The Fight for Fallujah - March - April 2005 Field Artillery

March-April 2005 Field Artillery22

Above, Highway10 crosses theEuphrates River.


Photo courtesy ofDigitalGlobe

Field Artillery March-April 2005 23

MEMORANDUM FORRECORD: FSE, TF 2-2 IN,3d Brigade Combat Team

(BCT), 1st ID, Operation Iraqi Free-dom (OIF) II, Forward Operating Base(FOB) Normandy, Muqdadiyah, IraqAPO AE 09392 (AETV-BGR-FSE),1 December 2004.

Subject: After-Action Review(AAR) for the Battle of Fallujah

1. Background and Mission. TheBattle of Fallujah was conductedfrom 8 to 20 November 2004 withthe last fire mission on 17 Novem-ber. The battle was fought by anArmy, Marine and Iraqi force of about15,000 under the I Marine Expedi-tionary Force (IMEF), sweeping fromnorth to south. The joint and com-bined force cordoned the city andsearched door-to-door, clearing build-ings and engaging insurgents in thestreets—reputedly the most fierce ur-ban fighting for Marines since theBattle of Hue City in Vietnam in1968.

Fallujah is roughly 40 kilometers

west of Baghdad on the Euphrates River.Its population before the battle was about250,000 people; however, TF 2-2 INencountered few civilians in its attacksouth.

TF 2-2 IN’s mission initially was toattack south to Phase Line (PL) Fran(Highway 10) from the northeasternedge of the city to protect our easternflank and destroy the anti-Iraqi Forces(AIF), keeping the lines of communica-tions open. For the attack, the city wassliced north and south into six areas ofresponsibility (AORs): TF 2-2 IN onthe northeastern slice of the city withTF 1-3 Marines on our western flankfollowed (east to west) by TF 1-8 Ma-rines, TF 2-7 Cav, TF 3-5 Marines and,finally, TF 3-1 Marines in the north-western AOR along the Euphrates River.

During the attack, many fragmentaryorders (FRAGOs) were issued, whichpushed TF 2-2 IN south of PL Fran tothe southern edge of the city. TF 2-2IN’s rear tactical operations center(RTOC) and two M109A6 Paladin how-itzers were at Camp Fallujah (22 kilo-meters southwest of Fallujah) fromwhich the Paladins fired during theBattle of Fallujah.

The city is about five kilometers wideand five kilometers deep. It is dividedeast and west by Highway 10 with resi-dential neighborhoods to the north andthe industrial sector in the south. In themost southern sector of the city is a poorneighborhood that was filled with for-eign fighters, dubbed the “Martyr’s Dis-trict.” This was the sector in which weencountered the heaviest resistance.

2. Enemy Forces. In TF 2-2 IN’sAOR, the AIF had emplaced many ob-stacles and fortified buildings asstrongpoints, dug trenches and estab-lished fighting positions and bunkers.Additionally, the enemy had riggedbuildings and vehicles with explosives.

Along the southeastern portion of the

city, the AIF emplaced rockets asremotely controlled direct fire weap-ons against any Coalition Forces thatattempted to attack from the south oreast of the city. The enemy alsoemplaced improvised explosive de-vices (IEDs) and mines along keyroutes and at intersections to impedeand funnel Coalition Forces’ move-ment. Vast caches of AIF munitionshad been positioned throughout thesector for tactical resupply.

3. Friendly Forces. TF 2-2 IN de-ployed to Camp Fallujah under theoperational control (OPCON) ofMarine Regimental Combat Team-7(RCT-7), 1st Marine Division. TF 2-2 IN’s task organization consisted ofone mechanized infantry company,one armored company, the brigadereconnaissance troop (BRT), oneIraqi Intervention Forces (IIF) Bat-talion (-), one engineer platoon, twoM109A6 Paladins (positioned onCamp Fallujah), four organic 120-mm mortars and two 81-mm mor-tars. Four Air Force joint terminalattack controllers (JTACs) were at-tached from the 3d BCT headquar-ters and sliced out to the maneuvercompanies with one BALO and anenlisted driver in the task force tac-tical command post (TAC).

