The European Radicalisation Awareness Network:

an assessment of the authority and knowledge produced

through the Network

Caspar Pille (10105611)

24/06/2016, Amsterdam

Thesis project “Master Political Science”: European Security Politics

Words: 19.965 (excl. references and appendix)

Thesis supervisor: Prof. Dr. Marieke de Goede

Second reader: Dr. Floris Vermeulen

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Content

1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................3

2. Literature review ..........................................................................................................................7

2.1 Epistemic communities .............................................................................................................7

2.2 Uncertainty ...............................................................................................................................9

2.3 External recognition ................................................................................................................ 11

2.4 Cohesiveness of expert knowledge .......................................................................................... 12

2.5 Defining radicalization ............................................................................................................ 13

2.6 Conceptualizations of radicalization and additional measures .................................................. 15

2.7 Summary and sub questions .................................................................................................... 17

3. Methodology ................................................................................................................................ 18

3.1 Qualitative approach ............................................................................................................... 18

3.2 Strategy of data analysis .......................................................................................................... 19

3.3 Method of data analysis ........................................................................................................... 25

3.4 Validity and reliability ............................................................................................................. 28

4. Uncertainty and external recognition ......................................................................................... 29

4.1 Perspectives of high-level politicians and bureaucrats towards the RAN .................................. 29

4.2 The RAN within strategic EU documents ................................................................................ 32

4.3 The authority of expert knowledge produced through the RAN ................................................ 35

5. Cohesion and content of expert knowledge produced through the RAN .................................. 37

5.1 Causal beliefs about radicalization ........................................................................................... 37

5.2 Notions of validity regarding preventive and counter measures ................................................ 44

6. The authority and content of knowledge produced through the RAN ..................................... 50

7. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 53

Appendix ......................................................................................................................................... 56

Bibliography.................................................................................................................................... 69

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1. Introduction

In light of the developments in the Middle East, the rise of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, the

emergence of European foreign fighters and the increased threat of “home grown” terrorism,

the European Commission founded the European Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)

in 2011 (RAN, 2016 I). Its goal is to facilitate transnational cooperation and information

exchange between Member States and European institutions (RAN, 2016 I). In 2014 the

European Commission published its communication “Strengthen the EU’s response to

radicalization and violent extremism (European Commission, 2014)”. This document with

recommendations for Member States seemed to reflect the European Commission’s

continuing ambition to prioritize the issue of counter-terrorism and radicalization as a

transnational tasks/objective. A central role was given to the RAN in providing the basis for

knowledge exchange between radicalization experts throughout Europe (European

Commission, 2014).

Since its establishment in 2011 the RAN has held various meetings and published a

wide range of approaches and practices to address radicalization (European Commission,

2016 III). The RAN serves as an umbrella network connecting experts involved in preventing

radicalization and violent extremism in Europe (European Commission, 2016 II). Within the

RAN practitioners from different European countries come together in the 10 thematic RAN

working groups1 to exchange ideas, knowledge and experiences on countering radicalization

and violent extremism (European Commission, 2016 II). Amongst these practitioners are field

experts, social workers, teachers, NGOs, civil society organizations, local authorities, law

enforcement and academics (European Commission, 2016 II).

In November 2015 in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris, the European

Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs Dimitris Avramopoulos stated to the

European Parliament: “Our strongest partner and guarantor for the delivery of effective

preventive measures is the Radicalisation Awareness Network (Avramopoulos, 2015)”. His

statement confirms the central role the RAN has been given in the area of counter-

1 Communication and Narratives working group (RAN C&N), Education working group (RAN EDU), EXIT

working group (RAN EXIT), Youth, Families and Communities working group (RAN YF&C), Local authorities

working group (RAN LOCAL), Prison and Probation working group (RAN P&P), Police and law enforcement

working group (RAN POL), Remembrance of Victims of Terrorism working group (RAN RVT), Health and

Social, Care working group (RAN H&SC) and the Steering Committee (European Commission, 2016 II).

4

radicalization policies. It suggests that the expertise produced through the RAN possesses a

degree of authority.

Avramopoulos further claimed that the RAN is able to guarantee the delivery of

effective preventive measures. A claim that is problematic in light of the contested nature of

counter-radicalization and prevention programs (e.g. Schmid, 2010, Sedqwick, 2010; Heath-

Kelly, 2013). A recent UN report authored by Ben Emerson2 and issued by the Human Rights

Council argued: “many programmes directed at radicalisation are based on a simplistic

understanding of the process (Human Rights Council, 2016:7)”. In addition, Alex P. Schmid

argued in 2013, based on an extensive literature review, that the popularity of the concept of

radicalization stands in no direct relationship to its actual explanatory power regarding the

root causes of terrorism. Moreover, regarding current counter-radicalization methods it is

difficult to identify what works and what does not work in general, or what is even counter-

productive (Schmid, 2013).

In light of the central role of the RAN as a transnational information hub and the

problematic nature of expertise in the area of counter-radicalization this research aims to

research the RAN in more detail. In doing so, this research aims to assess the authority of

expertise produced through the RAN and how it defines and conceptualizes radicalization and

counter-radicalization3 measures. The following research question has guided the research:

The first part of this question seeks to assess the authority of expert knowledge produced

through the RAN. In order to do so, this research understands the RAN as an epistemic

community. Literature on epistemic communities provides conceptual tools to analyze

networks of experts in Europe in a variety of issue areas such as the environmental, economic,

academic and security domain (Haas, 1992, Thomas, 1997; Radaelli, 1999, Verdun, 1999;

Zito, 2001; Davis Cross, 2012).

Understanding the RAN through the lens of the epistemic communities literature

enables this research to explain the degree of authority of the expertise produced through the

RAN. It uses three conditions, derived from the epistemic communities literature that could

2 The Special Rapporteur for the Human Rights Council on human rights and fundamental freedoms while

countering terrorism (Emmerson, 2016). 3 This research uses the term counter-radicalization to describe both counter-radicalization and prevention

measures.

“How can we assess the European Radicalisation Awareness Network and the authority

and content of expert knowledge about radicalization produced through the network?”

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explain this authority: uncertainty, external recognition and cohesiveness (Haas, 1992; Davis

Cross, 2011). Haas and Davis-Cross argue that uncertainty amongst policymakers, about how

to address certain complex issues, enhances the authority of an epistemic community of, when

this is combined with recognized expertise and competence in that particular issue area (Haas,

1992; Davis Cross, 2011). Furthermore, the more cohesive the expertise of a particular

epistemic community, the greater their influence on policymakers (Haas, 1992; Davis Cross,

2011).

In addition, the second part of the question, which aims to assess the content about

radicalization produced through the RAN, uses the work of scholars as Sedgwick, Lindekilde

and Heath-Kelly and their critical approaches towards contemporary counter-radicalization

measures (Sedgwick, 2010; Lindekilde, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013). It takes into account their

critical assessments of contemporary definitions, conceptualization and approaches related to

counter-radicalization policies.

This research aims to be academically relevant by improving our theoretical

understanding of epistemic communities in the European counter-terrorism domain. While

empirical studies on epistemic communities have been focusing on networks of experts in

Europe in various domains (environmental, economic, academic and security domain) no

attempt has been made so far to analyze transnational networks of experts in the domain of

radicalization (Haas, 1992, Thomas, 1997; Radaelli, 1999, Verdun, 1999; Zito, 2001; Davis

Cross, 2012). This research therefore provides new insights into how a community of

radicalization experts in Europe, in terms of the European Radicalisation Awareness Network,

is able to make an authoritative claim on policy-relevant knowledge.

By analyzing the expertise produced through the RAN this research in addition aims to

provide new information about contemporary thinking about radicalization and counter-

radicalization measures amongst experts at the transnational level. Current research into

counter-radicalization approaches has mainly been focusing on (comparisons of) national

programs (e.g. Sedgwick, 2010; Heath-Kelly, 2013).

The societal relevancy of this research is linked to the role of the RAN as an

information hub for Members States, policymakers, practitioners and EU institutions. Due to

this role it is important to critically assess the expert knowledge produced through the RAN.

Assessing this expertise is relevant in light of the perceived threat of “home grown” terrorism

in Europe and the observation that many counter-radicalization programs over the past years

have resulted in potentially counter-productive and stigmatizing practices (e.g. Mythen,

Walklate and Khan 2009; Heath-Kelly, 2013).

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This research is structured as follows. Firstly, the relevant literature and concepts used

to analyze the central research question are discussed. Secondly, important methodological

considerations and used strategies of data gathering and analysis are explained. In addition,

three analytical chapters discuss the authority and content of the expert knowledge produced

through the RAN. Finally, a conclusion is presented including relevant practical and

theoretical implications of this research.

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2. Literature review

The central research question, “How can we assess the European Radicalisation Awareness

Network and the authority and content of expert knowledge about radicalization produced

through the network?”, consists of two central elements. Firstly, it seeks to assess the degree

of authority of expert knowledge produced through the RAN. Secondly, it aims to assess the

particular knowledge about radicalization that is produced through the RAN. Here assessment

refers to the attempt not only to analyze, but also critically evaluate the knowledge produced

through the RAN. This chapter explains the relevant literature and academic concepts that

have been used to examine the central research question.

2.1 Epistemic communities

This research uses literature about epistemic communities in order to understand the RAN.

Theoretical work on epistemic communities provides useful concepts to explain the authority

of knowledge produced through the RAN (Haas, 1992; Davis Cross, 2011). The concept of

epistemic communities has its origins in the work of Thomas Kuhn (1962). Kuhn developed

the notion of a scientific community arguing that members of academic disciplines are sharing

certain common beliefs and methodological standards and therefore are bound to each other

(Kuhn, 1962). Such a shared paradigm in terms of common norms, values and practices

touches upon the idea of epistemic communities as it has later been developed by John Gerard

Ruggie, arguing that epistemic communities share a specific construction of social reality in

terms of symbols, points of reference, behavioral rules, expectations and intentions (Ruggie,

1975). Ruggie used Foucault’s (1973) notion of episteme in order to explain the type of

relationship that emerged from the increased interconnectedness between states in the area of

technology, ecology, politics, economics and social environments and the need to represent

national interests internationally (Ruggie, 1975). As a result epistemic communities in terms

of bureaucratic bodies with technocratic training, similarities in scientific outlook and shared

disciplinary paradigms emerged (Ruggie, 1975).

Traditionally the EU has relied greatly on such bureaucratic bodies (Radaelli, 1999).

A wide range of working groups, standardization bodies and committees of experts are

involved in the policy process (Joerges et al. 1997; Pedler and Schaefer 1996). This practice

has been up for debate as it builds on expertise as the basis of authority, which is opposite to

democracy relying on legitimate consensus, free elections and participation (Wincott 1998;

O’Neill 1999; Radaelli, 1999). Within this context of technocracy in the EU several scholars

made attempts to explain the authority and influence of bureaucratic networks of experts in

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the EU, by using the notion of epistemic communities developed by Peter Haas in 1992

(Haas, 1992; Richardson 1996; Verdun 1999; Zito 2001).

Haas developed the concept of epistemic communities by referring to it as “a network

of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an

authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area” (Haas,

1992:3). According to this notion, epistemic communities are networks of individuals with

shared professional expertise, that must have an authoritative claim on knowledge in order to

influence policy (Davis Cross, 2011).

In addition, Haas argues that epistemic communities are characterized by four main

characteristics (Haas, 1992). First, a shared set of normative beliefs which provide a value-

based based rationale for social action of community members (Haas, 1992:3). Second, shared

causal beliefs based on their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of

problems in their policy domain, and thus about the possible policy actions in relation to

desired outcomes (Haas, 1992:3). Third, there are shared notions of validity in terms of

internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their

expertise (Haas, 1992:3). Fourth, a common policy enterprise amongst the members of the

community, meaning a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which

their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human

welfare will be enhanced as a consequence (Haas, 1992:3).

In one of the more recent works on epistemic communities, Mia Davis Cross outlines

that epistemic communities are not simply issue networks whose members use personal

contacts within the community in order to exchange services, information or debate issues

(Davis Cross, 2011). She argues that epistemic communities have much more tighter

membership (Davis Cross, 2011). She states that epistemic communities are not advocacy

networks with idealistic goals for change, but driven by expert knowledge, regardless the

question whether or not it serves social or environmental goals (Davis Cross, 2011). It is their

authoritative claim on knowledge which determines their influence on policymakers (Davis

Cross, 2011).

Approaching the RAN as an epistemic community thus provides a useful starting

point, to explain the authority of expert knowledge produced by the RAN. The RAN is a

transnational network of radicalization experts and exists of several thematic working groups

(European Commission, 2016 II). These working groups have tight membership and

attendance of their meetings is by invitation only (European Commission, 2016 IIII). Since its

establishment in 2011 the RAN has held various meetings and published various documents

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on radicalization (European Commission, 2016 III). The RAN appears to be more than just an

issue or advocacy network. Consequently, this research views the RAN as an epistemic

community. The next sections discuss the concepts that have been used from the epistemic

communities literature in order to analyze the authority of expert knowledge produced

through the RAN.

2.2 Uncertainty

Several scholars applied the concept of epistemic communities to empirical case studies in the

field of environmentalist, economic, scientific and security experts (Haas, 1992 II, Thomas,

1997; Radaelli, 1999, Verdun, 1999; Zito, 2001; Davis Cross, 2011). Davis Cross (2011)

argues that these authors all seem to agree that epistemic communities can only exercise

authority when some form of uncertainty allows them to do so. Haas (1992) argues that the

forms of uncertainty arising around transnational issues tend to stimulate demands for

information. In particular, it concerns transnational issues that feature a strong

interdependence between states’ policy choices to addressing the issue (Haas, 1992).

Haas illustrates this by referring to studies of uncertainties that were topical when he

published his article: uncertainties about strategies to avoid nuclear destruction and the

uncertainties about how to respond to the threat to the ozone layer (Haas, 1992). These kinds

of uncertainties cannot be addressed unilaterally (Haas, 1992). They are of a transnational

nature and interrelate with other processes which results in a demand for scientific and

technical expertise (Haas, 1992).

More concretely, in order for epistemic communities to have an authoritative claim on

knowledge at a transnational level, decision makers must be faced with uncertainty

surrounding an issue which is located in the domain of expertise of the particular epistemic

community (Davis Cross, 2011). Such uncertainty could be related to a loss of previous held

beliefs regarding an issue, the new nature of an issue, or the complex nature of an issue (Haas,

1992; Radaelli, 1999).

Several authors have problematized this authority of experts and uncertainty (e.g.

Bigo, 2002; Antoniades, 2003; Huysmans and Squire, 2009). First of all, as Andreas

Antoniades argues, expertise is embedded in social constructs and not necessarily about

whether knowledge is correct (Antoniades, 2003). Expert knowledge produced through

epistemic communities is part of a system of intersubjective assumptions and definitions,

which has been produced and reproduced through social interaction, representing a particular

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social construction of reality (Antoniades, 2003). Both expert knowledge and the conditions

of uncertainty, to which epistemic communities respond, should therefore be understood as

part of a broader social construction of reality.

Didier Bigo and others makes a similar claim with regard to the influence of security

experts in Europe (Bigo, 2002; Huysmans and Squire, 2009). Bigo argues that the perceived

importance of security in Western societies is the product of the construction of a continuum

of threats and unease (Bigo, 2002). Ulrich Beck famously referred to this as the “risk society”,

a society in which increased technological developments have enlarged risks by making

society more complex and empowering those who want to pose a threat (Beck, 1992).

According to Bigo, this context of risk and unease is constructed through the social

interaction between various security experts (Bigo, 2002). Bigo argues that these experts

share a “sense of the game” or common habitus, which means that these professionals believe

act and react in a similar fashion even if they are always in competition (Bigo, 2002:75). In

doing so, they create a common notion of security threats and how to address them.

In addition, security experts would become influential in transnational European

networks, in light of the complex nature of threats and uncertainty amongst policymakers

about how to address them (Bigo, 2002; Huysmans and Squire, 2009). In this sense, security

experts gain authority over “nonprofessionals or amateurs” based on their professional

knowledge about how to address these complex threats (Bigo, 2002; Huysmans and Squire,

2009). According to Bigo, this authority is enhanced by the often very technical nature of

their expertise, making their assessments only accessible for a limited few (Bigo, 2002).

Returning to the notion of uncertainty outlined by Haas, related to a loss of previous

held beliefs, the new nature or complexity surrounding particular policy domain, Bigo would

argue that it are especially those issues, that are perceived as very technical or complex and

potential security threats, that enable experts to exercise authority (Bigo, 2002).

In the area of radicalization various academia have acknowledged uncertainty

regarding the complex nature of radicalization (e.g. Schmid, 2010, Sedgwick, 2010;

Kundnani, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013). While the concept of radicalization has been used

frequently in the past years its nature is still very much contested, as well as proposed

approaches to prevent or counter it (Schmid, 2010, Sedgwick, 2010; Kundnani, 2012; Heath-

Kelly, 2013) (see paragraph 2.4 for a more detailed discussion). A recent UN report of Ben

Emerson4 (2016) issued by the Human Rights Council, further confirmed this lack of definite

4 The Special Rapporteur for the Human Rights Council on human rights and fundamental freedoms while

countering terrorism (Emmerson, 2016).

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knowledge/certainty about radicalization (Human Rights Council, 2016). The report states

that many governmental programs directed at radicalization lack valid statistical data and are

rather based on a simplistic understanding of the process as a “fixed trajectory to violent

extremism with identifiable markers along the way” (Human Rights Council, 2016:7).

In addition, Schuurman and Eijkman (2013:3) from the International Centre of

Counter Terrorism in 2013 emphasize the lack of sufficient empirical testing and the

overreliance on secondary sources when it comes to research on terrorism, its “root causes”

and how it can best be countered. There appears to be a degree of consensus within academia,

bodies as the UN Human Rights Council and terrorism think tanks regarding radicalization as

complex issue and that is surrounded by uncertainties.

Parallel to this notion of uncertainty, policymakers show a tendency to make the issue

of radicalization governable (Githens-Mazer, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013). Radicals or potential

radicals are perceived as security risks that require governmental action (Githens-Mazer,

2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013). De Goede and Simon argue that European counter-radicalization

efforts aim at the anticipation of threat and early intervention into individual trajectories of

potential radicals (De Goede and Simon, 2013). In addition, it seems that this anticipation of

threat is motivated by what Aradau and Van Munster describe as “precautionary risk”

(Aradau and Van Munster, 2007:91). The notion that the threat of radicalization, as it could

materialize into violence, is potentially catastrophic and thus needs to be governed, even when

the used approaches and practices are contested (Aradau and van Munster 2007; De Goede,

2008).

