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The Final Evaluation of the BDRCS/IFRC Cyclone Sidr Operation in Bangladesh: November 2007 –November 2009

Core Shelter, Bagerhat District, Bangladesh. The design of the core shelter was based on the wind resistant shelter developed during the 1997 cyclone response in the Cox’s Bazaar/Chittagong region, constructed with improvements to increase greater cyclone and flood resistance. Final Report Authors: Ateeb Siddiqui, Director of Operations, Pakistan Red Crescent Society Jeff Duncalf, Team Leader, External Consultant Sharmind Neelormi, External Consultant Umesh Dhakal, Executive Director, Nepal Red Cross Society February 2010

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Acknowledgements: On behalf of the team I would like to express our extreme gratitude for the help and support extended to the four of us by the staff, both former and current, of the Federation Delegation in Bangladesh, and the HQ and Unit level staff and volunteers of the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society. We are grateful also for the constructive dialogue we were able undertake with representatives of the Asian Pacific Zone Office and from the South Asia Regional Delegation. Furthermore, I would also like to thank those from outside the Movement who took the time to meet with the team and to share their thoughts, experiences and expertise. Finally, I would like to personally thank the evaluation team members for the commitment and enthusiasm that they have shown throughout this evaluation and for their valued input which I have relayed in this report. Jeff Duncalf, Team Leader.

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Table of Contents: Page 1: Cover page Page 2: Acknowledgements Page 3: Contents Page 4: Executive Summary Page 11: Background information Page 12: Purpose of the evaluation Page 14: Methodology Page 15: Results and findings Page 30: Conclusions Page 39: Recommendations Page 44: Appendices Page 47: Abbreviations

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Executive Summary:

Background: Cyclone Sidr struck the south-western coast of Bangladesh during the evening of 15 November 2007. It arrived as a Category-4 Super Cyclone with peak winds at 250 kilometres per hour, travelling in a north - north easterly direction, pushing through the coastal areas into rural central Bangladesh causing the mass destruction of infrastructure, housing and livelihood assets as it progressed. The cyclone resulted in a large scale homeless population, a massive blow to the population’s livelihood and survival strategies and an increased risk of diseases due to damaged sanitation facilities and polluted water sources. Approximately 30 of Bangladesh’s 64 districts were affected. A total of 3,295 people were reported dead, 53,000 injured, and there are currently 341 people still missing. Approximately 2 million families and 8.7 million people were affected. 1.5 million houses were damaged, bridges and thousands of miles of roads and embankments were washed away or destroyed. Since then, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BDRCS), and a number of partner national societies, have responded to the cyclone, and to the subsequent recovery needs, with a particular focus on four severely affected districts of Barguna, Patuakhali, Pirojpur, and Bagerhat. The operation followed a holistic community based approach for each targeted village, with a range of programmes including shelter, livelihoods, health, water and sanitation, and capacity building.   The evaluation team was made up of two external consultants, one a Bangladeshi national, and two senior representatives from National Societies within the South Asia region. The evaluation took place in February 2010. An extensive review of secondary data was undertaken, together with individual and group interviews with key informants, beneficiaries, volunteers, and programme staff from both IFRC and BDRCS. The team attended and fully contributed to a two day lessons learnt workshop in Dhaka with participants from all aspects of the response, followed by a five day field trip to the affected region. The purpose of this evaluation was to examine the extent to which the goal, objectives and expected results of the Cyclone Sidr operation were achieved during the relief and recovery phases, including the identification of lessons learnt, good practices, and areas of improvement for future programming. The evaluation focused on the entire Sidr operations (both relief and recovery phases), and addressed the following focus areas of the response:

Quality, relevance and accountability Effectiveness and efficiency of management Capacity of the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society

Main Findings: The Red Cross Movement has again shown its ability to respond quickly and effectively to a large scale disaster. The relief package was extensive and, according to the beneficiaries, was delivered in a timely manner, of a reasonable quality and quantity, and for the most part relevant to their needs. The emergency food items certainly went some way in alleviating each beneficiary family’s immediate food shortage. The staff of both the IFRC and BDRCS should be applauded for the immense effort undertaken to provide such a swift and wide ranging support during this phase of the response. The vast operational area remains one of the most remote and inaccessible districts of Bangladesh made worse at that time by extensive damage to its infrastructure.

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However, the Movements ability to follow up operational success in the relief phase with a smooth transition into recovery has proved questionable. The preparation for the recovery stage started too late and its implementation has seen too many delays. The one year gap between the end of relief and the start of the recovery implementation is disappointing, both for Movement, as well as for the beneficiaries themselves. Future operations will need to consider recovery needs much more effectively in the earlier stages of any emergency response, allocating the necessary staff and resources in order for this process to take place. Funds lost through the additional time spent could have been better utilised to further expand the support provided to the communities thus augmenting the overall response impact, and accelerating the recovery period of the beneficiaries. That said, the eventual delivery of the recovery programmes within the appeal timeframe was only possible due to the dedicated efforts of the IFRC and BDRCS recovery teams, together with the commitment of the new leadership of both organisations. This positive conclusion gives hope for more effective and efficient future operations. Although there are many positives to be taken from the operation in terms of the relief response, the shelter and latrine provision, and the livelihoods program, this has been a missed opportunity in terms of the development of the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society, which, at the end of such a huge operation, should have developed considerably their capacity to respond to future disasters, but seemingly haven’t. Although a great deal of hard work has been invested into the considerable support provided to the beneficiaries, specifically the intense effort to ensure that programme objectives have been met within the timeframe of the original appeal, the overall response could have been undertaken in a more timely, efficient manner, had a beneficiary focus and the humanitarian imperative prevailed throughout, and finally, had the implementing partners fully integrated and co-ordinated for the whole of the operational timeframe. There is a need to find the balance between speed and accuracy. The blanket approach to beneficiary support can of course lead to a small percentage of recipients receiving support that perhaps they may not desperately need. However, if this enables more timely support to those who do desperately need this support, then at times the decision needs to be made to accept this margin of error. A great deal of time has been spent in the operation identifying and monitoring beneficiaries who receive small amounts of funding e.g. the shelter repairing objective. How much did it cost to monitor this small support we have given? The cost benefit analysis of these types of control measures needs to be taken into account during future operations. The recovery phase witnessed a spiral of distrust and the creation of an “us and them” mentality between the IFRC and the BDRCS staff and middle management which needed to have been addressed at an earlier stage both locally, and at a SARD/Geneva level once it could be clearly seen that progress was not being made. This polarisation was overwhelmingly evident during the two day Cyclone Sidr lessons learnt workshop held in Dhaka in February 2010. Some good steps to improve the situation have taken place over the last nine months, when, with new senior management on both sides, the recovery phase geared up to complete its activities before the appeal deadline. Much improved co-ordination between the two organisations, a smoother decision making process within BDRCS, and a focused effort from

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everyone to complete the task, has seen the successful completion of the recovery phase confirm the potential for success the joint implementing organisations do possess. However, there remains a sustained need for greater transparency and inclusiveness on the side of the IFRC, matched by improved information sharing, commitment and initiative on the side of the BDRCS. Although in some ways the response can be said to have been integrated, there was certainly little integration between the two offices, and with respect to BDRCS, between departments. However, the comparatively new sets of senior management on both sides are a cause for optimism that this situation can be rectified. Future responses need to have a clear memorandum of understanding, readily available, and quickly signed, with standard operating procedures clearly defining roles and responsibilities. This should facilitate cooperation and co-ordination between IFRC and BDRCS, and should establish a sense of operational ownership within the BDRCS that was lacking during the recovery phase of the Cyclone Sidr Operation. This, and a greater beneficiary focus should enable a faster decision making process within the BDCRS organisational structure at both HQ and Unit level. Contingency planning needs to be finalised to enable an effective response to future disasters. Considering the population density and the inevitability of future natural disasters, the prepositioning of food and NFIs is clearly a necessity. The majority of the recovery phase implementation was undertaken between March and November 2009, a year after the Relief Phase had finished. Delays in providing delegates for key roles, gaps between delegates, too many changes in decision makers, and perhaps too many first time delegates have delayed this process. Significantly progress in any particular sector seemed to stop once the delegate was not available. Per Diem issues, and delays in decision making by BDRCS, notably finalising the beneficiary list, and approval of the strategic recovery framework, have been further factors in this delay. Although there were viable justifications for some of this gap, one year is unacceptable. The Livelihoods component of the response has been very successful and well received in the communities. This success however has been achieved with seemingly little support or expertise in this sector from either the IFRC SARD or the Asia Pacific Zone office. Ultimately the RCRC Movement needs to accept that Livelihoods will be an integral part of all large scale major responses, and although not a “core area”, expertise at a regional or local level needs to be identified that can be called upon to support a sector in which the IFRC and BDRCS are institutionally lacking. Despite this comment, the livelihood programme has been well implemented. Of particular interest are the participatory methodologies of social mapping and wealth ranking that identify the most in need of support. This process needs to be well documented and further investigated to see where time savings can made for replication in future responses. Opening of bank accounts for the beneficiaries was a particularly positive aspect as was the 15% additional support for female headed households. Supporting the beneficiaries with continued training on managing their livelihood activities would further improve their financial recovery. Some integrity issues were discovered in a couple of villages between beneficiaries and Community Committee members. However, considering the social background, this is to be

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expected, and should not detract from the successful approach that was applied. Moreover, it would have been better had a separate, HQ based, joint IFRC/BDRCS monitoring dept been established from the outset, which would have strengthened the ongoing sectoral monitoring, and would have facilitated a formal complaints procedure which should have, but didn’t exist. This should be included in the Memorandum of Understanding to be signed for each future response. IFRC and BDRCS should issue a warning of no tolerance regarding integrity issues. Replication of the core shelters, which have been very well received, and in particular the option to install an upper floor where the householders can seek refuge from rising waters, should be immediately available for future responses without the delay of time consuming design changes. The shelter has worked particularly well for those beneficiary families that have space available, and who have been able to add to the project’s additional funding support to expand the core shelter, as per the design philosophy. Unfortunately for those less affluent, or without the available space, therefore unable to extend the shelter, an issue has arisen as to the length of the roof awning/”verandah” which, according to the beneficiaries, is possibly too short. An extended roof, protecting the shelter both from rain and sunlight, could extend the life expectancy of the shelter’s bamboo walls from two years to between five to ten years. This possibility needs to be further examined technically to see if the roof can be extended without compromising its ability to withstand the high wind pressure. The ultimate issue therefore to be investigated is whether two variations of the same design should be available for future responses i.e. an allocated shelter design based on the ability of the family to extend the core shelter, or simply, one variation with the extended roof. This review needs to be undertaken immediately in preparation for any future responses. The blanket provision of latrines to each household within the villages is a great step forward, and much appreciated by the communities themselves, although the latrine structures, built by the beneficiaries themselves after receiving training on construction techniques, in many instances, could be improved upon. Continued health dissemination by the RC volunteers (a great potential that the BDRCS need to nurture and develop) and further technical and hardware support, where necessary, is essential for the programme to fulfill its potential. Prior to Cyclone Sidr there was no WatSan dept in the BDRCS, a situation to which the organisation has quickly reverted to now that response has finished. However, water supply in terms of tube wells, hand pumps, and sand filters remains an issue in some villages. More importantly however, is the reality that the next major cyclone will invariably need a similar water supply related response. Safe drinking water will always be an integral need for affected communities. The BDRCS therefore needs to build on the experience it has gained during this operation and establish a WatSan dept to enable a comprehensive response to future disasters. Health issues related to a clean water supply remain prevalent in the beneficiary communities. The Health Sector contribution to the response, once the relief phase mobile health teams had departed, was minor in comparison. Some good work undertaken by the RC volunteers needs to be built upon to provide a supplementary health service to remote communities with minimal access to governmental health services. Often the distance and expense involved for the villagers to reach a health centre is prohibitive. The possibility of small mobile health teams, as well as further training for the volunteers should be investigated.