4. Artillery Fires. As part of TF 2-2 IN, the M109A6 Paladins and aplatoon fire direction center (FDC)were attached in direct support (DS)to the TF. For most of the fight, thiswas their only role. Later, after TF 2-2 IN had reached its limit of advance(LOA) at PL Fran, it also was taskedto support RCT-7.

The Paladins were in a positionarea (PA) in Camp Fallujah adjacentto the Marine Corps and a battery ofPaladins from the 1st Cavalry Divi-sion, A/3-82 FA, that was attachedto the IMEF. This facilitated the FA’s

TF 2-2 IN FSE AAR:Indirect Fires in the Battle of Fallujah

By Captain James T. Cobb,First Lieutenant Christopher A. LaCour

and Sergeant First Class William H. Hight


Task Force 2d Battalion, 2dInfantry’s (TF 2-2 IN’s) fire sup-port element (FSE) operated asa mini-brigade FSE during theBattle of Fallujah. The FSE co-ordinated the combat effects ofArmy, Air Force and Marineassets more autonomously thanthe traditional, doctrinal bat-talion-level FSE—a model ofjoint interdependency.

Although the FSE did not havejoint personnel assigned to it, itworked closely with the brigadeair liaison officer (BALO), whowas chopped to TF 2-2 IN, andfunctioned as a “Joint FSE,” ifyou will.

Ed.


sharing meteorological (Met) dataand survey and relieved the platoonof self-security.

a. Organic to the TF. As an organicpart of the TF, the howitzers pro-vided accurate, timely fires through-out the fight, delivering 925 rounds,mostly in danger-close fires. As dedi-cated assets to the TF, Paladin fireswere greatly expedited in a 360-de-gree fight with fluid targets and arapidly advancing maneuver force.Fire missions took less than two min-utes from the initial call-for-fire(CFF) to rounds down range.

b. Responsibilities of TF FSE. TheTF FSE assumed responsibility forcoordinating with the TF 2-2 IN S4for Class V resupply, positioning theplatoon and selecting shell-fuze com-binations. The TF FSE cleared firesat the TAC along with the TF battlecaptain or S3. Clearance of fires wasexecuted by demanding accurate com-pany frontline traces and forward ob-server (FO) locations at regular inter-vals and battle tracking in detail.

c. Role of the Artillery. The artil-lery was used in doctrinal roles, suchas screening the initial point of pen-etration, preparatory fires, close firesupport and disruptive deep fires, aswell as in non-doctrinal roles, such asclearing routes of IEDs and breechingminefields.

Using Paladins directly attached tothe TF gave us a tremendous advantagein the fight. Our tactics, techniques andprocedures (TTP) were effective and le-thal and gave maneuver TFs greaterflexibility, firepower and mobility.

The overall performance was outstand-ing. By using FOs and accurate intelli-gence-driven targeting, the artillery wasa driving force in the TF’s ability toattack through a large city with mini-mum casualties in six days.

d. Massing Fires. The only drawbackwas our inability to mass fires on targetsdue to having only two guns. While wedid have general support reinforcing(GSR) assets, they were slow, cumber-some and more difficult to coordinatewith than our organic systems. Trustwas also an issue as the vast majority ofour fires were danger-close, and we didnot know the proficiency level of thesupporting guns.

While it did not impact our operationsoverall, at times the physical and psy-chological effects of massed artilleryfires were the preferred effects. Wecould use our 120-mm mortars when

we wanted to mass fires, but additional155-mm howitzers would have beenmore effective.

5. Mortars. The Thunder Mortar Pla-toon that is organic to 2-2 IN proved tobe the equal of the artillery in this fightin terms of accuracy and responsive-ness and was an integral part of theindirect fires used.

When provided the five requirementsfor accurate predicted fires, mortars wereevery bit as accurate and deadly asartillery. The firepower of the 120-mmmunitions allowed us to respond quicklywith overwhelming firepower whenneeded. During the course of the battle,mortars fired 942 rounds of timely, ac-curate fires.

a. Mortar Challenges. Our mortar pla-toon received two M252 81-mm mor-tars before deploying to the FallujahAOR. These were useful indirect fireweapons when close fires were required.The only drawback was they had nosights. To use them, we had to takesights from the 120-mm tubes and usethe sights with the 81-mm mortars, tak-ing two 120-mm tubes out of the fight.

