The European Information Society: A Reality Check

THEEUROPEANINFORMATIONSOCIETYA REALITY CHECK

NEWMEDIAintellect

Edited By Jan Servaes

The European InformationSociety

A reality check

Edited by

Jan Servaes

Published in Paperback in UK in 2003 by Intellect Books, PO Box 862, Bristol BS99 1DE, UK

Published in Paperback in USA in 2003 byIntellect Books, ISBS, 920 NE 58th Ave. Suite 300, Portland, Oregon 97213-3786, USA

Copyright © 2003 Intellect

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrievalsystem, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,recording, or otherwise, without written permission.

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Electronic ISBN 1-84150-893-4 / ISBN 1-84150-106-9

Printed in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Eastbourne.

European Consortium for Communications Research

This series consists of books arising from the intellectual work of ECCR members. Books addressthemes relevant to ECCR interests; make a major contribution to the theory, research, practiceand/or policy literature; are European in scope; and represent a diversity of perspectives. Bookproposals are refereed.

Series Editors

Denis McQuailRobert PicardJan Servaes

The aims of the ECCR:

• To provide a forum where researchers and others involved in communication and informationresearch can meet and exchange information and documentation about their work. Its disciplinaryfocus will be on media, (tele)communications and informations research;

• To encourage the development of research and systematic study, especially on subjects and areaswhere such work is not well developed;

• To stimulate academic and intellectual interest in media and communications research, and topromote communication and cooperation between members of the Consortium;

• To co-ordinate information on communications research in Europe, with a view to establishing adatabase of ongoing research;

• To encourage, support, and where possible publish, the work of junior scholars in Europe,

• To take into account the different languages and cultures in Europe;

• To develop links with relevant national and international communication organisations and withprofessional communication researchers working for commercial and regulatory institutions, bothpublic and private;

• To promote the interests of communication research within and between the member states of theCouncil of Europe and the European Union; and

• To collect and disseminate information concerning the professional position of communicationresearchers in the European region.

Contents

By way of introduction 5

Introducing the issue1. Jan Servaes – The European Information Society: 1. A wake-up call 11

Checking discourses, policies, and findings2. Paschal Preston – European Union ICT Policies: Neglected 2. Social and Cultural Dimensions 333. Caroline Pauwels & Jean-Claude Burgelman – 3. Policy challenges to the creation of a European Information 3. Society: A critical analysis 594. Francois Heinderyckx – Issues in measuring Information 4. Society adoption in Europe 875. Nico Carpentier – Access and participation in the discourse 5. of the digital divide: The European perspective at/on the WSIS 996. Cees J. Hamelink – Communication Rights and the European 6. Information Society 121

Checking in more detail7. Robert G. Picard – Business Issues facing New Media 1498. Peter Johnston – Perspectives for Employment in the 8. Transition to a Knowledge Society 1659. Andrea Ricci – The Political Internet: 9. Between dogma and reality 17710. Brian Trench – New roles for users in online news media? 10. Exploring the application of interactivity through 10. European case studies 205

By way of conclusions11. Luisella Pavan-Woolfe – Social and Human Capital in the11.Knowledge Society: Policy implications 225

12. Jan Servaes – Digital citizenship and information inequalities: Challenges for the future 231

List of acronyms 239

Note on contributors 241

By way of introduction

The globalization of social, cultural and economic relations is facilitated, and at thesame time conditioned by developments in the information and communicationstechnologies (ICT) and infrastructure. Human knowledge brought mankind from anoral to a literate culture, thanks to the invention of the print media. Thedevelopment of the electronic media in the last century paved the path for theinformation age, in which spatial and temporal constraints are lifted. “In everysociety, the production, distribution, and use of information play vital roles in themanagement of events… The development of these Information Societies hasbeen characterized by the innovation and adoption of technologies, changes inmass media systems, and changing patterns and procedures for individual andgroup decision-making. Attention has shifted in these societies from thedevelopment and utilization of technologies to a concern for their impact uponeach society” (Edelstein, Bowes & Harsel, 1978: vii). The consequences of thisrevolution in human communications are multidimensional in character, affectingeconomical, political and social life on national, international and local levels.

The focus of this book will be on Europe. However, as argued by John Pinder(1995) or Cees Hamelink in his contribution to this book, it is rather difficult toqualify what is meant by the notion of the ‘European Information Society (EIS)’.Therefore, we cannot but take other geographical dimensions into consideration aswell.

Though many authors (see, e.g., Dordick & Wang, 1993; Martin, 1995; Webster,1995) express serious doubts about the validity of the notion of an informationsociety, a variety of criteria could be used to analytically distinguish definitions ofan information society (IS). Frank Webster (1995: 6), for instance, identifies thefollowing five types of definitions: technological, economic, occupational, spatial,and cultural. The most common definition of an IS is probably technological. Itsees the information society as the leading growth sector in advanced industrialeconomies. Its three strands – computing, telecommunications and broadcasting –have evolved historically as three separate sectors, and by means of digitizationthese sectors are now converging.Throughout the past decade however a gradual shift can be observed in favor ofmore socio-economic and cultural definitions of the IS. The following definition,drafted by a High Level Group of EU-experts, incorporates this change: “Theinformation society is the society currently being put into place, where low-cost

The European Information Society6

information and data storage and transmission technologies are in general use.This generalization of information and data use is being accompanied byorganizational, commercial, social and legal innovations that will profoundlychange life both in the world of work and in society generally” (Soete, 1997: 11).

Others prefer to use the term knowledge society to clarify the shift in emphasisfrom ICTs as ‘drivers’ of change to a perspective where these technologies areregarded as tools which may provide a new potential for combining the informationembedded in ICT systems with the creative potential and knowledge embodied inpeople. “These technologies do not create the transformations in society bythemselves; they are designed and implemented by people in their social,economic, and technological contexts” (Mansell & When, 1998: 12).

Also in other ways, this book intends to move away from the technological hurrahto a more historical and contextual assessment of the opportunities and dangerson the information highway ahead of us. One of the fundamental questions iswhether the information society in Europe will also be a welfare society? Thewelfare society which is one of those great captivating ideas Europe wants tocherish (Calabrese & Burgelman, 1999). Undoubtedly the evolution towards aninformation society puts pressure on the classical ways in which the welfaresociety has been constructed. And this at the level of political philosophy – forinstance: what means citizenship in a digital environment? (see Castells, 1997; orthe contribution by Andrea Ricci) – as well as at the level of social and economicpolicy.

These discussions imply choices in such areas as universal availability, investmentin education, regulation, the role of public authorities, and the balance betweenindividual privacy and community security, and between information freedoms andcommunication rights (see Venturelli, 1997, or the contributions by Cees Hamelinkand Peter Johnston). One of the hottest issues in debates on the informationsociety is the digital divide between the ‘information haves’ and ‘have-nots’ (the so-called ‘information underclass’). According to Hacker and van Dijk (2001), thereare four main hurdles of access to the information society producing theseinequalities: (a) lack of basic skills and ‘computer fear’; (b) no access to computersand networks; (c) insufficient user-friendliness; and (d) insufficient and unevenlydistributed usage opportunities. Especially the contributions by Jan Servaes,Francois Heinderyckx, and Nico Carpentier address these issues in some detail.

The European communications environment is undergoing a number of majorstructural changes. The Single European Act (SEA), adopted by all nationalparliaments in the European Union, which entered into force on 1 July 1987, has


introduced a new strategic vision – the 1992 objective for completion of the internalmarket. It created the framework for Europe 1992, and therefore it can be said tobe the most important reform of the Treaty of Rome since its inception on 25March 1957.As the Single European Market-idea is based on the philosophies of mutualrecognition and subsidiarity – mutual recognition by member states of thedifferences in national laws so long as these do not distort inter-community trade,and subsidiarity whereby international bodies should not assume powers overnational issues and that national governments should not take control of mattersbetter dealt with on a regional level – it is increasingly becoming governed byinternational and supranational regulations.

Therefore, the SEA has introduced new dynamic elements to generate theconvergence of the member states of the European Union. International regulation,as laid down in the Council of Europe's Convention on Transfrontier TelevisionBroadcasting (1989), and supranational regulation, as expressed in the EU Councilof Minister's Broadcasting Directive (1989), has contributed to a more competitivecommunications environment, both at national and supranational levels.Nowhere, perhaps, as argued by Caroline Pauwels and Jean-Claude Burgelman,are these changes more profound than in the field of broadcasting, which isceasing to be an activity almost entirely regulated by national legislation.Furthermore, one could argue that different logics are guiding the EC policies indifferent hardware and software sectors. Therefore, the telecommunications policywith an emphasis on liberalization and deregulation differs from the policyrecommendations in the broadcasting field where some measures (e.g., the quota-system) could be interpreted to be protectionist. For instance, with regard to anti-cartel legislation, there is at present no cohesive legislative provision in theEuropean Union.

The EU industrial policies have changed during the eighties from a defensivetowards a more offensive policy. Two sectors where this policy change hasbecome very obvious are telecommunications and informatics. This has led to atechnological convergence of communications and computer technology intoInformation Communication Technologies (ICT). This convergence will haveconsiderable implications for policy formulations at distinct levels. However, it isfeared that the EU is not really anticipating an overall policy on the problems ofconvergence within the EU. Only at operational levels some concern is expressedand isolated initiatives are initiated. A more comprehensive and centralizedstructure is urgently needed to tackle this convergence issue.


As the two historically, separately evolved sectors of telecommunications andbroadcasting converge, the different policy consequences of the economic versusthe cultural, and local versus international interests have to be taken into account.It is no longer sufficient to concentrate on a distinct sector from only atechnological or an economic perspective. Therefore, a multi-dimensional analysisof the different policy options and their respective consequences is necessary.

This discussion can also be observed at the more theoretical level. Jan VanCuilenburg and Denis McQuail (1998) distinguish between three different historicalphases of media policy in the US and Western Europe. During the first phase (untilWorld War II) media policy was largely dominated by the tensions between stateand corporate interests at a national level. Afterwards (from the fifties into theeighties) a shift took place from economic and national concerns to more socio-political considerations. This phase is often summarized with a reference to public-service broadcasting as the political ideal for media policy, notably in WesternEurope. There was a strong policy commitment to universal service, diversity ofcontent, democratic accountability, public financing and non-profit making.Caroline Pauwels and Jean-Claude Burgelman argue that these concepts arelargely insufficient in view of the problems and challenges that new information andcommunication technologies pose for the information society.

Such a broad perspective coincides with the third phase, as identified by VanCuilenburg and McQuail. They describe how from 1980 onwards severaltechnological, economic and socio-cultural trends have fundamentally changed thecontext of media policy.

In general one could say that both national governments and the European Unionas a governing body are faced with a dilemma when it comes to developing acommunications policy. If they would give preference to economic and technicalconsiderations, they would stimulate the media policies in the direction ofuniformization and large-scale developments. Quantitative criteria, which aremainly based on 'technical' (or hardware) considerations, do play a more importantrole than qualitative criteria that build upon the 'content' (or software) of mediaproducts. The latter approach would be more in line with a cultural policy, whichemphasizes pluriformity and small-scale autonomy (see also Becker, 1995).

The contributions in this book take shape at three levels:

At one level, the policy of an EIS will be analysed in terms of its underlyingassumptions and discourses. Although most of the articles deal with this point,especially the ones by Jan Servaes, Paschal Preston, Caroline Pauwels and Jean-


Claude Burgelman, Francois Heinderyckx, Nico Carpentier, and Cees Hamelinkdiscuss EIS policies in some detail.

Starting from the assumption that information and communication technologiesundoubtedly possess the potential to contribute to social change, these authorsquestion whether this potential will be converted into advantages for everyoneunder the given scenario's the EU has planned. As large-scale application ofinformation and communication technology increases, new problems will arisewhich 'the market' as such will not being able to resolve. More and betterregulatory mechanisms, this book argues, will have to be developed to deal withthese. If it should appear that the means proposed by the EU representatives areinadequate to arrive at the intended result, then the current ICT strategy will haveto be amended, or, if necessary, an alternative strategy will have to be proposed.

A second level of critical issues deals with the tension between the national andthe supranational (the EU) and how this might affect EIS policy and planning in thedistinct nation-states. As in every dossier, different national authorities in Europereact differently to the plans of Brussels (and this mainly due to nationalspecificities).

At a third level, specific issues or cases are being scrutinized: business issuesfacing new media (by Robert Picard), the impact of the EIS on employment andwork (by Peter Johnston), the prospects for on-line voting and e-democracy (byAndrea Ricci), and the new roles for users in on-line news media (by BrianTrench).

The book concludes with a number of recommendations for both policymakers andresearchers.

Jan Servaes


References

Becker J. (1995), “Information for all or knowledge for the elite? The contours of adissimilar European information policy”, Prometheus, vol. 13, no. 1, June.Calabrese A. & Burgelman J-C (eds.) (1999) Communication, Citizenship andsocial Policy: Rethinking the limits of the welfare state, Boulder: Rowman &Littlefield.Castells M. (1997), The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vols I, II& III, Oxford: Blackwell.Dordick H. & Wang G. (1993), The Information Society: A retrospective view.Newbury Park: Sage.Edelstein A., Bowes J. & Harsel S. (eds.) (1978) Information Societies: Comparingthe Japanese and American Experiences. Seattle: School of Communications,University of Washington.Gates B. (1995), The road ahead, London: Viking Penguin.Hacker F. & Van Dijk J. (2001), Digital Democracy: Issues of Theory and Practice,London: Sage.Mansell R. & Wehn U. (1998) (eds.), Knowledge Societies: Information Technologyfor Sustainable Development. Report for the United Nations Commission onScience and Technology for Development, New York : Oxford University Press.Pinder J. (1995) European Community. The building of a union. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.Soete L. (1997), Building the European Information Society for us all. Final policyreport of the high-level expert group. Brussels: EU-DGV.Van Cuilenburg J & McQuail D. (1998) “Media Policy Paradigm Shifts: In search ofa New Communications Policy Paradigm”, Picard R. (ed.), Evolving MediaMarkets, Turku: The Economic Research Foundation (pp. 57-80)Venturelli S. (1997), “Prospects for Human Rights in the Political and RegulatoryDesign of the Information Society”, Servaes J. & Lie R. (eds.), Media and Politicsin Transition. Cultural identity in the age of globalization, Louvain: Acco, (pp. 61-76).

The European Information Society:

A wake-up call*

Jan Servaes

In many ways the European plans to build an Information Society (IS) emerged asa reaction to Japanese and American initiatives (Edelstein, Bowes & Harsel,1978). As in many other previous technological projects, European policies oninformation and communication technologies (ICT) were lagging behind thepolicies of its main global competitors.This situation has changed slightly since the beginning of the eighties, when itbecame clear that information and communication would be one of the maintechnological factors and markets for the future. From then onwards Europe hasspend a growing amount of its R&D on ICTs.This went hand in hand with a radical change in policy orientation. Starting fromthe Green Paper on Television Policy (Television without Frontiers) in 1984, thearea of communications became gradually and more or less totally liberalized.From 1998 onwards, the whole ICT field became deregulated.

Though, in the eighties, the term information society as such wasn't used in theR&D and policy discourse of the EU, the idea underlying it was neverthelesscaptured in most R&D programs in terms of 'wired society', 'broad band networks'and so on. Thus the EU didn't start from scratch in this field. On the contrary, avery considerable research effort was made. Nevertheless, in terms of useracceptance, these first generations of large-scale R&D projects in integratedcommunications were not very successful.This might explain why, when the idea of an ‘information highway’ was officially'launched' by the Clinton-Gore administration, Europe almost immediatelyintegrated it into its own discourse. First, under the label of trans-Europeannetworks, in the so-called Delors White Paper (1993), but much more prominently


in the Bangemann report (1994) with an unconditional belief in the market as thedriving force.

What resulted is the EU way to build the information society: pushing politically thewiring of Europe and the building of its highways, but leaving it up to the privatesector to implement. Europe clearly wanted no lagging behind this time and, at thesame time though not explicitly, got a brand new 'grand societal project' for itsofficial policy. The information society indeed became a discourse in which it waspossible to integrate many of the at first sight disparate European ambitions: fromcompetition policy over competitiveness to maintaining cultural diversity andsubsidiarity.

Two waves of IS-rhetoric … and severalcontradictory discourses

The first initiative of the European Commission in its ‘information society planning’of the nineties was the white paper ‘Growth, Competitiveness and Employment’ of1993. The Commission under the chairmanship of the former French SocialistMinister of Finance, Jacques Delors, prepared this paper. It starts from a Social-Democratic concern for job creation and equal opportunity combined with a focuson Europe’s competitiveness in an increasingly internationalizing world economy.This rather neo-Keynesian white paper was followed by the much more neo-liberalBangemann report in 1994 on the basis of an initiative by the Council. This report,chaired by the former German FDP (liberal) Minister Martin Bangemann, focusesmore on the issues of liberalization of telecommunications and the primacy of theprivate sector in the development of an information society.

Therefore, the information society policies of the European Union in the ninetiescan be presented as two waves, one in the first part of the decade with anemphasis on liberalization of telecommunications and information technologydevelopment, and the other in the second half of the 1990s with more focus onsocial aspects of information society developments. This understanding is, to alarge extent, well founded especially if the first wave is seen as being representedby the Bangemann report and the ‘Action Plan’ of 1994. The development in theEU information society policy has thus been characterized by an oscillationbetween broader social concerns and a more technology and market-orientedfocus. However, by doing so, it probably portrays the development in too rosycolors as a continuous development without the differences of opinion oremphases that have existed.

The European Information Society: A Wake-up call 13

In 1995, for instance, a high-level expert group (HLEG) and an Information SocietyForum were established to analyze “the social aspects of the information society”as the HLEG poses it in its final policy report ‘Building the European InformationSociety for us all’ (Soete, 1997). As a justification for this focus, HLEG wrote: “Untilthat time, the debate on the emerging information society had been dominated byissues relating to the technological and infrastructure challenges and theregulatory economic environment” (CEC, 1997a). There was, therefore, aperceived need for re-focusing on the social dimensions of the ‘European model’,in line with the white paper ‘Growth, Competitiveness and Employment’, as statedin the HLEG-report.

In yet another document, ‘The Social and Labor Market Dimension of theInformation Society – People First – the Next Steps’ (CEC, 1997b), theCommission suggests that information society policies should have as basic aimsto “improve access to information, enhance democracy and social justice, promoteemployability and lifelong learning, strengthen the capacity of the EU economy toachieve high and sustainable growth and employment, achieve and enhance equalopportunity between men and women, promote inclusion and support people withspecial needs and those lacking opportunities to improve their position, andimprove quality and efficiency of public administration”. In other words, theInformation Society will solve all problems of humankind.Often, the recommendations are less ambitious and comprehensive. Quite anumber of them give priority to social and labor market dimensions (see, forinstance, CEC, 2002a+b; Johnston, 2000; or Johnston’s contribution to thisvolume), but also other issues such as political integration, EU-citizenship andcultural diversity feature prominently In other contexts, other issues have beengiven priority. Especially, educational policies and lifelong learning and thecombination of information technology-related policies with other policy areas havecome to the fore in the last couple of years.One of the reasons for the change of priority in favor of social concerns is that theliberalization of telecommunications has developed in a satisfactory way seen fromthe point of view of the Commission. However, the basic aims listed still remain anexpression of a development in the EU information society policy.

Questions, questions, questions

Though it remains to be seen whether a mixture of Marshall Plan type of ‘grandworks’ (the Delors imprint) with an unconditional belief in the market as the drivingforce (the Bangemann influence) has a feasible future, the information society hasbecome a discourse in which it is possible to integrate many of the at first sight


disparate European ambitions. Or, as argued by Garnham (1997): the claimsmade for telecommunications and IT, as catalyst for economic development shouldbe seen as good old political rhetoric. "It meets the needs of politicians because itpromises a technological fix to deep seated social and economic problems, but asa 'new' initiative it distracts attention away from the failure of previous similarinitiatives to solve these problems" (Garnham, 1997: 327).

Furthermore, the policy of an IS has to be checked against its underlyingassumptions. Starting from the assumption that information and communicationtechnologies undoubtedly possess the potential to contribute to socio-culturalchange, it can be questioned whether this potential will be converted intoadvantages for everyone under the given scenario's the EU has planned. As large-scale application of information and communication technology increases, newproblems will arise which 'the market' as such will not being able to resolve. Moreand better regulatory mechanisms will have to be developed to deal with these. If itshould appear that the means proposed by the European Commissionrepresentatives are inadequate to arrive at the intended result, then the currentstrategy will have to be amended, or, if necessary, an alternative strategy will haveto be proposed. In other words, is it enough to state, as the fifth framework(1999–2002) for R&D of the EU did, that it has to be a “user friendly informationsociety in the benefit for all” to make it happen?

Sophia Kaitatzi-Whitlock (2000) notices that so far the questions that dominatedpolicy discussions about the ‘information society’ deal firstly about the ‘astonishing’quantities of films, shows, data etc. that can be consumed online and on the spot,and secondly, about the variety, the level and the speed of services that can beperformed from home. Both sets of issues stress the consuming function. Such anapproach obscures another set of questions that have to be addressed but remaindefault. What agency enhancing potential is actually offered to the citizen by theinformation society? How far does the famous interactivity element reach? Whatskills, and job-creating capabilities are conferred by information technology sold onthe market? What new outlooks, options are provided to individual members ofsociety? What familiarization processes have been initiated? These issues need tobe focused closely and systematically. Unless, these questions find viablesolutions, citizens and underfunded consumers will not create demand for suppliedinformation networks, contents and tools.

In general, the European Commission realizes that it still has a long way to go.Therefore, top aide Maria Rodrigues, the chief organizer of the EU’s first-ever ITsummit which took place in March 2000 during Portugal’s presidency of the Union,readily admitted that “we have to recognize that Europe is late compared with the


US regarding the transition to an innovation and knowledge society. We mustspeed up this transition not just because we are late but also so that we can findour own way -- a European model” (in Jones, 1999: 30). Since this Lisbon summitofficial texts of the European Commission teem with new terms coined withreference to the Information Society, such as ‘New Information andCommunication Technologies (NICTs)’, ‘on-line world’, ‘knowledge and innovationeconomy’, ‘e-Europe’, etc. Specific aims include: adopting a legal framework for e-commerce; fully liberalized telecommunications markets by 2002; cutting the costof Internet use; all schools to have Internet access in 2001 and all teachers to beskilled in Internet use in 2002; Internet access to basic public services by 2003;and an e-Europe action plan specifying targets for interconnected low-cost, high-speed Internet and telecommunication networks (see CEC, 2001, 2002c; orMather, 2000).

Is the European IS-policy sustainable?

Relating to telecommunications and with the benefit of hindsight, the question canbe raised whether information society policies have not just functioned as thesugar around a policy of telecommunication liberalization. Telecommunicationliberalization was the main issue in the Bangemann report of 1993 and the ‘ActionPlan’ of 1994 and is still the most marked result of the information societyinitiatives taken from the beginning of the 1990s.However, such an understanding would be a misconception of the general outlineof the EU information society policy. Telecommunication liberalization is not analien element in this policy but an important integral part. Although there aredisagreements on specific policy elements and directions, information societypolicies are answers to technological and international economic developmentsand general policy trends with a clear liberal taste, which is also why there is anoverall consensus around EU information society policies even though theyfluctuate and have different emphases depending on the people involved and thephases of development.

Regarding the field of telecommunications and broadcasting a distinction betweenliberal economic (in favor of deregulation) and cultural policies (mostly in favor ofregulation) respectively is visible in Europe.Early analyses of EU public policy show that the EU was not anticipating an overallpolicy on the convergence of these formerly distinct services (see Burgelman &Pauwels, 1991, as well as their contribution in this volume, and Venturelli, 1998).In telecommunications development the emphasis is on liberalization andderegulation, providing private corporations with a maximum of freedom to investon the telecommunication networks.


Public policy in the broadcasting field is guided by another logic. In the mediasector political concerns to safeguard a public sphere of pluralism and nationalsovereignty leads to the ambition to offer a diverse media system, containingpublic as well as private media (Wang, Servaes & Goonasekera, 2000; Servaes &Heinsman, 1991).As the two historically, separately evolved sectors of telecommunications andbroadcasting converge, the different policy consequences of the economic versusthe cultural, and local versus international interests have to be taken into account.Research indicates, however, that the national, and especially the Europeanpolicies regarding telecommunication services in general and broadcasting inparticular are based on economic instead of cultural considerations. This trend haseven increased after 1992 (Weymouth & Lamizet, 1996; Natalicchi, 2001).Also the public service broadcasting structure and philosophy have undergonemajor changes throughout the last decades. These changes, initiated by internalas well as external factors, have affected the organizational and finance structures,and the programming of public service broadcasting (Wolton, 1990).Therefore, it is questionable whether the European policies will be in theadvantage of the so-called smaller countries in the EU, like for instance Belgium orthe Netherlands (Servaes, 1993), on the one hand, and whether these policies willbe able to secure a free and balanced flow of information, ideas, opinions andcultural activities within the EU on the other hand. In other words, it is no longersufficient to concentrate on a distinct sector from only a technological or aneconomic perspective; a multi-dimensional analysis of the different policy optionsand their respective consequences is necessary.

Therefore, it could be argued that the EU strategy is not sustainable in the mediumand long term. The reason for this is that policymakers and market parties havethoroughly neglected the principle of balance between productive and consumptivefunctions. This is caused by the fact that the Commission and the politicallyaccountable EU policymakers and institutions have assigned the transition to thedigitized information economy to market forces and logics alone (see alsoPreston’s analysis in this book). Similarly this is the reason why the EU failed todevelop a longer-term vision of the future global networks.

The convergence issue

The convergence between telecommunications and broadcasting occurs at threelevels: at the levels of networks (infrastructure), service provision, and corporateorganization (Wang, Servaes & Goonasekera, 2000).In Europe policy decisions or policy perspectives are mainly technology and/orcommercially driven. A lot of attention focuses on the research concerning (and the


implementation of) hardware. A lot of money is spent for the development ofnetwork infrastructure, broadcasting facilities etc. (Foley, 2000, Heinderyckx, 1998;Salak, 2000).Second, regarding media ownership, we always seem to meet the same players inthe different sectors on different global, regional and national levels. These aretelecommunication operators, major publishing firms and media moguls. In most ofthe countries we observe that one or two of these actors (or a merger of them)control the telecommunication sector, major parts of the broadcasting sector andsometimes an important part of the print media (Doyle, 2002, Grimes, 2000).Third, because of these concentration tendencies, national governments are afraidof broadcasting monopolies. Their legal reaction is the promulgation of anti-trustand anti-concentration laws. Examples of this legislation are the prohibition ofcontrolling more than two national television networks and the restriction of marketshare percentage in the media landscape.Last, the emphasis in public policy making is on hardware. Software/contentdevelopment is heavily neglected.

Underlying assumptions

At least five assumptions or hypotheses can be derived from a review of theliterature (see, e.g., a number of special issues: Burgelman & Servaes, 1996;Servaes, 1991, 1997; Servaes & Burgelman, 2000; Servaes, Burgelman &Goonasekera, 1997; Servaes & Wang, 1997).The first one is that the visions are so alike, even if countries are different in manyways. Today, the visions in the different countries of the EU are very much in sync.There seems to have been a harmonization going on which has taken some timeto initiate.

The second assumption is that everybody agrees on the visions and policydirections even though there are different interests in society -- which especiallyshould come out in ‘revolutionary’ transformations. The establishment of aninformation society is often described as a revolutionary development, likened withthe transition from an agricultural society to an industrial society. However, theindustrial revolution surely resulted in fierce clashes between groups, classes,ideologies, etc. This does not seem to be the case with the ‘information revolution’.At a slightly less dramatic level, it can be noticed that in some countries, there arecenter-left governments and in others center-right governments. Still, the plans arevery much the same, even when countries shift political orientation of theirgovernments. This becomes obvious from the analysis on the Nordic countries byHenten and colleagues (1996, 1999, 2000). To an ‘outsider’ the Nordic countriesmay seem similar, there are many differences in economic structure which also


applies to the ICT-producing industries. Henten and colleagues showed that theinformation society thinking of different European countries differed to a noticeableextent. The reason, that could be established, dealt with the differences inproductive structures of the countries and the differences in points of departureand focus.The latter conclusion is also supported by the analysis of the Greek case inanalyses by Tonchev (2000) or by Sarikakis and Terzis (2000). Greece is a EUmember State but at the same time is part of the Periphery standing in betweenthe rich industrialized North and the poor developing South. Sarikakis and Terzisargue that, despite the citizens’ needs and wishes, the promotion of the EuropeanInformation Society in Greece is characterized by disproportionality. Another kindof capital difference between groups with different socio-economic status isemerging. The 'Knowledge-Gap' phenomenon becomes evident in that a highpercentage of the population is excluded as users of the new media, due toreasons related to their educational and financial status. Additionally, a newphenomenon of “pleonastic exclusion” is taking place, as a result of the enormousnumbers of channels of communication, which forces audiences to a continuousselection-exclusion of information sources.

A third and related assumption is the widespread support for the same visions in aperiod where the ‘great narratives’ are said to be vanishing. Information societyvisions have clearly become such a new narrative.A fourth and, once again, connected assumption is that there is so muchinformation society planning going on in a time when state planning is consideredto be obsolete because of the policies of liberalization and the flexiblecircumstances that an information society is supposed to require.

A fifth assumption is based on the strong move to create a ‘European culture’through communications, particularly TV broadcasting. This is seen in some of theEU-directives, such as the emphasis on 51 percent of European material intelevision programming, etc. In many regions of Europe the most importantdevelopment in the communications industry has not been the further dominanceof global media, but the emerging of cultural-linguistic television markets.Triggered by policy deregulation and the rediscovery of autonomy by communitieswithin a state, – e.g., the Welsh and Gaelics in the UK, and the Catalans andBasques in Spain – local and regional programmes have become increasinglypopular. Many of the ‘proximity television’ programmes are part of a public system.In the long run, market forces are expected to play a decisive role in their furtherdevelopment. But as it is only in those ‘nations without state’ that proximitytelevision has enjoyed the most powerful support, whether the market will work for,or against, the further development of proximity television will depend upon the


strength of the cultural and linguistic factors (Collins, 2002; De Moragas Spa &Lopez, 2000).

Divergent policies

Though a user-driven (and consequently more content oriented) and user-specificpolicy framework may be preferred, a more corporate driven economic rationaleseems to become the norm. Both policy perspectives start from quite oppositeassumptions, as shown in the following scheme (further developed in Burgelman &Verhoest, 1996):

Current corporate-driven policy Preferred user-driven policy• Agitated market/uncertain revenues • 'Controlled' market/'guaranteed' • Competition • 'New deal' type of policy• Short term • Long-term objectives• Technology push/technology specific • User-driven solutions• The medium is the message • Content oriented

Analyzing the ‘digital divide’

Apart from contradictory policies and questionable assumptions, also the problemof the measurement of the Information Society appears to be crucial for theorganization of the scientific debate, for the industrial development and for theimplementation of public policies.

The results of the Commission Surveys “Measuring Information Society” in 1995(pilot), in 1997 (Eurobarometer 47), in 1999 (Eurobarometer 51) and in 2000(Eurobarometer 53) present a timely information resource for all those scholarswho still today, when the Internet seems to have become ‘free and ubiquitous’,think that the Information Society must remain a problematic field of scientificresearch and an overriding public policy for Europe.

The results of the surveys are striking. It becomes very clear that the rhetoricscenario, which depicted a uniform, regional transition towards “a society foundedon electronics”, was radically contradicted by the data that emerged from thesurveys. [The general findings from these surveys are estimations, the accuracy ofwhich, everything being equal, rests upon the sample size and upon the observedpercentage. Though mostly confirmed by other sources, at least in the ranking of


the countries, the actual figures are difficult to compare by lack of consistency inquestion wording].For extensive interpretations and discussions of these surveys, see Ricci (1997,1998, 2000), Sarikakis & Terzis (2000), and Servaes & Heinderyckx (2002). Seealso Heinderyckx’ contribution to this volume.

2 + 1= 3 technology clusters

By reviewing descriptively the results of the 1995–1997– and 1999 surveys onenotes that different technologies are used with various intensity across theEuropean Union. Some countries are more oriented towards the television, othersto the computer technology cluster:

Television Computer

Video recorder Personal Computer

Satellite dish CD-ROM

Pay televisiondecoder

Modem

Teletext Internet or Minitel

The MIS 2000 survey confirmed these findings. The very nature of a technologicalcluster and the position, the functional area it intends to fill, is important. Thereforesome additional questions and hypotheses were added to the research design,and as a result a third ‘wireless’ or ‘mobile’ cluster came into the picture:Consequently, an additional distinction could be made between the two alreadyidentified clusters and a new emerging ‘wireless’ cluster.


Wireless

Mobile phone

UMTS

Broadband

WAP or i-Mode

Of all the technologies surveyed in 1999, the video recorder is the most mature. Ithas reached the flat part of its diffusion curve so that it is gradually being used bysimilar proportions of people in most countries and demographic groups. OnlyGreece and Portugal show significantly lower penetration rates.

Satellite dish, by contrast with the VCR, is a much younger technology. The rangeof penetration levels (between 2% in Greece and 52% in Austria) is the highest ofall technologies surveyed. Various factors attached to each country explain most ofthe discrepancies. For example, Belgium and the Netherlands are very heavilycabled (more than 90%), so that there is only a narrow market for satellite dishes.High penetrations in Germany and Austria are best explained by the wide choice ofGerman speaking channels readily available by satellite. Other sources confirmAustria as the European country where satellite dishes are most implemented.

The varying proportions of people resorting to pay television are to be consideredin connection with the media landscape so particular to each country. In Sweden,the high rates are due to the success of a few stations (Filmnet, TV1000, Canal+).In the UK, success is the result of a long established tradition of pay television(Sky is the best example). France offers a wide choice of pay channels, and fifteenyears of success for Canal+ account for most of the high proportion of users.France and Spain also have a head start with digital packages, which fall into thiscategory. The development of digital packages and of terrestrial digitalbroadcasting will considerably modify the choice of pay television made availablethroughout Europe, so that this variable is likely to move significantly in the nearfuture.

The teletext technology is widely available on most television sets manufactured inthe past ten years. Only old or low-end receivers are deprived of that feature.However, the data indicate that a number of people are either unaware that their


television set is equipped, or are unable or not willing to use teletext. The skillsrequired to operate teletext properly are indeed quite different from thosenecessary to just operate a TV set.

The use of a personal computer is no longer marginal. A little over a third of allEuropeans say they use a computer. Scandinavia and the Netherlands showsignificantly higher penetration figures. Do bear in mind that the question asked inthis survey was about use, not ownership, so that these differences cover thepenetration of computers in the workplace, at school, at the university as well as athome.

The use of CD-ROM shows slightly more contrast among countries ranging from53% in Sweden to 6% in Greece. If we assume that computers equipped with CD-ROM readers are either recent or high end machines only, combining PC and CD-ROM use figures may be interpreted as an indication of the average age or qualityof the computers used in different countries. However, one can assume that manypeople do use a personal computer and not a CD-ROM, even if there is one, be itby lack of skill or absence of need or even interest.

The modem is yet another additional feature requiring extra skills and cost(including running communication costs). Motivation and need for using a modemdo appear quite contrasting between the eight countries to the right of theEuropean average (16% or less of users), and the United Kingdom, Luxembourg,Finland, the Netherlands and particularly Denmark and Sweden where the modemachieves penetration figures as high as 58%, comparable to CD-ROM and not sofar from PCs.Unsurprisingly, the shape of the Internet users graph bears a strong resemblanceto that of modems, illustrating the fact that it is the Internet that is driving themodem market.