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Fourteen cyclone shelters have been repaired as a part of the DRR component of the response. However some communities still do not have an accessible cyclone shelter. The possibility of constructing or advocating for the construction of new shelters, in co-ordination with the Government and external donors, would help fill this gap. Repairing more of the current shelters should also be looked into. It was observed that the toilet for the shelter is at the ground level. During any future cyclone/flood, the toilet would get submerged, therefore, it is recommended that in future the toilet should be constructed on the first floor or the roof. Finally, the original Appeal budget seems to have been somewhat off target with its cost estimates related to beneficiary numbers and construction possibilities. The methods utilised need to be reviewed, and standard costs for shelters, tube wells and latrines, food and NFIs should be made available now for future operations. The Appeal received 80% coverage, and during the operation the Swiss franc rate to the Taka strengthened making local purchasing effectively cheaper. Despite this, the actual cost (3.7Million CHF) of shelters built and repaired, 1250, and 5000 respectively, compares badly against the Appeal budget cost of 4.3Million CHF for the target of 5000 built, and 30,000 repaired. The comparison only marginally improves against the revised construction budget of 5.5 Million CHF. In general the accuracy of appeal budgetary forecasting needs to improve considerably. It might seem ungracious to question cost savings, however it would have been more in line with the operational mandate to utilise the full balance of funds available. As at February 2010, having paid out the final retention payments on the construction projects, 15% (2.97mCHF) of the funds received have not been utilised. (The December 2009 Final Appeal Report showed a balance unspent of 4.496CHF i.e. 23% of the 19,676CHF received). . These funds could have been used to further support the targeted beneficiaries within the sectoral responses. There remain distinct needs for example in watsan hardware, cyclone shelters, and healthcare provision, that will be more difficult and expensive to return to now, compared to the cost when delegates where in country and expertise was available. Unfortunately, the size of the leftover fund only became evident to the new management teams during mid 2009 when the actual implementation of the recovery activities was gaining momentum and it was too late to begin additional construction projects or new activities given the appeal timeframe that was to end in November 2009. Seemingly most staff were unaware of the ongoing funding situation as the reason, often quoted in the situation reports for reducing the programme size or beneficiary support, of cost restraints doesn’t appear valid. In conclusion, the last nine months of the recovery phase have shown that the BDRCS/IFRC joint implementing partnership can co-ordinate and implement quickly and effectively. The response has mostly been appropriate and relevant to the beneficiary needs, despite not fully including the communities within the programme planning or management. The Movement can take some pride in the quality of the immediate response, but has failed to convert this original success into an efficient, sustainable recovery intervention. Prior to the new management teams, the operation had lacked effective and efficient management, notably during the early stage of the recovery operation, and had spurned the

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opportunity to develop the BDRCS’s institutional capacity, which needs now to become the main priority so that future programs can be run by BDRCS with the support of the IFRC. A BDRCS Strategic plan needs to be drafted with the full participation of each department. Financial stability, through an improved public image, diversified income sources, and effective, empowered programming at both the HQ and the Unit Office level, is imperative. The organisation needs to be depoliticised with its constitution rewritten as a matter of urgency. Key recommendations:

i. Standard MoUs need to be available, supplementary to the IFRC/BDRCS co-operation agreement, adaptable to the emergency at hand, outlining SOPs highlighting operational responsibilities, ready to be signed, so that future responses can be implemented without delay. (This is equally applicable to the recovery phase).

ii. Contingency planning needs to be finalised to enable an effective response to future disasters.

iii. A well documented chronology of programmatic decision making should be available in all future operations. (This is applicable to all sectors and elements of a response).

iv. Stocks of emergency food and non food items need to prepositioned in-country to provide an immediate response capacity, enough to cover the expected delivery period before items can be provided from the Zone or purchased locally.

v. An immediate investigation of the advantages and disadvantages of extending the roof of the core shelter should be undertaken to decide on a final design for future replication.

vi. The BDRCS needs to advocate for and seek funding for the construction of more cyclone shelters. Any future shelter construction projects should ensure that the toilets are built in the same structure, perhaps on the roof or first floor, and not separately.

vii. The current community based health programme should be continued and expanded. viii. BDRCS needs to empower its senior staff in the field to make decisions, moving away

from a time consuming, centralized, bureaucratic decision making process. Operational decisions in an emergency should be the domain of the departmental directors and managers and not the governing body.

ix. During future responses the BDRCS Unit Office capacity needs to be bolstered with additional staff sent to support the ULO and local volunteers.

x. IFRC/BDRCS need to issue a warning of zero tolerance regarding integrity issues. A

clear disciplinary process needs to be established within both HR functions and disseminated to all staff.

xi. Future programmes should be run by BDRCS with IFRC support. xii. A PSP capacity, to be established within BDRCS under the health dept, should be

incorporated into the emergency stages of all future responses.

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xiii. An ongoing watsan capability should be established within BDRCS for the continued implementation of the PHAST programme, to enable a full response capacity for future emergencies.

xiv. Further efforts need to be made by both the IFRC and the BDRCS to restore trust

between the two parties. This should include, but not be confined to, greater transparency from the IFRC in terms of operational initiatives and financial information and greater commitment and information sharing within the BDRCS.

xv. The rewriting of the BDRCS constitution should be addressed as a matter of urgency both at a local, regional and Geneva level. This should separate the Governance and Management functions.

xvi. A BDRCS Strategic Plan needs to be drafted with the full participation of each department.

xvii. A financial and operational review of the BDRCS should be undertaken by an independent international audit company, or an international bank, to examine the current financial viability of the organisation and its operations, and to highlight steps that could be undertaken to improve the Society’s financial position.

xviii. Unit office and volunteer development should go hand in hand. Each individual Unit Office should have a development plan should be drawn up on a participatory basis.

xix. New fundraising initiatives need to be identified and implemented to generate separate sources of income for the NS

xx. The livelihoods program should be well documented for future replication. The continuation of the programme would be advantageous to the beneficiaries.

xxi. Practical, village level, DRR initiatives need to be identified and implemented either on a community led basis or with external funding e.g. cash for work initiatives re-building embankments.

xxii. An ongoing public awareness campaign needs to be initiated to inform the national population of the BDRCS activities. Alongside this the reputation of the society need to be monitored to gauge its public acceptance, and therefore its fundraising capacity.

xxiii. A “gender issues in disaster response” course should be run in Dhaka for both IFRC and BDRCS staff. Future operations need a gender office to ensure gender issues are fully incorporated in programme planning and implementation.

xxiv. A new, quicker, system of beneficiary selection needs to be outlined now for use in future operations.

xxv. IFRC/BDRCS Staff need training on how to include beneficiary participation within their operational response.

xxvi. For future large scale operations a joint monitoring dept needs to be established to whom any complaints can be addressed.

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Background information: Bangladesh is located on a low-lying river delta with over 230 rivers and tributaries situated between the foothills of the Himalayas and the Bay of Bengal. With a population of over 162 million living on an area of 144,000 sq. km, Bangladesh is currently the 7th most densely populated country in the world. The combination of its geography, population density, and extreme poverty make Bangladesh highly vulnerable to disasters. Bangladesh has two cyclone seasons each year: April till May and October to November. Numerous tropical storms form during these months, some of which grow into cyclones that hit Bangladesh’s coastal areas. The country is also very susceptible to flooding when monsoon rains swell the country’s numerous rivers overflowing into the flood plains that make up 80% of the country’s land mass. There have been several major catastrophes in recent decades, a situation which is predicted to be further exacerbated by imminent climate change phenomena. The well known Community Preparedness Program has made significant progress in reducing the number of lives lost to such natural disasters, however this system needs to be maintained and improved, expanding its focus beyond lifesaving to protecting livelihoods as well. The BDRCS is the Government’s joint partner with in this programme. Cyclone Sidr struck the south-western coast of Bangladesh during the evening of 15 November 2007 around 18.30. It arrived as a Category-4 Super Cyclone with peak winds at 240 kilometres per hour, travelling in a north-northeasterly direction, pushing through the coastal areas into rural central Bangladesh causing the mass destruction of roads, bridges, housing and livelihood assets as it progressed. Electricity and communication systems were knocked out, and roads and waterways became impassable. Drinking water was contaminated by debris and many water sources were inundated with saline water from tidal surges. The cyclone resulted in a large scale homeless population, a massive blow to the population’s livelihood and survival strategies, and an increased risk of disease due to damaged sanitation facilities and polluted water sources. Approximately 30 of Bangladesh’s 64 districts were affected. A total of 3,295 people were reported dead, 53,000 injured, and there are currently 341 people still missing. Perhaps 2 million families and 8.7 million people were affected. 1.5 Million houses were damaged, bridges and thousands of miles of roads and embankments were washed away or destroyed. The most affected districts are some of the poorest, most densely populated areas in the country, with poverty levels higher here than in most other parts of the country. The IFRC, BDRCS, and a number of partner national societies, have responded to the cyclone and to the subsequent recovery needs, focusing on the four most severely affected districts of Barguna, Patuakhali, Pirojpur, and Bagerhat. The operation followed a holistic community based approach, with a range of programmes including shelter, livelihoods, health, watsan, and DRR. The Relief Phase started immediately after the cyclone with the deployment of a FACT team to the affected areas. The distribution of food and NFIs to 13 districts started in December 2007, finishing in March 2008, supporting 73,320 families. The recovery programmes were completed in November 2009, within the appeal deadline, with the majority of the implementation taking place between March and November 2009.

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Purpose of the evaluation:

The purpose of this evaluation was to examine the extent to which the goal, objectives and expected results of the Cyclone Sidr operation were achieved during the relief and recovery phases, including the identification of lessons learnt good practices and areas of improvement for future programming. Objectives:

a. To examine the extent to which the operation has achieved its goal, objectives and expected results.

b. To determine if the operation was implemented in the most effective and appropriate manner given the context of Bangladesh and the scope of the objectives.

c. To assess if BDRCS is satisfied with the support provided by IFRC and Federation/Movement Partners with regard to the mobilization of external assistance and coordination mechanisms.

d. To examine the Movement/Federation cooperation mechanisms and relationships between BDRCS, IFRC and PNS.

e. To assess key achievements, challenges and areas of success, as well as areas for improvement within the operation and make recommendations to replicate or improve and inform future programming. These recommendations must be realistic within the context and the Federation’s constitution and modus operandi.

The intended audience for the evaluation is the IFRC Bangladesh Delegation, the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society, and the RC/RC Movement in general, Scope of work: The evaluation focused on the entire Sidr operations (both relief and recovery phases), and addressed the following key questions / focus areas: Quality, relevance and accountability

• How effective has the operation been in identifying the most vulnerable among the affected population and in developing appropriate strategies to respond to their particular circumstances? Was the beneficiary selection modality/process fair, appropriate and effective? What strategies were used to ensure quality, timely and relevant delivery to target beneficiaries?

• How effective has the operation been in terms of responding to the needs identified by the affected communities? Did it focus on the priorities of the target groups? And to what extent was the most vulnerable population reached / provided with assistance relevant to their needs?

• To what extent were/are the beneficiaries involved in planning, design and monitoring of the operation?

• How do the community level beneficiaries and other stakeholders in the Movement operation perceive the integrated nature of the support they received? Was it appropriate, enough, or subject to gaps which could be better addressed in future operations? What didn't work well when attempting to deliver integrated services and programmes?

• Were the operation’s strategies and priorities in line with the priorities of the Bangladesh authorities and other key coordination bodies (Government of Bangladesh and coordinating bodies including the UN co-ordination mechanisms)?

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• Were the operation’s components/programmes linked with the Government’s longer term plans/initiatives?

• Was the BDRCS baseline capacity well defined before the operation (if appropriate using the Characteristics of a Well Functioning or Well Prepared NS) and how are these measurably different (and better or worse) after the recovery programme and why?

• What was the strategy to build BDRCS's organisational strengths throughout the operation and have these been achieved and why/why not?

• How was the volunteering in emergencies (ViE) aspects of the operation addressed? Was there any inclusion of the ViE work undertaken in other parts of the AP Zone and did this assist in any way? How could volunteering support have been improved for use in future operations?

• What aspects of the operation were improved to ensure the needs of the affected population or communities were met?

• Were the activities planned and quality determined as per beneficiary need? • What important lessons have been learned which can a) improve future

implementation of programmes in Bangladesh and b) be shared with the wider Federation?