The mortars’ high angle of fire waspreferable for military operations inurban terrain (MOUT), but there weretimes when the mortars’ maximum or-

dinate (MAXORD) exceeded theclose air support (CAS) ceiling, lim-iting mortar fires.

b. Platoon Security. The mortarplatoon operated outside of CampFallujah at various firing points andhad to pull self-security. It wasmanned to do so with no degradationof fires. The platoon received enemyindirect fires frequently during thefight and was forced to displace. Butdue to superior training and good man-euverability, it quickly displaced, re-set and resumed operations.

6. Danger-Close Fires. Danger-close missions were the rule, not theexception. 2/A/1-6 FA, our Paladinplatoon, and Thunder Base, our 120-mm mortar platoon, quickly earnedour confidence in their abilities todeliver timely and, more importantly,accurate fires. We routinely had 155-mm and 120-mm fires within 200meters of friendly forces. Less fre-quently, 81-mm mortars fired within100 meters.

a. Walking Fires In. We could de-liver fires in various ways. The na-ture of MOUT actually helped usmitigate the risk of danger-close mis-sions because the houses and struc-

tures served as buffers for effects be-tween friendly forces and the target.The most widely used method whenbringing fires in was to “walk” the firesin close, using adjustments sent from anobserver. Before going into the fire-for-effect (FFE) phase, friendly companiesabout to receive danger-close fires werealerted and given time to button up ortake cover.

b. Danger-Close Redefined. Per doc-trine, the smallest munitions were usedclosest to the frontline traces of themaneuver element and larger munitionsat greater distances. Although this tech-nique was used, rarely were any firesoutside of the doctrinal danger-close600 meters. That was the “deep fight” inthis environment, and to have consid-ered it as danger-close and followed allof the existing procedures for adjust-ment would have decreased the effec-tiveness of indirect fires.

7. FOs. The FOs played a key role inthis fight. We placed a fire support team(FIST) with A/2-2 IN, an FO with theBRT and a fire support officer (FSO)with A/2-63 AR. The FIST with A/2-2IN included a sergeant (promotable) asthe FSO, a private first class as radio-telephone operator (RTO) and a ser-geant in two of the three platoons. One

SPC Deretinald Batiste, Task Force 2d Battalion, 2dInfantry (TF 2-2 IN), looks for snipers in Fallujahduring Operation Al Fajr on 11 November 2004.

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of our team chiefs, a sergeant who wasan experienced FO, became the BRTFO. We did not have the manning todeploy full FISTs but compensated bydeploying leaders where they were mosteffective; the FSE platoon was at 50percent strength.

a. BRT FO Positioning and Reconnoi-tering. A/2-2 and A/2-63 were deployedin the city for most of the fight with theBRT screening to the east. Due to theBRT’s position outside the city, theBRT FO Sergeant Raymond Sapp hadexcellent observation from dominantterrain and was decisive in the earlyfight. He was in position very earlybefore the attack. This was excellentTTP that allowed us to adjust the pre-planned smoke fires for breeching op-erations and destroy enemy observa-tion posts (OPs).

As any combat training center (CTC)fight tells us, he who wins the recon-naissance fight will do well. SergeantSapp could destroy enemy OPs earlyand refine target locations as well asconfirm or deny that targets we hadplanned were viable, such as AIF tar-gets or buildings that did not appear tohave been recently inhabited. His loca-tion with the BRT outside the city look-ing in enabled him to see the entire battle-field and service targets throughout.

He used the BRT’s long-range ad-vanced scout surveillance system(LRAS3), an excellent piece of equip-ment that allowed him to accuratelylocate targets, day or night, with 10-digit grids. LRAS3 is superior to theground/vehicular laser locator designa-tor (G/VLLD) in both optics and target

location, has night-vision optics andcan be mounted on vehicles. If scoutand BRT elements have this equipment,fire supporters also should have it.

b. City FOs Kept Moving. The otherobservers were not as fortunate duringthe early phases of the fight becausethey were down in the city and could notreadily occupy OPs on dominant ter-rain. The platoons that included FOscould not afford the time or manpowerto establish an OP while they were con-ducting the attack.