The Euro barometer findings of 1999 are mostly confirmed by other sources (see,e.g., Sciadas, 2002), at least in the ranking of the countries (actual figures aredifficult to compare by lack of consistency in question wording).In addition, the MIS 2000 survey finds that more than half of the EU countriesshow more than 50% of households having a mobile phone, with Finland reaching80%, while Germany shows less than 40%.Most demographic variables bring significant contrast. Proportions vary accordingto professional status: 75% among the self-employed, two thirds among theemployed and 43% among those not working. Household income shows linearcorrelation between about one third of lowest income and three quarters of the


highest. Larger households are also more likely to have a mobile phone. Level ofeducation also shows a strong positive correlation.Gender is, on average, the least discriminating variable, while countries, incomeand terminal education and age are the most significant sources of disparities. Thisindicates, “strong and distinctive national practices and habits, and traces of acomplex social divide based on income and level of education” (INRA, 2000: 17).

Some observers notice that Europe may have a competitive advantage in themobile sector. Some key players in the electronics business – especially Nokiaand Ericsson – are based in Scandinavia. They contribute to a rapid growth inwireless technology. The Nordic region, for instance, has an internet penetration of41% compared with 37% in the US and 21% in the rest of Europe; mobile-phonepenetration in capitals Stockholm and Helsinki is more than 90%. Another key toEurope’s success is, according to Almar Latour (2000), its new equity culture:“Fueled by the arrival of the Economic and Monetary Union, a new breed of risk-taking CEOs have stepped up the merger-and-acquisition activity in Europe.Meanwhile, young entrepreneurs are founding their own companies at a paceEurope has never seen before”.

The country divide

On average, Europe shows a balanced growth between Television and Computertechnologies on the one hand, and between these two ‘older’ clusters and the new‘mobile’ cluster.

When one merged the penetration figures of the three clusters, one could identifysix groups: types oftypes of1-Sweden and Austria both show much higher than average penetrations of thethree technologies.2- Greece and Portugal, on the other hand, are significantly much lower on allclusters.3- Belgium, Italy, Ireland, Spain and Germany form a compact group around theEuropean average and seem to balance the use of the three types of technologies.4- Austria is higher than average on the television axis and about average oncomputer, but lower on the mobile cluster. The United Kingdom is higher thanaverage on the television axis and about average on computer, but higher on themobile cluster while Austria is more oriented to the ‘old’ technologies, the UKcombines the television and mobile cluster.


5- On the contrary, Luxembourg, Finland and the Netherlands are about averagefor television, but much higher up the PC technology and wireless axis, so thatthese countries appear more oriented towards new technologies.6- France stands on its own, with PC technology use about average and below-average use of mobile technologies, and it is still significantly below average fortelevision (mostly due to a very low use of teletext).

On the basis of the Information and Communication Technology Adoption Scale(ICTAS), which can be used as an integrated indicator of the use of moderninformation and communication related technologies (clustered around thetelevision and the computer), the gap between northern and southern Europe isquite striking and quantifiable: the medium user countries form a central block ofcontinental Europe (plus Ireland), the heavy users are found in Northern Europe,the light users are at the periphery of Southern Europe (Greece and Portugal).

Need, price, and complexity

What is keeping people from using these technologies?The notion of perceived need is central. Over half of the Europeans who are notinterested in on-line services say they don’t need them in their private life. Even anumber of heavy using countries show high proportions of non-users feeling noneed for on-line services. This fits perfectly into functionalist theory, and moreparticularly in uses and gratifications theory that sees media in general as a meanto satisfy various needs. However, the concept of need and its use by respondentsis to be taken with caution. Denying a need is in some cases a legitimate cover-upfor ignorance, fear or lack of financial means.

Therefore, second to the absence of need is price, then perceived complexity.Here again, there is no clear-cut dichotomy between northern and southernEurope, with Germans, Belgians and Austrians just as repelled by complexity asPortuguese and Spaniards.

Young, well-educated, rich males on the run

Women are more deterred by complexity than men. Noticeably, proportions ofpeople finding these technologies too complicated vary more significantly alongdemographic variables identified as key in predicting technology adoption: age,income and level of education. This shows that younger, wealthier and better-educated Europeans are less likely to find on-line technologies too complicated.


This is yet another confirmation that these three demographic variables can bequite powerful in segmenting the technology market inasmuch as they are reliablepredictors of restraint to adoption on the basis of perceived over-complexity. Anyproduct development or marketing campaign will have to be concerned about theseeming or factual complexity of any innovation. It is likely that, among lessdeterred groups, complexity might, in fact, encourage the adoption of innovationswhich, for that particular target, will have to prove an increase in complexity orfunctionality while the opposite is true for convincing non-users that it is all toocomplicated for them.

The lack of time is an obstacle of increasing importance as we go higher up theincome. Portugal, Greece and Ireland show significantly lower levels ofrespondents deterred by lack of time.

The age factor is also crucial in studying new technologies. We all know peoplearound us who show some level of reluctance towards technologies for which theyfeel insufficient need or skills. The generation gap is obvious. This is where the fullmeaning of new in ‘new technologies’ comes to light. For a technology to changestatus from ‘new’ to ‘aging’ or ‘obsolete’ only takes the next innovation to hit themarket.

How new is ‘new’?

There is a second dimension to the novelty of new technologies in the sense that itwas unknown to its users beforehand. Depending on your age or your length ofservice, your ability or likeness to modify your behavior and adopt a newtechnology will vary. Senior people are therefore more likely to remain longer onthe non-adopter side while, at the other end of the age spectrum, the youngerpopulation will have little difficulty in adjusting.

Generation gap isn’t, in this particular case, to be seen as just another sign of olderpeople’s conservatism. New technologies, and the changes in behavior associatedwith them, have to pass the hurdle of lifestyle and habits, which grow deeper,rooted as time passes. Something new might not seem like an improvement if onlybecause of the immense time investment necessary to learn or re-learn previouslyacquired and much practiced behaviours. Younger people have little merit in theirability to adopt innovations. In fact, it is worth stressing that to a child, the keyboardof a computer is not newer than a pencil; learning how to type and send an e-mailis not any harder (probably less) than learning how to hand-write a letter, fold it intoan envelope and apply a stamp; using a traditional phone confined to the wall plug


might even seem unnatural as compared to using a mobile phone; just as goingshopping might seem unpleasant and unwise as compared to ordering on-line.Naturally this is all a matter of education, depending mostly on efforts developedby schools and parents. Yet one can hypothesize that younger generations willgrow to be more enthusiastic adopters as they grow older, that is if they can bekept in a innovation-adoption dynamic which would prevent another generationgap when too radical an innovation would, in some time, leave them at the door,just like today’s elderly seem to have missed the current train of innovations (seealso Picard’s contribution).Therefore, Ricci (2000) argues that explanations can be found in what Kotler calls‘personal factors’: position in the life cycle, economic conditions, and moregenerally ‘life style’ appeared to be strongly correlated to use of and interest fortechnologies.

Active, passive, heavy and non-users

When one tries to evaluate with quantitative instruments the evolution of theinformatization of our societies, abundant evidence emerges confirming that thepenetration of the key technologies is indeed increasing with variable ratios in allEU member states.

If we try to categorize the different users, we could say that there indeed is an‘informatized/computerized society’ with a minority of Europeans which are heavyusers of information technologies. This social trend has also given rise to a countertrend of ‘conscious un-informatized’ which are educated, upper-class individualswho deliberately and consciously choose not to abide to the rules of consumptionof a societal model, which they consider to be in contradiction with their system ofvalues. In between one finds two other types: a community of moderate or lowusers which is either essentially ‘passive’ or ‘active’ to the media system and whichuses enough technologies to bear all the consequences of the competitionbetween media. These communities may either adopt a passive or active stance inmedia consumption, use of TV technologies, and seek entertainment as asubstitute to interpersonal communication or as a way to re-acquire apsychological relief against the complexities and the pressures of living in amodern society.


By way of conclusion

Seven general conclusions can be drawn:

Firstly, whether we like it or not, the information society in Europe is 'a society information' and certainly not immanently emerging. The dynamic character of itspolicy has the benefit to point to large possible degrees of policy impact. In otherwords: the information society is not pre-determined (see also Garnham, 1994).

Secondly, there is no single road to the Information Society. Every country has itsown particularities and these are very heavily determined by national politicalobjectives. As a result, there is no single road to the Information Society. Everycountry has its own particularities and these are very heavily determined bynational political objectives. As in every dossier, subsidiarity plays an importantrole here too and different national authorities in Europe react differently to theplans of Brussels (and this mainly due to national specificities).

A third somewhat contradictory conclusion is that there is so much informationsociety-planning going on in a time when state planning is considered to beobsolete because of the policies of liberalization and the flexible circumstancesthat an information society is supposed to require. However, it is clear that thetraditional neo-Keynesian way of state interventionism in public life is not the wayinformation society policy is being made. In fact a more ‘remote’ but neverthelessactive state seems to become the model here.

A fourth and related conclusion is the widespread support for the same visions in aperiod where the ‘great narratives’ are said to be vanishing. Information societyvisions have clearly become such a new narrative. This explains why, from 1994onwards and in a Europe without communism, the EU policy both accelerated theliberalization of its communications markets and did put an enormous efforttowards more general awareness-building measures and PR campaigns. As wealready noticed elsewhere (see Servaes & Burgelman, 1996), historians of thisperiod will undoubtedly uncover the beginning of a ‘digital gold fever' that got intothe discourse and policy of the EU.

Fifthly, the Internet in its most popular form (the World Wide Web) seems to holdcharacteristics, which might grow into true media integration. However, at thecontent side it remains to be seen whether it will not become another dividecomparable to the ‘old’ media. As is usually the case with new technologies, itremains to be seen how much ICTs will be used on top of existing devices and/or


will gradually replace them.

Sixthly, another kind of capital difference between groups with different socio-economic status is emerging. A high percentage of the population is excluded asusers of the new media, due to reasons related to their educational and financialstatus. Digital divide is enduring mostly because it underlies core social divides.Therefore, strategies to fill the gap can not be globalized.Lastly and additionally, a new phenomenon of ‘pleonastic exclusion’ is takingplace, as a result of the enormous numbers of channels of communication, whichforces audiences to a continuous selection-exclusion of information sources. Inother words, ICTs adoption is not to be taken for granted.

Note

* This chapter builds on Servaes (2002) and Servaes & Heinderyckx (2002)

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European Union ICT Policies:Neglected Social and Cultural

Dimensions

Paschal Preston

Introduction

For more than a decade now, existing ICT research and information societypolicies have generally been subjected to sharp and strong critique by social andcultural theorists. The latter have tended to criticise such policies for a lack ofattention to social and cultural concerns, or at least for their inadequate treatmentof such issues. My own view is that such critiques have been, for the most part,perfectly valid and justified in their essence and orientation. But they have oftenbeen conducted at a highly abstract level and thus fail to engage directly with theempirical or descriptive levels of the policies in question.

In this chapter, I want to start with a descriptive review of the EU’s ICT researchpolicies and related information society strategies from the mid-1990s up to theearly years of the new century. In section two, I will attempt to describe the keyaims, orientations and financial resource allocations associated with theseoverlapping policy initiatives. Here, I will seek to describe the evolution of the EU’sICT research policy agenda and its linkages, the notions or construction(s) of an‘information society’ and/or ‘knowledge-based’ society in Europe. I will alsoconsider the manner and extent to which such policy initiatives address thedomains of technical knowledge on the one hand and those of culture and otherforms of information ‘content’ on the other.

Having undertaken this empirically-focused, descriptive review of the EU’s ICTresearch and related information society policies, I will then move on to considersome of the more important strategic stakes and criticisms. The treatment here willbe necessarily brief for reasons of space, and so I propose to highlight a few keyissues that seem relevant to the wider policy debates in the run up to the WSISconferences.


In what follows, I should flag at the outset that my attention will focus on EuropeanUnion level policy thinking and practices. It should be borne in mind, however, thatthis is not merely a matter of considering or criticising the actions of some namelessEurocrats based in Brussels or Luxembourg. It must also be remembered that thecore orientations and direction of EC level policies are, in practice as well as inprinciple, subject to the approval and decision-making of national governmentrepresentatives, especially in the powerful if secretive arena of the ministerial councilsof the EU. They are also subject to the lobbying and pressures of interests that residein and operate at the national level throughout the member states of the Union. Thus,it is important to note that the flaws and weaknesses evident in selected aspects of‘Europe’s way to the information society’ as discussed here, also reflect and expressthose which generally prevail at the national level throughout this major world region.In addition, the research and writings of colleagues elsewhere suggests that most, ifnot all, of the critical comments concerning the EU’s ICT research and related policystrategies in this chapter can be equally applied to national-level strategies andinitiatives across most member states.

Overview of the EU’s ICT Policies & Initiatives sinceearly 1990s

"Not everything that can be counted counts and not everything that counts can becounted." (Albert Einstein)

Role of ICT Research and the ‘Framework’ R&D Programmes

Educational exchanges and research collaborations across the member stateshave been important elements in the overall project of constructing a moreintegrated European Union in recent decades. Since the 1970s, the EuropeanCommission has launched a number of successive initiatives which aim to promoteexchanges of students between educational institutions and especially to fostercollaborative research projects or knowledge sharing between researchers basedin universities and related institutions. Indeed, the Treaty establishing theEuropean Community (part 3, title XVIII, art. 166, page 114) provides for thecreation and funding of multi-annual research and development (R&D) initiatives,generally known as ‘framework programmes’. The Fifth Framework programme(FP5) covered the period 1998–2002 and the Sixth programme (FP6) will span theperiod 2002–2006.Considerable resources have been invested in the EU’s fourth and fifth frameworkR&D programmes since they commenced in the 1980s. The total budget for the

European Union ICT Policies 35

Fifth Framework programme amounted to 14.96 billion euro and that planned forthe Sixth Framework programme amounts to 17.5 billion euro or 3.9% of the EU’stotal budget, as indicated in Table 1.

Table 1FP5 & FP6: The EU’s Framework Programmes for Research andDevelopment

FP5 (1998-2002) FP6 (2002-2006)

‘Framework’ R&D Programme Budget

14.96 Bn Euro 17.5 Bn Euro

Share of total EU budget 4.0 % 3.9 %

Source: EU IST directorate’s ‘Factsheet’

The particular field of research concerned with the development of new informationand communication technologies (or ICT) has been accorded a major role withinthe overall budgets of the EU’s framework programmes since the 1980s. The termnew ICT is now usually taken to refer to this cluster or interrelated system oftechnological innovations in the fields of microelectronics, computing, electroniccommunications including broadcasting and the Internet. Thus, new ICT comprisesthe cluster or family of interrelated technical innovations, based around ‘a commondigital’ mode, and they are generally concerned with the handling, storing,processing and distribution of information or, as some would have it, ‘knowledge’.The term new IT was first used to refer to this field of technological innovations inthe 1980s (e.g. Hall and Preston, 1988). But this term was gradually changed tonew ICT as the communicational dimension became increasingly significant(Preston, 2001).

New ICT may be also defined as one of those relatively rare major new technologyclusters or systems which have a pervasive applications potential. This notionsuggests that they can or may be applied or adopted across a very wide range ofindustrial, social and cultural activities, in much the same way as electricity at theturn of the twentieth century, for example. However, the forms and extent of suchapplications, no less than the origins or supply-side aspects of new ICT, are notdetermined by any single technological ‘logic’ or trajectory. Rather these are andwill be influenced by a wide set of institutional, socio-economic, policy and otherfactors, In any case, although researchers may disagree about the precise role


and influence of technological and/or other factors in this process, new ICT hasbeen widely viewed the most significant contemporary technology cluster withimportant economic, social cultural and policy implications (Preston, 2001).

Thus it may not be surprising to find that technological research related to the newICT field has been a key focus within the successive ‘Framework’ programmessince the 1980s. Indeed, it is estimated that this particular field of technologicalresearch received EC funding of some 12.5 billion euro between 1984 and 2002(EC, 2000a: 1).

Because of its contemporary role and importance, research related to thedevelopment and production of new ICT (hardware and software) devices andsystems can be found in many sub-programmes or research fields within the EU’sframework programmes. But a large (unknown) portion of ICT related research isfunded via one specific sub-programme or research stream in the most recentFramework programmes. Within the Fifth Framework programme (FP5) coveringthe period 1998–2002, the ‘User-friendly Information Society’ was the mainresearch stream concerned with the development of new ICT and this wasallocated some 3.6 billion euro. The successor ‘Information Society Technologies’research stream within the Sixth Framework programme (spanning the period2002-2006) is scheduled to be allocated some 3.625 billion euro. Further details onthe categories of research and distributions of funds under these two most recentFramework programmes can be found in Table 2.

Table 2Key Themes & Budget Items in EU’s ‘Framework Programmes’ 5 & 6

FP5 (1998-2002) Budget(Euro M)

FP6 (2002-2006) Budget(Euro M)

.1) R&D &demonstration activities

10,843 .1) Focusing &Integrating CommunityResearch (a

13,345

.1.a) Quality of Life &Management of livingresources

2,413 .1a) Life Sciences, gneomics& Biotechnology for health

2,225

.1b) User-friendlyInformation Society

3,600 .1b) Information Society Technologies

3,625

.1c) Competitive &sustainable growth

2,705 .1c) Nanotechnologies and nano-sciences, materialsetc

1,300


.1d) Energy, Environment & Sustainable Development

2,125 .1d) Aeronautics & space 1,075

.1e) Food Quality & Safety 685

.1f) Sustainabledevelopment, global change& ecosystems

2,120

.1g) Citizens & governancein a knowledge-basedsociety

225

.1h) Activities ‘covering awider field of research’

1,300

.1k) Non-Nuclear work ofJRC

760

.2) International role of Community Research

475 .2) Structuring the Euro- pean Research Area

2,605

.3) PromotingInnovation & SMEparticipation

363 .3) Strengthening the foundations of the ERA

320

.4) Human researchpotential & socio-economic knowledgebase

1,280 .4) Nuclear Energy Programme

1,230

.5) Direct Actions : JRC 739

.6) EurAtom programme 1,260

Overall Total 14,96017,500

Notes: a) A more detailed breakdown of FP6 sub-categories is available from source.Source: Author’s re-working of data downloaded from EC’s CORDIS web site [13 Dec.2002]

Technological Projections: From ICT to IS, eEurope & the ERA

So much for the key formal or explicit research policies related to the developmentof ICT. But these do not mark the limit or boundaries of 'new ICT-related policies'and initiatives within the European Union, or indeed, in most other regions of thecontemporary world. The scope, role and implications of new ICTs are now (and,especially since the early 1990s) widely perceived and taken to apply to a wholerange of other policy discourses and practices. One expression or manifestation ofthis shift can be found in the very titles given to the ICT-related research streamswithin the EU Fifth and Sixth Framework programmes. These successive EU


technical research initiatives are referred to as 'the User-friendly InformationSociety' and 'Information Society Technologies' sub-programmes respectively.

There are several reasons why the apparent scope and role of new ICT-relatedresearch and other policies have expanded significantly in my view. In part, this isbecause of the contemporary role and pervasive applications potential of new ICTand in part, it reflects the fact that these technologies are precisely concerned withthe handling and processing of one other pervasive resources that is also heavilyladen with conceptual difficulties: information and/or knowledge.

But there is a further reason which I will briefly flag here but examine further insubsequent sections. This refers to the fact that the thinking and practices of therelevant industrial and policy elites are generally stamped by a very particular setof conceptualisations or understandings of the role of new ICTs and their socio-economic and policy implications on the one hand, and the notion of an emerginginformation society on the other.

To return to the development of the EU’s ICT research and related policies, we cannote a significant turn in the 1993–94 period. This was the time when the sametime as the Commission was preparing plans for the Fourth framework R&Dprogramme and just as the Internet, helped by its World Wide Web overlayinterface, began its rapid diffusion phase. It was also when some influentialpoliticians got bitten (or ‘byten’) by the digital deliria bug--that is quite some timebefore the stock market and private sector analysts caught the dot.com goldrushfever of the late 1990s. Al Gore had successfully managed to co-pilot the Clinton-Gore electoral-promise wagon via the virtual reality of an ‘informationsuperhighway’ in the USA. Now, as US vice president, he was by 1994 seeking toproject his vision-thing to a more global audience. In the run up to the Kyotoconference of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Al Gore, declaredto the wider world that it must now build and run nothing less than a Global version ofthe Information Infrastructure (GII):

"The linking of the world's people to a vast exchange of information and ideas is adream that technology is set to deliver. President Bill Clinton and I believe that thecreation of a network of networks, transmitting messages and images at the speed oflight across every continent, is essential to sustainable development for all the humanfamily… It will bring economic progress, strong democracies, better environmentalmanagement, improved healthcare and a greater sense of shared stewardship of oursmall planet…legislators, regulators and business people must now build and run aGlobal Information Infrastructure (GII)….All governments, in their own sovereignnations and in international co-operation, …[must] build this infrastructure…it must be


a co-operative effort and it must be democratic… The economics of networks havechanged so radically that a competitive, private market can build much of the GII…this is dependent, however, upon sensible regulation". (Al Gore, ‘Plugged into theworld’s knowledge’, in ‘The Financial Times’, 19 Sept. 1994).

The political and industrial elites involved in shaping the EU’s research and relatedindustrial and communications policies were not deaf to such promises andchallenges originating from the other side of the Atlantic—or to their rhetorical andmaterial implications. For such actors, after all, the core stakes boiled down toeconomic interests and crucially involved transnational trade and investment policyconsiderations, whatever the technology-centred vision-ware might suggest. Theywere, no doubt, aware that a full decade before Al Gore graced the vice-presidential electoral stage, US industrial and foreign policy strategists hadidentified communication networks, ICT-related services and the notion of an‘information society’ as ‘a strategic new element in the American global equation’(see Preston, 2001).

Even before that, the European Commission’s research and industrial innovationstrategy, much like the EU’s overall project for greater economic integration, wasessentially based on the view that this would enhance the competitiveness ofEuropean industry vis-a-vis US and Japanese competitors. Besides, the EC hadcommenced a programme for a radical re-regulation of the telecommunicationssector in 1988 that was very similar to the competitive vision of a ‘network ofnetworks’ which was instituted in the USA only a few years previously. In addition,the industrial and policy elites on both sides of the Atlantic were also actively re-positioning their international trade and industrial policies following the GATT (laterWTO) ‘Uruguay Round’ of negotiations. The latter had established a new regimefor the liberalisation of trade and investment in services, wheretelecommunications and other ICT-based services, alongside financial, media andother ‘information’ related services were perceived to play an increasinglyimportant role in the revised rules of the economic competition game. This wasechoed by new initiatives in the early 1990s to further deepen the regionalglobalisation economic, political and indeed cultural ‘integration’ at the EU leveland to create ‘a single market’ for all kinds of services, including the media andcultural industries.

The interwoven narratives around the deepening globalisation of trade andinvestment, the liberalisation of regulation, telecommunications and informationservices policies and EU ‘competitiveness’ were brought together and explicitlyexpressed in a number of important EU policy documents published in the1994–94 period. First, there was the Commission’s strategic white paper on


Growth, Competitiveness and Employment--Challenges for entering in the 21stcentury, colloquially called 'the Délors Report' (EC, 1993a). This was closelyfollowed by a report from the powerful Commissioner responsible for industrial andtelecommunications affairs entitled Europe and the Global Information Society:Recommendations to the European Council (EC, 1994a). Often referred to as 'theBangemann Report', this document was more than an EU retort to the somewhatshort-lived G7 and other ‘global information society’ initiatives which followed in theyears immediately after Al Gore’s original proposals. The ‘Bangemann Report' hadmore major and lasting influences on the framing of subsequent EU policies forICT research and communication services. Indeed, for some years following itspublication, this report was repeatedly cited as a sort of ‘bible’ or master mantra byCommission documents and officials dealing with a very wide spectrum ofindustrial and social policy initiatives. For example, it was explicitly invoked as aframework for an important 1994 document setting out a new industrial and policystrategy for the audio-visual sector in the European Union’s single market context(EC, 1994b).

In the EU’s R&D, industrial and communications policy arenae, the Bangemannreport’s most obvious influence was to insert the term ‘information society’ as thekey term in the vocabulary rather than IT or ICT. This semantic shift was meant toreflect a greater emphasis on demand-side rather than technology-centredapproaches to R&D and a more (neo-)liberal view of the role of market forces andcompetition in the allocation of economic resources, including those related totelecommunications and to the selection and direction of new technologicaldevelopments. The approach was also intended to signal a response to thecriticisms of prior EU framework research programmes which had highlighted apredominant focus on the further development of scientific and technicalknowledge and relative lack of attention to industrial applications or demand-sideaspects of ICT or other technological fields.

At the same time, not least for those associated with ‘the Social Europe’ agenda,the shift in vocabulary was taken to imply something rather different. It was takento imply that there was or may be something special about more ‘Europe’s Way’ tothe information society which reflected a traditional orientation towards a robustwelfare state and a social democratic conception of citizenship rights (EC, 1996a,1996b).

Even if such shifts in vocabulary were too late to influence the terminologicalframing of the EU’s Fourth Framework R&D programme they were clearly manifestin the two subsequent programmes (as indicated in Table 2). Despite thesesemantic shifts however, the impacts of the post-Bangemann report policy shifts


appear to be less evident in the core R&D policy arena than in other areas ofcommunication and information services policy. For example, there has been nosignificant shift in the character or orientation of the research activities fundedunder the Fifth framework programme compared to the previous programmes.Despite the substitution of information ‘society’ for ‘technology’, the vast majority ofthe funding remains allocated to the scientific and technical activities concernedwith the further development of new knowledge or technologies. The shift toapplications is more pronounced in the vocabulary framing the various researchaction lines than in the substance of the work undertaken.

Despite much rhetorical emphasis on the importance of the social and economicapplications and implications of new ICT and an emerging ‘information society’,there has only been a small increase in the share of funding allocated to socialscience or humanities based research in FP4 and FP5 compared to earlierprogrammes. One estimates suggest that explicit socio-economic research activitiesaccounted for about 1% of the Fifth Framework R&D programme’s overall budget(EC, 2002a:22).

But even that minor shift seems very temporary as the penultimate draftdocuments for the new Sixth Framework programme signal a much reduced rolefor socio-economic research compared to the previous programme.

Over the past couple of years and in the run-up to the launch of the FP6, the EU’sresearch and technology policy agenda has been increasingly framed around twoother related master concepts: eEurope and the European Research Area (ERA).Both have been directly influenced by the proceedings of the European Councilmeeting held in Lisbon in 2000 which expressed the ambitious aim of makingEurope “the most dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable ofsustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater socialcohesion” (EC, 2002a:7). This goal has been linked to an expanding emphasis onthe role of R&D for European competitiveness, especially at the the EuropeanCouncil’s Barcelona meeting in 2002 where the “Heads of State and Governmentcommitted themselves to investing 3% of GDP in R&D by 2010”, (ibid: 7). Policiesto develop and promote moves towards a more integrated European ResearchArea (ERA) are viewed as essential or closely linked to the EC’s declared ambitionto “become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy of theworld” (EC, 2002a).

In December 1999, the Commission launched its eEurope initiative. This has thedeclared aim of ensuring that “the European Union fully benefits for generations tocome from the changes the Information Society is bringing” (cited in Arlandis et al.,


2001:19). Over the past two years, the eEurope initiative and its action plan havebeen refined through a number of subsequent documents. The eEurope actionplan is defined as ‘part of the Lisbon strategy to make the European Union themost competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy with improvedemployment and social cohesion by 2010’ (EC, 2002b: 2). A subsequent documentstates that eEurope “is not only about making European industry more competitive;it is also about ensuring that all citizens… have access to modern communicationstechnologies to improve the quality of life” (EC, 2002c:3). Indeed, it suggests that“the new knowledge-based society must be an inclusive society” and that “inemphasising digital inclusion, the European Commission aims to distinguish theEuropean approach to the information society from other regions of the world” (EC,2002c: 4).

EU policies for Information ‘Content’ and Culture

Since the early 1990s at least, many of the EU’s ICT research, innovation andrelated industrial strategy documents have emphasised the growth potential of theinformation ‘content’ services sectors, especially those based on the application ofnew digital tools and systems. Indeed, the Bangemann report and other EU policydocuments published in the 1993–94 period, emphasised the growth of ‘high-level,grey-matter’ occupations in such media and ‘content’ services, predicting that thenumber of such jobs in the EU area would double by the year 2000.

As we might well expect with research strategies increasingly framed around thenotions of ‘an information society for all’ and seeking to construct ‘a knowledge-based eEurope’, recent EU R&D programmes have specific funding linesorientated towards information ‘content’ applications. The most important examplehere is the ‘User-friendly Information Society’ stream of FP5 (1998–2002) and, inparticular, its key action or funding line entitled ‘multimedia content and tools’. Abudget of some 564 million euro has been allocated to this research action in orderto address ‘the development of tools and systems for managing, disseminating andusing digital content’.

The very title and key descriptors of the ‘multimedia content and tools’ sub-programme would seem to suggest an equal balance between two separate butcomplementary streams of research and development activity: those concernedwith the production of new digital media ‘tools’ on the one hand, and the new kindsof new knowledge, creative and innovative initiatives required to successfullyadopt, combine and appropriate such tools for the production of digital contentartefacts or services, on the other hand. But the more detailed descriptions of thekinds of activities targeted by this sub-programme, and the kinds of project


proposals actually selected for funding tell a very different story. They are moreheavily biased towards the technical, engineering and programming knowledgefields concerned with development of digital ‘tools’ such as software and/orhardware-based devices, systems or platforms. Consequently, the equallyimportant new kinds of knowledge and research activity related to the‘downstream’ or application layers of innovation in the digital content field arerelatively neglected.

Even in this sectorally targeted sub-programme, there is minimal recognition of therole and importance of the new creative and hybrid forms of knowledge directlyrelated to the innovation process in the digital content field. These include researchrelated to the specific authoring, design and textual strategies which best fit, matchor mobilise the potentialities of the new technical systems, and/or to the new kindsof publishing, editorial, distribution and marketing strategies and business modelsappropriate for successful product and process innovation in the (still small andemergent) digital content sector.

Admittedly, some of these research agenda items are also addressed as minorthemes in other EC programmes such as the MEDIA initiative, and they areformally part of the agenda in the eContent programme launched in 2001. (TheMEDIA initiative will be discussed a little further on). The eContent programme isone of the two actions proposed in the ‘eEurope Action Plan’. Its main focus is onstimulating the digital content market through the following action lines: (a)Improving access to and expanding use of public sector information; (b) Enhancingcontent production in a multilingual and multicultural environment; and (c)Increasing dynamism of the digital content market (see Table 3 for more details onthese two programmes).

The eContent programme, which has been allocated EUR 100 million for theperiod 2001–2005 “focuses on commercial use of European digital content”. Itaims to promote the production, use and dissemination of European digitalproducts and services by “supporting cooperation between companies in the fieldand the public and private sectors”. The key actions in receipt of funding relate,inter alia, to public-sector services which use the information and “the developmentof digital databases and the necessary software tools”. The Commission statesthat this programme does embrace a concern for “multilingual access tomultimedia products and services distributed via digital networks and adaptingthem to local cultural requirements”. The research actions may “involve subjectssuch as art, cultural heritage, archives, libraries and tourism” (Commission’s‘Europa’ web site).


But the actual operation and implementation of the eContent programme so fardoes not appear to have been strongly orientated to cultural information. Overall,the major focus of the eContent programme appears to lie with ‘producer’ andinstrumental forms of information services more directly relevant to industrial andorganisational functions or uses.

Thus even in the case of EU programmes apparently orientated towards digitalmedia, the level of attention and funding accorded to the new design, authoring,publishing of knowledge forms and competencies related to ‘content’ productionactivities by the mainstream ICT research programmes is relatively small. Theextent to which these properly ‘content’ -related knowledge and activity fields areneglected, least compared to the activities and knowledge domains directed at thefurther development of technical systems and tools, is quite striking. Indeed, it is allthe more so given the context of EU policy discourses which appear to place somuch emphasis on ‘an information society for all’ and seeking to construct ‘aknowledge-based eEurope’.

Table 3EC’s Major Programmes related to ‘Culture’ & ‘Content’

Programme Focus and Scope (a Period

Budget (M Euro)

.A) ‘CULTURE’ Related (bCulture 2000 This programme ‘helps to finance

cooperation in all areas of the arts’ and‘aims to promote the cultural diversity ofthe European Union, creativity,exchanges between those involved in thecultural sector in the EU, and to makeculture more accessible to the public’

2000--2004

167

MEDIA-3 The MEDIA programme ‘supports thedevelopment, distribution and promotionof European audiovisual works’. Thesectors concerned are fiction (cinema &TV), creative documentaries, animationand multimedia.

2001--2005

400

.B) ‘CONTENT’ RelatedFP5 MultimediaContent & ToolsProgramme

The FP5 IST research stream relates to‘the development of tools and systems formanaging, disseminating and using digitalcontent’. The programmes brief citessome examples of content with a cultural

1998--2002

564


theme:FP5 Energy,Environment & Sus-tainable Developmenprogramme

This programme includes a key actioncalled "The city of tomorrow and culturalheritage". About one third of the budgetgoes towards ‘identifying and assessingdamage to cultural heritage, whether builtor movable heritage’. The action‘promotes the protection and sustainablemanagement of cultural heritage, itspreservation and development, and stepsto make it more accessible to the public’.

1998--2002

170

The ‘eContent ‘programme

This programme ‘focuses on commercialuse of European digital content’ and ‘aimsto promote the production, use anddissemination of European digitalproducts and services by supportingcooperation between companies in thefield and the public and private sectors’.tourism. It is ‘also concerned with multi-lingual access to multimedia products andservices distributed via digital networksand adapting them to local culturalrequirements’.

2001--2005

100

The ‘TEN-Telecom’programme

TEN-Telecom ‘promotes the marketing ofEuropean digital goods and services inareas of common interest’, includingeducation and culture. Providing fundingof up to 50% for feasibility studies and10% of the necessary investment, it ‘aimsto help European companies through thecritical phase of launching theseservices’.

2000--2006

276

Notes:a) This table reflects the EC’s own claims about the scope of its key ‘culture’ and content-related activities.b) In addition, we should note the EC’s education and training programmes, SOCRATESand Leonardo da Vinci (allocated respectively EUR 1.85 & 1.15 billion for 2000-2006). Bothcover a range of disciplines and provide funding for projects in the field of education andtraining, including educational projects in schools on cultural themes and those which raisecultural awareness. One of the key themes of the programmes is language learning. Also,the ‘Youth’ programme 2000-2006 (budget of EUR 520 M) plays a part in the cultural fieldby financing youth exchanges.Source: Author’s estimates and tabulation based on EU documents.


Implications for the domain of ‘culture’

I will now wind up this descriptive review of the EU’s ICT-related policies byconsidering their implications for the domain of ‘culture’. This is a rather elusive ifimportant arena where there are important overlaps with the discussion ofinformation and content matters immediately above.

As the Commission itself acknowledges, it is difficult to provide a succinct“overview of the European Union's various cultural activities and programmes”(Commission’s ‘Europa’ web site) . Perhaps, the most prominent and culture-specific activity or programme of the EC is the “Culture 2000” programme. As thetitle suggests, this initiative specifically targets cultural cooperation--I will addressits key features in more detail a little later. But, in addition, the Commission itselftends to emphasise that many of its research and other policy programmesembrace a strong cultural agenda or orientation. For example, it claims that “manyEuropean programmes have a cultural dimension in various areas of activity:support for the cultural industries, technological research, education and training inthe arts, regional development, cooperation with third countries, and so on”(Commission’s ‘Europa’ web site). The Commission recognises that theseprogrammes are managed by different Directorates-General and departmentswithin the European Commission and that these may well “have their own rulesregarding operation and eligibility”. Here, we might also add, that they have theirown priorities and orientations which are far removed from the cultural domain asconventionally defined. (See Table 3).

