23ibid., p. 5.

r a discussion of the relationship to the xirban crisis andwelfare, see Helen Ginsburg, Unemployment, Subamployment and P\jblicPolicy, ch. 5, or "Needed: A National Commitment to Full Employment,"Current History, 65 (August 1973), pp. 74-75 and 88.

25u.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Achieving the Goalsof the Employment Act of 1946—Thirtieth Anniversary Review, Vol. 1,Paper 5, Estimating the Social Costs of National Economic Policy:Implications for Mental and Physical Health, and Criminal Aggression,by Harvey Brenner (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office,1976), p. 5. This excellent study also contains a review of theliterature and a bibliography.

26por a discussion of the politics of this coalition and on thedevelopment of the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill in its early versions, seeHelen Ginsburg, "Jobs for All: Congressional Will-o'the-Wisp,"The Nation, February 5, 1977, pp. 138-143.

27p.L. 523, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.

THE EVOLUTION OF HUMPHREY-HAWKINS*Harvey L. Schantz, State University of New York—PlattsburghRichard H. Schmidt, United States Department of Labor

ABSTRACT

Humphrey-Hawkins, enacted into law as the Full Employment andBalanced Growth Act of 1978, is the most important step the Federalgovernment has taken for overall economic coordination since passageof the Employment Act of 1946. The centerpiece of the new law isspecific goals for unemployment and inflation. All Federal programsand policies are to work toward achieving a 3 percent adult and4 percent overall jobless rate within five years, and inflationrates of 3 percent by 1983 and 0 percent by 1988. The presentarticle outlines the major changes made in Humphrey-Hawkins from itsintroduction in June 1974 to its enactment in October 1978, the con-tents of the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, andthe politics surrounding its passage.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND. On June 26, 1974, Augustus F.Hawkins, a black Democratic congressman representing the Watts, LosAngeles congressional district, received a minute to address the U.S.House about the Equal Opportunity and Full Employment Bill

*This article is adapted from Planning for Employment, a full-length study being jointly conducted by the two authors. Sources in-clude interviews with certain principals (many not for attribution),the public record (media, scholarly, and congressional), and workingcongressional documents (including party, committee, group, and membersources), as well as participant observation (in the U.S. House andSenate). This article was co-authored by Richard H. Schmidt in hisprivate capacity. The authors are solely responsible for all errorsof fact and interpretation.

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(HR 15476) which he and Congressman Henry S. Reuss (D., WI)had introduced the week before. "Assuring full employment," beganCongressman Hawkins, "is the single most important step in thenational interest at this time." Furthermore, according to Hawkins,"an authentic full employment policy rejects the narrow, statisticalidea of full employment measured in terms of some tolerable level ofunemployment—the percentage game—and adopts the more human andsocially meaningful concept of personal rights to an opportunity foruseful employment at fair rates of compensation." ̂

The failure of the economy to provide adequate employmentopportunity for its almost 92 million civilian labor force was the impe-tus for Hawkins' action. After holding at an average annual rate of4.7 percent for the years from 1962 through 1973, ̂ the rate of unem-ployment began to grow precipitously in 1974. From a 5.2 percent unem-ployment rate in June 1974, the jobless rate rose to 5.8 percent in Sep-tember, 6.6 percent in November, and 8.2 percent in January 1975.During 1974, unemployment (seasonally adjusted) increased from 4.66million to 7.53 million workers—the largest single yearly increase inunemployment during the post-world war period.

Although unemployment increased in every sector of the workforce during 1974, blacks, youth, and women—groups having, evenin the best of circumstances, a relatively high unemployment rate—absorbed a disproportionate share of this increase in joblessness.Minority unemployment, for example, increased from 9.2 percent to13.4 percent; the rate of unemployment among black youth rose from28.7 percent to 41.1 percent during 1974.^ Vernon E. Jordan, J r . ,executive director of the National Urban League, commented that thissituation "amounts to a major depression for black workers."*^

The bill introduced by Hawkins and Reuss, and its Senate coun-terpart introduced August 22, 1974 by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey(D., MN) ,5 sought to establish in law a personal right for all Ameri-cans willing and able to work an opportunity for employment thatwould be enforceable in court; require the President to submit anannual economic report to Congress with recommendations that wouldassure full employment; expand the Local Planning Councils underCETA to assess community needs and create a reservoir of publicservice projects as a potential for job references; provide for thedelivery of an actual job by a Job Guarantee Office, an organiza-tional unit in the proposed U.S. Full Employment Service; create aStandby Jobs Corps for jobs of last resort if the private sector couldnot supply adequate employment; and require a full employmentsociety within five years of enactment.