However, during halts or while theplatoons occupied strongpoints, theobservers established OPs and destroyedtargets. The platoon FOs came into playmainly before the task force crossed theline of departure (LD) when they couldoccupy OPs on rooftops and adjust pre-paratory fires. Sergeant Randall Lairdwas very effective at adjusting roundsonto specific houses and destroyingthem before we crossed the LD.

c. FO Vehicles. The FOs had to ride inthe back of Bradley fighting vehicles(BFVs) or M113s to move around thebattlefield, degrading both their com-munications and ability to observe fires.The TF FSO chose not to bring our twoFIST vehicles (FISTVs) to the fight forthe following reasons: they are me-chanically unreliable; we could not manthem, given our personnel strength; andthey cannot stay abreast of maneuverforces in Bradleys.

Instead we had M1114 up-armoredhigh-mobility multipurpose wheeledvehicles (HMMWVs) with all relatedequipment in them although they oftenwere left in the combat trains with the

FSO’s riding in the company com-mander’s Bradley.

We could have used the new Bradleyfire support team vehicles (BFISTVs)with the personnel to man them.

d. Attached Companies with No FISTs.One of the biggest issues for FOs andmanning was attached companies fromother battalions that did not bring theirFIST personnel. A/2-63 AR broughtonly one second lieutenant for fire sup-port—no other FISTers. This severelydegraded its ability to use fires duringthe battle, especially when its FSO waswounded in action (WIA).

A company attached as part of a TFmust bring its entire FIST, particularlyin a MOUT fight. If not, the ability tosupport that company with fires is ex-tremely difficult.

8. Other Equipment. Before deploy-ing to Fallujah, we made deliberatechoices about what equipment to bringand what to leave behind, and there wasequipment we should have had but didnot have.

a. Fire Support Gear. The FOs hadsingle-channel ground and airborne ra-dio systems (SINCGARS) manpacks,binos, a compass, Viper-2 night-visiongoggles and precision lightweight glo-bal positioning system receivers(PLGRs). Communications were ad-equate. They were degraded when mov-ing, but once OPs were established,they worked well.

The Viper-2 is an excellent tool forFOs. In conjunction with the PLGR, itreliably provided accurate target loca-tion.

The Blue Force Tracker was a goodtool to use at the TF FSE. It provided agood picture of forces on the battlefield,but could not give friendly unit loca-tions consistently enough to clear fires.It is useful for targeting when imageryis loaded.

The flash, immediate, priority and rout-ing (FIPR) messaging function of BlueForce Tracker was a good tool we didnot use fully. It could have been veryeffective in communicating and pass-ing fire support products from TOC toTAC and vise-versa.

b. Joint Surveillance and Target At-tack Radar System (JSTARS). We usedJSTARS as a targeting tool. The assis-tant FSO and S2 collected JSTARS dataat the TOC and passed it to us as target-ing data to be serviced with indirectfires.

c. Advanced FA Tactical Data System(AFATDS). We did not have AFATDS

Soldiers assigned to to A/2-2 IN clear the upstairs of a house in Fallujah on 11 November 2004.

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in the FSE, although2/A/1-6 FA’s platoonoperations center(POC) did. The battal-ion-level FSE has onlyone AFATDS, and itwas at FOB Normandyto support counter-strike operations.

We need two AFATDSat the task force level.Twice we’ve had to ex-ecute split operationsand leave the AFATDSbehind (Najaf, April2004).

Fires were controlledat the TAC. With thevehicle available, wecould not have usedAFATDS, althoughwith a BFIST, wewould have been able to.

We did not use the lightweight for-ward entry device (LFED); it was tootime-consuming to input targets of op-portunity, and there was no AFATDS atthe battalion FSE.

9. Munitions. The munitions webrought to this fight were 155-mm high-explosive (HE) M107 (short-range) andM795 (long-range) rounds, illumina-tion and white phosphorous (WP, M110and M825), with point-detonating (PD),delay, time and variable-time (VT)fuzes. For the 120-mm mortars, we hadHE, illumination and WP with PD, de-lay and proximity fuzes. We also car-ried 81-mm HE with the same fuzes.

a. Range of Munitions. The munitionsat our disposal gave us excellent flex-ibility. The 81-mm munitions allowedus to deliver extremely close fires tofriendly forces while we used largercaliber munitions to engage and destroyheavily fortified houses and bunkers.The standard table of organization andequipment (TOE) for a mechanizedbattalion does not include 81-mm mor-tars, something the Army should exam-ine and correct.

