Master Thesis

The ForgesOf

InnovationTypology and strategic study of Incubator and Accelerator of Start-ups

DAMIEN CAZESMSc 2 General Management English track

2016/2017Internship

Thesis SupervisorDr. Antonin RICARDMaster MGE Directorantonin.ricard@iae-aix.comIAE Graduate School of ManagementChemin de la Quille, 13540 Aix-en-Provence

Company TutorM. Clément CHEVRETTE

Smart Food Paris, Chief of platformclement.chevrette@parisandco.com

Paris&Co 157 Boulevard Macdonald, 75019 Paris

The ForgesOf

Innovation

« La nouveauté. A quoi ça ressemble ? C'est vieux comme le monde, ça, la nouveauté. »Les Enfants du paradis dialogue de Jacques Prévert.

A la mémoire de mon père.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This master thesis aspires to define, classify and study on strategic point of view the support structures put in place to coach, help and develop start-ups. We use as practical example the incubation unit of Paris&Co, the economic development agency of Paris.

After a literature review we categorise support structure looking on their interest in start-up incubated and the final aim (for profit or not) of the structure from which it results a four categories typology: Accelerator, Impact Accelerator, Private incubator, public incubator.

In a second part we analyse the business model of Paris&Co where arises the importance of corporate partners. This partner invited in the incubator to deals with start-up are is in fact the second revenue sources of the incubator which is transform it strategic aim if the dynamic of public grant reduction continues. At the same time, we observe a value proposition of start-up oriented on the young seed at the very beginning of their development even if the customer segment is wider.

The analyse of a practice case, through an interview of the CEO and co-founders of Phenix, teaches us that the offer does not match the need of a mature start-up which look to scale-up is organization and business. Paris&Co is one of the leader among start-up incubators in Paris, probably in France but the competition is rough, to face the next challenge for Paris&Co, we modestly recommend some changes.

The practical case of Phenix shows the incubation programs provided by Paris&Co could be inadequate for mature start-up. The “Hors Murs” offer could be legitimately questioned. How an incubation, we call craft in on purpose, as its more a handcraft than an industry, could be provided when the start-up are on the other side of Paris. A questioning should be done on the “Développement” program to provide a true business acceleration to the start-up as the practical case shows it does not give satisfaction to the studied start-up. A second spot shown by the interview is the question of legitimacy of incubator to give counsel to entrepreneur. Some proposition could reduce this problem. First, co-coaching should be held and developed. It is a method to help a start-up from the first resource of the incubator, the community and a way to obtain types from a legitimate source, other entrepreneurs. Counsels by peer are valuated.

History is one of the most important assets of Paris&Co, the creation of an alumni club on the model of the Open-Innovation Club could be a way to build asset on this history. This Club is an additional way of networking for each actor, a pool of mentors and experts recognised as peer by incumbents and a way to communicate it legitimacy as incubator.

The last recommendation can help Paris&Co to manage the influence of Corporate Partners, the satisfaction of start-up and its understanding of start-up’s needs. Start-up founders don’t know their incubator’s operation, corporate partners role is numb, difference between institutional actors are unclear. A way to manage that could be to put co-governance in use to manage the incubator. The creation of assembly of incubated at the platform level could be a way to concretize that. This organ can receive delegation for some decision and include start-up in the management of their own platform.

INTRODUCTION

Start-ups are one of the most important business phenomena at the turn of the XXIe century. In the common sense, start-ups became equivalent to innovation, novelties and future, thereby they became a key point for state in the economic competition between countries global and less global companies. This work will study the support structure used by the group of interest named “the ecosystem” (including public power, universities, large companies, business angel and venture capitalist) to help start-ups to succeed.

Incubator are born before the age of start-ups as business incubator. The first of its kind was the Batavia Industrial Centre in Batavia, New York in 1959. The model has expanded, the European Commission list around nine hundred business incubators in Europe only, and had been adapted to start-ups and any entrepreneurial initiative. An incubator, as the medical device who bears its name, helps young companies when they are just born. The little brothers are far younger, accelerators are born in 2005. TechStars, born in Cambridge MA, is the first of its kind. The approach is a revolution for the time, start-ups are more mature, cohorts are integrated each year, and the focus is made on the scaling of the start-up with two propositions, finance, from Venture Capitalist’s (VC) and coaching, from successful entrepreneurs. The formula meets success and the model expand has expanded, Seed–DB, which charts their performances, now lists 136 programmes around the world. As the success is confirmed, the model is replicated and expanded. TechStars have accelerators in 18 cities. This expansion is explained by the success of the model, support structures are analysed as the reason of success behind the digital revolution in USA. The link between universities, entrepreneur and public agencies create an ecosystem of business angel and investors explain the Silicon Valley, build around Stanford and its industrial park, the development of Boston and Cambridge, innovative technologies industries, build around the MIT and Harvard. These examples are duplicate duplicated around the world with more or less success.

In the same time public authorities have begun to support the process as part of public development of a city, a region, a country. The Frenchtech policies, start started in 2013 by the French government is a good illustration of that. The objective is to develop entrepreneurship and innovation. With the financial support of Bpi France, the program aims to build cluster around innovation in 15 French cities. This movement puts Paris in one of the most active places to attract start-ups and investors. The city became a battlefield for incubators, accelerators and investors. Station F, a campus of start-up made to concentrate actors and program have been initiated by the Internet mogul Xavier Niel in June 2017. MAIF Avenir and AXA Strategic Ventures invest 125 million euro and 200 million euro, respectively, since 2015. TechStars opened an accelerator in September 2017 in Paris. Paris&Co announced three openings of platforms between March and September 2017 (circular economy, fintech, HR). Vivatech, in the communication side became the great mass where meet start-ups, investors and all the ecosystem actors. Listing all the new projects of incubators, accelerators, science park, innovation campus and so on from public, individual, corporate initiative in France since the beginning of the Frenchtech policies could be a thesis work by itself.

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This kind of program flourish on the consensus that innovation is the key of success in the global economy, even the key of survival in the global world. The financialization of the economy has dictated the companies to find cheap innovations promptly to replace product which can’t bring value on the long times. Start-ups are a solution to obtain innovation quickly, with less risk without funding R&D unit on uncertain projects. At the same time the globalization and digitalisation imply a direct competition between every part of the world. Innovation are not the monopoly of some industrial countries anymore. High technological product come from all around the world and each company and territories con compete on the global market. To obtain strong financial revenue, the company need return on invest which imply innovative product. This quest to innovation require early funding for start-ups, that VC’s role and structures to select and nurture the most promising start-ups. The Innovation Awards as “Grand Prix de l’Innovation” in Paris, play a role to select the start-up, but the most central players are supports structures which find and select the most promising start-ups. The incubation and acceleration programs then nurture and control the most important start-ups to obtain the birth of unicorns. Support structures have a key role to canalise investment to the start-up which could deliver the innovation promise. They are central cogs to the modern economy by creation of innovative products which could nurture large company with optimization of revenue fast enough to interest their shareholders and investors.