For example, the Commission points to “elements of the Framework R&Dprogramme (1998–2002) , especially… the key action ‘multimedia content andtools’, which has been allocated EUR 564 million, and in particular its culturalheritage components” (Commission’s ‘Europa’ web site). But as noted above, thisresearch action line is more strongly focused on the development of digital toolsand platforms that content design and production activities per se. TheCommission also points to another element of FP4, ‘the Energy, Environment andSustainable Development programme’ because this features a research streamcalled ‘The city of tomorrow and cultural heritage’, for which 170 million euro havebeen earmarked. Around a third of this sum goes towards identifying andassessing damage to cultural heritage, ‘whether built or movable heritage’. Thisresearch action line seeks to “promote the protection and sustainable managementof cultural heritage, its preservation and development, and steps to make it moreaccessible to the public” (Commission’s ‘Europa’ web site). Thirdly, it is suggestedthat funding may be provided under the FP4 for ‘certain cultural projects involving‘international cooperation activities’, particularly with the Mediterranean countries.


Finally, we may note that the EU’s main educational exchange and trainingprogrammes, SOCRATES and Leonardo da Vinci , do provide funding particularlyfor projects in the field related to the arts and culture. These include educationalprojects in schools on cultural themes and projects to raise cultural awareness,and indeed language learning. But as suggested earlier, only a tiny portion of theresearch-related resources in these programmes are directed at the knowledge,competencies and activities involved in the design and production of new media-based cultural content compared to the sums devoted to the technical andscientific knowledge fields.

Apart from such ‘side-shows’ in policy terms, we really end up with two major ECprogrammes that are directly and explicitly engaged in supporting culture-specificactivities: the Culture 2000 programme and the MEDIA programme.

The European Commission’s ‘Culture 2000’ programme helps to financeCommunity cooperation in all areas of the arts, such as the performing arts, visualand fine arts, literature, music, history and cultural heritage. Its declared aims areto promote the cultural diversity of the European Union, creativity, exchangesbetween those involved in the cultural sector in the EU, and to make culture moreaccessible to the public. The programme has been allocated 167 million euro forthe period 2000–2004 . Financial assistance is awarded to projects selected on thebasis of a call for proposals, which is published at the beginning of each year.

The MEDIA programme provides financial and policy support for the audio-visualand related industries. The latest phase of this programme has been allocated abudget of 400 million euro for the period 2001–2005, supports the development,distribution and promotion of European audiovisual works. The sectors addressedby this initiative comprise fiction (cinema and television), creative documentaries,animation and multimedia. The MEDIA programme also earmarks 50 million eurofor business and legal training (marketing, intellectual property law), training intechnology (computer graphics, multimedia) and courses in how to writescreenplays for foreign audiences.

In essence, the MEDIA and the Culture 2000 initiatives comprise the two major EUprogrammes directly concerned with ‘culture’ and related ‘content’ . In combinationthey provide an annual average funding resources of 142 million euro over the2000–2004 period. These sums are relatively tiny when compared to the resourcesdevoted to the technical knowledge fields involved in the design and developmentof new digital and other technologies (see Tables 2 and 3).


These statistical indicators suggest that the levels of attention and fundingaccorded to the domains of culture and other content production activities by themainstream ICT research programmes are relatively low. They are tiny comparedto the resources allocated to the activities and knowledge domains involved in thefurther development of technical systems and tools. Again, this is all the more sowhen considered in the context of EU policy discourses which place so muchemphasis on ‘an information society for all’ and seeking to construct ‘a knowledge-based eEurope’. These and other quantitative indicators all seem to underline thefact that the official project for constructing a new ‘knowledge-based’ EuropeanUnion is a peculiarly lopsided one. In terms of material resources and surroundingpolicy frameworks and supports, it is heavily biased towards one end of theknowledge production and distribution spectrum. As with ‘content’ and informationstructures relative to technical infrastructures, the creative and culturalcomponents of new knowledge creation and distribution are relativelyneglected—and this more than two decades after one of the founding fathers ofthe European Union integration project had declared that, if beginning again, hewould ‘start with culture’.

EU’s ICT & IS Policies: Towards a Critique andEvaluation

Having presented an empirically focused, descriptive review of the EU’s ICTresearch and related information society policies, I will now move on to considersome of the more important strategic stakes and criticisms. The treatment here willbe necessarily brief for reasons of space, and so I propose to highlight two keysets of issues that seem relevant to the wider policy debates in the run-up to theWSIS conferences.

Technology-Fixated Versus Socially-Centred Visions &Imaginations

The first major point of criticism I wish to identify in relation the EU’s research andinformation society policies focuses on their predominant fixation with technology-centred concerns and their consequent un-social or a-social character. Thisstrategic criticism applies despite all the ritualistic genuflections towards a ‘social’dimension in EU policy documents since the mid-1990s and in more recent reportsrelated to the newer eEurope initiative. I have already indicated how this ismanifest in the tendency of successive EU research programmes to privilege the


design and production of new ICT devices and systems over the application anduse of existing technologies for social and cultural ends.

Despite some growth in the 1990s, the recognition and funding of socio-economicresearch, even that which is directly related to the presumed significant socio-economic implications of new ICT as a major new technology system, remains smallin relative terms. Some EC estimates suggest that explicit socio-economic researchactivities accounted for 1% of the Fifth Framework R&D programme’s overall budgetand that this will grow to comprise some 2% of the Sixth Framework programme (EC,2002a). But my own reading of the latter’s documentation suggests a reduction ratherthan increase in such research funding over the next few years.

When it comes to the arena of ‘information society’ policies-- where we mightexpect to find broader concerns with, or discussion of, social development paths oralternatives—the situation is really no different. On the one hand, we have theimplied message that we confront the emergence of a radically new and distinctkind of social formation, but on the other, this is defined and measured solely interms of changes in the supply and use of new technological infrastructures orservices. For all operational purposes, the information society, no less than thesuccessor concept of eEurope, is fundamentally framed, imagined and measuredin terms of the maximum production and use of new ICTs. The same applies to thesister concept of a ‘knowledge-based’ Europe, where once again the predominantemphasis falls upon the production and dissemination of one particular sub-category of knowledge: the scientific and technical (Preston, 2002a).

In other words, what seems like a concept, strategy and debate concerning futuresociety-wide development and change is reduced to a highly freighted technology-centred discourse and one-sided conception of knowledge creation. What isinitially presented as a radical or significant societal change turns out to be largelya case of ‘business as usual’, except that we must all produce and use new ICTsmore widely and avidly. In essence, we are presented with an impoverished, andessentially a-social, vision of the scope or potential for future societal development.Technology and instrumental technical knowledge becomes not merely the meansbut is substituted as the key measure and goal of societal development (Preston,2001: especially chaps. 9 and 10; Preston, 2002a).

This is certainly a much reduced and impoverished vision compared to the initialconceptions of an emergent ‘information society’ which were first advanced bysocial theorists in the 1970s, even if we recognise that these were much criticisedby other sociologists and theorists subsequently. The US sociologist Daniel Bell(1973) is usually designated as the author of the most robust early information


society theory--even if Adam Smith could prior lay claim to a pioneering prognosis ofthe ‘knowledge economy’ phenomenon (Preston, 2001).

Certainly, we can find some clear echoes and borrowings from the work of Daniel Bellin the information society discourses favoured by the political and industrial elites inEurope. (These are also manifest in the writings of many contemporary postmodernand ‘cultural turn’ theorists, even if these are self-defined as critical theorists.) Onecore example is the determinist view that changes in the technological infrastructureand in the division of labour are inherently transformative, liberating and presumed tolead to a significant reduction in material ‘scarcity’ or needs. The growth of jobsdefined as information or knowledge-intensive is deemed to lead to much greaterindividual autonomy and power in the workplace. Another borrowing here is theassertion that material issues (such as those pertaining to wealth and income) or the‘politics of distribution’ are now much less salient compared to ‘the politics ofrepresentation’, or in extreme cases, compared to the ‘end of politics’ in the modernsense. Another echo comprises a set of presumptions about the decline (if not death)of larger-scale ‘modern’ social solidarities and integration mechanisms, and anincreasing obsession with individual consumer(ist) or small discrete group identitiesor cultures. (Taken together, these do not merely reflect the borrowings ofcontemporary EU policy discourses from older academic theories of an emerginginformation society. In addition, they also provide some striking commonalitiesbetween the core tenets of official information society discourses, based around thenow dominant political economic theory of neo-liberalism on the one hand, and thoseof postmodern or cultural turn theorists, on the other hand.)

However, such borrowing by contemporary information society policy discoursesreflect only some highly selective elements of the seminal post-industrial thesisadvanced by Daniel Bell. A more rounded engagement with Bell’s thesis, however,would reveal that whatever its analytical flaws and conservative ideological leanings,it was certainly not singing along to the ‘there is no such thing as society’ hymn sheetwhich has become the increasingly dominant anthem of our own times. Its coreanalysis concerning the post-industrial society as a just or progressive society wasnot solely predicated on changes in the technological infrastructure or division oflabour or the newly influential role of intellectual knowledge. Rather it placed an equalemphasis on the continuing, if not growing, role of the socially-progressive,Keynesian welfare state policy regime which prevailed during the post-war boomperiod and a concomitant decline in the sway of markets relations and of unregulatedeconomic rationality. In essence, Bell’s ‘venture in social forecasting’ was alsopredicated on a trend towards reducing economic inequalities within an increasinglymeritocratic order. It was precisely and only in such a social and political context thatBell envisaged the new role or social character knowledge and planning as a direct


counter to the economic rationality of the market and competitive capitalism (Preston,2002b, Seville).

Of course, much has changed since Bell first advanced his thesis in the early 1970s,not least the increasing sway of economic rationality and market forces over all formsof knowledge and information production. Hence, the highly selective contemporaryborrowings from the post-industrial society thesis, as advanced by the eliteinformation society discourses (or indeed, the cultural turn literature) are highlypartial. Indeed, as cultural productions of a sort themselves, they can hardly beunderstood as innocently accidental or politically neutral, but highly attuned to thepolitical and economic sensibilities and pressures of their times. What we arepresented with is an impoverished and hallowed-out version of an emergentinformation society compared even to that advanced in Bell’s seminal work (despiteits undoubted flaws) -- or even compared to the social rights dimension of citizenshipwhich prevailed in many EU member states during most decades of the twentiethcentury (Preston, 2002b).

In essence, we find little by way of sustained discussion or attention to thequestion of what is or might be special about ‘Europe’s way to the informationsociety’, to quote a phrase from some of the earlier EU policy documents in themid-1990s (Preston, 1998; 2001). We may note ‘significant silences’ or absencesespecially in relation to the implications of the strong tradition of social democraticpolitics and associated social citizenship rights which key features of the politicalculture in many member states. Of course, as indicated earlier, we may notecertain semantic shifts and genuflections towards a ‘social Europe’ agenda withinthe EU’s research and information society policy documents, including the morerecent spate of eEurope policy reports. But these seem little more than occasionalrhetorical gestures in the midst of policy concepts and practices that arefundamentally embedded in the neo-liberal ideology which celebrates a ‘market-driven’ information society and which privileges consumer identities and roles overthose of citizenship. Indeed, we may note that the elite discourses surroundingnew ICT and the information society have provided important ideological arenaefor the general promotion of neo-liberal ideas and policy practices. This, of course,does not reflect or contribute anything along the lines of a distinctive ‘Europe’sway…’ to societal development, nor does it indicate any serious attempt to addressthe new and alternative developmental possibilities opened up by a large andincreasingly integrated economic union embracing some 320 million people.Rather it indicates a certain poverty of political imagination on the part of elites whorely so heavily on the importation or universalisation of ideas and practicesdeveloped elsewhere.


Finally, we should briefly also note here that this impoverished approach to aEuropean social development strategy has serious implications for evolving formsof social inequality, of which the much debated ‘digital divide’ is but one aspect.The wider adoption of neo-liberal policy ideas and practices in the EU area, notleast via the frequent presumptions of a necessary or beneficial linkages betweennew ICT and a ‘market-driven’ vision of societal development, have had majorimpacts with respect to deepening social inequalities. Of course, this particularattack on the prospects for any meaningful ‘social Europe’ policy strategy hasnothing to do with technology per se. Rather, it comprises the impacts andintentions of a particular political-economy regime which has been increasinglyhegemonic over the past two decades.

One of the major and most obvious consequences has been a significant increasein inequalities with respect to the distribution of income and wealth. But, we shouldalso note, this has accompanied the push to commodify an ever greater number ofservices and functions which comprise the evolving basket of ‘socially-necessary’goods (i.e. those which are required to match/access prevailing consumptionnorms) or indeed, which are required for effective exercise of citizenship rights incontemporary society. Thus the extending sway of the ‘naked cash nexus’,alongside growing material inequalities, now impacts upon the levels and modes ofaccess to a growing number of services and functions in areas such as health,education, legal services as well as in the arena of information and communicationservices. Considerations of the nature and origins of the so-called ‘digital divide’and effective policy responses must be framed as but one manifestation orexpression of these wider developmental trends and contexts.

Information ‘Content’ and Culture Matters

The second selective focus of my criticism concerns the implications of EU policiesfor information ‘content’ services and the domain of culture. As noted earlier, EUresearch and information society policies, since the early 1990s at least, havetended to emphasise the beneficial implications of new ICT for the growth potentialof downstream (or application) fields such as information content services,including cultural and media-related services (EC, 1993a; 1994a, 1994b; 1997a,1997b, 1997c ). They have also emphasised the beneficial implications of new ICTfor greater diversity of cultural and other media content services. In keeping withthe technology-centred vision discussed earlier, key EU policy and researchreports have also assumed or asserted the rapid replacement of the old media bynew/digital media and a radical ‘convergence’ or blurring of boundaries betweenpreviously separate communication services (EC, 1997a, 1997d; Techno-Z FH,1997; TechServ, 1998).


Whilst the range of new ICT-based ‘content’ delivery systems and networks hasexpanded rapidly over the past decade, the optimistic forecasts of a doubling ofthe numbers of ‘high-level, grey-matter’ and labour intensive jobs in the mediacontent services sector by the year 2000 have failed to materialise. The reasonswhy this is so are multiple and quite complex (Preston, 2001). One key factor hasbeen the tendency for key EU research and policy reports to embrace thetransformative, determinist visions of ICTs and their implications for the media andcontent sectors associated with the digital deliria of the late 1990s. Another hasbeen the failure of EU policies to adequately recognise or address the distinctiveeconomic and social characteristics of the cultural and other media contentservices. Instead, the tendency has been to extend the very same technologicaland economistic logics relevant to the new ICT (tools and systems) supply sectors(where economies of scale, standardisation and scope are highly relevant) to thevery different goals and requirements of the cultural and media content domains(where diversity and difference rather than standardisation should be taken as theoverriding goals). These flaws are linked to the tendency of EU research andinformation society policies to neglect the specifics of the innovation andproduction processes involved in the new media domain, as already indicated insection two above. The implied assumption is that the supply of new ICT-baseddevises and networks will somehow ‘automatically’ create the new content formsand texts appropriate to the new technical capacities or potentialities. Theprivileging of technical domains of new knowledge within the EU research andrelated policy programmes tends to neglect the all-important ‘downstream’ orapplication layers of innovation processes in the domain of media and content. Itimplies a de-valuing and neglect of the various other domains of new expertise,competencies and creativity required to successfully explore, test and develop therelevant new authoring, design and textual strategies, editorial and publishingmodels etc. (Preston and Kerr, 2001; Williams and Slack, 1998).

Concluding Comments

This brief account of the EU’s research and information society policies has beenboth selective and highly critical in its content and tone. I do not, however, mean itto be totally negative, either in the sense of being anti-technology (or against newICT in particular) or of being opposed to the very principle of an EU research anddevelopment policy in this field. In my view, both the further development andapplication of new ICT and the role of EU-level policies in this field are importantendeavours. Indeed, both have the potential to contribute to improved living andworking conditions for citizens, workers and consumers in an increasinglyintegrated Europe and global society. My main problem with the thrust of the


existing policies and initiatives is that they appear to deliver so very little by way ofrealising such potential. And, as stated at the outset, the key sources of thisproblem do not lie with some remote or all-powerful Eurocrats based in Brussels.Rather they reflect the wider patterns of political vision, policy strategies anddecision-making related to new ICT or an emergent new information or knowledge-based society at the local and national level.

At root, the most significant criticisms and challenges posed in this chapter havelittle or nothing to do with technology per se. The crucial and critical issues are todo with how we, or more precisely those in possess the relevant resources ofeconomic, political and discursive power in our society, think about, discuss andseek to address the ‘impacts’ or implications of such technologies for the living andworking lives of citizens and consumers in Europe and the wider world. One of thebiggest challenges or ironies here is the dominant elites’ vision of new ICTsinaugurating a radical shift to an allegedly new kind of social formation on the onehand, and on the other, the portfolio of highly conservative and extremely old-fashioned social and political doctrines they proffer at the same time. In part atleast, the success of the New Right in Europe no less than the USA rests on itssuccessful packaging together of the enthusiastic embrace of new technologicaldevelopments (especially ICTs) in combination with some of the oldest and crudestideas concerning the supremacy of market-based economics and associatedindividualism (Kintz, 2002). The ultimate logic and political prescriptions here arethe celebration of the individualised consumer in the marketplace and vehementopposition to social forms of collective identity, solidarities or action, for exampleon the part of workers, women, citizens or consumers (e.g. Toffler, 1993; Gilder,1989).

As I see it, one key task for critical researchers and progressive civic organisationsis to challenge the prevailing elite discourses which describe and prescribe ahighly partial and impoverished vision of new ICT and to assert its relation to amore progressive and just emergent/future social order. This means challengingthe prevailing assumptions and prescriptions that: (a) the maximum developmentand use of new ICT is the key measure, goal or end of social development, and (b)the effective development and use of new ICT is somehow necessarily bound upwith the embrace of the neo-liberal doctrine of a ‘market-driven’ path to socialdevelopment. It is only by challenging such technocratic, economistic andimpoverished (but highly partial) political visions that the growth of socialinequalities--including those embraced by the ‘digital divide’ -–may be addressedeffectively, both within the European region as well as in the wider global level.


References

Arlandis, J., E. Bohlin, J. Leyten, and R. Mansell (2001), ‘Sustainable e-Europe: AnAgenda for Dynamic Information Societies. An ENCIP Policy Position Paper’.Montepelier: ENCIP.Bell, Daniel (1973), The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in SocialForecasting’ . New York: Basic Books.Collins, Richard and Christina Murroni (1996), ‘New Media, New Policies’.Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.EC (European Commission) (1993a), Growth, Competitiveness and EmploymentChallenges for entering in the 21st century. (White Paper, colloquially called 'theDélors Report'). Luxembourg: European Commission.EC (1994a), Europe and the Global Information Society: Recommendations to theEuropean Council ['Bangemann Report']. Brussels: CEC.EC (1994b), ['Green Paper'] Strategy Options to Strengthen the EuropeanProgramme Industry in the Context of the Audiovisual Policy of the EuropeanUnion, Brussels: EC [Com(94) 96 final]EC (1996a) Building the European Information Society for Us All: First Reflectionsof the High Level Group of Experts. Brussels: EC, DGV,1996aEC (1996b), People First: Report on the Dublin Colloquium, Dublin Castle, 30Sept. – 1 Oct. 1996. Brussels: DGV.EC (1997a), ‘Economic Implications of New Communication Technologies on theAudio-Visual Markets- Final Report’, Report of research by Norcontel, NERA,Screen Digest , Stanbrook/Hooper and commissioned by the EC [DGX/D/3].EC (1997b), Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecoms, Media andInformation Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation: Towards andInformation Society Approach. Brussels: COM (97)623 [Final. 3.12.1997].EC (1997c), Electronic Publishing in Europe: Competitiveness, Employment andSkills [Flash Presentation of the Electronic Publishing Sector]. Report prepared byIDATE and commissioned and published by EC, DG XIII/E (October 1997).EC (1997d), Interactive Digital Media: Impact of the Technology to 2003. Reportprepared by ‘Informed Sources’ and commissioned/published by EC, DG XIII/E(Oct 1997).EC (1998a), ‘Trading Cultural Assets: The European Commission at Milia 1998’.[WWW2.echo.lu/milia98 ] Prep. for the EC by Cambridge Management Group.EC (2000a), ‘Five Year Assessment Report Related to theSpecific Programme: User-Friendly Informaiton Soceity, 1995-99’, Brussels: EC[Accessed from EC web site, 13 Dec. 2002].EC (2000b), ‘eEurope, An Information Society for All: Communication on aCommission Initiative for the Special European Council of Lisbon’, 23 and 24March, 2000.


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Toffler, Alvin (1993), ‘Previews and Premises’, London: Pan Books.Williams, Robin and Roger S. Slack (eds.) (1998) 'Europe AppropriatesMultimedia: A Study of National Uptake in Eight European Countries and Japan',pp. 215-275, Trondheim: NUST STS Rapport No. 42.

Policy challenges to the creation of aEuropean Information Society:

A critical analysis

Caroline Pauwels & Jean-Claude Burgelman1

A vital factor in the formation of the European Information Society has been theEU’s aggregate policies as regards broadcasting and telecommunication. Bothsectors have been propelled into the age of high technology and deregulation overthe past decades and, as a result, their industrial strategies and policy goals have,since the mid- eighties, gradually merged. This trend was reinforced by thepublication of the White Book of 1985 and the endorsement of the SingleEuropean Act (SEA). Both of these reflect the decision, prompted by the recessionof the seventies, to push for integration of all EU member states into one internalmarket where people, goods and services could move freely from 1 January 1993,.From this moment, the creation of the necessary conditions for a single market hasbeen the dominant theme of European policy making. The creation of a commonmarket for broadcasting and telecommunications was described in the White Bookas an urgent issue for the EU. This can be found back in the landmark publicationof the Green Book on Television without Frontiers (1984) and the Green Book onTelecommunications in 1987. Both Green Books had the same basic message:communication is a good/service and should move, be sold and purchased freelywithin the EU. EU policy has, since then, focused on removing barriers that hindercompetition and the creation of an internal broadcasting and telecommunicationsmarket.

These objectives have been reiterated several times in initiatives where thecreation of the European Information or Knowledge Society has been high on theEU policy agenda, for example, in the Bangemann report (1994) and particularly inLisbon Summit (March 2000). Significantly, this whole process has been labeledas E-Europe since the end of the 90s, indicating a trend towards looking at theInformation Society from a societal rather than a technological point of view.It is also noticeable that broadcasting and telecommunication policies are nowconverging at a European and worldwide level, along side technological andeconomic convergence. At a European level, this has been made explicit in the


Green paper on the convergence of the telecommunications, media andinformation technology, published in 1997, and its follow-up, the 2003 regulatoryframework for electronic communications networks and services. The latter clearlyindicates the EU approach, which is that all communications should be regardedas part of the same regulatory concept.

There is clearly a lot of activity going on at the policy level, and efforts are beingmade to achieve clarity in regulating the communications sector in an integratedway. However, the question remains: what sort of Information Society does Europewant?In this context, we will review the political and economic trends in Europeanbroadcasting and telecommunications, as in contrast to the underlyingassumptions and presuppositions of both EU policy and research in this field. Wewill show:(1) how the discourse on European integration and cultural diversity contradicts

the oligopolistic tendency of the market,(2) how the emphasis on creating a plethora of competing distribution channels is

opposed to the overstated and overrated demands of theuser/consumer/viewer, and

(3) how the Euro-specificity of policy making puts a burden on reaching coherenceand efficiency in policy making.

This ‘Euro specificity’ of policy, as in other areas, is mainly due to the origins of theEU as an ‘imposed supra-national’ state, based on common interest that are realbut nonetheless challenged most of the time. Indeed, when studying Europeanproblems one has to bear in mind that the EU is an integration process that hasbeen imposed on what have been for several hundred years, competing, isolatedand very heterogeneous regional entities and/or states. Therefore, a fragileequilibrium has to be found between heterogeneous member states on the onehand, and the European institutions on the other, especially when several newstates join the European Union from 2004 onwards. This will result in a permanentstruggle over enlargement of powers and competencies at both sides of the policyspectrum, especially also when the world level, by means of WTO policy making,comes in. Political and economic globalization trends are indeed opposed by themember states and regions themselves, which try to reinvent and renegotiatepowers of their own (according to the principle of subsidiarity).

Policy challenges to the creation of a European Information Society 61

Trends, issues and assumptions in WesternEuropean media policy and research: Broadcastingand telecommunications

Though originally separate empirical realities which responded to distinct internaldynamics, both broadcasting and telecommunications sectors have changeddramatically over a very short period of time. This due to more or less the samefactors: firstly, technological innovation has made new ways of deliveringcommunication content possible. Also, user needs have changed as a result of amacro-economic climate (post fordism and globalism as a result of hyper-capitalism) linked with a changing consumer culture (individualization and pay-perlogic). This was reinforced, up until recently, by an ultra-liberal climate of policymaking backed up by a post-modern ideology of super individualism. Finally, awithering away in Europe of the nation-states as politico-geographical entities,which had traditionally shaped both the audio-visual and telecommunicationssectors, has also contributed to the change (Burgelman, 1994; Charon, 1991;Collins, 1994; Collins, Garnham and Locksley, 1988; Eliassen and Sjovaag, 1999;Euromedia Group, 1992; Garnham, 1990a; Kayzer, 1993; McQuail, 1990 and1991; Pauwels, 1995; Sanchez-Tabernero, 1993; Siune and Trutzschler, 1992).With regard to the latter, a political shift has been observed away from the regionaland national level to the post, transnational, or European level, and furthermore,the global level. At the global level, institutions such as the WTO have extendedtheir powers into the telecommunications and audiovisual sector, thus adding anextra dimension to and pressure on European policy making. This goes hand inhand with a paradigmatic shift in European policy making in broadcasting anduniversal service issues in telecommunications, where a completely market drivenapproach now challenges the decades-long tradition of public servicebroadcasting, state subsidy to the film sector, must and may carry rules, etc.(Pauwels and Cincera 2001; Pauwels and Loisen 2002). Paternalism and stateinterventionism have given way to a policy based on consumer sovereignty andliberalization. Most of the time this is as rhetorical as the old discourse on‘educating for the better’ and ‘protecting the weak cultures of Europe’.

From the viewpoint of telecommunications and broadcasting economic actors, theabove-mentioned dynamics resulted in managerial professionalization,capitalization and industrialization. Both sectors moved away at the same timefrom what had been only 20 years ago a public service monopoly in Europetowards a private, oligopolistic functioning. Telecommunications and broadcastingare becoming more and more intertwined, and concentration is indeed a veryapparent trend in the communication industries. This means that overall


competition or antitrust policies are becoming more important than traditionalsector-specific regulation and legislation.

From fragmentation to unification and backwards: Discourse andthe process of policy making at the European level

European unification and the policy making process was and still is a question ofgive and take. It has been a struggle to get the member states to allow atransnational organization such as the EU to meddle in what they see as culturally(broadcasting/audio-visual sector) and economically (telecommunications)strategic sectors. In order to legitimize its intervention in both sectors, the EU hastherefore been forced to depict in detail all sorts of boom-and-doom scenarios, andalso continually amend and refine its policy instruments.

As stated above, the creation of a common market for broadcasting andtelecommunications was described as an urgent matter for the EU in the WhiteBook of 1985. The reasoning then was that the European dimension could offerthese sectors new prospects for growth and competitiveness. In turn, these sectorscould contribute to the realization of a European dimension in other economicsectors; for example, micro-electronics, consumer electronics, advertising etc.However, because of lack of concerted action and national fragmentation, thiseconomic potential was not fully realized. European action was thereforenecessary, particularly in view of the economic and cultural threats increasinglyposed by Japan and America in these domains. If Europe was not to miss the boatas regards Information Society benefits, then concerted action was absolutelynecessary. This message was repeated in the Green Books on TV (1984) and ontelecommunications (1987). It was expressed again in two important publications,which were supposed to put Europe on track for the Information Society -- namelythe 1993 White Paper on competitiveness, employment and growth and theBangemann report on the Information Society, published in 1994.

The Lisbon Summit in 2000 made the realization of a European Knowledge societythe new paradigm, as well as the driving force behind EU policy for both sectors.We note however that, with eEurope, discussion on what kind of InformationSociety Europe wants to develop is, to a significant degree, no longertechnologically driven, as it was at the beginning. In the first decade of EU policymaking, however, the opposite was true: the technological developments and thusthe creation of an Information Society are not only unavoidable but also includequasi limitless possibilities, if only people know how to make use of them(Burgelman, 2001).


EU policy, which aimed at the realization of an internal market intelecommunications and broadcasting, encompassed both negative integration, i.e.the breaking down of existing national regulations that form an obstacle toEuropean unification, and positive integration, i.e. the creation of the EU’s owncommunity-wide regulations and policy. The latter meant that certain matters hadto be withdrawn from the domain of autonomous national policy. This resulted inthe adoption of a battery of Directives (secondary community laws) that haveliberalized, harmonized and standardized the production and distribution of boththe hardware and software sectors. In addition, action was taken on stimulationprograms in the form of a community industrial policy that was intended to support,among other things, the production of broadcasting and telecommunicationsequipment, infrastructure and content. These are or were often prestigiousindustrial programs such as Race, the action plan relating to HDTV or even themore culturally inspired and, compared to the previous two, largely underfundedMedia program (Measures to Encourage the Development of an AudiovisualIndustry in Europe).

With a view to the realization of the internal market and mainly by extensive use ofDirectives, the EU aimed to accommodate pressure from the member stateswishing to reserve some control over their own policies. A Directive is, after all,binding in respect of the result but allows member states to choose the means bywhich they achieve it. Although this was the only way to draw in reluctant states, italso led to a situation in which the member states regarded community legislationas a sort of à la carte system. This allowed them to defend national interests botha priori, when they have the last word when complying with primary and secondarycommunity legislation, and a posteriori, when it comes to the often ambivalent andchallengeable implementation and interpretation. Although economically unified,the internal market is still, due to this, legally fragmented to an important degree.

After the legislative harmonization, which resulted in the establishment of theinternal market in 1993, some important policy shifts occurred.On the one hand, there is a major shift from a sector-oriented policy towards amore general competition and antitrust policy: ‘the European competition authorityhas taken over the regulatory task, outweighing to a certain extent the decline inthe Commission’s legislative influence since the passage of the SEA’ (Pauwelsand Cincera 2001). From that moment onwards tensions between bothapproaches have occurred frequently. Simultaneously, the member states haveshown even greater opposition, as they consider the intervention of the EU inquestions of competition unwanted interference with national matters. Indeed,most national authorities tend to promote and defend, first and foremost, theinterests of, for example, their own telecommunications operator instead of


thinking and acting ‘European’. Hence there is a constant tension between themand the EU (Hulsink, 1994; Mansell, 1993a). The small nations and the so-called‘less favored regions’ especially, as they have smaller markets to build on (alsotrue in broadcasting), seem to be less inclined to follow the road of perfectliberalization than the big ones (Preston, 1993). The question is, however, whetherthese countries have any other choice and whether, given their specific economicand infrastructural situation, EU policy should not adopt more case-specificstrategies at this level (Constantelou and Mansell, 1994).On the other hand, the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht caused a series ofmajor changes. The EU started to emphasize a Europe of diversity, heterogeneityand pluralism – at least in discussion -- to the disadvantage of concepts like aEuropean cultural unity and identity. In the phrasing of the cultural paragraph of theTreaty, cultural diversity became institutionalized. At the same time, Maastrichtinstitutionalized the principle of subsidiarity, which serves to safeguard (at least inprinciple) the policy margins of the member states, in questions of culture, forexample. The audio-visual sector gets mentioned here explicitly.

The inclusion of the principle of subsidiarity, may have been the only option left toconvince the more restrained member states to move further in the direction ofEuropean integration and liberalization, as this principle aims to limit theinterference of the Community as much as possible. De facto, it has resulted indecentralization and a tendency towards bottom-up rather than the former top-down policy making. This becomes obvious in the growing use of mechanismssuch as the ‘open method coordination’. In this more laborious bottom-up strategy,member states or other (economic) actors are requested to co-ordinate theirpolicies as much as possible and to implement self-regulation and control. Initiatedin the Maastricht Treaty, and from the Treaty of Nice onwards, decentralizationbecomes next to centralization the road Europe has – almost by necessity–chosen. In that respect, one can speak of a partial renaissance of the nation-state.

Towards a new global communication order: The economicconvergence of broadcasting and telecommunications

The increasing importance of EU competition policy is not solely the result ofinternal political regulatory developments but also relates to the economicintegration and concentration of the communication industries themselves. It iscertain, however, that concentration, integration, and ownership entanglementsbetween industrial/economic conglomerates and media corporations are neitherexplicitly recent phenomena nor strictly linear evolutionary processes. This isillustrated by the recent difficulties of some, once so promising, mergers (Mattelart,


1991a: 20&ff.; Pilon, 1991: 287&ff.; Bonnell, 1989: 471&ff.; 494&ff.; Conso, 1991:291; Brenner, 1993; Crookes, 1996). The 80s and 90s, however, werecharacterized by a great number of takeovers, mergers and alliances, as wasillustrated, among other things, by the rising number of cases which the EuropeanUnion had to process under its merger regulation2. It is noteworthy that the scale ofthese alliances were spectacular -- the largest merger of all time in economichistory was the one between AOL and Time Warner (January 2000) with acombined value at that moment of 187 billion dollars. Other figures confirm thistrend -- for example, 5 out of the 10 largest mergers were related to the telecomand media sector in 2000 alone. At the same time, these mergers have led to afundamental strategic reorganisation of both the audio-visual andtelecommunications sector (Idate, 1992: 7&ff.; Luyken, 1990: 621&ff.; Pilon, 1991;Hancock, 1993; Screen Digest February 1993: 36&ff.; Booz Allen and Hamilton,1989; 1992; European Audiovisual Observatory, Statistical Yearbook 1996–1997;Pauwels and Cincera 2001; Burgelman, Bogdanowich and Punie, 2002).

These restructuring moves have indeed set the stage for a new era. Back in 1988,American networks were the world’s largest audio-visual concerns, but from 1989on they were overtaken by corporations pursuing both horizontal but mostlyvertical integration strategies in the production, distribution, hardware, andsoftware (programmes) areas. At that time, along with a trend towards integrationof software and hardware companies, sales of American majors such as Columbiaor MCA/Universal kept the headlines buzzing. Since in the mid-90s, however, theemphasis has been on convergence between telecommunications groups,computing and audiovisual companies. The telecom operators’ strategy here is, asa former BT chairman remarked, “to become (CP) retailers of anything that can beconverted into digital form” (IMO working paper 95/5). These alliances, whateverform they take, point to what the Green Paper on convergence refers to as a trendtowards diversification as a response to the economic and technologicalopportunities being created in the EU and the global market (CEC, Com(97)623).Even though some alliances tended to misfire or were more inspired by hype thanrational thinking3, usually leading to a renewed focus on core activities, furtherintegration of telecommunications, cable, film industry, programme packaging, andconsumer electronics was inevitable (Mansell, 1993; Noam & Kramer, 1994;Noam, 1996). These alliances can also be interpreted within the generalframework of American and European plans for the establishment of informationhighways (Burgelman, Punie &Verhoest, 1995). Related to this, the latesttakeovers and mergers such as AOL and Time Warner or Vivendi, Canal Plus andSeagram illustrate how far the Internet has become a 'driving force' behind themerger movements.


With this integration of the old and the new economies, the ‘megalisation’ of thecultural industry has clearly taken on a new dimension: i.e. to acquire the ‘old-fashioned’ media conglomerates. In 2000 e.g., Time Warner, AOL, the biggestplayer in the new media economy, was ready to pay five times as much as Viacomhad stumped up five years before for CBS (Rutten, 2000).

Another trend is apparent: although European public service companies inbroadcasting still hold respectable market positions, they have lost the completedominance they had 20 years ago. The presence of a limited number of privatemultinational conglomerates here is simply overwhelming. This explains the recentshifts in policy thinking, pointing at the fact that public objectives do not have to besecured by definition by public service institutions but can be met equally well bythe market (Oreja, 1998; Tongue, 1999). Or as EU Commissioner Viviane Redingsaid, referring to the coming digital age, where a scarcity of frequencies and otherdistribution channels will no longer be a problem, “... some public interestobjectives, such as pluralism, will increasingly be met by the market itself "(Reding, 30 November 2000; Tongue, 1999: 128; 136; CEC COM (97) 623 3December 1997). The challenge here, of course, is to understand how far a ratheroligopolistic market with a minority of public services, will automatically providepluralism, particularly as regards content.