• What unanticipated positive or negative consequences arose out of the operation and why?

• Were gender and diversity aspects considered in planning and implementing the operation components (ensuring participation and equal access of services to women, socially marginalised and often excluded groups, etc)?

Effectiveness and efficiency of management

• Has the operation met its stated objectives in an efficient and effective way? (E.g. were inputs used in the best way to achieve outcomes and if not why not?)

• Were there adequate resources (financial, human, physical and informational) available and were they utilized effectively and efficiently?

• Were the global tools made available appropriate to the operational needs and were these appropriately mobilised in a timely manner? How effective were the operation's processes for planning, priority setting, monitoring and quality management (e.g. use of assessment data, internal reviews and other quality assurance mechanisms). Were regular reviews held at different stages of the operation?

• Was there adequate integration across the different programmes? • Was there effective coordination with Federation Delegation and PNSs? And how

appropriate and effective were the inputs of partner organizations in the implementation of the operation.

• Was there effective coordination between BDRC NHQ, Federation Delegation, PNSs and BDRCS Units?

Capacity of Bangladesh Red Crescent Society

• What changes in capacity, capability, understanding and learning have occurred

within the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society as a result of the ongoing operation? Are these appropriate?

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Methodology:

The review was undertaken by a team of four evaluators during the February 2010 as per the methodologies indicated in the inception note: • Desk research and secondary data review of key documents: the team carried out a

detailed review of all appeal documentation, plans, reports, programme documentation, and relevant information prepared by other stakeholders. An information matrix was utilised by each evaluation team member to facilitate information gathering, sharing, and consolidation. The format enabled each team member to put forward their comments and recommendations on each individual program or facet of the operation under review.

• Briefing: Prior to departure staff/personnel and before departing for the field a briefing was held with key personnel of the Sidr operations.

• Key informant interviews / group interviews as appropriate:

- Key BDRCS staffs / volunteers both at NHQ and Units level, community committee members and Red Crescent youth volunteers as well other volunteers trained by various sectoral programs.

- BDRCS District Unit Liaison Officers and staff - Key IFRC staff involved in the operation. - Relevant Federation staff in Geneva, KL, Delhi and the Bangladesh

delegation. - Representatives of the ICRC and partner national societies. - Key external stakeholders such as members of the Government of

Bangladesh, UN agencies, DFID, NGOs and other actors. - Interviews will also be held with randomly selected members of the

affected population with whom the Sidr operation has worked at community level.

A Q and A form was utilised by the team to maintain focus on the questions that need to be answered to comply with the requirements of the evaluation TOR. This did not constitute a formal questionnaire to be answered by each interviewee, although certain sections may be relevant for some, nor did it exclude other questions that may have been more relevant or applicable.

• Active Learning groups: the evaluation team attended and actively participated in the

Sidr Operations lessons learnt workshop held on February 3-4th. The workshop highlighted what went well and also some of the key lessons learnt from the operation.

• Field visits to engage with recipient communities: A five day field visit to the main project areas of Barguna, Patuakhali, Pirojpur, and Bagerhat was undertaken to witness the programmes first hand and to interview the District Branch Secretaries and officers of BDRCS. Short participatory beneficiary sessions in the recipient villages were made to get the beneficiary point of view on the efficiency and impact of the support they have received. Interviews with Key informants at a local level were undertaken.

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Results and findings: Relief Phase: The response was orchestrated by an emergency working group established at national headquarters. The morning after cyclone Sidr made landfall, BFRCS/IFRC rapid response teams were sent to the region with funds for the local provision of emergency supplies. Staff, already busy near the affected area dealing with floods that had taken place earlier in June the same year were reassigned. 20,000 family packs of food and NFIs, set aside for the floods, were made available for the cyclone response as no other emergency stocks had been prepositioned locally. DREF funds (250,000CHF) were made available, and a 9 member FACT team with representatives from SARD, BDRCS, Geneva, the Kuala Lumpur Zone Office, and PNSs, was deployed immediately, launching a draft emergency appeal followed by a full emergency appeal on November 25th 2007 for 24,483,160 CHF. A British RC ERU logistical team, together with seven RDRT members were immediately deployed, and 18 mobile medical teams were mobilised and sent to the region. Communication links were established using the Red Crescent Unit offices, unit volunteers, and CPP village personnel. The possibility of deploying an ERU Watsan team was considered at the time but rejected. With hindsight this additional support could have proved beneficial. Commencing December 1st a relief package containing 14 items of food and non food items, including water purification tablets, clothing, household and hygiene items, were distributed to 38,600 of the most affected families. Immediate priority was given to four of the worst hit districts of Barguna, Patuakhali, Pirojpur and Bagerhat. A further 9 districts were subsequently included in the distribution lists, making the total coverage in this first phase of the relief operations 13 districts, 73 Upazillas, and 73,320 families, approximately 330,000 beneficiaries. Not all items were distributed at the same time due to the logistical difficulty of having 14 items available. Access to the remotely located distribution centres proved difficult as road had been damaged and there were long delays at the ferry crossings. Some supplies were transported by boat to facilitate the process. The operation was not without its difficulties. There had been some delays during the selection of the beneficiary villages to be supported as political influence and personal preferences had started to become an issue. The governance functions at the national society Unit Offices should not have been involved with such managerial decisions. There is a debate also that we did not, but should have, only supported the most vulnerable villages. The distributions that took place outside of the four most affected areas were, of course not the most in need. Furthermore, even the level of need of some of the villages selected, in the four most affected areas was questioned by some staff. It also appears that there was a lack of documentation regarding some of the decisions taken between IFRC and BDRCS which led to uncertainty and ambiguity. The availability of the DREF funds, and the lack of communication on this issue created confusion and mistrust between the two implementing partners.

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There was a delay in the appointment of the Head of Operations to be positioned in Barishal, which had a detrimental effect on the response. The delegate finally took up his post three months after the arrival of the FACT team which recommended the position. Ultimately, the number of households supported (73,000), was less than the 100,000 target set in the Emergency Appeal. Considering the budgetary aspect of providing the food packet, which due to rising food prices was the most expensive aspect of the distribution, together with the fact that the extended timeframe needed for the remaining distribution would have taken the relief phase beyond the March 31stdeadline, it was decided to accept this shortfall and to utilise the stocks remaining for a second deferred NFI distribution. A post distribution assessment (PDA) was undertaken after the closure of the relief phase to assess the impact of the relief items. This was an extensive exercise covering 901 families over 6 of the 13 districts, approximately a 2% sample. Overall two thirds of the beneficiaries would have liked a greater quantity of the food items, particularly for large families, but, in general, their response to the commodities given was positive. That said, the quality of the Sarees, Lunghis, and blankets were seen by most beneficiaries to be poor. There was also little appreciation or perhaps understanding of the water purification tablets, and some concerns were made regarding the necessity of foldable jerry cans. Items not distributed that beneficiaries would have liked included children’s clothes, originally mentioned in the Appeal, water and baby food. This PDA initiative should be seen as a worthwhile exercise to be repeated in future operations. A second round of relief distributions, consisting of 6 non food items, started on February 10th 2009, aimed at supporting 10,675 beneficiary households in the four prioritised districts through the imminent cold spell and oncoming cyclone season. Unfortunately, before this could take place some items had passed their shelf life and had to be disposed of. There appears to have been little media coverage of the distributions, and this appears to have been a missed opportunity to raise the profile of the BDRCS. Undertaking an evaluation of a relief operation that took place over two years ago did contain some challenges, as few staff remained that were part of the original response team, and beneficiaries found it hard to remember the exact time it took before they received relief supplies, and from whom they had received them. Recovery Phase (by sector): Shelter: Cyclone Sidr caused damage in three ways: storm surge, flooding and wind. Some of the better built houses were resistant to wind, often serving neighbours as ad hoc shelters, but still sustaining damage through flooding and surge water. According to governmental reports, storm surge was by far the most powerful agent of destruction, resulting in the total destruction of housing structures in some areas. Wind caused some direct destruction but was generally quickly repairable, as was damage caused by falling tress.

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Approximately 550,000 houses were completely destroyed, and over 900,000 were partially damaged in the affected area. As many as 9 million people were without shelter initially, and 3.5 million were without shelter over a significant period. The majority of people who lived in the affected rural areas lived in basic homes, as expected considering their income and social status, constructed with poor quality corrugated iron sheets with simple wood or bamboo frames. These structures provided limited shelter or resistance to the cyclonic winds and rain. The Appeal divided the sectoral objectives into two: firstly, to support 5000 families with a new home, and secondly, to repair the houses of a further 30,000 families. This was later reduced to 1250 and 5000 respectively as the house construction implementation methodology was revised from an owner driven strategy, to an external contractor construction programme, therefore increasing fourfold the costs of constructing a core shelter, and the total number of houses within the communities totaled only 10,275, out of which 5000 were deemed in need of repair. The original appeal estimates were seemingly overly optimistic. Both objectives were supplemented with a cash grant and a tool kit, the latter was also supported with training in construction methodologies. With respect to the first objective, the construction of the core shelters, based on the wind resistant shelter developed during the 1997 cyclone response in the Chittagong region, redesigned with improvements to increase greater cyclone and flood resistance, has ultimately gone well, although the programme, as with all other programmes in the recovery phase, has taken too long to reach completion. The one year gap between the end of the relief phase and the start of recovery work is a disappointment. Time taken to finalise the beneficiary list, to redesign the shelter, and to tender (18.08.08) and re-tender (01.01.09) for contractors has delayed the start of the implementation period until March 2009. Matters were further delayed as some BDRCS staff lacked a beneficiary focus and the urgency to move forward. The lack of empowerment of BDRCS managers at the Barisal operations centre, and at the Unit offices slowed down the decision making process. That said, replication of the core shelters, which have been very well received, significantly the option to install an upper floor where the householders can seek refuge from rising waters, should be immediately available for future responses without the delay of time consuming design changes. The shelter has worked particularly well for those beneficiary families that have land available, and who have been able to add to the project’s additional funding support to use the core shelter, as designed, to expand on. Unfortunately for those less affluent, or without the available lands, which therefore cannot extend the shelter, an issue has arisen as to the length of the roof awning/”verandah” which, according to the beneficiaries, is possibly too short. An extended roof, protecting the shelter from both rain and sunlight, could extend the life expectancy of the shelter’s bamboo walls from two years to between five to ten years. This possibility needs to be further examined technically to see if the roof can be extended without compromising its ability to withstand the high wind pressure.

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The issue therefore to be investigated is whether two variations of the same design should be available for future responses, i.e. based on a family’s capacity to expand, or one variation with the extended roof. The notion that roofs were made shorter so at avoid loose CGI sheets injuring beneficiaries in future cyclones is somewhat irrelevant as most villages contain so many household structures whose CGI roofs could fly off during a strong wind. This review needs to be undertaken immediately in preparation for any future responses. Another cause for concern was how well the mud plinth would endure the effects of a continued flood situation. Initial feedback in the wake of Cyclone Alia is positive however this, as well as the owners’ continued maintenance of the plinth, needs to be monitored. The cost of the shelter, set at approximately 109,000 taka (1700CHF), was approximately three times as much as a Concern, ACF or World Vision shelter and twice as much as a Habitat for Humanity or BRAC shelter of a similar size, if not a greater square footage. (These figures are taken from the Shelter working Group draft report – Annex 1). This needs to be investigated further to check the accuracy of the report, but furthermore to see if the additional costs incurred were justifiable and provided a significant benefit. The additional support of 5000 taka (approx. 75CHF), given with the core shelter, was considered insufficient, by all beneficiaries spoken to, to expand the core shelter in all directions. Even if this was intended to help support the extension on in one direction, the estimated cost for this was said to be between 5,000 and 15,000 taka, dependent on the quality of the extension. There seems to have been up to 5 slightly different designs of the shelter utilised by Movement partners in the consolidated response. It would make sense to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each and formulate the optimal design. With respect to the shelter repair programme (objective 2), again beneficiaries suggested that, even with the toolkit and the construction training, the support, ranging from 5,000 to 10,000 taka was insufficient to fully repair their house. Furthermore consideration needs to be given as to whether, with such small amounts being distributed, the detailed beneficiary selectioning and monitoring processes were necessary, or could these administrative funds have been more effectively spent on an increased “blanket” distribution to all those villagers already preselected for technical verification? Like other recovery elements of the response this sector has suffered from human resource difficulties in that there have gaps between delegates (5 months in terms of the shelter repair programme), and long periods when there was only one delegate in country as opposed to the necessary two. On a positive note, there has been a tremendous effort, both by the IFRC staff and the BDRCS counterparts to finish the programme within the last 11 months of the Appeal timeframe. As one delegate wrote “80% of the work was done in 20% of the time”. The new management within both implementing partners had speeded up the decision making process and moved matters forward at a great pace. This tremendous effort should not go unnoticed, not just within the shelter sector but within all sectors active in the recovery phase.

