Solar, wind, biomass and geothermal advocates lobby hard for their chosen energy source. But policy makers at the local and national levels want the ``best energy mix’’ that offers ``safe, stable, and secure’’ electricity generation.
WHICH combination of renewables meets this goal in the short to medium-term? Depends on who you talk to.
Problems with Renewable Energy
GroupsWeakness in Addressing
Specific Public Concerns about
Higher Electricity Bills for Individuals and Possible
Negative Effects on Industries Using Lots of
Electricity
HOWEVER. . .
FOR ALL OF THE PROBLEMS WITH
RENEWABLE ENERGY, THE PROBLEMS WITH A
RETURN TO NUCLEAR ARE MUCH GREATER
AGING REACTORS13 out of the remaining 50 reactors are now over 30 years old.
Four are at least 40 years old.
The life-span of Japan’s nuclear reactors is officially considered 40 years.
At the end of the 40 year cycle, the operator can apply for a 20 year extension and then another one, if needed, theoretically extending the life of a plant to 60 years.
Average Operability Rates for All Reactors 1987-2010
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
77.1
71.4 7072.7 73.8 74.2 75.4 76.6
80.2 80.8 80.3
84.2
80.181.7 80.5
73.4
59.7
68.971.9
69.9
60.7 60
65.767.3
%
系列 1
Since 2003, plants operating between 60-70%
AGING REACTORSPower Company Reactor
# of Years in Operation
(by Dec. 2014)
Kansai Electric
Mihama No. 1 43
Mihama No. 2 41
Takahama No. 1 39
Takahama No. 2 38
Mihama No.3 37
Oi No. 1 35
Oi No. 2 34
Kyushu Electric Genkai No. 1 38
Genkai No. 2 33
Shikoku Electric Ikata No. 1 36
Ikata No. 2 33
Chugoku Electric Shimane No. 1 40Nihon GenshiryokHatsuden Tsuruga No. 1 44
PROBLEM NUMBER TWO:
SPENT FUEL POOLS ALMOST FULL:
``Building a nuclear power plant is like building a house without a toilet.’’
Once nuclear fuel is burned, the resulting spent fuel waste is removed from the reactor and stored in cooling
pools.
But. ..
NUMBER OF YEARS AFTER RESTART UNTIL SPENT FUEL
POOLS ARE FULL
NAME OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND REACTORS
LESS THAN SIX YEARS REMAINING UNTIL
FULL
(33 of 50 reactors)
Tomari No. 1, 2 (Hokkaido); Onogawa No. 1, 2 (Miyagi)
Fukushima Daichi 1 No. 5, 6; Fukushima Daini, No. 1-4Kashiwazaki-Karuiwa No. 1-7 (Tepco)
Hamaoka No. 3,4 (Chubu),Mihama No. 1, 2; Oi 1, 2; Takahama 1, 2 (Kepco)
Shimane No. 1, Ikata No. 1,2 (Shikoku)Genkai No. 1-4 (Kyushu)
BETWEEN SIX AND TWELVE YEARS
REMAINING UNTIL FULL
(14 of 50 reactors)
Higashidori (Aomori)Onogawa No. 3 (Miyagi)Tsuruga No. 1,2 (Fukui)
Hamaoka No. 5 (Shizuoka)Shiga No. 1,2 (Ishikawa)
Mihama No. 3 (Fukui)Oi No. 3, 4 (Fukui)
Takahama No. 3, 4 (Fukui)Shimane No. 2 (Shimane)Sendai No. 2 (Kagoshima)
MORE THAN 12 YEARS (3 reactors)
Tomari No. 3 (Hokkaido)Ikata No. 3 (Ehime)
Sendai No. 1 (Kagoshima)
SO, NOW WHAT?Currently, 14,200 tons of spent nuclear fuel sits in storage at
Japan’s nuclear power plants. Spent fuel pools are now 70 percent full, on
average
What Are The Options Each Plant Has For Dealing With Spent Fuel?
OPTION 1: Ship it to the (as-
yet-to-start) Rokkasho
Reprocessing Plant in Aomori Prefecture
OPTION 2: Move it from plant to specially
designed mid-term (50 years) storage
containers and then bury it or reprocess at Rokkasho
OPTION 3:Reprocess the
spent fuel overseas
OPTION 1: Ship it to Rokkasho
PROBLEMSThe Rokkasho reprocessing plant :1) HAS YET TO START, having suffered numerous
technical problems, delaying the projected start-up numerous times.