b. White Phosphorous. WP proved tobe an effective and versatile munition.We used it for screening missions attwo breeches and, later in the fight, as apotent psychological weapon againstthe insurgents in trench lines and spiderholes when we could not get effects onthem with HE. We fired “shake andbake” missions at the insurgents, usingWP to flush them out and HE to takethem out.

c. Hexachloroethane Zinc (HC) Smoke

and Precision-Guided Munitions. Wecould have used these munitions. Weused improved WP for screening mis-sions when HC smoke would have beenmore effective and saved our WP forlethal missions.

We had several important targets, of-ten reinforced houses that FOs had eyeson, that would have been more effec-tively engaged with a precision-guidedmunition, such as Copperhead with itsshaped charge or the developmentalExcalibur Unitary round that is con-crete piercing (to be fielded in 2006).Barring the use of such precision-guidedmunitions, concrete-piercing (CP) fuzeswould have been more effective thandelay and PD fuzes were, but the latterwere satisfactory.

d. Ammo Resupply. The biggest chal-lenge we had was ammunition resup-ply. The amount of munitions expendedwas surprising, and we had to struggleto keep our cannons and tubes supplied.The targeting officer at the TOC and theS4 did a fantastic job of obtaining am-munition, but in the future, it would beeasier to over-anticipate ammunitionneeds before the fight and stockpile it.

The Marines gave us what they had,and the location of the Paladin platoonon FOB Fallujah helped greatly. Thefact that the Paladin platoon brought apalletized loading system (PLS) was ahuge plus. It allowed the S4 to coordi-nate for ammunition and the Paladinplatoon to pick it up.

In the final analysis, it all worked, butI recommend we not put ourselves inthat position again. We never ran out ofammunition, but we came close several

times.10. CAS. We used

CAS well in this fight,dropping more than 15guided-bomb unit-12s(GBU-12s), which arelaser-guided 500-pound bombs; four2,000-pound joint di-rect attack munition(JDAMs) penetrators;and one Maverick. Wealso had more than sixhours of AC-130 Spec-ter gunship support.

a. CAS Effectiveness.We had problems withthe GBU-12s. At leastfive duds were dropped,all from F/A-18s. TheAC-130 was an awe-some weapon, operat-

ing at night and prepping our deepbattlespace with outstanding accuracy.The four JDAM penetrators weredropped on a bunker complex with ex-cellent results. The bunker and morethan 20 AIF were destroyed.

Initially, we had difficulty workingwith Marine air. However, once ourJTACs learned the system, it workedrather well. An air liaison officer (ALO)from the Marines at the TOC wouldhave helped in the early stages andfacilitated the use of more Marine CAS.

b. Pulling Timely Air Assets. Whilethe Air Force JTACs were useful on theground, they had limited success pull-ing timely air assets. A TOC ALO is amust for two reasons: first, a MarineALO with direct access to higher willpull air assets more quickly and be ableto disseminate their fires faster than anAir Force JTAC on the ground. Second,you need an officer who understandsthe Marine system attached to the FSEfor better coordination.

Air assets are requested through a dif-ferent system than indirect lethal fires.An ALO with two radios tied in tohigher and the battalion is a must andwill cut air request times in half. Al-though air was planned, it often wasdifficult for the battalion JTAC to talkto the RCT-7 ALO and get air whenneeded.

c. CAS and Other Indirect Fires. A biglesson is that CAS was not a substitutefor responsive artillery and mortars.CAS was most effective in the deepfight, particularly when used on intelli-gence-driven targets.

11. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

A precision air strike takes out an insurgent stronghold as Coalition Forces moveforward through Fallujah during Operation Al Fajr.

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(UAVs) and Tactical UAVs (TUAVS).UAVs were an integral part of this fightand should be included in any futureplanning. The UAVs in this fight—thePredator, Shadow, Hunter and Pio-neer—were very effective for preci-sion, intelligence-driven targeting. Theirtargets often were built-up strongpointsbeing fortified or occupied before ourattack.

a. Targets in the Deep Fight. TheUAVs gave us a great advantage in thedeep fight, usually beyond the coordi-nated fire line (CFL). We engaged whatthe AIF considered safe areas well inadvance of the forward line of troops(FLOT), destroying the AIF’s com-mand, control and communications (C3)nodes and denying them any respitefrom the fight, a tremendous psycho-logical advantage.

