The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility and Community Bank Utilization Kyle...

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The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility and Community Bank Utilization Kyle Allen, Scott Hein, and Matthew Whitledge

Transcript of The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility and Community Bank Utilization Kyle...

Page 1: The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility and Community Bank Utilization Kyle Allen, Scott Hein, and Matthew Whitledge.

The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s

Term Auction Facility and Community Bank Utilization

Kyle Allen, Scott Hein, and Matthew Whitledge

Page 2: The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility and Community Bank Utilization Kyle Allen, Scott Hein, and Matthew Whitledge.

Disclaimer: As a researcher I come with a lot of baggage• I like community bankers. Some of my good friends are either community bankers

or themselves like community bankers.• I believe the community bank business model is different from what large banks

do and is viable in the future. Relationship banking and using soft information amongst other matters means community banks are different.• To the extent the financial crisis entailed banks, it was the large banks, nor

community banks. Community banks suffered “collateral damage” in the financial crisis, but those that would misstep failed.• I don’t think the Federal Reserve and many other banking regulators fully

understand how different community banks are.• I don’t like the academic use of asset size as the sole gauge of identifying

community banks.

Page 3: The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility and Community Bank Utilization Kyle Allen, Scott Hein, and Matthew Whitledge.

Overview of Paper

• Community Bank Identification• Focus on business model and uniqueness of community banks• Use the FDIC’s broader identification of community banks method, going beyond simple asset size

identification method. Distinguish between “community banks” and all others, “non-community banks”

• Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility (TAF) Evolution -- 3 changes implemented by the Fed:• Decrease in minimum bid amount• Introduction of longer term loans• Increase total auction amount to $150 billion, morphs system from lending freely at a penalty rate to

lending at potentially below market rates

• Results• Fed was not oblivious to community bank utilization of TAF• Most important change was increase in total auction amount, October 2008• Community banks were less likely to participate, especially early in TAF’s existence

Page 4: The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility and Community Bank Utilization Kyle Allen, Scott Hein, and Matthew Whitledge.

Community Bank Identification

• Alternative measures, asset size as the sole identifier• Typically it is $1 billion in total assets• Federal Reserve uses $10 billion in total assets• Conference of State Bank Supervisors recent concern about floating definition

• FDIC (2012) measure, provides a superior means of community bank identification

1. Business focus2. $1 billion in total assets, adjusted for inflation3. Geographic, branch, and deposit/branch limit

• Improvements• Focuses beyond simple asset size; Community Bank attributes and business model

Page 5: The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility and Community Bank Utilization Kyle Allen, Scott Hein, and Matthew Whitledge.

Term Auction Facility

• Purpose• Designed to “promote the efficient dissemination of liquidity when the unsecured interbank

markets are under stress”

• Process• Auctions every two weeks, total auction offering amount was announced by Fed and known

in advance. Like discount window borrowing, borrowers had to post acceptable collateral.• Each bank could submit up to two bids per auction• Bids contain loan amount requested and rate borrower was willing to pay• Bids awarded from the highest to lowest rate, until all funds allocated, with stated minimum

bid announced• Available to institutions in “generally sound financial condition”• Can borrow up to a total of 10% of the total auction amount• Dutch auction, all winning bidding banks pay the same rate

Page 6: The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility and Community Bank Utilization Kyle Allen, Scott Hein, and Matthew Whitledge.

Additional TAF Research

• Analyzed within small and large Banks, mainly focused on financial position of borrowing banks and how they used the funds• Berger, Black, Bouwman, and Dlugosz (2014)

• Privately-held institutions borrowed twice as much when scaled• Cyree, Griffiths, and Winters (2014)

• Foreign banks were the largest borrowers• Benmelech (2012)

• Borrowers willing to pay more for TAF than Discount Window, early on in TAF, see this as evidence of a stigma associated with discount window borrowing• Armantier, Ghysels, Sarkar, and Shrader (2011)

Page 7: The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility and Community Bank Utilization Kyle Allen, Scott Hein, and Matthew Whitledge.

Timeline of the Fed’s Term Auction Facility

December 12, 2007The Federal Reserve establishes Term Auction Facility

February 14, 2008The Federal Reserve lowers minimum bid size from $10 million to $5 million

August 14, 2008The Federal Reserve offers 84 day loans for the first time

March 11, 2010The Federal Reserve extends the last loan for the TAF

October 9, 2008The Federal Reserve raises total offering amount to $150 billion

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Page 8: The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility and Community Bank Utilization Kyle Allen, Scott Hein, and Matthew Whitledge.

Number of Loans extended in Different Sub-periods, mainly large (>$5m) loans, accepting smaller bids after Feb. 14, 2008, Change #1

Time Period

Less than $10 Million $10 Million or More

Total CB Total CB

(1) Before Feb 14, 2008 1 0 135 10

(2) Feb 14 to July 31, 2008 21 12 639 49

(3) Aug 14 to Sep. 25, 2008 10 5 204 15

(4) After October 1, 2008 488 433 2,716 707

Total Loans 520 450 3,694 781

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Maturity Break-down of # of TAF Loans, Introduction of Longer-term Loans, August 14, 2008, Change # 2

Time Period Maturity of 28 days or less Maturity greater than 28 days

(1) Before Feb 14, 2008 112 24

(2) Feb 14 to July 31, 2008 660 0

(3) Aug 14 to Sep. 25, 2008 163 51

(4) After October 1, 2008 1,856 1,348

Total Loans 2,791 1,423

Page 10: The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility and Community Bank Utilization Kyle Allen, Scott Hein, and Matthew Whitledge.