The instigation of the establishment of the RAN by the European Commission in 2011

for the purpose of providing approaches and practices to address radicalization, seems to be in

line with this tendency amongst policymakers to make the issue of radicalization governable

(European Commission, 2014).

Returning to the notion that the authority of expert knowledge is related to uncertainty

surrounding a particular policy domain, the complex and potentially threatening nature of

radicalization is expected to enhance the authority of the expert knowledge produced through

the RAN. In chapter 4 this uncertainty in relation to the role of the RAN is empirically

analyzed.

2.3 External recognition

The previous paragraph has explained the relation between uncertainty surrounding the

particular domain or issue area and the authority of expertise. Next to this condition of

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uncertainty the epistemic communities literature argues that the authority of expert knowledge

is based on external recognition of this knowledge (Haas, 1992). As Haas argues, networks of

professionals need to possess “recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain”

in order to have authority (Haas, 1992:3). This external recognition could be formal when the

network of professionals is institutionalized by national administrations or international

secretariats (Haas, 1992). In case of the RAN this formal institutional position seems evident

since the network is part of the Directorate General Migration and Home Affairs of the

European Commission (European Commission, 2016 I).

In addition to this institutional position, external recognition manifests itself in the role

attributed by high level politicians and bureaucrats to the particular network and its expertise.

Considering that expert knowledge in the area of radicalization is embedded in social

constructs, as previously discussed, authority is not related to objective validity but to social

recognition (Antoniades, 2003). In order to research the authority of expert knowledge

produced through the RAN it is therefore important to include perspectives of EU high level

politicians and bureaucrats as part of the analysis of external recognition (see chapter 4).

2.4 Cohesiveness of expert knowledge

Next to the elements of uncertainty and external recognition, the epistemic communities

literature argues that internal cohesiveness of the knowledge produced through the epistemic

community is an important factor in explaining its authority (Haas, 1992; Davis Cross, 2011).

According to Davis Cross cohesiveness reflects the ability of an epistemic community to

reach consensus on particular issues and therefore significantly affects the degree to which

epistemic communities can pursue and impact decision makers of that consensus (Davis

Cross, 2011).

As argued earlier epistemic communities are characterized by shared normative

beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shared notions of validity and a common policy enterprise

(Haas, 1992; Davis Cross, 2011). In the case of the RAN a common policy enterprise is

evident since the experts working within the network have a formalized policy aim (i.a.

providing expertise for policymakers) financed by the European Commission (European

Commission, 2016 I). In addition, this research deviates from Haas and Davis Cross regarding

the separation of the elements of shared normative beliefs and shared notions of validity. In

the area of radicalization validity in terms of perspectives on what works and what does not

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work is socially constructed and lacks statistical prove and therefore to a great extent relies on

normative beliefs (Schmid, 2010, Sedgwick, 2010; Schuurman and Eijkman, 2013).

In order to determine the level of cohesiveness of expert knowledge produced through

the RAN this research thus looks at two elements: 1) shared causal beliefs and 2) shared

(normative) notions of validity. Shared causal beliefs in the domain of radicalization refer to

notions about a perceived process of radicalization. Claims about what causes an individual to

become a violent radical or terrorist. In turn, shared notions of validity refer to consensus

about preferred approaches and practices.

2.5 Defining radicalization

Expert knowledge in the area of radicalization is contested. Alex P. Schmid argues that

radicalization, de-radicalization and counter-radicalization are widely used concepts despite a

complete lack of clarity about what these concepts mean (Schmid, 2013). He further states

that the popularity of the concept of radicalization stands in no direct relationship to its actual

explanatory power regarding the root causes of terrorism (Schmid, 2013). Moreover, Schmid

argues that regarding the current de-radicalization and counter-radicalization methods it is

difficult to identify what works and what does not work in general, or what is even counter-

productive (Schmid, 2013).

Before 9/11 the term radicalization was relatively unknown to the wider public, it was

rarely used in the media and only occasionally by academia (Sedgwick, 2010). The use of the

concept experienced a boost after 2001 and became even more prominent in 2005 in the wake

of the rise of “home-grown” terrorism in Western Europe and the London bombings

(Sedgwick, 2010). Since then many Western governments have used the concept of

radicalization and established “counter-radicalization” programs (Sedgwick, 2010).

According to Mark Sedgwick “radicalization” nowadays is the standard term to

describe “what goes on before the bomb goes off” (Sedgwick, 2010:479). Over the past years

various authors have pointed at the contested nature of radicalization and the problem that the

concept is understood and used in a variety of different ways (e.g Mandel, 2009; Sedgwick,

2010; Githens-Mazer, 2009; Kühle and Lindekilde, 2010; Kundnani, 2012; Schmid, 2013).

Sedgwick argues that most researchers who use the terms “radical” or “radicalization”, do not

define these terms but assume that their meaning is understood (Sedgwick, 2010:483). Few

attempts have been made to further develop radicalization as an analytical concept.

Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley developed a definition which separates

radical from activism. They define activism as readiness to engage in legal and non-violent

14

political action and radicalism as readiness to engage in illegal and violent political action

(Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009). They argue that activism is widespread and radicalism is

rare (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009). Important regarding this definition, is that they make

a conceptual distinction between non-violent radicalization and violent radicalization. This

distinction often lacks in governmental definitions of radicalization, as will be explained

briefly.

Official definitions of radicalization agree and differ on several aspects. Sedgwick has

illustrated this by looking at definitions used in the US, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark

since these countries represent a range of current official thinking (Sedgwick, 2010). The

definitions in these countries show similarities in that they assume that: 1) a terrorist is

presumed to be a radical, but not every radical is a terrorist, 2) “radical” and “extremist” are

interchangeable terms, and 3) they include a reference of the radical as a threat (Sedgwick,

2010:483).

These official definitions differ, however, on how they conceptualize the relationship

between radicalism and violence (Sedgwick, 2010). In the US a Congressional Bill defines

radicalization as related to violence by “promoting an extremist belief system for the purpose

of facilitating ideologically based violence” (The Senate of the United States, 2007:2).

However, it is unclear whether someone is a radical when he promotes a violent belief system,

while not being engaged in violent activities himself. The British definition of the Home

Office too describes a link in terms of radicalization “as the move towards active support for

violent extremism” (Youth Justice Board, 2012:6). Again the definition is vague regarding

the question whether active support for violent extremism, means that the radical also needs to

be engaged in violent activities himself. The lack of clarity about this separation between non-

violent and violent radicalization within governmental definition, as will be explained in

paragraph 2.6, result in approaches the framing of individuals or groups of individuals as both

“at risk” and “risky”.

The Dutch and Danish definitions of radicalization are more clear about their focus on

violent and non-violent radicalization (Sedgwick, 2010). The Dutch AIVD refers to

“radicalisation with the potential to result in terrorist violence” and “the active pursuit of

and/or support for far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to the

continuity of the democratic legal order (aim), possibly by using undemocratic methods

(means)” (AIVD, 2010:10). The Danish definition refers to radicalization as being “socialized

into accepting the radical ideology, hostile imagery and a division into “us” and “them” and,

15

possibly, into accepting the use of violent and undemocratic means” (Danish Government,

2009:8).

The Dutch and the Danish definitions in addition to the definitions used by the US and

UK, conceptualize radicalization as the possible use of nondemocratic means which not

necessarily means violence. According to Sedgwick this blurs the element of threat related to

the concept of radicalization (Sedgwick, 2010). He argues that when something that leads to

violence is certainly a threat, the question is whether something that does not lead to directly,

or not at all to violence, can be a threat (Sedgwick, 2010).

It seems thus the official definitions of radicalization create a basis for governmental

programs to focus at both non-violent and violent radicals.

2.6 Conceptualizations of radicalization and additional measures

Policy documents often present radicalization as a linear process to terrorism (Lindekilde,

2012). Heath-Kelly and others argue that this notion of a linear process serves to make

radicalisation accessible for problem solving approaches (Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010;

Githens-Mazer, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013). Lindekilde described this commonly perceived

linear scenario in the following terms:

“Adolescents, in particular of immigrant descent, who are socially isolated, identity seeking

and politically aggrieved, may experience a ‘cognitive opening’ (a concrete event in the realm

of politics, social life, private life, etc.) which renders the individual in search for alternative

life styles, ideological outlooks, etc. This situation may be exploited by ‘radical entrepreneurs’

who seek out such vulnerable youngsters and recruit them to radical groups. Once inside

radical milieus, newcomers come under heavy peer pressures and radicalize further due to

group dynamics of socialisation and cultivation. Taking on an identity as, e.g., radical Islamist

avant-garde, individuals radicalise to the degree where they are ready to put actions behind

their radical views. A process of ‘hardening’ takes place (Lindekilde, 2012:337)”.

Based on this narrative preventive measures to stop radicalization processes from gaining

momentum, become central to counter-terrorism approaches (Lindekilde, 2012). In addition,

measures to prevent radicalization and potential violence, focus at careful monitoring of

adolescents deemed to be at risk of radicalization as well as early intervention in worrisome

cases (Lindekilde, 2012). In terms of practical policy measures this means effort towards

increased surveillance, engagement with Muslim communities, counter-narratives against

16

extremist propaganda, community cohesion programs, individually focused mentoring

programs, role model campaigns and anti-discrimination measures (Lindekilde, 2012:338).

Conceptualizing radicalization as a linear process to terrorism includes notions of

vulnerability. The described measures imply that some individuals or groups of individuals

are more at risk of becoming radicals than others (Lindekilde, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013).

Consequently, problems concerning the integration and socio-economic development of

Muslim communities in Western Europe are identified as risk factors creating vulnerable

individuals prone to contagious ideas responsible for violence (Mythen, Walklate and Khan

2009; Heath-Kelly, 2013; Bigo, Bonelli, Guittet, and Ragazzi, 2014). Based on her analysis of

counter-terrorism programs in the UK, Heath-Kelly argues that this has led to governmental

framing of Muslim neighborhoods of significant density as risky sites of possible contagion

(Heath-Kelly, 2013).

The centrality of risk and vulnerability within recent notions of radicalization and the

assumption of a linear process, presents Muslim communities as both “at risk” and “risky”

(Heath-Kelly, 2013:397). According to Heath-Kelly these notions are problematic and cannot

be sustained because there is no certainty over whether and when a holder of radical views

shifts to being a violent radical or terrorist (Heath-Kelly, 2013). This uncertainty implies that

being at risk of becoming risky, means that individuals who are deemed vulnerable to develop

a propensity of dangerousness, according to Heath-Kelly are “always already rendered as

dangerous” (Heath-Kelly, 2013:408). Heath-Kelly and others argue that interventions aimed

at preventing radicalization therefore inevitable result in the blurring of vulnerability into

presumed riskiness and thus the blending of Muslim communities with notions of being

suspicious and dangerous (Omand, 2010; Nickels, Thomas, Hickman and Silvestri, 2012;

Heath-Kelly, 2013). Thus, the lack of conceptual distinction between individuals at risk or

risky individuals results in counter-radicalization programs that problematize entire

communities rather than at the exceptional few that engage in violent extremism (Lindekilde,

2012).

Furthermore, preventive policies often identify broader socio-economic and

integrations issues as risk factors (Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010). By making social issues

part of counter-terrorism strategies, minority or Muslim communities suffering from these

social problems are indirectly being presented at prone to violent radicalism (Bartlett,

Birdwell and King, 2010). This again could have stigmatizing effects with possible counter-

productive effects (Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010). Bartlett, Birdwell and King argue that

“whole of government” approaches of prevention work, risk isolating Muslim communities

17

and stigmatizing social policy without proof that certain approaches prevent radicalization to

violent extremism (Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010:133). They argue that Muslim

communities in the West often face economic and social difficulties, pool life chances, poor

education and professional attainment and suffer from challenges relating to integration and

social cohesion (Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010). Therefore, securitizing what are in

essence social or economic issues can be “divisive and unhelpful” (Bartlett, Birdwell and

King, 2010:3). Addressing these issues is part of the domain of social policy and should not

be brought into the realm of counter-radicalization measures (Bartlett, Birdwell and King,

2010).

2.7 Summary and sub questions

Epistemic communities are networks of individuals with shared professional expertise and an

authoritative claim on knowledge in a particular domain. The authority of their knowledge is

related to a context of uncertainty surrounding the particular issue area, external recognition

and cohesiveness of their knowledge. Assessing the RAN through these concepts leads to the

following sub-questions:

To what extent do high level politicians, bureaucrats and strategic documents

describe the RAN as a way to respond to uncertainty in the area of preventing

and countering radicalization?

To what extent do high level politicians, bureaucrats and strategic documents

describe the expertise of the RAN as important for counter-terrorism efforts in

Europe?

To what extent contain the documents and expert opinions produced through

the RAN shared causal beliefs about radicalization and notions of validity

regarding preventive and counter measures?

The next chapter amongst others discusses the indicators used to examine these sub-questions.

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3. Methodology

The central question, “How can we assess the European Radicalisation Awareness Network

and the authority and content of expert knowledge about radicalization produced through the

network?”, contains roughly two parts. The first part assesses the authority of expert

knowledge about radicalization produced through the RAN and the second part assesses the

particular content about radicalization produced through the RAN. However, it has to be

mentioned that these parts are not completely separate. The particular content produced

through the RAN gives important information about the cohesiveness of expertise in the

network and therefore about the authority of its expert knowledge. This chapter elaborates on

the research design that has been used to conduct these assessments. The chapter explains the

qualitative approach, as well as considerations regarding the strategy of data gathering and the

methods of data analysis. The chapter ends with a short discussion of important validity and

reliability issues.

3.1 Qualitative approach

In order to answer the central research question this research uses a qualitative approach. A

qualitative approach is “characteristically exploratory, fluid and flexible, data-driven and

context sensitive” (Mason, 2002:24). According to Mason, a qualitative approach means

rejecting the idea of a research design as a single document with the entire advance blueprint

for a particular research (Mason, 2002). This research follows this line of thinking about

qualitative research, since it enables for in-depth analysis of the perceptions towards the RAN

and expert knowledge produced through the RAN, partly based on predetermined concepts

but also with an inductive nature aimed at identifying new unexpected insights.

A qualitative approach furthermore enables this research to explore the RAN by using

a variety of data sources in an in-depth fashion (Baxter and Jack, 2008). Applying a

qualitative approach has consequences for the strategy of data gathering and data analysis. In

short, regarding the strategy of data gathering a qualitative approach implies that sources are

selected based on their ability to provide in-depth information regarding the particular

research problem. In the case of this research the assessment of authority and content

produced through the RAN. They are not selected based on quantitative availability and their

potential to identify correlations or even causal relationships. Furthermore, with regard to the

strategy of data analysis, the qualitative nature of this research makes it possible to apply an

interpretivist approach concentrating on the meaning and perspectives surrounding knowledge

about radicalization produced through the RAN (Punch, 2013).

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3.2 Strategy of data analysis

This research has used a variety of data sources to analyze both the authority and the content

produced through the RAN. This strategy of triangulation, meaning that more than one type of

data source is used, enhances the reliability of the research findings (Bryman, 2008). The

different sources have been used to analyze the authority and expert knowledge produced

through the RAN by focusing on 1) uncertainty, 2) external recognition and 3) the content

about radicalization.

As discussed in the literature review, uncertainty refers to lack of knowledge amongst

policymakers about how to address certain issues in light of their complex nature. External

recognition refers to the notion that epistemic communities need to possess recognized

expertise and competence in a particular domain in order to have authority. The elements of

uncertainty and external recognition are closely connected in the sense that they both require

information about perspectives towards the RAN from high level politicians, bureaucrats and

strategic documents. The cohesiveness of the RAN in terms of the presence of shared causal

beliefs about radicalization and shared notions of validity about preventive and counter

measures, is in turn closely related to a critical assessment of its content, since both these

research aims require an in-depth analysis of expert views and documents about radicalization

produced through the RAN.

Statements of high-level politicians and bureaucrats about the RAN

The degree to which the RAN is described as responding to uncertainty about radicalization

and the importance attributed to the RAN regarding European counter-radicalization measures

is analyzed by focusing on: 1) statements of high level politicians and bureaucrats in the

European Parliament and 2) strategic documents about radicalization and terrorism.

Statements made in the European Parliament are relevant for analyzing the authority of the

RAN since they are directed at EU policymakers and the wider EU public (European

Parliament, 2016 I). Furthermore, the European Parliament is the body where high level

politicians (members of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe) and bureaucrats

(members of the European Commission) have the opportunity to make statements (European

Parliament, 2016 I). Important information about the perspectives of high level politicians and

bureaucrats towards the RAN and what role they attribute to the expertise of the RAN

regarding the policy domain of radicalization can therefore be found in EP debates. These

statements therefore provide information about both the degree to which the RAN is described

as responding to uncertainty about radicalization and the perspectives of politicians and

bureaucrats on the importance of the RAN addressing radicalization issues.

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The analyzed statements have been selected based on two criteria: 1) they need to

mention the “Radicalisation Awareness Network” or “RAN”, and 2) they were presented

during EP plenary debates in the period of 2011 (establishment of the RAN) till now (May

2016). In the period from 2011 till May 2016 nine debates with the topics of terrorism or

radicalization were held (see appendix). Within these debates seven statements of six different

debates have been selected based on references to “RAN” or “Radicalisation Awareness

Network”:

Statement of Cecilia Malmström (Member of the Commission) during the European

Parliament Plenary: “European Union’s internal security strategy”, 21 May 2012

(Malmström, 2012);

Statement of Viviane Reding (Vice-President of the Commission) during the European

Parliament Plenary: “Marketing and use of explosives precursors”, 19 November 2012

(Reding, 2012);

Statement of Siôn Simon (Member of Parliament) during the European Parliament

Plenary: “Oral explanations of vote about Anti-terrorism measures”, 11 February 2015

(Simon, 2015);

Statement of Theresa Griffin (Member of Parliament) during the European Parliament

Plenary: “Oral explanations of vote about Anti-terrorism measures”, 11 February 2015

(Griffin, 2015)’

Statement of Dimitris Avramopoulos (Member of the Commission) during the

European Parliament Plenary: “Prevention of radicalisation and recruitment of

European citizens by terrorist organizations”, 24 November 2015 (Avramopoulos,

2015).