However, this kind of structures overcome their roles as innovation controllers. The development of social economy and the emergence of the ecology and climate change as the next global challenges imply development of innovative solutions. These innovative solutions will be technological and managerial to obtain fast change in the economic structures. The start-ups and support structures cannot be seen only as cogs of an economy disconnected of the real world, focus on shareholder’s return of interest only. They are an opportunity to changes the economy which can be used on noble purposes, as common interests, environment, etc. Phenix as start-up, Paris&Co, as structures, specifically “Economie circulaire” and “Smart Food Paris” platforms, are the most obvious examples, but this work will show they are not the only ones.

In this context, Public structures look to sustain the economic development of their territories to maintain them in the global competition when corporate actors look to watch and integrate the innovation which can transform their business model and become a strategic advantage on global competition. As unicorns, company valuated over 1 billion dollars, are extremely rare these structures find them to nurture and scale them up. As we will see, the stage of development requires different structures. First incubator to test and sustain the project, before scaling and replicate the business model in accelerator. This way and the multiple actors who initiate them, universities, local government, bank, large companies, successful entrepreneur explain the multitude of different experiences, name and program to target a same objective

This project closes a MSc2 in General Management and an internship in Smart Food Paris, incubator of Paris&Co specialized in food sector. This project tries to bring answers to these simple questions: How to classify support structures to understand the specificities of each one? Which accuracy have these programs? Furthermore, in a strongly competitive market as the French ecosystem, this is a modest contribution to the Paris&Co questioning on it strategic choices, no an answer but some reflexions to manage the near future.

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Paris&Co defines start-ups as innovative enterprises less than five years old. This definition does not include all the start-up and doesn’t define what is an innovation, limiting itself to the customer segment of Paris&Co as we will see. This project uses as definition the one given by Eric Reis in his best-seller The Lean Start-up:

“A human institution designed to create new product and services under condition of extreme uncertainty.”[1]

We circumscribe this project to the independent company built specifically for this activity and make money on it. Public and non-profit organizations are not customer of a structures of support as studied in this project. Intrapreneurship is a widely different field which require its own study.

First, we will try to classify all the structures in a jungle of incubators, accelerators, networks, campus, and so forth (1). Then we will analyse the value proposition and business model of Paris&Co (2). At last we will analyse a Smart Food Paris ‘s success story as a case to determine the relevance of the model (3).

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SUMMARY

Executive summary...........................................................................................................10

Introduction..........................................................................................................................5

Summary..............................................................................................................................9

1. The Typology of start-ups support.............................................................................11

1.1 Literature review.............................................................................................11

1.2 Criteria of typology.........................................................................................13

1.2.1 Accelerator and incubator............................................................................13

1.2.2 Public or Private structure...........................................................................15

1.2.3 The four types of structure...........................................................................16

1.3 Matrix of support structures............................................................................19

2 A model of incubator: Paris&Co................................................................................21

2.1 Incubation.......................................................................................................22

2.2 Business model...............................................................................................22

2.2.1 Corporate partner business..........................................................................22

2.2.2 Start-ups incubation.....................................................................................23

2.3 Start-ups value proposition Model..................................................................24

2.3.1 Value Map...................................................................................................24

2.3.2 Paris&Co customers profile.........................................................................24

2.4 Synthesis: the canvas......................................................................................26

3 A case of incubation: Phenix......................................................................................29

3.1 The quest of legitimacy...................................................................................29

3.2 Matching the target.........................................................................................30

3.3 An experience in incubation: The Phenix lab.................................................32

Conclusion.........................................................................................................................33

References..........................................................................................................................35

Illustration Tables..............................................................................................................36

Thanks................................................................................................................................36

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1. THE TYPOLOGY OF START-UPS SUPPORT

Studying of incubators and accelerators is not struggling with the lack it’s struggling with too many. In the innovation world where successful communication is almost as important as successful execution, to attract investor and customer, support structures distinguish themselves by the diversities of the value proposition. However, a classification is required to help ecosystem to understand over the communication which value give each type of structures. Many kinds of typologies have been exposed in the literature (1.1) but concern mostly business incubator in the traditional way. Based on common definition we will try to define an accurate one (1.2), before showing a result of this typology apply on most important French and international incubator and accelerator (1.3).

1.1 LITERATURE REVIEWStart-ups incubation had not been a common field of research. Literature focus on

business incubation in general. The work is not easier as the economic, cultural and necessities to be adaptive to the demand produce a lot of difference between incubators. However, we can list the follow works.

The most cited typology have been made by von Zedtwitz in “CLASSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT OF INCUBATORS: ALIGNING STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND COMPETITIVE SCOPE FOR NEW BUSINESS FACILITATION” (2003) [2] . This article is cited 115 times in the literature. The author identifies five kinds of incubator based on their strategic objectives. These categories are, regional incubators focused on economic development, university incubators on R&D, virtual incubator focused on IT. Independent commercial Incubator and Internal business are looking for profit. If the formers are independent the last are built by large companies to sustain innovation and nurture their own changes. These categories could be analysed on two factors. First the origin of the fund Private or public than the strategy follows by the structure, economic development or scientific research. Virtual incubators are mostly one of the others incubator focused on a specific customer segment.

Grimaldi et Grandi[3] based their typology on historical criteria. First to appear incubators created by public institution targeting economic development, Batavia Industrial Centre is the first of his kind. Second category to appear is universities incubator to develop Scientific research by linking world of science and world of business. Stanford industrial park is probably the most famous as centre of a little experience named “Silicon Valley”. The two other kinds of incubator for Grimaldi and Grandi are Private Incubators and Corporate incubators. These are very similar to the two kinds of private incubator defined by von Zedtwitz.

Hackett and Dilt in “A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF BUSINESS INCUBATION RESEARCH” [4] identifies four categories of criteria to classify support structure. The type of seed supported (spin-off, start-up, etc.). The field of activities of the companies. The nature of incubator (universities, private, …) and the source of incubator’s funding. The first criterion is the delimitation of our field of study, the other ones could be used in a strategic classification based on structure’s aim.