The central idea behind Hawkins' bill—planning and coordi-nating the Federal economic mechanisms to assure a full employmenteconomy—was not novel. Planning for full employment had informedthe efforts of Senators James E. Murray (D., MT) and Robert A.Wagner (D., NY) during the mid 1940s. The resulting EmploymentAct of 1946 is generally looked upon as a milestone in the economichistory of the United States.^ The Act declared that it is the policyof the Federal Government to "coordinate and utilize all its plans,functions, and resources for the purpose of creating and maintaining,in a manner calculated to foster and promote free competitive enter-prise and the general welfare, conditions under which there will be

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afforded useful employment for those able, willing, and seeking towork, and to promote maximum employment, production, and pur-chasing power." Subsequent sections of the 1946 Employment Actprovide the statutory basis for the annual economic report of thePresident, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Joint EconomicCommittee of Congress.

Many liberal and labor groups were disappointed in the Employ-ment Act of 1946. Not only had the opposition succeeded in deletingthe term "full employment" from the title of the Act, they haddeflected its purpose by requiring the President to equally considerother economic goals. It was partly "to reverse this calamitous out-come and return to the original intent of the Murray-Wagner fullemployment bill as introduced in 1945," that Hawkins launched hiscampaign for full employment legislation. '^

PLANNING FOR EMPLOYMENT. On May 21, 1975, Senators HubertH. Humphrey and Jacob Javits (R., NY) introduced S 1795, TheBalanced Growth and Economic Planning Act of 1975. The thrust ofthis comprehensive national economic planning measure was muchwider than the then current version of Humphrey-Hawkins. A keyprovision of S 1795 sought to create an Economic Planning Board inthe Executive Office of the President to appraise the nation's totalfiscal needs and establish an outline of economic goals. These goalswere to be submitted by the President to the Congress' Joint EconomicCommittee for review and for eventual approval by a concurrentresolution of the House and Senate.

On June 11 and 12, the Joint Economic Committee, with ChairmanHubert H. Humphrey presiding, held hearings on "National EconomicPlanning, Balanced Growth, and Full Employment." One of the high-lights of these hearings was the forceful argument of Leonard Wood-cock, President of the United Auto Workers, as to the need for im-proved national economic planning mechanisms. Woodcock argued thatthe Humphrey-Javits bill and Humphrey-Hawkins "are complimentarypieces of legislation.. .The Humphrey-Javits bill deals with the entireissue of long rangje national planning. The Humphrey-Hawkins billmakes it clear that the primary goal of any such national planning mustbe the achievement of full employment." ^ Future versions of theHumphrey-Hawkins legislation provided an amalgam of these two bills:a national economic planning bill which called for full employment asthe primary goal.

PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS.

The 1976 Campaign and Election. As the 1976 presidential campaigngot underway, many Democratic party leaders sought to exploit theunemployment problem—and Humphrey-Hawkins was looked to as theappropriate legislative vehicle. Hubert Humphrey and his staff, aswell as organized labor, however, were very concerned with the costof some of the specific provisions of Humphrey-Hawkins. Humphreyand other Democratic leaders feared that the bill had the potential ofbecoming an "albatross" around the neck of any Democratic partypresidential candidate, as the guaranteed annual income had to GeorgeMcGovern in his 1972 presidential bid. Already, the Republican admin-istration had publicly attacked the cost of the bill, estimated at$30-60 billion annually.

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Representatives of organized labor, Humphrey's office, andHawkins' office met to discuss their concerns. After long and pro-tracted negotiations, a new version of Humphrey-Hawkins—one thatcould safely be used as a presidential campaign issue—was agreedupon.

On March 12, 1976, Hubert Humphrey and Augustus Hawkinsintroduced the new version of their bill at a joint news conference.Their announcement was coordinated with a burst of announced sup-port for Humphrey-Hawkins by black, labor, and liberal groups.The following week, a two day conference on unemployment, in com-memoration of the 30th anniversary of the Employment Act of 1946,was held by the Joint Economic Committee. ^

The version introduced in March 1976, although calling for3 percent unemployment within four years, did acknowledge theimportance of national production and purchasing power, as well asthe need to curb inflation. In short, it reflected the influence of theHumphrey-Javits planning bill, and the increasing saliency ofinflation.