Statement of Elżbieta Bieńkowska (Member of the Commission) during the European

Parliament Plenary: “Protection of victims of terrorism”, 14 December 2015

(Bieńkowska, 2015).

Statement of Bert Koenders (President-in-Office of the Council) during the European

Parliament Plenary: “Increased terrorism threat”, 21 January 2016 (Koenders, 2016).

European strategic documents about the RAN

Next to the statements of politicians and bureaucrats this research has selected strategic

documents that contain information about the EU approach to radicalization. These

documents provide important additional information about the degree to which the RAN is

21

described as responding to uncertainty about radicalization and the importance that has been

given to the RAN in addressing radicalization issues. These documents have been selected

based the following criteria: 1) they need to mention the “Radicalisation Awareness Network”

or “RAN”, and 2) they were published in the period of 2011 (establishment of the RAN) till

now (May 2016).

Based on these criteria three strategic documents have been selected. First, the

European Commission’s 12 page long Communication on “Preventing Radicalisation to

Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU”s Response” published in January

2014 (European Commission, 2014). Second, the European Commission’s 21 page long

Communication on “The European Agenda on Security” published in April 2015 (European

Commission, 2015). These two communications of the Commission were both directed to the

European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the

Committee of the Regions and entail recommendations for EU and Member State

policymakers in the area of radicalization (European Commission, 2014; European

Commission, 2015).

The third document that has been selected is the 15 page long “Revised EU Strategy

for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism” published in may 2014 by the

Council of Europe (Council of Europe, 2014). This third strategic document is relevant for

identifying the degree to which the RAN is described as responding to uncertainty and the

institutional position of the RAN since it entails not only recommendations but actual agreed

upon strategies (Council of Europe, 2014).

Expert perspectives and documents produced through the RAN

Next to the earlier described data about external perspectives towards the RAN, this research

focuses on perspectives about radicalization within the RAN. The aim is to identify the

particular content and cohesiveness of knowledge about radicalization produced through the

RAN. In order to identify the level of cohesiveness and assess the content, different data

sources have been used: 1) expert interview data, 2) media interview data (both textual and

video), 3) documents published by the RAN about radicalization.

The different data sources have been selected based on the following criteria: 1) they

need to provide information about how experts in the RAN conceptualize radicalization and

additional approaches to prevent and counter radicalization, 2) they need to be published in

the period of 2011 (establishment of the RAN) till now (May 2016). In the case of expert

22

interviews the second criteria is slightly different in the sense that the interview data needs to

provide information about the RAN in the period from 2011 till now.

Based on these criteria this research conducted two expert interviews. Regarding these

expert interviews, this research has used semi-structured interviews as a method of data

gathering. This means that a list of predetermined questions in terms of an interview guide has

been used, as well as that the interviewee has been given the opportunity to elaborate broadly

on the questions and come up with new insights (Bryman, 2008). A semi-structured interview

further allows questions to not be asked exactly in the way outlined in the interview guide

(Bryman, 2008). It further gives the researcher the opportunity to ask questions not included

in the interview guide, based on the things said by the interviewees (Bryman, 2008). The

flexible nature of semi-structured interviews is important for this research since it potentially

leads to unexpected elements/aspects of the RAN (see appendix for interview guide).

The experts have been selected based on one important criteria: they have participated

in the RAN as part of the secretariat, as a working group leader, or as a member of one of the

RAN working groups. Based on this criteria several experts have been found through desktop

research and through the website of the RAN (European Commission, 2016 I). From the

twelve experts that have been contacted eventually two were willing to give an interview (see

appendix for interviews transcripts):

The former chair of the INT/EXT Working Group, involved with setting up the

RAN in 2011. The expert has a think-tank/academic background in the field of

radicalization and terrorism.

Current member of the RAN working for the EXIT Working Group, the RVT

Working Group (Remembrance of Victims of Terrorism Working Group), and

the RAN centre of excellence. The expert has a social/youth care back ground.

Using expert interviews as a data source has implication for the validity and reliability of the

research findings. Since the researcher is very much the research instrument himself it is

inevitably that his subjective perspectives influence the way the interviews are conducted

(Bryman, 2008). This risk of steering the answers of the interviewee into a particular direction

has been minimized by using open phrased interview questions (Bryman, 2008).

In addition to the expert interview data, this research has used media interview data. It

is important to mention that the term media interview here does not suggest that the

interviews have been conducted by media or news broadcasting agencies. The interviews have

been conducted by a consultancy organization, think tanks and the magazine of a security

23

cooperation organization. The term media interview is used to describe interviews that have

been conducted for the purpose of being published for the public.

The media interviews have been selected based on similar criteria as the expert

interviews: the particular interviewed expert needs to have participated in the RAN as part of

the secretariat, as a working group leader, or as a member of one of the RAN working groups.

Furthermore, the media interviews need to contain information about the expert his ideas

about radicalization or approaches to address radicalization. Desktop research based on these

criteria has resulted in the selection of the four media interviews (see appendix for transcripts

of video interviews):

Interview with Omar Ramadan the current head of the RAN, (video, 4:53

minutes), conducted by ICF Mostra5 (consultancy and communications) and

published at 21 August 2015 (Ramadan, 2015);

Interview with Jessika Soors the current chair of the LOCAL Working Group

(video, 5:33 minutes), conducted by ICF Mostra and published at 21 August

2015 (Soors, 2015).

Interview with Magnus Ranstorp current member of the editorial board of the

RAN and involved with setting up the RAN (video, 2:47 minutes), conducted

by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs6 and published at 19 April

2016 (Ranstorp, 2016);

Interview with member Rob Out current member of Working Group RAN

Police and law enforcement (POL) (5 pages), conducted by Security

Community7 and published in February 2015 (Out, 2015).

The media interviews with experts are different types of data sources than expert interviews

conducted by the researcher himself. As argued earlier, media interviews are meant to be

published, which might make the interviewee reluctant with making certain statements.

Moreover, the people who have conduct the media interviews were not restricted by rules of

academic interviewing. This is also the case with regard to the editors of the described videos

and magazine text. Thus, both the interviewer and the editors could have influenced the

5 “ICF Mostra is part of ICF International, a global provider of consulting, communication and technology

services to governments and commercial clients with more than seventy offices around the world” (Mostra,

2016). 6 “CIDOB is an independent and plural think tank based in Barcelona, dedicated to the study, research and

analysis of international affairs.”(CIBOD, 2016). 7 Security Community is the magazine of the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe)

(OSCE, 2016).

24

content of the interview. However, regardless these limitations the use of media interviews in

addition to expert interviews and document produced through the RAN, provides valuable

information about the perceptions towards radicalization of experts within the RAN, since

they indicate how these experts aim to present their narrative regarding radicalization.

In addition to the expert en media interview data, this research has used documents

published by the RAN on its website to analyze the content about radicalization produced

through the RAN. Since the RAN has published many documents about approaches and

practices to address radicalization, this research aimed at 1) recently published documents in

2016, and 2) a variety in the selection of documents, which means that the goal has been to

select documents from a variety of RAN working groups. Following these criteria the

following document about radicalization and approaches to address radicalization have been

selected8:

“RAN Collection Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent

Extremism: approaches and Practices (258 pages)”, recently updated in 2016,

(RAN, 2016 I);

“RAN Issue paper: The Root Causes of Violent Extremism” (5 pages),

published in January 2016” (RAN, 2016 II);

“EX POST PAPER: Identifying and treating lone actors” (10 pages), published

in January 2016 after the meeting of the RAN working group health and social

care (H&SC) in Zagreb (RAN H&SC, 2016);

“EX POST PAPER: How to create local networks?” (8 pages), published in

February 2016 after the meeting of the RAN working group Local authorities

(LOCAL) in Rotterdam (RAN LOCAL, 2016);

“EX POST PAPER: Empowering and supporting teachers” (6 pages),

published in February 2016 after the meeting of the RAN working group

Education (EDU) in Gothenborg (RAN EDU, 2016);

“EX POST PAPER: Methodological minimum requirements exit

interventions” (8 pages), published in March 2016 after the meeting of the

RAN working group Exit in London (RAN EXIT, 2016);

8 Presented in chronological order.

25

“EX POST PAPER9: Successful and effective engaging with communities” (9

pages), published in April 2016 after the meeting of the RAN working group

Police and law enforcement (POL) in Oslo (RAN POL, 2016);

“EX POST PAPER: Religion Matters” (7 pages), published in April 2016 after

the meeting of the RAN working group Youth, Families and Communities

(YF&C) in Madrid (RAN YF&C, 2016).

3.3 Method of data analysis

This research has used a qualitative content analysis in order to research the earlier described

data sources. A qualitative content analysis is a systematic method that can be used to analyze

both the content of textual as well as video sources (Mayring, 2000). This method provides a

technique to systematically categorize data in order to make sense of it (Huberman and Miles,

1994). This research made use of theoretically determined concepts and themes to analyze the

authority and content of expert knowledge produced through the RAN. These concepts and

themes are analyzed in a qualitative way. The general strategy has been to analyze the

different data sources on certain words, sentences and paragraphs representing indicators of

uncertainty and external recognition and particular definition and conceptualizations of

radicalization.

Table 1 (next page) shows how the different concepts have been derived from the

literature discussed in chapter 2. It furthermore outlines the particular indicators that been

used to research the different concepts related to the research question. The indicators have

been used to close read the various data sources and to interpret the findings.

9 RAN ex-post papers published after RAN activities and Working Group meetings highlighting lessons learned,

insights and follow-up initiatives (European Commission, 2016 III):

26

Table 1 “Operationalization”

Concept “Uncertainty”

Description Uncertainty refers to lack of knowledge about how the address certain issues in light of

their complex nature (Haas, 1992; Radaelli, 1999; Davis-Cross, 2011). In the security

domain this uncertainty is particularly related the complex and therefore uncertain

nature of security threats (Bigo, 2002). Uncertainty surrounding a particular issue area

furthermore enhances the authority of epistemic communities and their expert

knowledge about how to address these threats.

Indicators The extent to which the RAN is described as responding to uncertainty about

radicalization:

High level politicians, bureaucrats and strategic documents link the relevancy

of the RAN to the complex nature of radicalization;

High level politicians, bureaucrats and strategic documents link the relevancy

of the RAN to a knowledge deficit in the area of radicalization;

High level politicians, bureaucrats and strategic documents link the relevancy

of the RAN to the complex nature of threats caused by radicalization.

Concept “External recognition”

Description External recognition refers to the notion that epistemic communities need to possess

“recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain” in order to have

authority (Haas, 1992:3).

Indicators The degree of external recognition of the RAN:

The expertise of the RAN is described by high level politicians, bureaucrats

and strategic documents as important for policies and strategies in area of

counter radicalization and prevention

Concept “Cohesiveness of expert knowledge”

Description Cohesiveness of expert knowledge refers: 1) shared causal beliefs and 2) shared

(normative) notions of validity (Haas, 1992; Davis-Cross, 2011). Shared causal beliefs

in the domain of radicalization then refer to shared conceptualizations of the causes of

radicalization. Shared notions of validity refer to consensus about preferred approaches

and practices to counter radicalization. The authority of expert knowledge produced by

an epistemic community is related to the cohesiveness of their knowledge (Haas, 1992;

Davis-Cross, 2011).

Indicators The extent to which the RAN consists of shared causal beliefs about radicalization and

shared notions of validity about preventive and counter measures

Documents and expert opinions produced through the RAN contain shared

27

conceptualizations about radicalization

Documents and expert opinions produced through the RAN contain similar

claims about preferred approaches to prevent and counter radicalization

Concept “Radicalization”

Description Expert knowledge about the concept of radicalization is analyzed by looking at the

following aspects:

- Defining radicalization. This refers to the question whether the used definitions make

a distinction between radicals and extremists, include a reference of the radical as a

threat, and separate violent and non-violent radicalization, or target both (Sedgwick,

2010).

- Conceptualizing radicalization and additional measures. This refers to the question

whether the used conceptualizations describe radicalization as a linear process, are

centered around risk and vulnerability, and aim at broad preventive policies (Githens-

Mazer and Lambert 2010; Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010:13; Lindekilde, 2012;

Heath-Kelly, 2013).

Indicators The particular expert knowledge about radicalization produced through the RAN:

Defining radicalization

o A distinction is made between radicals and extremists

o The used definitions include a reference of the radical as a threat

o Both violent and non-violent radicalization is targeted without making a

conceptual distinction

Conceptualizing radicalization

o Radicalization is described as a linear process

o Vulnerability to radicalization is described as potentially leading to violent

extremism or terrorism

o The used conceptualization of radicalization refers to individuals or groups of

individuals “at risk” of becoming terrorists

Conceptualizing radicalization measures

o The approach proposes interventions targeted at those individuals deemed

vulnerable to extremist ideas

o The approach aims at vulnerable communities in terms of prevention

o The approach aims at broader social issues as making communities vulnerable

(risk factors) to violent radicalization

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3.4 Validity and reliability

It is important to reflect on validity and reliability issues related to this research. Validity

refers to extent to which a study is observing, identifying and measuring what it seeks to

investigate (Mason, 2002; Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki, 2008). Any qualitative interpretivist

strategy needs to be aware of potential overreliance on subjective judgments of the researcher.

Validity in this sense can be enhanced by a clear operationalization of concepts (Mason,

2002). This research has aimed at doing so by providing a clear overview (see Table 1) of

how certain indicators were derived from discussed concepts in literature.

In addition, external validity is another kind of validity to that needs to be addressed.

External validity refers to extent to which it is possible to make some sort of wider claim

based on research finding (Mason, 2002). Regarding external validity this research has aimed

at analytical generalization referring to the attempt to draw conclusions from studied data to

theory rather than some sort of statistical generalization regarding a population (Yin, 1994).

This research has aimed to provide insights into theories about epistemic communities and the

authority of expert knowledge, in addition to providing in-depth knowledge about the RAN.

However, it has to be mentioned that also the analytical generalizability of this research is

restricted due to the exclusive focus on the RAN.

Next to validity, it is important to take issues regarding reliability into account.

Reliability refers to the accuracy of research methods and techniques (Mason, 2002). It

questions whether the research provides similar findings when replicated by subsequent

researchers (Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki, 2008). This research has aimed to enhance its

reliability again by using clear indicators that foster opportunities for replication (Mason,

2002). Furthermore, as argued earlier triangulation of data sources has been used to create

broad basis of various kind of sources in order to enhance the reliability of research findings

(Bryman, 2008).

29

4. Uncertainty and external recognition

This chapter analyzes how high-level politicians, bureaucrats and strategic documents view

the relationship between uncertainty and the expertise of the RAN. It furthermore analyzes the

degree to which the RAN as externally recognized expertise in the area of counter

radicalization and prevention. The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, the perspectives of

high-level politicians and bureaucrats towards the RAN are analyzed by using the concepts of

uncertainty and external recognition. Secondly, strategic documents are analyzed, again by

using the concepts of uncertainty and external recognition. At the end of the chapter the

findings of these two analysis are combined and discussed.

4.1 Perspectives of high-level politicians and bureaucrats towards the RAN

The RAN has been referred to by a variety of actors: high-level bureaucrats of the

Commission, Members of European Parliament, and the President in office of the Council. In

May 2012 Cecilia Malmström (European Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs)

during a debate about the evaluation of the European internal security strategy of 2010

mentioned the five objectives of the strategy: “…fighting and preventing serious and

organized crime, terrorism and cybercrime, management of our external borders, and building

resilience to natural and man-made disasters (Malmström, 2012)”. Regarding each of these

objectives she referred to important policy achievements:

“We have achieved quite a lot since the first publication: for instance, the report on

confiscation of goods, the establishment of the radicalisation awareness network, the proposal

on EU PNR, and the proposal to establish a cyber centre (Malmström, 2012)”.

By referring to the RAN as one of the main achievements in the area of fighting and

preventing terrorism, the RAN is given importance within the European internal security

strategy. Malmström further argued:

“we will hold a conference gathering our experience and building on one year of the

establishment of the radicalisation awareness network, with some ideas and policies presented

from that network (Malmström, 2012)”.

With this quote Malmström seems to recognize the knowledge of the RAN as important for

the creation of ideas and policies regarding counter-terrorism efforts in Europe. However, she

appears to make no attempt to connect relevancy of the expertise of the RAN to uncertainty

30

regarding radicalization in terms of its complex nature and lack of knowledge amongst

policymakers about how to address it.

In November 2012 Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the Commission, took the

opportunity in a debate about the marketing and use of explosives precursors to mention that:

“… the Commission will continue to work in other areas, too, to help reduce the threat from

terrorism […] that is the work of the Radicalisation Awareness Network, which exchanges

best practices between those who work on the ground with people at risk of being drawn into

violent extremism (Reding, 2012)”

Reding seems to take the opportunity to emphasize the importance of best practices provided

by the RAN, even if the initial debate topic is about a different kind of counter-terrorism

efforts. She further seems to link the expertise of the RAN to reducing the threat of terrorism,

but does not refer to the uncertain nature of these threats.

In addition, in February 2015 the European Parliament adopted a resolution about anti-

terrorism measures (European Parliament, 2015). This resolution contains a paragraph about

the RAN, and the role of the network in combating the “root causes of terrorism and

radicalization leading to violent extremism” (European Parliament, 2015). The resolution

called on the Commission to strengthening the RAN and referred to the role of the RAN in

setting up de-radicalization structures and processes (European Parliament, 2015). This

resolution, that was passed though the Council and the Parliament, thus seems to present the

RAN as important regarding counter-terrorism efforts in Europe. It suggests that the expertise

of the RAN is able to provide approaches to create de-radicalization structures and processes.

This assumes a degree of certainty or understanding of the process of radicalization and how

to counter amongst experts within the RAN.

Furthermore, during the “Oral explanations of vote about anti-terrorism measures”,

Theresa Griffin and Siôn Simon both Members of the European Parliament for the Group of

the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, emphasized the RAN when explaining

their vote. They argued for the “full use of existing measures such as the Radicalisation

Awareness Network (RAN)” to tackle terrorism and radicalization (Griffin, 2015; Simon,

2015).