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Health: Despite a three day delay before deploying, at one stage up to 18 mobile health teams, each containing a doctor, a paramedic, and a RC volunteer, were deployed to the 12 most affected areas during the emergency response phase of the operation. Access difficulties made reaching beneficiaries in the most remote communities a challenge. 25% of all cases treated were diarrhoeal and many more were related to clean water issues. Water purification tablets and oral rehydration packets were distributed as well as hygiene parcels as a component of the relief distributions. It was also discovered that there was a lack of awareness amongst the beneficiaries regarding health and sanitation issues which exacerbated the situation. The need therefore to disseminate basic primary health care information was clear. Unfortunately there seems to have been little progress on this issue from the end of the Relief phase in March 2008 until April 2009. Oddly the BDRCS counterpart working on the programme during 2009 did not have a medical background. Between June and November 2009 12 PHiE trainings among 263 community volunteers in 48 of the most affected communities had taken place, together with 10 experience sharing workshops among the same participants. The Federation guide to PHiE was translated into Bengali and distributed to key staff. This will enable the RC volunteers to respond with first aid support on a day to day basis as well as during future disasters. The medical teams encountered during the evaluation field trip seemed motivated and enthusiastic. They will need further support both in terms of training and first aid supplies. As with other programmes, it was felt that there was too much work for the one BDRCS unit level officer to deal with. As the sole person in the unit office responsible for organising volunteers and resources for shelter, watsan, livelihood, PSP, and health programmes etc, communicating with BDRCS HQ, as well as working with community committees and beneficiary selection, there were inevitable shortcomings and delays. Sadly there were some integrity issues associated with the Unit Office administration. This is unacceptable and all concerned should be immediately disciplined within a structured HR process. Any repeat offences should lead to instant dismissal. Overall, (and this applies not only to the health sector), the programme was seemingly run by IFRC with BDRCS support. Although, this is the wrong way round, at the time this was the only way of moving forward. Further implementation delays could have jeopardized the entire recovery operations. Selected, capable, BDRCS staff need to be trained to design and implement programmes and manage finances and budgets. This is difficult due to their lack of experience and technical expertise. BDRCS staff have complained that they lacked ownership of the Cyclone Sidr response and this needs to be rectified in future operations. For this to happen however, BDRCS need to prove themselves capable and trustworthy for such operational initiatives. This will take time and a great deal of patience and effort on both sides. Again, a great effort has been made in the last 9 months of this programme that should not go unnoticed. Trainings were undertaken despite security concerns, staffing issues, and logistical difficulties. The long term impact of the PHiE community based support needs to be

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monitored and assessed on an ongoing basis. If successful it should be replicated and expanded throughout all Unit level offices. PSP: It is inevitable that in such a large scale disaster there would be a great deal of trauma felt amongst the affected population a great many of which will have lost a family member, their house and possibly their livelihoods. Similarly, few RC volunteers have seen let alone worked amongst such devastation before. The need for psychosocial support in this scenario, as well as in future responses, is clearly visible. It is difficult therefore to understand why PSP was only introduced during the recovery stage of the operation and not during the immediate relief phase. Starting psychological support for post traumatic stress six months after the event is hardly optimal. The PSP delegate arrived in Barisal on March 8th 2008. There has been some good training undertaken with the 464 CPP staff and 1,001 community volunteers, although most volunteers spoken to felt that more trainings would be useful. The impact of such activities needs to be monitored, and, if successful, replicated at the Unit Office level throughout the country. All planned trainings have been successfully realised, and Federation training materials have been translated into Bengali, although the papers need a clearly visible BDRCS logo to be printed on them. As above, the program was an additional burden to the lone Unit Level Officers who had little time or inclination to get too involved. There were also budgetary issues and problems surrounding the timely transfer of cash to the operation. Water and Sanitation: The immediate relief response for this sector was the distribution of jerry cans and a large number of water purification tablets. An assessment completed in the districts of Bagerhat and Pirojpur in the second week of December 2007 determined that interventions were urgently needed for water supply and sanitation, however no repairs to the water supply were started before June 2008, this despite health statistics clearly showing a high prevalence of water supply related issues such as Diarrhoea. The Department of Public Health Engineering (DPHE) reported damage to 11,612 tube wells, 7,155 ponds and over 55,000 latrines. Considering the importance of the water supply and the damage it had received, clearly this response should have been started earlier. The refusal of a WatSan ERU seems to have been a mistake. The blanket provision of latrines to over 6600 households during the recovery phase is a great step forward, and much appreciated by the communities themselves, although the latrine structures in many instances might be knocked over by a strong wind and could be improved upon. A final design of the latrine needs to be agreed for future replication. This could be co-ordinated with the WASH cluster. Continued health dissemination by the RC volunteers and further technical and hardware support, where necessary, is essential for the programme to fulfill its potential. The estimated cost per latrine was approximately 50CHF. A further 103 tube wells were repaired, 3 sand filters and 18 bore holes were installed. Programme documentation has been translated into Bengali.

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The PHAST initiative should be followed up as only a small percentage of the target population (3%) has been reached. However there has seemingly been little ownership within BDRCS of this program in the past, and perhaps little enthusiasm to continue what has been started. Unusually the software element of the programme was started months after the hardware construction had begun. For improved community involvement future interventions should reverse this trend. Prior to Cyclone Sidr there was no WatSan dept in the BDRCS, a situation to which the organisation has reverted to now the recovery phase is complete. However, water supply in terms of tube well and hand pump maintenance, and sand filters remain a serious issue in some villages. More importantly however, is the reality that the next major cyclone will invariably need a similar water supply related response. Safe drinking water will always be an integral need for affected communities. The BDRCS therefore needs to build on the experience it has gained during this operation and establish a WatSan dept to enable a comprehensive response to future disasters. Health issues related to a clean water supply remain prevalent in the beneficiary communities and needs attention, specifically in two of the villages visited: Gabtola and Amtoli. This sector has suffered from too many changes of delegates and too many gaps between those changes. Obviously this affects programme continuity. The last Watsan delegate left in November 2009, not much has happened since. Seemingly there are still some latrines to be installed and two sand filters remain outstanding. If there is the capacity or the inclination to do this, in addition to the PHAST program, is unclear. The levels of bureaucracy and the lack of empowerment of BDRCS staff and the ULO have again led to a slow decision making process which has affected progress. Working with contractors and monitoring the standard of materials received has been an issue. Again the issue of integrity issue within BDRCS was raised by an outgoing delegate. Another issue affecting this sector but applicable to the whole operation, was the transparency of IFRC regarding the relevant operational budgets. This is an issue of great importance to BDRCS staff who feel this is a source of their lack of ownership and initiative. There is a lack of trust from both sides which needs to be addressed. The sectoral budgets are of course available on the IFRC website in the appeal documents, however this does not go into enough detail as far as BDRCS are concerned, who further feel that they have had little input into making the budgets. IFRC staff are suspicious of the motives behind the need for such detailed information. It should be noted that some contractors were also apparently wary of working with BDRCS, which was one justification for excluding their name from tendering processes, and for IFRC to maintain control of the procurement process. Livelihoods: The timing of the cyclone coincided with the imminent harvest of the main annual Aman rice crop. The destruction of thousands of hectares of rice paddy fields (normally harvested in December) together with the majority of the coastal fishing industry, raised fears of food shortages. The loss of livestock (almost 80 percent of the animals and 76 percent of the birds died in the four worst affected districts) and productive household assets (rickshaws, vans, small shops etc) destroyed the livelihoods of thousands of families, leaving them without their normal means to make a living and support their families.

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The original appeal called for the distribution of seeds and saplings as a relief item, although it seems this minimal idea was not implemented. A livelihoods assessment undertaken in December 2007 called for a more thorough recovery approach which was further expanded upon in the January 22nd 2008 Recovery planning meeting. Once implemented, the recovery phase livelihoods component of the response, was very successful and well received in the communities, however it has taken a very long time to get going. The early recovery delegate didn’t arrive until February 14th 2008 and left in August the same year. The next livelihood delegate was transferred from his relief delegate role on January 4th 2009. This success has been achieved with seemingly little support or expertise in this sector from either the IFRC SARD or the Asia Pacific Zone office. Ultimately the RCRC Movement needs to accept that Livelihoods will be an integral part of all large scale major responses, and although not a “core area”, expertise at a regional or local level needs to be identified that can be called upon to support a sector in which the IFRC are institutionally lacking. Despite this comment, the livelihood programme has been well implemented. Of particular interest are the community based participatory methodologies of social mapping and wealth ranking that identify the most in need of support. This process needs to be well documented and further investigated to see where time savings can made so it can be considered for replication in future responses. The opening of banks accounts in which the beneficiaries received their cash grants was a particularly positive aspect, as until then it had been almost impossible for the beneficiaries to access such services. Quadruplicate copies of ID cards however seems excessive. The 15% additional support to encourage female headed households to apply for the grant also worked well with, in such a male dominated society, one quarter of the recipients being female. Supporting the 5000 beneficiaries with continued training on managing their livelihood activities would further improve their financial recovery. Some integrity issues, such as payments by beneficiaries to Community Committee members to open bank accounts or to secure materials or support, were discovered in a couple of villages, however, considering the social background, this is to be expected, and should not detract from the successful approach that was applied. Moreover, it would have been better had a separate, HQ based, joint IFRC/BDRCS monitoring dept been established which would have strengthened the ongoing sectoral monitoring, and would have facilitated a formal complaints procedure which should have, but didn’t exist. Delays, as elsewhere, regarding beneficiary selection, protracted decision making processes, and overburdened ULOs were prevalent. However, yet again the outstanding effort by both IFRC and BDRCS staff and senior management to have the programme finished before the November 2009 Appeal deadline should be appreciated. Despite the vast terrain, the innumerable ferries, and the dire road conditions, both sides pulled together to get the job done. Capacity Building of BDRCS Disaster Risk Reduction The Bangladesh Govt./BDRCS Community Preparedness early warning program has responded well to the cyclone, informing villagers of the storm’s imminent arrival. Its

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success can be seen in the much reduced mortality figures compared to previous large scale cyclones. Further trainings of RC and CPP staff have taken place, and although there is some confusion as to whether the CPP staff are RC volunteers or not, both parties do seem to work together even if there have been some differences of opinion, both locally, and at a Government level. The CPP staff however are ill equipped and lack basic equipment such as flashlights, life jackets, or sturdy boots. The positive impact of the CPP, in terms of the reduced numbers of fatalities within recent disasters is unquestionable. It is imperative that the capacity of this structure is maintained and supported. Fourteen cyclone shelters have been repaired as a part of the DRR component of the response. However some communities still do not have an accessible cyclone shelter. The possibility of constructing or advocating for the construction of new shelters, in co-ordination with the Government and external donors, would help fill this gap. It was observed that the toilet for the shelter is sometimes in a separate building at a ground floor level. During any future cyclone/flood, the toilet would get submerged. Therefore, considering it could be 24 hours before the villagers can leave the shelter, it is recommended that the toilet should be constructed on the first floor or the roof. This is particularly helpful for the female community member who cannot relieve themselves so easily in public. DRR training has been given to 239 RC volunteers. However, this apart, outside of the inherent DRR within the shelter, livelihood and watsan programmes, little practical progress seems to have been made in building community resilience or increasing their preparedness to cope with and respond to future disasters. Contingency plans have been drawn up for 12 villages, however what impact this has had is not clear. One cyclone simulation exercise was undertaken. The development of the RC volunteers however has been a major success in the operation. This legacy needs to be built on and expanded throughout the Unit level structure, nationwide. This is a well trained, enthusiastic, experienced human resource that has two years experience in disaster response and recovery programming. The volunteers have been the backbone of the operations, undertaking assessments, making distributions, monitoring, and dealing with the local communities. This knowledge and experience should be refreshed and retained in the organisation for future disaster responses. The four unit offices in the most affected areas have been repaired, and two small warehouses have been built at RC offices in Barguna and Bagerhat. The warehouses currently sit empty. Some computers were supplied to the offices and power supply issues were rectified. Again the appeal seems to have been overly optimistic. The operation has come well short of the plan to build 5 new cyclone shelters and repair 47 existing ones. Organisation Development: Firstly, it must be clarified that the Chairman and Secretary General of the BDRCS changed at the start of 2009 (which coincided with a change in HoD at the IFRC). This completely separates the final nine months of the operation, which saw the completion of the recovery stages of the operation, due to a vast improvement in the commitment, initiative, and the decision making speed of the BDRCS compared with the previous 15 months. However there

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are still some issues that remain that were present for a great deal of the Cyclone Sidr operation:

There is a lack of interdepartmental information sharing. Communication systems need to be improved both internally and with the BDRCS Unit offices.