Infrastructure and technology driven assumptions as opposed tocontent: Is content diversity and cultural identity politically andeconomically feasible?

The latest integration developments and the crisis of public service missions, aswill be argued later, illustrate very clearly the way in which the ‘content’ sector hasover the years become a strategic choice for takeover targets (Tongue, 1999;Rutten, 2000). The more distribution channels are added or freed throughtechnological development and deregulation, the greater the demand for content,whether for traditional culture industry products like films, music, novels,magazines and television programmes, or more recent forms of electronicservices. According to Screen Digest, continental Europe had over 650 TVchannels at the end of 1998. With regard to the growth of digital TV, Idatecalculated that as of June 1999, there were 35 digital TV platforms in the EU,compared with 20 at the end of 1998. At the end of 1999, Idate therefore estimatedthat there were around 400 digitally broadcast TV channels in the EU (Idate,2000).

The first question to answer is, of course, to what degree this explosion of potentialchoice will be matched by a real demand for new broadcasting services on a pan-European level? Most policy makers and actors were expecting a lot from thisbecause broadcasting is not a market to be invented (like multimedia was and is).Research suggests, however, that a more cautious approach to pan-European TVshould be taken.

First of all, research shows that over the last few years total TV consumptionstabilized in Europe (3-4 hours a day). This means that whatever newbroadcasting services are offered, they will have to substitute existing viewinghabits. These viewing habits are at the moment very well established and cost theviewer almost nothing. This raises the question as to why consumers would pay fornew broadcasting services when they already have a multitude of free choice.

There is also the question of who is going to finance a segmented offer in Europe,given the fact that it took CNN, for example, more than 10 years to reach break-even. Indeed, is there enough advertising revenue to support a segmentedbroadcasting offer? It must be remembered that the largest TV advertisers are theProcter and Gamble type of consumer goods -- precisely those that need a broadaudience and not a segmented one.


The answer could be subscription TV. However, here too it is questionablewhether the European market is large enough to allow specialized TV on asubscriber basis. Or more precisely: is it homogeneous enough? The analogy interms of specialized offer with the written press clearly does not work, since presseconomies are not at all comparable with broadcasting economies (though digitalinnovation makes the business model here more and more attractive). One alsohas to bear in mind that watching cross-border TV, an essential condition for asegmented pan-European broadcasting offer, is very infrequent in Europe.

Finally, what will be the ease of use of an explosion of demand? How will theviewer make a choice between 400 channels? The answer one reads about hereis that someone will offer to make a choice for the audience (navigator systemspre-selecting e.g. half an hour of soap, 15 minutes of news, a movie and so on).Although possible, is this not exactly what the general channels offer?

As a result, this increase in channels has for the moment only resulted in anexplosion in demand for cheap programmes. The European broadcasting industrycan only provide 1/3 of the programmes needed (especially in fiction, the mostcompetitive programme category). Hence the need to import entertainment anddrama – this lies at the roots of one of the most complicated questions of mediapolicy in Western Europe: namely, the dominance of the US and the endangeredEuropean audio-visual culture and industry.

The figures illustrate this domination clearly. If the Europeans only have a 6%market share of the US market, the American audio-visual sector in Europe has amarket share of approximately 75%, though the European broadcasting and filmsector pursue their own logics. In general one can say that people generally stickto national programmes, if available, when watching television but prefer watchingUS movies on the big screen.

As far as broadcasting is concerned, reception analysis as well as internal EUevaluation reports have shown that national broadcasters do programme homemade fiction, especially during prime time as these programmes are the mostpopular ones. However, the remaining time is filled with imported American, ratherthan imported non-national European, programmes. Figures from the EuropeanAudiovisual Observatory confirm these trends. They show that the import ofEuropean fiction in 16 European countries has stabilized since 1994 but thatimport from American has increased (Table 1). In other words, the explosion indemand for programmes has up till now been filled with national and Americanmaterial.


Table 1: Origin of imported fiction in 16 European countries

Fiction of European origin Co-production Imported fiction – non-European

Ger-many France UK Italy

Euro-pean joined.

Non-Eur. US CA AU+ NZ

1994 1.7% 2.9% 6.0% 1.6% 2.7% 1.8% 0.4% 69.8% 1.5% 3.4%

1995 1.6% 2.7% 5.8% 1.1% 2.9% 2.7% 0.4% 69.8% 1.6% 3.3%

1996 1.5% 2.2% 5.2% 1.0% 3.0% 2.6% 0.5% 71.2% 1.5% 3.2%

1997 1.6% 2.3% 5.0% 1.0% 4.4% 2.0% 0.4% 71.3% 1.7% 3.1%

Source: l’Observatoire de l’Audiovisuel, Statistical Yearbook (1999: 196)

As far as film is concerned, the same imbalance occurs. It is striking that Europeannon-national films still do not circulate in Europe, and that the share of nationalfilms in their own market, not withstanding some recent exceptions and EU policyin this area4 is extremely small (Directorate of Culture and Audiovisual Policy,1997: 14 et seq.; Pauwels, 1995; Directorate of Culture and Audiovisual Policy,1997: 12 et al.). The market share of national films in their home market is around17%, and the share of non-national European films on the European market onlyamounts to 13%. The gross earnings per distributed film are by consequencemuch higher in America than in Europe, namely 5.3 million dollars or 4.8 millioneuro in America compared to 1 million dollars or 900,000 euro in Europe(Directorate of Culture and Audiovisual Policy, 1997: 14).


Table 2: Market shares of the national and European non-national filmon the European markets (1995/1996/1997).

Market share (%) of national film (incl.Copro)

Market share (%) of European non-nationalfilm

1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997

France 35.3 37.5 34.2 8.4 6.5 10

Germany 6.3 15.3 16.7 5.1 8.9 11.5

Italy 23.7 23.9 31.3 11.7 12.5 15.9

Spain 11.9 9.3 13 14.1 11.8 17.6

UK 10.2 - 26 6.1 - -

Belgium 2.5 5.3 3.6 20.8 10.9 13.4

Netherlands 7.6 5.4 3.4 75. 3.6 10.5

Denmark 10.3 3.7 6.6 7.4 15.3 13.1

Portugal 8.4 17.2 18.8 34 - 29

Finland - - - 11.2 15.7 18.6

Greece 4 - - 21 - -

Switserla 2 4.3 2.3 24 24.3 21

Norway 12 5.4 5.2 - - -

Luxemburg 0 0.2 1.7 15.1 16.2 28.4

Iceland 5.9 8 3.7 - 6.7 13

Sweden 20.4 18 17.8 6.1 - -

Source: Media Salles (1998)

This has resulted in a trade deficit that has continued to grow through the years. Itincreased from only 2.5 billion euro in 1990 to 8 billion euro in 2000 (Idate, 1992:104-115; l’Observatoire de l’Audiovisuel, Statistical Yearbook 1998: 37 and 2002).According to the Commission's Communication on 'Principles and guidelines forthe Community's audiovisual policy in the digital age' (CEC COM(1999) 657final):“American productions account for between 60 – 90% of Member States'audiovisual markets (receipts from cinema ticket sales, video cassette sales andrentals and from sales of television fiction programmes), whilst the respectiveEuropean share of the American market is of the order of 1 – 2%”. In terms ofcontent, this is visible in the ubiquity of American films on European TV and


television screens. Of the top 50 box office successes in 1998, just 10 were ofEuropean origin, including two British-American co-productions. Leading the top 50was Titanic, Armageddon and Saving Private Ryan. As Tongue argues "Thisdeficit has a cultural, social and political impact on the UK and Europe" (Tongue,1999:108).

These trends are even more problematic in the smaller EU countries because theirmarkets are smaller and their cultures are more hermetic and thus not so easilyexportable (Burgelman and Pauwels, 1992; Pauwels, 1995). There seems to bevery little interest indeed among Greek viewers to watch a Scandinavian soap, andvice versa.

It is also much more difficult to realize a return on investment when making aprogramme for an audience of 6 million people, in a language that few understand(and thus needs dubbing, extra promotion etc. if it is to be exported), than whendoing the same for an audience of 50 million. At the same time, this means lessinvestment is made in film production in smaller states as compared to their biggerEuropean neighbors, not to mention their American counterparts. As shown inTable 3, the average production budget of bigger member states is double theaverage budget the smaller states can spend.

Table 3: Average film production budget in 1997 (billions of dollars)Big EUcountries

Small EUcountries US

France 5.53 Belgium 3.18 Majors 53.41Germany 5.68 Netherlands 4.2 Independent -U.K. 8.34 Luxemburg 0.66Spain 2.97 Ireland 5.08Italy 3.44 Denmark 2.6

Finland 1.65Sweden 2.63Austria 1.23Switzerland 0.82Portugal 0.44

Average 5.19 Average 2.25 Average 14.53Source: Screen Digest, June 1998


However, if content diversity is a difficult economic objective within a globalizingentertainment economy, it might also be politically difficult to promote or organize.Does this rather dominant position of the USA imply that (1) European culture isthreatened and (2) that a European response should be imposed? Thesequestions divide both the policy and research communities in Europe, and areproblematic in several respects.

Firstly, the assumption of American hegemony is disputable because it assumeson the one hand, that European production is better, because it is not American. Italso ignores the fact that most American media groups, and indeed Europeangroups too, are now global multinationals, as illustrated by the recent mergerbetween Canal Plus/Vivendi/Universal. In this respect, it comes as no surprise thatformer Canal Plus/Vivendi’s CEO Jean-Marie Messier declared European culturalspecificity to be dead.

Second, European research in this area makes more or less the same mistakes asthose observed in the debate on the New World International Information Order.This mistake resides in the fact that studies on the origin of a programme (in itselfan irrelevant indicator as the example on the American programming industry justclarified) are used to presuppose effects on the audience, a fallacy that receptionanalysis within the cultural studies tradition has sufficiently tackled.

Third, it raises the question of what is so specific about European culture, that ishas to be considered as endangered (Garnham, 1993). This is a vital butextremely complex research question since it is difficult to imagine how this can beoperationalised. It would mean that European research would have to demonstratewhat the specific quality of European culture is -- again, a very complex issuesince it depends on the interests involved. Quality in broadcasting is somethingwhich can be measured in many different ways (Mulgan, 1990). It is in fact relatedto different assumptions as to the nature of the audience (consumer versuscitizens), of broadcasting (being a commercial good or not) and as to therelationship between broadcasting and society.

From this point of view, the mechanisms Europe puts in place to establish acompetitive audio-visual industry -- i.e. the Media program, quota and competitionpolicy – should be fundamentally reconsidered.

First of all, US domination cannot possibly be compensated for through EUfunding. The total amount of the Media III program targeted at the production ofaudio-visual programmes, barely amounts to 350 million euro for 2000/2005, -- inno way comparable with the average production budget of the US major


companies. To push the comparison a bit further: the total budget of Media 1 wassimilar to that of just one high budget US production, i.e. Titanic.

An interesting paradox within European policy thinking emerges here: promotingcompetition and free market as the ultimate benchmark for free movement ofgoods and services within the community is not easily compatible with any support,based on cultural interests, of the broadcasting industry. This would mean anagreement has to be reached between big and small countries whom both havedifferent objectives and interests in this area, as illustrated by the quota discussionin the Television without Frontiers Directive.

Smaller countries not only have much higher import rates than the biggerEuropean ones, but they also complain about being too dependent on their bigEuropean neighbours. This came to the fore in the quota debates at the end of the80s. In order to protect the European broadcasting industry, it was suggested thateach country would have to schedule more than 50% of European programmes. Inresponse, the small countries aired the view that this would oblige them to buymore expensive European programmes when they could buy cheaper elsewhere(from the US). The whole debate resulted in the adoption of the EUrecommendation that member states should do their best to schedule as manyEuropean programmes as possible. Not only did the whole issue illustrate thatquotas are economic and in this context to a large extent contestable, anotherfallacy appears: the scheduling of European content does not per se mean that it isactually watched. Audience research as well as political economy have clearlyshown that one can only speak of homogeneous markets in broadcasting when thecultural proximity of the audiences is close. As we have said before, there seemsto be very little interest indeed from a Southern European viewer in watching aScandinavian soap and vice versa. This underlines the fundamental frictionbetween the policy of a united Europe for business and the continuing constraintsof cultural specificity.

Another level of complexity is added by looking at how EU competition policycomes into play here. EU competition policies are meant to reconcile twoconflicting objectives. On the one hand, sizeable corporations are essential foraccomplishing internal market objectives and strengthening Europeancompetitiveness. Improving technical efficiency in the production and introductionof a given set of (new) services at the lowest possible cost and overcomingfragmentation are important criteria in the industrial economic analysis of alliances.On the other hand, these holdings have to be deterred from taking advantage oftheir increased market power to undermine competition, i.e. their potential for anti-competitive behaviour towards both their competitors and suppliers and the abuse


of a dominant position vis-à-vis the users (Kiessling and Johnson, 1998:157; Ciniand McGowan, 1998). As regards the media, Community competition policies addsan extra dimension stemming from the added cultural value of the softwareproduct. Here decisions regarding competition may have an impact on mediapluralism and diversity, policy principles which in Europe are traditionallyassociated, among other things, with a public service mission, but as such do notbelong to the specific objectives of the EC competition policy which is concernedsolely with fair competition. It is questionable whether objectives for pluralism anddiversity have been met by the outcomes of EU competition policy.

With regard to the application of the rules concerning state aid, an area that istraditionally not regarded as anti-trust, it is the general belief of the Commissionthat state aid does not contribute to economic efficiency. Its only benefit is toremedy market imperfection. It is in the light of this conviction that state-aid caseshave been adjudicated. As the European Commission has often pointed to theneed to remedy structural weaknesses in the audio- visual sector, it seemed untilrecently that the application of the state-aid rules in this area could be positivelyevaluated (CEC, COM (96) 160 final of 17 April 1996), in particular since the ECTreaty made provision for a new exception to the application of state-aid rules inorder to support culture (art. 87.3.d). In this context it should, however, beemphasised that the Commission and the Court seldom deviate from the legalessence of the European unification, i.e. broad rules and no exceptions.Discriminatory and non-proportional provisions included in German, French,Danish, Spanish, Italian, Dutch and Greek support mechanisms for the filmindustry have had to give way under pressure from the Commission (Pons, 1996).Since 1998, however, the Commission has been seeking to lay down a moregeneral policy line with regard to state aid to cinema and television programming.In its Decision of 9.6.1998 on the French system of support to film production, theCommission set out a list of 4 specific criteria on the basis of which it intended toassess state aid to cinema and TV programme production under the culturalderogation of Article 87.3.d. In particular the provisions that aid to the audio- visualsector should be limited to 50% of the production budget and that producersreceiving such support must be free to spend at least 20% of the film budget inanother member state led to uproar and unrest in professional and political circles.Significantly, the often heard point of view that ‘culture should not serve as an alibifor subsidizing an industry’ has been neutralized by the adoption in November2000 of a resolution stating that the audio-visual industry is an ‘exceptional culturalindustry’. Assistance to film and media ‘forms’ is, in the wording of the resolution,‘one of the most important means of maintaining cultural diversity, which isprecisely the objective of government assistance’. Whether this marks a turn in thetide has still to be seen.


Public service as guarantee for quality and diversity?

In so far as the Treaty recognises the importance of the concept of public serviceand provides guarantees for its existence and maintenance (arts. 7d, 86, 87.3.d),the Decisions of the Commission undoubtedly point to a certain goodwill. In theaudio-visual sector member states have gone so far as to emphasise theimportance of public broadcasting by endorsing the Protocol on Public ServiceBroadcasting, which was an annex to the Amsterdam Treaty5. Of morefundamental importance, however, are the proceedings that the Commission hasinitiated concerning state support to public broadcasting. Various privatebroadcasters have complained that the licence fee system distorts competition,especially when coupled with advertising on public service broadcasters. Severalcomplaints have been brought before the Commission on this basis by the privatebroadcasters (Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, Germany) (Oreja, 1998). ThePortugese RTP case was the first one on which the Commission has passedjudgement (Decision of 7 November 1996). The Commission concluded that thepublic financing which the RTP enjoys is not a form of government supportbecause, in return, the RTP is required to fulfil public service tasks which areclearly defined by law. Whether this has had the effect of creating an importantprecedent is, however, another question, particularly since the Commission’sDecision has recently (May 2000) been cancelled by the Court of First Instance. Itfound that the Commission had incorrectly reached a decision too quickly andshould therefore start a more thorough enquiry. Similar failings had beendenounced earlier by the Court of First Instance in the case of TF1 versus France2 and 3. It is clear that, in the eyes of the Commission (Oreja, 1998) and the Courtof Justice, support measures always have to be tested against principles such astransparency, proportionality, objective necessity and the like, which are arbitraryin that they have never been precisely defined. This raises the question, forexample, as to whether licence fees can be maintained, and if so, how and in whatform. Are they indeed proportional? In other words, is public broadcasting fundinglimited to the strictly necessary to allow fulfillment of the public service remit? Is itobjectively necessary with respect to the public service mission? Is it really relatedto the added costs incurred by fulfilling a public service mission? As the added costis almost impossible to calculate and criteria like proportionality are interpretedrestrictively, public service broadcaster remain in a situation of legal uncertainty.

However, even if public service institutions were to survive, one should bear inmind that Public service status is not in itself a guarantee for varied content, or for‘providing what the market does not offer’. One should bear in mind, when beingcritical of the market, that one should also be critical of public broadcasting as an


instrument for relevant policy, as the EU competition policy quite rightly pointedout.Indeed, the whole debate on the nature of public service broadcasting as opposedto commercial broadcasting rests on two assumptions (Burgelman, 1990). Firstly,public broadcasting has no inherent operational mechanism that determines itsmanagement, unlike commercial broadcasting (profit making). Public broadcastingis only a concept. Second, and by consequence, it is assumed that a public serviceexploitation model in broadcasting is a distinct organizational way of running abroadcasting institution.More precisely it is accepted that public service broadcasting offers differentoutputs in terms of programming than commercial broadcasting (which is the mainreason why public broadcasters are defended) because public servicebroadcasting is a different way of organizing communication. This specificity ofpublic service broadcasting is very seldom challenged. On the contrary, thespecific nature of public service broadcasting is accepted, almost as an ontologicalfact, which has been there from the beginning of broadcasting. Therefore one canalmost speak of an ideology of public service broadcasting: public servicebroadcasting was and is superior to commercial broadcasting because it isorganized in a non-market way. Many studies have, in the meantime,demonstrated that the way public broadcasters operate is very similar tocommercial ones.

This means that having a public service output in broadcasting is not onlydependent on media inherent characteristics. In fact, it may be more related tonon-media specific elements, such as political culture and economic policy than tothe specific way in which it is organized as a mass medium.It follows from this non-media centric point of view that the dilemma presented bycurrent regulatory debates on communications policy – i.e. between the need toregulate a communications system so that it fulfils its public service role, and theneed to deregulate it commercially in order to fit a given cultural project – may befalse.Simply because regulating into a public service way, because of its supposedrationale of quality, culture or independence, is not the most important reason whysuch a system was chosen for by the policymakers. A non-media centeredapproach even suggests that a public service can also be chosen for itsconservative, middle of the road, non- critical or whatever characteristics a marketapproach is said to be typical for.

The same reasoning goes for the implementation and articulation of the concept ofuniversal service in telecommunications. Although large-scale comparativeanalysis of the regulatory concept of universal service is lacking, what is available


(Garnham, 1988b; Burgelman & Verhoest, 1994) demonstrates that it was, likepublic service in broadcasting, a compromise between all dominant interests (andthe fact that business users and residential users had no other choice than to usethe same network). It differs from country to country and is not a God-givenconcept that has a regulatory dynamic of its own. This means that ‘solving’ thepresent problems of equal distribution and access to telecommunications inEurope, in a fully liberalized market, by imposing a concept like universal service --or by proposing regulatory concepts in which infrastructure, platform services andapplications are seen as separate entities -- without negotiating this with industry,political authorities and so on, is bound to fail.

Public service and universal service should therefore be regarded as a normativeand dynamic set of rules which have to be constantly reviewed and redefined (butnot reinvented) in the light of the constantly changing nature of power relations andsociety.

Political and regulatory convergence of broadcasting andtelecommunications at the global level: The impact of the WTOpolicy actions

Last but not least is the extra burden the WTO might actually put on the politicaland economic trends in European broadcasting and telecommunications. It couldresult in more conflicts between cultural diversity and the noticeable oligopolisticreality of the market on the one hand, and on tensions between the global policies,EU policy and the regional priorities on the other. As a consequence, a blurring ofdefinitions might put extra pressure on maintaining traditional mechanisms likesubsidies and public service for promoting content creation and diversity.

This last point becomes crucial within the coming WTO negotiations, launched inQatar in November 2001 (Pauwels and Loisen 2002). Although the EuropeanUnion was able to postpone the dismantling of its audio-visual policy and theliberalisation of the audio-visual sector during the Uruguay round, it did notsucceed in exacting a separate cultural status for the audio-visual sector. TheEuropean audio-visual sector is therefore not safeguarded against future attemptsat liberalisation. On the contrary: other contracting parties have already started onthis liberalisation and have made concrete commitments. As few liberalisationcommitments have been made in the audio-visual sector and an elaborate list ofMFN exceptions has been drawn up, the only immediate effect of the GATSAgreement is that all members who have not entered into agreements willundertake to keep any rules and measures in the audio-visual sector which they


subscribe to now or in the future transparent (Article III of GATS Agreement). Inthis way, the largest and most important opponent of imposed liberalisation of thesector, the EU, has primarily gained time and a certain amount of room formanoeuvre. It remains temporarily free to enforce its regulatory framework andsupport measures.

However, the increasing convergence between traditional and new, digital,communications media (telecommunications and other ICT services) is leading toa situation where audio-visual sector policy and regulation are increasingly cominginto contact with other forms of service provision. The result of this convergence isthat borders between formerly relatively isolated concepts such as ‘audio-visualservices’, ‘electronic commerce’ or ‘online trading’ are becoming blurred (Wheeler2000, 254, 257; Deselaers & König 1999, 148). In view of the stalemate on theaudio-visual dossier during the Uruguay round, it may be supposed that theadvocates of imposed liberalisation of the audio-visual sector will attempt to crackthe audio-visual market via the points of contact between various types of service.This is even more valid insofar as major steps towards liberalizingtelecommunications had already been undertaken during the Uruguay round andin subsequent years. Although extreme differences between mainly the US and anumber of developing countries meant that agreement was only reached on valueadded services during the Ministerial Conference in Marrakech (which formed theclosing section of the Uruguay round), the deregulation of the entire telecom sectorfollowed soon after. Basic telecommunications services, which representapproximately 80% of total turnover in telecommunication services trade (Barth1999, 60) were finally fully included in GATS following difficult negotiations on 15February 1997 (Fredebeul Klein & Freytag 1997, 477, 483, 486).

An additional aspect which may ensure that it will become ever more difficult toconsider audio-visual services as a cultural product, is the fact that the newconcepts arising from convergence are not yet clearly defined. In the past it waspossible to fall back on the position that regulatory interference in the distribution ofcontent was defensible for cultural reasons during discussions about the audio-visual sector. Thus Europe could keep free of liberalization commitments andadvance the provisions of the Directive ‘Television without Frontiers’ without beingsanctioned. However, where audio-visual services can be seen as a form ofelectronic transport, the issues are not so clear (Wheeler 2000, 257; Deselaers &König 1999, 148, 150). Furthermore, the US wishes to classify some productswhich are delivered and downloaded via the Internet as virtual goods, making themfall under the GATT regulation, which (for the time being) demands much strongerliberalization than GATS (Deselaers & König 1999, 151). Incidentally, this positionis not only supported by the US, but also by another major trading power, Japan.


In view of the dominance of Japanese companies in the production of CDs, theprospect of a fully liberalized Internet market is an important reason for siding withthe US (Le Monde 23 November 1999, 8). This may therefore mean an end to thecultural exception and the situation where member states can subsidize the audio-visual sector.

However, as previous negotiations within the GATS framework were disappointingfor the US, an attempt is now being made to apply the rules already negotiated forother sectors to the audio-visual. Anticipating the position that the Europeans willprobably adopt in this dossier, the US is attempting to demonstrate that sufficientsafeguards exist for preserving the cultural component of audio-visual services.Thus, Article IV of GATT (dating from 1947) provides for an exception concerningthe rules for national treatment of cinema films, GATS Article XIV (a) and GATTArticle XX (a) provide for possibilities to intervene on a regulatory basis “topreserve public morality” and the acceptance of obligations does not by definitionmean no possibility of acting via regulation … “so long as the regulation is notadministered in a way that represents an unexpected trade barrier” (United States,Communication from the United States – Audiovisual and Related Services; 18December 2000).In other words, room for European manoeuvre is limited.

Conclusion: Building the European Knowledgesociety on converged policy making?

If a European Knowledge Society is to appear, the three aspects of EU regulation -- competition policy, telecommunications policy and media policy -- must be tunedinto each other.

The first obstacle to overcome is the fact that European Information Society policyis, to a large extent, concerned with infrastructure. The issue of what contentshould be provided is very sensitive for the member states, as they want as muchsubsidiarity as possible. This means that two rival policies are at work: a ‘centralist’hardware policy as opposed to a decentralizing preoccupation with subsidiarity interms of content to be offered on that infrastructure.

The second obstacle (related to the first) which must be overcome is the conflictbetween the will of the EU to install fair competition, open the market, abolish themonopolies, etc. (EU competition objectives) and the need for at least a stableenvironment with guaranteed revenues to attract the necessary investment in


trans-European networks (EU industrial policy objectives) on the one hand, andthe safeguarding of diversity and pluralism on the other hand (EU media policyobjectives). Moreover EU competition policy is not always compatible withfinancing mechanisms for Public Service (state aid) or EU action programmessuch as Media. This means that EU policy is rather inadequate when it comes totackling what has always been a major concern -- promoting cultural diversity inmass media, as demonstrated by the problems associated with the import ofAmerican broadcasting.

The last is even more fundamental. Since the EU is a top-down construction,composed of nations which have, as their first priority, to gain their legitimacy atthe national level, it is inevitable that the principle of subsidiarity will not alwayssmooth the path of the European integration. Europe’s specificity resides in factthat it is the local (nation states), which has been there far longer than the global(the EU). As argued throughout this article, there is nothing specific aboutEuropean media policy. In fact, the main issues at stake are the same in otherindustrialized countries, but it is the context of Europe that makes them unique.This uniqueness lies in the fact that though Europe is a market, it lacks thenecessary homogeneity to behave like a real market for communication services; itis also a political unity, without most of the ‘normal’, bottom-up political legitimacysuch a unity requires. It is this tension between the local and the global reality thatmakes a pan-European communication policy so problematic, much more than thetechnical problems.


Notes

1 The main ideas of this article were already developed in Burgelman (1997).The views inthis chapter are the ones of the authors and do not represent the views of the EC. Theauthors want to thank Jan Loisen for his input.2 Since the regulation came into effect a number of mergers involving audiovisual mediaand allied services have been reported. Statistics on the merger regulation applicationmoreover show increased merger activity in the telecommunications and media sectorsince 1996 (Cini andMcGowan, 1998:124). Of the 1158 decisions which have been takenuntil now on the basis of the merger regulation, about 45 decisions are related to the mediasector and 142 to the telecommunications sector. More importantly, however, six of thetwelve negative decisions made until now under the merger regulation directly affect themedia sector: MSG Media Service (1994), Nordic Satellite Distribution (1995), HMG(RTL/Veronica/Endemol (1995), Bertelsmann/Kirch/Première (1997), DeutscheTelekom/Betaresearch (1997) and MCI Worldcom/Sprint (2000) (Pauwels and Cincera2001)3 The many different agents in this field, from all kinds of network operators to consumerelectronics companies and software distributors, seem not to be driven so much byrational, long-term strategies, but rather by a possibly short-sighted compulsion not to missout on current developments and state-of-the-art technology (Burgelman, 1994).4 Here, this relates mainly to the major producing countries such as Germany, GreatBritain, and France. Often however this increasing market share held by the national filmcan be attributed to one or more box office successes (‘The Full Monty’, ‘Bean’, ‘The fifthelement’, ‘Knockin’on heavens door’, ‘Rossini’, ‘Kleines Arscloch’,...) so that it is perhapstoo early to talk of a real structural trend (l’Observatoire de l’Audiovisuel, StatisticalYearbook 1999: 78).5 The protocol declares that, considering that ‘the public broadcasting system in MemberStates is directly connected with the democratic, social and cultural needs’ of every societyand the need to maintain media diversity (…) the provisions of this treaty (…) do notdetract from the rights of member states to provide financial resources for publicbroadcasting, in so far as such resources are provided to broadcasting organisations forthe fulfilment of the defined and organised missions entrusted to them in the public servicearea, and providing that these resources do not influence trading and competitionconditions in the Community to such an extent that, taking into account the demands ofpublic service, they are opposed to the public interest.”


References

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Issues in measuring Information

Society adoption in Europe

François Heinderyckx

Adoption of the Information Society in Europe (as well as in the developed world atlarge), is considered a given and a political priority. The only uncertaintyassociated with this overwhelming and said to be irreversible trend is the rate ofadoption and the nature of the obstacles holding it up. This contribution will arguethat the attention and energy vested into studying these issues foster on restrictiveperspectives partly based on erroneous assumptions. In particular, it will be arguedthat most IS adoption indicators are not only diverse (hence hazardous tocompare) but more importantly deprived of unequivocal conceptual basis. Thecentral and apparently simple ‘Internet use’ indicators will be used to elaborate onthis issue.

Moreover, it will be argued that mainstream initiatives in assessing IS take up areoverlooking two crucial issues: (a) that besides those individuals who cannot useIS technologies, there remains a significant and potentially irreducible proportion ofindividuals who simply do not want to use them and (b) that these ‘want-nots’ arelikely to be discriminated in their rights as citizens.

The challenge of measuring IS adoption

Ever since the Information Society self-proclaimed its emergence and advent, ithas been considered inseparable from a major shift in society bearing highexpectations as a source of growth, wealth, employment, and well-being ingeneral. Even though social and innovation research has gradually turned its focuson the users (Vedel, 1994), technological determinism still imposes the view thattechnological innovation drives progress. These prospects have triggeredcountless initiatives in attempting to measure its progress among businesses,administrations and households. Those measures have gradually become fully-


fledged socio-economic indicators alongside traditional indicators used to monitorcountries or regions (GDP, unemployment rate, etc.).The development of the Information Society, however, is much more challenging tomonitor than one would think. Undertakings to monitor the adoption of theInformation Society rely almost exclusively on survey research interviewingrepresentative samples of population about their use of IS related technologies.Given the prohibitive cost associated with such studies, measures are so farpredominantly carried out by the industry for which the exercise is also one of plainmarket research. The successive waves of such indicators are strikinglyheterogeneous in their methodology, up to the point where using their resultsrequires great caution if only regarding the variables they actually measure.One of the core indicators of IS take up is the ‘Internet penetration’. Behind thisseemingly simple and unambiguous concept lays a variety of variables as wide asthat of the survey questions they are based upon. A number of ‘meta-sources’ tryto compile various studies in order to provide a reliable basis for comparisons,mostly on a nation-by-nation perspective. NUA, Internetstats.com, CyberAtlas andother web sites gather statistics from various sources and try to aggregate themwith too little concern for the diversity of underlying methodologies, except for afew words of caution (‘Often, there are widely differing counts. We do our best tocheck on the accuracy of counts by comparing them to regional growth patternsand other projections’ warns CyberAtlas).

For lack of a systematic meta-analysis, we shall consider two main clusters ofindicators used to measure Internet adoption. The first cluster focuses on ‘accessto’ the Internet. The questions used query whether respondents have within theirreach the means to use the Internet, most often at home or at work. AlthoughInternet is accessed from a number of places (Heinderyckx, 2001), one can regardas genuine Internet users those having a connection at home. This particularapproach is quite typical of the market research perspective in which ‘penetration’is gauged against ownership of the necessary equipment and services to use theInternet. These studies are easily identifiable when they feed triumphant headlinesannouncing that so many households, for example, are ‘connected’.

Using data from the Eurobarometer surveys organised by the EuropeanCommission, we can assess Internet penetration in European households on thatvery basis (EB 56.0, see second column of Table 1). On average, a little less than30 % of all European respondents say they have access to the Internet from theirhome. However impressive these figures may be, they tell us very little about ISadoption. At best, they provide an evaluation of potential users.

Issues in measuring Information Society adoption in Europe 89

Deciphering the ‘Internet user’

The second cluster of indicators is centred on determining whether respondentsqualify as actual ‘Internet users’. This apparently simple indicator can beparticularly misleading. What makes one an ‘Internet user’? One way to avoidendless arguments about what is an adequate definition of an Internet user, is tosimply ask people whether they consider themselves an Internet user. Eventhough such an approach obviously relies on a blurred and ambiguous basis, it isnonetheless relevant in the way it measures consistently respondents’ self-perception of being an Internet user, i.e. singling out individuals who feel they havetaken a step towards those technologies and, in a way, are committed to integratethem in their way of life, if only partly.

Let us see what picture of the ‘Internet user’ is produced by such a broadapproach. Using data from wave 56.3 of the Eurobarometer, we find that over onethird (37,2 %) of the European population see themselves as Internet users (thequestion was “Do you use the Internet nowadays?”). Quite predictably, thatproportion varies considerably among countries (from 19% in Greece to 68% inSweden) and among various demographic groups (see first column of Table 1).Another approach to measuring Internet adoption is to concentrate not only on theuse of Internet in general, but to include some notion of frequency of use. Somestudies include in ‘Internet users’ statistics even those who use it very seldom. Ifone has ever used the Internet, it can be argued that he or she has taken thatdecisive first step towards IS technologies. On the contrary, one could argue thatvery low frequencies of use can be an indication of dissatisfaction which is likely tobuild up resistance against, rather than initiate transition towards IS technologies.Using questions querying the ‘frequency of use’ allows to differentiate ‘occasionalusers’ from ‘heavy users’. In fact, on the continuum of frequency of use, one mightdecide ‘true’ or ‘actual’ users are only found above a specific threshold offrequency. This approach can be upheld by arguing that it takes into account onlyindividuals who have truly integrated IS technologies into their daily lives, theircultural practices, their information, communication and leisure activities.Again, the Eurobarometer provides figures regarding the frequency of use (EB56.0). The third and fourth columns of Table 1 allow direct comparison with theprevious approaches (access at home and self-perception).

If we consider only those using the Internet at least several times a week, theEuropean average drops below a quarter (24%). And if we only count the ‘heavyusers’, i.e. those using it on a daily basis, the figure falls below 10%.None of these approaches are completely satisfactory. In practice, each studytends to find its own set of indicators to determine the nature and amplitude of the


use of technologies in a particular way. Even if we agree on conventionalqualifying factors for being an Internet user, we are still very far fromunderstanding the mechanisms of adoption which require a finer investigation ofthe actual uses of the Internet. Being a user, even a regular one, still leaves a widerange of questions open as regards the actual applications being used, the timespent using them, etc. Such studies rely mostly on panels of Internet users whoserepresentativeness is questionable.

Within the wide range of Internet applications frequently investigated, a few bearrelevance well beyond their strict scope. One of these, for example, is the use ofInternet for bank transactions. Its relevance, I argue, comes from a number ofunderlying attitudes associated with doing online banking: technical skills (in spiteof the efforts for user-friendliness, the applications are still complex), trust inreliability (one would not resort to e-banking if having doubts about the fact thatthings will happen as they seem), trust in confidentiality (most people are quitenervous about secrecy of financial issues), willingness to carry out remote taskswhich until recently required presential transactions with an individual (bank clerk),etc. All these attitudes indicate a strong basis for the most ambitious Internetapplications, so that it could be argued that e-banking activities are to beconsidered as an aggregate parameter defining a particular class of core Internetusers.