In November 2015 in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris during a debate

about the “Prevention of radicalisation and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist

organizations” Dimitris Avramopoulos (European Commissioner for Migration and Home

31

Affairs) attributed importance to the RAN by referring to it as the Commissions “strongest

partner and guarantor for the delivery of effective preventive measures (Avramopoulos,

2015)”. It seems thus that after the events in Paris, Avramopoulos presented a narrative in

which the expertise produced through the RAN is able to guarantee effective preventive

measures to prevent and address radicalization. He argues that: “… the RAN has produced

policy recommendations as well as practical guidance and training material to better prevent

and address radicalization (Avramopoulos, 2015)”. By doing so, he suggests that the RAN

possess the knowledge to better prevent and address radicalization. Avramopoulos does not

refer to uncertainty regarding the nature of these approaches.

In December 2015, Elżbieta Bieńkowska (European Commissioner for the Internal

Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs10

) in a debate about the “Protection of victims

of terrorism” emphasized the importance of the RAN and in particular the RAN Centre of

Excellence11

: “… our Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Centre of Excellence

connecting over 2000 practitioners across the Union and supporting them in addressing

radicalization (Bieńkowska, 2015)”.

In January 2016 Bert Koenders (President-in-Office of the Council), in a debate about

the “Increased terrorism threat”, argued that the RAN is “the main tool” at the European

Union level for “sharing best practices” (Koenders, 2016). By referring to the RAN as the

main tool he gives the RAN an important role regarding counter-radicalization efforts in

Europe. Koenders furthermore stated that the RAN “has made impressive strides in recent

months, facilitating the flow of best practice and expertise between Member States”

(Koenders, 2016). Koenders thus very clearly outlines the importance of the RAN regarding

expertise and best practices in the area of counter-terrorism in Europe, without mentioning the

uncertainty surrounding these best practices nor the uncertain nature of threats posed by

radicalization.

Based on the analyzed statements it first of all seems that the expert knowledge

produced through the RAN is described as important for policy recommendations and

practical guidance in the area of preventing and countering radicalization in Europe. European

high-level bureaucrats and politicians recognize the importance of the best practices produced

through the RAN. By doing so, they seem to recognize the authoritative claim of the RAN on

policy relevant knowledge in the area of radicalization.

10 Small and medium-sized Enterprises. 11 “The RAN Centre of Excellence uses its expertise to guide the RAN Working Groups. It also supports the EU

and individual countries when requested to do so and disseminates key knowledge gathered (European

Commission, 2016 I)”.

32

Next to this external recognition of the RAN, the analysis of statements suggests that

uncertainty regarding the nature of radicalization and additional approaches to prevent and

counter it, is not part of the way high-level bureaucrats and politicians communicate their

narratives. The analysis implies that the role of the expert knowledge produced through the

RAN is not described as responding to the complex nature of radicalization, neither the

existence of a knowledge deficit. To the contrary, the statements present a narrative in which

the RAN is able to provide effective measures to prevent and counter radicalization. This

suggests that a narrative is presented in which the knowledge produced through the RAN

contains a degree of certainty regarding the nature of radicalization and how to address it. It

seems to deny the complex nature of perceived threats posed by radicalization.

These findings suggest that high-level politicians and bureaucrats aim to present a

narrative in which radicalization is governable, without referring to its contested nature.

However, there appears to be a particular dynamic at play. On the one hand, these high-level

politicians and bureaucrats present the RAN as necessary for improving expertise and best

practices regarding radicalization in Europe, which implies recognition of the lack of

knowledge within the domain of counter-radicalization. On the other hand, they seem to

actively avoid and displace this uncertainty onto the RAN in order to make radicalization

governable. Paragraph 4.3 discusses this observation in more detail.

4.2 The RAN within strategic EU documents

Next to the statements of high-level politicians and bureaucrats the RAN is mentioned in EU

high-level strategic documents on the issues of terrorism and radicalization. In January 2014

European Commission published its Communication about “Preventing Radicalisation to

Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU”s Response” directed to the

European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the

Committee of the Regions (European Commission, 2014). In general the RAN is given a

central role in this communication. The influence of the RAN on the ten areas of

recommendation outlined in the Communication is mentioned very clearly:

“The Commission […] with significant input from the RAN, has identified ten areas which

Member States and the EU could consider as part of their efforts to tackle radicalisation at

home and abroad (European Commission, 2014:4).”

The Communication furthermore outlines that it “contains a broad range of practices” based

on the RAN Collection of approaches and practices (European Commission, 2014:4).

33

The communications begins with recognizing that “trends, means and patterns of

radicalisation have evolved and broadened (European Commission, 2014:2)”. It further argues

that the threat of radicalization has “progressively evolved to include smaller EU-based

groups, cells, and lone actors operating in a more unconstrained and unpredictable way”

(European Commission, 2014:2). The Commission by referring to unpredictability, thus

seems to recognize to some degree the complexity and uncertainty regarding radicalization, as

well as the uncertain nature of threats posed by radicalization.

In addition, the Communication states that the risk of radicalization leading to

extremist violence is growing and that “Member States would benefit from increasing their

efforts to effectively respond to these challenges” (European Commission, 2014:3). In order

to do so, the Communication emphasizes the important role of the RAN:

“The European Commission is already supporting Member States in their efforts to prevent

and counter violent extremism […] RAN pools expertise and facilitates the exchange of ideas

on topics ranging from the empowerment of local actors through to organising international

conferences, bringing together expertise at all levels (European Commission, 2014:3)”

The Communication thus seems to connect the need for effective responses to radicalization

to the important function of the RAN as network of expertise and body for the exchange of

ideas.

The Communication further argues that the threat of terrorism is “persistent and

terrorist attacks are unpredictable (European Commission, 2014:4)”. It argues that “terrorism

can strike anywhere at any time” (European Commission, 2014:4). By emphasizing this

unpredictable nature the Commission again seems to imply that some degree of uncertainty

surrounds radicalization. In order to address this uncertainty regarding the threat of terrorism,

the Communication states that the role of the RAN as a “knowledge hub” needs to be

strengthened by “concentrating expertise dedicated to preventing and countering

radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism” (European Commission, 2014:5).

The Communication further refers to the importance of the RAN in terms of:

“Responding to requests for support from the Member States and the Commission in their

effort to implement the proposals on preventing radicalization; connecting expertise in the

field of preventing, formulating best practice, and actively helping to shape the research

agenda (European Commission, 2014:5)”

34

The Communication claims that the RAN has had “success in developing tools for addressing

the challenges of radicalization” (European Commission, 2014:5). However, at the end of the

document the Communication also mentions that more research is needed to “understand how

and why people radicalise or de-radicalise” (European Commission, 2014:10).

It seems thus that the Commission, on the one hand aims at presenting the RAN as an

important body of expertise that has been successfully developing approaches to address

radicalization. Consequently, the RAN is described as important for responding to requests

for support of Member States. On the other hand, the Commission refers in this

Communication to uncertainty surrounding the issue of radicalization by emphasizing the

unpredictable and broad nature of the phenomenon, as well as arguing that more research is

needed to understand (de)radicalization.

In April 2015 the Commission further emphasized the importance of the RAN in their

Communication on the “European Agenda on Security” (European Commission, 2015). In

this Communication the RAN is presented as important for “tackling terrorism and preventing

radicalization” (European Commission, 2015:15). This Communication again states the

importance of the RAN as an “EU-wide umbrella network” which “enables the exchange of

experience and practices facilitating early detection of radicalisation and the design of

preventive and disengagement strategies at local level” (European Commission, 2015:15)”.

The Communication refers to RAN an “EU knowledge hub to consolidate expertise and foster

the dissemination and exchange of experiences and cooperation on anti-radicalisation”

(European Commission, 2015:15). Thus, the Commission similar as in their Communication

of 2014 emphasizes the important role of the expertise of the RAN regarding counter-

radicalization efforts in Europe. The document does not relate the uncertain nature of

radicalization and uncertainty regarding the perceived threats posed by radicals to the need for

expertise to address these issues.

Next to these high-level strategic document published by the Commission, the Council

of the European Union in 2014 published the “Revised EU Strategy for Combating

Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism” (Council of the European Union, 2014). This

strategy also emphasized the importance of the RAN regarding “the exchange of best

practices and experience at the European level” to “assist in developing new programmes,

acquiring know-how and re-integrating former terrorists”(Council of the European Union,

2014:11)”. The strategy further refers to the need for a “common understanding of the factors

of radicalization and recruitment to terrorism and the principles and actions to combat it”

35

(Council of the European Union, 2014:15). By doing so, the document states that Member

States should build on their own experiences but also on the “available expertise from the

RAN (Council of the European Union, 2014:15)”.

Based on these strategic documents it seems that uncertainty regarding the nature of

radicalization is only described to a limited degree in relation to the expert knowledge

produced through the RAN. The Communication of 2014 refers in a few sentences to the

complex, broad and unpredictable nature of radicalization and the need for more research to

understand radicalization, but on the other hand presents 12 pages of recommendations

assuming otherwise. The strategy presented by the Council furthermore referred to the role of

the RAN regarding the need of commonly perceived factors of radicalization, therefore

implying that this is currently absent. However, the general narrative presented in these

strategic documents explains the importance of the expertise of the RAN by its ability to

provide best practices to address radicalization and seems to avoid references to the uncertain

nature of radicalization and additional policies.

4.3 The authority of expert knowledge produced through the RAN

Returning to the epistemic communities literature arguing that the concepts of uncertainty and

external recognition explain the degree of authority of expertise regarding a network of

professionals such as the RAN, the following can be argued.

While the importance of the expertise of the RAN regarding best practices in the area

of counter-radicalization is widely recognized by EU high-level politicians and bureaucrats,

as well as by strategic documents, it seems that a narrative of uncertainty is generally avoided.

The expert knowledge produced through the RAN is not described as responding to

uncertainty in terms of a lack of knowledge amongst policymakers due to the complex nature

of radicalization.

This suggests that in the area of radicalization and counter-terrorism a different

dynamic is at play, than in for instance the domain of environmental issues which has partly

inspired the epistemic communities framework of Haas (see paragraph 2.2). Where regarding

the nature of environmental issues uncertainty surrounding the threat of different topics (e.g.

global warming) is often openly debated by policymakers and politicians and not rarely the

reason to not act12

, it seems that in the area of radicalization this acknowledgement of

uncertainty is avoided by high-level politicians and bureaucrats. This could be related to the

12 See for instance Mike Hulme (2009) “why we disagree on climate change: understanding, controversy,

inaction and opportunity”.

36

fact that radicalization and terrorism after 9/11 have become highly politicized topics

resulting in a public demand for certainty regarding policies to govern it (e.g. Sedgwick,

2010; Kundnani, 2012; Githens-Mazer, 2012).

Returning to the idea that uncertainty amongst policymakers within a particular

domain enhances the authority of expert knowledge produced by an epistemic community, it

appears that in the area of counter-radicalization this relation is not part of the public

narrative. However, by emphasizing the importance of the RAN in providing expertise to

counter radicalization, high-level politicians and bureaucrats do suggest the need for expert

knowledge in the area of radicalization. It therefore seems that while the acknowledgement of

uncertainty in statements and strategic document is absent, it does play an important role in

explaining the authority of expert knowledge produced through the RAN.

High-level politicians and bureaucrats appear to aim at making radicalization

governable and therefore seem to avoid references to uncertainty. This active avoidance of

uncertainty in the public narrative, however seems to enhance the authority of expert

knowledge produced through the RAN. It seems that in the domain of radicalization and

terrorism policies, expertise is influential based on their perceived ability to address the threat

of radicalization. Again this is likely related to the political and social climate in Europe and

the demand for effective governmental action against radicalization. In addition, this seems

closely related to the observation of Bigo arguing that it are those issues that are complex and

perceived as security threats that enable experts to step in and exercise authority (paragraph

2.2).

Based on these findings it can be argued that authors as Haas and Davis-Cross should

include the notion that in the domain of counter-radicalization, uncertainty is a politically

unacceptable narrative and thus not acknowledged by high-level politicians and bureaucrats,

but still important for explaining the authority of epistemic communities in this domain.

Findings show that the RAN has widely accepted expertise and competence in the domain of

counter-radicalization policies and is presented as a provider of effective approaches and best

practices. This authority of expert knowledge produced through the RAN, in addition, seems

be enhanced due to the active avoidance of uncertainty regarding the domain of counter-

radicalization amongst high-level politicians and bureaucrats in Europe.

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5. Cohesion and content of expert knowledge produced through the RAN

This chapter analyzes the particular content about radicalization produced through the RAN.

It both focuses on the cohesion of the presented knowledge about radicalization, as well as its

broader implications. The chapter starts with analyzing the causal beliefs about radicalization

produced through the RAN. In addition, notions of validity regarding preventive and counter

measures produced through the RAN are outlined.

5.1 Causal beliefs about radicalization13

In 2016 the RAN published its most recent edition of the RAN Collection of approaches and

practices to prevent radicalization to violent extremism (RAN, 2016 I). The Collection of

approaches and practices is meant as input for first line practitioners and policymakers (RAN,

2016 I:9). The document states that due to the primary focus of the RAN on prevention “many

practices are aimed at citizens and youth in general and specific individuals and communities

at risk”(RAN, 2016 I:9). This implies a focus on individuals trajectories, as well as broader

social issues. The document further refers to the RAN DNA, in terms of a number of key,

overarching insights that apply to all approaches presented in the collection (RAN, 2016 I:9).

The first of these insights refers to the key role of prevention (RAN, 2016 I:10): “… it

is crucial to invest in interventions that are aimed at removing the breeding ground for

radicalisation to prevent these processes or stop them as early as possible (RAN, 2016 I:10)”.

This implies that one of the key elements within the approach of the RAN is to focus on those

individuals or communities at risk of radicalization. No conceptual distinction seems to be

made between violent en non-violent radicalization. The RAN Collection furthermore argues

that radicalization is a process which can be stopped by removing its breeding ground, by

which is implied that there are certain known root causes that create radical individuals.

In January 2016 the RAN published an issue paper about the root causes of

radicalization. The paper acknowledges that there is “no single cause or pathway into

radicalisation and violent extremism” (RAN, 2016 II:1). It argues that there are a “wide array

of factors on the macro-, meso-, and micro-levels of analysis” (RAN, 2016 II:1). In doing so,

the document builds on the work of Magnus Ranstorp (function within RAN). It argues that

violent extremism can best be conceptualized in terms of a kaleidoscope of factors creating

infinite individual combinations (RAN, 2016 II:3). The document, in line with a recent media

interview published in 2016 with Magnus Ranstorp (Ranstorp, 2016), states:

13 The order in which the different documents and expert views are discussed is not chronological, but chosen to

improve the readability of the text.

38

“There are some basic primary colours which create complex interlocking combinations: 1)

individual socio-psychological factors; 2) social factors; 3) political factors; 4) ideological and

religious dimensions; 5) the role of culture and identity issues; 6) trauma and other trigger

mechanisms; and three other factors that are a motor for radicalisation: 7) group dynamics; 8)

radicalisers/groomers; and 9) the role of social media. It is the combined interplay of some of

these factors that causes violent extremism (RAN, 2016 II:3)”.

This metaphor kaleidoscope implies that it is impossible to identify causal relationships

regarding radicalization, since there are infinite number of combinations of factors possible.

However, it also suggests that violent extremism is the outcome of the process of

radicalization, by which it suggests that every radical is potentially violent. In addition, this

implies that having radicals ideas is sufficient to be perceived as a potential security threat.

A presentation with the title “Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) and its Centre

of Excellence” used by Maarten van den Donk14

during a research seminar in Vienna in April

2016, applied the notion of root cause of radicalization developed by Ranstorp and presented

in the RAN Collection (Van den Donk, 2016). The particular slides about the root causes were

accompanied by the following image (Van den Donk, 2016:9-10):

The image presents a linear and staged movement. The arrow seems to represent the radical.

The image suggests that root causes as explained by Ranstorp, via a linear process of

radicalization lead into violent extremism. This suggests that having a weak socio-economic

background and identity issues, makes particular individuals or Muslim immigrant

communities of which is known that they generally suffer from these issue, potential violent

extremist.

14 Working for the EXIT Working Group, the RVT Working Group (Remembrance of Victims of Terrorism

Working Group) and the RAN centre of excellence.

39

In January 2016 the RAN working group H&SC (Health and Social Care) published a

paper based on their meeting of 27 and 28 January 2016 in Zagreb (RAN H&SC, 2016). The

following image was used in the document (RAN H&SC, 2016:7):

The paper argued that this model is developed to help multi-disciplinary teams to address

radicalization and to identify signs indicating that an individual is “at risk” (RAN H&SC,

2016:6). The model is called “Pathway to Intended Extreme Violence for Individuals” (RAN

H&SC, 2016:7). The model clearly refers to a linear or staged process of radicalization, in

which grievances potentially lead to violent extremism.

The arrows in de model suggest moments for intervention. Having grievances could

lead to violent ideation and is therefore presented as an “area of treatment and interventions”

(RAN H&SC, 2016:7). The paper argues that these grievances could be the result of

“sociological and psychological processes” or “mental health issues” (RAN H&SC, 2016:6).

The idea of grievances in this paper thus partly overlaps with the root causes of Ranstorp. An

explanation for this selective identification of causes could be related to the fact that the

working group H&SC is thematically aimed at heath and social care.

The notion that radicalization is an individual trajectory has also been underlined by

an expert interviewed for this research, who works for the RAN Working Group EXIT and

40

Working Group Remembrance of Victims of Terrorism Working Group (RVT), as well as for

the RAN centre of excellence. He argued that radicalization is a “process” in which

everybody has a “unique way to radicalize” (Expert 1, 2016)15

. He further stated that there are

a number of overall trends, which have often to do with “problems regarding frustration”

(Expert 1, 2016). According to the RAN expert frustrations can be related to “discrimination

or the feeling of being discriminated” (Expert 1, 2016). The expert further argued that being

excluded can be a strong trigger for people to radicalize (Expert 1, 2016). In addition, various

psychological, social and economic factors would support these frustrations but none of these

factors alone lead to radicalization (Expert 1, 2016).

By arguing that there is no unique way to radicalize and by referring to factors that are

very similar to the factors described in the conceptualization of Ranstorp (e.g. socio-

psychological, social, political, identity issues and trauma), the RAN expert builds upon the

same notion of radicalization. Furthermore, by focusing on frustration as the result of

discrimination and social exclusion, this expert seems to imply that it are immigrant

communities that are especially vulnerable to radicalization. The RAN expert further states

that “we assume that every form of radicalization more or less follows the same pattern”

(Expert 1, 2016). He adds: “with youngster, but also with adults, you see at some point signals

such as personal retreat, feelings of exclusion, angriness, these factors can point at

radicalization” (Expert 1, 2016). Thus, this expert emphasizes that particular conditions of

frustration such as exclusion make individuals vulnerable to radicalization. In addition,

because feelings of exclusion are generally associated with minority communities, a focus on

such conditions seems to present minority communities again as vulnerable.