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The Centre for strategy and evaluation services working for the European Commission[6] provide a typology in two criteria. The technological level and the management support. Each one has three levels who brings not less than nine categories typology. Only three of them are business incubator: innovation centre, business and Innovation centre, techno-centre. This classification is simply too large for our studies.

Figure 1: European commission’s typology of business incubator

Albert and al. (2003)[7] is a multi-criteria typology based on non-profit or profit organization, on the strategic objective targeted (economic development, research, etc.) and the dominant activity of the project (generalist and high tech). These multi-criteria result in a four categorizations typology in two groups. First ones are non-profit incubators with economic development incubator (the only generalist category) and academic incubators, second ones are for profit structures with private investor incubator and business incubator. As we are looking for a specific sector, start-up ecosystem, this categorization is too generalist with too many criteria, but the strategic aim is probably very accurate.

Aernould (2004) [5] mixes objectives of incubator with an historical dimension. If the first incubators are mixed, for him, they differentiate, in the 1980, in economic development and technological incubator. He shows the recent development of social and fundamental research incubator. First ones are made to support project with social dimensions, from integration of minorities to support of education and so on. The seconds ones, as their name indicate, are born to promote fundamental scientific research.

Finally, typology has been built, by Bakkali and al.[8], based on the Human Resources management of the incubator. Using the contextual model of Pichault and Nizet (2000) who determine four organizational models based on the nature of the link between employees and the structure. These four models are:

- Entrepreneurship where the arbitrary of the leaders define the culture of the company.- Bureaucratic where the support is standardized and depersonalized.- Adhocratic with the individualization and interpersonal relationship between actors.- Professional where the model is conventionalist. Support is based on convention and

negotiation between actors.

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- Missionary where the HRM policy is defined from the constant value which are the foundation of the organisation.

Missionary structures

Entrepreneurial structures

Bureaucratic structures

Professional structures

Adhocratic structures

Projects supported Social

Specialized in a single sector

of activity

Several sectors of activity

Academic Technological

HR management

Value-related model

Arbitrary model

Objectivizing model

Conventionalist model

Individualizing model

Criteria adoptedImplicit

(reference to values)

Non-existentFormalized according to

rules

Formalized following

debate

Formalized in an interpersonal

contextFormalization Low Low High Variable High

Flexibility High High Low Variable HighDecentralizatio

n Conditional Low Low Decentralized IntermediateFigure 2: HR management practices and incubators.[8]

Accelerator do not appear in the literature focus on classification of support structure. This is not really a surprise as the oldest accelerator, TechStar, is younger than most of the article published. Literature is more focused on analyse success and failure off acceleration and description of the ecosystem. Structures specialised in start-ups and innovation do not have a specific typology which allow to understand them. By merging criteria from the literature, we are going to propose a typology for start-up support structure.

1.2 CRITERIA OF TYPOLOGYAs seen before a recurrent problem appears in these typologies, partial distinction without

including accelerator. Something linked to the start-up ecosystem as more of the literature is not focused on start-ups and end-up with a lot of categories. We will first use accelerator as a first criterion and determine which factors make the accelerator (1.2.1) and use the source of the funding as second criteria (1.2.2) before determining four types of structures and describe them (1.2.3).

1.2.1 Accelerator and incubator.Incubator as the child care device helps companies to start by creating and helpful

ecosystem, breaking the loneliness, providing office and network. Most of them are public and help local government to provide economic development to their territories. Paris&Co is a good example of that. It’s an agency organized as a non-profit organization which has delegation from Paris local government for economic development of the city. This study will retain as definition of incubator the one from Sean Hackett and David Dilts in “A REAL OPTIONS-DRIVEN THEORY OF BUSINESS INCUBATION” :

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“We define business incubator as a shared office-space facility that seeks to provide its incumbents (i.e. ‘‘portfolio’’ or ‘‘client-’’ or ‘‘tenant-

companies’’) with a strategic, value-adding intervention system (i.e. business incubation) of monitoring and business assistance”[9]

This definition is not shared by all the search in the field. There is no consensus on the definition makes a consensus in the field. This definition is, however, an accurate description of Paris&Co, our model. We find a providing of office facility part and a coaching part.

Accelerators have been made by successful entrepreneurs and Venture Capital companies to scale up start-up. Accelerator can be defined by five key features, according to Miller and Bounds (2011) for Nesta foundation [10]:

- It opens to all application- The structure invests in equity in the companies- Time limited support with event and monitoring- Cohort of company rather than on-demand services- Focus on small team rather than individual relationship

Those criteria are method criteria. Since the birth of accelerator in 2005 incubator has taken some of the method without becoming accelerator in the same time. The application limit is mostly a problem linked to the sponsor of the structure. School incubator limit the application to founder exit from their cursus and research program. Time limited support is becoming common even in incubation, Paris&Co practice it. Cohort of companies rather than on demand services is not a distinctive criterion either. On one side, Paris&Co practices it, as “AgoRise” a food incubator in Dijon. On the other side “The Family”[11] provides mentoring without time-limit (“You don’t leave the family” blazon the website) and invests in equity.

We could conclude that the key criteria to define an accelerator is the investment in equity made by the structure linked to a fast exit expected. This distinction is useful as in practice incubator and accelerator do not support the start-up at the same stage. Incubator help them as seed. Accelerators helps them as small business to grow up. The interest in fast exit of accelerators is a factor to consider.

These will be the first criteria of our typology, a distinction should be done between structures which engage themselves and take part in equity or structures which act as providers of services, whatever the services will be. The first kinds are accelerators. The second kinds are incubators. The place of a company in this distinction is linked to one factor. Does the structure have interest in the equity of the start-up? If it is interested, it is a partner in the upper side of the matrix. The engagement of the structure depends on the part it got in the equity. Higher is the part in equity of the structures higher is the company. If the structure is not interested in equity, we can presume it is paid by fees. In this case its position is in the base of the matrix. On this part, higher the fees lower the company is in the matrix.

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Figure 3: Positioning Accelerator and Incubator

1.2.2 Public or Private structureIn the second place, we should distinguish the origin of funding in the support structure,

between public and private structure. It’s a criterion identified by Hackett and Dilt[4] and used by Grimaldi and Grandi[3]. This criterion shows its accuracy as the origin of the fund impacts directly the strategy of the structure. A private structure will not have the same strategy than a public one. A structure built by one large company has its interest in mind, if the sponsors are multiple the interest change. A public structure paid by the local government of a territories will focus on the strength and weakness of this one. A universities structure will look to promote the research inside. If the first distinction is useful to understand to which structure a start-up should apply according to its stage of development and expectancy, the second one is useful to understand what to expect from the structure as strategy.

