The Evolution of Deterrence The McNamara Years. Robert S. McNamara Secretary of Defense, 1961-1968...

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The Evolution of The Evolution of Deterrence Deterrence The McNamara Years The McNamara Years

Transcript of The Evolution of Deterrence The McNamara Years. Robert S. McNamara Secretary of Defense, 1961-1968...

Page 1: The Evolution of Deterrence The McNamara Years. Robert S. McNamara Secretary of Defense, 1961-1968 Secretary of Defense, 1961-1968.

The Evolution of The Evolution of DeterrenceDeterrence

The McNamara YearsThe McNamara Years

Page 2: The Evolution of Deterrence The McNamara Years. Robert S. McNamara Secretary of Defense, 1961-1968 Secretary of Defense, 1961-1968.

Robert S. McNamaraRobert S. McNamara

Secretary of Secretary of Defense, 1961-Defense, 1961-19681968

Page 3: The Evolution of Deterrence The McNamara Years. Robert S. McNamara Secretary of Defense, 1961-1968 Secretary of Defense, 1961-1968.

A new approach at DoDA new approach at DoD

McNamara applied techniques from McNamara applied techniques from the private sector to manage, the private sector to manage, analyze, and evaluate defense analyze, and evaluate defense programs.programs. planning-programming-budgeting planning-programming-budgeting

system (PPBS)system (PPBS) systems analysissystems analysis

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The “Whiz Kids”The “Whiz Kids”

McNamara brings in a new civilian McNamara brings in a new civilian team to apply his more centralized, team to apply his more centralized, quantitative approach.quantitative approach. Cyrus VanceCyrus Vance William BundyWilliam Bundy Paul NitzePaul Nitze

Page 5: The Evolution of Deterrence The McNamara Years. Robert S. McNamara Secretary of Defense, 1961-1968 Secretary of Defense, 1961-1968.

John F. KennedyJohn F. Kennedy

President, 1961-63.President, 1961-63. Critical of Critical of

Eisenhower policies.Eisenhower policies. Under McNamara’s Under McNamara’s

guidance, his guidance, his administration administration develops the policy develops the policy of “Flexible of “Flexible Response.”Response.”

Page 6: The Evolution of Deterrence The McNamara Years. Robert S. McNamara Secretary of Defense, 1961-1968 Secretary of Defense, 1961-1968.

Flexible ResponseFlexible Response

The U.S. would develop the capacity The U.S. would develop the capacity to meet Communist encroachments to meet Communist encroachments with an appropriate level of force.with an appropriate level of force.

Included a more optimistic Included a more optimistic assessment of the U.S. economy.assessment of the U.S. economy. Greater defense spending could actually Greater defense spending could actually

stimulate the economy.stimulate the economy.

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Appropriate levels of force?Appropriate levels of force?

NuclearNuclear ConventionalConventional Assistance to alliesAssistance to allies

Counter-insurgencyCounter-insurgency

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McNamara and Nuclear McNamara and Nuclear Weapons:Weapons:Two IssuesTwo Issues

Modernize U.S. strategic nuclear Modernize U.S. strategic nuclear forces.forces.

Limit damage to civilians (should war Limit damage to civilians (should war occur).occur). Initial development of counterforce Initial development of counterforce

strategy for U.S. nuclear forces.strategy for U.S. nuclear forces.

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McNamara rejects defense McNamara rejects defense optionsoptions

Included civil defense and anti-ballistic Included civil defense and anti-ballistic missiles (ABM’s)missiles (ABM’s)

Arguments against them:Arguments against them: Soviets could overwhelm ABM systems by Soviets could overwhelm ABM systems by

building more missiles/warheads.building more missiles/warheads. Such systems very expensive (about $40 Such systems very expensive (about $40

billion each)billion each) Soviets might interpret such programs as a Soviets might interpret such programs as a

sign U.S. thought it could survive nuclear sign U.S. thought it could survive nuclear war.war.

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The problems of counterforce The problems of counterforce doctrinedoctrine

If U.S. targeted Soviet military targets If U.S. targeted Soviet military targets after U.S.S.R. had launched a first after U.S.S.R. had launched a first strike, the number of such targets was strike, the number of such targets was exceedingly high.exceedingly high. The about of damage would invariably kill The about of damage would invariably kill

millions of Soviet civilians.millions of Soviet civilians. Developing such an ability would appear Developing such an ability would appear

as if the U.S. was building a first strike as if the U.S. was building a first strike capability.capability.

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Assured DestructionAssured Destruction

McNamara seeks to avoid programs McNamara seeks to avoid programs that could be considered that could be considered provocative. provocative.

Bolsters stability by emphasizing Bolsters stability by emphasizing survivability of U.S. nuclear arsenal survivability of U.S. nuclear arsenal and capacity to retaliation.and capacity to retaliation.

Becomes known as assured Becomes known as assured destruction, also mutually assured destruction, also mutually assured destruction, or MAD.destruction, or MAD.