In 2016 the RAN Working Group Exit published the paper “Methodological minimum

requirements exit interventions” following their meeting of 15 and 16 March in London. The

paper argues that “root causes for radicalisation (like discontent and grievances) have a lot of

identical components” (RAN EXIT, 2016:2). The paper furthermore argues: “pathways to

radicalisation do differ and are unique so do deradicalisation processes. The extent to which

people are able to change and at what speed is also unique in its kind (RAN EXIT, 2016:2)”.

The paper presents a similar notion of radicalization as present in the conceptualization of

Ranstorp. It emphasizes the unique pathways and grievances as root causes.

Another document has been published by the RAN Working Group Youth, Families

and Communities in April 2016 (RAN YF&C, 2016). The paper “Religion Matters” was

15 The interview was conducted in Dutch, the quotes are translations made by the researcher.

41

based on the working group meeting of 7 and 8 April in Madrid. The document argues: “to

not ignore the religious aspect when it comes to violent extremism” (RAN YF&C, 2016:1).

However, the document starts with a similar notion as the one from Ranstorp by arguing:

“When discussing the role of specific aspects in the individual radicalisation process, one

quickly comes to a long list of factors that could play a role. Religion is acknowledged as one

of these factors (RAN YF&C, 2016:2)”.

Thus, the document assumes that there are many factors leading to radicalization of

which religion could be one. It furthermore, refers to an “individual path to radicalization”

which differs per person and “some might be highly religious where others just use a religious

façade but are really driven by other motives” (RAN YF&C, 2016:2). By focusing on

individual trajectories and various factors leading to radicalization this paper follows a similar

conceptualization as has been described earlier.

Rob Out, a member of the RAN working group Police and law enforcement (POL)

argued during a media interview in 2015 that there is “a great variety of possible reasons and

it is always a composition of more than one factor” that leads people to engage in terrorist

activities (Out, 2015). One of these factors he argues is that “youngsters in their adolescent

period are looking for their identity, looking for their purpose in life and sometimes struggling

with all the complex problems in the world” (Out, 2015). He argues that these youngsters are

“vulnerable” and attracted to “very simple solution for all these problems” (Out, 2015). Out

seems to underline the conceptualization of Ranstorp that there are various combinations of

different factors leading to radicalization. He focuses in particular on the identity and the

complex problems of the world which could in fact refer to all the factors described by

Ranstorp (socio-psychological social, political, ideological and religious dimensions, the role

of culture and identity issues, trauma and other trigger mechanisms).

During a media interview in August 2015 the current head of the RAN, Omar

Ramadan argued:

“This process of radicalization it starts with exploring who am I, what is my place in the

world, what is my group, what is my religion, and in that search they make themselves seen.

And once they become convinced of their ideas they do not need to share that with their

teacher, youth worker, people from the neighborhood that do not share their violent and

extremist ideas. So then you need to worry (Ramadan, 2015)”.

During this interview Ramadan presents a more limited conceptualization of radicalization in

the sense that it only refers to the factors of identity and religion. No attempt is made to

42

emphasize that there is no unique trajectory and that there various combinations of factors

possible that cause radicalization, as described by Ranstorp. However, Ramadan similar as

Out refers not to grievances or frustrations, but to the notion that particular youngster are

searching for meaning in life which potentially leads them to extremist ideas. It seems thus

that according to this notion, being in search for meaning in life, makes particular youngsters

a potential radicals. Moreover, Ramadan does make a conceptual distinction between

extremist ideas and extremist violence, suggesting that having extremist ideas should be

perceived as a similar security threat.

Jessika Soors, the head of the RAN Working Group LOCAL, during an media

interview in 2016 partly presented a similar perspective as Out and Ramadan:

“People who are seduced by radicalism, are offered a custom-made, all-inclusive, total

coherent identity. They no longer have to question who they are, what their life goal is, why

they have certain set-backs in life. Somebody tells them who they are, what to believe and

which authors to read. It’s very easy. That the process they are undergoing (Soors, 2016)”.

The quote shows that Soors also aims to build on this view of radicalization which starts with

youngsters seeking for meaning in their life, but also seems to refer to frustrations regarding

certain set-back that could potentially lead people to extremist ideas.

Soors also refers to the idea that there are various pathways of radicalization: “If only

there were just one profile of people who are at risk of becoming radicalized, we would

always now who is at risk or not. Unfortunately it is different in reality (Soors, 2016)”.

However, Soors also refers to factors that slightly deviate from the conceptualization of root

causes of Ranstorp. She argues:

“We can distinguish between direct and indirect causes. A direct cause, is for instance, that

sharia4belgium did “dawah” or street preaching. It has recruited a number of people, mostly

young people with a policy record, who probably saw Syria as an escape. Vilvoorde has to

cope with indirect challenges. 78,3% of the children under three or of non-Belgium origin.

There are many challenges regarding integration, youth work and education, to make sure that

these children, have a future perspective within the city (Soors, 2016)”

Soors thus makes a distinction between direct and indirect causes. These causes broadly fit

within the conceptualization of Ranstorp. Street preaching corresponds with the idea that

radicalizers/groomers are a motor for radicalization as described by Ranstorp. In addition, by

referring to integration issues, Soors argues that social factors are important. However, her

43

sharp distinction between direct and indirect causes deviates from the kaleidoscope metaphor

of Ranstorp, which argues that there are no direct causes, only individually determined

combinations of various factors that cause radicalization. Furthermore, the presented narrative

by Soors that most of the young children are of immigrant origin and additional integration

issues are indirect causes of radicalization, implies that immigrant communities are especially

vulnerable and at risk of radicalization.

Finally, this research has interviewed the former chair of the INT/EXT Working

Group, involved with setting up the RAN in 2011. This expert argued “one of my points of

critique is that contemporary research and the way in which radicalization is approached,

constantly looks to radicalization in terms of an individual process. Individual history,

individual trajectories16

” (Expert 2, 2016). However, according to him radicalization is a

collective phenomenon (Expert 2, 2016). He argues that it is about people and their social

environment in terms of their network and the politics surrounding them (Expert 2, 2016). He

argues: “nobody would dare to argue that everything that has happened with the IRA and

ETA, to reduce that the practices of a number of individuals. But the remarkably, when it

concerns Islamic radicalization or religious radicalization, we tend to think that it is all about

crazy individuals”.

This expert only partly aligns with the conceptualization of Ranstorp regarding the

social and political factors, and the idea of group dynamics as a motor of radicalization.

However, by moving away from the emphasis on individuals he suggests that some groups of

individuals or communities with no proper political articulation channels are more vulnerable

or at risk of radicalization.

Based on these documents and expert views it seems that the expert knowledge

produced through the RAN contains a reasonable degree of coherence regarding causal beliefs

related to radicalization. As the analysis shows, the idea of multi-level root-causes of

Ranstorp, presented as central to the RAN collection of approaches and practices, can be

traced back in most documents and expert views. It seems that depending on the particular

RAN working group different aspects of this model are used to explain the nature of

radicalization.

Furthermore, a majority of the analyzed sources refers to radicalization in terms of

unique individual trajectories of radicalization, linear processes in which grievances,

frustrations or the lack of meaning in life, potentially result in radicalization or violent

16 The interview was conducted in Dutch, the quotes are translations made by the researcher.

44

extremism. The notions in this sense differ with regard to whether they refer to being at risk

of radicalization or violent extremism. It is often not clear whether only violent or also non-

violent radicalization is meant. In addition, most documents and expert opinions indirectly

refer to immigrant communities as being vulnerable to radicalization.

However, due to the very broad and “catch all” nature of the model of Ranstorp, by

including every possible causal factor regarding radicalization without prioritizing them, his

model in fact lacks any explanatory power. Moreover, by stating that every individual

trajectory is unique, the described linear or staged processes of radicalization cannot make

causal claims.

The conceptualization of radicalization based on the model of Ranstorp seems to be

built on similar assumptions as the narrative described by Lindekilde (chapter 2). It argues

that youngsters, in particular of immigrant roots, who are socially isolated, identity-seeking

and politically aggrieved, are vulnerable to ‘radical entrepreneurs’, who in addition recruit

them to radical groups in which they due to group dynamics radicalize to the degree that they

are willing to commit violence (Lindekilde, 2012:337). Vulnerability as the result of broader

socio-economic and integration issues, implies that it are especially the individuals in the

particular communities suffering from these issues that are prone to radicalization.

In this sense the conceptualization of radicalization as an individual trajectory,

dominant within the expertise produced through the RAN, is not completely individual. The

emphasis on discrimination and exclusion suggests a focus on immigrant communities and

refers to the view of the first discussed RAN expert that every trajectory more or less follows

the same pattern (Expert 1, 2016).

5.2 Notions of validity regarding preventive and counter measures

Regarding preventive and counter measures the RAN Collection refers to the following key

insights: 1) focus on first line practitioners, 2) a multi-agency approach, and 3) tailor-made

interventions (RAN, 2016:10). The document emphasized the importance of practitioners

since they work with “vulnerable individuals or groups at risk of radicalisation” (RAN,

2016:10). Furthermore, the document states that interventions first line practitioners need to

be “aware of signals of radicalisation” of these individuals at risk (RAN, 2016:10). Regarding

the multi-agency approach, the document states that networks of law enforcement,

professional care organizations, NGO’s and community representatives are key to be “able to

prevent radicalisation and to safeguard individuals at risk” (RAN, 2016:10). It further argues

that “each individual at risk is different which calls for a case-by-case approach” and “tailor

45

made interventions” (RAN, 2016:10). Meaning that in order to provide effective support

practitioners need to be aware of the “individuals’ background, grievances, motivations, fears,

frustrations etc. and the individual’s social environment and other local circumstances” (RAN,

2016:10).

It seems, thus, that in the RAN Collection, effective preventive and counter measures

are described as targeted at those individuals deemed vulnerable to extremist ideology and

aim at targeted interventions. It does not refer to the need of addressing broader social issues

in order to prevent radicalization.

In de RAN Paper of the Working Group Education “Empowering and supporting

teachers”, published after the working group meeting of February 2016 in Gothenborg,

recommendations are presented for teachers in relation to radicalization (RAN EDU, 2016).

Where the RAN Collection refers to targeted interventions as a key element regarding

effective preventive and counter measures, the paper of the WG EDU refers to the “school as

an instrument for change and training ground for democracy” and to promote “citizenship and

the common values of freedom, tolerance and nondiscrimination” (RAN EDU, 2016:2). This

approach of the WG EDU thus seems to imply that effective preventive measures at schools

should be aimed at broader social issues regarding norms and values, rather than focusing on

targeted interventions. The paper emphasized that the teacher should not be a spy: “if pupils

think the teacher might have a double agenda, education and monitoring for the sake of

security, they might be afraid to participate in classroom conversations (RAN EDU, 2016:3)”.

This seems to contradict the earlier described need targeted preventive work.

In April 2016 the RAN Working Group Police and law enforcement (POL) published

a paper about “Successful and effective engaging with communities” (RAN POL, 2016). The

approach argues for cooperation between the police and people working for the municipality

and members of the community in order to “see signals of potential radicalisation” (RAN,

POL, 2016:2). The paper argues in order to “safeguard the youth in communities at risk”,

“engagement with minority communities is pivotal” (RAN, POL, 2016:2). This aim at

minority communities is “since jihadist recruitment is targeting mainly, but not solely, on

ethnic or religious minority communities” (RAN, POL, 2016:2). The paper of the RAN WG

POL thus seems to imply that effective measure to address radicalization should be aimed at

individuals at risk part of vulnerable minority communities.

The RAN Working Group Youth, Families and Communities in April 2016 published

the paper “Religion Matters” (RAN YF&C, 2016). The paper argues that it is key that a

prevention strategy and intervention is developed form a “holistic approach” (RAN YF&C,

46

2016:4). The paper states that “religion should be one of the elements to pay attention to”

(RAN YF&C, 2016:4). However, it outlines that interventions should also be “focusing on

other factors of vulnerability as well” (RAN YF&C, 2016:4). In order to do so, religious

leaders should develop a “multi-factor approach as well as a multi-level approach” (RAN

YF&C, 2016:4). They should do their preventive work at “the personal level, at home, in

schools, online, within the community or in the neighborhood” (RAN YF&C, 2016:4).

Furthermore, approaches enhance trust and cooperation between government and religious

communities and their leaders (RAN YF&C, 2016:3).

The RAN Working Group Local authorities (LOCAL) published a paper after the

meeting of February 2016 in Rotterdam “How to create local networks?” (RAN LOCAL,

2016). The paper argues that the “preventive approach needs to be tailored to the needs of the

persons who are susceptible for violent extremism” (RAN LOCAL, 2016:1). In order to do so,

the paper argues for a multi-agency approach in which “local authorities, civil society

organisations, schools, mental health organisation and social work” cooperate “in order to

have a chance at preventing the youngster from violent extremism” (RAN LOCAL, 2016:2).

The paper further emphasizes that an approach needs multiple entries into the communities

“for example the local Muslim community does not equal the local mosque(s)” on also needs

to look at schools, local employers, youth work, etc. (RAN LOCAL, 2016:3). In addition, the

paper argues that an approach should focus on broader issues important for the community

and offer solutions (RAN LOCAL, 2016:3).

The paper of the WG Local emphasizes the importance of first-line practitioners, a

multi-agency approach and targeted interventions. However, it also argues that approaches to

counter-radicalization need to focus at broader issues important for the community, which

indicates that tackling social problems should be part of counter-radicalization efforts.

In addition, Omar Ramadan during a media interview in 2016 emphasized the

importance of first line practitioners (Ramadan, 2016). He argued that the RAN tries to

achieve that “people who encounter the target group” in class rooms and community centers

are aware of radicalization and learn how to detect it as early as possible (Ramadan, 2016).

According to Ramadan an important strategy to prevent extreme ideas from developing

further is “planting seeds of doubt” (Ramadan, 2016). He refers to targeted interventions in

which a person struggling with his religious identity is identified and supported by an

ideological expert helping that person in search of his identity (Ramadan, 2016).

Ramadan, further stated that “the line between radicalization and violent extremism is

thin, but there is a huge difference between thinking to do something and actually doing it”

47

(Ramadan, 2016). Ramadan thus explicitly suggest that there is a difference between violent

and non-violent radicalization, but in his proposed strategy of planting seeds of doubt he does

not refer to this distinction.

The RAN expert working for RAN EXIT, RAN RVT and RAN CoE, interviewed for

this research, argued that radicalization should be addressed in an “integral way” (Expert1,

2016). He illustrated this by stating that schools are currently already concerned with the

wellbeing of their students (Expert1, 2016). In worrisome cases schools should include

radicalization as an extra possibility next to the regular checks of for instance sexual abuse

and gambling addictions (Expert1, 2016). The RAN expert further argued that “happy people

do not radicalize” (Expert1, 2016). Therefore, preventions and interventions should target

“feelings of exclusion and disappointment at an early stage” (Expert1, 2016). He further

argued that for instance the Moroccan groups in big cities, feel disadvantaged due to

disappointing experiences at the labor market (Expert1, 2016). When within these groups

feelings emerge of “they don’t want us, we don’t fit in”, the RAN expert argued that

preventive workers need to get involved (Expert1, 2016). In addition, the approach should not

only show that the “Jihadist option is no solution” but also address other areas of problems

(Expert1, 2016). By which the RAN expert suggests that for instance problems at the labor

market should also be addressed in light of the prevention of radicalization.

The RAN expert argued that there are three levels of prevention and intervention

(Expert1, 2016). In general it is important to aim at schools and to “provide courses on

citizenship, democratic processes, but also being aware of sensitivities in history” (Expert1,

2016). By which he deviates from the idea of targeted interventions and argues that broader

social (identity) issues should be part of preventive aims. He further argued that you need to

aim at the level of vulnerable groups and at practitioners that know and work with these

groups on a daily basis (Expert1, 2016). At last, he argued there is the “group of people that is

already radicalizing showing worrisome concrete signs” (Expert1, 2016). Regarding such

cases you need to “work at an individual level”(Expert1, 2016).

During a media interview Rob Out argued that community policing can do a lot

against radicalization and violent extremism but cannot work alone (Out, 2016). He stated that

the “multi-agency” approach is very important in which police offers work together with first

line practitioners (Out, 2016). He argued that community police officers are engaged within

local communities, so they are among the first to notice such signs of changing behavior (e.g.

changing names and clothing) (Out, 2016). He stated, “the earlier we can identify them, the

better we can prevent terrorist radicalization” (Out, 2016). He further argued that “a teacher,

48

for instance, unlike a police officer, has contact with pupils every day and may be in a much

better position to identify and maybe even constructively react to changes in vulnerable

youngsters” (Out, 2016). Out seems to deviate here from earlier described notions that schools

should be concerned with broader social issues in terms of for instance citizenship courses,

instead of being teachers being an instrument of intervention.

Finally, this research has interview the former chair of the INT/EXT Working Group,

involved with setting up the RAN in 2011. The RAN expert present a completely different

narrative. He argues that radicalization is not an individual but a collective process which has

to do with the social environment and the politics surrounding it (Expert 2, 2016). Therefore,

he argues for the need to “create political channels of articulation” so people can express their

grievances (Expert 2, 2016). He further states: “there is nothing wrong with having radical

views, but it is important that people that have these radical views have access and are guided

to the political debate (Expert 2, 2016)”.

Based on the analysis it seems that notions of validity within the expertise produced

through the RAN lack coherency. While the importance of a multi-agency approach and local

practitioners is generally shared, the issue of targeted interventions as the central method of

prevention and intervention is less consensual. The RAN Collection calls for targeted

interventions by practitioners, while the paper of RAN EDU within the educational field

argues for the need to address broader social issue instead of using the teacher as an

instrument of intervention. Also the interviewed expert from RAN EXIT, RAN RVT and

RAN CoE deviates from the idea of targeted interventions and argues that broader social

issues should be part of preventive aims. Rob Out from RAN Local refers to the importance

of teachers for local efforts of surveillance. In this sense, he presents teachers as an instrument

of intervention. In addition, the paper WG Local argues that prevention should focus on

broader problems and solutions related to communities as a whole, which seems to contradict

the idea of targeted interventions.