In the first approach a support structure is private if more than 50% of its equity is owned by a private shareholder. Public if universities, municipalities, local government or any public entities own more than 50% of the structure.

However, this distinction should include the revenue. A public structure financed by its incumbent or corporate partner cannot be defined as fully public. Likewise, a private structure can be granted by a public actor which impact its policies. To positioning an incubator or accelerator in the matrix we should define first the nature of its equity then weights it with the part of subvention and private participation in its revenue.

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Figure 4: Positioning Private and public structure

With those criteria, origin of fund and participation in equity, we can build a two dimensions matrix with four categories of structure.

1.2.3 The four types of structure.From two criteria, origin of fund and interest in equity, we can manage a four types

typology. This typology is not totally original as it corresponds to Albert and al.[7] criteria adapted to start-up ecosystem. This typology will categorize structures based on their strategic interests and objectives in order to give to start-up a clear looking of which kind of relationship can be expected from each structure.

Figure 5: The Typology Matrix

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Private accelerator are private and interested in equity: They take part in the risk but work for the growing of the start-up. The exit of a scaled-up start-up is their way to earn money. Most of the accelerators fund between 5 and 10% of equity[12]. These structures have the advantage of taking risk with the start-up. They bring money, they look for a quick exit. They are founded by VC’s and former entrepreneurs. That could be a liability as the objectives of the accelerator could not match the objectives of the start-up. An accelerator interested in exit will coach a start-up in the same way than a non-interested structure. This structure is designed for start-ups which look for fundraising and fast growth in a profitable business, not for less profitable business or start-up looking for slow scaling.

Eg: The Family, TechStars, Y generation, NUMA, …

Impact accelerators are public funded, and take interest in equity. For Miller and Stacey[13] they are the next big waves of program. Their work finds, in 2014, 50 programs worldwide. This program is funded in three ways, by grants only, by private sponsorship or with management fees. This stream of revenue reminds of public incubator. This model spread around the world, Middle-East specifically, where sovereign wealth fund are common, has got 50% of non-profit accelerator, again 25% in the rest of the world[14]. This kind of accelerator work where profit is more uncertain (EdTech and HeathTech mostly). They are an alternative to common accelerator to provide growth and mentoring to seed which does not match the requirement of profitability. They develop mostly in sectors linked with social economy environment, etc. The result of such accelerators cannot be yet observed (even Y generator take five years to be profitable and the growth expectations are not the same) but the hopes are strong.

Eg: Bethnal Green Ventures, The Difference Engine, Better Ventures, Greenstart, Rock Health,

Private incubators: They are developed by big companies to sustain innovation. By sustain we understand it as watch it, nurture it, and control it. This category is subdivided between corporate incubators, drive only by one mother company, or commercial incubators, partner of multiple big company. The balance of power between corporate and start-up is different in these two configurations. They are interesting for start-up to build relationship with business partners as their way of funding imply link with interested company. The participation of a private actor means in most of cases no-expenses for incumbents. On the other side this kind of incubator looks after the interest of its sponsor and founder. If the interest of the company diverges from start-ups interest some problems can arise. The start-up is strongly dependent on the partner, specifically in corporate incubator. If the start-up looks to compete the partner after a pivot instead of becoming a supplier or customer, the incubation can go wrong. The same problem arises if the partner becomes the major customer of the start-up and practices extended period payment like mass retailing.

Eg: SNCF development, CA Village, La Ruche …

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Public Incubator are publicly owned. The part of corporate partner in the result can exist but not enough to change the focus of the structure. These structures have the advantage of being protective for their incubated to look for sustainability over time of the business model. They subdivide between academic incubators linked to university or equivalent and economic development incubators. Latest look to develop a territory’s activity, formers to develop a technology in core of the business project. They are neutral in term of strategy but do not take risk with the start-up. They are useful for seed, start-up barely born, and project linked to a specific territory.

Eg: Paris&Co, Impulse Incubator, StartX…

Now we can differentiate the actors of the ecosystem. We are going to determine the accuracy of incubation which is made by a strategic analysis of Paris&Co.

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1.3 MATRIX OF SUPPORT STRUCTURES

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2 A MODEL OF INCUBATOR: PARIS&CO

Paris&Co is the economic development agency of the City of Paris. The agency has been come from to former agency Paris Developpement and Paris Region Innovation Lab which use to manage incubation and economic development for the city of Paris and the Ile-de-France region, respectively. Paris&Co is one of the oldest one as the incubation activity began in 1998[15]. It’s also one of the biggest in France with 300 start-ups incubated. Paris&Co is a public agency, a non-profit organisation under the French association’s law of 1901 presided by an elected member of the counsel of Paris. 43,5%[15] of its budget is financed by public subside.

If Paris&Co is old in a sector where most of the structures are less than ten years old the current strategy is linked to the Frenchtech and the new interest in start-up since the beginning of 2010’s years? Paris is looking to attract companies to guarantee its future development and competition with London, Berlin, Barcelona and so on. Paris&Co is the key man in this policy. Its mission is fulfilled in five ways.

It welcomes foreign entrepreneurs via Paris Landing Pack. The program “EXPLORE” supports foreign start-ups to begin in the French market and test their product in this market for four weeks. Start-ups obtain a desk and coaching for the specificities of France. The program “INVEST” incubates a foreign start-up, already incorporated abroad, to develop their French subsidiary.

The Open Innovation Clubs, created in 2012, gather large companies to facilitate meeting between major economic actors and start-ups. The club works on two axes. It builds concrete collaboration between start-ups and large company with networking and pitch from seed. It calls for innovative project to integrate innovation in major companies. It’s a way for companies to obtain and adapt innovation which can’t be generated in intern as big companies struggle with creativity and change.  The second axis is linked to this fact and focus on changing organizations via sharing good governance practice and building collaboration and experimentation. The club is the key to attract corporations in Paris and coach large companies investing in innovation.

To create experimentation, the Paris&Co ’s Urban Lab, organizes and coaches experimental project taking place in Paris. The Urban Lab helps to test an innovative product in real conditions. Experimentation enables start-ups or large companies to understand the needs of the consumers and test their innovative offer in vivo and in situ.