The new version of Humphrey-Hawkins is "a piece of legisla-tion around which candidates can base their campaigns," HubertHumphrey noted at the March 12th news conference. And indeed.Democratic presidential hopefuls were doing just that. Humphreyhad, from the beginning, viewed Humphrey-Hawkins as a means ofreturning to the national limelight. Representative Morris K. Udall(D., AZ) and former Senator Fred Harris (D., OK) had both en-dorsed the earlier version of Humphrey-Hawkins. Senator Henry M.Jackson (D., WA) was expected to support the new version of thelegislation.^^

Presidential candidate Jimmy Carter, through his economicadviser Lawrence Klein, other prominent economists, and freshmanDemocratic House members indicated that they did not shareHumphrey's enthusiasm with the legislation, however. To meet theobjections of these parties, "extensive revisions" were made. Thefall 1976 draft—which was reintroduced on January 4, 1977, thefirst day of the 95th Congress—reflected greater emphasis upon thegoal of curbing inflation and contained specific anti-inflation pro-visions, as well as made clear that the last resort reservoir of fed-erally funded jobs would consist of low paying employment so as notto encourage inflation or employee migration from the private to thepublic sector. ^^

The Carter Administration. During the initial months of the Carterpresidency Senator Hubert Humphrey was, in the opinion of manyWashington observers, the president's most effective congressionaladvocate. In the words of one well placed staffer, Humphrey timeafter time rescued the President's "legislative chestnuts from thefire." Humphrey understood the difficulties of setting up a newadministration and therefore did not press the White House forbtrong support of Humphrey-Hawkins. By June, however, Humphreybegan to push for action. It was to take considerable pressure—fromHumphrey, labor, black leaders, and Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill (D.,MA)—and compromise to win the administration's support forHumprhey-Hawkins.

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On November 14, 1977, in a joint news release, the Offices ofSenator Hubert Humphrey and Representative Augustus Hawkinsannounced that an agreement had been reached with the Presidentover a new version of the bill. The new draft contained "the pro-vision that adult unemployment be reduced to 3 percent and overallunemployment reduced to 4 percent within five years, in lieu ofthe earlier provision that adult unemployment only be reduced to3 percent within four years."^2 Also, the President was granted a"bailout" clause; he was given the right to request Congress to alterthese goals for the third and subsequent years that the bill was ineffect.

The President also received more leeway in the bill's anti-inflationary provisions. The new version of the bill did not requirethe President to maintain inflation at or below the level at enactment,as did the fall 1976 draft.

The new version further stressed the expansion of privateemployment. The creation of reservoirs of last-resort public servicejobs were delayed for at least two years after enactment, andrequired to have a separate authorization.

In short, for his endorsement, the President exacted more flex-ibility in the legislation's goals, and greater reliance on privateemployment.

CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS.

The House. The Carter endorsed versions of HR 50 and S 50 wereintroduced on the first day of the second session of the 95th Con-gress. On February 8, 1978, the Employment Opportunities Subcom-mittee of the House Education and Labor Committee, chaired byAugustus Hawkins, approved the latest version of Humphrey-Hawkins.The Subcommittee had rejected an amendment by Ronald A. Sarasin(R, CT) that would have set a goal for reducing inflation to 3percent by 1983. This amendment was subsequently rejected by thefull committee.

Although the liberal-labor oriented Education and Labor Com-mittee quickly disposed of this attempt to establish an inflation goalalongside of the unemployment goal, this issue was to become conten-tious at almost every step of the legislative process. The importanceof the inflation goal grew as inflation rekindled, and continued to bethe dominant concern of the American public.^^

The House of Representatives, after four days of debate andconsideration of fifty amendments, passed HR 50 by a final vote of 257to 152 on March 16, 1978. The legislative strategy of the opponents—to alter the bill through the addition of specific goals—was partiallysuccessful. The House rejected amendments which would have addeda goal of reducing inflation to 3 percent by 1983, and one that calledfor a balanced federal budget by the same year. However, com-promise versions of these amendments, offered by leadership Demo-crats, were approved by the House. The first of these "requiresthat the third and subsequent (Presidential) Economic report setforth programs to reduce inflation and progress to that end." Theother added that it was one of the purposes of the Act "to achieve