The documentation of operational decisions and the justifications thereof need to be clearly documented.

BDRCS is a financially troubled organisation which struggles to survive despite revenues from its Estate Services, the efficiency of which needs to be reviewed. Retirement payments cannot be made, and the flagship RC hospital in Dhaka consumes resources. The organisation probably needs to reduce its staff, but at the same time is unable to meet their redundancy payments. The Government of Bangladesh does not contribute financially to the organisation’s ongoing expenses.

HR procedures, typically the transfer of staff to functions for which they have little knowledge or experience, need to be reviewed and realigned.

The public image of the BDRCS is questionable. Contractors are wary of dealing with them due to lengthy payment delays and possible integrity issues.

There have been integrity issues that have not been thoroughly dealt with nor resolved.

There was minimal reporting being produced by the BDRCS during the operations, this would need to change should they become the lead partner in future operations.

The signing on July 5th, 2009 of a Co-operation agreement between the BDRCS and IFRC is a positive step forward. However subsidiary MoUs and SOPs need to be ready and available to be signed in anticipation of future disasters. There is a clear need for a strategic plan for the BDRCS and the Bangladesh Delegation as a whole. (There has been no Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) since 2002). This should be the driving force that moves the delegation and the NS forward, in an objective focused manner, over the coming years. The plan should include realistic goals and objectives for each department including contingency plans for disaster responses, and a financial plan of action. The upheaval caused every time a new government is elected affects the NS both at the HQ and the Unit Level Offices. HQ Senior level management and Unit Management Committees are replaced causing a lack of continuity and a loss of institutional memory and experience. One of the seven fundamental principles of the Red Cross Movement is Independence. The constitution of the BDRCS needs to be realigned to reflect this principle, at the same time separating the organisational Governance structure from the day to day management activities. This may be difficult however as the government sees the BDRCS as its first line of support for natural disasters, and may not wish to lose control of such an important political function. Of the four Unit Level Offices visited, three have had their management committees disbanded for various reasons related to efficiency or political affiliation. This does nothing to foster the capacity building of the Unit offices. During the Cyclone Sidr response the ULOs were said in many instances to be over worked and understaffed. For future responses these needs to be better managed with more human resources sent to the Unit Offices to increase their capacity.

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There have been a number of OD reports and studies in the past which have highlighted steps for the NS to take which would improve their performance. These recommendations have mostly been ignored. Similarly the Sidr Recovery Phase Strategic Framework recommended 8 key result areas that the operation should aim for. Again a lot of these suggestions were not pursued. The interim Sidr evaluation also proposed a number of recommendations, of which only a few were achieved. Together, IFRC and BDRCS need to strive for an improved performance at a managerial level, were issues raised, and problems highlighted, are followed by solutions offered and problems solved. A simple example is the recommendation for a monitoring department which has never materialised. Support Services Human resources: There has been a continual shortfall in IFRC delegates throughout the programme. Gaps between sectoral delegates, short mission periods, frustration induced refusals to extend, and delays before delegates have arrived, have led to a stop-start form of operation, specifically as activities seemed to have stopped when no delegate was in place. There seems to have been a high percentage of first time delegates which may have been due to the number of delegates active in the Tsunami response during the same period, however the overall indication is of a lack of delegate planning and foresight. There does not seem to have been a specific person responsible for the recruitment of delegates within the operation, this seems to have been an oversight.HR Management in the Asia Pacific Zone needs to review their support for this operation to see if there are lessons learnt to improve the provision of delegates to future, similar, operations. There has also been a shortage of BDRCS staff with the relevant sectoral experience to act as a counterpart for the operation. For a national society who has provided a number of overseas delegates in recent years this was surprising. BDRCS seemingly has too many directors and not enough programme officers. There also doesn’t seem to be an appraisal or staff development system within BDRCS. A number of staff have been redeployed into new, quite different roles after the end of the Cyclone Sidr operation. The HR management of staff within BDRCS needs to be reviewed. The Per diem issue seems to have led to a lot of ill feeling and dissatisfaction within the BDRCS. The payment or non payment of per diem should be clearly laid out within the co-operation agreement or disaster specific MoU at the start of the response. This issue is certainly one of the central points behind the divide that was created between the two teams. Once resolved in June 2009 the operations were able to proceed at a strong pace. Logistics: A regional logistics delegate was sent by KL RLU immediately to provide additional logistics support to the country office. In addition, a British Red Cross logistics ERU was deployed for a month which was later extended for another month to assist in particular the reception of international consignments arriving by air and sea at Chittagong and Dhaka as well as setting up the warehouse in Barisal. A senior procurement officer from Geneva, arrived in Dhaka to speed up the procurement approval process.

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There were of course tremendous logistic challenges in providing a package of 14 separate items across a wide, difficult to access, terrain. Items were sent by road and by boat, whatever was deemed the most appropriate. In general, IFRC have retained control of the procurement and logistical functions and it appears this has gone well. No doubt, the number of IFRC staff present at the very start, and one of the logistics delegates remaining on mission for the full term of the operation, has facilitated the process. The only complaint has been the need for faster procurement during emergencies when it is felt that some of the rigorous controls could be marginally relaxed in exchange for expediency and the humanitarian imperative. Financial aspects: Certainly, it was outside of the remit of this evaluation to conduct a financial audit. However, the general impression is that the day to day financial aspects of the operation have been well managed, and that donor reporting has been well done. Nevertheless, there have been some complaints in a number of sectors regarding the slow transfer of money, either to the Unit Office or to the operational sector. Seemingly this was due to lack of financial capabilities in the Unit offices, and the numerous levels of authorisation through which each document needed to pass before a payment or a transfer could be made. This needs to be reviewed and a more streamline version made available for future operations. IFRC transparency in terms of the funds available has been an issue throughout the response. Although responsible to the donors for the usage of the donations IFRC need to share more financial information with the BDRCS senior management and programme staff. The Appeal budget seems to have been somewhat off target with its cost estimates related to beneficiary numbers and construction possibilities. This needs to be reviewed, and standard costs for shelters, tube wells and latrines, food and NFIs should be made available for future operations. The Appeal received an 80% coverage, and during the operation the Swiss franc rate to the Taka strengthened making local purchasing effectively cheaper. Despite this, the actual cost (3.7Million CHF) of shelters built and repaired, 1250, and 5000 respectively, compares badly against the Appeal budget cost of 4.3Million CHF for the target of 5000 built, and 30,000 repaired. The comparison only marginally improves against the revised construction budget of 5.5 Million CHF. In general the accuracy of appeal budgetary forecasting needs to improve considerably. Project to date expenditures, according to the December 2009 Final Appeal Report, stood at 15,1M CHF i.e. 77% of the 19,7M CHF received. Retention costs and other outstanding payments have brought the under spend down to approximately 15% by February 2010. Theoretically these funds could have been used to further support the targeted beneficiaries within the sectoral responses. Unfortunately, the size of the leftover fund only became evident to the new management teams during mid 2009 when the actual implementation of the recovery activities was gaining momentum and it was too late to begin additional

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construction projects or new activities given the appeal timeframe that was to end in November 2009. Reporting: In terms of donor reporting this seems to have been done by the IFRC. This skill needs to be passed on to BDRCS for future operations should they wish to take the lead. It is not clear how much local media coverage the operations received. However BDRCS certainly need the exposure to improve their public image. Interestingly, despite huge signs at the edge of each beneficiary village highlighting the activities of IFRC/BDRCS, the Additional District Commissioner in Pirojpur had no idea of what the BDRCS had been doing in his district. Neither did the Relief and Rehabilitation officer nor the local magistrate present at the meeting. Seemingly the Unit Office had never sent them a report. Admittedly the normal governmental contact point was the DC himself, however, it is a small reflection of the public awareness of what work is being undertaken. Security: Security during the response and at present is well managed. There was one specific incident of a threat from a local radical group which led to the relocation of the Barisal office to Dhaka and a closure of the operations for three weeks. The threat was later not thought to be from the group named, however, it did lead to another unwanted delay. Cross Sectoral threads: Gender: Although some proactive gender emphasis was given to pregnant or lactating mothers, widow/female headed households, or elderly women living alone within the beneficiary selection and livelihoods programme, there does not appear to have been a gender appropriate focus in the operation. In fact, during the two day lesson learnt workshop the word “Gender” was not mentioned. The lack of a gender unit/officer in either IFRC or BDRCS reflects the low emphasis placed on gender within the operation. The subject was not mentioned in the Appeal. There needed to be a higher representation of women in the community medical teams to deal specifically with health issues surrounding pregnant, lactating mothers, or gynecological problems. There were few women working at the Barisal operations centre or in the Unit Office management. Co-ordination: The lack of an operational MoU or co-operation agreement at the start of the relief operation has certainly led to confusion about who should have has been responsible for what, although somehow co-ordination during the relief stage was reasonable. The recovery phase saw the escalation of the problem, with each sectoral report stating that co-ordination has been an issue. A lack of trust and the creation of an “us and them” mentality between the IFRC and the BDRCS staff and middle management arose, which should have been addressed at an earlier stage. This was overwhelmingly evident during the two day lesson learnt workshop, and although this has improved considerably during the

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implementation period of the recovery phase, this issue will need a sustained effort on both sides to defuse. Although in some ways the response can be said to have been integrated, there was certainly little integration between the two offices, and with respect to BDRCS, between departments. However, the comparatively new sets of senior management on both sides are a cause for optimism that this situation can be rectified. Outside of the Movement, there doesn’t seem to have been a great deal of interaction with other NGOs beyond the cluster meetings. Integrity: This issue has been mentioned previously in the report and there remain little more to say save that unless the attitude of some staff is rectified, and that unless the BDRCS Senior Management take a clear stand on the issue , then the future reputation of the BDRCS will remain questionable.. Specifically, the incidences of beneficiaries in Patuakhali being charged by Community Committee members to open bank accounts, or to receive houses or financial or material support need to be fully investigated. The system for electing the community committee members should also be reviewed as this will be a pivotal role in any future similar responses, and a has been a common source of integrity issues. At times it has been said that these were people of influence who could not be challenged. In other places if they did not properly represent the community they were removed by the community members themselves. Beneficiary Selection: For the recovery phase, a joint assessment was conducted in all four districts starting in April 08. The teams visited over 70 communities and prepared a socio-economic and damage profile. The process was coordinated with local government authorities, paying particular attention to the advice and recommendations from the district commissioner (DC), district relief and rehabilitation officer (DRRO), and upazilla nirbahi officer (UNO). The field assessment focused on all components of recovery programmes to identify and plan for each sectoral intervention. Moreover, the accessibility to those communities was also assessed. The targeted villages were classified under categories A and B. Clusters were formed and priority was given to category A as the first area of programme intervention and category B as the second priority area for intervention. This prioritization was made by the respective BDRCS district units based on the assessment result as well as a better understanding of their own locality. Accordingly a total of 12 clusters comprising 33 villages in four districts were selected for the recovery program. This was followed up by a door-to-door technical verification of each household. In total 10,272 households were surveyed, and then resurveyed by each relevant sector from which they would be supported. Seemingly as accurate a process as could be undertaken was made. There was of course still some opportunity for political influence and not all villagers may have been the most needy

