The EU’s Neighbourhood Policy in the Mediterranean AreaThe Young Generation

Iván MartínSAHWA Project Coordinator

CIDOB, Barcelona Center for International Affairs

THE YOUNG GENERATION

Population: 60 million young people in Arab Mediterranean Countries (15-30 years old) (largest group in society) In 2020, 70 million

Education: Close to 6 million illiterate (10%) Average university enrolment rate: 30%

NEET: 30% in a very prudent estimate: 20 mill. 3/4 of them young women

THE PRESENT, NOT THE FUTURE EXCLUSION AS DEFINING FEATURE

Youth in AMCs (60 millions 15-30 old)

In education (33% - 20 mill.)

In formal employment (2% -1,2 mill.)

In informal employment (25% -15 mill.)NEET - neither in education nor in employment or training (40% -24 mill.)

UfM Regional Employability Review 2012 (ETF)

YOUTH AS A PROBLEM Arab Spring as an alarm indicator of

the problem of youth and youth as a problem: Too many, too needy, badly educated…. Frustrated and angry, unmarried graduates… Anxious to migrate…..(EU Neighbourhood

Barometer: 18% of Maghreb & 14% Mashrek youth 15-24 “likely to move in the next two years”)

Youth as an emergent social category: object of “empowerment” and mobilization

programmes object of research (SAHWA, Power2Youth….)

object of specific policies (youth policies) INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IS MARGINAL FOR YOUTH LIVES IN AMCs

ENP AND YOUTH IN MED   

Since 2011 more PROJECTS focused on youth…

Regional: Euromed Youth (€ 11 mill., 2010-2016)

EU-CoE Youth Partnership

NET-Med Youth (€ 8 mill.) (UNESCO)

Exchanges, capacity-building, youth policies

Regional Approach?

Bilateral: Long-existing Vocational Education and Training

New Youth Employment projects in many countries

Sectorial approach Strategic Approach?

(is youth considered when discussing DCFTAs, Mobility Partnerships or Neighbourhood Actions Plans?)

 

ENP AND YOUTH IN MED   

 

… but ENP still inadequate for youth inclusion

After the Arab Spring, cooperation has focused more on a) reaching out to new, unknown actors; b) supporting technical infrastructure of the transition process, where youth were largely excluded

Beneficiaries are still governments rather than people Implemented largely through budget support and technical

assistance to public institutions Focused on reform and intensifying relations with the EU

(exchanges, legal convergence) rather than on social services or direct support to people

Complexity (country programmes, several thematic programmes, regional programmes…) and heavy bureaucratic imperatives

Mobility is strongly restricted, even within Mobility Partnerships

ENP PERCEIVED AS REMOTE AND SELF-CONTAINED HOW DOES THIS AFFECTS EU CREDIBILITY (DESPITE

BEING A MAJOR DONOR)?

AN ENP VISION FOR (YOUTH) INCLUSION & OWNERSHIP

  

Budget resources maintained… 2014-2020: €10.26 bn. for ENI-South, €7.3 per inhabitant/year

… but ENP should aim integration, not cooperationRationale of ENP is to extend the enlargement method; so partners should not be treated as third countries, but as members of the same community (co-responsibility): Mobility (trainees, Mode IV service liberalization, some day job

search visas) Employment (Strategy Europe 2020, Euromed Employment

Strategy/2010 Framework of Action, EURES, Youth Guarantee) Regional development and cohesion (Structural Funds)

NEED FOR YOUTH MAINSTREAMING INTO ENP AT STAKE: ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF THE EU AS A

GLOBAL ACTOR