Except for the Raven TUAV, theUAVs provided 10-digit grids and ac-curate target descriptions, allowing usto choose the most appropriate weaponfor the targets. The Raven also did nothave enough loiter time to obtain theinformation we needed.

b. Targets of Opportunity. We at-tempted to initiate and adjust fire mis-sions against targets of opportunity us-ing UAVs as observation platforms andwere unable to do so in a timely andaccurate fashion. It was difficult to co-ordinate with the platform operatorswho were great distances away (somestateside) to give us the viewing anglesneeded for adjustments.

The TF TOC used UAVs for targetingand as observers for fire missions sev-eral times. But unless the UAVs werelooking straight down, the grid receivedusually was off by several hundredmeters. When adjusting from the Preda-tor, the delay on the feed is about 20 to30 seconds. The Shadow or Scan Eagleis a better platform for battalion indirectfires as they are more responsive andmore easily adjusted.

We displayed the UAV feed in theTOC on a projector so the FSE couldcoordinate and call for fires. The easiestway to call for fires is to create a ficti-tious observer and adjust through cardi-nal directions (the operators flying theUAVs are not trained in calling forfires). We need to develop TTP foradjusting fires with UAVs.

The way to use a UAV is for the TFFSE to have this asset under its control.It was an almost insurmountable task tocoordinate for and adjust fires accu-rately using UAVs because the control-

ling element had to describe the rounds’impact.

12. Personnel Manning. Big prob-lems in this fight were lack of fire sup-port personnel with concurrent opera-tions in two separate geographical loca-tions. The TF 2-2 IN FSE had 14 of 30authorized personnel before the tacticalroad march to Fallujah.

a. Fire Support Personnel. TF 2-2 INforward deployed with a 10-man FSE,including FIST personnel, leaving fourpersonnel behind as part of the S5 andoperations sections.

Even when the TF fire support NCOwas able to join the FSE, the shortage ofpersonnel stretched the FSE. At theTOC, the targeting officer and RTOliterally slept next to the radios. Untilthe TF FSNCO arrived, the TF FSO wasforced to maintain 24-hour operationsfor three days.

The company FSO for A/2-63 AR wasWIA on Day +3, leaving that companywith no organic FSE to facilitate fires,effectively taking them out of the indi-rect fire fight.

b. Manning Effects on the Fight. Theshortage of fire support personnel putunnecessary strain on maneuver ele-ments and damaged our ability to de-tect, engage and destroy targets. In fu-ture combat deployments, it is impera-tive for the Army to ensure fire supportpersonnel are at or near 100 percentstrength to avoid the problems we facedin this fight.

13. Training. The training that pla-toon, company and battalion personnelreceived at the various CTCs paid offrichly. Our fire supporters could handle

any mission presented to them.TF 2-2 IN FSE conducted danger-

close training several times in Iraq thatpaid huge dividends in the Battle ofFallujah.

a. Confidence in Fires for the Force.FOs were confident in their ability tocall for and adjust close fires and oftendid so. Training with our organic mor-tar platoon facilitated our fire missionsin Fallujah. We often worked with them,knew their capabilities and were su-premely confident in them.

Although we had not worked with 2/A/1-6 FA before deploying to Fallujah, thebattery’s performance early in the fightquickly won our confidence.

b. Importance of Danger-Close Live-Fire Training. In our time in the Army,we have had limited live-fire trainingfor danger-close missions until last sum-mer in Iraq. The typical training ofinitiating and adjusting rounds on tar-gets at great distances is vastly differentfrom training for danger-close fires. Theresults of our missions clearly indicatethis type of training must be imple-mented across the board for fire sup-porters.

c. Training for MOUT. We also learnedthat corrections in MOUT are muchsmaller, often smaller than the doctrinalminimum of add/drop 50 and left/right30 that we are trained on. We oftenfound it necessary to make adjustmentssmaller than these values to get roundson target, particularly when engagingfighting positions, fortified houses,trench lines and spider holes. The artil-lery and mortars showed outstandingflexibility in applying these corrections.