Paris&Co organizes some major events in Paris (“Hack de l’Hôtel de Ville”, “Option start-up”, “Le Grand prix de innovation”) this mission establishes the reputation of Paris as the centre of innovation and Paris&Co as the major actor of the ecosystem. It’s a way to establish legitimacy in a cognitive way by putting in place rituals. Specifically, “Le Grand prix de innovation” awards foreign or local start-ups in nine categories. Winners obtain a 12 000 € price and an incubation in Paris&Co.

We will concentrate on the fifth mission, the incubation of French start-ups at Paris&Co. After describing the organization of the activities (2.1), we will analyse the business model (2.2) then determine the value proposition for start-up of the incubator (2.3) then synthesize with two tools the business model canvas, value proposition model canvas (2.4).

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2.1 INCUBATIONParis&Co is an association linked to the different local governments (regional counsel

and city of Paris), we could categorize it as publics structure. The annual rapport [15] declared 43.5 % as public subvention and 56,5% as private revenue in 2016. This number make us think Paris&Co has a strong private part. However, part of this are start-up payments for services paid via a specific subvention from the Bpi France, the PIA. This subvention is built to fund the incubation as we will explain in the part 2. This is a hidden subvention which should be analysed as public grant for Paris&Co. Paris&Co is a public structure with a strong part of private funding.

As Incubator, Paris&Co has a specific structure. Rather than a generalist approach, Paris&Co develops a business unit focused on a specific sector of business. Each platform has got specific partners from the sector and connects its start-up to the network built by the chef of platform in the sector.

Platforms are[16]:

- “Le Tremplin” specialised in Sport and entertainment business- “Economie circulaire” focused on solutions for minimised leakage and waste by

slowing, closing, and narrowing material and energy loops. It opened in June 2017- “Welcome Lab” specialised in tourism- “Le Labo de l’Edition” for book edition- “Lincc” for video game and digital industry- “Tech care” for innovation in health and well being- “Rolling Lab” for logistic and urban solution of mobility- “Immobilier de demain” for urbanism- “RH et transformation du travail” for innovation in HR Field. It opened in September

2017- “Upper” generalist with a focus in quick internationalisation of French incubated- “Comet” generalist incubating foreign start-up. It is the support of most of the

programs Paris landing pack- A Fintech incubator which open in September 2017 in La Defense[17]- “Smart Food Paris” specialised in the food from the field to the table and the support

to the professional. This one will be taken as example as platform of incubation

2.2 BUSINESS MODELParis&Co inherits two roles from its mother structures. Its aim to attract companies in

Paris and support innovation. The primal revenue stream comes from the start-up, to obtain incubation support, the first value proposition of the agency. The secondary revenue comes from corporate partners who pay to be in relationship with start-ups which make innovations. These two businesses generate two offers targeting two kinds of customers, corporate partners (2.2.1) and Start-ups (2.2.2).

2.2.1 Corporate partner business.To accelerate the business of seeds, one of the distinctive proposition of Paris&Co is the

partnership between corporate partners and start-ups. The formers are targeted by a special business of Paris&Co. A corporate partner is a large company which is associate to Paris&Co

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to manage its innovation strategy. Each incubation platform has specific corporate partners which are major actors of the sector. The partners participate to choose the start-up incubated, network with them and experiment with them.

Paris&Co makes a profit by selling a special relationship between its corporate partners and the customer of the Core Value proposition, the start-up. This secondary stream derived from the core business, is the first stream in revenue from the private sector in proportion (31% of the total revenue, against 22% for start-ups)[15]. The part of corporate partners in the revenue will increase as the subvention go down. The City of Paris reduce by 13% its subvention this year. This reduction is expected to be continued in the future as the state contribution to the city’s budget decreases. These numbers bring some essential information on the balance of power between actors. On the one hand, Start-ups are customers, in the core business model, and products, in the secondary business model of Paris&Co. In the other hand, corporate partners are more important in the result of Paris&Co than start-ups. Furthermore, they share the government of the platform in the direction committee and are members of the selection jury. This fact should be weighted in the strategy of Paris&Co and ask question for the independence of the agency against corporate partners, in the future.

If the corporate partner stream is the most important in value they are not the core business who define the identity of Paris&Co, which is incubation.

2.2.2 Start-ups incubation.The Core business of Paris&Co is the incubation. The mentoring and hosting of

innovative companies Paris&Co considers as customer target, innovative enterprises incorporated less than five years before the beginning of the incubation. This definition corresponds to the definition used by Bpi France and the major public institution to name the start-up. Innovation is seen as the use of technologies to transform a product or a business model. Applicants are selected by chief of platform before pitching in front a selection committee composed of corporate partners, experts and members of Paris&Co. Applications can happen all around the year as incubated start-ups turnover is important. However, the most important process is the creation of annual cohort of twenty start-ups in order to create an emulation between start-ups. Incubation is paid by start-ups, their payment amount to 22%[15] of Paris&Co revenue.

The program “Amorçage” is designed for the younger start-ups, most of the applicants are not already integrated when they pitch. Offices are provided, furnished, start-ups access general and individual mentoring. In this programme start-ups can ask for a grant named PIA. The PIA is a benefit from Bpi France reserved to the young innovative companies incubated by a structure certified Paris innovation[18]. A Paris&Co incubator in fact. Start-ups need to prove an innovative R&D. The subvention is computed on the R&D expenditure of the start-up. This 30,000 € grant is designed to pay the 12,000 € of the “Amorçage” program. The program has a duration of a year and targets the first sales and the consolidation of the project (rising money, write status, hire the first employees, etc).

“Décollage” is focus on accelerating the business for two years. It is designed to boost the start-up after the validation of the business model. Paris&Co proposes to make a second turn of fundraise, bring visibility to the start-up, and accelerate the business development. The program includes an individual help on human resources problem and strategy for a cost of

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5,000€ with or without accommodation (“Hors Mur” program in this last case). All the program included the collective program manages at the Paris&Co level.

The Customer relationship between start-ups and chief of platform works mostly on an informal and inter-personal relationship. The chief of platform keeps contact with the founder and seek toto know their needs and try to fulfil them. The team of incubation is small, three or four people intern included in most of the platform and provide the value proposition.

2.3 START-UPS VALUE PROPOSITION MODELTo summarize Paris&Co provides two kinds of values, material by providing office

facility, preferential deals with some providers- and unmaterial values: counsel, networking, business relationships.