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a balanced budget consistent with the achievement of theunemployment goal.. . "^^

Additionally, a number of other amendments, including onewhich called for a goal of 100 percent parity for farm products, wereapproved. Among the amendments rejected were an attempt at man-dating the use of a more restrictive definition of unemployment, andan amendment which provided a reduction in personal and corporateincome taxes. In all, the large margin of the final vote did not sig-nify the difficulty the House leadership had in maintaining theintegrity of the full employment purpose of the bill. That integritywas going to meet a more severe challenge in the Senate.

The Senate. In the Senate the bill was jointly referred to the Com-mittee on Human Resources and the Committee on Banking, Housing,and Urban Affairs. The Human Resources Committee, led by Employ-ment, Poverty, and Migratory Labor Subcommittee Chairman GaylordNelson (D., WI) and ranking Republican Jacob Javits, reported thebill out without major changes on April 13, 1978. The Banking,Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, however, added four sub-stantial amendments before approving the bill on June 28, 1978. Twoof these set goals of 0 percent inflation, and a balanced budgetby 1983. The other two were Chairman William Proxmire's (D., WI)amendment which set a goal of limiting the federal budget to a maxi-mum of 20 percent of the gross national product, and an amendmentoffered by John Tower (R., TX) which gave the President the powerto modify the unemployment goal, of 4 percent or less by 1983, inhis first economic message subsequent to the bill's passage. Thedifferences between the two committee versions of the bill—particu-larly the inclusion of the inflation goal by Banking—made it difficultfor the two committees to write up a joint report on the legislation.The joint report, filed on September 6, 1978, followed two months oftough negotiations in which few of the differences were resolved. ̂ 5

By this time, the scheduled October adjournment made theclock a strong ally of the opponents of Humphrey-Hawkins. The Con-gress was confronted with a host of important issues and but a fewweeks to deal with them. Already, a group of conservative senators,led by Orrin G. Hatcn (R., UT) had threatened a filibuster if thelegislation did not include an inflation goal. One senator on theBanking Committee confided that the only way Humphrey-Hawkinscould pass was if Congress reconvened after the November elections.

Proponents of Humphrey-Hawkins—particularly the Black Con-gressional Caucus and the Full Employment Action Council—pressedthe President and Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D., WV)for action. President Carter and Senator Byrd responded. ThePresident once again reaffirmed his support. And Senator Byrd,in an effort to reach a compromise and avoid a filibuster, appointedan ad hoc committee consisting of key proponents and opponentsof the legislation. On October 13, 1978, the ad hoc committee came upwith a proposal acceptable to all concerned. In the words of Sena-tor Bob Dole (R., KS), "we agreed to disagree on inflation andspending goals."^6

The full Senate decided on the spending and inflation goalson October 13, 1978, when it debated, amended, and passed

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Humphrey-Hawkins. The version of the bill before the Senate,HR 50, did not mention spending limits. Senator Proxmire, however,introduced an amendment which called for a goal of reducing the fed-eral budget to 21 percent of the GNP by fiscal 1981, and 20 percentby fiscal 1983. Instead, the Senate approved language introducedby Senator Edmund Muskie (D., ME) setting the goal of reducingfederal outlays to their "lowest level consistent with national needs."

Later on in the day, the Senate dealt with the inflation goal.The version beiore the Senate called for an inflation goal of 3 percentby 1983, and 0 percent by 1988. This inflation goal, however, wasnot to "impede" achievement of the unemployment goals. SenatorsMuskie and Muriel Humphrey (D., MN) offered an amendment callingfor a goal of reducing inflation to 3 percent "at the earliest possibledate." Their amendment—in what was perhaps the key vote onHumphrey-Hawkins—was defeated by a coalition of Humphrey-Hawkinssupporters, who feared a filibuster if the amendment were approved,and opponents of the bill.

The adoption of the specific inflation goals probably spelled thedifference between victory and defeat. It averted a threatened fili-buster by amendment on the part of conservative Republicans, andthus cleared the way for Senate approval, by a 70 to 19 vote, late inthe evening of October 13th. A number of conservative Republicansenators voted against final passage—rejecting increased Federaleconomic planning—even though they had succeeded in modifyingthe goals of the legislation.-^^

Several hours before adjournment on October 15, 1978, theHouse approved in 15 minutes, by a standing vote of 56 to 14, theSenate passed version. President Carter signed Humphrey-Hawkinsinto law at a White House ceremony on October 27, 1978.