Let us consider this as yet another way to define, hence to measure the ‘Internetuser’. Still based on Eurobarometer data, this would bring the proportion of Internetusers in Europe down to a mere 6% (last column of Table 1).


Table 1: Various approaches to measuring internet penetration usingEurobarometer data

(Per cent)

Self-perceived(1)

Internetaccess

athome(2)

At leastseveraltimes aweek(2)

Everyday(2)

Remotebanking(2)

EU15(3) 36.3 29.3 23.7 9.1 6.0S 67.6 59.4 48.8 24.9 27.7

DK 61.9 55.5 44.5 23.6 21.8NL 61.5 53.7 39.9 19.9 12.2

FIN 53.0 34.3 33.0 11.4 24.5L 48.4 46.3 31.2 13.2 14.0

UK 41.2 37.2 27.2 12.3 6.3A 38.9 26.5 24.8 9.1 8.5

IRL 36.2 20.8 17.8 7.2 1.0I 34.3 32.2 26.0 10.0 2.4

F 33.9 21.6 18.5 6.9 4.9D 33.8 27.6 21.9 6.0 7.3B 32.7 24.1 19.5 8.6 4.1E 27.5 18.5 18.7 5.8 1.5P 20.9 11.8 10.9 2.8 0.5

GR 18.9 12.1 9.7 3.7 0.6

Male 43.0 33.8 30.3 12.2 8.3Female 30.0 25.1 17.6 6.2 4.0

Age 15 - 24 years 63.8 43.4 39.9 14.5 4.525 - 39 years 47.4 38.3 33.9 13.6 9.840 - 54 years 37.4 34.2 24.6 9.6 7.8

55 + years 11.9 10.9 6.0 2.1 2.2

Self-employed 43.5 37.4 30.8 12.1 10.6Employed 45.4 37.4 32.6 12.7 9.3

Not working 27.5 20.8 14.7 5.4 2.4

Income - - 21.1 12.6 10.7 4.5 1.9- 26.2 17.7 15.4 5.6 3.7+ 36.7 31.0 22.5 7.1 7.2

+ + 56.7 55.6 45.5 19.1 15.8


TEA(4) up to 15 years 10.1 9.6 5.6 2.1 1.216 - 19 years 32.5 27.9 20.6 7.2 5.5

20 + years 56.4 48.1 43.1 18.7 14.4Still studying 78.4 54.1 49.3 17.5 5.2

Average coefficientof variation(5) 0.36 0.39 0.44 0.50 0.63

(1) Eurobarometer 56.3 (n=15,926, fieldwork January-February 2002) ; (2) Eurobarometer56.0 (n=16,162 , fieldwork August-September 2001) ; (3) weighted average ; (4) TerminalEducation Age (age at which respondent stopped full-time education) ; (5) COV=stddeviation/mean

These five different, yet uncomplicated definitions of ‘Internet users’ not only resultin a wide range of levels of penetrations, they also prompt significantly differentpatterns among various demographic groups. The deviation observed amongclasses of such basic demographic variables as nationality, gender, age, level ofeducation and occupation are notably higher when considering narrowerdefinitions of the Internet user (see ‘Average coefficient of variation’ in Table 1).Figure 1 plots the penetration values for each EU country in both the self-perception of being an Internet user (broadest definition) and the use of e-banking(narrow definition). Coefficients of variation indicate much more ample differencesamong countries as regards e-banking (COV=0.95) than regarding broadpenetration (COV=0.35). Figure 1 also shows that although the two variables areglobally correlated, they are far from perfectly so. Countries with similar levels ofInternet penetration on the broad scale (Denmark and Netherlands, 62%) showconsiderable difference in the stricter scale of e-banking (22 versus 12%).Countries showing not so dissimilar levels on the stricter scale of e-banking suchas Austria and the Netherlands (8.5 and 12%) nonetheless present contrastinglevels on the broader scale of self-perception (39 versus 61.5%).


Figure 1

S

D K

N L

F I N

L

U KA

I R LI

F

D

BEG R + P

E U 1 5

0

10

20

30

40

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Proportion of self-perceived internet users (C. of Var. = 0.35)

Likewise, the key demographic variables traditionally underlying the ‘digital divide’(Servaes and Heinderyckx, 2002) give quite a different picture depending on theapproach used as the basis for Internet penetration. The gender gap is much lessspectacular on the self-perception scale than on stricter scales (where men aretwice as keen on Internet as women, see Table 1). The generation gap takes aparticular shape using the e-banking criterion given that younger users are lessinvolved in financial transactions. The e-banking criterion enhances the alreadyspectacular income gap.

Even this quick comparison of five approaches to Internet penetration assessmentusing a coherent source (all our data comes from recent Eurobarometer surveysso that differences observed cannot, in our comparison, be attributed tomethodological discrepancies) shows how delicate the exercise of measuring theInformation Society can be. Methodological choices are never neutral and mayimpact considerably the observations and the conclusions one might draw uponthem. Yet, measuring the Information Society faces even more fundamentalissues, that of the very meaning of the variables to be measured, as can be seenby continuing to examine our example of the ‘Internet users’.


Internet users as ‘audience’?

History somewhat repeats itself. The early newspapers could only assess theirsuccess on the basis on circulation figures. Soon, their legitimacy and moreimportantly their advertising rates demanded that the number of readers beevaluated. This could only be achieved by surveys on representative samples.Respondents were (and still are) asked whether they read a particular newspaper.Interestingly, the notion of ‘being a reader’ of a newspaper is as simple inappearance, and as tricky to handle as that of the ‘Internet user’. What is a‘reader’? In spite of genuine efforts of harmonisation, the definitions used to qualifyas such vary among countries and among studies. The variations revolve alongtwo dimensions: (a) what is considered ‘to read’ and (b) what is the referenceperiod. In some cases, one is considered a reader if he has barely held a copy ofthe publication in hand. As for the reference period, it can range from the past 24hours to the past week, if not more. In many cases, the result of some of theseridiculously broad definitions is that one who is merely in contact with some issueof a newspaper or a magazine is to be included in its readership, its audience.Likewise, audiences for posters and billboards are assessed by studying people’swhereabouts. In this case, one passing by (‘abeam’) a poster is considered ashaving had an ‘opportunity to see’ (OTS) the poster, and on that basis in includedin the audience of that board.

The early days of radio and television bear even more resemblance with thecurrent situation of IS technologies. Early broadcasters circulated figures not ofviewers or listeners of their station, or of any station, but rather the number ofreceivers sold. These figures appear nowadays as of limited interest except for themanufacturers and sellers of those appliances, yet the ‘access to Internet’approach, or the number of domain names or of ISPs or of Internet hosts that weoften see today is very similar in nature.

Likewise, in more recent times, the transnational and thematic television stations,by lack of systematic study of their audience, usually advertise the number ofhouseholds where their programme is received, or rather ‘can be received’, that is,most of the time, the number of subscribers to ‘bouquets’ or cable carriers onwhich they are included, if not the number of households in the area covered bytheir signal. There again, confusion exists between audience and potentialaudience. As does confusion prevail in radio audience measurement where twonotions coexist, one based on simple contact with a station (audiences), the othertaking into account the time spent listening to the various stations (market shares).Nowadays, the audience of broadcast media is monitored using complex surveyapproaches involving diary-based surveys (for radio) as well as people-meters


panels (for television). However, various evolutions lead to an increased audiencefragmentation which begins to cause difficulties in audience measurement andcalls for an integrated system capable of tracking audience trends of all mediabased on large samples surveys (Heinderyckx and Phillips, 2001).

But to what extent can the history of media audience measurement be transposedto assessing the implementation of IS technologies? Or even to the sole issue ofInternet use? The frequent reference to ‘new media’ certainly entertains the ideathat, after all, the Internet is just a case of new media, so that monitoring its usersin just a case of measuring new audiences.

Although such an approach seems quite stimulating, it is based on twoquestionable assumptions, namely that (a) Internet is a medium and (b) thatInternet users are the audience of that medium. Internet is, indeed, a medium ifonly because it serves the purpose of disseminating information and content tolarge and dispersed numbers of individuals which could, on that basis, beconsidered as audiences. As such, the web site or web pages can be seen as asuitable medium for advertising, so that similar instruments to those used foranalogous purposes in traditional media would be suitable.

However, this would reduce the Internet to only a fragment of its reality and use.Studying television audience can be boiled down to two questions: is one (a)watching television and, if yes, (b) what channel? Even though there are manyways to watch television (how loud the volume, doing anything else at the sametime, etc.) measurement can merely work on that simple dual basis. No such luckwhen assessing Internet users. Web surfers have a wealth of possibilities to gobeyond browsing when, for example, they rely on the Internet for communicatingwith others (e-mail, chat, forum), or even to, themselves, disseminate content to anaudience (personal web pages, peer-to-peer file exchange). The multifaceted useof Internet related technologies, and the fact that these facets combine into anunlimited and evolutional number of patterns makes the study of the use of theInternet, hence of the IS adoption, a knotty enterprise. It also brings into questionthe sheer relevance of such notion as the ‘Internet user’, hence its measurement.

Measuring and monitoring the Information Society, i.e. understanding how theInformation Society takes shape, how new technologies tempt some, but notothers, how adoption reshapes existing media and communication practices, atwhat pace, in what directions, and for whom, and so many more crucial questionscannot be merely touched upon without a sustained effort in quantitative as well asqualitative research among users as well as non-users, including time-budgetanalysis to monitor the role and place the new practices take and how it affects


pre-existing practices. These studies are not only complex and expensive. Moreimportantly, they take time. Too much time in comparison with the pace at whichchanges, innovations and evolutions are taking place.

The issue of the ‘want-nots’

Most of the industry driven studies are understandingly oriented towards IS as amarket: hardware and software purchase, ISP and broadband, e-commerce,advertising exposure and response etc.

In a number of instances, one can suspect that the questions used to survey ISpenetration are worded in such a way as to produce an optimistic snapshot of thesituation, if not to provide the highest possible figures. One can speculate that thisfavourable light sustains efforts to demonstrate the fast growing rate ofpenetration, thus reassuring investors while simultaneously creating a momentumlikely to make non-users feel deviant and pressure them to join the movement.This is not unlike self-fulfilling prophecies: the projections built upon these surveysusually come to the conclusion that the progression is overwhelming and that soonnearly everybody will own and use a particular technology.

Literature, news discourse as well as political rhetoric on the subject convergepredominantly on the fact that the advent of the Information Society isunquestionable, inevitable and indeed necessary in order to solve and anticipatevarious societal problems (Mansell, 2002). Therefore, it is widely accepted thatanything likely to stimulate ICTs take-up is of general interest, hence legitimate asa priority.

From that viewpoint, non-users are seen as outcasts likely to be left out of societyand needing help to gain access to what has become a basic and necessarycommodity. The gap between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ of the IS has becomeknown as the ‘digital divide’. Its reduction now ranks alongside that ofhomelessness, unemployment or illiteracy in the political agendas of allindustrialised countries and beyond.

However prevailing these views have become, discordant voices can be heardparticularly regarding the role of public authorities in stimulating a market which,some say, if given time, might simply regulate itself and, as cost decreases,primarily leave out those who choose not to join rather than those who cannot(Compaine 2001).


This leads to an important distinction generally overlooked: beyond the welldocumented ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, we must consider the ‘can-nots’ and, moreimportantly, the ‘want-nots’. When talking about the Information Society,mainstream discourse usually only distinguishes the first two categories which, inessence, constitute an oversimplification, for this dichotomy tends to uphold theabsurd idea that one is either ‘in’ or ‘out’ of the Information Society (not to mentionthe underlying idea that those who are out are deviant). The ‘can-nots’ areoccasionally mentioned when explanations have to be provided as to the causesfor ‘not having’: they can’t afford and/or they lack the skills. There again, theassumption is that ‘they wish they could’, but they cannot, yet.

What we call the ‘want-nots’ are seldom discussed. They are seen as a classic by-product of resistance to change, reactionary fringes of population againstmodernity. The fact that ‘want-nots’ are largely neglected (apart for trying toconvince them otherwise) is hardly surprising and does not seem, at first sight, tobe a matter of concern. After all, even in the most ‘advanced’ countries, there isstill a sizeable number of households with no television. However, I believe IStechnology is different and the ‘want-nots’ cannot be overlooked, if only for oneemerging motive: ‘e-government’. Although the term still sounds like a politician’sfantasy, a vague project nurtured to give campaigns a flavour of modernity, manyadministrations in many countries, regions, localities are engaged in a process ofthorough reorganisation and modernisation under the banner of ‘e-government’which has become a goal as well as a leverage for in depth organisationalchanges.

The likely outcome of this turmoil is the development of online applications madeavailable to the public (citizens and businesses). When those applications areoffered as an alternative for traditional procedures, the ‘want-nots’ of IS simplydecide implicitly to carry on doing things as before. Yet, a number of new servicesare developing (e.g. access to information, tax simulation, full-text search of legaldocuments, etc.) that IS ‘want-nots’ will be deprived of. Worse, the same is true ofe-government applications which are intended to replace pre-existing services,hence introducing discrimination which infringes fundamental principles of today’sdemocracies.

We can see early examples of the problems which lay ahead. In 2003, the officialjournal of Belgium will no longer be printed in its traditional paper format. Theofficial publication will only be accessible online. Even though the vast majority ofregular subscribers to the journal (lawyers, large companies, university professors)do have access to the internet and do find it much more convenient, those citizensor businesses not wanting to blend into the Information Society, or simply repelled


by the Internet or by computers, are now deprived of access to the mostelementary source of official information. The implications go well beyond that ofrefusing to acquire a television set.

It seems that public authorities have moved to a position whereby using ICTs isconsidered essential and in the public interest, as is vaccination, road safety,sewage or running water. For public authorities to determine that something is ofso essential a nature, there needs to be either unquestionable evidence that it willimprove safety and well-being and / or public and democratic debate. TheInformation Society and its adoption by the population became unquestionablefollowing neither of these processes.

References

Compaine, B. A. (2001), The Digital Divide: Facing a Crisis or Creating aMyth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Heinderyckx, F. (2001), ‘Measuring the Information Society – the use of theInternet by the European consumer’, European Information TechnologyObservatory, EITO, pp. 414-439.Heinderyckx, F., Phillips, A. (2001), ‘Mesurer les audiences à l’époque de laconvergence médiatique’, in Droesbeke J.-J., Lebart, L., Enquêtes, modèleset applications, Paris: Dunod, pp. 231-24.Mansell, R. (2002), ‘From digital divides to digital entitlements in knowledgesocieties’, Current Sociology, 50:3, pp. 407-426.Servaes, J., Heinderyckx, F. (2002), ‘The ‘New’ ICTs environment in Europe:closing or widening the gaps?’, Telematics and Informatics, 19:2, pp. 91-115.Vedel, T. (1994), ‘Sociologie des innovations technologiques et usager:Introduction à une socio-politique des usages’ in Vitalis, A. (dir.), Médias etnouvelles technologies, Rennes: Editions Apogée, pp. 13-34.

Access and participation in the discourse

of the digital divide

The European perspective

at/on the WSIS

Nico Carpentier1

The digital divide: c’est quoi finalement?

The discourse on the digital divide is characterised by a complex set ofarticulations. Some of this complexity can already be found in the diversity ofcommonly used definitions of the digital divide. Rice (2002: 106) defines the digitaldivide as the ‘differential access to and use of the Internet according to gender,income, race and location.’ At the launch of the UN ICT Task Force in November2001, established to ‘lend a truly global dimension to the multitude of efforts tobridge the global digital divide, foster digital opportunity and thus firmly put ICT atthe service of development for all’ (UN ICT Task Force, 2002), Kofi Annan (2001)links the digital divide to development, and the reduction of poverty and inequality,as he states that “one of the most pressing challenges in the new century” is to“harness this extraordinary force [of the new technologies], spread it throughoutthe world, and make its benefits accessible and meaningful for all humanity, inparticular the poor.”

In the ‘Digital opportunities for all’ report of the DOT Force (which was created bythe G8 heads of state at the Kyushu-Okinawa Summit in July 2000), the need for a“rapid response to the so-called ‘digital divide’” is deemed ‘essential’: “Access to,and effective use of the tools and networks of the new global economy [2], and theinnovations they make possible, are critical to poverty reduction, increased socialinclusion and the creation of a better life for all.” At the same time it is added thatthe digital divide is a “reflection of existing broader socio-economic inequalities andcan be characterised by insufficient infrastructure, high cost of access,


inappropriate or weak policy regimes, inefficiencies in the provision oftelecommunication networks and services, lack of locally created content, anduneven ability to derive economic and social benefits from information-intensiveactivities.” (DOT force, 2001: 4)

At a more European level, a similar articulatory diversity can be found, althoughfew recent high-level policy documents explicitly focus on the digital divide. TheeEurope 2002 Action Plan3 (EU, 2001: 4) for instance calls on the member statesto “draw the attention of citizens to the emerging possibilities of digital technologiesto help to ensure a truly inclusive information society. Only through positive actionnow can info-exclusion be avoided at the European level.” Only in the manuscriptfor an information brochure on eEurope 2002 – targeting the ‘general public’ – itsobjectives are more clearly linked to an element of the digital divide, when theseobjectives are (re) presented as seeking “to create a digitally literate Europe and toensure that the whole process is socially inclusive, builds consumer trust andnarrows the gap between the haves and haves-not in European society.” (DG forPress and Communication, 2002: 7)

The eEurope 2002 Action Plan does not only refer to the ‘European society’, butalso (at least briefly) mentions the need for a more global contextualisation when itcalls “closing the digital divide between developed and developing countries […] akey goal for the European Union.” (EU, 2001: 4) The commissioner responsible forDevelopment and Humanitarian aid – Poul Nielson (2002: 34) – also takes thisposition when he defines the digital divide as “unequal access to ICTs among andwithin countries.” In the introduction of the @lis-brochure (EuropeAid, 2002: 3),Erkki Liikanen (responsible for Enterprise and the Information Society) writes that“the European Commission attaches great importance to developing theinformation society in an inclusive manner, and fighting against the digital divide,both within and between the regions and countries.” The !85 million @liscooperation programme – the Alliance for the information society – aims “to extendthe benefits of the information society to all citizens in Latin America and reducethe digital divide between those who have access to the new informationtechnologies and those who are excluded from the information society.”(EuropeAid, 2002: 2)

Finally, the European position that was advocated at the first meeting of thePreparatory Committee (PrepCom 1 – Geneva – July 2002) of the upcoming WorldSummit of the Information Society also emphasised the importance of the digitaldivide, which will be “a central theme of the Summit.” (EU, 2002a: 3) This positionwas also echoed by the statement of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2002),who spoke on behalf of the European Union: “Our objective is to reach a balanced

Access and participation in the discourse of the digital divide 101

approach that deals as much with bridging the digital divide as with other keyquestions for the development of a common vision of the information society.”These other key questions are mentioned in EU PrepCom 1 document (EU,2002a: 3), where it is stated that “Actually, the debate associates all the actorsconcerned, and includes, in addition to the questions of infrastructure/access,regulation/competition, and applications, the following topics: content (respect oflanguages and practices and local socio-cultural sensitivities; development of localcontents), knowledge (training of the human resources required by the InformationSociety), and participation (implication of the civil society in the economic andtechnical local and international choices).” In the EU position document forPrepCom 2 (2002b: 7), which took place in February 2003, this nuanced position isrepeated, at the same time articulating a definition of the digital divide: “Thepotential benefits of the Information Society for citizens and companies areundoubted. At the same time, there is a possible threat of a widening gap betweeninfo-rich and info-poor, a concept known as the digital divide. This divide reflectsand exacerbates existing inequalities, not only between countries but also withineach country.”

As most of the definitions mentioned above illustrate, the core of the digital dividediscourse is based on the articulation of three elements: 1/ the importance ofaccess to on-line computers, 2/ which use results in increased levels ofinformation, knowledge, communication or other types of socially valued benefits3/ that are in turn so vital that the absence of access and the resulting ‘digibetism’(or computer illiteracy) will eventually create or maintain a dichotomous society ofhaves and have-nots. Especially the element of unequal access to on-linecomputer technology plays a crucial role and functions as a nodal point (to refer toone of the basic concepts of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory (1985)) of thedigital divide discourse. As a nodal point it creates the stability and fixity that everydiscourse needs to maintain its coherence. The centrality of the signifier access iswell illustrated by the rather enormous amount of research aimed at documentingsocio-demographically based differences in ICT access4.

Lines of critique

This specific articulation of the discourse of the digital divide, with access as itsnodal point, does the same time exclude a series of other meanings. As is thecase in any discourse, a specific set of elements is linked in a way that theiridentity is modified by the articulatory practice (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 105). Thediscourse of the digital divide can be analysed, and in a way deconstructed, by


focusing on the specificity of the articulation of the different elements that composethe discourse, and by focusing on what meanings and elements become excludedby these specific articulations. This exclusionary aspect of the digital dividediscourse can trigger different discursive coping strategies, when for instance thediscursive limitations are simply accepted or attempts are being made torearticulate it. Some of these rearticulations simply add new signifiers orsuperimpose new layers of meaning to the digital divide discourse, withoutcriticising the specificity of this discourse, whilst other (re)articulatory practices aretargeted at broadening the meaning of the discourse (or its nodal point access)itself.

In this chapter, three lines of critique towards the digital divide discourse arediscussed and illustrated by referring to the position the EU formulates in their twoPrepCom documents5 for the World Summit of the Information Society (EU 2002a;2002b).

Line of critique 1: broadening access

A first line of critique of these discursively exclusionary practices is based on theargument of the multi-dimensional character of Internet access. Steyaert (2000and 2002) for instance argues that ‘psychical access’ (stressing the materiality ofaccess) should be complemented with the different necessary skills required forthe interaction with ICT (informacy). He distinguishes three levels of capabilities:instrumental, structural and strategic skills6. This argument is complemented by theemphasis on user practices. As Silverstone (1999: 252) remarks on thedomestication of ICT: “The more recent history of home computing indicates thatindividuals in the household construct and affirm their own identities through theirappropriation of the machine via processes of acceptance, resistance, andnegotiation. What individuals do, and how they do it, depends on both cultural andmaterial resources.”

A third broadening of the scope is performed when the focus is placed on both therelevance of on-line content and on the possibilities of feedback towards thecontent producing organisation. A clear illustration of this position can be found inthe definition of (media)access proposed at the 1977 Unesco-meeting in Belgrade,which has been reproduced in Servaes (1999: 85): “access refers to the use ofmedia for public service. It may be defined in terms of the opportunities available tothe public to choose varied and relevant programs and to have a means offeedback to transmit its reactions and demands to production organisations.” Morespecific content-oriented approaches focus on ‘missing content’ from a userperspective. The Children’s Partnership (2000) analysis, for instance, points to the


absence of content of interest to people (living in the US) with an underclassbackground, with low levels of literacy in English and with interests in local politicsin culture, in other words: “underserved Americans [that] are seeking the followingcontent on the Internet: practical information focusing on local community;information at a basic literacy level; material in multiple languages; information onethnic and cultural interests; interfaces and content accessible to people withdisabilities; easier searching; and coaches to guide them.

Comparing the meaning(s) access is attributed within the digital divide discourseand the ‘other’ articulations and definitions of access discussed above, thefollowing elements have become disarticulated from the digital divide discourse: 1/the possession of skills (and not only of equipment), 2/ user practices, 3/ relevantcontent and 4/ feedback (and not only the mere use of the equipment).

When analysing the EU PrepCom documents for these potential shortcomings,several attempts to broaden the digital divide discourse can be found. First, a clearemphasis on ‘developing human capacity’ (EU, 2002b: 4) is present, althoughsome of the segments on training in the PrepCom 1 document tend toinstrumentalise the acquisition of skills, as for instance in the following fragmentdefining knowledge as the “training of the human resources required by theInformation Society” (EU, 2002a: 3). In the EU PrepCom 2 document, the need to(discursively) broaden the nodal point access is addressed in the discussion of e-Learning (one of the four priorities for action, next to e-Inclusion, e-Governmentand e-Business). e-Learning is defined as “the development of skills to accessknowledge”, which is in turn seen as one of “the foremost issues for bridging thedigital divide” (EU, 2002b: 7). Also the need to include access to content isacknowledged, thus avoiding another type of reduction to physical access. Herethe emphasis is on ‘cultural diversity and identity’ and on ‘varied’ (EU, 2002b: 7)and local content: “ICTs and media as a whole can and should stimulate linguisticand cultural diversity, including through the facilitation of exchange of local content.[…] In this respect, production and exchange of appropriate local content availablein the user’s mother tongue is of vital importance.” (EU, 2002b: 4) The problem isthat although the EU clearly postulates in their PrepCom 1 document that it is “oneof the major challenges […] to convey to […] the average citizen and small andmedium enterprises that the ongoing changes related to the Information Societyare not just about technologies and sophisticated financial market mechanisms,but also about their daily way of life and working process” (EU, 2002a: 12), thesedocuments hardly refer to the complexity and contingency of user practices anduser needs. The meaning of the nodal point access remains well locked within theboundaries of a macro-approach to informational benefits, blatantly disregardingpotential disadvantages7: “The potential benefits of the Information Society for


citizens and companies are undoubted.” (EU, 2002b: 7) Despite the recognitionthat these actors “should be part of the political process in which they have theirown voice” (EU, 2002a: 12), the EU PrepCom documents hardly utilise a bottom-up perspective to content and use.

Line of critique 2: challenging the truth claim

A second line of critique touches the very hart of the digital divide discourse,challenging the truth claim this discourse inherently carries. More gentle criticismsare oriented towards the notion that a two-tiered division is not tenable. Van Dijk(1999: 155) pleads for replacing the ‘gap’ or ‘divide’ by a ‘continuum’, when hesays that: “a better representation would be a continuum or spectrum ofdifferentiated positions across the population with the ‘information elite’ at the topand a group of ‘excluded people’ at the bottom.” Others point to the dynamiccharacter of innovation, the role and specificity of early adopters (and implicitly orexplicitly to Rogers’ (1996) theory of the diffusion of innovations) in order toaccount for the reduction or reinterpretation of the ‘divide’. Frissen (2000) takesthis position and refers (a bit less gently) to the ‘myth of the digital gap’. One of herarguments for this position goes as follows: “The term ‘gap’ suggests that theidentified differences have a static character. There are enough empirical cluesthat this is not the case. Certain groups such as women and elderly do not belongto the vanguard, but are rapidly catching up.” (Frissen, 2000: 9-10 – mytranslation) In the USA similar arguments have been used stating that racial andgender differences are decreasing or disappearing (Katz et al., 2001; Hoffman etal. 1999). The triumphant 2002 U.S. Department of Commerce report “A nationonline: how Americans are expanding their use of the Internet” concludes: “thosewho have been the least traditional users – people of lower income levels, lowereducation levels, or the elderly – are among the fastest adopters of this newtechnology.” (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2002: 92)

An even morefundamentalversion of thiscritique is thatthe digitaldividediscoursearticulates adichotomy between information haves and information have-nots, betweeninformation rich and information poor or between those who use or benefit fromICT and those who do not8. Not only does this dichotomy imply a static approach

Source: BBC News Online (1999) – Special report:‘Bridging the digital divide’


to technological innovation, but it also offers a structuring of the social on the basisof a technological criterion, both in explaining contemporary and future societies.Especially when the introduction and/or increased access to these ‘technologies offreedom’ (de Sola Pool, 1983) is seen as the motor for social development, atechnological deterministic ideology is seen in operation. ICTs in general arearticulated as beneficial and their possession as enviable. For this reason so-called ‘non-users’ or ‘want-nots’ (also see Heinderyckx’ contribution in this volume)are often considered as being in a transitory phase, which can be illustrated by thefollowing statement in the UCLA report: “Many people still don’t have a computerat home – nearly 40 percent (39.7) of respondents.” (UCLA, 2000: 24) Wolf (1998:26) links this articulation with commodification: “calling the Internet the GreatEqualizer helps to sell more computers. The metaphor masquerades as a quick fixto social inequality while ignoring the factors that lead to inequality.”

Moreover, at the epistemological level the foregrounding of information formsagain a specific articulation that is closely related to the more liberal approachestowards a free flow of information as a democratic practice. The fetishisation ofinformation (to the detriment of knowledge) is based on a very mechanicalapproach to human learning and knowledge acquisition. One of the major reasonsfor this can be found in the lack of adequate philosophical reflection on theconcepts of information and knowledge (Karvonen, 2001: 50). Stehr (1994: 92)argues here that especially the concept of knowledge has been treated as a blackbox: ‘although many and elaborate definitions of knowledge are offered, anequivalent effort toward a theoretical analysis of the decisive phenomenon“knowledge as such” is not thought necessary. The new qualities of scientificknowledge and its social consequences are merely postulated. In short, knowledgeis essentially treated as a black box.’ As knowledge is more closely related to the(knowledgeable) subject, this can also account for the secondary role of the user.Yet another problem is that the possession of the tools of connectedness as astate of being is conflated with the possession of information and even knowledge,thus further advancing the commodification of information.

In the two EU PrepCom documents under scrutiny, only one reference is made tothe “possible threat of a widening gap between info-rich and info-poor” (EU, 2002b:7). The use of signifiers as ‘e-Inclusion’ (EU, 2002b: 7) and ’digital opportunities’(EU, 2002a: 13) allows the EU to avoid the dichotomous connotations of the gap-metaphor. This is further strengthened by the attention spent on the societalcontext of the digital divide – where the divide ‘only’ ‘reflects and exacerbatesexisting inequalities’ (EU, 2002b: 7) and where technologies are ‘not an end inthemselves’ (EU, 2002b: 6). At the same time the two documents breathetechnological optimism, which in some cases approximates technological


determinism, for instance when it is stated that “[the World Summit] takes place ata moment that there is world-wide recognition that the society has, and continues,to change as a result of the past-paced changes of information andtelecommunications technology and thereby driving economic, social, and culturalchanges to extend never held for possible.” (EU, 2002a: 2) In other cases atechnological deterministic position is only avoided by the use of words as ‘could’and ‘potential’, as for instance in the following fragments: “in a developmentcontext, e-Inclusion could contribute to the eradication of extreme poverty andhunger [...].” (EU, 2002b: 7) & “ICTs have great potential as a tool to meetdevelopment policy objectives; such as the achievement of the Development goalsset out in the UN Millennium Declaration.” (EU, 2002b: 8) Other elements whichexpose the EU position to this line of critique are the strong emphasis on thepotential benefits of information, the conflation of information and knowledge, andthe lack of a theoretical substructure supporting the use of these concepts. Anexample of the first element is the statement that “multilingual and affordableinformation can powerfully contribute to developing and sustaining democracy, andto economic development.” (EU, 2002b: 3) The conflation of knowledge andinformation can be illustrated by referring to the rather nonsensical and eventautological description of the topic ‘access to knowledge’ – next to ‘access toknowledge’ (see above) and ‘ICT policies aiming at poverty alleviation andeconomic wealth creation’ and ‘participation and new mechanisms forgovernance’, one of the key topics that constitutes the EU’s proposal for a ‘GlobalDeal’ – “access to knowledge which would address numerous access issues suchas in relation to telephony, Internet, information, and knowledge, and in a variety ofdimensions.” (EU, 2002a: 4)

Line of critique 3: decentring the divide

A third line of critique attempts to decentre the digital divide discourse. A moremodest attempt is oriented towards people with disabilities. In Kearns’ (2001)paper, which can be found on the ‘International Centre for Disability Resources onthe Internet’ web site, people with disabilities are simply added to the moretraditional list of socio-demographic categories that are said to be concerned,when the digital divide is defined as follows: “The “Digital Divide” is an obstaclethat looks to segregate many groups of people from these technologicaldevelopments simply due to their socio-economic status (SES), their geographiclocation, their education level, or because they have a disabling condition that isphysical, sensory, or cognitive/psychological in nature.”

The second and more important attempt to decentre the digital divide discourse isoriented towards a more international perspective, and aims to de-westernise the


digital divide. An example of this position can be found at the Bridges.org web site(which includes the frequently used visual representation of the need to overcomethe digital divide, which is rendered on the next page) where it is stated that: “’the

digital divide’ means that between countries and between different groups ofpeople within countries, there is a wide division between those who have realaccess to information and communications technology and are using it effectively,and those who don't. […] More often than not, the ‘information have-nots’ are indeveloping countries, and in disadvantaged groups within countries. Tobridges.org, the digital divide is thus a lost opportunity – the opportunity for theinformation "have-nots" to use ICTs to improve their lives.”

As Servaes (2000: xi) remarks in the introduction of ‘Walking on the other side ofthe information highway’, many developing countries’ governments have attributeda leading role to ICT in their strategies for economic growth and are beingencouraged by the IMF and World Bank9 to do so. The involvement of theseWestern-oriented development agencies still embedded in the paradigms ofmodernisation (Burgelman et al., 1999: 16), nevertheless strongly nuance theclaim of the de-westernisation of the digital divide discourse. This implies that thesame specific articulations that characterise the Western digital divide discourse,can be found in many (but not all) of the more ‘global’ reorientations of thisdiscourse. Due to these similarities the ‘global’ digital divide discourse remainsvulnerable for the previously outlined lines of critique.

The EU PrepCom documents incorporate both elements of this line of critique.Firstly (and not surprisingly10) clear emphasis is placed on the specific position ofdisadvantaged – or even ‘marginalised’ (EU, 2002b: 9) – groups, for instance whenit is stated that “another important aspect is to make ICTs equally available to menand women, and to the benefit of disadvantaged groups (elderly, disabled, youth,indigenous people, etc.).” (EU, 2002b: 6) A similar statement can also be foundwhen ‘access to information and knowledge’ is elaborated: “Notably, information inthe public domain should be of high quality, easily accessible for all, including thedisabled.” (EU, 2002b: 4) Secondly, due to the nature of the Summit, focussingsolely on the West would be virtually unthinkable. Some of the fragmentsmentioned above have already illustrated that the digital divide is (also) seen in a

Source: Bridges.org web site


‘development context’ (EU, 2002b: 7). The second key topic of the EU’s proposalfor a ‘Global Deal’ is the development of “ICT policies aiming at poverty alleviationand economic wealth creation” (EU, 2002a: 4), where the following ‘description’ isgiven: “debate between industrialised and developing countries in a relativelyneutral field, a number of interests are shared, the perspective and the speed ofgrowth in the sector give the feeling that there is still openness and a margin for awin-win exercise.” (EU, 2002a: 4) Despite the repeated use of signifiers asopenness, dialogue, partnership and co-operation vis-à-vis the developingcountries, their position and specificity (with the exception of the EU’s emphasis onrespect for cultural diversity) remains virtually absent, while the European eEurope2002 Action Plan features prominently as an example of the road ahead.

Participation as a complement to access

Another group of attempts to decentre the digital divide discourse, which are aimedtowards a more political11 rearticulation of the divide, are discussed separately. Anexample of this position is Gandy’s (2002) article entitled “the real digital divide:citizens versus consumers”, in which he sees “the new media as widening thedistinction between the citizen and the consumer.” (Gandy, 2002: 448) The mainconcern here is that the ‘new economy’ will incorporate and thus foreclose thedemocratic possibilities of the new media (Kellner, 1999). The basis of analysis isprovided by a distinction between a ‘consumer’ and a ‘civic model’ of networkactivity; the balance between both models will eventually determine the role of theInternet in post-industrial democracy. This political rearticulation of the divide offersmajor opportunities towards the inclusion of power and empowerment within thisdiscourse, avoiding at the same time the technological deterministic, media-centred, westernised and epistemologically biased position, and safeguarding theimportant notion of social exclusion. This rearticulation also implies the inclusion ofyet another signifier in this debate, which has always (to a very high degree)complemented access: participation.