The first mission of Paris&Co’s staff is to determine the needs of their start-ups. “What do my start-ups need?” is the most important question a chief of platform has in mind. To determine which vision of its customer Paris&Co has, we will design the map of its proposition of value (2.3.1). This Map will teach us which problem Paris&Co wants to solve by its proposition, from that we can derive a customer’s profile (2.3.2).

2.3.1 Value MapAs Incubator, Paris&Co provides office space, Offices are shared in “Amorçage” and

come with furniture. They are individual and unfurnished in “Décollage”. The office facilities are provided by a partnership with the RIVP. The Estate agency of the city of Paris. If the office’s rent and incubation are separate contracts, a renting is impossible without Paris&Co incubation. This service defines Paris&Co as an incubator, according to literature[2], [3], [9] but is not the only one. Paris&Co plays the role of professional buyer to deal special arrangements with a provider (Jobteaser is one of them to recruit people. Another one concerns Microsoft to have Office at an affordable price, etc.).

On the financial part, Paris&Co brings access to the PIA via a partnership with Bpi France. It organizes contact with venture capitalist and corporate partners with pitch days organized for start-ups to present their activities to group of investors. On the operational part, Paris&Co is specialized to make experimentation between large companies and start-ups to develop product or innovation at industrial scale.

Being incubated at Paris&Co, whatever the program and platform concerned, it is be member of two mentoring programs. The first is a general business program provided by Paris&Co HQ and consists of workshops and conferences to help start-ups to fundraise, shape their businesses and accelerate them. Individual or group meetings are proposed on a variety of theme. (UX design, accountancy, HR management, law, etc.) The second one is managed by each platform and focus on the specific needs of the sector. The platforms are the level where the connection and network with the professional of the sector are made, specifically the collaboration with corporate partners is made at this level.

2.3.2 Paris&Co customers profile.A company creates a value proposition to answer a need of its targeted customer. The

offer shows the profile of the customer as seen by the company. In the case of Paris&Co

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Paris&Co relieves start-ups from charges linked to premises management but a subtler pain is relieved by the incubator. One crucial point of an incubator is to break the founder’s loneliness. Entrepreneur is a solitary position. By sharing offices and concentrating them in on place, by making events as trivial as barbecues or by providing a cafeteria, Paris&Co provides this very essential value which is community. Thereby a part of the offer is simply not described on the website. The slack network to exchange CV, ideas and tips, the neighbourhood, the events and the free beer, the smoking area discussion, life of an office in short. In a more operational way, the start-ups gain likewise an extensive business network, corporate partners which are implicated to make deals with them or fund them. They gain deals induced by their number and mentoring by people who aggregate experience from previous incubations, the platform’s staff. Coaching by experts and network of start-up founders are a gain too

The archetype of the start-ups incubated are the ones at early stage with a lot of R&D and struggle with the beginning of the incubation. How to start selling? How to rise fund? Etc. They need offices, and help to start their business. They are looking to collaborate with larger companies and rise money.

In a third part we are going to analyse a practical case of incubation in Smart Food Paris and confront the model to the practice.

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2.4 SYNTHESIS: THE CANVAS

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Figure 7: Value proposition Canvas

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Figure 8: The Paris&Co's Business Model Canvas

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3 A CASE OF INCUBATION: PHENIX

To analyse a, incubation process which has so much declination, this work will study a practice case. We are going to analyse the return of experience of Jean Moreau to understand the virtue and limit of the incubation process

Phenix was born in 2014 and founded by Jean Moreau and Baptiste Corval as a start-up of social economy which provides other businesses with solutions to reduce their waste of food and provide surplus to association. At the very beginning: Phenix began with an idea of C2C solution for wasting. The company pivot quickly as too much struggle had arisen (no business model, preservation of food, logistic, etc.) to become a solution provider for waste in B2B. The company was created and run before any incubation thereby it integrated the incubation as a mature stage. Phenix has been incubated by not less than six structures in parallel:

- Scale up by Entropia, Essec, a college incubator funded by Rothschild Foundation. focus on scale the start-up of Social economy.

- SNCF development: The corporate incubator of SNCF.- Le comptoir, incubator of the investment fund “Le comptoir de l’innovation”.

It focusses on social economy as Entropia which is the only case of competition between incubators for Phenix.

- RAISE is an investment fund which provides counsel, coaching and networking.- Paris&Co with “Smart Food Paris” and “Ville Durable” specialized respectively in

food and ecological solutions for the vertical integration.

Jean and Baptist are also members of the entrepreneur network. Experienced Entrepreneurs take time to bring practical solutions to new entrepreneur. Jean Moreau recognises this way of coaching as one of the most accurate.

Two kinds of lessons to learn emerge from this interview on Phenix experience. One of legitimacy (3.1), one of targeting of the Value proposition (3.2). We will analyse at the end the experience run by Phenix of a corporate support structure, a result of its own incubation experience (3.3).

3.1 THE QUEST OF LEGITIMACY“Why are you legitimate to coach me? To take on my precious time?” If one sentence

could sum critical comments on support structure it would be this one. Legitimacy is a part of most of entrepreneur’s speeches and is a part of Jean Moreau’s interview. We will us the definition of Bitektine (2011):

“Legitimacy can be understood as actors’ perceptions of the organization, as a judgment with respect to the organization, or as the behavioural consequences of perception and judgment, manifested in

actors’ actions—“acceptance,” “endorsement,” and so forth.”[19]

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This legitimacy can have 3 ways to emerge, legal, normative and cognitive. The legal legitimacy comes from the law. The normative legitimacy comes from the peer’s recognition. The cognitive legitimacy comes from respect of rite, practice and so on. If the support of the City of Paris and Bpi France could be analysed as a legal legitimacy for Paris&Co this would not enough in an ecosystem where public authorities are seen with prudence. As we will see the cognitive legitimacy plays a role but not as much as the normative one.

Incubators attracted Phenix in the first place for the credibility they could bring to the start-up. Joining an incubator is a way to demonstrate investors and business partners the serious and steadiness of the project. A way to show that some serious people validate the project and support it. This shows the first trade of an incubator, its own legitimacy. Start-up is a fancy word to designate many different realities. In a not-standardized world like the innovation world, trust is funded on reputation. The reputation of something as new as a seed is derived from institution and people wo trust it. In this aspect, incubators bring their own legitimacy to their start-up. Group like Carrefour, Danone, will probably not let their executive officers receive business developers of small enterprises younger than a few years, if a partner did not back up them, without speaking about making important contract. Being part of Paris&Co, one of the big players which already proves the validity of its incubation with other projects, brings credibility to the new start-up and accelerates their legitimacy as economic players. This legitimacy from Paris&Co in the ecosystem is a cocktail of history, start-up have already been successfully incubated, the mediatisation of events organized by Paris&Co and process of selection matching the expectation of the business sector. These two last factors based on cognitive legitimacy, the respect of rites, validates the incubator as a serious actor and its start-ups with it.