THE FULL EMPLOYMENT AND BALANCED GROWTH ACT OF 1978.Humphrey-Hawkins—enacted into law as the Full Employment andBalanced Growth Act of 1978—is a much different mechanism than thebill introduced by Representative Augustus Hawkins in June of 1974.It does not create an absolute guarantee of a job for every able-bodied American. Nor does it establish any employment creatingprograms. The Act does, however, establish in law for the first timea procedure by which basic economic goals are to be proposed, con-sidered, and established by the President and his advisors. Con-gress, and the Federal Reserve Board.

Specifically, the new Act requires the President to submit inhis economic report, annual numerical goals for employment, unemploy-ment, production, real income, productivity, and prices during thenext five years. Short term goals are to be established for the firsttwo years, medium term goals for the following three years. Thepurpose of these short and medium term goals is not only to achievefull employment and production, but a balanced budget, improvedtrade balance, and federal outlays at the lowest percentage share ofthe GNP as practical.

The centerpiece of the new law is specific goals for unemploy-ment and inflation. All programs and policies implemented under theAct are to work toward achieving a 3 percent adult and 4

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3 percent by 1983 and 0 percent by 1988.

Although specific inflation goals were added by the Senate, theprimacy of the attack on unemployment was preserved by the pro-viso that "policies and programs for reducing inflation shall be sodesigned so as not to impede achievement of the goal and timetables"on unemployment.

Equally important, flexibility in goal setting as requested byPresident Carter, was retained. Beginning with the second eco-nomic report in January 1980, the President may modify both the 4percent unemployment proal and the 3 percent inflation goal andtimetable where changed economic circumstance require it. In anothertitle of the Act Congress is given the opportunity to review, accept,modify or reject the changed goals. However, the Act provides for acontinued commitment to the goal of reducing unemployment to 4percent as soon as possible.

The other instrument of economic policy making, the FederalReserve Board, is also required to report to Congress. The Boardmust report twice a year (February 20 and July 20) explaining themonetary policies it is pursuing in furtherance of the unemploymentand inflation goal.

The legislation stresses that none of its provisions shall be usedto control production, employment, allocation of resources, wages,or prices. The Act emphasizes that increases in available jobs shouldcome about by growth in the private sector. Only if the privatesector proves inadequate, can federally subsidized jobs, publicemployment, and reservoirs of employment projects be used toameliorate unemployment.

The employment reservoir is a final option. It can only betriggered by the President if he finds that the other procedureslisted are not working. It is further restricted by the requirementthat any new employment prog-ram, that involves more than an expan-sion of existing law, must be authorized by Congress and can not gointo effect until after October 27, 1980. In addition, to satisfy thecritics that had opposed the employment reservoir because it wouldbe inflationary, this provision also required that any job must be inthe low pay range and should be designed so as not to draw workersfrom private employment.

In order to coordinate the branches of government, the Actamends the Congressional Budget Act to establish procedures forCongressional review of the goals, programs, and policies recom-mended in the President's annual economic report. The Joint Eco-nomic Committee is to act on the President's recommendation and thensubmit a report to the respective Senate and House Budget Commit-tees. The Budget Committees are to address the goals and timetablesin their report on the first concurrent resolution on the budget.

The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 is thefirst step the Federal government has taken for overall economic coor-dination since 1946. The Act sets employment goals for the UnitedStates, as well as procedures for planning how to meet these goals. Ina few short years, we may be able to tell if the United States govern-ment is capable of planning for employment.

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NOTES

-^Congressional Record (CR) , 93d Congress, 2d Session, Jxine 26,1974, pp. H 21278-21283, at 21278.

^Employment and Training Report of the President, transmittedto the Congress 1978, p. 210, Table A-18.

^"Employment Status by Age, Sex, and Color, SeasonallyAdjusted," Monthly Labor Review 98 (March 1975), p. 88.