In order to achieve this broadening of the scope, we now turn to the field ofparticipatory communication for inspiration, bearing in mind that access does notbecome completely discredited, but continues to play (together with interaction –see Carpentier (2002)) a crucial role, especially as a necessary condition forparticipation.

The following overview of the interpretation(s) of participation is structured byServaes’ (1999: 84) thesis that the field of participatory communication is


characterised by two points of view: Freire’s dialogical pedagogy and the alreadymentioned Unesco debates on access, participation and self-management in theseventies.

Despite Freire’s focus on the educational process and the struggle againstilliteracy and injustice, where the (mass)medial context is only minimally taken intoaccount, Freire’s theory has had a considerable impact within the domain ofparticipatory communication. Freire’s pedagogy of the hope is initially aimedagainst the traditional educational system, which he regards paternalistic and non-participative, since this system considers knowledge to be passed on as a ready-made package instead of as the result of a dialogic meeting between subjects. Inthis fashion the educational system maintains and supports existing powerimbalances. Freire aims to transform this system, allowing students (together withtheir teachers) to develop valid knowledge in a process of ‘conscientisation’.“Authentic participation would then enable the subjects involved in this dialogicencounter to unveil reality for themselves” (Thomas, 1994: 51). Participation is, inother words, situated in a context of the reduction of power imbalances, both at thebroad social, political and economic level (the relations between oppressors andrepressed) and at the level of the educational system, where students andteachers strive for knowledge in a non-authoritative collaboration that fosterspartnership.

The second point of view within the field of participatory communication has to besituated in the context of the Unesco debates about a 'New World Information andCommunication Order' (NWICO)12 and a ‘New International Economic Order’(NIEO). These debates, with the report of the 1977 Belgrade-meeting as transcriptof this discussion, are among others oriented towards defining of the conceptsaccess, participation and self-management. In this report “access refers to the useof media for public service. It may be defined in terms of the opportunities availableto the public to choose varied and relevant programs and to have a means offeedback to transmit its reactions and demands to production organisations.”(reproduced in Servaes, 1999: 85) Participation and self-management are in theUnesco debates defined as follows: “participation implies a higher level of publicinvolvement in communication systems. It includes the involvement of the public inthe production process and also in the management and planning ofcommunication systems. Participation may be no more than representation andconsultation of the public in decision making. On the other hand, self-managementis the most advanced form of participation. In this case, the public exercises thepower of decision making within communication enterprises and is also fullyinvolved in the formulation of communication policies and plans.” (reproduced inServaes, 1999: 85)


Participation and em/power/ment

The above discussed approaches to participation might give the impression thatthe definition of participation goes uncontested. The opposite is the case, as forinstance Pateman (1972: 1) remarks: “the widespread use of the term […] hastended to mean that any precise, meaningful content has almost disappeared;‘participation’ is used to refer to a wide variety of different situations by differentpeople”. This widespread use (or the floating) of (the signifier) participation hasprompted the construction of hierarchically ordered systems of meaning in whichspecific forms of participation are described as ‘complete’, ‘real’ and ‘authentic’,while other forms of participation are described as ‘partial’, ‘fake’ and ‘pseudo’. Asthe illustrations that follow will illustrate, the defining element of this categorisationis the degree to which power is equally distributed among the participants.

An example of the introduction of the difference between complete and partialparticipation can be found in Pateman’s (1972) book ‘Democratic theory andparticipation’. The two definitions of participation that she introduces are thedefinitions of ‘partial’ and ‘full participation’. Partial participation is defined by heras: “a process in which two or more parties influence each other in the making ofdecisions but the final power to decide rests with one party only” (Pateman, 1972:70), while full participation is seen as “a process where each individual member ofa decision-making body has equal power to determine the outcome of decisions.”(Pateman, 1972: 71)

Other related concepts construct a hierarchically ordered system within thedefinitions of participation on the basis of the real-unreal dichotomy. In the field ofthe so-called political participation, for example, Verba (1961: 220-221) indicatesthe existence of ‘pseudo-participation’, in which the emphasis is not on the creatingof a situation in which participation is possible, but on the creating of the feelingthat participation is possible: “participation has become a technique of persuasionrather than of decision”. An alternative name which is among others used byStrauss (1998: 18) is ‘manipulative participation’13.

Also in the field of participatory communication this difference between real/trueparticipation on the one hand and pseudo-participation on the other hand isacknowledged. White, for example, refers to a paper of Deshler and Sock (1985)who have analysed the literature on development and participation, in function ofthe applied basic concepts. In this context they introduce the difference between‘pseudo-participation’ and ‘genuine participation’. White (1994: 17) summarises thedefinitions used in this conference paper as follows, where (again) much weight isattributed to the presence of equal power relations: “People's participation in


development in which the control of the project and the decision-making powerrests with the planners, administrators, and the community's elite is pseudo-participation. […] When the development bureaucracy, the local elite, and thepeople are working cooperatively throughout the decision-making process andwhen the people are empowered to control the action to be taken, only then canthere be genuine participation”. A second author working within the tradition ofparticipatory communication that uses terms as 'genuine' and 'authenticparticipation' is Servaes. In 'Communication for development' (1999) he writes thatthis ‘real’ form of participation has to be seen as participation “[that] directlyaddresses power and its distribution in society. It touches the very core of powerrelationships.” (Servaes, 1999: 198) The concept of power is in other words againcentral to the definition of ‘real’ participation. White (1994: 17) also emphasisesthis central link between power and participation: “it appears that power andcontrol are pivotal subconcepts which contribute to both understanding thediversity of expectations and anticipated out-comes of people's participation.”

Participation at/in the WSIS

In December 2001 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution14

that (among other things) asked for the active participation by non-governmentalorganisations, the civil society and the private sector in the WSIS. This activeparticipation in the Summit also includes the preparatory process and (thus) thePrepCom 1 and 2 meetings. In the European PrepCom 1 document, “thepreparatory process is [considered] very important and representation from allinterested groups should be sought in order to give a clear signal of an all-inclusiveness.” (EU, 2002a: 8) This document refers to the public resentment“based on the perception that policy making processes are not sufficientlytransparent and are taking place behind closed doors. Time has come for apolitical reaction: this UN Summit offers an excellent occasion to experiment with anew formula and show the public at large that inclusive processes are not only ofinterest to them, but also possible.” (EU, 2002a: 8). A few pages further, thedocument raises the stakes even higher, as the Summit itself is seen as a modelfor the future role of civil society (and commerce): “the preparatory process isalmost as important as the political outcomes of the Summit itself. The format andpositioning of the Summit will be key factors for an event which will attract attentionand activate a decentralised follow up process, not only at political level but also insociety at large.” Also in the European PrepCom 2 document, the decentralisednature of the follow up process is emphasised: “the Plan of Action will constitute acommon reference and framework for implementation for all stakeholders, to bepromoted in a decentralised way, under the lead of a multitude of stakeholders.”(EU, 2002: 11)


In relation to this position three major critiques need to be formulated. Firstly,concerning the participatory nature of the preparatory process, the Interim CivilSociety Plenary Coordinating Group has written a letter to the WSIS SecretariatExecutive Director (Pierre Gagné) to raise two concerns regarding this process,which are summarised in the two following statements: “civil society participation isdiscouraged” and “civil society inputs are not receiving enough consideration”. Atthe CRIS web site (an acronym for Communication Rights in the InformationSociety), the following statement can be found: “The WSIS: A vessel adrift: Forlack of leadership, clear vision and real political will, preparations for the WorldSummit on the Information Society are off to a difficult start. Although frustrated,civil society is getting organized.” (CRIS, 2002) When taking these statementsfrom civil society representatives into account, it can hardly be maintained that thepreparatory process is a model for future civil society participation. In this light theEU statement that “civil society involvement is vital in the take-up and socialacceptance of the Information Society” (EU, 2002b: 6) might even be read asinstrumental and cynical.

Secondly, when analysing the articulation of the signifier participation in the twoEuropean PrepCom documents – and disregarding the strong discursive presenceof civil society participation in the World Summit of the Information Society – it issurprising how little emphasis is placed on the participation of civil society andcitizens in the Information Society as such. There are (only) two exceptions: one isthe potential role ICT can play in the domain of e-Governance, as its “underlyinggoal is to meet the challenges of modern governance: efficiency, i.e. to enablepublic administration to reach a higher productivity, equality, i.e. to serve allcitizens without discrimination, while being responsive to individuals’ needs, andactive citizen participation through the use of ICTs.” (EU, 2002b: 7) More generally,the empowering potential of information is highlighted: “Information has a key rolein strategies oriented towards empowering people with a special emphasis in thisregard on the equal participation of women and men in the Information Society.”(EU, 2002b: 10) The second exception is the rather vague statement (which is alsothe third key topic of the proposed ‘Global Deal’) concerning ‘participation and newmechanisms for governance’. These mechanisms are situated “at global andnational levels encompassing a) issues related to the sector like electroniccommunications regulatory frameworks, data protection, network security andCyber Security, legal aspects of e-commerce and internet governance as well asb) more general issues related to the new citizenship in the information age.” (EU,2002a: 13) These two exceptions only further illustrate the weak articulation ofcitizen and civil society participation in the two European PrepCom texts, which donot address the power imbalances that characterise the relations between


governments, civil society and commerce, and between the industrialised anddeveloping countries.

Finally, the lack of attention for the existing structural power imbalances that resultout of economic processes (both in industrialised countries and in the relationshipsbetween industrialised and developing countries) and the related tension betweenthe people’s articulation as citizens and/or consumers in the new economy(discussed by Gandy (2002)), becomes apparent when the role of business isaddressed in the second PrepCom document. With some optimism it is stated thatthe Bucharest Conference15 has not only shown a change in the perception of civilsociety, but also in the perception of “business [which] defines itself not only as amarket player but sees its role in a wider political and social context, i.e. helpingcountries to develop ICTs and overcome the digital divide.” (EU, 2002b: 6) At thesame time the EU – especially in relation towards developing countries –articulates users as consumers and pleads for their integration into the‘international market’ and into a ‘competitive economy’, through the developmentof non-protectionist (or so-called ‘non-discriminatory’) legal and policy frameworks:“An trustworthy, transparent, and non-discriminatory legal and regulatoryframework for electronic communications, including the conditions under whichconsumers have access to services, is a necessary condition for the mobilisationof private sector investment and the development of effective communicationinfrastructures and services, which in turn are the basis for a competitiveeconomy.” (EU, 2002b: 4-5) This issue is explicitly included in the EU’sconsiderations for the WSIS action plan, when they suggest to “promote theestablishment, by developing countries, of appropriate regulatory and policyframeworks including in particular areas affecting consumers, which wouldfacilitate their integration into the international ICT market through increasedforeign direct investment by the private sector.” (EU, 2002b: 9) Again, there is anexception to the lack of attention for the structural power imbalances, as the EUpromotes the use of open source software, and creates a link to citizenship (andnot to consumption). “widespread access to information and knowledge ataffordable cost for citizens should be promoted also through a broader use of opensource software with a focus on the eventual use and further development of theUNESCO software CDS/ISIS; along the same line use of a multiplatform approachand use of open platforms, and interoperability increase the freedom of choice.”(EU, 2002b: 4)


Conclusion

The digital divide discourse is considered problematic in many regards, because ofits unilateral emphasis on access, and because of its specific articulation of thesignifier access. As a first line of critique has shown, this articulation results in theexclusion of user skills and practices, relevant content and opportunities forfeedback. A second line of critique is even more vital, as it challenges the truthclaims of this discourse, on empirical, conceptual, ideological and epistemologicalgrounds. A third line of critique attempts to decentre, de-westernise and politicisethe digital divide discourse.

Despite these different lines of critique some elements of the digital dividediscourse are worth saving, more specifically a broadened notion of access, andthe emancipatory discourse of a struggle against social exclusion that lies hiddensomewhere behind the discursive complexity of the digital divide discourse.Although social exclusion cannot be reversed without tackling the factors that leadto inequality (following Wolf (1998) and many others) and ‘inclusive politics ofinclusion’ form a necessity, access to ICT remains one of the many tools toachieve this aim, but not without broadening its scope and connecting the digitaldivide discourse to another signifier: participation (and the inseparable discursiveelements of power and empowerment).

In the documents for the meetings of the preparatory committee of the WSIS, theEU has succeeded in partially broadening the scope of the digital divide discourse,mainly by complementing the gap-metaphor with signifiers as ‘e-Inclusion’ and‘digital opportunities’, and by their focus on the acquisition of skills, the respect forcultural diversity and the need for local and varied content. This discursivebroadening of the meaning of access has not reached its full potential, as the EU’sarticulation of citizenship does not take the citizens’ (democratic) needs asdiversified users communities into account. The fetish of information (sometimescalled ‘knowledge’) is seen as the sole mechanism for empowerment, thus stronglyreducing the democratic potential of ICT, at the same time embedding ICTs withinthe divide’s technological optimism (or even determinism). Information andknowledge have become interchangeable concepts, and are used without atheoretical substructure. Moreover there is hardly any critical reflection on theprevailing power/knowledge relations, and their impact on for instance theproduction of content at the level of the ‘microphysics of power’ (Foucault, 1997:42).


At the level of participation, the EU has demonstrated the keen will to include allrelevant actors in the decision-making process of the WSIS. The EU wishes toprovide the “developing countries [with] an opportunity to be fully associated to thedebate and decision process” (EU, 2002a: 4) and hold the opinion that “the variousstakeholders [… including civil society …] should be part of the political process inwhich they have their own voice” (EU, 2002a: 12). By doing so, the EU hasexpressed the intention to support the creation of a new model for decision-making, for the future role of civil society (and commerce) and for “citizenship inthe information age” (EU, 2002a: 12). Despite these (discursive) efforts, civilsociety’s frustration has shown that even their partial participation (usingPateman’s (1972) vocabulary) at the Summit remains problematic. Furthermorethe EU does not address the matter of citizen participation in the InformationSociety as such (with some minor exceptions) and does not thematisecommunication as a human right, bottom-up processes as a valid politicaldecision-making tool and structural power imbalances (generated by a diversity ofpolitical, social, cultural and economic mechanisms) as a threat to the propagatednew models of citizenship. Because of these shortcomings, the EU does notmanage to supplement the nodal point of access in these two PrepComdocuments with a conclusively deepened articulation of participation and (at leastpartially) fails to live up to the expectations created towards civil societyparticipation.

Notes1 The author would like to acknowledge the support of the Flemish Community (PolicyResearch Centres Program – Programma Steunpunten voor Beleidsrelevant Onderzoek) inthe preparation of this chapter. This text contains the views of the author and not the viewsof the Flemish Community. The Flemish Community cannot be held accountable for thepotential use of the communicated views and data.2 This chapter does not directly deal with the construction of signifiers as the ‘neweconomy’ and the ‘(European Information Society) and their truth claims. Others in thisvolume do take on this issue.3 Recently the European Council of Seville endorsed an eEurope action plan for 2005.4 See for instance Krumme (2002) and Bridges.org (2001).5 The analysis of these two PrepCom documents is complicated by their strategic natureand by their place in the ongoing processes of negotiation. For this reason the use of thesetwo documents remains illustrative, and cannot be extrapolated to the entire EU IS-policywithout further analysis.


6 Instrumental skills deal with the operational manipulation of technology, while structuralskills relate to the use (and understanding) of the structure in which the information iscontained. Strategic skills include the basic readiness to pre-actively look for information,the information-based decision-making and the scanning of the environment for relevantinformation (Steyaert, 2002, 73-74).7 In the PrepCom 1 document one reference to the potential threats is made in theintroduction, and it immediately countered by pointing to the potential benefits of ICT:'despite the pervasive effect of ICTs, their impact on societies and economies is still only atthe first stage. These changes are accompanied by a number of new challenges andthreats but at the same time, they offer new potential and new models to deal with.' (EU,2002a: 3)8 Users of these discursive elements often bracket them, signifying their unease with thesignifier. In other cases even the signifier ‘digital divide’ is bracketed. Despite the impliedconditionality, the signifiers are still articulated as described in the paper.9 The World Bank has for instance established GICT (the Global Information &Communication Technologies Department) in January 2000.10 In the eEurope 2002 Action Plan, "eParticipation" for the disabled was already one of thepriority areas (EU, 2000: 17).11 Political is used here in the broad sense, not being restricted to a specific sphere and/orsystem, but as a dimension that is ‘inherent to every human society and that determinesour very ontological condition’ (Mouffe, 1997: 3).12 Or also: 'New International Information Order' (NIIO).13 The well-known rhyme, which according to myth appeared sometime around thebeginning of the seventies on a Paris wall, also takes advantage of this dichotomy between‘real’ and ‘fake’ participation: 'Je participe, tu participes, il participe, nous participons, vousparticipez, ils profitent.' (Verba & Nie, 1987: 0)14 Resolution 56/183, adopted by the 90th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 21December 2001.15 This is one of the regional preparatory conferences, for the Pan-European countries,held in Bucharest from 7-9 November 2002.


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Communication Rights and the EuropeanInformation Society

Cees J. Hamelink

Introduction

For the sake of convenience and coherence I shall use in this chapter the notion ofthe ‘European Information Society’. I think it necessary however to preface thiswith some qualifying observations.

• There is no European Information Society. There are in the European regionsocieties that are confronted with ‘informational developments’. This notion refersto the growing significance of information products (such as news, advertising,entertainment, scientific data etc.) and information services (such as provided bythe WWW), to the increasing volumes of information available, to the role ofinformation technologies as part of society’s infrastructure and to the contributionof information handling activities to key economic transactions in finance andtrading in modern societies.The confrontation with ‘informational developments’ occurs in different ways, atdifferent levels, at different speed and in different historical contexts. Societiesdesign their responses through policies, plans, and programmes both as centrallysteered initiatives (for example by the European Commission) and asdecentralized activities on national and local levels. The actors involved are bothpublic institutions and private bodies and increasingly there are forms ofpublic/private partnership. Society's responses may take the form of both legalinstruments and self-regulatory arrangements. Most of these initiatives are drivenby economic motives and are strongly technology-centric.The key questions for academic inquiry address such crucial sociological issuesas: what will be the distribution of benefits of these developments (‘cui bono’, orwho benefits?), which actors will be included and which ones excluded frompolitical participation in decision-making about these developments (whodecides?), and which actors will be accountable in case these developments haveadverse social effects.• Discussing the European Information Society also raises the question about theEurope that should be addressed. The geo-strategically most comprehensive


Europe? From Alaska to Siberia? This is the Europe of 55 member states of theOSCE. Or the more restricted Europe of the Council of Europe (with its 42 memberstates), or the smallest, but expanding Europe of the European Union? Moreover,beyond the geographical descriptor there is also the more substantialdifferentiation between a European conception that is driven by commercial andtrading interests and a European ideal that is motivated by the tradition of humanrights protection. These different Europe’s are not easily reconciled!• The European democratic deficit. Europe may be en route towards an informationsociety but it does so without adequate democratic institutional arrangements for abroad social debate and civil participation in the decision making on Europe’sfuture. There is in Europe no broad public debate on how Europe can develop as ademocratic project. The current EU decision making structure resembles morethan anything else a TGV that races on at high speed with no alternative routes. Itspolitical arrangement is an imposition from above which de-motivates citizens totake elections for the European Parliament seriously. There is at present not aEuropean Public Space and its creation should be the foremost priority for anyattempt to build the European Information Society.European politics is mainly shaped by the secret deals that the European politicalleadership makes. The European Parliament has no matching power to control,expose and correct these deals.

The core of any democratic political deliberation should be formed by a sharedvalue orientation (i.e. a normative consensus), a sense of ‘imagined community ‘(i.e. a feeling of belonging), and a common purpose. The current efforts of the EUto construct a European identity through such legal instruments as the EU Charterof Fundamental Rights (2000) are doomed to fail since identity is a matter of socialpsychological processes and not of regulatory initiatives. You cannot regulatepeople to feel European. People in the European region will only becomeEuropeans when they feel comfortable with this notion and when they concludethat it benefits them in direct, concrete and material ways. Actually, the adoption ofthe European Charter next to the already existing European Convention on HumanRights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) does not help to promote the Europeanfeeling. It rather strengthens the impression that there are several Europes.

Communication Rights in Europe

Fundamental rights that are relevant to the ‘European Information Society’ are atpresent (in various legal provisions) found in connection with (a) the freedom ofexpression, (b) the protection of privacy and data traffic, (c) the security ofinformation infrastructures, and (d) the protection of intellectual property rights.

Communication Rights and the European Information Society 123

The Right to Freedom of Expression

The basic legal instrument is the European Convention on Human Rights andFundamental Freedoms (ECHR) of 1950. Its Article 10 reads:“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedomto hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas withoutinterference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall notprevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinemaenterprises.The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as areprescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests ofnational security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorderor crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputationor rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received inconfidence , or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary”.

A supra-national court supervises the implementation of the provisions of thisregional legal instrument and thus develops over the years a jurisprudence thathelps to understand the meaning of the various articles of the Convention.

Over the past years a number of cases involving violations of Article 10 have beenbrought before the Court and through this case law important Europeanjurisprudence on free speech is developing.Between the beginnings in the early 1950s till 1970 there was only one case inrelation to Article 10. In the 1970s there were three cases, in the 1980s twelve andsince then the caseload is only growing. Between January 1990 and July 1999 theCourt handed down some seventy judgments. In 50% of these cases the Courtconcluded that there had been a violation of Article 10. Between July 1999 andMay 2002 the Court concluded in 36 cases that there was a violation of Article 10.

Most cases address forms of direct and indirect interference by state authorities inthe freedom of expression. The Court uses as basic rationale in judging forms ofstate interference that free speech “constitutes one of the essential foundations ofa democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and eachindividual’s self fulfilment”. According to the Court the notion of free speech isapplicable not only to “information and ideas that are favorably received orregarded as inoffensive, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb: such arethe demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without whichthere is no democratic society”. The Court has repeatedly stated that in ademocratic and pluralist society free speech is particularly essential to the political


debate. “Free elections and freedom of expression, particularly political debate,together form the bedrock of any democratic society” (the Bowman versus the UKcase of 9 February 1998).

In this context the Court has stressed the essential role of the media. Inthe case Bladet Tromso & Stensaas v. Norway of May 20, 1999, the Court stated:“One factor of particular importance for the Court’s determination in the presentcase is the essential function the press fulfils in a democratic society”.

The rulings of the European Court can be organised under the following headings(see http://www.echr.coe.int/).

1. Political Polemics

Exemplary is the Janowski versus Poland Case of January 21, 1999:On 2 September 1992 Mr Janowski – a Polish journalist-- intervened when he sawtwo municipal guards ordering street vendors to leave a square in Zdunska. Heargued with the guards and told them they had no legal basis for their action. TheZdunska public prosecutor instituted a criminal proceeding against Mr Janowskiand charged him with having insulted the municipal guards. On 29 April 1993, theDistrict Court convicted Mr Janowski and sentenced him to eight months’imprisonment suspended for two years and a fine plus the court costs. Against hisappeal, also the Regional Court found him guilty of having used such insultingwords as ‘oafs’ and ‘dumb’. The Court found that Janowski had insulted stateofficials. His remarks were not part of a public discussion and he was operating asa private person, not as a journalist. Civil servants should allow for criticism but notto the same extent as politicians. To strengthen their credibility with the generalpublic it may be necessary to protect them against verbal violence. As the Courtstates, “it cannot be said that civil servants knowingly lay themselves open to closescrutiny of their every word and deed to the extent to which politicians do andshould therefore be treated on an equal footing with the latter when it comes tocriticism of their actions”. The Court concluded that the Polish authorities did notoverstep their margin of appreciation in assessing the necessity of the measures.With twelve votes against five the Court held that there had been no breach ofArticle 10.The margin of appreciation rule that the Court refers to is intended to leave spaceto national authorities to judge the pressing need for interference with free speech.Starting point here is the position that “it is in the first place for the nationalauthorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law. The Court’s srule is limited to verifying whether the interference which resulted from the


applicant’s conviction of that offence can be regarded as necessary in ademocratic society” (Lehideux & Isorni vs France). Following Bladet Tromso the Court defines the margin of appreciation in this way:“According to the Court’s well-established case law, the test of ‘necessity in ademocratic society’ requires the Court to determine whether the ‘interference’complained of corresponded to a ‘pressing social need’, whether it wasproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the reasons given by thenational authorities to justify it are relevant and sufficient…In assessing whethersuch a ‘need’ exists and what measures should be adopted to deal with it, thenational authorities are left a certain margin of appreciation. This power ofappreciation is not, however, unlimited but goes hand in hand with a Europeansupervision by the Court, whose task it is to give a final ruling on whether arestriction is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10”.

Whereas on the one hand the margin of appreciation is circumscribed by the needto show a pressing social need and by the essential role of the press in democraticsocieties, there is a much wider margin for national authorities in relation tomatters of public order, in situations where there is incitement to violence or when“matters liable to offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of moralsor, especially, religion” are at stake (Wingrove v. UK, 25.11.1996). With regard tothe latter, the Court has argued that “what is likely to cause substantial offence topersons of a particular religious persuasion will vary significantly from time to timeand from place to place, especially in an era characterized by an ever growingarray of faiths and denominations. State authorities are in principle in a betterposition than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content ofthese requirements with regard to the rights of others as well as on the ‘necessity’of a ‘restriction’ intended to protect from such material those whose deepestfeelings and convictions would be seriously offended”.The margin is greater in cases of insults against officials, incitement to violence, orcases that refer to morals or religion. The problem with this flexible approach to themargin of appreciation is that the Court distinguishes in its protection of Article 10between different situations where state restrictions obtain. The scope of thenational margin of appreciation varies but, in the absence of explicit criteria, thereis a margin of arbitrariness.

In the field of political polemics also the Oberschlick versus Austria (No 2) Case ofJuly 1, 1997 is interesting. The periodical Forum reproduced a speech held on 7October 1990 by Mr Jörg Haider, leader of the Austrian Freedom Party. The editorof the magazine, Mr Gerhard Oberschlick, commented on the speech and calledHaider a Trottel, an ‘idiot’. On 26 April 1991 Mr Haider brought an action fordefamation and insult. On 23 May 1991 the Court found Mr Oberschlick guilty of


having insulted Mr. Haider and sentenced him to a fine and also ordered theseizure of the relevant issue of Forum. In his application to the European Court MrOberschlick alleged that his conviction was contrary to Article 10 of theConvention. The Court stated in its judgment that the use of the word ‘Trottel’should be seen as part of a political discussion in response to Haider’s speech. Asthe Court expressed, “the applicant’s article and in particular the word Trottel, maycertainly be considered polemical, but they did not on that account constitute agratuitous personal attack as the author provided an objectively understandableexplanation for them derived from Mr Haider’s speech, which was itselfprovocative”. The necessity of interference with the author’s freedom of expressionwas not shown, concluded the Court, and it found that there been a breach ofArticle 10.

2. Racism and Revisionism

The Lehideux & Isorni versus France Case of September 23, 1998:On 13 July 1984 the daily newspaper Le Monde published a one-pageadvertisement bearing the title ‘People of France, you have short memories’. Thetext basically called for a more positive attitude towards Marshal Pétain and hisrole during World War Two as French Head of State. On 10 October 1984 theNational Association of Former Members of the Resistance filed a criminalcomplaint against Mr Lehideux as President of the Association for the Defence ofthe Memory of Marshal Pétain, against Mr Isorni as the author of the text, andagainst the publication manager of Le Monde, for publicly defending the crimes ofcollaboration with the enemy. In the judicial process that followed, the highestFrench court judged (16 November 1993) that the text defended a personconvicted of collusion with the enemy and concluded that the finding of the lowercourt in favor of the complainants did not infringe the right to freedomof expression as protected by Article 10 of the European Convention. Mr Lehideuxand Mr Isorni submitted an application to the European Commission on HumanRights which found their complaint admissible. The case thus proceeded to theCourt which concluded that the criminal conviction of the applicants wasdisproportionate and not necessary in a democratic society. According to the Courtthere had been a breach of Article 10.The Court clarified that the protection of Article 10 would not hold if the cruelties ofthe Nazis had been justified in a publication or if the Holocaust would have beendenied. In its ‘obiter dictum’ the Court said that Article 17 of the Convention takesthe protection of Article 10 away from those who deny the Holocaust.


3. The Use of Confidential Documents

The Case Bladet Tromsoe & Stensaas versus Norway of May 20, 1999:The newspaper Bladet Tromsoe published some articles on the hunting of seals. Inthe first article scientist Lindberg, inspector for the Ministry of Fishing, talked aboutthe unacceptable ways in which the animals are killed. The hunters got anopportunity to do their story. Then the newspaper published the official report byLindberg for the Ministry. The report was withdrawn from publicity since there wereallegations of criminal conduct that needed investigation and the accusations ofLindberg were not proven. The newspaper and editor Stensaas were sentencedfor slander.The Court expressed the need for careful scrutiny in cases where governmentinterference may discourage the participation of the press in debates on matters ofpublic concern. It confirmed the ‘watch dog’ function of the press even if reputationand name of people are at stake.The Court’s majority confirmed that the seal hunters have a right to the protectionof their name and reputation and the right to be held innocent until their guilt hasbeen proven in a court of law. However, the allegations were part of the contentsof the Lindberg report and the newspaper had good reason to believe the reportwas reliable. The Court saw no evidence that the newspaper acted not in goodfaith! Therefore, the Court concluded that the interference with the applicant’sfreedom of expression was disproportionate. The Court sentenced the Norwegiangovernment to a compensatory payment of 693.606 Norwegian crowns.As may be expected the Court’s opinions are not always without dissent andcontroversy. In this case the three dissenting judges argued against the consentingmajority: “In our view the fact that a strong public interest is involved should nothave the consequence of exonerating newspapers from either the basic ethics oftheir trade or the laws of defamation”. They concluded that the judgment “sendsthe wrong signal to the press in Europe…Article 10 may protect the right for thepress to exaggerate and provoke but not to trample over the reputation of privateindividuals”. The dissenting opinions found the judgment undermines the basicethics of the profession which imply that journalists should carefully check factsand should not trample over the reputation of private individuals.

4. Protection of Journalistic Sources

The landmark case is William Goodwin versus The United Kingdom (March 27,1996). This case provides the legal basis for the journalistic privilege in Europe.Until this case the protection of journalistic sources was only recognized involuntary professional codes.


Journalist William Goodwin who worked for The Engineer received confidentialinformation about financial problems at the company Tetra Ltd. He intended topublish an article on this. The company complained that the information in thearticle originated from a confidential business plan and requested a prohibition topublish the information. A court of law supported the request that would be valid forall British media. Moreover, as the judge found that ‘the interests of justice’ are atstake, Goodwin was ordered to reveal his source. Also in appeal the House ofLords confirmed “the importance to the plaintiffs of obtaining disclosure lies in thethreat of severe damage to their business”. Goodwin got a fine of 5.000 BritishPounds for contempt of court and took his case to Strasbourg.The European Court stated that freedom of expression constitutes one of theessential foundations of a democratic society and confirmed that the protection ofjournalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press freedom. The Courtfinally judged that the disclosure order couldn’t be regarded as having beennecessary in a democratic society. The Court took a principled position in favour ofthe journalistic privilege and did not make it dependent upon certain conditions,like how information was gathered.Relevant in the case was the concurring opinion of one judge who suggested thatthe injunction was an utterly unacceptable form of prior restraint; and even if therehad been no injunction the disclosing order would have been illegitimate!The Goodwin case is particularly important since the Convention does not providefor the freedom to gather information. This is a difference with the UniversalDeclaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights that provide for the right to ‘seek’ information and ideas. The Courtconcluded very strongly “Protection of journalistic sources is one of the basicconditions for press freedom. Without such protection, sources may be deterredfrom assisting the press in informing the public on matters of public interest”.Failing this protection “the vital public-watchdog role of the press may beundermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable informationmay be adversely affected”. The Court proposed that an order to reveal sources“must be limited to exceptional circumstances where vital public or individualinterests are at stake”. The Court also proposed that in these cases the nationalmargin of appreciation is restricted since the interests of the democratic society arehere at stake. The Court saw the legitimate interests of the Tetra company butconsidered that they weighed less than the vital public interest in protectingconfidential sources.A relevant dimension of this case was also that the Court made reference to thefield of professional self-regulation through codes of conduct. “Protection ofjournalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press freedom, as it isreflected in the laws and the professional codes of conduct in a number of


Contracting States and is affirmed in several international instruments ofjournalistic freedoms ”.Also in the cases Fressoz & Roire v. France and in Bladet Tromso, the Courtreferred in its argumentation to the ethics of journalism. The reference was usedagainst state interference and in support of professional secrecy (a.o. in BladetTromso, Goodwin and De Haes & Gijsels). However, reference to the failure ofjournalists to heed the provisions of professional ethics has also been used tojustify state interference, as in the Praeger & Oberschlick versus Austria case of 26April 1995, where the Court argued that the applicant could not invoke compliancewith the ethics of journalism.

5. Freedom of Expression in Turkey

The complex and tense situation in Turkey has led to several cases involvingjournalists who wrote about or in favour of the PKK, the Kurdish Political Party. Inmost cases the government was considered guilty of breaching Article 10, but insome cases the Court also decided that there was hate speech or incitement toviolence and thus legitimate interference.

The case of Zana versus Turkey of 25 November 1997:Mr Mehdi Zana, former mayor of Diyarbakir, while serving sentences in the militaryprison of Diyarbakir, remarked in an interview with journalists, ”I support the PKKnational liberation movement; on the other hand I am not in favour of massacres”.The statement was published in the national daily newspaper Cumhuriyet on 30August 1987. By means of an indictment of 19 November 1987, the Diyarbakirmilitary prosecutor instituted proceedings in the Military Court against Mr. Zanacharging him with supporting an armed organisation whose aim was to break upTurkey’s national territory. The Turkish National Security Court held in its judgmentof 26 March1991 that Mr Zana’s statement to journalists amounted to a criminaloffence.When the case ended up with the European Court, the judges found Mr Zana’sstatement contradictory and ambiguous. “They are contradictory because it wouldseem difficult simultaneously to support the PKK, a terrorist organization whichresorts to violence to achieve its ends, and to declare oneself opposed tomassacres”. The Court finally judged that the penalty imposed on the applicantcould be regarded as answering to “a pressing social need” and that consequentlythere had been no breach of Article 10.The Court voted twelve against eight. The dissenting opinions found that therestriction imposed by the Turkish government was not necessary in a democraticsociety. In one opinion, a dissenting judge stated, “Even if one accepts…that themaintenance of national security and public safety constituted a legitimate aim for


the purpose of taking measures in respect of the statement made by the applicant,his conviction and twelve-month prison sentence cannot, in my opinion, be held tobe proportionate to those aims, considering the content of the statement”. And inthe rationale for his dissent, the judge wrote, “The mere fact that in the statementthe applicant indicated support for a political organisation whose aims and meansthe Government reject and combat cannot, therefore, be a sufficient reason forprosecuting and sentencing him”.

It is interesting to compare the Zana case with the Incal versus Turkey case ofJune 9, 1998. Mr Ibrahim Incal, lawyer by profession, was a member of theexecutive committee of the Izmir section of the People’s Labour Party, dissolvedby the Constitutional Court in 1993.On 1 July 1992 the executive committee decided to distribute a leaflet criticizingmeasures taken by the local authorities against small-scale illegal trading and thesprawl of squatters’ camps around the city. The leaflet concluded with “The Drivingthe Kurds out policy forms part of the ‘special war’ being conducted in the countryat present against the Kurdish people. It is one of the mechanisms of that war, theway it impinges on the cities. Because the methods used are the same, namelyenslavement, violence, terror and oppression through compulsion. It is apsychological war”. The Izmir security police considered that the leaflet containedseparatist propaganda capable of inciting the people to resist the Government andcommit criminal offences. A criminal investigation was opened and Mr Incal wasfound guilty by the National Security Court and sentenced to six months andtwenty days imprisonment and a fine. In a judgment of 6 July 1993 the Court ofCassation upheld the judgment. When the case came to the European Court thejudges observed that interference with the freedom of expression of a politicianwho is a member of an opposition party, like the applicant, calls for the closestscrutiny on the part of the Court.The Court further stated that the limits of permissible criticism are wider withregard to the Government than in relation to a private citizen, or even a politician.“In a democratic system the actions or omissions of the Government must besubject to the close scrutiny not only of the legislative and judicial authorities butalso of public opinion”. The Court was prepared to take into account problemslinked to the prevention of terrorism. Here it referred to its judgment in the Zanacase. However, the Court judged that Mr Incal’s conviction was disproportionate tothe aim pursued and therefore unnecessary in a democratic society. It isinteresting that the Court finds contrary to the Zana case that found Mr Incalcannot be held responsible for terrorism in Turkey.