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villages in the area. However, despite some rumours, there is only minor evidence of one or two beneficiaries using their influence to receive support they were possibly not entitled to. None of the beneficiaries could be termed “well off”. Female headed households and elderly families with no sources of income were targeted. Disabled families were also amongst the target criteria. Unfortunately after the “master” list was finalised it took several months for the list to be approved by BDRCS. This was an unnecessary delay. The draft recovery framework had been outlined at a meeting on January 24th 2008 but this also had taken four months to approve. These are clear factors in why the recovery phase started so slowly. Beneficiary Participation and Accountability: The Community Committee members, CPP, PSP, Community Health staff and RC volunteers have been involved throughout the project in various roles; a high percentage of these staff are based in the beneficiary villages. There has been some effort to include the beneficiaries in the design and implementation stages of the programmes, however this has varied from village to village and more could have been done in terms of including the beneficiaries in programme design, planning, the selection of the villages to be supported, and in terms of notifying the beneficiaries of what they are entitled to and of programme progress and monitoring results. This is reflected in the lack of knowledge amongst the beneficiaries as to what they were to receive on distribution days. Alongside the large billboards highlighting RC activities could have been an information notice board which could have been used to disseminate the Red Cross mandate, contact details of contact persons, planned activities, distribution dates and locations, health awareness information, and the complaints procedure which should have been, but wasn’t, in place. Only within the livelihood program were participatory techniques used. These should be documented for replication. Monitoring: Although there has been a monitoring function at the IFRC office, this activity has not been undertaken thoroughly and the monitoring of each sectoral performance has been left to that department itself. There has been no official monitoring function at the BDRCS although senior managers have played that role to a certain extent on field trips. Sustainability: Questions arise as to who will look after the maintenance of the tube wells and monitor the usage of the latrines? Also, who will continue to replenish the first aid kits for the community health volunteers? Furthermore, now that the PSP delegate has departed who will continue to train the volunteers? The long term sustainability of some of the programs has not been thoroughly thought through. The exit strategy has not been properly considered Climate change considerations: There was a lack of orientation towards climate change issues. The shelter plinth was designed with normal flood levels in mind. This may well be inadequate in years to come.

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Conclusions:

Relief Phase: Despite not having a contingency plan, a co-operation agreement, or a MoU in place, the immediate response to Cyclone Sidr was nevertheless reasonably efficient and effective. In spite of the vast operational area, which still remains one of the most remote and inaccessible districts of Bangladesh, made worse at that time by extensive damage to its roads and bridges, the operation managed to access and support over 330,000 beneficiaries, who, at that time were in desperate need of food supplies amongst other necessities. It was fortunate that stocks of emergency supplies were available from the 2007 floods programme else there would have been serious delays to the response while items were purchased locally or transferred from the AP Zone warehouses. Regulations regarding local purchasing did slow down the operation as there had been no pre-selectioning of suppliers, and procurement procedures seemingly could not be compromised. The PDA exercise was a good initiative confirming that the relief package was appropriate and, in general, was delivered in a timely manner, of a reasonable quality and quantity, and, for the most part, relevant to the beneficiary needs. The emergency food items certainly went some way in alleviating each beneficiary’s immediate food shortage. It also highlighted however the lack of beneficiary consultation or participation in the relief process. Most beneficiaries did not know what they would be receiving or were unable to read their beneficiary card. Future responses should look at the possibility of increasing the distribution of items that can be sold locally e,g, rice, so that the beneficiaries themselves can decide what household items they need. This would also reduce the logistical dilemma of procuring 14 separate items, which in essence is probably too many. The operation was not without difficulties however and could have been finished earlier had some decisions been made more quickly and had more empowerment been given to the BDRCS managers in the field. Similarly the local BDRCS Unit officers were reluctant to move without head office confirmation. This centralized approach is unsuitable to emergency relief operations. Relief distributions could have been used to raise the profile of the BDRCS as well as for the dissemination of hygiene promotion or other awareness raising issues. Experience gained during the Sidr response has strengthened the capacity of BDRCS to respond to future emergencies but only marginally. Improvements can be seen in the increased knowledge of the RC volunteers and their future potential. Recovery Phase (by sector): Shelter: Like all of recovery phase programmes the shelter sector has suffered from the delays in the selection of beneficiaries. This has been further compounded by the redesigning and tendering processes. It is also disappointing that we have been able to only meet less than

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25% of the original appeal targets for beneficiary support. UNDP considers there are still 160,000 families in need of new shelters in the affected areas. The core shelter in itself however has been a success in terms of beneficiary acceptance and should be ready for immediate replication should the need arise again. The only issue that needs to be addressed is the length of the roof/awning. The possibility and consequences of lengthening the roof, both in financial terms and in the lifespan of the bamboo walls needs to be investigated. Compared to other agencies, the cost of our shelter is high. It may well be a superior structure, with a greater resistance to high winds or greater flood protection. However, this needs to be confirmed as the cost differences are substantial. The Taka lump sums, given to supplement the core shelter expansion, or to repair damaged housing, seem to have been insufficient. Considering the cost savings inherent with the reduced numbers of beneficiaries supported, it should have been possible to increase this amount so that the lump sums, especially with respect to the numbers of repaired houses targeted could have made a significant impact. One worrying aspect is that due to the time taken before the cash lump sums were distributed, some families may have deferred any repair work due to the perceived potential loss of benefit. With respect to this element of the shelter response, it may have been better to look at cash for work initiatives combined with the provision of materials, especially considering the number of female headed households that may have struggled to undertake the repair work themselves. This would have precipitated beneficiary recovery and provided a local market stimulus in the early days of the response. HR management has been a problematic issue throughout the Sidr Response. There have been too many gaps between delegates, frustrated delegates not extending their contracts, and possibly too many first time delegates. As a non core area shelter may have suffered more than most. If necessary, the option to deploy staff from Geneva or the AP Zone Office on a short term basis should be investigated. The final 11 months of the operation have illustrated the true potential and capability of the implementing organisations. This should be built on and taken into the next shelter sectoral response. Health: The Health Sector contribution to the response during the emergency phase was much needed and well implemented. However, once the health teams had departed, there was too long a gap (one year) before the implementation of the PHiE program. This has been a missed opportunity made even more disappointing by the clear need for medical support in the communities. Some good work has been undertaken with the RC volunteers. The capacity of the individuals and that of the Unit offices has been increased. This needs to be built upon to provide supplementary support to remote communities with minimal access to governmental health services. Often the distance and expense involved for the villagers to reach a health centre is prohibitive. The volunteers need more training to build their confidence.

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Possible interventions in the form of small scale mobile health teams or with respect to training traditional birth attendants or mother and child health clinics should be investigated. For future responses the BDRCS Unit Office capacity needs to be bolstered with additional staff sent to support the ULO and local volunteers. Integrity issues have been mentioned in many instances by individuals within the response. IFRC staff are governed by the IFRC code of conduct, however, within BDRCS, there does not seem to be an official process for dealing with such issues. If there is not a formal procedure in place there needs to be. The long term sustainability of the PHiE needs to be considered. Who will support these volunteers in the future? There will be a constant need for first aid materials and continued training. PSP: It appears that BDRCS has not completely “bought into” PSP as an element of future disaster responses. This is understandable as it is a comparatively new concept. However, there will always be a need to psychological support in large and small scale disasters. As such BDRCS should be encouraged and supported to establish a PSP capability within the health department, and as such build on the experiences gained in the Sidr response, to be used in future operations. There has been some good work undertaken with the community based CPP staff and RC volunteers some of whom are now capable of providing psychological first aid. This needs to be built on, its impact monitored and possibly replicated throughout the Unit Office structure. The IFRC should have had a delegate in place earlier to provide support to the staff and beneficiaries in the relief phase, and to elaborate a recovery plan for immediately after that phase was over. Water and Sanitation: The inclusion of a watsan delegate in the first wave of arrivals for any flood/cyclone operation in Bangladesh is a necessity. There is little current capacity within BDRCS and there are few indicators that this will increase. The sustainability of the programme does not appear to have been looked into in detail. If no Watsan department is adopted into the BDRCS structure how will the effectiveness of the latrines and health training be monitored ? Experience gained during the cyclone Sidr operations needs to be built on. The establishment of a PHAST trained watsan capability in the BDRCS office is essential for the continuation of the program. The impact of the latrines needs to be monitored over at least a two year period. In future, the software element of the PHAST programme should be instigated before the “hardware” latrines are constructed. The possibility of Water Purification Plants should be investigated to be used in future responses. This should only be done if there is a specialist staff member in BDRCS who will control the purchasing and installation process. Similarly, the possibility of supplementing beneficiary rain water harvesting should be looked into as this is a cheap source of drinking water.

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The IFRC need to be more transparent, and inclusive, in the budgeting and financial management aspects of current and future operations. However BDRCS do not need to be involved in the core costs expenditures of the delegation. For this to work BDRCS also need to institutionalise clear procedures re integrity issues. Until this has clearly been addressed procurement and contracting will need to remain with the IFRC The difficulties of working in a highly corrupt national environment should not be underestimated (Bangladesh has a ranking of 139 out of 180 in Transparency International’s corrupt countries league). Holding a position of authority immediately leads to suspicion irrelevant to how the incumbent behaves, as others, knowing how they would use the position for making money, therefore assume the incumbent is behaving in the same way as they would. Openly slandering another without documented evidence is commonplace. To get to the truth of the matter is almost impossible. Red Cross and Red Crescent staff, therefore, has to be cleaner than clean, and be seen to be as such to improve the reputation of the organisation. The BDRCS needs to work on its public image. The best way to do this is to focus on managing well publicised beneficiary focused initiatives and programmes. Livelihoods: Although there was a livelihood delegate on the FACT team, the transition from relief to recovery didn’t go well at all. The first cash grant was distributed on July 15th 2009. More emphasis needs to be placed on planning the recovery phase during relief operations. The possibility of using British Red Cross Household Economic Security delegates on a one month contract to kick start the recovery work should be investigated. The programme, once implemented, has been of great benefit to the beneficiaries and should be extended to enable further support in the form of animal husbandry and business management training. The additional time will also allow further monitoring of the programmes full impact. In essence, it should have started earlier and should last longer. The livelihoods process, particularly the social mapping and wealth ranking elements, should be well documented and replicated within the region and elsewhere, especially if the time taken to select beneficiaries can be shortened. BDRCS has now undertaken its first cash based programming initiative since the 1997 Chittagong intervention. Although understandably cautious at first with the possible problems associated with dealing with cash, solutions were found at each stage of the process and the programme ultimately met its objectives. Capacity Building of BDRCS Disaster Risk Reduction: The CPP has had a very positive impact on the well being of its community members. However more can be done in terms of the provision of additional cyclone shelters and equipping CPP staff. The original appeal estimate of 47 shelters to be renovated seems to have been overoptimistic. It is again imperative that this life saving system be maintained and