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Such policy sought:Such policy sought:

“… “…the ability to deter a deliberate the ability to deter a deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies by maintaining at all times a or its allies by maintaining at all times a clear and unmistakable ability to inflict clear and unmistakable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage an unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor… even after upon any aggressor… even after absorbing a surprise first attack.”absorbing a surprise first attack.”

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Bolstering the U.S. nuclear Bolstering the U.S. nuclear arsenalarsenal

The strategic “triad”:The strategic “triad”: ICBM’sICBM’s submarines with SLBM’s/FBM’ssubmarines with SLBM’s/FBM’s manned bombersmanned bombers

Multiple, independently targetable Multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV’s)re-entry vehicles (MIRV’s)

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Another means to address Another means to address nuclear weaponsnuclear weapons

Arms control:Arms control: The U.S., U.S.S.R. and U.K. sign theThe U.S., U.S.S.R. and U.K. sign the

Limited Test Ban Treaty in October, Limited Test Ban Treaty in October, 1963.1963.

Agreed only conduct future nuclear tests Agreed only conduct future nuclear tests underground.underground.

Currently 113 signatories.Currently 113 signatories.

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The conventional side ofThe conventional side ofFlexible ResponseFlexible Response

By developing conventional forces, By developing conventional forces, U.S. would be better able to deter or U.S. would be better able to deter or fight conflicts without escalation to fight conflicts without escalation to nuclear war.nuclear war.

McNamara proposes a “two-and-a-McNamara proposes a “two-and-a-half war” capability.half war” capability.

Of the increased funds devoted to Of the increased funds devoted to defense, 80% goes to developing defense, 80% goes to developing conventional forces.conventional forces.

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Conventional force Conventional force developmentdevelopment

Navy: maintains 24 Navy: maintains 24 carriers, updates carriers, updates aviation.aviation.

Army: develops air Army: develops air cavalry/air mobility cavalry/air mobility forces forces (helicopters), (helicopters), reorganizes ground reorganizes ground divisions.divisions.

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CounterinsurgencyCounterinsurgency

JFK gives attention to having the JFK gives attention to having the Army develop its Special Forces.Army develop its Special Forces.

Directs other agencies to enhance Directs other agencies to enhance counterinsurgency (CI) capabilities:counterinsurgency (CI) capabilities: CIACIA U.S. Agency for International U.S. Agency for International

DevelopmentDevelopment U.S. Information AgencyU.S. Information Agency

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Flexible Response and NATOFlexible Response and NATO

U.S. pushes to develop alliance’s U.S. pushes to develop alliance’s conventional capabilityconventional capability DoD analyses determine actual Soviet DoD analyses determine actual Soviet

threat to Western Europe only 46 threat to Western Europe only 46 divisions, much lower than “New Look” divisions, much lower than “New Look” estimates.estimates.

NATO forces increase from 21 to 27 NATO forces increase from 21 to 27 divisions, up to 3,500 aircraft.divisions, up to 3,500 aircraft.

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Fissures in the allianceFissures in the alliance

Flexible response gave the Flexible response gave the impression that the U.S. was backing impression that the U.S. was backing away from a commitment to use away from a commitment to use nuclear weapons in Europe’s defense.nuclear weapons in Europe’s defense.

Said impression reinforced by other Said impression reinforced by other U.S policies.U.S policies. Cancellation of a missile program to Cancellation of a missile program to

modernize British bomber force.modernize British bomber force. Refusal to assist French development of Refusal to assist French development of

nucealr weapons.nucealr weapons.

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France leaves NATO’s military France leaves NATO’s military organization, 1966organization, 1966

Pursues independent development of Pursues independent development of atomic bomb.atomic bomb.

Argues French nuclear forces Argues French nuclear forces enhance credibility of deterrence enhance credibility of deterrence (whereas Flexible Response (whereas Flexible Response undermines it).undermines it).

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Tests of Flexible ResponseTests of Flexible Response

January 1961: January 1961: Nikita Khrushchev Nikita Khrushchev states U.S.S.R. will states U.S.S.R. will support “wars of support “wars of national liberation” national liberation” and support and support socialist socialist governments in the governments in the Third World.Third World.

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Bay of PigsBay of Pigs

April 1961: CIA April 1961: CIA arranges a landing of arranges a landing of anti-Castro exiles, in anti-Castro exiles, in anticipation of anticipation of provoking an provoking an uprising against the uprising against the Cuban regime.Cuban regime.

Invasion botched, Invasion botched, embarrasses embarrasses Kennedy Kennedy Administration.Administration.

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BerlinBerlin

Communists build Communists build the Berlin Wall.the Berlin Wall.

Page 24: The Evolution of Deterrence The McNamara Years. Robert S. McNamara Secretary of Defense, 1961-1968 Secretary of Defense, 1961-1968.

South VietnamSouth Vietnam

Special Forces Special Forces introduced in introduced in November 1961November 1961

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October 1962: The Cuban Missile October 1962: The Cuban Missile CrisisCrisis