6. Operational Procedure

In its operational procedure the European Court follows the standard practice thatit first decides whether there was an interference of Article 10.1 and then examineswhether the interference is justified. The questions then asked are:Was the interference prescribed by law? What is the basis for the interference innational law? Is the law precise enough? Did the applicant have adequateprotection from arbitrary interference? Did the interference pursue a legitimateaim? Was the interference necessary in a democratic society? In other words canthe interfering state authority demonstrate that there was a pressing social needfor its intervention? The contracting states have a certain margin of appreciation inassessing whether a pressing social need exists but eventually the decision is withthe Court.The question about the pressing need will be followed by the question whether themeasures taken by the state are proportionate to a legitimate aim and whether theproposed reasons are relevant and sufficient? In several cases the Court hasjudged an interference to be not legitimate since the information that was censoredby the state was already available in the public domain anyway.

Challenges for the Future

A first challenge addresses an essential and far-reaching element in the Court’sjurisprudence, which is its interpretation of the right to receive information.According to the jurisprudence of the European Court, the European citizen hasthe right to be properly informed. In several opinions the Court has stated that notonly do the mass media have a right to impart information, they have the task “toimpart information and ideas on matters of public interest” and the public has aright to receive such information and ideas. The Court has ruled that the media arepurveyors of information and are public watchdogs. This imposes a special publicresponsibility on the performance of the media. According to the Court, the mediaof information have a corresponding duty to provide information that properlyinforms their audiences. This is a vitally important position in view of the increasingcommercialization of media and the trend towards trivialisation of informationprovided by them: the ‘sound bites’, the info-tainment formats, the ‘media-hypes’which are a very provocative challenge to both practitioners and policymakers. TheCourt’s position also deserves to be elaborated. It will turn out to be very difficult tofind more precise formulations than ‘properly informed’ and even harder tooperationalize such formulations. It is, however, a task urgently needed and verypertinent to the current media climate.


A second challenge deals with the relationship between the European Conventionand the European Union. A peculiarity of the European region with regard tohuman rights is the fact that although individual EU member states have ratifiedthe ECHR, the EU as an institution has not. This creates a situation in which it isunclear how robust the protection of human rights really is for EU citizens. At theend of 2000 the European Union has proclaimed at its meeting in Nice theEuropean Charter on Fundamental Rights. The Charter formulates the freedom ofexpression in Article 11, “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. Thisright shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart informationand ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. 2.The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected”. In the commentaryon this article, it is stated that restrictions of the right to freedom of expressionshould not exceed the limitations of the European Convention, Article 10,paragraph 2. It is regrettable that the Charter only refers to the interference bypublic authority and effectively excludes the interference from private parties andthus undermines the possible horizontal effect of the Charter. As with theEuropean Convention, also here the right to seek information is not explicitlymentioned. It is also unclear whether paragraph 2 on the pluralism of the mediadoes imply a positive duty on the part of governments to promote this mediapluralism. It would be a constructive step if the EU decided to ratify the EuropeanConvention and if the provisions of the European Charter would be implemented inaccordance with the jurisprudence of the European Court.

A third challenge concerns the accession of Eastern European countries. In recentyears Albania, Armenia, Azerbeidjan, Bulgaria, Rumania, Russia and other Centraland Eastern European countries have ratified the ECHR, and thus the number ofparties to the Convention has risen to forty-three. The newly acceded countriesbring different legal traditions and political experiences to the Court’s proceedingsand it will be of critical importance that the level of protection secured by theConvention will not be lowered. The expanded membership may also confront theCourt with more complex cases about situations where gross and systematicviolations of human rights take place and this raises the question of whether theCourt is adequately equipped to deal with this growing burden of the caseload.

The fourth challenge regards the horizontal effect of basic rights. It may well bepossible that in the years ahead there will be a considerable number of cases inwhich interferences with the right to freedom of information come from privateparties. Will the Court be adequately legally equipped to deal with this? In the caseof Fuentes Bobo versus Spain of February 29, 2000 (about an employee of RTVE,the Spanish public broadcaster, who criticized his employer and who wassubsequently fired) the Court concluded that Article 10 also applies to horizontal


relations. There is therefore a legal precedent but more work needs to be done asthe so-called ‘Dritt-Wirkung’ or horizontal effect of constitutional rights remains acontroversial issue.

A fifth challenge for the Court will be the need to apply in its opinions verysubstantial lines of argumentation and avoid non-essential arguments. In somecases the Court has introduced peculiar (non-essential) arguments that tend toerode the principled nature of these cases. An illustration is the consideration inparagraph 55 of the Incal case where the Court refers to the fact that the securitypolice had an opportunity to require changes in the leaflet. Also in the Goodwincase there is the odd consideration that the interfering party no longer had a claimto the exposure of sources since a judge had already prohibited the publicationand thus limited the damage thereof.

A sixth challenge will be the find a balance between the right to free speech andEuropean efforts to secure safety of the Internet in particular for children. TheCouncil of the European Union approved on 21 December 1998 an Action Plan onpromoting safer use of the Internet by combating illegal and harmful content onglobal networks. Whatever the valid intentions behind this Plan it will imply limitson Internet contents and thus requires a careful consideration of the limitation ofthese limits.A seventh challenge will be the need to make the Court more accessible forEuropean citizens. Given the current caseload this sounds like a very irresponsibleproposition. It should be realized, however, that the institution of the Court is agreat historical example of how the protection of human rights can become areality indeed. The ultimate success of the Court’s functioning will depend upon itsconcrete effect on the lives of European citizens. It is evident that in this process agreat deal could be done by national judicial institutions. In many cases nationalcourts would have come to different conclusions if they had already introduced intheir reasoning the test of the criteria that emerge from European Court’sjurisprudence.

A last challenge is also provided by the need to have robust rules on access toinformation. Although the Council of Europe has declared work on a legal text onaccess to information a priority, no concluding document has been produced sofar. The European Court has held in the Guerra & Others versus Italy case of 19February 1998, that the Convention does not provide a general right of access topublic information, but it does provide a specific right to information onenvironmental hazards.As mentioned before, the right to freedom of expression is also part of theprovisions of The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Brussels,


October 2000). Article 11 of the Charter and more recently the right to freedom ofexpression was reconfirmed by the Bucharest Pan-European conference inpreparation of the World Summit on the Information Society (November 2002). Theparticipating states proposed a vision on an Information Society “where allpersons, without distinction of any kind, exercise their right to freedom of opinionand expression, including the freedom to hold opinions without interference, and toseek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardlessof frontiers”. It should be noted that the Bucharest Declaration does include theright to seek information!

The Right to the Protection of Privacy

Throughout the 1970s several European countries began to adopt national dataprotection laws. These laws had several common features, such as “setting limitsto the collection of personal data in accordance with the objectives of the datacollector and similar criteria, restricting the usage of data to conform with openlyspecified purposes, creating facilities for individuals to learn of the existence andcontents of data and have data corrected, and the identification of parties who areresponsible for compliance with the relevant privacy protection rules anddecisions” (OECD, 1980: 11). Differences between national laws existed inparticular with reference to licensing requirements and control mechanisms, thedefinition of sensitive data, and the provision of individual access. When in the1970s the data protection concern became an international issue, the primevenues for negotiation were the Council of Europe (COE), the EuropeanCommunities, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD).

The work of the COE was obviously inspired by the privacy provision in theEuropean Convention (ECHR) of 1950 which states in Article 8: “(1) Everyone hasthe right to respect for his private and family life, his home and hiscorrespondence. (2) There shall no interference by a public authority with theexercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessaryin a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or theeconomic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for theprotection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms ofothers”. It is important to observe here that the Convention protect citizens againstinterference by public authorities whereas increasingly the right to privacy is alsounder threat through the activities of private agencies (such as marketing firms andconsumer databases).


Following the Convention the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europeadopted in 1973 and 1974 two resolutions concerning data protection. Theresolutions recommended that member countries would take steps to implementbasic principles of protection relating to the collection of data, the quality of data,and the rights of individuals to be informed about data and data processingactivities. On this bases the COE began to prepare for an internationalarrangement through a Convention. This became the basic European instrument inconnection with privacy protection: the Council of Europe Convention for theprotection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data. Theconvention was opened for signatures on 28 January 1981. On 15 June 1999 theCommittee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted an amendment to theConvention that allowed the European Communities to accede to the convention.

In the 1970s also the European Community began to study the possibleharmonization of legal rules in connection with transborder flows of personal dataand in 1978 the European Parliament held a public hearing on data processingand individual rights. The sub-committee responsible for the hearing prepared areport that was submitted to the European Parliament in 1979 with a resolution onthe protection of individual rights in view of data processing.The OECD programme goes back to the late 1960s and its studies on computerusage. In 1977 the OECD Data Bank Panel held a symposium in Vienna todiscuss privacy problems in the context of transborder data flows. The symposiumpresented a number of guiding principles that recognized, ‘(a) the need forgenerally continuous and uninterrupted flows of information between countries, (b)the legitimate interest of countries in preventing transfers of data which aredangerous to their security or contrary to their laws on public order and decency orwhich violate the rights of their citizens, (c) the economic value of information andthe importance of protecting ‘data trade’ by accepted rules of fair competition, (d)the need for security safeguards to minimise violations of proprietary data andmisuse of personal information, and (e) the significance of a commitment ofcountries to a set of core principles for the protection of personal information’(OECD, 1980: 14). In 1978 a new expert group on Transborder Data Barriers andPrivacy Protection was initiated and was instructed to work closely with COE andEC to ‘develop guidelines on basic rules governing the transborder flow and theprotection of personal data and privacy’ (OECD, 1980: 14).The work of the expert group led to the OECD Guidelines that were adopted in1980. Although there are similarities with the COE Convention, the main differenceis that the Guidelines are a non binding instrument, they define very generalprinciples for a minimal international consensus, they contain no enforcementprocedures, and their constituency is limited (although powerful). Anotherdistinction is that the Guidelines apply to all personal data, also those handled


manually. The COE Convention addresses only automatically processed data. TheCOE Data Protection Convention is a binding legal instrument for states that ratifyit. As the Council is a regional body, the constituency of the Convention is limited,although the instrument is open for accession by all countries. The basic principlesof the Convention are the right to confidentiality, the right to be informed about theexistence of data collections, and the right to data quality. The Convention isformulated rather generally and leaves the methods to deal with these principles tonational legislation. The Convention does not say how people are to know aboutdata being collected about them or how to obtain remedy in case data registersrefuse either access or rectification.There are also serious questions about the adequacy of the concepts that areused in the Convention. A core concept is the automated personal file. This wasbased upon the early situation in which large mainframe computers would holdfiles that could be accessed/processed by different users. Today files areubiquitous, they are in personal computers, for instance. One can hardly apply therules on all automated files. Also the notion of ‘machine readable’ has changedwith the application of optical scanners.The concern about the quality of data (COE Convention Art. 5. or OECDGuidelines, Part Two, para 8) led to the formulation of a right of access for the datasubject. This is insufficient if the data subject wants to get all the data correct. Thedata in different collections may be in and by themselves correct, but theircombination may create inaccurate statements. If you combine correct data ongross income from one database and combine them with correct data from anotherdatabase on net income and then present them as income, the outcome is nolonger accurate. There is also the development towards more automated datacollection devices. The data subject does not provide him/herself the informationwhich is collected by electronic systems, such as traffic control systems.The Convention deals with the sensitivity of data (Art. 6) and refers to health, sex,and crime. The question is whether this is sufficient? How about data on politicalaffiliation? Or data about race and religion? Sensitivity increases with the potentialfor discriminatory use of the data. What guarantees does the Convention provideagainst collective surveillance, for example the surveillance of suspectpopulations? ‘The majority of those subject to surveillance are not actuallycriminals, but only persons qualified by coincidence as members of the suspectpopulation’ (Bing, 1992: 256).There is also a problem with the provision of the right of access as a fundamentalright of citizens. The question is whether this really functions as an instrument ofcontrol. ‘It is a disappointing international experience that very few citizens makeuse of the right to access, regardless of how comprehensive this right is outlined inthe different national statutes’ (Blume, 1991: 17). Yet there is sufficient evidence tosuggest that ‘citizens feel very strongly about data protection and are worried


about the extent of knowledge that public authorities and large private firms canacquire about them in our modern, information society’ (Blume. 1992: 17). Blumesuggests that the fact that access has to be a personal initiative constitutes amajor barrier to use this means of control. An alternative might be a system inwhich citizens would be informed about the data held about them. ‘Denmark hasdiscussed such a system. However, besides the practical difficulties of such asystem, a file of files would also create political problems. It would mean that thestate had one big file or database containing all available information on allcitizens, which when seen from the point of privacy would be very dangerous’(Blume, 1992: 18).On 24 October 1995 the European Parliament and the EU Council issued aDirective (95/46/EC) on the protect ion of individuals with regard to the processingof personal data and on the free movement of such data.On 25 October 1998 the European Union Privacy Directive took effect. Thedirective requires EU member states to implement personal data policies thatinclude such principles as transparency, purpose limitation, data quality, specialprotection of sensitive data and the appointment of ‘data controllers’ responsiblefor all data processing. The Directive also stresses the need for individual redressthus providing the right of individuals to access information about themselves, tocorrect or block inaccuracies and to object to information’s use. Article 1 of theDirective demands of EU member states that they protect “the fundamental rightsand freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with respectto the processing of personal data”. The EU Directive in fact recognizes theprotection of privacy as a fundamental human right.The substantial basis of the Directive is found in the reference to the right toprivacy as contained in the 1981 COE Convention. The Directive reiterates thatrights are conferred on individuals, the data on whom are the subject ofprocessing. These rights include that those individuals are informed thatprocessing takes place, that they can consult the data, request corrections andobject to processing under certain conditions, for example if the data are beingprocessed for the purpose of direct marketing. The preamble of the Directivestates that the processing of personal data must be carried out with the consent ofthe data subject.When decisions affecting data subjects are taken on the basis of automated dataprocessing, the data subject must be able to know the logic on which theseautomated decisions are based.In the Directive EU Member States are asked to establish exceptions orderogations from data protection provisions in such a way as to strike a balancebetween different but equally fundamental rights such as the right to privacy andthe right to free speech.


On 23 February 1999 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopteda recommendation which proposes guidelines for Internet users and serviceproviders (among others on the means of protecting themselves) and advises onthe implementation of data protection standards. The Guidelines also emphasizethe users’ responsibility when process or transfer information about other people.On 12 July 2002 the European Parliament and the EU Council adopted Directive2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection ofprivacy in the electronic communications sector. In its Preamble, para (2) theDirective “seeks to respect the fundamental rights and observes the principlesrecognized in particular by the Charter of Fundamental rights of the EuropeanUnion” . This concerns in particular Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. And in para (3)the Directives assures that “confidentiality of communication is guaranteed inaccordance with the international instruments relating to human rights, in particularthe European convention for the protection of human rights and fundamentalfreedoms and the constitutions of Member States”.Article 4 addresses security and provides “(1) The provider of a publicly availableelectronic communication service must take appropriate technical andorganisational measures to safeguard security of its services…. and (2) In case ofa particular risk of a breach of security of the network, the provider of a publiclyavailable electronic communication service must inform the subscribers concerningsuch risk….” Article 5 deals with the confidentiality of communications andprovides (1) that “Member States shall ensure the confidentiality ofcommunications and the related traffic data by means of a public communicationsnetwork and publicly available electronic communications services, throughnational legislation. In particular, they shall prohibit listening, tapping, or storage orother kinds of interception or surveillance of communications and the related trafficdata by persons other than users without the consent of the users concerned,except when legally authorised to do so….”.The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Brussels, October2000) provides for the right to the protection of private communication andpersonal data in Article 7 which states, “Everyone has the right to respect for his orher private and family life, home and communication”. And Article 8 provides “1.Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 2.Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of theconsent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning himor her, and the right to have it rectified. 3. Compliance to these rules shall besubject to control by an independent authority”.The protection of ‘informational privacy’ as provided in this article is clearly basedupon Article 8 of the ECHR and the EU privacy directive.


Compared to Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights andFundamental Freedoms with regard to the protection of privacy the term‘correspondence’ was replaced by ‘communication’. This obviously takes intoaccount developments and innovations in information- and communicationtechnology. The Charter provides no unequivocal recognition of the right ofencryption and there is no explicit no right to anonymous communications. Yet,paragraph 3 of Article 8 represents an important step towards the establishment ofan independent European data commissioner.

In the course of 2001 the EU Council and Parliament have given more power tolaw enforcement agencies to monitor telephone, internet and email traffic. Thisallows these agencies to develop a fairly complete picture of people’s movements(from mobile phone records) and of their personal communications by phone andemail as well as of their internet behaviour. To further reinforce this the Belgiangovernment proposed in 2002 a text for a Draft Framework Decision on theRetention of Traffic Data and on Access to this Data in Connection with CriminalInvestigation and Prosecutions. The text states that the use of telecommunicationsservices has grown to the extent that the data relating to its use, and principallythose relating to traffic are very useful tools for investigating and prosecutingcriminal offences. Following this the proposal is made for the a priori retention oftraffic data during a period of a minimum of 12 months and a maximum of 24months. In order to protect the right to privacy Article 4 of the draft suggests that“Access to retained traffic data is given only to judicial authorities; Access toretained traffic data is not authorised when other measures are possible which areless intrusive in terms of privacy; Confidentiality and integrity of retained traffic dataare ensured; Data to which access has not been asked are destroyed at the end ofthe period of mandatory retention”.Finally, it is remarkable that the Declaration that was produced by the BucharestPan-European conference in preparation of the World Summit on the InformationSociety (November 2002) contains no provisions on the issue of privacy protection.

The Right to Security

Among some of the early signals that pointed at the problem of technology-vulnerability was the 1978 report by the Swedish Ministry of Defense Committeeon the Vulnerability of Computer Systems (SARK) ‘The Vulnerability ofComputerized Society’.In 1981 the Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD)held a workshop in Sigüenza (Spain) on the Vulnerability of the ComputerizedSociety. In 1984 the Information Task Force of the Commission of the European


Communities published ‘The vulnerability of the information-conscious society-European situation’.In 1986 the Norwegian Vulnerability Commission presented a report called ‘TheVulnerability of a Computer Dependent Society’.In 1989 a committee of the British Computer Society reported that current skills insafety assessment were inadequate and therefore the safety of people could notbe guaranteed (Forester and Morrison, 1990: 3).These various commissions and reports began to identify the risks that the use ofinternational computer systems entailed. Such risks could be incorrecttransmissions either by technical malfunction or by the intentional act of anintruder. Incorrect transmissions could include the transmission to the wrongaddress, or of the wrong content, or of both. Transmissions could also be afflictedby delays or by the unexplained loss of data.Another risk could be the unauthorized access to the data traffic or the datathemselves or both. A third type of risk could be the possibility of communicatingwith fraudulent persons (Redeker, 1989: 19). Risks could also be caused bymalfunctions of networks that take care of Electronic Funds Transfers and suchmalfunctions may be caused by environmental factors, by equipment failures,errors in design architecture, or by human errors in data processing. Such errorscould cause inadvertent changes in the contents of payment instructions.The 1986 OECD study referred to the international dimension of computer-relatedcrime due to the internationalisation of information and computer services. Thestudy pointed to the need for an international response since “international co-operation in the repression of computer-related offenses... would facilitatetransborder data flows” (OECD, 1986: 7). In the summary the study stated thatinternational co-operation is recommended in both areas of civil and penal law. “Asfar as civil and administrative economic law is concerned, international harmonizedsolutions are necessary also in order to secure equal conditions of competition, tofacilitate transborder data flow, and to avoid the transfer of undesirable ordetrimental actions in foreign countries... It is important to develop commonapproaches to penal and procedural law in order to protect the international datanetworks, to enable the functioning of international instruments of co-operation incriminal matters and to guarantee that evidence gathered in one country isadmissible in court in another country” (OECD, 1986: 64). The report stated veryclearly that any other solution “would lead to ‘data havens’ and ‘computer crimehavens’ and therefore lead to restrictions in transborder data flow” (OECD, 1986:64). The purpose of international cooperation would be the repression andprevention of computer crime.It has been increasingly realized that international cooperation in the field of lawenforcement and computer crime would demand directives regarding cases whereseveral states are entitled to prosecute the same case, law enforcement authority


on foreign territory and the harmonization of criminal sanctions. Harmonization isrequired if the emergence of computer crime havens is to be prevented.In October 1989 the OECD Secretariat submitted to the Committee for Information,Computer and Communications Policy (ICCP) a report on Information NetworkSecurity. The preparation of this report had been approved by the ICCP in October1988.Following the report the ICCP appointed a Group of Experts to draft guidelines forinformation system security. On 26 November 1992 the OECD Council adoptedthe Recommendation and the member countries adopted the Guidelines. In itsrecommendation to the member countries the Council pointed to the “increasinglysignificant role of information systems and growing dependence on them...thesensitivity and vulnerability due to risks arising from available means ofunauthorized access, use, misappropriation, alteration and destruction’. In thememorandum annexed to the Guidelines the group of experts has highlighted thegrowing dependence on information systems and its concern for the possibility ofinformation system failure. ‘Failures of information systems may result in directfinancial loss, such as loss of orders or payment, or in losses that are more indirector perhaps less quantifiable by, for example, disclosure of information that ispersonal, important to national security, of competitive value, or otherwisesensitive or confidential” (OECD, 1992: 17).The Guidelines are presented as a general framework within which membercountries can develop laws, codes of conduct, technical measures and userpractices. Central to the instrument are a set of nine principles. The accountabilityprinciple which provides that responsibilities and accountability of those involvedwith information system should be stated explicitly. The awareness principle whichprovides that those interested should have access to information about measuresfor the security of information systems in order to foster confidence in suchsystems. The ethics principle which implies that the provision and use ofinformation systems and the security of information systems should take intoaccount the legitimate rights and interests of others. The multidisciplinary principlewhich states that the development of security measures and practices should takethe whole range of pertinent viewpoints and forms of expertise into account. Theproportionality principle which suggests that security needs vary and securitymeasures should be in line with the value of information systems and the severityof potential harm. The integration principle which says that security measuresshould be coordinated and coherent security systems should be designed. Thetimeliness principle proposes that the timely response to security breaches is vital.The reassessment principle suggests that the dynamic development of informationsystems renders a periodical assessment of security measures necessary. And theconcluding democracy principle says that the security measures should be in linewith legitimate interests in use and flow of data and information.


The Guidelines conclude with a set of recommendation to member countries onthe implementation of security measures through policy development, educationand training, enforcement and redress, exchange of information, and cooperation.Presently, the OECD Guidelines represent the core of an emerging politicalpractice and eventually a robust and effective agreement in connection with theconcern about data security.The Convention on Cybercrime adopted on 23 November 2001 by the memberStates of the Council of Europe represents the first international legal instrument toaddress crime and criminal investigation in relation to the new electronicenvironment (cyberspace). In connection with the protection of privacy one findsthe most contested provisions in Articles 16 and 17 that deal with the preservationof data. The articles address the need to adopt legislative and other measures toobtain the expeditious preservation of specified computer data, including datatraffic for a period of time as long as necessary, up to a maximum of ninety days toenable the competent authorities to seek its disclosure. This is particularly wherethere are grounds to believe that the computer data is particularly vulnerable toloss or modification.In terms of fundamental rights the Convention refers to the provision (Article 15)that all procedures are subject to conditions and safeguards for the protection ofhuman rights and liberties as arising from such instruments as the ECHR and the1966 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.The Bucharest Declaration (2002) proposes that “A global culture of cyber-securityneeds to be developed: security must be addressed through prevention andsupported throughout society, and be consistent with the need to preserve free flowof information”. The Declaration has nothing to offer in terms of the protection ofbasic human rights in this process of developing cyber-security.On 7 August 2002 the OECD has adopted the Guidelines for the Security ofInformation Systems and Networks. The Guidelines aim to promote a culture ofsecurity among all participants as a means of protecting information systems andnetworks. This OECD recommendation provides no rules on the protection ofcitizen’s rights to their privacy.

The Right to Anonymous Communications

This is a strongly contested issue. In general, law enforcement authorities areconcerned that anonymous communications seriously hinders criminalprosecution. There are also industry representatives who find full anonymityundesirable in relation to network integrity and anti-fraud actions. However others,and in particular privacy experts, claim that fundamental rights to free speech andprivacy cannot be guaranteed without anonymous communications. The issue of


anonymity represents a classic dilemma between conflicting public policyobjectives and demands that a balance is sought between securing basic rightsand permitting certain limits on these rights. The Declaration of the MinisterialConference in Bonn on Global Information Networks (July 6-8, 1997) proposed theprinciple that where the user can remain anonymous off-line, this should also bepossible on-line. By consequence the powers of authorities to limit basic rightsshould not be greater in cyberspace than they are in the off-line world.

The Right to the Protection of Intellectual Property

Unlike the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (in Article 27:2), the EuropeanConvention (ECHR) provides no protection of intellectual property . As aconsequence there is no recognition in Europe’s most important human rightsinstrument of the status of intellectual property protection as a fundamental humanright. This is significant, because in case intellectual property rights are recognizedas human rights this recognition shapes the political framework for all partiesinvolved, producers, distributors, artists, and consumers. It implies that theprotection of intellectual property rights is constituted by: the right to fullparticipation in cultural life for everyone; the right of affordable access toinformation for everyone; the recognition of moral rights of cultural producers; therights of creative artists; the diversity of cultural production, and the protection ofthe public domain.As human rights always imply responsibilities, the human rights-based conceptionof copyright would follow Larry Lessig’s proposal to add to ‘copyright’ a ‘copyduty’.As he writes, “We may well see the day when our students are taught not of‘copyright’ but of ‘copy duty’ – the legal duty of copyright holders to assure publicaccess” (Lessig, 1998).A human rights approach would give full meaning to the so-called ‘fair use’doctrine. ‘Fair use’ is a principle in US copyright legislation that entitles the publicto access and use copyrighted works in situations that would otherwise constitutean infringement on intellectual property rights. The principle (which is also knownon UK and German copyright legislation, although not as liberally applied as in theUSA) implies a limitation of the property rights of owners of intellectual products incases of educational use, use for news media, criticism and review, private non-commercial copying and parody. Fair use limits the otherwise exclusive control ofrights-holders over intellectual products and recognizes that in most casescopyrighted works could only have been created by using materials from the publicdomain.The fair use doctrine is under serious threat through the use of advancedtechnologies that allow rights-holders the control over access by third parties of


works in digital form. The use of protective technologies (such as encryption, copyprotection codes) strengthens the monopoly control of IPR owners. As consumersare likely to develop and apply circumvention technologies to undermine thiscontrol, the US administration and US motion picture industry have effectivelylobbied the WIPO to incorporate in the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty the followingArticle 13, “Contracting Parties shall provide legal protection and effective legalremedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that areused by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty orthe Berne Convention and that restricts acts, in respect of their works, which arenot authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law ”.In the USA this provision was enacted in the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act(DMCA) which went much further than the WIPO agreement. The DMCA prohibitsthe manufacture, sales, or import of technologies that can be used to circumventprotective technologies. This could make it impossible for people who buy perfectlylegal items and want to make extra copies for private use (the extra CD or DVD inthe car or second home, for example). It may also become impossible to play acopyrighted item – legally acquired – on different platforms (not the CD player butyour PC).

The DeCSS case demonstrates where this could lead to. In 1999 Norwegianteenager Jon Lech Johansen was arrested on the accusation of creating acircumvention technology to crack the protection code for DVDs. Contrary to mostmedia publicity cracking the DVD encryption was not an individual effort, but wasthe effort of the MoRE group that authored DeCSS. This is a software applicationto decrypt DVD movies that can be used among others to play DVDs on Linux-operated computers. When the magazine Computer 2600 reported about this (andoffered a link to the programme), the publisher was successfully sued by theMotion Picture Association of America. Fortunately, in January 2003 a NorwegianCourt found ‘DvD Jon’ not guilty and judged that copying for personal use was nota legal offence. The Court found that the purchase of a legally produced carrier(such as a DVD disk) gives full access to its information. This would not be thecase the Court emphasized if copies had been illegally obtained.In the Norwegian case the film business lost its claim upon the DMCA against‘DvD Jon ‘, but this will certainly not deter the contents-industry from futureoperations against digital copying. Such operations threaten to erode the fair useprinciple and as this has far-reaching implications for people’s access to culture,information, and knowledge, the forthcoming United Nations World Summit on theInformation Society (Geneva, 2003) should issue a strong statement on the needto protect the public dimension of IPRs. A statement from André Gide “Everythingbelongs to he who makes good use of it” fits very well into a human rights IPR


framework and it should provide guidance to the future of intellectual propertyrights.In the European region the WIPO Copyright Treaty was implemented through theEU copyright directive ( Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and theCouncil on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights inthe information society) In the Directive the EU went much further that the WIPOprovisions on technologies that could circumvent measures to protect copyrightedworks.“Article 6 (2) Member States shall provide adequate legal protection against themanufacture, import, distribution, sale, rental, advertisement for sale or rental, orpossession for commercial purposes of devices, products or components or theprovision of services which (a) are promoted, advertised or marketed for thepurpose of circumvention of, or (b) have only a limited commercially significantpurpose or use other that to circumvent, or (c) are primarily designed, produced,adapted or performed for the purpose of enabling or facilitating the circumventionof, any effective technological measures”. That goes beyond the WIPO WCTprovision in Article 11, that countries should “provide adequate legal protection andeffective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technologicalmeasures”.Then under article 5 a long list of exceptions or limitations to copyrights is providedthat do constitute a fair use exemption. However, the exemptions are (with a minorexception) optional. There is no obligation for Member States to apply the wholelist. They can make their own choice. This is peculiar in the view of the fact that thePreamble of the Directive states several times that this is an effort atharmonisation! In any case, mandatory or optional, it seems an odd effort topresent an exhaustive list of limitations in connection with technological conditionsthat may rapidly change. Moreover, in terms of communication rights the Directivehas bypassed the essential matter of moral rights of authors altogether. This wouldseem to fit with the overall impression that the EU Copyright Directive serves therights of the cultural industries much better than the rights of individual authors,composers and performers. The Directive has little if anything to offer for theprotection of individual creative artists --the essential sources for copyrightedcontents --against the powers (contractual and otherwise) of corporate publishinghouses, broadcasters and music recording firms.

Conclusion

If one assesses the current provisions for communication rights in Europeaninformation societies from the perspective of European citizens, they are clearlyunsatisfactory. Even more so now that communication rights are facing strong


pressures from the ‘war on terrorism’ which seems a convenient argument formany governments to limit rights and freedoms in the field of free speech andprivacy. Moreover, there are forceful commercial trends that tend to favourindustrial interests over individual interests in the field of intellectual property rights.There is also the added problem with the trend that people are in the EU contextincreasingly seen as ‘consumers’ for whom modern communication technologiesand networks offer commercial goods and services. They are not primarily seen as‘citizens’ in need of public space for political deliberation. The 1997 EuropeanCommission ‘Greenbook on convergence in telecommunications, media and IT’(December 3, COM(97) 623), for example, presents users of ICT exclusively aspurchasers of goods and services on a market. There is little if any interest in ICTas vehicle for people’s political interactions and exchanges.

Communication rights that would be more adequate from a citizen’s perspectivewould imply at a minimum:• A robust protection of the right to freedom of expression including a strongprovision on access to information and an obligation on states to support media-pluralism.• A robust protection of privacy and confidentiality including strong provisions onthe use of encryption and anonymity.• An understanding that these fundamental rights and freedoms can only be limitedunder the condition that restrictive measures should be temporary, proportional,effective and the only available alternatives.• A robust protection of the ‘fair use’ principle in relation to intellectual propertyrights including ‘copy duty’ provisions that oblige parties to facilitate the publicdissemination of materials that are essential to public life (in politics and culture).This requires a positive formulation of the fair use standard in copyright legislation,i.e. the provision that fair use claims represent basic rights. They are currentlymainly formulated as an exception to a standard protecting the interests of ownersof copyright claims.

It would seem that in most policy debates and media reports the essential questionis about what the European region can do to promote the development of theEuropean Information Society. It is however more relevant and urgent to turn thisquestion around and reflect on what informational developments can do topromote a democratic European space. This is critical since a peaceful future forthe economic, technological, and cultural aspirations of the European regiondepends upon the democratic quality of its political deliberations. If currentinformational developments are to contribute to this constructively, Europeansmust begin – today -- with the design and implementation of a pan-European Bill of


Communication Rights that robustly secures the pivotal position of Europeancitizens in the future of their region.

References

Blume P. (1992), “How to control data protection rules?”, International ComputerLaw Adviser, 6 (6): 17-21.Council of Europe (1990), Computer-Related Crime. Strasbourg: EuropeanCommittee on Crime Problems.Forester, T. and Morrison, P. (1990), Computer Ethics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.I-Ways (2002), Digest of Electronic Commerce Policy and Regulation, OECDAdopts Guidelines for Security of Information Systems and Networks, 3-4, 2/2002.Lessig, L. (1998), Life, Liberty, Copyright, The Atlantic Monthly Unbound,10.9.1998.OECD (1980), Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governingthe Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. C (80) 58(Final) October 1. Paris: OECD.OECD (1986), Computer-Related Crime: Analysis of Legal Policy. Paris: OECD.OECD (1992), Guidelines for Security of Information Systems. OECD/GD (92)190.Paris: OECD.Redeker, H. (1989), “Liability in telecommunication systems: the German case”,International Computer Law Adviser, 4 (1): 18-21.Rodotà, S. (1992), “Protecting informational privacy: trends and problems”, in W.F.Korthals Altes, E.J. Dommering, P.H. Hugenholtz and J.C.kabel (eds), InformationLaw towards the 21st Century. Deventer: Kluwer, pp. 261-72.

Business Issues Facing New Media

Robert G. Picard

Most studies of new media for the past decade have concentrated on technologicalissues, on new media companies, and on content providers. Because it is basedon contemporary developments, most of the literature has concentrated on thecharacteristics of new media, their technological underpinnings, and theirperceived potential to affect society and markets.

The authors of these studies have come primarily from technological and socialsciences and their work has generally ignored the commercial requirements for thesuccess of information and communication technologies (ICT) and new mediaproducts and services in market economies. Most of the studies have been highlypositivistic in their approach, have asserted wide-ranging benefits from new media,and have assumed their attractiveness to the public.

The scholarly and governmental studies mirrored the enthusiasm within theemerging industry. High new media growth rates in the second half of the 1990swere fuelled by relatively easy access to venture capital and stock funds that weremade possible by booming national economies. Persons --primarily young-- withinnovative ideas but little business experience and business education ledcompanies for which seemingly endless possibilities existed. New technologicalbreakthroughs, products, and services were introduced almost weekly.

And then the dot.com bubble burst. The collapse in 2000 was led to companies inwhich basic business logic or ability to manage the business were absent. In manycases, problems in the companies had been unseen or ignored by novicemanagers who were blinded by growth rates, easy money, and their own optimism.Some had good ideas that were surpassed by better ideas, most financed theirresearch and development through risk capital, and most were technology-drivenrather than consumer-driven firms. In the end, the firms ran out of capital tocontinue operations, lacked workable business models, and often faced consumerindifference to their products or services.