Furthermore, the proposed approaches of intervention and prevention do not make a

distinction between radicalization leading to violence and radicalization that does not.

Despite, a brief acknowledgement of this difference by Ramadan, proposed measures do not

conceptually recognize this distinction. As suggested before, this results in the notion that

having extremist ideas is interpreted as a security threat. Furthermore, the focus on broader

socio-economic issues of some of the proposed approaches, means that preventive measures

are aimed at immigrant or minority communities suffering from these “risk factors”. The next

chapter further elaborates on these observations.

49

Returning to the idea that cohesiveness of knowledge enhances the authority of expert

knowledge produced through an epistemic community the following can be argued. As

showed in the previous chapter, the expert knowledge produced through the RAN contains a

reasonable degree of coherence regarding causal beliefs related to radicalization. However,

regarding notions of validity the expertise produced through the RAN seems less consensual.

The documents and experts views produced through the RAN agree on the importance of

practitioners and a multi-agency approaches, but differ regarding their emphasis on targeted

interventions. It seems thus that the authority of expert knowledge produced through the

RAN, is to a great extent enhanced by external recognition and the need to govern

uncertainty, but to a lesser degree determined by the cohesiveness of the produced expertise.

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6. The authority and content of knowledge produced through the RAN

Based on the earlier discussed findings the knowledge produced through the RAN has an

authoritative claim on policy relevant knowledge in the domain of counter-radicalization in

Europe. High-level politicians, bureaucrats and strategic documents describe the expertise of

the RAN as important input for practitioners and policymakers in Europe. The authority of

expert knowledge produced through the RAN furthermore seems to be enhanced by the

attempt of high-level politicians and bureaucrats to govern the uncertainty related to

radicalization. From an internal perspective the knowledge produced through the RAN is

coherent in the sense that causal beliefs about radicalization amongst experts and within

papers of the RAN are based on similar notions. However, as argued before, this seems to be

related to the broad nature of the used root causes framework, which is a multi-factor

explanation that catches almost every possible cause of radicalization. Consequently, many of

the causal beliefs produced through the RAN, fit partly in this root causes framework.

Regarding shared notions of validity it seems that the proposed measures to prevent

and counter radicalization are less consensual. This again seems to be related to the broad

nature of conceptualization of root causes which includes macro-, meso-, and micro-level

explanations (e.g., social factors, group dynamics, individual socio-psychological factors) and

argues that every path of radicalization is formed by a unique combination of these factors.

Consequently, there seems to be a lack of clarity amongst the different experts and documents

produced through the RAN, about whether valid counter measures are based on tailor-made

interventions addressing these unique pathways or should also aim to address broader “macro-

factors”. In this sense, it seems that the contested nature of radicalization expertise as

discussed by authors as Schmid, Sedqwick, Kundnani and Heath-kelly is reflected in the

expert knowledge produced through the RAN (Schmid, 2010, Sedgwick, 2010; Kundnani,

2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013).

The notion of Haas and Davis-Cross that the authority of epistemic communities is

fostered by conditions of uncertainty within the particular policy domain of their expertise and

the external recognition of the expert knowledge they produce, thus seems to be applicable to

the RAN (Haas, 1992; Davis-Cross, 2011). Regarding, the cohesiveness of expertise this

research would add that regarding the RAN cohesiveness of expert knowledge seems to be

less relevant in explaining the authority of expertise. The authority of its expertise, as seen

within the statements and strategic documents of high-level politicians and bureaucrats, seems

more related to the ability of the RAN to provide approaches to counter-radicalization that can

be applied by practitioners and policymakers.

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The authority of epistemic communities seems to be enhanced by the need amongst

policymakers to make radicalization governable. This refers to the observations of Githens-

Mazer and Heath-Kelly that after 9/11 radicals or potential radicals are perceived as important

security risks and therefore require governmental action (Githens-Mazer, 2012; Heath-Kelly,

2013). The tendency amongst high-level politicians and bureaucrats to present a narrative in

which the expertise of the RAN possess a large degree of certainty about the nature of

radicalization and approaches to govern it, seems problematic due to overreliance on

perceived effectiveness but lack of actual proof.

First of all, the expert knowledge produced through the RAN presents radicalization

has a linear process towards violent extremism. The idea of targeted interventions in addition

suggest that the expertise of the RAN contains knowledge about the point at which

individuals at risk turn into violent extremists. However, as authors as Omand, Heath-Kelly

and Schmid argue, there is a great lack of knowledge, both empirically and theoretical, about

when this shift takes place (Omand, 2010; Heath-Kelly, 2013; Schmid, 2013). Consequently,

early interventions aim at individuals perceived “at risk” of radicalization (Heath-Kelly,

2013). Being “at risk” within the expertise of the RAN, is in addition related to a wide range

of macro-, meso-, and micro-level factors making particular individual vulnerable to

radicalization.

However, due to this broad range of factors many individuals suffering from factors as

social exclusion, discrimination or socio-economic deprivation are perceived as vulnerable.

This implies that the expertise produced through the RAN presents relatively large groups of

individuals as “at risk” of radicalization. However, due to what Heath-Kelly describes as the

blurring of being “at risk” into being “risky”, because of the absence of actual knowledge

about when individuals at risk turn into violent extremists, these individuals are in fact always

perceived as dangerous (Heath-Kelly, 2013).

The result is that the targeted interventions as described within the expertise of the

RAN potentially stigmatize large groups of individuals as being potential terrorists. Moreover,

the expert knowledge produced through the RAN makes no distinction between individuals

with radical ideas and those who are actually willing to commit violent activities. This implies

that having radical ideas is reason for intervention. It seems thus that the critique of Sedgwick

(paragraph 2.5) that certain approaches to radicalization blur the element of threat, is very

much applicable to the expert knowledge produced through the RAN. Consequently,

something that does certainly lead to violence, something that does indirectly lead to violence,

and something that may not at all lead to violence is similarly approach as a threat. This is

52

problematic since this, amongst others, could imply a form of “thought police” (Ou, 2016:36).

Ou argues that certain practices have the potential to foster the jihadist narrative and support

their anti-Western propaganda, which makes them counter-productive (Ou, 2016).

Furthermore, the practice of targeting non-violent radicals undermines fundamental

democratic rights as freedom of speech (Kundnani, 2012).

In addition, the expert knowledge produced through the RAN, on the one hand argues

for targeted interventions, but on the other hand refers to the need to tackle broader social

issues. By making these broader social issues part of counter-radicalization aims communities

suffering from socio-economic or integration issues are potentially stigmatized as being

dangerous (Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010). Taking into account that the analyzed expert

views and documents often imply a focus on individuals in minority and Muslim

communities, the proposed approaches and practices by the RAN potentially problematize

these communities, which could have counter-productive effects (Omand, 2010; Heath-Kelly,

2013).

Finally, the expertise produced through the RAN appears to be consensual regarding

the need for a multi-agency approach centered around practitioners. While amongst the

documents and experts within the RAN there appears to be no doubt about the use of these

practitioners, this approach can been criticized. Practitioners embody contradictory positions

as they are both “allies” of youngster at risk of radicalization, as well as agents of the state

(Coppock and McGovern, 2014). Combing this difficult position with the notion that

practitioners are informed by the social context they are situated in, meaning that they are no

less immune to the pervasiveness of discourses that securitize Muslim communities, it seems

problematic to rely on their knowledge and experience as a major source of information

(Gilligan, 2009).

It seems thus that the critical work of authors as Heath-Kelly, Sedgwick, Bartlett,

Birdwell and King, regarding prevention in the area of counter-radicalization, is very much

applicable to the RAN. This suggest that in addition to national counter-radicalization

programs, at the transnational level approaches are promoted that potentially blur vulnerable

with dangerous individuals. Thus despite academic critique on these potentially stigmatizing

and counter-productive practices, experts within the RAN seem to built on contested

approaches. This is likely related to the role of the RAN as provider of “effective solutions”

regarding the issue of radicalization and the fact that the authority of the RAN is determined

by its ability to provide such policy solutions.

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7. Conclusion

Returning to the central research question, “How can we assess the European Radicalisation

Awareness Network and the authority and content of expert knowledge about radicalization

produced through the network?”, the following can be argued. The epistemic communities

approach provides useful angles to assess the authority of expert knowledge produced through

the RAN. Findings show that the RAN has recognized expertise and competence in the

domain of counter-radicalization and is presented as a provider of effective approaches and

best practices. This external recognition seems to be informed by high-level politicians and

bureaucrats their aim to govern radicalization and additional threats. While they not openly

refer to uncertainty, the great importance they attribute to expertise of the RAN suggest the

absence of knowledge amongst these politicians and bureaucrats regarding the issue of

radicalization.

With regard to the notion that the authority of epistemic communities is enhanced

when their expertise is coherent, findings of this research deviate from the theories of Haas

and Davis-Cross. Regarding the RAN it appears that causal beliefs and notions of validity are

not completely coherent. This seems to be related to the broad nature of the notion of root

causes that informs the expert views and documents produced through the RAN. Root causes

aim at unique combinations of macro-, meso-, and micro-level explanations, which results in

a lack of explanatory power. The notion of root causes therefore leads to the absence of clarity

whether valid counter measures are based on tailor-made interventions, addressing these

unique pathways or should be directed at broader social issues. Findings of this research

suggest that the authority of knowledge produced through the RAN is therefore less

determined by its level of cohesiveness, but more related to its externally perceived and

attributed ability to govern radicalization.

Based on these findings this research suggests that theories about epistemic

communities, as developed by Haas and Davis-Cross, need to include the notion that even

when uncertainty is not part of the political and policy narrative, it can play a crucial role in

explaining the authority of epistemic communities. In the domain of counter-radicalization it

seems that uncertainty amongst politicians and policymakers, through the active attempt to

make radicalization governable, is displaced onto radicalization experts. This seems to

enhance the authority of expert networks such as the RAN.

This research would furthermore add that in policy areas where the need to govern

uncertainty is very high, the authoritative claim on knowledge of epistemic communities is

less dependent on the cohesiveness of their expertise. Where studies have shown that in the

54

areas of economic or environmental policies epistemic communities need a coherent narrative

to influence policymakers, findings suggest that in the domain of counter-radicalization this

cohesiveness is less important. This is likely due to current developments in Europe and the

high political importance of counter radicalization programs.

With regard to the second part of the central research question, assessing the particular

content about radicalization produced through the RAN, this research found that the perceived

“effectiveness” by high-level politicians and bureaucrats of the approaches provided by the

RAN requires a critical reflection. The expert knowledge produced through the RAN contains

several elements that question the success of the proposed approaches. Many of the RAN

documents and experts argue for the need of a multi-agency approaches focused on

practitioners. Based on the idea that practitioners are often confronted with difficult positions

being close to the community and simultaneously agents of the state, together with the notion

that they are inevitably influenced by their social context and discourses about Muslim

communities, it seems problematic that experts within the RAN refrain from any attempt to

doubt the quality of their knowledge.

In addition, the expertise produced through the RAN refers to the need of targeted

interventions. However, these interventions are not as targeted as they suggest. Due to the

absence of knowledge about when vulnerable individuals turn into violent extremists, targeted

interventions in fact aim at a broad range of individuals at risk of radicalization. According to

the notion of root causes, it concerns individuals associated with a wide range of factors such

as social exclusion, discrimination or socio-economic deprivation. This implies that a large

group of individuals, in particular from minority and Muslim communities, requires “targeted

interventions” and is framed as potentially dangerous. This risk of stigmatizing groups as

dangerous, also appears to be present within the proposed focus on broader social issues such

as citizenship courses at schools. In this sense, the RAN seems to bring social issues into the

counter-radicalization domain, which problematizes communities suffering from these issues.

This research furthermore found that the expert knowledge produced through the RAN

is unclear about the distinction between violent and non-violent radicals. This implies that

having radical ideas is perceived as potentially threatening. However, acting upon the threat

of ideas could lead to the type of “thought police” that fosters jihadist propaganda and could

therefore have counter-productive consequences. In this sense, the success of the proposed

approaches by the RAN is uncertain.

Altogether, it appears that the RAN has an authoritative claim on knowledge in the

area of counter-radicalization in Europe, but that the effectiveness of their proposed

55

approaches is not as certain as high-level politicians and bureaucrats would like them to be. In

this sense, this research adds to the work of authors as Heath-Kelly, Lindekilde, Segwick and

Githens-Mazer that at the transnational level, experts within the RAN built on similar

contested notions as present within national counter-radicalization programs.

In light of the authoritative role of the RAN as an information hub for Members States,

policymakers, practitioners and EU institutions this observation is problematic. The quality of

the expert knowledge produced though the RAN would benefit from a strict separation

between targeted interventions and broad preventive approaches. More research on the factors

contributing to radicalization is needed, to make these targeted interventions more targeted. In

addition, preventive programs aimed at socio-economic issues, such as identity and

employment problems, should be part of social policy and left out of counter-radicalization

recommendations.

The findings as well as the limitations of this research provide angles for future

research. Due to the limited number of expert interviews conducted for this research, this

research mainly aimed at the external perceptions and published output of the RAN. More

research on the internal workings of the RAN is needed. Several important questions are left

unanswered such as which RAN experts are influential regarding the production of output and

how approaches are actually derived from the various working group meetings. Questions that

seem especially relevant due to the observed contested nature of large parts of the analyzed

RAN approaches.

In addition, this research due to its limited scope and time frame did not elaborate on

important issues regarding the undemocratic position of the RAN within the European

framework. The authoritative claim on knowledge of the RAN and their attributed importance

regarding policies in the area of counter-radicalization, seems to give the RAN an influential

role regarding policies to govern radicalization. Future research could further explore issues

regarding the transparency and democratic legitimacy of this influence of the RAN.

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Appendix

1. List of debates about terrorism or radicalization in de European Parliament between 2011

and May 2016, based on a search on the terms “Terrorism” and “Radicalization” in the

debates and videos database (European Parliament, 2016 II):

- 21-01-2016: Increased terrorism threat

- 14-12-2015: Protection of victims of terrorism

- 14-12-2015: Strategic cooperation in the fight against serious crime and terrorism

between the United Arab Emirates and Europol

- 24-11-2015: Prevention of radicalisation and recruitment of European citizens by

terrorist organisations

- 11-03-2015: Relations between the EU and the League of Arab States and cooperation

in countering terrorism

- 28-01-2015: Anti-terrorism measures

- 19-11-2012: Marketing and use of explosives precursors

- 21-05-2012: European Union’s internal security strategy

- 12-09-2011: EU counter-terrorism policy: main achievements and future challenges

2. Interview guide. Since the interviews were conducted in Dutch, the interview guide has

also been in Dutch:

Introductie: voorstellen, indruk onderzoek en verzoek tot het opnemen van het interview.

1. Wat zijn de criteria voor lidmaatschap/deelnamen aan de RAN Werkgroepen?

2. Wat voor soort experts zitten er in deze werkgroepen?

3. Hoe vaak komen de RAN Werkgroepen ongeveer bij elkaar (per jaar)?

4. In welke mate is er buiten de officiële bijeenkomsten contact tussen de deelnemers in

het netwerk? Bijvoorbeeld via congressen, informele bijeenkomsten, etc.

5. In hoeverre kende u de spelers binnen de RAN voordat u zelf deelnam aan het

netwerk?

6. Hoe ziet u het proces van radicalisering? Baseert u zich hierbij op een specifiek

model?

7. Voortbouwend op deze zienswijze, hoe denkt u dat radicalisering het beste aangepakt

kan worden?

8. Welke maatregelen ter preventie van radicalisering zijn volgens u effectief?

57

9. In hoeverre zijn de door u geprefereerde benaderingen van radicalisering en

preventieve maatregelen ook zichtbaar in het document “RAN Collection Preventing

Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism”?

10. Hoe en door wie wordt de uiteindelijke inhoud van het document “RAN Collection”

bepaald?

11. Het document “RAN Collection” worden duidelijke benaderingen en best practices

gepresenteerd ten aanzien van de preventie van radicalisering. In welke mate is er

binnen de RAN consensus over het proces van radicalisering en deze benaderingen en

best practices?

12. In hoeverre merkt u onder de deelnemers aan de RAN een gedeeld gevoel van urgentie

ten aanzien van het probleem van radicalisering?

13. In hoeverre is er binnen de RAN een gedeelde missie gericht op het beïnvloeden van

beleidsmakers op Europees niveau en het niveau van de lidstaten in hun aanpak van

radicalisering?

14. In hoeverre merkt u onder beleidsmakers een gevoel van onderzekerheid/onvermogen

ten aanzien van het aanpakken van radicalisering?

15. In welke mate krijgt de RAN als “information hub” verzoeken tot advies met

betrekking tot counter- radicaliseringmaatregelen van beleidsmakers (op Europees

niveau en het niveau van de lidstaten)?

16. Zijn er nog zaken die u zou willen toevoegen of verhelderen?

3. Transcript interview expert 1(14-04-2016):

1. Wat zijn de criteria voor lidmaatschap/deelnamen aan de RAN Werkgroepen?

Wij als radar advies hebben de opdracht gekregen van de Europese Commissie om het

secretariaat te vormen. Dus dat is gewoon een soort van openbare aanbesteding, die wij

hebben gewonnen. De leden die mee doen aan onze bijeenkomsten zijn inderdaad

practitioners. Daarbij volgen we verschillende strategieën. Dat hangt ook van de werkgroep af.

Dat is soms een verhaal van dat er per land zeggen we willen één of twee mensen hebben en

dat heeft er dan mee te maken dat je een soort van geografische spreiding hebt, en daarbij

wordt dan gekeken wie het beste bij die job past. En dat wordt beslist door de

werkgroepleiders. En soms hebben we een horses for courses benadering, dan kijken we naar

een onderwerp dat we willen bespreken. En we kijken wie daar het beste bij past. Een van de

belangrijkste dingen die we proberen te voorkomen is dat we te veel mensen op theorie niveau

hebben die heel ver van de uitvoering zitten. Dat is altijd een heel belangrijk criterium.