Marked Increase in Total Offering Amount, after the fact no longer lending at a penalty rate, Change #3, the Big Change, October 9, 2008

Before After

Number of Auctions 23 37

Avg. Offer Amount ($B) 50.43 118.24

Avg. Stop Out Rate (%) 2.87 0.34

Avg. Total Submitted ($B) 71.6 71.85

Avg. Total Accepted ($B) 50.43 71.85

Avg. Number of Bidders 71.26 86.11

Avg. Bid to Cover Ratio 1.69 0.58

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Community vs. Non-Community Bank TAF Utilization

  (1) (2) (3) (4) Full Sample  Dec. 1, 2007 to

Feb. 13, 2008Feb. 14, 2008 to July 31,

2008

Aug. 14, 2008 to Sep. 25

2008

Oct 1, 2008 to Mar. 31,

2010

Dec. 1, 2007 to Mar. 31,

2010  

Non-Community BanksTotal Amount Borrowed($ billion) $27.99 $268.62 $109.72 $1,346.79 $1,753.12Total Number of Borrowings 51 313 99 1,140 1,603Med. TAF Loan Amount ($ mil) $200 $240 $430 $150 $150Med. TAF Loan to Total Assets .0116 .0146 .0146 .0225 .0202Med. TAF Loan to Core Deposits .0199 .0245 .0265 .0384 .0344

Community BanksTotal Amount Borrowed($ billion) $0.161 $7.21 $2.77 $58.18 $68.32Total Number of Borrowings 10 61 20 1,140 1,231Med. TAF Loan Amount ($ mil) $14 $17 $12.5 $10 $11Med. TAF Loan to Total Assets .0168 .0165 .0108 .0287 .0278Med. TAF Loan to Core Deposits .0241 .0256 .0166 .0454 .0440

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Bank Utilization: Probit Model Estimation, Likelihood of TAF Utilization  Before October 1, 2008 After October 1, 2008  All Banks Non-Comm. Comm. All Banks Non-Comm. Comm.Probability of Borrowing .03% .73% .01% 1.93% 16.89% 1.21%Log Total Assets 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.019 0.073 0.014  (12.05) (6.24) (8.57) (18.90) (9.34) (9.61)NCFD -0.000 -0.000 -0.012 0.002 0.024 1.893  (-1.19) (-1.21) (-1.48) (1.36) (1.79) (1.82)Tier 1 Ratio -0.009 -0.149 -0.002 -0.012 -0.001 -0.013  (-2.58) (-2.76) (-1.01) (-0.51) (-0.05) (-0.74)STD ROA 0.009 -0.334 0.006 -0.107 -4.719 0.197  (0.54) (-0.57) (1.28) (-0.56) (-2.58) (1.29)ROE 0.000 -0.005 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.000  (1.34) (-0.34) (1.87) (0.72) (-0.73) (0.79)Spread -0.001 -0.024 -0.001 0.009 0.012 0.009  (-2.70) (-1.95) (-3.58) (5.57) (0.82) (6.10)CRE 0.005 0.082 0.001 0.213 1.835 0.090  (3.84) (2.37) (1.38) (4.39) (2.93) (2.18)MBS -0.062 -0.585 -0.058 0.574 -0.720 0.448  (-1.47) (-0.79) (-1.79) (1.38) (-0.20) (1.26)Pseudo R2 .5159 .3498 .2976 .2541 .1856 .1525

Page 13: The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility and Community Bank Utilization Kyle Allen, Scott Hein, and Matthew Whitledge.

Conclusions

• The Federal Reserve adjusted the program guidelines as the crisis evolved. They seemed to recognize early on they weren’t serving community banks, with reduction in size of minimum bid amount.

• Still, either program constraints, or lack of need, limited community banks’ ability to borrow in the first half of TAF program.

• Community banks didn’t fully take advantage of the program in the latter half, even when monies were relatively inexpensively priced. Community banks did increase use, but funds were very inexpensive.

Page 14: The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility and Community Bank Utilization Kyle Allen, Scott Hein, and Matthew Whitledge.

References

Armantier, O., E. Ghysels, A. Sarkar, and J. Shrader, 2011. Stigma in financial market: Evidence from liquidity auctions and discount window borrowing during the crisis (No. 483). Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Benmelech, Efraim, 2012. An Empirical Analysis of the Fed's Term Auction Facility. No. w18304. National Bureau of Economic Research.

Berger, A., L. Black, C. Bouwman, and J. Dlugosz, 2014. The Federal Reserve’s Discount Window and TAF Programs: “Pushing on a String?” Working Paper.

Cyree, Ken, Mark Griffiths, and Drew Winters, 2014. TAF: Wall Street Bailout or Main Street Funding? Working Paper.

FDIC Community Banking Study, 2012. Retrieved September, 2013, from http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/cbi/report/cbi-full.pdf .

Federal Reserve, Term Auction Facility Questions and Answers (FRB: Frequently asked questions (revised January 12, 2009)).