A general critic against incubators, expressed in the interview is the one of legitimacy to give counsels. The fact is that counsels come from people who don’t have necessarily experience of entrepreneurship, most of the Paris&Co team members have not been entrepreneurs and incubators which are not run by entrepreneurs are seen as legitimate for Jean Moreau. However, is it a problem? Incubators have the return of experience of the multiple start-ups they are mentoring. These multiple experiences could be more important than one experience which could be not repeatable. If an entrepreneur can bring pragmatic counsel, a more general view of the ecosystem could be more accurate for seeds. However, this critic cannot be ignored, Legitimacy should be claimed and explained by the incubators. Furthermore, the way counsels are given could be important, whatever the legitimacy of the counsellor is, he is never as engaged than as the founders.

3.2 MATCHING THE TARGETPhenix integrated Paris&Co in “Development Hors Mur” made to accelerate the business

without been hosted by the incubator. This program is supposed cover two years but Phenix left after one year. The incubation is built on promises to coach the scale-up of the start-up. The interview shows it is not satisfactory at least to quote Jean. Moreau:

Phenix validates the specialisation of platforms. This specialisation seduces the founders to integrate the incubator and appreciated. Paris&Co is recognized as helping founders when founders ask to organize an event on precise topics.

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« Pourquoi est-on là ? Pour être aidé par l’incubateur ou pour aider l’incubateur ? »

(“Why are we here. To be helped or to help the incubator?”)

Paris&Co provides a good help in fundraising, less in management, scaling and business acceleration. Phenix was lacking help when they need in business acceleration. How to make blanket orders? How to scale their sales forces? Phenix is satisfied by the coverage and the support of the incubator which puts the start-up forward as much as possible, but expects more operational help from its incubator. One reproach made to the organization is the multiple interventions asked to incumbents. If some are very pertinent, pitch in front of Carrefour Online directors, some less interesting, like the mayor of London or foreign ambassador’s delegates, which take time without bringing business opportunities, only visibilities which is good but not enough. Workshops are repetitive and not really targeted for not so young start-ups.

Paris&Co made the promise to accelerate the business, to help on contracts over one million euro, this one has not been fulfilled for Jean. Moreau. The contacts provided were already know and the incubator did not have the power to help the deal to close as, according to Jean Moreau, “the incubator does not have leverage to accelerate the deal with corporate partner”. The price is high for the result given, large visibility but the business acceleration promise is not fulfilled. However, the incubator network helped to be seen by the key account targeted by Phenix. Phenix leave left the incubator when other start-ups were just too immature, and the founders became more mentor mentors than mentored.

If the model shows strength to help seed start-up start-ups at their very beginning, Jean Moreau recognises that some events on fundraising or starting the business are very relevant. They show deficiency for more mature start-ups. The question is: Did Phenix make an appropriate choice to be incubated as the founders have lot of network and knowledge already? Phenix was not part of the day to day life of the incubator because it was not hosted by it. Installed in the north of Paris, near Place de Clichy, when Smart Food Paris is housed near Nation in the east, the contact cannot be the one of a hosted start-up in with a customer relationship founded on inter-personal contact like Smart Food Paris incubation. We can ask if the “Hors murs” programme is a promising idea in an inter-personal relationship as the one built in Paris&Co’s incubator. If Phenix gains visibility, a great point of this incubation according to Jean Moreau, and Smart Food Paris gains a leader and a star in its first cohort, the inadequacy between the need of a strong and mature start-up and the reality of the program limits the satisfaction of actors. Phenix does not have the boost expected by its founders and Paris&Co lost an investment in time before the end of the period. Incubators derive their legitimacy from start-ups success, Phenix as an old start-up has been incubated to help other start-ups and the incubator itself. If it a reasonable strategy for the incubator, this one needs to find a way to help this kind of start-up, if it wants to avoid bad message from frustrated incubated start-ups.

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3.3 AN EXPERIENCE IN INCUBATION: THE PHENIX LABPhenix has started its own incubator from the benevolent mentoring activities for future

entrepreneurs. Founders answered questions and solicitations from other founders at an earlier stage of development. The company developed a business from this free mentoring and opened an incubation unit in January 2017. The Lab has developed an answer from the lack observed by Phenix as an incubated start-up of multiples incubators. The program wants to be very operational and bespoken for start-ups. It targets only start-ups in the circular economy. As any corporate incubator Phenix used it as a sector’s watch. Phenix Lab is fully home-founded, no grants, no fees, no partners, funding this activity. It is the project of the executive but is not yet concretized. Tough no offices are provided, the costs encapsulate a full-time chief of project and some transport cost.

Applicants contact the Lab and meet the founders and chief of project for 2 hours. The program begins with a one-year incubation then Phenix takes a share in Equity and accelerates the start-up. If the first year is not a full incubation programme, no offices are provided, which is not an incubation for the literature. However, the second part of the program validates it as an accelerator. Even if it is described as an incubator, Phenix Lab is a private accelerator with a virtual incubation program in the first year.

Phenix does not have expectation on a return on investment for the Lab. The Lab helps, without hosting, 11 start-ups at the day of the interview. For Jean Moreau, we can expect success from only 3 seeds. We could compare this to Paris&Co incubated start-up which are 81% to survive until 5 years. However, Phenix gets side return from the experience, it can potentially hire failing founders and watches the innovation of the sector. The team is looking to professionalize the process, to build a jury, a process of application and find subsidies to concretize the business model.

This experience is truly interesting as an alternative to the Paris&Co model. No offices are provided, the mentoring is the key and provided by the entrepreneur, with the advantage and limit to not know all the matter. The Lab’s legitimacy derivates from the founders’ experiences. This experience shows the priorities of start-up’s founders. However, this kind of incubator don’t not jeopardize Paris&Co. First, they need to prove the accuracy of their model by showing results. Most importantly the demand of incubation is so important than we can presume that different offers can match diverse needs. The competition from generalist incubators could be a danger for Paris&Co (as the “founders program” by Station F). A corporate structure, which brings a complete different offer, is not a direct competition. This experience teaches us nevertheless some recommendations for the future of incubation.