Soldiers attached to A/2-2 IN clear a house in Fallujah during Operation Al Fajr on 13 November2004.

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The bottom line is that before engag-ing in offensive operations in a MOUTenvironment, it is imperative that allfire support personnel are highly trainedon call-for-fire and adjustment proce-dures and their equipment. The MOUTenvironment is extremely fast-moving,and there is no time to waste. Fires mustbe initiated, adjusted and brought to theFFE phase rapidly.

Paladins and mortars are an integralpart of this process, and must move asrapidly as the observers. Combined live-fire training for observers, the FDC andthe guns is the answer.

14. Conclusion. The contributions ofindirect fires were a decisive part of theBattle of Fallujah and contributed tre-mendously to the outcome of the fight.They allowed the maneuver forces torapidly move through the city with mini-mum casualties and demonstrated whata joint and combined arms team can do.

The effects were physically and psy-chologically devastating. Not only didindirect fires destroy AIF personnel,but they also destroyed their will tostand and fight. Indirect fires also posi-

tively influenced our forces by demon-strating to commanders on the groundthat overwhelming firepower was attheir disposal.

The Paladin platoon greatly increasedthe TF’s firepower, timeliness and flex-ibility, allowing us to move at an un-precedented pace through a fortifiedcity.

We learned to use indirect fires earlyand often in large volumes. During thecourse of the battle, more than 2,000artillery and mortar rounds were firedand more than 10 tons of precision AirForce munitions were dropped.

However, as successful as we were,had the battle lasted longer it wouldhave been difficult to sustain fire sup-port operations. We must learn fromthis fight to prepare for the future.

At the end of the fight we thought backon some of the things we were theproudest of. What jumped to the fore-front was infantry and tank platoon ser-geants, platoon leaders and companycommanders telling us that the artilleryand mortars were awesome. At the endof the day, that is what it is all about: our

maneuver brethren recognizing why weare called the “King of Battle.”

Captain James T. (Tom) Cobb has beenassigned to 1st Battalion, 6th Field Artillery(1-6 FA), 1st Infantry Division, and served asthe Fire Support Officer (FSO) for Task Force2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, (TF 2-2 IN) in Op-eration Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II, includingduring the Battle of Fallujah. He also de-ployed with Kosovo Force (KFOR) 4B.

First Lieutenant Christopher A. LaCour,assigned to 1-6 FA, has been the TargetingOfficer for TF 2-2 IN in OIF II, includingduring the Battle of Fallujah. Also in OIF II,he was a Platoon Leader for 2/C/1-6 FA and,previously, a Fire Direction Officer in thesame battery.

Sergeant First Class William H. Hight, alsoassigned to 1-6 FA, has been TF 2-2 IN’s FireSupport NCO since September 2003, de-ploying in OIF II and fighting in the Battle ofFallujah. He also deployed to Bosnia as partof the Implementation Force (IFOR) and toKosovo as part of KFOR 4B.

Captain Jason M. Bender, SeniorFire Support Instructor, was namedthe Officer Instructor of FY04 at theAviation Warfighting Center, FortRucker, Alabama. He received aplaque for his performance from theCommanding General of the AviationCenter and Fort Rucker, BrigadierGeneral E.J. Sinclair, in ceremonies atthe Museum of Army Aviation in De-cember 2004. He also received a statuefrom the Army Aviation Associationof America (AAAA).

Captain Bender is the Chief of theFires Branch at the Aviation Centerand has been a Fire Support Instructorat the Center since December 2002. Inhis previous assignment, he was aTask Force Fire Support Officer as-signed to the 1st Battalion, 10th FieldArtillery, part of the 3d Infantry Divi-sion (Mechanized) at Fort Benning,Georgia. During his career, he has de-ployed to Operation Allied Force aspart of Task Force Hawk in Albaniaand Operation Desert Spring in Ku-wait.

Redleg CPT Jason Bender SelectedAviation Center Officer Instructor of FY04

Captain Jason Bender, Senior Fire Support Instructor, receives a plaque for hisperformance as Officer Academic Instructor of FY04 from Brigadier General Sinclair,Commanding General of the Aviation Warfighting Center, in a ceremony at Fort Ruckerlast December.

The Fight for Fallujah - March - April 2005 Field Artillery

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