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supported. Funding is not available within Bangladesh for this, fundraising will need to be undertaken with overseas partners and donors. More practical issues need to be identified and rectified at a village level in terms of improving resilience for future disasters. This could include strengthening or repairing embankment walls, improving the construction of homes and other buildings in the community (outside of those constructed or repaired by the response), and planting trees to reduce the impact of the storm winds. Volunteer management and tracking should be an ongoing initiative within the BDRCS. When a volunteer moves district, for example to work or study, s/he should be immediately linked with the relevant Unit Level Office, so that the valuable training and experience is not lost. Contact details should be continuously updated. A capable person needs to be put in charge of volunteer retention, training and management. Volunteers expressed the need for continued refresher courses and ongoing training, specifically within Health and PSP initiatives. Some prepositioning of DM stocks needs to be undertaken in the two new RC warehouses. The sustainability of this prepositioning needs to be clarified within the BDRCS. Organisational development The recent recruitment of an OD delegate is a positive step, however, it must be made clear that capacity building is the responsibility of all IFRC staff. More significantly BDRCS need to have ownership of this process and commit themselves to change and the strengthening of internal rules and procedures. This delegate role should have been in place throughout the response. There is much to be done regarding the de-politicising of the NS, amendments to its constitution, and the establishment of standard operating practices for future disaster responses, as well as for the day to day management of the organisation. This will require a concerted effort from all parties concerned including IFRC and ICRC Geneva. Future responses need to have clear memorandum of understandings, quickly signed, with standard operating procedures clearly defining roles and responsibilities and decision making capabilities. This should facilitate the cooperation and co-ordination between IFRC and BDRCS, and should establish a sense of operational ownership within the BDRCS that was lacking during the recovery phase of the Cyclone Sidr Operation. It is hoped that this and a greater beneficiary focus will enable an improved operational performance within the BDCRS organisational structure at both HQ and Unit level. BDRCS needs to embark on a long term public awareness campaign aimed it informing the general population of its activities and improving its public image. This needs to be accompanied by long term fundraising initiatives both for the HQ and for individual Unit offices. The possibility of resurrecting the system for BDRCS core cost recovery should be investigated. The recruitment and allocation of staff should be based on experience and qualification. Furthermore the recycling of ULOs from Unit to Unit seems to be undertaken on a biannual

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basis irrespective of whether or not the ULO is performing well or not. This practice should be reviewed. The Unit offices and the volunteers are the future of this organisation. Their capacity needs to be raised and the officials empowered. A Unit Office capacity building programme needs to be developed, funded and implemented. The ULO need to be more empowered during future operations. Training in financial accounting, management and reporting would be advantageous. The system of BDRCS “work orders”, whereby the HQ needs to draft an order before the Unit Office can undertake an activity, does not match well with emergency response practicalities. There needs to be emergency protocols which empower the Unit Offices to respond quickly to the changing environment during emergencies. There are many positives to be taken from the operation, however overall this has been a missed opportunity in terms of the development of the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society. The only significant improvement can be seen to be the increased capacity and enthusiasm within the BDRCS RC Unit level volunteers. The organisation itself is at a pivotal moment in its existence. Considering its unenviable financial position, its lack of a strategic plan, and its reliance on Movement partners to meet numerous salaries (a figure of 25% was quoted), if considerable immediate actions are not implemented the organisation could slip into bankruptcy and dissolution. A great deal rest on the shoulders of the new Chairman and Secretary General. Thankfully the concluding months of the recovery program have shown they are capable of making effective decisions, moving forward, and meeting objectives. The NS should be supported as much as possible to formulate this change management process. Support Services Human resources: The IFRC needs to improve and diversify its delegate sources both within the region and externally. Delegate planning should be a key function of the head of delegation or head of operations in future operations. It is important that the IFRC look to utilise staff locally available before recruiting externally. BDRCS needs to examine its staff structure to ensure a balance between managerial and implementing roles. A complete review of the HR system would be valuable. Per Diem regulations needs to be clarified, established and maintained. There should only be per diem payments for staff leaving their designated operational base. No per diems should be paid for attending workshops in a staff member’s work location. Logistics: For BDRCS to run operations in the future they would need to substantially improve their logistical and procurement procedures and capabilities. The prepositioning of stock and the identification of warehouse space and trusted suppliers needs to be undertaken now so as to ensure a fast response to any future disasters. This would go some way to counter the possibility of procurement delays affecting operational success.

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Current stocks are for 5000 families, considering the population size and the countries propensity for disasters; perhaps we could increase this prepositioning to cover up to 25,000 families Finance: Future financial approval procedures need to be agreed now and made available for standard operational MoUs in advance of any future jointly implemented programmes. BDRCS will need some training with respect to the budgetary and financial management procedures required to comply with donor audit requirements. IFRC need to be more transparent with the amount of funds available for future projects. The Appeal budget under spend, together with the costs incurred during the one year gap between the end of the relief and the start of the recovery phase implementation period, could have been better utilised to further expand the support provided to the communities thus augmenting the overall response impact, and accelerating the recovery period of the beneficiaries. The funds received have not been efficiently utilised. In light of the ongoing water problems in some villages, surely some of the remaining funds could be utilised to address this problem. The “shelter/livelihood cash grant programme and distribution modality” should be considered for future replication. Reporting: Training in report writing needs to be undertaken within BDRCS should they wish to take over the implementation of future projects and programmes. Any opportunity to raise the public awareness of the BDRCS activities should be taken. Security: The security procedures are suitable for the conditions under which activities operate. The main day to day threat is from vehicle accidents. It may be wise to have a driver available beyond 10 pm for delegate staff at the weekends. If not they have little option but to take, contrary to the security regulations, taxis or rickshaws in order to get home from any late night social events. Communication in the field is currently reliant on the mobile phone network. A reserve system of satellite phones or HF radios needs to be available to put into operation whenever a cyclone warning is in place. The equipment needs to be charged and tested on a regular basis. Cross Sectoral threads: Gender: Although some positive steps were taken to address some of the problems for women in the villages, a cross sectoral gender integration was missing from the response. The level of gender awareness needs to be raised in both the IFRC and BDRCS offices. Gender in disaster trainings need to be undertaken.

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A gender assessment at the start of both the relief and recovery phases would have highlighted the specific needs for women in the communities. The relief items could have included items such as children’s food which would have alleviated some of the strain amongst the female family carers. Psychosocial support could have been target to those women widowed in the disaster. Co-ordination: Although co-ordination between the two organisations certainly improved in the final implementation stages of the response, once the new senior management teams were in place, for the situation to continue improving there is a sustained need for ongoing dialogue, with greater transparency and inclusiveness on the side of the IFRC, matched by improved information sharing, commitment and initiative on the side of the BDRCS. There is also a need for increased co-ordination with local government offices. Integrity: BDRCS need to approach this issue with a consistent effort to improve their organisation reputation in the eyes of the public as well as the local government. Uncovering the truth can be a long difficult process, however each case needs to be taken in turn as it arises and dealt with according to a set or set procedures and guidelines. For serious issues that remain unresolved both IFRC and BDRCS need to have a set of procedures in place that allows the issue to be raised at a higher level. Beneficiary Selection: The process of beneficiary selection has taken much too long, particularly in the recovery phase. In part this is due to slow decision making. However, this process cannot be allowed to take so long in the future. The system need to be reviewed and improved with time allocations allowed for each step. Although a system of joint assessment has been used it to a certain extent there have been too many visits to each beneficiary before a decision is made. In such a large scale operation there are bound to be some problems with double registration or similar such occurrences. There are some complaints under investigation, and in the past some BDRCS staff have been replaced or relocated due to their wrongdoings. However, at this point there is no evidence of widespread misregistration of beneficiaries. Some villages are more “well off” than others, and some seem to have been promoted by individuals with a political or family interest, but selection has been made openly in group discussion and was never meant to be based purely on poverty or vulnerability alone. It would be advantageous if a standard questionnaire was available in the SARD or the A/P Zone offices that can be adopted and amended for future cross sectional beneficiary interviews. Beneficiary Participation and Accountability: There has been an attempt to include the beneficiaries within the operations from the outset, however there is a lack of knowledge amongst some IFRC/BDRCS regarding beneficiary participation and accountability techniques. Similarly to gender issues, training should be

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supported on this issue so that future responses can incorporate these ideas into the planning and implementation of future responses. Monitoring: There has been a fair amount of monitoring undertaken on a sector level, and even an occasional trip from head office. However, as mentioned above, a centralised joint monitoring department should have been set up from the start of the relief operation. This should have been included in the Appeal budget from the outset. Sustainability: Neither the sustainability of the programmes, nor an exit strategy, seems to have been considered in the design or planning of the interventions. The Watsan and PSP programmes have been initiated and implemented in a National Society that has neither capacity, nor perhaps the inclination for these activities. Climate change considerations: There is a lack of knowledge of how climate change may affect Bangladesh within both organisations. This issue needs to be addressed so that future responses can build in climate change considerations into programme planning.

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Recommendations:

Relief Phase: • Standard MoUs need to be available, supplementary to the IFRC/BDRCS co-

operation agreement, adaptable to the emergency at hand, outlining SOPs highlighting operational responsibilities, ready to be signed, so that future responses can be implemented without delay. (This is equally applicable to the recovery phase).

• Contingency planning needs to be finalised to enable an effective response to future disasters.

• Stocks or emergency food and non food items need to prepositioned in-country to provide an immediate response capacity. Considering the high population density of the country and its disaster prone nature, stock levels need to be reviewed upwards from the present provision for 5000 families, preferably before the coming cyclone season in April 2010.

• A well documented chronology of programmatic decision making should be available in all future operations. (This is applicable to all sectors and elements of a response).

• BDRCS needs to empower its staff in the field to make decisions, moving away from a time consuming, centralised, bureaucratic decision making process. Operational decisions should be the domain of the departmental directors and managers and not the governing body.

• BDRCS should ensure increased media coverage of its relief and recovery activities to raise the profile of the organisation in both the public and governmental domains.

• Distributions could also be used to disseminate public health or hygiene information, as well as informing beneficiaries of other RC activities, e.g. the PSP programme, that are currently operational.

• It would have been more beneficial to have undertaken an internal review of the relief phase of the operations in April 2008 when the main participants were more accessible and the events more easy for beneficiaries to recall.

• A gender assessment at the start of both the relief and recovery phases would have highlighted the specific needs for women in the communities.

• The relief items could have included items such as children’s food which would have alleviated some of the strain amongst the female family carers.

• The tracing function should be included in all future emergency responses.

Recovery Phase (by sector): Shelter:

• An immediate investigation of the advantages and disadvantages of extending the roof of the core shelter should be undertaken to decide on a final design for future replication.

• To share this design on a regional basis and in the Zone for future usage within the Movement.

• A comparison of the various core shelters provided by the Movement and other aid agencies, noting their strengths and weaknesses compared to their cost, should be undertaken forthwith to ensure we have a cost efficient core shelter to be replicated.

• Either through training, or though case study examples, IFRC/BDRCS staff should be made more aware of the possibilities of cash for work alternatives during relief and early recovery periods.

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• HR in the Zone and SARD need to build up the number of shelter delegates on its HR database. Like livelihoods shelter is becoming a frequent element of short and long term recovery programmes.

• Budget estimating techniques for the price of constructing and repairing shelters need to be revisited so as to improve the accuracy of budget forecasting in the appeal process.

• A assessment should be undertaken of the core houses constructed in the Cyclone Alia affected areas to ascertain the durability of the mud plinths.

Health:

• The current community based health programme should be continued and expanded on.

• The possibility of small mobile health teams, as well as further training for the volunteers should be investigated.

• A long term commitment to this programme is needed within the BDRCS structure to guarantee its sustainability.

• The selection of BDRCS counterparts should be more considered. At least someone who has a background in that sector.

PSP: • A PSP capacity, to be established within BDRCS, under the health dept, should be

incorporated into the emergency stages of all future responses. • Psychosocial support could have been targeted to those women widowed in the

disaster. • To establish a linkage with the Turkish Red Crescent or Danish Red Cross Societies

for ongoing support and training on PSP initiatives. • To continue training and to monitor the impact of the trained PSP volunteers and if

deemed successful to replicate the initiative throughout the Unit Office structure. Water and Sanitation:

• An ongoing watsan capability should be established within BDRCS for the continued implementation of the PHAST programme, to enable a full response capacity for future emergencies.

• A final design needs to be agreed for the latrine to be replicated in future responses. • To investigate the feasibility of water purification plants in future responses. • Future large scale flood/cyclone responses should include a Watsan delegate in the

immediate phase of the operations Livelihoods:

• SARD and the AP zone need to look at alternatives to increasing their livelihood delegate options so as to ensure the rapid deployment of livelihood delegates to large scale disasters.

• Local livelihood expertise within the region should be identified for possible partnerships and to gather local knowledge and experience.

• The livelihoods program should be well documented for future replication. • Continuation of the programme would be advantageous to the beneficiaries. • Cash for work initiatives in the early recovery stages should be looked into during

future operations.

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Capacity Building of BDRCS Disaster Risk Reduction:

• The accuracy of the RC volunteer database needs to be continually maintained and updated. Volunteers need to be proactively retained in the organisation.