^Quoted in "Continuing High Rates of Minority JoblessnessPrompt Calls for Full Employment Legislation," Congressional Quar-terly Weekly Report (CQ), July 19, 1975, pp. 1588-1589, at 1588.

paragraph is based upon information placed into the CR byRepresentative Hawkins in the pages indicated in note 1. Virtuallyidentical versions of the bill were introduced in the House andSenate at the outset of the 94th Congress, January 1975. These andsucceeding versions of Humphrey-Hawkins bore the designations HR 50and S 50.

legislative history of this law is eloquently told inStephen Kiemp Bailey, Congress Makes a Law: The Story Behind theEmployment Act of 1946 (New York: Vintage Books, 1950).

'congressman Hawkins, CR, Jxme 26, 1974, p. H 21278.

^Leonard Woodcock, "Testimony," National Economic Planning,Balanced Growth, and Full Employment, Hearings before the U.S. Con-gress, Joint Economic Committee, June 11 and 12, 1975, pp. 4-8, at6, 7.

^U.S. Congress, Thirtieth Anniversary of the Employment Actof 1946—A National Conference on Full Employment, Hearings beforethe Joint Economic Committee, March 18 and 19, 1976.

l^Martha V. Gottron, "New Bill: Full Employment," CQ, March 20,1976, pp. 641-642; and Bob Rankin, "Candidates on the Issues: FullEmployment," CQ, March 6, 1976, pp. 513-514.

^^^, August 21, 1976, p. 2278; and U.S. Congress, House, Com-mittee on Education and Labor, Full Employment and Balanced GrowthAct of 1978, H. Rept. 95-895, February 22, 1978, pp. 6-7.

^2H. Rept. 95-895, p. 8.

for example, Louis Harris, "Inflation Ranks Above Unem-ployment as Problem," The Harris Survey (New York: Chicago Tribune-N.Y. News Syndicate, March 20, 1978).

provisions are noted in a document printed for theuse of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,Agenda: Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, S.50,June 1978, pp. 7,5.

S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Human Resources and Com-mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Full Employment andBalanced Growth Act of 1977, S. Report 95-1177.

16Quoted in Associated Press, "Senate Snaps Deadlock on

Employment Bill, Agrees to Final Vote," Fort-Lauderdale News andSun-Sentinel, October 14, 1978, p. 8A.

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I'See for example the statement by Senator Barry Goldwater(R., AZ) just prior to passage of H.R. 50, in CR, October 13, 1978,p. S 18968.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND THE CARTER ADMINIS-TRATION: AN ANALYSIS OF REORGANIZATION OPTIONSCharles M. Lamb, State University of New York at Buffalo

ABSTRACT

Responding to his 1976 campaign pledge. President Carter hasreorganized the federal government's enforcement of equal employ-ment opportunity (EEO) laws. He has done so by shifting some EEOresponsibilities from the Civil Service Commission and the Depart-ment of Labor to create a "Super-EEOC." This article examines whyPresident Carter chose the EEO reorganization that he did from thestandpoint of advantages and disadvantages. Also presented arealternative reform options that the President could have selectedthat would have involved increasing EEO coordination or reorgani-zation entailing new legislation that would have gone far beyondthe creation of a "Super-EEOC."

Voters were regularly promised during the 1976 presidentialcampaign that, if elected, Jimmy Carter would streamline the execu-tive branch of the federal government. One area in which reorgani-zation will probably have a significant impact is in equal employmentopportunity, especially since past equal employment programs havebeen ineffective, inefficient, overlapping, and uncoordinated. Inlight of President Carter's 1978 reorganization of federal equal em-ployment opportunity programs, this subject looms large in the mindsof many interested in employment policy.

PRESIDENT CARTER'S REFORMS. In March, 1977, Congress author-ized President Carter to reorganize the executive branch of the fed-eral government, with his reorganization plans to go into effect unlesswithin sixty days they were rejected by either house of Congress.^Carter then established a civil rights reorganization task force atthe Office of Management and Budget, headed by Howard Glickstein,a former staff director of the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights.From the beginning it was clear that the task force would first dealwith the perplexing problem of equal employment opportunity beforemoving on to civil rights enforcement in education and housing. 2

The task force's reorganization options were presented toPresident Carter in the fall of 1977. After considering the alterna-tives, which were never officially released to the public. Carter for-warded his equal employment proposal to Congress on February 23,1978. Calling his reorganization plan "the single most importantaction to improve civil rights in the past decade," President Cartertransferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)

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