2) Is opposed by not only traditional antinuclear activists but also international nonproliferation experts.
3) Is not expected to go into operation anytime soon.
4) Is already storing 2,945 tons of previously shipped spent fuel –98 percent of its storage capacity
OPTION 2: Mid-term Storage PROBLEMS
1) COSTS: Transporting spent fuel by truck or ship from current location to new facility and costs of storage: Who pays? The utilities and/or the government, but, ultimately, the consumer in the form of higher electric bills for ``cheap’’ nuclear power?
2) SAFTEY CONCERNS: What happens if towns and villages or fisherman’s unions oppose shipments, forcing transportation routes to be altered? Will they demand financial compensation from government or utilities for allowing waste to pass through? How does that affect the ultimate cost of ``cheap’’ nuclear power?
3) THE BIGGEST PROBLEM: Local governments around Japan have ignored pleas from Tokyo to host facilities, which would mean nuclear waste in their backyard for at least a half century.
OPTION 3: Reprocess it Overseas
This has been done. Reprocessing Japanese fuel, which is then returned to Japan and reused, has taken place in England and France.
PROBLEMS: 1) Huge Expense, Drives Up Cost/kWh.2) International Proliferation Risks3) Refusal of Many Countries to Allow
Nuclear-laden Ships to Pass Through Their Waters.
4) Risk of an Accident, Sinking or Damaging Ships Transporting Nuclear Cargo.
``So, just extend the plants’ life past 40 years.’’
Questions about Safety Would a plant that is 40
years old pass the stricter safety standards that went into effect in 2013?
Would the operating utility be required to beef up safety measures before government permission for extension past 40 years is granted?
Would local governments
hosting the plant need to implement any additional safety measures?
Questions about Money Though not a legal requirement, would local authorities grant permission for plant’s life to be extended past 40 years?How much money would they demand (in the form of, for example, ``stronger safety measures’’) from either Tokyo or the operating utility before granting permission?
How long would these negotiations over money take, and, ultimately, would they cost the taxpayers money in the form of higher utility bills?
Would a nuclear reactor more than 40 years old generate electricity at an economically competitive price?
By The Way. . . National Energy Policy requires
planning for the mid and long-
term –decades, not years.
Obviously, the most basic
question is, how big will
your domestic electricity
market be by, say, 2030 or
2040?
Future Electricity Demand: Supplying Power to a Smaller,
Older Japan
Japan’s Population faces a steep decline between now and 2040
2010populatio
n
2015populatio
n
2020populatio
n
2025populatio
n
2030 populatio
n
2035 populatio
n
2040 populatio
n
128.057
million
126.597
million
124.100
million
120.659
million
116.618
million
112.124
million
107.276
million
The Working Age Population (15-64) was 81 million in 2010
By 2040, it will be 57 million – a decline of 30 percent
Who is Going to Need Electricity?
In Tokyo, the overall population is expected to decline by just seven percent by 2040, compared to 2010.
However, over one-third of Tokyoites (34%) will be over 65 years old (20% in 2010) ;and 17% (9% in 2010) will be over 75 years old by 2040.
In Osaka, the overall population will decline by 16% by 2040 compared to 2010.
36% of Osakans will be over 65 years old in 2040 (22% in 2010). 20% will be over 75 years old (10% in 2010).
Nationwide, 36% of the population, on average, will be over 65 years old by 2040.
Over one-fifth, 21% ,of Japan will be over 75 years old in 2040.
And What If. . .?20% of the world’s earthquakes 5.0 and above on the Richter Scale occur in Japan.
According the Japanese government, the number aftershocks (not earthquakes) that measured 5.0 and above on the different scale Japan uses between March 11, 2013 and March 10, 2014 was ``only’’ 56. That’s down from 653 between March 11, 2011 and March 10, 2012
Do you really want build more nuclear reactors given this seismic reality?
So, To Sum Up. . . In 2040, Japan’s electricity demand will be for a country
that has 16% less people than it had in 2010 (128 million down to 107 million).