• The BDRCS needs to advocate for and seek funding for the construction of more cyclone shelters.

• Any future shelter construction projects should ensure that the toilets are built in the same structure, perhaps on the roof or first floor, and not separately.

• Practical, village level, DRR initiatives need to be identified and implemented either on a community led basis or with external funding e.g. cash for work initiatives re-building embankments.

Organisation Development: • The rewriting of the BDRCS constitution should be addressed as a matter of urgency

both at a local, regional and Geneva level. This should separate the Governance and Management functions.

• A BDRCS Strategic Plan needs to be drafted with the full participation of each department

• The possibility of the BDRCS Chairman and Secretary General visiting other national societies within the region for an experience sharing exchange should be investigated and promoted.

• A financial and operational review of the BDRCS should be undertaken by an independent international audit company, or an international bank, to examine the current financial viability of the organisation and its operations, and to highlight steps that could be undertaken to improve the Society’s financial position.

• Future programmes should be run by the BDRCS with IFRC support, not vice versa. • Unit office and volunteer development should go hand in hand. Each individual Unit

Office should have a development plan should be drawn up on a participatory basis. • During future responses the BDRCS Unit Office capacity needs to be bolstered with

additional staff sent to support the ULO and local volunteers. • An ongoing public awareness campaign needs to be initiated to inform the national

population of the BDRCS activities. Alongside this the reputation of the society need to be monitored to gauge its public acceptance, and therefore its fundraising capacity.

• New fundraising initiatives need to be identified and implemented to generate a separate source of income for the NS

• A system of information sharing needs to be established within BDRCS. Perhaps the circulation of minutes or decisions made in meeting can be shared with all staff.

• Each BDRCS staff member should have their own BDRCS e mail address established within a standardized office system.

Support Services Human resources:

• IFRC/BDRCS need to issue a warning of no tolerance regarding integrity issues. A clear disciplinary process needs to be established within both HR functions and disseminated to all staff.

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• BDRCS Staff management procedures and practices need to be reviewed and modernized with staff appraisal systems introduced.

• Per Diem regulations need to be set out in future MoUs.

Logistics: • Emergency procurement procedures need to be agreed so as to precipitate local

purchases during any future emergency responses. • The process of pre-selectioning of suppliers and materials at prices that could be

reviewed quarterly need to be set in place. • Potential warehouse space should be identified on a nationwide basis in preparation

for future operations. • Training, or a possible secondment, in logistical practices should be organised for

BDRCS • Standard costs for shelters, tube wells, latrines, food, and NFIs should be permanently

available for future operational budgeting. Finance:

• As a part of the ongoing OD initiative trainings in budgeting and financial management and reporting need to be provided.

• The humanitarian imperative should always come first. Operational activities should not be slowed down due to financial reporting shortfalls. Training should be provided to all staff operating working advances and procedures need to be streamlined if taking too long.

• Financial transparency on both sides is a necessity for the development of a full, open partnership between the two operational organisations.

• IFRC HoDs and operational heads need to be fully conversant in the budgetary aspects of managing a large scale response. If they are not they need to be trained.

Reporting:

• A report writing workshop should be organised for IFRC and BDRCS management staff as they will need this should they wish to become the lead agency on future responses.

• Reporting to the local government of activities undertaken should become standard practice.

Cross Sectoral threads: Gender

• A “gender issues in disaster response” course should be run in Dhaka for both IFRC and BDRCS staff

• Future operations need a gender office to ensure gender issues are fully incorporated in programme planning and implementation.

• There needs to be a specific effort to increase the number of women team members in all sectors of future operations

• Gender based reporting should be available in future responses. • Gender assessments should be included in future operations.

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Co-ordination: • Further efforts need to be made by both the IFRC and the BDRCS to restore trust

between the two parties. This should include but not be confined to greater transparency from the IFRC in terms of operational initiatives and financial information and greater commitment and information sharing within the BDRCS.

• Regular co-ordination meeting need to take place between the two implementing partners. A system to inform all managers of the minutes of such meetings should be implemented.

• An integrated office, not two separate offices would need to be set up to improve co-ordination in any future joint IFRC/BDRCS responses.

• The District Commissioner’s Office needs to be informed of activities undertaken by the BDRCS in that District.

Integrity: • IFRC/BDRCS need to issue a warning of zero tolerance regarding integrity issues. A

clear disciplinary process needs to be established within both HR functions and disseminated to all staff.

Beneficiary Selection:

• The selection process for electing community committee members should be reviewed to see how it can be improved.

• This iterative approach to assessment should be reviewed and improved so that each beneficiary does not have to interviewed again and again.

• A new, quicker, step by step system of beneficiary selection needs to be outlined now for use in future operations.

Beneficiary Participation and Accountability:

• IFRC/BDRCS Staff should undertake training on how to include beneficiary participation within their operational response.

Monitoring:

• For future large scale operations a joint monitoring dept needs to be established to whom any complaints can be addressed.

Sustainability

• How local populations will be able to manage and maintain the support given needs to be an important consideration in future responses.

• Exit strategies should be clearly stated in future programme and project proposals.

Climate change considerations: • IFRC/BDRCS DRR teams need to familiarise themselves with climatic change issues

in Bangladesh and how they may affect community life and livelihoods in years to come. This needs to be considered for future program design.

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Appendix 1: Information gathering The review was undertaken during February 2010 with preliminary reading and administrative matters, undertaken during the last two weeks of January 2010. 1. Desk research and secondary data review of key documents: IFRC Appeal documents IFRC Situation Updates BDRCS Recovery Phase Strategic Framework, January 2008 IFRC Delegates’ End of Mission reports Internal Review of the Cyclone Sidr Report, April 2009 Cyclone Sidr Recovery Program, Revised Plan of Action, January – November 2009 BDRCS Organisational Review Report, Paul Davenport 2009 BRRCS Organisational Review Report, Arthur D Little 1975, 1977 Care Bangladesh Review Report Agenzia Italia Risposta Emergenze Report Responding together when disaster strikes, UNDP Bangladesh Damage, loss and needs assessment for disaster recovery and reconstruction, Government of Bangladesh, April 2008. Post Distribution Assessment Report, IFRC Shelter Working Group draft report. BDRCS/IFRC Shelter Recovery program review, IFRC 2. Key informant interviews: Undertaken at BDRCS/IFRC Bangladesh Office: Tues February 2nd - Friday February 5th Capt. Retd. Abu Bakar, Secretary General, Bangladesh Red Crescent Society Julia Brothwell, OD Delegate, IFRC John Roche, Regional Disaster Management Delegate, SARD Kathryn Clarkson, Regional WatSan Delegate, Asia Pacific Zone Undertaken during the Lessons Learned workshop: Wednesday February 3rd – Thursday February 4th: Helmut Raehimann, Country Representative, Swiss Red Cross, Bangladesh Nanda Lal Sharma, Logistics Delegate, IFRC Brijesh Kumar, Shelter Delegate, IFRC Areefa Mehera Islam, OD Manager, IFRC Dr. Satya Dash, Former PSP Delegate, IFRC Ashfaque Ahmed, Logistics Officer Sirajul Islam Mollah, Coord, Swiss Red Cross Project, Afsar Uddin Siddiqui, Assistant Director, EPRP, Sidr Shelter, health and assessment team, Mizanur Rahman Community Committee Member. Mijanur Rahman, AD/DIPHECO, Sidr Relief Support, Community Committee and Implementation Team Volunteer Manager, Ms. Rashida, Beneficiary. Afsar Uddin, Deputy Director Estate Dept, BDRCS Dr. Fazl Quader, PSP Manager, Zihual Ahasan, Assistant Director, BCDPC,

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Alamin, Implementation Team Member, Ms. Aklima, Beneficiary. Undertaken by telephone/Email: Azmat Ulla, HORD, IFRC. Pepe P. K. Salmela, HoD, IFRC Pakistan Delegation, (Former HoD, Cyclone Sidr Operations). Selva Sinnadurai, HoD, IFRC Philippines, (Former HoD, Cyclone Sidr Operations). Bjorn Eder, Head of International Division, Swedish Red Cross (Former IFRC HOD in Bangladesh) Ahmed Nazri, former Relief/Livelihood delegate, IFRC Bangladesh Undertaken during the field trip: Saturday February 6th: Dhaka to Barisal: The evaluation team were accompanied and briefed by: Surrendra Kumar Regmi, Field Recovery Co-ordinator, IFRC. Mohammed Belal Hossain, Deputy Director, Community Based Disaster Management Dept (Deputy Chief Field Co-ordinator during Sidr Recovery Operations), BDRCS. Khahlim Rehman, Assistant Director, Administration. (Watsan co-ordinator during Sidr Recovery Operations), BDRCS. Sayed Keramat Ali, Livelihood Programme Manager, IFRC. Haseebul Barri, Construction Officer, IFRC. Sunday February 7th : Barisal – Barguna: Villages visited: Berghuna District Cluster 1: Latabaria, Dalbhanga, Mularhura Cluster 2 : Jailkhana, Falishatala Met with Berghuna Unit Office and RC Youth Mohd Golam Mostafa – Former Branch Secretary Golam Haider Nilu – Former Executive Chairman Abdul Bashar – Life Member Musharaf Hossain Khan – Unit level officer Monday February 8th : Barguna- Patuakhali: Villages visited: Patuakhali District Cluster 1: Vhaierhaula, Nijhaula, Talukdarhaula & Gabunia Cluster 3: Lebubunia Met with Patuakhali Unit Office and RC Youth Iqbal Masud, Unit level officer

Tuesday February 9th : Patuakhali – Bagerhat Villages visited: Bagerhat District Cluster 1: Amtoli & Kumarkhali Cluster 2: Gabtola Met with Bagerhat Unit Office and RC Youth Shaikh Mohamed Ali – Executive Chairman

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Wednesday February 10th: Bagerhat – Pirojpur (overnight in Barisal) Villages visited: Pirojpur District Cluster 1: Chorkhali & Darulhuda Cluster 3: Durgapur & Bajukati Met with Pirojpur Unit Office and RC Youth Unit Level Officer Met with Pirojpur Assistant District Commissioner - Mr. Golam Mustafa Thursday February 11th: Barisal - Dhaka Interviews held with BDRCS: Mr Mihar Kumar Das, Sidr Operations Coordinator. Dr Haider, Director of Health. Mr Matiur Rahman, Head of Relief at the NHQ, Mr. Khair Ul Islam, Deputy Field Coordinator located at the Barisal Office.

Interview with ICRC: Mr Christoph Vogt, Head of Mission, ICRC, Bangladesh. Mr. Osama B. Abdul Razaq, Cooperation Delegate, ICRC, Bangladesh.

Sunday February 14th: Dhaka Meetings: Prof. (Dr.) M.S.Akbar, Chairman, Bangladesh Red Crescent Society Capt. Retd. Abu Bakar, Secretary General, Bangladesh Red Crescent Society Udaya Regmi, HoD, IFRC UNDP: M.Aminul Islam – Asst Country Director – Disaster Management Mohd Siffayet Ullah – Programme Analyst – Disaster Management Amar Chandra Kar – Economic Recovery Specialist Mozharul Huq, Advisor, Humanitarian Response Team CDMP: Tasdiq Ahmed – Senior Project Specialist M A Wazed, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Food and Disaster Management. Monday February 15th: Dhaka Meetings: Ali Agba, British Red Cross, Programme Officer Mahfujur Rahman, Finance Manager, IFRC

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Appendix 2 – Abbreviations:

IFRC: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

BDRCS: Bangladesh Red Crescent Society

DRR: Disaster Risk Reduction

UNDP: United Nations Development Program

CDMP: Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme

CPP: Community Preparedness Programme

Watsan: Water and sanitation

OD: Organisational Development

FACT: Filed Assessment and Co-ordination Team

DREF: Disaster Relief Emergency Fund

PDA: Post Distribution Assessment

NFI: Non food item

ACF: Action contre le faim

ERU: Emergency Response Unit

RDRT: Regional Disaster Response Teams

DC District Commissioner DRRO District relief and rehabilitation officer UNO Upazilla Nirbahi Officer CHF Swiss Francs