2. Wat voor soort experts zitten er in deze werkgroepen?

Denktanks proberen we buiten de deur te houden. Wetenschappelijke ook behalve, zoals je

misschien al hebt gezien hebben we tegenwoordig ook een editorial board en

wetenschappelijke poot zitten in het nieuwe project. Daar zitten wel wetenschappers. En

hetzelfde geld eigenlijk voor beleidsambtenaren die niet op lokaal niveau zitten, die proberen

58

we ook buiten de deur te houden omdat die heel vaak in een topdown benadering zitten,

terwijl wij bottomup willen werken. Het kan wel zijn dat zij bijvoorbeeld en dat gaan we

binnenkort met exit doen, dat als jij wat organiseert voor mensen van de werkvloer, dat dat

dan inderdaad bij denktanks zit. Of iemand van academische achtergrond. Maar dat is dan

vooral in dienst van die practitioners. Want dat is natuurlijk wel het unique selling point van

RAN.

Wij hebben de laatste jaren heel erg met een sneeuwbal effect gewerkt door aan professionals

te vragen ken jij andere professionals, ook van andere landen, en soms hebben we het ook bij

regeringen gedaan. Sommige regeringen zijn daar heel erg meewerkend in geweest en andere

vonden het een beetje eng, dat we mensen van de grassroot level uit hun land aan de slag

gingen. Omdat ze zoiets hadden van hoe moet dat, want dan hebben we er geen controle op.

Het doel van RAN is om vanuit het praktijk niveau tot beleidsadvies te komen en daarom

hebben we dus ook practitioners nodig, en willen we niet hebben dat het op een gegeven

moment van bovenaf bedacht wordt hoe radicaliserings preventie en deradicalisering moet

plaatsvinden. Dat doen we voor een stukje vanuit het idee dat we denken dat de mensen vanuit

de praktijk veel weten. Anderzijds omdat er al heel veel andere plekken zijn waar topdown

wordt gewerkt. Iedere regering doet dat al zo, dus daar zit niet ons unieke punt in de markt.

3. Hoe vaak komen de RAN Werkgroepen ongeveer bij elkaar (per jaar)?

2 tot 4 keer per jaar.

4. In welke mate is er buiten de officiële bijeenkomsten contact tussen de deelnemers in het

netwerk? Bijvoorbeeld via congressen, informele bijeenkomsten, etc.

Wij organiseren zelf congressen of workshops want congressen mogen we het niet noemen.

Wij zien dat mensen actief reageren op de nieuwsbrief. Ook naar elkaar toe. Wij hebben ook

een intranet site voor deelnemers, waar nog meer gebruik van zou mogen worden gemaakt.

Maar wat we veel tegenkomen is dat mensen naar aanleiding van bijeenkomsten informeel

met elkaar contact opnemen buiten ons om. Dus daar heb ik niet helemaal zicht op. Wat we

ook heel vaak krijgen en dat is misschien wel goed om te noemen. Is dat mensen die ooit bij

ons hebben deelgenomen, bijvoorbeeld contact met mij opnemen en bijvoorbeeld zeggen ik

zoek iemand zich bezighoud met –laten we het een boom in het bos noemen- met alle

qualificering binnen de Sloveense politie, heb je een naam voor me?

5. In hoeverre kende u de spelers binnen de RAN voordat u zelf deelnam aan het netwerk?

Ik kende er wat in het Nederlandse netwerk, want Radar heeft zelf al een hele geschiedenis in

het radicaliseringswerk. Ik kwam zelf voordat ik met RAN begon, uit het preventieve

jeugdbeleid, daar zitten nu ook nog heel wat mensen in . Dus ik kende al wel heel wat mensen.

In Nederland en een beetje in het buitenland. Maar goed, dat is de afgelopen jaren hand over

hand toegenomen.

6. Hoe ziet u het proces van radicalisering? Baseert u zich hierbij op een specifiek model?

Wij zien het als een proces. Wij zien het ook als een verhaal waarbij je zegt dat iedereen heeft

zijn unieke manier om te radicaliseren. Het is niet zo dat je een weg hebt naar radicalisering.

Natuurlijk zijn er een aantal grote lijnen te zien, dat je heel vaak ziet dat er problemen zijn op

het gebied van frustraties. Op een gegevenmoment niet begrepen voelen. Dus soms ook

daadwerkelijk discriminatie en het gevoel van discriminatie. Dus het buitengesloten zijn kan

een grote trigger zijn voor mensen om te radicaliseren. Daarnaast heb je allerlei psychische en

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psychiatrische patronen die daarbij ondersteunend kunnen zijn. Omgevingsfactoren. Die

overigens allebei niet direct leiden tot radicalisering is onze overtuiging. Plus het economische

wat je soms hoort. Als mensen geen werk vinden dan radicaliseren ze. Dat vinden we te kort

door de bocht. Wat wel kan gebeuren is dat je geen werk hebt en daardoor heel gefrustreerd

kan raken en daardoor radicale oplossingen zoekt.

De lengte van radicaliseringprocessen verschillen heel erg. Soms kan het zijn dat het heel

langzaam opbouwt en dat het heel sluimerend gaat. Soms kan het ook ineens heel snel gaan. Je

hebt hier ook te maken met mensen in de adolescentie leeftijd waarbij je ziet dat als jongeren

iets heel ergs in hun omgeving krijgen dan heel impulsief voor iets kiezen. En dan kan

radicalisering ineens heel snel gaan. Of dat ze naar Syrië gaan. Het is variabel in tijd. We gaan

er ook vanuit dat iedere vorm van radicalisering min of meer hetzelfde patroon aan de

achterkant heeft. Dus niet dat er een bepaald patroon is dat zou leiden tot jihadisme of extreem

rechts, maar er zitten een heleboel overeenkomsten in die processen. Bij jongeren (maar ook

volwassenen) maar jongeren is de grootste groep, zie je op een gegeven moment signalen,

zoals zich terugtrekken, zich buitengesloten voelen, boos zijn, of dat soort zaken, die kunnen

duiden op radicalisering maar die kunnen ook duiden op andere zaken. Het kan ook te maken

hebben met een gokverslaving of in een crimineel milieu zit, of problemen thuis heeft. Dus het

is niet altijd één op één dat als je bepaalde signalen hebt dat je zegt, dit is radicalisering.

7. Voortbouwend op deze zienswijze, hoe denkt u dat radicalisering het beste aangepakt

kan worden?

Daarom zeggen wij steeds dat als je radicalisering wilt aanpakken doe dat dan in een integrale

manier. Je hebt nu op scholen al overleg als mensen zich zorgen maken over bepaalde

kinderen, dan wordt er gecheckt is er seksueel misbruik aan de orde of gokverslaving, en neem

daar dan gewoon radicalisering als een extra mogelijkheid bij. Ga daar niet een heel apart

circus voor optuigen.

Gelukkigen mensen radicaliseren niet. Dat is best moeilijk, want tieners zijn vaak niet

honderd procent van de tijd gelukkig. Dat zullen we ook wel nooit voor elkaar krijgen. Maar

het is heel belangrijk bij vroege preventie dat mensen niet het gevoel krijgen dat ze

buitengesloten worden en dat je teleurstellingen in een vroeg stadium bespreek om dat ook in

perspectief te zetten. En niet, wat je soms ziet, binnen bepaalde groepen, bijvoorbeeld bij

Marokkaanse groepen in grote steden, die voelen zich achtergesteld, bijvoorbeeld, nadelige

ervaringen gehad op de arbeidsmarkt en dergelijke. Als je die dan elkaar gaan lopen

versterken, bijv. ze moeten ons niet, we horen er niet bij, daar moet je er eigenlijk al in gaan

zitten. En neem dat ook mee in een aanpak van waar je ook andere problemen verwacht. Maar

dat is meer de organisatorische kans. De hoofdzaak is mensen laten inzien dat het geen

oplossing is en grappiger is eigenlijk nog dat het jihadistische aanbod voor gelukkige mensen

geen prettig vooruitzicht is.

8. Welke maatregelen ter preventie van radicalisering zijn volgens u effectief?

Maatregelen die er vroeg bij zijn. Als jij al maanden lang op salafistische sites zit dan zit je op

een gegeven moment in een fase waarop ik je niet meer kan aanspreken terwijl in het begin

van radicalisering als mensen aan de rand zitten dan is hun netwerk nog groot met niet

geradicaliseerde. En je ziet dat mensen er altijd in worden gezogen en dat mensen contact

gaan zoeken met de geestverwanten en dat is een natuurlijk proces want dat doet iedereen.

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Maar dan wordt het steeds moeilijker om mensen te benaderen. Dus het gaat er heel erg om

om aan de vroege kant te zitten.

Effectieve maatregelen? Bijvoorbeeld wat wij zien in Nederland, maar ook in Denemarken en

Duitsland, is als ik in de klas iemand heb die op een gegeven moment twijfelt over de

Holocaust, dan kun je twee dingen doen. Dat keihard de kop indrukken maar dan heb je de

kans dat iemand zich nog verder buitengesloten voelt en in de armen wordt gedreven van

allerlei groepen waarvan je hoopt dat ze er nooit inkomen. Je kunt het ook zeggen ik doe er

niks mee. Maar het verhaal is uiteindelijk dat als je zo’n verhaal hebt dat je of met de persoon

zelf gaat spreken of met klasgenoten of de ouders om te kijken, is er wat aan de hand?.

Kunnen we daar met een productieve manier mee omgaan. Productief betekent wel aan het

onderwerp werken maar ook een goede band en het respect houden voor de persoon, want

anders voelt die zich nog verder buitengesloten.

Preventieve maatregelen gericht op individuen? Of bepaalde groepen waarvan bekend is dat er

meer uitreizigers zijn?

Je hebt de drie niveaus. De algemene kant. Daarom is het van belang om op scholen te werken

aan burgerschapskunde, democratische processen, maar je ook bewust bent van gevoeligheden

in de geschiedenis. Maar ook op het niveau van kwetsbare groepen. Wie kent die kwetsbare

groepen en werkt er ook dagelijks mee. Want dat is heel belangrijk. Als je zegt dat

radicalisering een proces is, dan kun je het alleen maar zien als iemand over een langere tijd

ziet. De marechaussee op Schiphol ziet dat niet, die moet in 10 sec beslissen of jij naar een all-

in resort in Turkije gaat of de Syrische grens over wil. Maar bijvoorbeeld mensen op scholen,

jongeren werkers die kunnen het wel zien. En tenslotte heb je een groep mensen die al aan het

radicaliseren is en waar serieuze zorgen over zijn concrete aanwijzingen, daar werk je op een

individueel niveau.

9. In hoeverre zijn de door u geprefereerde benaderingen van radicalisering en preventieve

maatregelen ook zichtbaar in het document “RAN Collection Preventing Radicalisation

to Terrorism and Violent Extremism”?

Grotendeels komen deze benaderingen terug. Waar wij niet zo heel veel over verzamelen is

het brede stuk van algemene preventie. Omdat het dan de vraag is in hoeverre dat bewust voor

radicalisering wordt ingezet. Je krijg lessen van burgerschapskunde niet alleen maar vanwege

het feit dat er radicalisering in de gemeenschap plaatsvindt maar je geeft het ook aan kinderen

om gewoon wat handvatten te geven. Dus eigenlijk zitten we met name meer op de kwetsbare

groepen kant en het individu.

10. Hoe en door wie wordt de uiteindelijke inhoud van het document “RAN Collection”

bepaald?

Dat is een ingewikkeld proces geweest om te bepalen. Maar uiteindelijk hebben we nu gezegd

dat iedere aanpak ooit moet zijn besproken in één van de werkgroepen en vervolgens moet

daar ook van zijn gezegd: dit is een mooie aanpak. De instantie krijgt vervolgens de

mogelijkheid om een formulier in te vullen waarin zij het project voorstellen, en dan wordt er

naar gekeken door het centre of excellence of dat een goede omschrijving is en dat wordt ook

nog een keer door de werkgroepleiders nagekeken. Omdat die werkgroepleiders ook uit

hetzelfde veld voortkomen. Dus die kijken of het ergens op slaat.

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We zijn heel bewust steeds aan het goochelen, we noemen het steeds een collection of

practices, en bewust niet best practices want dat zou impliceren dat overal ook een academisch

bewijs voor is en we zitten helaas in een sector waarin academisch bewijs dun gezaaid is.

11. Het document “RAN Collection” worden duidelijke benaderingen en best practices

gepresenteerd ten aanzien van de preventie van radicalisering. In welke mate is er

binnen de RAN consensus over het proces van radicalisering en deze benaderingen en

best practices?

Mensen hebben vaak niet gekozen om te werken binnen radicalisering maar zijn erin gerold.

Ik werkte eerste met drugs runners in Rotterdam die opeens heel gelovig werden. Dit leidt

ertoe dat er veel scholen zijn vanuit waar er naar radicalisering wordt gekeken. Je ziet

sommige mensen het echt bekijken vanuit de veiligheidskant, uit de politiehoek. Sommige

mensen meer uit de sociologische of psychologische kant, jongeren werkers maar ook

eerstelijns psychologen. Mensen vanuit het onderwijs, of vanuit religie. Dus er zijn heel veel

verschillende benaderingen en de nemen allerlei handelingsrepertoires met zich mee. Die soms

heel aanvullend kunnen zijn, maar soms ook niet. Bijvoorbeeld, er zijn sommige mensen die

zeggen als jij iemand wil deradicalisering dan moet je aan de voorkant heel goed weten hoe je

iemand psychisch aan toe is. Andere mensen zeggen gewoon, we gaan heel praktisch met ze

aan de slag en zien dan wel of daar een probleem oppot. En sommige zeggen je moet het in

groepsverband aanpakken andere weer individueel. Dus er zitten verschillende scholen in. En

wij proberen die zo goed mogelijk naast elkaar neer te zetten en daar de voor en de nadelen

van te benoemen.

12. In hoeverre merkt u onder de deelnemers aan de RAN een gedeeld gevoel van urgentie

ten aanzien van het probleem van radicalisering?

Over het algemeen zijn de mensen zie zich bij ons aanmelden vrijwillig. Maar bijvoorbeeld bij

de politie kan het voorkomen dat de politieleiding heeft besloten dat meneer a moet komen en

die heeft eigenlijk geen zin. Maar in het algemeen zijn het mensen met een heel hoog gevoel

van urgentie. En sterker nog een aantal mensen zit, zeker ook de afgelopen jaren, aan hun

plafon, wanneer het gaat om wat ze kunnen opnemen. Er is heel veel vraag naar

radicaliseringswerk. Er zit een grote druk op. Ook maatschappelijk. Dus daar hoeven we heel

weinig ambassadeurs werk te doen.

13. In hoeverre is er binnen de RAN een gedeelde missie gericht op het beïnvloeden van

beleidsmakers op Europees niveau en het niveau van de lidstaten in hun aanpak van

radicalisering?

Dat speelt ook vaak al vanuit hun professionele kant. Bijvoorbeeld, als het landelijk opeens

wordt bedacht dat uitreizen strafbaar wordt gesteld dan heeft dat een hele grote invloed op

werkers in de praktijk. Want waar ouders eerste makkelijk contact opnamen met de lokale

autoriteiten/politie, van ik denk dat het niet helemaal goed gaat met mijn kind. Bekent dat dat

nu omdat het strafbaar is gesteld, dat de politie dan in actie moet schieten en wellicht moet

gaan vervolgen. En dat geld ook voor een jongeren werken die met deradicalisering bezig is,

wat moeten die zeggen van wat zij weten van mensen die zijn teruggekomen. Als ze zeggen

we gaan morgen een bom gooien dat ben je ertoe verplicht het te melden maar als iemand iets

opbiecht uit het verleden. Wat moet je daarmee? Dus er zijn heel veel praktische dingen die

we zijn tegengekomen die we heel graag op het landelijk niveau willen agenderen.

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14. In hoeverre merkt u onder beleidsmakers een gevoel van onderzekerheid/onvermogen

ten aanzien van het aanpakken van radicalisering?

Radicalisering is niet normaal. De meeste wetten zijn gemaakt voor normale mensen. De

wetgever gaat er niet vanuit dat jij op een dag naar buiten loopt met een bomgordel om en dat

je denkt laat ik mij eens oplazen in een metrostation. Normale wetgeving heeft dus een ander

aanzien. Bijvoorbeeld we pakken je paspoort af. Dat is helemaal geen straf. Dat is één

ingewikkelde kant.

Ten tweede wat we veel zien, is dat de publieke opinie streng is en roept om allerlei zaken en

naar oplossingen. En dat leidt ertoe dat op dit moment allerlei strenge maatregelen worden

afgekondigd. En die werken wel voor een rechtvaardigheidsgevoel voor de hele gemeenschap.

Maar juist bij deze doelgroep doet dat heel weinig. En dat geeft mensen ook meer het gevoel

van we worden in een hoekgedrukt. We worden gemarginaliseerd. Dat maakt het moeilijker.

Dat maakt het voor veel beleidsmakers ingewikkeld. En wat wij eigenlijk proberen te doen is

waar mogelijk met goede argumenten te komen hoe je op de werkvloer dingen kunt

aanpakken. Te hopen dat mensen niet de reflex ingaan van te streng regeren of te algemene

opmerkingen te maken. Maar om mensen argumenten te geven om bijvoorbeeld te

onderkennen dat dit een langdurig proces is. Het is niet zo dat Syrie binnen twee jaar is

opgelost en iemand die terugkomt uit Syrië hebben wij niet binnen twee jaar weer fris in de

college banken zitten.

15. In welke mate krijgt de RAN als “information hub” verzoeken tot advies met betrekking

tot counter- radicaliseringmaatregelen van beleidsmakers (op Europees niveau en het

niveau van de lidstaten)?

16. Zijn er nog zaken die u zou willen toevoegen of verhelderen?

4. Transcript interview expert 2 (19-04-2016):

1. Wat zijn de criteria voor lidmaatschap/deelnamen aan de RAN Werkgroepen?

Ik ben vanaf het begin betrokken geweest bij de oprichting van de RAN. We hebben in het

begin nogal ruimhartig aan uitnodigingen gedaan om zoveel mogelijk mensen binnen te halen.

Voor de werkgroep extern was dit wat makkelijker, want de hele wereld doet aan

radicalisering, van de VN tot en met allerlei internationale NGO. Dus we konden wat

makkelijker allemaal mensen uitnodigen waarvan wij dachten dat het voor binnen Europa

interessant zou zijn. Hele strikte criteria hebben we daar niet voor aangelegd. Het was niet het

moment om ons te buigen over criteria, meer over de vraag hoe kunnen we dit tot een succes

maken door gewoon mensen uit de nodigen die er iets vanaf weten.