In 2040, Japan’s electricity demand will be for a country where, overall, more than one-third of the population (36%) has reached retirement age and, presumably, will be consuming less electricity in the workplace than at present.
In 2040, Japan’s domestic electricity market will include the needs of the one-fifth of the country (21%) who are 75 years and above.
In 2040, Japan’s domestic electricity market will provide power to consumer products and businesses that are likely to be far more energy-efficient than is the case today, as technological innovation continues.
``Nuclear power will continue to play an important role in Japan’s future energy mix’’.
A Reality Check… In 2040, 45 of the current 50 commercial nuclear
power plants will be at least 40 years old (By 2020, 12 will have already reached 40 years of operation)
Assuming their life is extended to 60 years (involving unknown additional costs), 17 of the 50 reactors would be at least 50 years old in 2040.
12 reactors would be over 60 years old by 2040 and would be undergoing decommissioning – including 8 of 14 reactors in Fukui Pref. which supply power to the Kansai region.
what all this means is. . . By 2020, long-term decisions will have to be made on the
first 12 reactors that have reached, or surpassed, 40 years of operation. Continuing their operations means:
1) Getting local permission to operate for another 20 years. This will involve increased use of national tax money for local pet construction projects in return for permission.
2) Ensuring that the reactors pass the new safety standards, including, perhaps new standards to operate past 40 years. This will be a time-consuming process, filled with political and bureaucratic struggles.
3) Making whatever safety and engineering adjustments are needed to get approval for another 20 years. Who pays for such measures? How long will they take to implement?
4) Operating an aging plant, more likely to be in needed of increased monitoring and repairs. Will such plants continue to operate at a capacity that keeps the cost per kilowatt hour competitive with LNG or even some renewables?
Oh, and don’t forget about those nearly full spent fuel pools.
Even if you extend the life of a 40 year old reactor, you still have the problem of what to do with the spent fuel it generates over the extra 20 years.
Remember, at present, 33 of the nation’s 50 reactors will see their spent fuel pools filled to the brim within about six years if operations are restarted tomorrow. Another 14 will be full a dozen years after being restarted.
And just who is going to be operating those nuclear plants?
Japan has three undergraduate and nine master’s degree courses with either ``nuclear’’ or ``atomic’’ in their names. Most are under-enrolled.
Majority of nuclear plant workers entered workforce in the 1970s, now facing retirement.
Japan Atomic Industrial Forum reported that 80 percent fewer students participated in annual recruitment events in Tokyo and Osaka in 2012, compared to 2010.
The lack of interest in nuclear power among the younger generations comes as aging plants must be continued or decommissioned after 40 years, requiring a new generation of skilled workers.
BUT HERE IS THE REAL PROBLEM:
Japan says it is doing all it can to save energy and electricity and is far more efficient than most nations in using electricity. Is it?
Not Legally Required to Cut Usage
1) Despite all of the nuclear power village warnings about possible electricity shortages, there are no legal, mandatory electricity savings measures in place.
What Japan has are ``voluntary’’ reductions on electricity use that carry no legal weight.
``Don’t Worry, Be Happy’’
4) City residents have made very few major changes to their lifestyle since 3/11. Many cities have not curbed the use of neon lighting. Nor have they made serious efforts to do things like hold outdoor sporting events at night during the summertime or enact countless other ``common sense’’ measures to save electricity.
A Small Example: Vending Machines
Few curbs on things like electricity-guzzling vending machines.
Japan has over 5 million vending machines –in country with a population of 127 million.
The U.S, with a population of 317 million, has about 4.6 million vending machines.
Limits on What Households Can Do
Traditional Japanese Homes: Beautiful, but Not Designed with Efficient Use of Electricity In Mind.
Modern Homes: Often lack insulation, central heating, double-glazed windows, and insulation
In Conclusion To continue with nuclear power will be far more
expensive than the Nuclear Power Village claims, carries all sorts of safety risks, and runs the risk of investing in a technology that, like the steam engine, has had its day.
To switch to renewables will take time and huge amounts of money, angers the politically powerful Nuclear Power Village, and involves technologies that are still being developed.
Japanese are addicted to a hyper-urban, hyper-convenient lifestyle that uses lots of electricity. Getting them to change their habits is the toughest challenge, but demographics may do it anyway.
THANKS FOR LISTENING!