The Evolution to Basel II XBRL and the Basel II Capital Accord Donald Inscoe Deputy Director...
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Transcript of The Evolution to Basel II XBRL and the Basel II Capital Accord Donald Inscoe Deputy Director...
The Evolution to Basel IIXBRL and the Basel II Capital Accord
Donald Inscoe
Deputy Director
Division of Insurance and Research
U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
XBRL International, Tokyo, Japan November 8, 2005
First Basel Accord
The first Basel Accord (Basel I) was completed in 1988 – Set minimum capital standards for banks– Standards focused on credit risk, the main risk
incurred by banks– Became effective end-year 1992
Reason for the Accord
To create a level playing field for internationally active banks– Banks from different countries competing for the
same loans would have to set aside roughly the same amount of capital on the loans
1988 Accord Capital Requirements
Capital was set at 8% and was adjusted by a loan’s credit risk weight
Credit risk was divided into 5 categories: 0%, 10%, 20%, 50%, and 100%– Commercial loans, for example, were assigned to
the 100% risk weight category
Risk-Based Capital
The Accord was hailed for incorporating risk into the calculation of capital requirements
Capital Calculation
To calculate required capital, a bank would multiply the assets in each risk category by the category’s risk weight and then multiply the result by 8%– Thus a $100 commercial loan would be multiplied
by 100% and then by 8%, resulting in a capital requirement of $8
Criticisms of the Accord
The Accord, however, was criticized for taking too simplistic an approach to setting credit risk weights and for ignoring other types of risk
Risk Weights
Risk weights were based on what the parties to the Accord negotiated rather than on the actual risk of each asset – Risk weights did not flow from any particular
insolvency probability standard, and were for the most part, arbitrary
Operational and Other Risks
The requirements did not explicitly account for operating and other forms of risk that may also be important– Except for trading account activities, the capital
standards did not account for hedging, diversification, and differences in risk management techniques
Banks Develop Own “Capital Allocation” Models
Advances in technology and finance allowed banks to develop their own capital allocation (internal) models in the 1990s
This resulted in more accurate calculations of bank capital than possible under Basel I
These models allowed banks to align the amount of risk they undertook on a loan with the overall goals of the bank
Internal Models and Basel I
Internal models allow banks to more finely differentiate risks of individual loans than is possible under Basel I– Risk can be differentiated within loan categories
and between loan categories– Allows the application of a “capital charge” to
each loan, rather than each category of loan
Variation in Credit Quality
Banks discovered a wide variation in credit quality within risk-weight categories– Basel I lumps all commercial loans into the 8%
capital category– Internal models calculations can lead to capital
allocations on commercial loans that vary from 1% to 30%, depending on the loan’s estimated risk
Capital Arbitrage
If a loan is calculated to have an internal capital charge that is low compared to the 8% standard, the bank has a strong incentive to undertake regulatory capital arbitrage
Securitization is the main means used by U.S. banks to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage
Example of Capital Arbitrage
Assume a bank has a portfolio of commercial loans with the following ratings and internally generated capital requirements
– AA-A: 3%-4% capital needed– B+-B: 8% capital needed– B- and below: 12%-16% capital needed
Under Basel I, the bank has to hold 8% risk-based capital against all of these loans
To ensure the profitability of the better quality loans, the bank engages in capital arbitrage--it securitizes the loans so that they are reclassified into a lower regulatory risk category with a lower capital charge
Lower quality loans with higher internal capital charges are kept on the bank’s books because they require less risk-based capital than the bank’s internal model indicates
New Approach to Risk-Based Capital
By the late 1990s, growth in the use of regulatory capital arbitrage led the Basel Committee to begin work on a new capital regime (Basel II)
Effort focused on using banks’ internal rating models and internal risk models
June 1999: Committee issued a proposal for a new capital adequacy framework to replace the 1998 Accord
Basel II
Basel II consists of three pillars:– Minimum capital requirements for credit risk,
market risk and operational risk—expanding the 1988 Accord (Pillar I)
– Supervisory review of an institution’s capital adequacy and internal assessment process (Pillar II)
– Effective use of market discipline as a lever to strengthen disclosure and encourage safe and sound banking practices (Pillar III)
Pillar I
In the United States, all banks that will be required to conform to the new capital standard will use the Advanced Internal Ratings Based approach (AIRB)
AIRB Approach Requirements
Collect sufficient data on loans to develop a method for rating loans within various portfolios
Develop a Probability of Default (PD) for each rated loan
Develop a Loss Given Default (LGD) for each loan
Example: Safe v. Risky Loans
Safe loans:– Over a 1-year period, only 0.25% of these loans
default– If a loan defaults, the bank only loses 1% on the
outstanding amount Risky loans:
– Over a 1-year period, 1% of loans default every year– If a loan defaults, the bank loses 10% of the
outstanding amount
Example: Safe v. Risky Loans (continued)
For a $100 million portfolio of the safe loans, the bank would expect to see $250,000 in defaults in a year and a loss on the defaults of $2500– ($100 million X .25% = $250,000)– ($250,000 X 1% loss rate = $2500)
Example: Safe v. Risky Loans (continued)
For a $100 million in a risky portfolio the bank would expect to see $1 million in defaults in a year and a loss on the defaults of $100,000– ($100 million X 1% = $1 million)– ($1 million X 10% = $100,000)
Goal of Pillar I
Although simplistic, this example demonstrates what Pillar I is trying to achieve– If the bank’s own internal calculations show that
they have extremely risky, loss-prone loans that generate high internal capital charges, their formal risk-based capital charges should also be high
– Likewise, lower risk loans should carry lower risk-based capital charges