2. Wat voor soort experts zitten er in deze werkgroepen?

Een zo gevarieerd mogelijke groep aan experts. We hadden Peter Norman, Richard Pert, ISD,

maar ook mensen uit Indonesië, Nigeria, Kenia, vanuit de gedachte, laten we zoveel mogelijk

mensen hierbij betrekken die er iets vanaf weten en die de status van de RAN kunnen

verhogen.

3. Hoe vaak komen de RAN Werkgroepen ongeveer bij elkaar (per jaar)?

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Als de groep RAN extern, hadden we drie of vier bijeenkomsten per jaar. Twee keer per jaar

kwam de hele RAN bij elkaar onder leiding van DG Home. Dus in totaal vijf tot zes

bijeenkomsten per jaar.

4. In welke mate is er buiten de officiële bijeenkomsten contact tussen de deelnemers in het

netwerk? Bijvoorbeeld via congressen, informele bijeenkomsten, etc.

Niet. (Caspar: Oke?). Nou ja, via email waren er veel contacten. Ik had veel contact met

Magnus, waarmee ik co-chairde, via de mail maar ook telefoon. Het was niet zo dat we bij

elkaar op kantoor kwamen. Maar we hadden intensief contact met elkaar.

5. In hoeverre kende u de spelers binnen de RAN voordat u zelf deelnam aan het netwerk?

Er was een “call voor proposals” vanuit DG Home, en wij (ICCT) hebben die met Radar

gewonnen. (Caspar: Hebben jullie toen bij het opbouwen gebruik gemaakt van bestaande

netwerken binnen counter-radicalisering en preventie?). Magnus en ik brachten uitgebreide

netwerken mee. Magnus was meer binnen Europa en ik wat meer buiten Europa. Omdat mijn

oriëntatie altijd wat internationaler is geweest. Ik heb mij nooit zo bezig gehouden met de

Europese omgeving. Dus ik bracht het externe netwerk en hij wat meer het interne, daar was

niet aan te ontkomen en het zou ook vreemd geweest zijn om dat niet te doen.

6. Hoe ziet u het proces van radicalisering? Baseert u zich hierbij op een specifiek model?

Het is niet mechanisch. Een van mijn kritiek punten op de stand van onderzoek en de manier

waarop radicalisering wordt benaderd, is dat er voortdurend naar gekeken wordt alsof

radicalisering een individueel proces is. Individuele historie, individuele trajecten. We doen

net alsof het een individueel verhaal is. Maar dat is natuurlijk onzin. Het is een sociaal verhaal

een collectief verhaal. Het is het verhaal van mensen in hun sociale omgeving van mensen

connecties, en hun sociale politiek, hun sociale werkelijkheid is bepalender voor de keuzes die

zij maken dan hun individuele traject. Dus 1) het is een collectief en sociaal verhaal en niet

individueel. Niemand zou in zijn hoofd halen om alles wat er met de IRA en ETA is gebeurd,

om dat terug te brengen tot wat een aantal individuen hebben gedaan. Maar het gekke is dat

we voortdurend, wanneer het gaat om islamitisch radicalisering of religieuze radicalisering,

doen we net alsof dat allemaal losgeslagen individuen zijn die niet onderdeel zijn van de

sociale omgeving. Echt te bizar voor woorden. 2) Bij radicalisering doen wij voortdurend net

alsof het iets bijzonders is. Alsof het niet onderdeel is van… jeugd rebelleert. De Arabische

lente, de zestiger jaren was de hele wereld aan het rebelleren. Dat rebelleren moet een politiek

kanaal hebben om zich te uiten. Dat is lange tijd socialistische marxistische ideologieën

geweest… het politieke kanaal waar langs grieven aan de onderkant van de samenleving zich

politiek konden manifesteren. Het was de articulatie van een rebellerende generatie. Die

toegang, kanalen, richting de politieke arena zijn verdwenen. Je zit bij Starbucks, of je zit bij

Starbucks of je zit bij Starbucks. Als je opstandig bent zijn er weinig kanalen om die onvrede

te articuleren. En dan is religiositeit in deze tijd dan een van de weinige kanalen om zich te

uiten. Dan zie je een toename in fundamentalistische kringen, in het Christendom, in Israel en

ook in de Islam. Dus je ziet een toename aan fundamentalisme ideologische bewegingen die

een vorm van articulatie bieden aan mensen of groepen in de samenleving die ontevreden zijn.

Misschien moeten we ophouden met denken dat radicalisering iets bijzonders is.

7. Voortbouwend op deze zienswijze, hoe denkt u dat radicalisering het beste aangepakt

kan worden?

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Het scheppen van kanalen voor politieke articulatie. Met name politiek. Politiek is verworden

is een soort management systeem, om onze maatschappij boekhoudkundig en managerial in

orde te brengen. De uitdaging is om een inhoudelijk gesprek te hebben over politiek. Politiek

moet weer kanalen bieden waarin mensen hun grieven kunnen uiten. De politiek moet weer

terug naar hun oorspronkelijke rol, politiek bedrijven. Mensen de kans bieden om hun

ontevredenheid te uiten en hun mening. Maar Islamitische fundamentalistische bewegingen

moet je verbieden. Dat is niet de politisering die ik bedoel. Je moet in een veel vroeger

stadium mensen de kans geven om hun meningen te articuleren.

8. Welke maatregelen ter preventie van radicalisering zijn volgens u effectief?

9. In hoeverre zijn de door u geprefereerde benaderingen van radicalisering en preventieve

maatregelen ook zichtbaar in het document “RAN Collection Preventing Radicalisation

to Terrorism and Violent Extremism”?

Ja, je moet in een vroeg stadium signaleren dat mensen niet tevreden zijn met hun huidige

situatie. Vervolgens moeten mensen die grieven kunnen uiten. Het hebben van radicale

standpunten is niets mis mee. Maar het is belangrijk dat vervolgens die mensen de weg wordt

gewezen waarop ze met de radicale standpunten ook daadwerkelijk het publieke debat kunnen

bereiken. Dat moet je niet doen via het fundamentalistische Islamitische discours. Dus early

warning en het bieden van een kanaal om je te uitten dat hoort bij elkaar. Want je kan niet

tegen iemand zeggen, hé, ik hoor dat je radicaal wordt, ik heb dat nu gemerkt en ik ga je in het

ziekenhuis zetten en ik geef je twee injecties en het is weer over. Dat is niet de bedoeling. Je

signaleert het in een vroeg stadium en vervolgens geef je mensen de ruimte, de arena, de plek

waarbinnen ze hun ideeën kunnen ventileren.

(Caspar: Denkt u dan dat overheden zich moeten focussen op bepaalde kwetsbare groepen?)

Ja, dat is een ingewikkelde discussie. Ik realiseer mij dat. Er zijn twee kampen. Ik ben

undecided. Je hebt mensen die vinden dat je daar mensen mee stigmatiseert, er zijn andere die

dat gevaar onbewezen achten. Ik ben daar niet uit, omdat ik geen helder beeld heb van de

onderszoeksresultation op dit punt.

10. Hoe en door wie wordt de uiteindelijke inhoud van het document “RAN Collection”

bepaald? (ik las dat dat de steering committe is?)

Ja, daar zijn lange discussies over gevoerd. Over de vraag, zou je daar een peer review op

moeten zetten. Zou je een kwaliteitstoets in moeten bouwen. Of zouden mensen die wat

aanmelden als iets waar ze waarde aan hechten, is dat voldoende basis om het op te nemen in

die lijst. Als iemand zegt, go ik heb hier iets aan, het is voor mij zinvol. We hebben besloten

om het niet te bureaucratiseren. Om het niet al te zwaar te belasten. Ik was het met die keuze

wel eens. Omdat er voldoende kritische vermogen is bij de ontvangende partij. Ze kunnen dit

lezen ze kunnen er kennis van nemen, ze kunnen vervolgens bij betrokken organisaties terecht

voor nadere informatie, en dan kan de ontvangende partij alsnog besluiten dat het voor hen

weinig zinvolle informatie biedt. Dat is voldoende garantie op zorgvuldigheid. Er waren in de

tijd ook mensen die vonden dat er een echte peer review en kwaliteitscontrole op zou moeten

plaatsvinden. Uiteindelijk is besloten om het niet al te zwaar te belasten.

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11. Het document “RAN Collection” worden duidelijke benaderingen en best practices

gepresenteerd ten aanzien van de preventie van radicalisering. In welke mate is er

binnen de RAN consensus over het proces van radicalisering en deze benaderingen en

best practices?

Ja er is consensus. We hebben destijds, vanuit de werkgroep intern en extern een aantal

aanbevelingen geformuleerd, waarin eigenlijk alle aanbevelingen staan die volgens mij nog

steeds geldig zijn. En waar we het wel over eens waren. De jigsaw puzzle. Dat verschillende

onderdelen van de overheid moeten samenwerken, moeten bouwen van vertrouwen. Tussen

gemeenschappen communities en overheidsdiensten. Ik denk nog steeds dat dit een van de

beste documenten was op ons terrein en dat daar wel consensus over was.

12. In hoeverre merkt u onder de deelnemers aan de RAN een gedeeld gevoel van urgentie

ten aanzien van het probleem van radicalisering?

Die was er in het begin veel minder. Osama Bin laden was net overleden, de Arabische lente

zou het begin van het einde zijn van Al Qaida. Ik heb in die tijd ook gezegd dit is het bankroet

van Al Qaida. Dus in 2011, 2012 en 2013 was de sense over urgency vrij laag. Pas met de

opkomst met ISIS, die een enorme aantrekkingskracht bleek te hebben op grote groepen in de

samenleving. Pas toen begon de urgentie weer naar boven te komen. En nu is die natuurlijk

nog veel hoger. Na de aanslagen in Europa.

13. In hoeverre is er binnen de RAN een gedeelde missie gericht op het beïnvloeden van

beleidsmakers op Europees niveau en het niveau van de lidstaten in hun aanpak van

radicalisering?

Geen. De RAN was nadrukkelijk ingericht om de practitioners van instrumenten… van advies

te voorzien van hoe je dingen doet. Inventarisatie van best practices, van dingen die wel en

niet werken. Dat was uitdrukkelijk bedoelt voor de leden van de RAN die daar werkte, om bij

te dragen aan de uitvoeringscapaciteit, de implementatie, aan het werk, aan de basis. De

beïnvloeding van beleid was secundair.

14. In hoeverre merkt u onder beleidsmakers een gevoel van onderzekerheid/onvermogen

ten aanzien van het aanpakken van radicalisering?

Dat kwam voor. Later iets meer. Met name in de tijd dat de Foreign Fighters problematiek

begon. België, Portugal en nog een paar andere landen uit de Balkan begonnen zich te

melden… hoe moeten we hier mee omgaan, hoe kunnen jullie ons helpen. Dat werd in de loop

van de tijd iets meer. Maar vergis je niet, de RAN was helemaal niks in 2011. Het heeft

redelijk lang geduurd, voordat RADAR op de radar kwam. Voordat het ook daadwerkelijk

begon te werken. Dit soort nieuwe initiatieven moeten ook een plek verwerven en zich

bewijzen. Dus het eerste jaar was vooral laten zien dat het nuttig is en dat je iets voor elkaar

kunt brengen. En stonden overheden dus nog niet te popelen om zich bij een gloed nieuwe

organisatie aan te kloppen. Omdat het nog geen instituut was dat bekend was. In de loop van

de jaren , in de richting van 2014 begon dat toe te nemen. Maar dat heeft wel een paar jaar

geduurd.

15. In welke mate krijgt de RAN als “information hub” verzoeken tot advies met betrekking

tot counter- radicaliseringmaatregelen van beleidsmakers (op Europees niveau en het

niveau van de lidstaten)?

66

Zie vorige punt.

16. Zijn er nog zaken die u zou willen toevoegen of verhelderen?

5. Transcripts of video interviews:

Interview Omar Ramadan (Ramadan, 2015)

- First header: “Omar Ramadan: planting the seeds of doubt”

Spoken text:

My name is Omar Ramadan, I am the head of the secretariat of the Radicalisation Awareness

Network. RAN is a network of practisioners. We have over 1000 people active in our network now,

from all 28 member states. RAN was lounched in 2011 by Commissioner Malmström. She wanted a

network of pratisioners, first line practisioners, people like teachers, youth workers, health workers.

Why? Because the issue radicalization and violent extremism at that time and still is being discussed

very intelligently by policymakers and academics, but the people that are actually encountering the

target group, the first line practisioners, their voice is not being heard a lot. And therefore we created

this network to learn from each other and so they can feed in into the policy process.

- Second header: “detecting radicalization”

Spoken text:

This process of radicalization it starts with exploring who am I, what is my place in the world, what is

my group, what is my religion, and in that search they make themselves seen. And once they become

convinced of their ideas they do not need to share that with their teacher, youth worker, people from

the neighborhood that do not share their violent and extremist ideas. So then you need to worry. What

we try to achieve is that people who encounter the target group I class rooms in community centers are

aware of radicalization learn how to detect it, as early as possible so they can change the hards and

minds of those people and plant seeds of doubt to make sure that their, sometimes extreme ideas, are

not developed further.

- Third header: “A thin line that makes all the differences”

Spoken text:

The line between radicalization and violent extremism is thin, but there is a huge difference between

thinking to do something and actually doing it. There is a huge difference between thinking it is okay

to commit acts of violent extremism in Europe and actually doing that, planning it, and executing it.

The question whether radicalization is caused by nature or nurture, it’s a very interesting question but

my answer is very clear: there is no such thing as a terrorist dna. Currently a lot of focus is on the

foreign fighters. Youngster going to Syria and Iraq and fight there. That’s quite an amazing number of

people close to 3000. But let not forget that for instance Norway, not so long ago, somebody like

Brivik killed a lot of people. So right extremism that’s quite a serious problem.

- Fourth header: “de-radicalisation”

Spoken text:

67

De-radicalizing people always starts with planting seeds of doubt. So that they themselves start to

doubt whether their radical ideology is true. Just go to them and say: no you are not right, or all those

people that radicalized you are wrong, that will not work. Discussing with them, why they have these

ideas and asking them to explain these ideas. Then you can challenge them and that is when the

process starts.

- fifth header: “The future”

Spoken text:

In the coming years two things will happen. The world will become more interconnected, events

abroad, in the Middle East, or on the other side of the globe, and ideas developed over there, will reach

us much easier and faster than before. So that will promote radicalization. And on the other hand, what

will also happened, is that initiatives such as the RAN will develop and growth, and allow us to

prevent radicalization even better.

Interview Jessika Soors (Soors, 2015).

Title: “A city’s combat against radicalization”

Spoke text:

My name is Jessika Soors. I work for the Vilvoorde city council at the department Radicalisation &

Polarisation. My main focus is the social impact of radicalization. Locally, we look at how

radicalization often goes with social isolation. People who are no longer able, or willing to function in

society and who look for a way out. For instance by going to Syria.

First header: “In 2013 over 30 young man from Vilvoorde have joined the fight in Syria. Some are

back, many are still fighting, other are death”

Spoken text:

We can distinguish between direct and indirect causes. A direct cause, is for instance, that

sharia4belgium did “dawah” or street preaching. It has recruited a number of people, mostly young

people with a policy record, who probably saw Syria as an escape. Vilvoorde has to cope with indirect

challenges. 78,3% of the children under three or of non-Belgium origin. There are many challenges

regarding integration, youth work and education, to make sure that these children, have a future

perspective within the city.

Second header: “Detecting radicalization”

Spoken text:

If only there were just one profile of people who are at risk of becoming radicalized, we would always

now who is at risk or not. Unfortunately it is different in reality. All things of radicalization have one

thing in common: the social dynamics at play. People who are seduced by radicalism, are offered a

custom-made, all-inclusive, total coherent identity. They no longer have to question who they are,

what their life goal is, why they have certain set-backs in life. Somebody tells them who they are, what

to believe and which authors to read. It’s very easy. That the process they are undergoing. A process,

68

which leads locally, our partners, such as schools, sport clubs, associations and youth workers, are

being sensitized against.

Third header: “Acting on radicalization”

Spoken text:

When we find out that somebody is being radicalized, why try to get a grasp of his social context.

Who is he? What are his social surrounding? By looking at the social context, we try to ensure that

existing ties between that person and society are protected. But we also look for strategies to develop

new ties. If the person is struggling with his religious identity, we try to involve an ideological expert

to help that person in his search for identity. Or an alternative that is less radical.

Fourth header: “Disengagement”

Spoken text:

We can’t get into people’s minds. We can’t read minds. Even when people have their own specific

views, we cannot act based on that, unless their behavior translates into violence. We concentrate on

their behavior and try to make sure that they in their day-to-day activities, people can be part of

mainstream society. The scientific term for this is “disengagement”. When somebody becomes

radicalized, the first priority is to prevent them from action upon their radical views.

Interview Magnus Ranstorp (Ranstorp, 2016).

Header: “What are the factors that cause radicalisation?”

Spoken text:

It is very complex, there is not one profile, there is not one pathway. So the way I describe it is that

you actually have a kaleidoscope with a variety of colors and when you actually look at those colors, it

can vary depending on who you are as a person. What are then the basic primary colors in this

kaleidoscope. It is socio psychological factors, what makes you as a person, you may have black and

white thinking, you may have trauma, you may have psychological issue, you may be more or less

receptive to the ideology. The second issue is: social factors. So social mobility. Many of the people

that are foreign fighters have criminal back grounds, they may have no prospects, so social factors also

matter. There are political factors. Political factors of the conflicts around the world. Everything from

Bosnia to the Balkans, to Syria to Palestine, to Afghanistan, and they are all reduced into the narrative

that the West is at war with the Muslim world. Also the cartoon issues. And you also have the

religious dimensions, and that means the Salafi-Jihadi mission and there is a whole ideological world.

On top of that you have identity issues. What is it like to stand between different cultures, different

generational aspects. But all of those kaleidoscope, you know, when you switch and turn them, of

course that doesn’t cause radicalization, but there is a motor, there is an engine of it. And what are

then those factors? Those factors are group dynamics, what happens in small groups with a bunge of

friends. With socializing individuals. There are the radicalizers who are preying on vulnerability who

recruit people. And lastly it is the social media. And the social media creates and eco chamber. You

only filter in ISIS or Daesh propaganda and you live in this world that reinforces your own world

view. So those are the factors of this kaleidoscope of radicalization.

69

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