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CONCLUSION

This work had as objectives to define and classify support structures to understand their strategy and objectives as an ecosystem around a practice case of incubation. This work tries to find some solutions to adapt Paris&Co to the competition and keep it in good place. It does not pretend to give disruptive solutions but suggest some possible paths. We can now recapitulate and give some recommendations.

From the conceptual part, we can conclude than the definition of incubator should be questioned. Is an office a necessary part of incubation in online economy? An incubator can be virtual and provide coaching only, the criterion of office facility is still accurate. On the other side an accelerator is properly defined by its interest in equity of start-ups. From this definition and the origin of the support structure’s funding, we can classify support structures in four categories. Private accelerator, public incubator, private incubator, impact accelerator. This categorization highlights the commercial interests and objectives of support structures which shape their strategy.

In a second part we analyse the business model of Paris&Co where we can observe a value proposition of start-up oriented on the young seed at the very beginning of their development even if the customer segment is wider. At the same time, the importance of corporate partners, invited to the incubator to deal with start-ups are in fact the second incubators revenue sources after the public subsidy which is transforming its strategic aim if the dynamic of public grant reduction continues. Paris&Co needs to determine which is its future. Public incubator? Semi-private incubator funded by corporate partners? The future will probably see more reduction of grant, with the reduction of tax revenue for French municipalities. The balance of power between actors and the attractivity and strategy of the incubator will change as partners revenue will proportionally grows. This choice should be made soon and assumed.

The analyse of a case of incubation, through an interview of the CEO and co-founders of Phenix, teaches us that the offer does not match the need of a mature start-up which looks to scale-up its organization and business. This observation substantiates the previous analyse of the model. The incubation programs provided by Paris&Co could be inadequate for mature start-ups. The “Hors Murs” offer could be legitimately questioned. How an incubation, which as see exists through an interpersonal relationship between the incubator’s staff in general, chief of platform as this one, we called craft in purpose - could be provide provided when the start-up is on the other side of Paris. The same questioning should be done on the “Développement” program to provide a true business acceleration to the start-up. The general and specific coaching should be re-fitted to these specific segments. Which implies multiple questions: new expert to find, new services (in law, HR, etc.). These imply multiple internal reflexions.

The second lesson of the case is that legitimacy is a value of exchange in the ecosystem. Incubators bring it to the young seed in their first business with large companies and investors. This legitimacy is the value watched by start-up to rate counsel and people giving them. To answer this problematic any tools using concrete experience of the community should be developed. Among them, coaching should be held and developed. It is a method to

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help a start-up from the first resource of the incubator, the community and a way to obtain types from a legitimate source, other entrepreneurs. The creation of an alumni club on the model of the Open-Innovation Club could be a way to build asset on Paris&Co legitimacy: its history. A club could be an additional network for alumni and incubated start-ups and a pool of experts with their own legitimacy as entrepreneurs and increasing Paris&Co’s one as a successful incubator. This is also a way to avoid mature incubated start-ups to play the role of mentor against their expectancy.

The challenge of the strategic counsel is another problem of chiefs of platform in their works. Strategic counsels impact directly the future and results of the start-up. Which legitimacy has the incubator to bring counsel when it is playing with other’s money? A way of working could be to develop processes which guide incubated start-ups without bringing direct counsel. Analysing the situation without bringing the answer. The maieutic, the Socratic way to make makes the Truth emerge. as comparison. Paris&Co must develop models to coach start-up by bringing tools and practical and personal workshops. We can even consider the building of a home method, born from the platform’s staff return of experience to coach step by step a company, a method which could be learnt to newly hired people from diverse professional backgrounds.

The last recommendation can help Paris&Co to manage the influence of corporate partners, the satisfaction of start-ups and the understanding of start-up’s needs. Field-observation during the internship shows that Start-up founders do not know their incubator’s operations. Corporate partner role is numb, differences between institutional actors are unclear (difference between Smart Food Paris and Paris&Co and the role of the RIVP) A solution could be to put co-governance in use to manage the incubator. The creation of general assembly of incubated at the platform level could be a way to concretize that. This kind of organ can receive delegation for some decisions and include start-ups in the management of their own platforms. It is a way for staff to communicate with founders on the incubator, and induce questions and requirements from start-ups and thus know with more accuracy their needs. If it could be a management challenge it could help to manage the platform day to day and help to sensitize the start-up to platform problem. Give responsibility to the actors is hardly a bad management decision.

The next step of this work could be to analyse if the traditional support structures, born in the USA, can operate efficiently in France. The model, Silicon Valley, is a singularity and nothing prove that a simple copy is efficient to develop a strong ecosystem. A systematic study should be done with economic, financial and strategic tools. The pursuit of this work could be by opening the way to a new model adapted to France with its institution, its weak private investment, its specific geography, its welfare state, its business practice, etc. Questioning the accuracy of the model in any case prepare prepares the next step, replace replacing it. The evolution of the ecosystem, the general reduction of grant subsidies, the development of the social economy could be the reasons of the emergence of a new model, with different strategic aims, maybe not focused on quick scale-up, may be maybe oriented on other expectations than digitalisation and disruption. Eventually, the pursuit of this work could create a model which cannot be integrated in this strategic oriented classification, which will become obsolete until a student in master of management finds a new one.

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Incubators and accelerators, these factories of innovation, should disrupt themselves. Transforming their own model, for their success, for the future of their start-ups, the growth of the ecosystem and the pursuit of innovation. The revolution has just begun.

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ILLUSTRATION TABLES

Figure 1: European commission’s typology of business incubator...................................12Figure 2: HR management practices and incubators.[8]...................................................13Figure 3: Positioning Accelerator and Incubator...............................................................15Figure 4: Positioning Private and public structure............................................................16Figure 5: The Typology Matrix.........................................................................................16Figure 6: Map of major French and foreign supports structures.......................................19Figure 7: Value proposition Canvas..................................................................................26Figure 8: The Paris&Co's Business Model Canvas...........................................................27

THANKS

Mr. Clement Chevrette, Miss Lucie Torres et Jeans Annie Salmon and all Paris&Co Teams to receive me and teach me what supporting innovation is.

Pr. Antonin Ricard for the support and guidance.

Mr. Jean Moreau, Phenix’s CEO and Founders to have taken on his precious time to answer my questions.

Miss Pauline Priez for her patient proofreading and support of my faulty English grammar.

Some specific thanks for Miss Mélanie Roux for the proofreading, counsels and support. “There is a woman behind each tall man” should be say.

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