Complexity of Pillar I
Banks have many different asset classes each of which may require different treatment– Each asset class needs to be defined and the
approach to each exposure determined
Minimum standards must be established for rating system design, including testing and documentation requirements– The proposals must be tested in the real world
Assessing Basel II
To determine if the proposed rules are likely to yield reasonable risk-based capital requirements within and between countries for banks with similar portfolios, four quantitative impact studies (QIS) have been undertaken
Results of Quantitative Impact Studies
Results of the QIS studies have been troubling– Wide swings in risk-based capital requirements– Some individual banks show unreasonably large
declines in required capital
As a result, parts of the Accord have been revised
Operational Risk
Pillar I also adds a new capital component for operational risk– Operational risk covers the risk of loss due to
system breakdowns, employee fraud or misconduct, errors in models or natural or man-made catastrophes, among others
Pillars II and III
Progress has also been made on Pillars II and III– Pillar II focuses on supervisory oversight– Pillar III looks at market discipline and public
disclosure
Pillar II
Supervisory Oversight– Requires supervisors to review a bank’s capital
adequacy assessment process, which may indicate a higher capital requirement than Pillar I minimums
Pillar III
Market discipline and public disclosure– The United States is currently in the forefront of
disclosure of financial data SEC disclosure requirements for publicly traded banks Bank regulators require quarterly filing of call reports for
all banks
– U.S. authorities are currently considering what banks should publicly disclose about their Basel II calculations
U.S. Implementation of Basel II
Based on results for QIS4, which show the potential for substantial declines in capital, the U.S. banking regulators have proposed a revised implementation timeline– The revised timeline includes a minimum three-
year transition period
Revised U.S. Timeline for Basel II Implementation
Year Transistional Arrangements
2008 Parallel Run
2009 95% floor
2010 90% floor
2011 85% floor
U.S. Implementation of Basel II (Continued)
After 2011, an institution’s primary federal supervisor will assess the institution’s readiness to operate under Basel II– Institutions will be assessed on a case-by-case
basis– Further revisions to the floors are anticipated– Both Prompt Corrective Action and leverage
capital requirements will remain
Basel I-A: The Search for Equal Capital Treatment
In the U.S., concerns that Basel II could give those banks operating under it a competitive advantage over other banks has resulted in a proposal called Basel 1-A
Basel 1-A is designed to modernize the way all U.S. banks and thrifts calculate their minimum capital requirements
Implications
The practices in Basel II represent several important departures from the traditional calculation of bank capital– The very largest banks will operate under a
system that is different than that used by other banks
– The implications of this for long-term competition between these banks is uncertain, but merits further attention
Implications
Basel II’s proposals rely on banks’ own internal risk estimates to set capital requirements– This represents a conceptual leap in determining
adequate regulatory capital
For regulators, evaluating the integrity of bank models will be a significant step beyond the traditional supervisory process
Implications
The proposed Accord will elevate the importance of human judgment in the process of capital regulation– Despite its quantitative basis, much will depend
on the judgment of banks in formulating their estimates and of supervisors in validating the assumptions used by banks in their models
Work Continues
During the past 3 years the FDIC has expressed its concern that the proposed Accord will result in banks having too little risk-based capital
Work continues on recalibrating the proposals and a workable solution is expected
Implications Additional Data Needed to Counterbalance to Changes in Environment
H ig h e rL e v e ra g e
Un pro v e nR a t in g
S y s te m s
Ev o lv in gC o n tro l
S tru ctu re s
Th re e Y e a rFlo o rs /L e v e ra g e
R a t io
I m pro v e d R is kM a n a g e m e n t
• Changes in environment necessitate changes in risk analysis for banks and supervisors/insurers
• Additional information will be needed to:
Inform policy development.
Supplement other sources of risk information used in supervisory resource planning and overall risk assessments
Serve as an input into deposit insurance pricing and overall insurance funds adequacy analyses
Why XBRL ?
Internal ratings based and standard approach measures require complex data model
– Common data requirements flow from Accord and Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS I – IV)
– Domestic and international comparisons needed to ensure consistent application
– Taxonomy needed to compare banks’ internal ratings of similar and diverse risks
Common Data Elements Flow from Accord:Standardized Internal Risk Estimates
Exposure
Internal Risk EstimateP
DLG
DE
AD
M Other
Wholesale X X X X -
Retail X X X - -
Securitization - - - - X
Equity - - - - X
Market Risk - - - - XOperational
Risk- - - - X
Data Types Reporting Granularity
Portfolio Level Data
Individual Exposure Data for
All Transactions
Summary Data
Why XBRL ?
Internal ratings based measures and standard approach require complex data model
– Supervisors need detailed information to qualify banks for advanced approaches (IRB, AMA, and Market Risk)
– Data can be shared across different supervisory regimes
- Independent of systems, platforms, geography and language translation
Consistent data needed to help identify risk estimates that may be inconsistent with peer estimates.
Follow-up: Can differences between Bank’s PD and benchmark be adequately explained by differences in risk?
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
AA or better A to AA BBB to A BB to BBB B to BB >B
Bank’s PD Distribution Mapped to S&P Rating Scale
Peer Banks’ PD Distribution Mapped to S&P Rating Scale
% of Wholesale Exposures
Why XBRL ?
XBRL provides a framework for complex data model
– Open standard facilitates reuse and innovation– Analysts can spend more time analyzing data– Reduced reporting burden, especially for
organizations operating in multiple jurisdictions
Why XBRL ?
A standard is needed in any case.
Why XBRL ?
FINIS