To be fair, however, the failure rates for new media firms were about the same forstart-up firms in any industry. Among new firms, about two thirds die within 3 yearsand about three quarters within 5 years. After the bubble burst, the surviving newmedia companies tended to be those with better ideas, better products, betterbusiness practices, and better managers.

Today, it is clear that new media must be understood as commercial entities thatoperate in the market economy. The basic requirement of a market economy is theexistence of a market, that is, consumers willing to consume the product orservice. A truism--apparently forgotten in much of the emergent industry--is thatsellers must have a product worth acquiring, that there must be buyers who wantto purchase, and that the product must be offered at a price buyers are willing topay. Although the truism seems trite, the history of new media in recent yearsindicates that many companies did not comprehend this basic business logic andthat the lack of comprehension was responsible for a good deal of the difficultiesthe industry has faced.

Supply and Demand

In recent years, literature on business strategies for new media and the operationof firms for commercial gain has begun to emerge from business scholars,economists, and practitioners. Although generally supportive of ICT and newmedia, they have taken a more critical and realistic view of the technologies andtheir potential for success and failure. These studies have begun to lay out thenecessities and requirements for successful introductions and operations of newmedia. Central to these studies has been the analysis of new media businessmodels and strategies.

Effective business models encompass how a business operates, its underlyingfoundations, it value-creation processes, its cost structures, the resources uponwhich it is dependent, its creative and production elements, its distributive activitiesand mechanisms, and its exchange activities and financial flows. They include adescription of the potential benefits for the various business actors and the sourcesof revenues.Theoretical and applied analyses have investigated business models for newmedia activities and a number of significant contributions have appeared. Timmers(1998) explored 11 models that can be utilised in electronic commerce. Failuresand changes in four fundamental business models employed by online contentproviders were explored by Picard (2000). Recently four models for mobile voiceand data services, based on continuity of basic business models and their

Business Issues Facing New Media 151

expansion across telecommunications technological generations have beensuggested (Ballon, et al., 2002) and Afuah amd Tucci (2001) identified threegeneric strategies for firms attempting to gain advantages from Internetcommercial opportunities. The application of business models in firms has led toin-depth examinations of the business models of nearly two dozen accessproviders, online portals, online content providers, online retailers, online brokers,and other firms were recently completed (Eisenmann, 2002).

A basic element of the models is that the firms must have revenue streams tosurvive and grow. The primary sources can be consumers, advertisers, e-commerce activities, or a parent company that operates the new medium as anextension of existing products or services. There are many different means inwhich a business model can be constructed to provide necessary revenue.A much-tried method is the transfer of the advertising-support model fromestablished print and broadcast media. The result has not been highly successful.Despite Internet use nearing an average of 25% across Europe, online advertisingexpenditures represent less than 2% of total European advertising expenditures(World Advertising Trends, 2002).Electronic commerce models have had limited success for some retailers andtoday reach nearly !2 trillion. Although this can be considered a success, e-commerce sales still accounts for less than 1% of total retail sales in the EuropeanUnion.

Part of the difficulty results from the explosive proliferation of new media, that isdramatically fragmenting audiences. Millions of ICT users spread their use amongmillions of host sites. The result is illustrated by the situation of online contentsites. National content sites gaining 250,000 daily visitors are consideredenormous successes and only about 3 or 4 sites in a nation achieve such visitrates. Taken in context, however, these 250,000 visitors represent only 2.5% of thepopulation in a nation with 10 million inhabitants or of 1% in a nation with50,000,000 inhabitants. Some advertisers are interested in audiences of thesesizes, but have been unwilling to transfer large amounts of advertisingexpenditures to new media to reach them.

The supply side of new media thus faces a variety of challenges in findingrevenue, controlling costs, and developing sustainable business models. Goodplanning and good management alone are not enough to overcome the marketand ensure success of new media, however.The biggest challenges come not from the supply side of new media but from thedemand side. The choices of consumers will determine what consumer resources


are devoted to new media and those choices will influence choices of marketersand advertisers who are critical to many business models.

Unfortunately, a significant understanding of consumer behaviour is absent frommost analyses of new media. This has produced two major problems in the viewsof consumers in most new media studies. First, there is an assumption of universalinterest in the new products and services. Second, there is an assumption ofuniversal adoption at some point. Both ideas are highly suspect because no mediaor communication device has ever achieved 100% adoption and nothing inconsumer behaviour theory or research supports either idea.

Most new media studies by non-consumer scholars are based on theadoption curve and uncritically accept the notion that this Bell curve representsadoption by 100% of the population or households (Figure 1). The problem withthis view is that the curve does not represent the entire population but only thosewho ultimately adopt the new product or service.

Figure 1: The Adoption Curve

Many proponents of new information and communication technologies seemconvinced that because the technologies can serve good purposes, they will beautomatically embraced by the public. The problem is that there are a range ofimpediments to success of ICT technologies brought on by competing interests inthe technologies and that individual choices of consumers determine whatconsumer resources are devoted to new media (Figure 2). Ultimately, consumerchoices will influence choices of marketers and advertisers, which are critical tomany market-based business plans for digital media (Albarran, 2000; Picard,2002). Only if the interests of the various stakeholders converge or can be

innovatorsearly

adoptersearly

majoritylate

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accommodated and if consumers become willing to make expenditures does thelikelihood of successful market introduction increase (Picard, 1998).

Figure 2: Convergence of Interests in Communication Technologies

The introduction of new ICT devices is not all just a matter of communicationstechnologies, but also a matter of how digitalisation and modern communicationdevices are changing communication functions and abilities. They are changingcommunication from one-way to two-way communication and from passive tointeractive communication. They are changing media from mass media tospecialised media, are moving us from access to few media to many media, andfreeing us from fixed location media and communication devices to mobile mediaand devices. At the same time, we are moving from having separate mass andpersonal communication media into mixed technologies that have multiple

Copyright 1998 Robert G. Pi card

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functions. And the technologies are changing the content available from merelynational media to global media as well.Despite these significant functional changes, if one actually looks at the results ofthis situation we see that the digitalisation, new media, and information andcommunication technologies are part of an evolutionary rather than revolutionarychange in communication ability. No real new communication ability is beingcreated. They are not affecting communications in such fundamental ways as didthe arrival of the printing press, the telegraph and telephone, photography andmotion pictures, and broadcasting. What the information revolution is primarilydoing is increasing the speed, flexibility and integration of existing forms ofcommunication. The most revolutionary aspects are new economies of scope andintegration that are changing the economics of production and distribution.These factors play significant roles in the choices of audiences and consumersregarding new media access and use.

Audiences and Consumers Increasingly Play theCentral Role

Perhaps the most critical change brought on by the functions and capabilities ofICT is the change in locus of control over the communication. And it is this changethat is moving audiences and consumers to the centre of all business aspects ofICT. In the new bi-directional communications environment, ICT users can play amore active role in the information creation and selection process. Audiencesinfluence the content of media more directly, gain selectivity and control, choosetheir own communications, use it in their own ways, and filter and personalisecommunication. Firms communicating with these users can learn more about theircustomers, provide better service, and more effectively customise and personaliseservices for specific recipients.

If digital media are to be successful, consumer needs must be central parts ofdigital media strategies. One must be able to answer questions such as: What willthey get they aren’t getting now? How is the technology or service relevant to theirlives? How does it improve life or help them? Why is it valuable for them? Whyshould they use and pay for the new service?Many new media/ICT products and services have failed or had slow acceptancebecause they were searching for wants and needs to satisfy rather than answeringthose kinds of consumer questions. Trying to find wants and needs to satisfyreverses the normal pattern of product/service creation to fill wants and needs. It is


not a problem-solution approach that more often leads to success for newtechnologies.

Customer value is created through use of new communication capabilities. Itprovides immediacy that was previously absent. It provides flexibility in use andinformation handling, it provides mobility, makes it possible for common platformsto carry different types of content and communication, provides more control tousers, provides response ability to communications, and permits more rapidsearching for information.One also needs to understand that there are great differences between groups ofconsumers. The first purchasers are innovators and enthusiasts who lovetechnology or want high performance, but these enthusiasts don’t represent allconsumers. General consumers want solutions to their wants and needs andconvenience of use. Success in new media products typically does not occur untilgeneral consumers acquire and use them.

Economics and Consumer Expenditures

We also need to recognise that digitalisation does not change the laws ofeconomics. It may change in business models and it often alters costs structures(particularly production and distribution costs), but it does not change anyeconomic laws or remove need for capital, operational financing, or effectivemanagement. Because digital media lower costs and ease distribution, theyactually make market investments more risky by increasing competition andremoving existing advantages from economies of scale and scope and lowertransaction cost.

Digital media shift media from variable to fixed cost economics less affected byeconomies of scale, economies of scope, and transaction costs. As a resultcompetitors tend to have similar costs and competition tends to focuses on quality,service, and image. Only a few large suppliers can typically become successful insuch an environment.Consumer acceptance of media and communication products and services aredetermined by the extent to which they serve consumer wants and needs, thewillingness of consumers to invest in hardware and software, their willingness topay use charges, and their willingness to use their time differently. Thus,understanding consumer behaviour is a critical issue in the successful introductionof ICT.


A significant but often ignored factor in consumer behaviour involves temporalexpenditures. The time available for media and communications use is constrainedby consumers’ overall time use. Many daily activities compete for this highly limitedresource. Because humans spend about one third of the day sleeping and useanother third for work, school, or other subsistence needs, only about one third oftheir day is available for activities ranging from household maintenance, dailytravel, eating, and leisure (Areese and Albarran, 2003). Although there tended tobe greater differences in the past, time use patterns are generally convergingacross the developed world and national and individual differences are diminishing(Gershun, 2002).

Temporal expenditures for media tend to come from leisure time, travel time, andwork time, but not all media and ICT can be used equally during these activitiesand the media use must be compatible with the time from which it is taken. Manyof the new ICT technologies are having to find a place in the available time use orare being introduced with the thought of changing time use patterns.It is very difficult, however, to change personal time use patterns. An example ofthis is seen in television during the 1990s. The number of television channels inEurope nearly tripled and satellite and cable services were widely subscribed. Thesupply of television programmes to viewers jumped dramatically becausebroadcasters also increased their broadcast days and the total amount ofprogramming hours offered increased proportionally with the number of newchannels. Nevertheless, television viewing time increased only an average of 2minutes per year, less than one half hour programme over the course of thedecade (Figure 3).


Figure 3: Average Daily Viewing Time (Minutes) in EU nations, 1990-1999

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In order to be successful, then, new media and ICT products and services mustdisplace part of existing time use, must provide the same or better communicationsin a more advantageous manner, must be easily used at the time in which currentuse is made, or must find new time that can be allocated to themedia/communications product.As a result one cannot expect consumers to use mobile Internet while driving amotorcycle or to use a computer while painting a bedroom, but these new mediaand devices can be used while riding on a bus or replace some television viewingtime.In addition to time issues, consumers increasingly face monetary issues in newmedia. Although traditional print media are relatively low priced due to advertising,and free-to-air broadcasting or a low license fee broadcasting are available, newmedia require significant hardware and software expenditures. Consumers’spending on all media comes from the personal spending involves a wide range ofexpenditures for food, housing, clothing, household and personal care goods,transportation, medical care, and other items. Their capacity to switch significantamounts of expenditures to media and ICT is somewhat limited.


Today, Europeans expend about 4% of personal spending on media, andtelephony expenditures are about 1%. The amount spent is slightly higher inNorthern Europe than in the rest of Europe.When consumers consider new media and ICT, a number of factors are critical intheir choices: whether the new technology is an improvement in providingfunctions on existing communication devices, whether the product or service isdesirable, whether it is compatible with existing technology they own, the amountof use they anticipate will be made of the new technology, what types of switchingcosts would be involved (would one have to repurchase video recordings in a newformat, for example), their level of belief in success of the technology, and thetemporal and financial resources they have available.

Because these types of questions are answered differently, patterns of acceptanceof different media vary widely by nation and individual. So it is unrealistic to expectthat everyone will have every new digital media and communication product andservice.This is illustrated by the penetration patterns of current media and communicationtechnologies in Europe. Even with these basic media and communication devicesthere is a wide difference in acceptance (Figure 4). Telephones, television andradio exceed 95% penetration in households and VCRs, magazines and CDplayers have between 50 and 90% penetration. Computers, Internet, mobilephones, newspapers, and cable and satellite services are available in fewer thanhalf the homes.


Figure 4: Household Penetration Rates of Selected Media and ICTproducts and Services in Europe

Source: Eurostat, 2001

The range of new digital media and information and communications technologiesbeing offered is stunning and increasing rapidly. It is tempting to argue thatconsumers will get used to the new technologies and acquire them. This is a highlypositivistic view that ignores the significant gap between the rate of change intechnology and changes in human attitudes and behaviour. Although thetechnologies of communication are changing rapidly, the responses to them byconsumers are much slower.Part of this is occurring because the introduction of much ICT is based on marketexpenditures on both the production and consumption sides. Digital mediadevelopment and operation are today relying primarily on market funding and mustbe understood within the context of financing all analogue and digital media.

A classic example of the problems that occur when the market’s role in ICT is notrecognised can be seen in the introduction of digital terrestrial television. Digitaltelevision has been implemented in a number of nations as an ill-conceived anddoomed effort for policy and technology to triumph over the market. This effort hasprimarily been promoted by governments to support frequency reallocation, to

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support industrial development of their ICT sectors, and to promote national orregional images of ICT leadership for political and economic purposes.

In the introduction digital television broadcasting requirements placed onbroadcasters by policymakers made public service broadcasters bear the brunt ofthis digital transformation. Few public service broadcasters received additionalfinancial support for the effort and were forced to rely on their existing license feesand advertising sales for financial resources. The increased costs of developingand operating digital transmission capabilities and digital channels have been themajor cause of negative overall results for European public service broadcasters inrecent years (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Financial Results of EU Public Services Broadcasters

Source: Compiled from data in European Audiovisual Observatory (2002).Statistical Yearbook 2002. Strasbourg: European Audiovisual Observatory.

Even in markets where commercially funded introductions have taken place, therehas been a wholesale rejection of digital terrestrial television costs by consumers,with notable failures in the United Kingdom and Spain. As a result, some Europeangovernments are responding to this case of market failure by consideringsubsidised distribution of digital TV boxes to speed the switch to digital televisionand the US is seeking to require TV manufacturers to put digital receivers in newtelevision receivers. These are classic examples of forcing consumers to bear thecosts for a technology they have clearly not embraced.

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Policymakers and broadcasters in some nations are taking notice of the problemand are making efforts to delay implementation of digital terrestrial television and inothers nations they are trying to delay previously planned switch-offs of analoguebroadcasting because of the lack of consumer switching to digital.These problems of funding digital television are part of broader issues of consumerwillingness to purchase the range of media and communication products beingoffered. We must recognize that technologies, policies, and business plansthemselves do not create demand and that the choices to purchase will bedetermined by consumer behaviour, not the wishes of technology manufacturersand policymakers.

One of the ignored issues of new media and ICT products and services is that theyincreasingly transfer costs to users that were previously borne elsewhere or theyrequire additional expenditures above current media and communicationexpenditures. And the current expenditures on these products are notinsubstantial.Television reception, for example, is free or funded through a relatively low, broad-based license fee. But television viewing also typically involves new hardwarepurchases an average of every 7-10 years, with a !25-!50 annualised cost. Inaddition, radio listening is free with new receivers being purchased an average ofevery 7-10 years, at an annualized cost of !5-!10. On the print media side,newspapers cost European consumers !200-!300 annually for news-standpurchases and !300-!600 annual for subscriptions, while magazines cost !2-!5per issue at news-stand and !12-!35 for annual subscription.If one looks at the consumer costs that are currently being expended and thosethat will incur for new digital media and communications, one immediately seesthat they will increase substantially.A simple CD player requires a !50 to !250 hardware investment and then paymentof !15 to !20 per title purchased. Purchase of a DVD player means a !250 to!1,000 hardware investment, with costs of !20 to !30 per title purchased and !3 to!5 per title rented.Because of changes preparing the way for digital television, consumers need toreinvest in receivers for wide screen television. This represents a !1,000 to !5,000hardware investment. Where digital television is available, consumers must makean additional !300 to !500 hardware investment and then spend !180 to !360average annual cost for advanced services.To access the Internet, consumers must make a !1,000 to !2,500 investment in apersonal computer, plus pay !300 to !1,000 annual costs for access and phonefees. If consumers want mobile Internet services, they must make a !330 to!1,000 hardware investment and then pay !600 to !1,200 average annual cost foradvanced services.


These are not minor costs in term of average household expenses. Selecting therange of digital media and communication spending would approximately triplecurrent annual household expenditures. To anyone who has followed personalspending changes over time, this represents a completely unrealistic expectationfor any category of spending.

The costs included in this description are only for major technologies that currentlyexist and do not include any new types of digital products or services that willrequire expenditures. Nevertheless, it is abundantly clear that consumers will beunable to fund the entire range of the growing number of ICT possibilities and willthus make individual choices among them.Another factor promoting different use patterns and wide differences in demandare variations in costs of using ICT products and services. An example of this isseen in the cost for using the Internet (Figure 6), where costs in some Europeannations are double those of others. The law of supply and demand thus becomes afactor in the choice to use and the amount of use.

Figure 6: Costs for Internet Access in Selected European Nations

Source: OECDComparison based on 40 hours, usage in peak time, including VAT

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In addition, expenditures will be influenced by income levels, which vary widelyamong segments of the populations and nations. Even within the European Unionaverage income levels vary.These types of financial limitations are particularly problematic to the view ofwidespread uptake of ICT because consumers and market funding are the basis ofnearly every current business plan. Because of the expenditure issues, consumerscan be expected to make individual choices among the technologies and sometechnologies that could be beneficial will fail. This will occur because when newmedia are introduced, they must become successful in a relatively short period oftime (often 2 to 4 years) or their producers and financiers will abandon theproducts and services for ventures with more revenue-producing and profitabilitypotentials.Ultimately, the choices made may not reflect the wishes of policymakers and socialengineers who wish to have specific parts of the technologies adopted to supporttheir social, political, or cultural agendas.

Summary

Creating successful business from new media and communication technologiesand services is a far more difficult activity then merely developing a goodtechnology or service, creating a business plan, and offering the new media toconsumers. It requires convincing them to part with their time and money.If new media are to become successful commercial activities, companies offeringthe products and services and policymakers supporting them will have to devotemore attention to consumers and the market. They will need to recognise limits toacceptance of the new technologies and plan accordingly. Firms will need to targetgroups of consumers more selectively and governments will need to considerpolicies that respond to market failure for those information and communicationproducts and services that are most important for social and political goals.There is great potential in ICT but that potential must be viewed realistically, withinthe constraints of the market economies that are being asked to introduce andsupport them.

References

Afuah, Allan, and Christopher L. Tucci (2001), Internet Business Models andStrategies. Boston: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.


Areese, Angel, and Alan B. Albarran (eds.) (2003), Time and Media Markets.Mahweh, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Publishers.Ballon, Pieter, Sandra Helmus, Roland van de Pas, Henk-Jan van de Meeberg(2002), ‘Business Models for Next-Generation Wireless Services’, Trends inCommunication, No. 9.Davis, William (1999), The European TV Industry in the 21st Century. London:Informa Publishing Group.Eisenmann, Thomas R. (2002), Internet Business Models: Text and Cases.Boston: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.European Audiovisual Observatory (2002), Statistical Yearbook 2002. Strasbourg:European Audiovisual Observatory.Gershun, Jonathan (2000), Changing Times: Work and Leisure in PostindustrialSociety. Oxford University Press.IP Deutschland (2002), European Key Facts. Internet 2001. Köln, Germany: IPDeutschland.Picard, Robert G. (2000), ‘Changing Business Models of Online Content Services:Their Implications for Multimedia and Other Content Producers,’JMM—International Journal on Media Management,” 2(2):60-66.Picard, Robert G. (2002), The Economics and Financing of Media Companies. NewYork: Fordham University Press.Picard, Robert G. (1998), ‘Interacting Forces in the Development of CommunicationTechnologies: Business Interests and New Media Products and Services,’ EuropeanMedia Management Review (No. 1), pp. 16-22.Timmers, Paul (1998), ‘Business Models for Electronic Markets,’ ElectronicMarkets, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 3-8.TV International Sourcebook 2001, London: Informa Media Group.World Advertising Trends 2002, Oxfordshire, U.K.: NTC Publications.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policiesof the Commission of the European Union.

Perspectives for Employment in theTransition to a Knowledge Society

Peter Johnston

The Lisbon Strategy: The Changing Nature Of WorkIn A Knowledge Economy

The future of work and employment in a networked knowledge society must beseen in the context of four inter-related trends: the continued professionalization ofwork in a service economy; the trend to higher information–value in all products andservices; globalisation of the economy, notably now for services, and theaccelerating pace of change.

These trends lead some to great pessimism about the future of employment, asmanufacturing industry declines in economic importance and the employmentstructures associated with it begin to evaporate: in 1900, 60% of jobs in the UKwere in farming, mining and manufacturing; by 1950, these sectors provided 40%of jobs; and in 1999, they provide only 16%. Others see reason for great optimismas a ‘long boom’ associated with a transition to a networked global informationsociety spreads prosperity to a much higher proportion of the world population.

In this vision, everyone in this society can have skills, ideas, experience, creativityor time that others are willing to pay for. In fact, the job losses have been more thancompensated by new job creation in services: the total UK working population was20 million in 1950; it is now at a record 27 million, with most of the new jobs ineducation, health-care, finance and food/catering services.

What infrastructures and market mechanisms will mediate this new economy? Willthey be accessible to all, or will the knowledge economy be only for the educatedelite?


Professionalization: Unpaid Activities Become Paid Services

In the Western, Christian culture, work is the central feature in life: it determines aperson’s status in society and provides both the necessities of life and materialwealth. During the industrial revolution, largely within the last 200 years, work hasalso largely become synonymous with employment; it has become a profession formost people (although this trend is far from complete and will continue into aninformation society), and dependent on organised structures – whether privatecompanies, government administrations or networks of self-employed individuals.

The trend towards the commercialisation of work has accelerated in the last 20years with increases in overall prosperity, with the complexity of socialorganisation, and with the continuing shift towards a service economy. This trendcurrently continues to encroach on the set of previously unpaid activities donemainly by women in the house, as women are increasingly drawn themselves intopaid employment. The recent changes are best illustrated in the areas of core‘housework’ tasks of cooking, child rearing and cleaning/washing.

New Value Chains

The fundamental process of adding value by conceiving and producing productsand services doesn’t change. The ownership and linkage of different partschanges, and the relative ‘weight’ of different parts changes, as we move into aninformation society.

If the value chain is (artificially) separated into the five phases of design,production, advertising/packaging, retail and after-sales services, the relative‘weight’ in terms of investment and employment have changed dramatically in thelast 20 years from an industrial to a service paradigm.

The industrial paradigm was characterised by the dominance of the massproduction. Henry Ford’s Model T was a triumph of production engineering.However, in today’s emerging information society, more than 70% of the retail valueof a car is related to immaterial features – only 16% reflects the price of rawmaterials (steel, plastic and rubber). The informative content (microprocessors andsoftware) is worth more, and the advertising, retailing and after-sales servicesrepresent about 40%. The design and retail phases have become both more criticalto commercial success and the most expensive.

This trend will continue; the highest value-added will be in immaterial design work;in advertising, retail and after-sales service, with the latter taking the dominantplace as ‘car manufacturers’ migrate up the value chain to become ‘mobility serviceproviders’.

Perspectives for Employment in the Transition to a Knowledge Society 167

Globalisation

With the completion of the liberalisation of world trade in Uruguay Round; the recentpolitical commitment to further liberalisation for services in Doha; and the shrinkingof distance through global communications networks; economic activities are morethan ever integrated and interconnected around the world. This has led to fears inEurope that capital, enterprise and jobs will increasingly move to countries wherelabour is cheap.

These fears are largely unfounded; and the evidence of the last decades is moreoptimistic: firstly because the idea that there is a fixed volume of work to sharearound is a fallacy. The more people in employment, the more jobs there will be forothers everywhere in the world. Global job creation has been exceptionally high inthe last 25 years -- in developed countries (the USA, Canada, Japan have seenindigenous job creation of over 65 million jobs) at the same time as over 500 millionjobs have been created in the developing countries of Asia.

Secondly, the OECD ‘job study’1 of 1998 showed that new job creation has beenstrongest in those countries which have invested most in information andcommunication technologies. More jobs were created in the US between 1975 and1995 than in the 20 previous years: because of the IT revolution. Since 1985, about50% of new jobs were in the managerial and professional service sectors, and70% were high-skill, high pay.

An Accelerating Pace of Change

We all suffer from this: And perhaps our generation is the one that has had to livethrough the critical period in which for the first time the lifetime of a ‘job’ has becomeshorter than our working life. In previous centuries and generations, skills andprofessions were learned for life: ‘Apprenticeship’, then school education andvocational/professional training, prepared people for a lifetime of work as acarpenter, a miner, a doctor or an accountant. Yet during our working lives some ofthese professions have almost disappeared in Europe.

This has its effect in the labour market: the average duration of ‘employment’ hasbecome shorter -- now about 6 years in the EU -- but not by as much as manypeople feared: ‘lifetime employment’ is not disappearing when organisations areable to re-skill and re-deploy people in a flexible and effective way. Nevertheless,there is a growing mismatch between skills learnt when young (up to 25) and theskills required for new jobs today: especially with the ageing workforce in the EU.


Life-time learning has therefore become a key priority in the eEurope Action Planand in European employment policies: ‘investing in employability and adaptability ofpeople’ through a revitalised and advanced education and training system;workplace re-skilling; self-training; new access to training and conversion coursesfor older workers.

There is already a ‘skills gap’ for IT and e-commerce specialists, especially thosewith softer ‘social skills’ of team-working, creativity and communications2. Theprivate sector is already the major investor in ‘management-training’ and will need tobroaden this type of ‘work management’ and ‘creativity’ training to most people inknowledge-related activities.

The faster pace of change also increases stress in work: more than 41 million EUworkers are affected by work-related stress each year. The European Week forSafety and Health at Work 2002 will aim at tackling this growing problem byincreasing awareness of these and other psychosocial risks as well as promotingand developing preventive measures. At the Stockholm Summit, Heads of State alsoaddressed the ‘quality of work’, both in the life/work balance; and in terms ofworkplace safety. The Commission has now proposed to develop by 2003 acomprehensive Community strategy to promote health and safety at work, toachieve a substantial reduction in work accidents and professional illness.

New Work Opportunities For All?

What Do We Mean by ‘All’?

In 1993, the Commission raised the stakes in the ‘full employment ‘ debate byhighlighting the relatively low level of participation in the formal labour market inEurope (60%, compared with 70% in Japan and 75% in the USA), as well as thedisparity between jobs and those seeking employment (the traditional‘unemployment’ figures).

In March 2000, the European Heads of State set a new strategic goal to raise theemployment rate to near 70% and to increase the proportion of working-agewomen in employment to more that 60% in 2010. In Stockholm, in March 2001, thesegoals were reinforced by intermediate targets for women in 2005 and for olderworkers in 2010. In March 2001, European Heads of State reviewed progress.Europe enjoyed 3.5% growth in 2000, and unemployment fell to its lowest levelsince 1991. However, in the current slowdown, renewed efforts must be made toaccelerate structural change, notably to get more flexibility and creativity into work.


Innovation and technology change are still driving job creation. Investments in ICThave contributed over 0.5% per year to growth since 1995, and job creation hasbeen particularly strong in the ICT and related business services with over 3.5million new jobs. In the last 5 years, high-skill non-manual ‘eWork’ has accounted forover 60% of the new jobs: 1.5 million in the high-tech sector itself, and over 5 millionwith higher education qualifications

In most EU-countries, the same goal of a higher participatory workforce isaddressed through policies to re-integrate the ‘excluded’ – whether through racism,lack of skills, disability, homelessness or misfortune. It is anyway clear that we aregoing to need much more flexible, part-time, and local work opportunities to getanother 10% of the potential workforce into employment (going from 60-70% of thetotal workforce), especially as an ageing workforce will be more conscious of‘quality-of-life’ issues and less mobile: we will have 10 million more people over 50in the workforce by 2010, and the proportion of people with disability is likely toincrease from 11% today to 17% in 2020.

User-Friendly Work-Tools and Work Organisation

Clear choices will have to be made to increase participation in the workforce:

• Do we invest in making work-tools easier to learn and use; or do we invest in re-training everyone in their use every time they change?

• Do we invest in road and public transport systems to allow more people to travelto work, or do we invest in ‘bringing work opportunities’ nearer home?

Of course these choices are not black and white: they are questions of balance ininvestment. This has already started to shift: The explicit focus on ‘user friendly’information society technology development at EU level; and the modest trimmingback of road-building programmes in the UK and NL. In its proposal for a sustainabledevelopment strategy, the Commission proposed to de-couple transport growthfrom GDP growth in order to reduce congestion and to promote more balancedregional development by reducing disparities in economic activity; maintaining theviability of rural and urban communities.

There is nevertheless far to go. The average commuting times and distances aregreater then ever. The annual public and private investment in IT training for theworkforce is greater than ever, and still rising fast.


New Organisation and Employment Structures

The third major question is what social structures will organise this global marketfor services – one in which most people have to manage their own affairs, or onein which security and stability will be provided by private companies andgovernment organisations?

Effects of Scale

The ability to find customers for a specialist skill depends on a large enough pool ofpotential clients. This is why the variety of services in cities has always beengreater than in small towns or villages: it is why the Internet has a wider variety ofservices/information than any corporate intranet; it is why bio-diversity is lesswhen habitats are fragmented; and it is why economic growth in an informationsociety is so intimately linked to globalisation of the service sectors in oureconomies.

But the scale of markets, and the complexity of inter-related services alsoinfluences the organisational ‘ecology’ of the economy. For the same reason thatyou don’t get large animals in small habitats, you don’t get large companies in smalltowns. But when you integrate smaller economies, larger economic units becomeviable. The completion of the single market in Europe allowed companies in somesectors to amalgamate (by merger or acquisition). Similarly the current economicglobalisation is producing a new set of global giants in accountancy, banking,media, IT, telecoms, oil and insurance. These grants will be world leaders intechnology and service development; they will ‘set the standards’ for price andquality of service; and they will ‘structure markets’, but they will collectivelyrepresent a diminishing proportion of world direct employment. They willincreasingly dominate the newspapers and stock exchanges, but it is theirincreasingly wide networks of smaller suppliers and collaborators that will provideemployment.

The largest volume of new job creation will remain at the bottom of the businesssize spectrum: small businesses (<250) represent over 80% of employment inEurope and generate proportionally twice as many new jobs as large companies.

We therefore have the intriguing prospect that a new generation of global giantswill set the economic environment for work; they will develop the tools and set themodels and expectations for work, but most people will have to use these tools indramatically different circumstances – of small companies, working near homewithout the various support services offered by larger organisations.


Growing Complexity

At the same time, the growing complexity and amount of ‘embedded knowledge’ inproducts and services, is making all activities more interdependent than ever. Carmanufacture now depends on specialist suppliers of machine tools, specialmaterials, chemicals and financial services. The world of business is not thereforebeing polarised into a few large and many small independent companies; but is re-structuring as fewer global focal points for a large number of interlocking and highlydependent networks of supply and co-operation.

The implications for work and employment are relatively re-assuring: firstly, that thistrend is not towards a model of individual and autonomous self-employment in achaotic free market; but rather towards a model in which even self-employment willbe in a framework of ‘networks of co-operation’ which will have some stability overtime beyond an immediate ‘project’ or ‘job’ – the proportion of people in self-employment has in fact declined from 15.4% to 14.4% in the EU since 1988 and islowest in the most developed knowledge economies (US: 7.7%). The recent resultsof research in the EU STAR project has confirmed that the myth that ‘e-lancing’ willbe the employment model of the future is without foundation. However, in theknowledge economy, integration of people into the culture of the organisation, willdepend more on ‘stakeholder’ commitments and benefits, rather than proximity.

A key issue will be the degree of stability and ‘social protection’ associated with theemployment ‘networks’. Some new models have emerged: temporary employmentagencies offering holidays, sickness and maternity leave/benefits to staff ‘on theirbooks’ for a long time; the ‘big-five’ accountancy/business service ‘partnerships’such as Anderson, PWC, etc. providing a framework for ever-changing teams tomove from one project to the next with continuity of employment. Theseorganisation frameworks which allow different skills to be pulled together at shortnotice in ever changing combinations can not only make more effective use of skillsfor clients, but can also provide security and continuity for the individuals involved.

Mobility of People and Work

The localization of work will also change. With ‘telework’ and ‘virtual enterprises’,the geographic spread of companies will broaden. Companies will develop differentactivities in different countries, and employees will also disperse. In 2000, there arealready about 10 million ‘teleworkers’ in Europe3, and over 20 million in the USA4.The Gartner Group predicts that 130 million people will telework by 2003. A UKsurvey indicates that the one million UK teleworkers in 1999 will grow to over 50%


of the working population by 2010. A recent IDC survey predicts that there will be28 million eWorkers in Europe by 2005.The survey results from the EU EMERGENCE project show that over 50% ofbusinesses in Europe already make use of external services provided overcommunications networks.

Work and employment for all will require structural change in society; radicalchange in the way organisations manage their activities, provide service andemploy people. eWork is central to these changes, and has a special place in theEuropean model:

• For global competitiveness, European companies will need to maximiseefficiency in use of skills because of high wage costs; they will need to minimise‘non-wage’ costs; and they will need to provide high-quality services by beingcloser to their customers: eWork contributes to all three goals.

• The geographic mobility of Europe's workforce is substantially less than in theUS, and decreasing. Over 25% of Americans move state to work; less than 3%of Europeans move to another country to work -- and with the economicconvergence of Portugal, Spain and Ireland, the figure is decreasing. Thebarriers to mobility are no longer regulatory -- the Single Market exists inemployment market -- but people are ‘culturally anchored’ to their regions of birthmore strongly in Europe than in the US. eWork can compensate for poor labourforce mobility, by greater ‘virtual’ mobility of work.

• People's quality-of-life is increasingly important, and the proximity of home andwork is critical to it. As we move towards a shorter working week and togreater involvement in part-time work; proximity will become more important.eWork is part of the solution.

Finally, the European Union is now committed to sustainability as an overall policygoal in the Amsterdam Treaty. Structural change in production and workorganisation is crucial.

Corporate Governance

New approaches to ‘governance’, both within the EU and globally, will be essentialto progress. Globalisation and network-based activities raise extra-territorialgovernance issues, some of which can only be handled collaboratively betweenmulti-national businesses and civil society organisations: Structural change inlifestyles and business practices throughout the world – will need the commitmentof civil society and the business community.


It is European policy to encouraging a greater sense of corporate socialresponsibility and to establish frameworks for businesses to integrateenvironmental and social considerations in their activities. Some of the most farsighted businesses have realised that sustainable development offers newopportunities and have begun to adapt their reporting arrangements accordingly.The Union’s efforts to achieve sustainable development ultimately depend onwidespread ‘ownership’ of the strategy by individual and businesses.

However, we cannot expect that businesses take on the same broad social andenvironmental responsibilities as Governments. While the three main categories ofconcern in sustainable development, the economic, social and environmentaldimensions are all pertinent to both governments and businesses, their focus isinevitably different.

While governments must concern themselves with the overall stability of theeconomic environment, and with the sustainability of economic resources foressential public services, businesses must ensure their continued profitability andrenewal. Milton Friedman once said, “There is only one social responsibility ofbusiness – to increase its profits…” He (and more recently Martin Wolf in the FT)have seen meeting this and other responsibilities as a zero-sum game – effortstowards others goals can only be at the expense of profits. Others fortunately nowsee a more holistic relationship in which businesses constantly evolve to meetsociety’s goals and, in doing so, achieve continued profitability in new markets.There is good evidence for this is now in the success of ethical investment funds.

For socially sustainable development, European governments have consistentlyseen their priority as the increase of participation in employment, with more andbetter job opportunities for a better-trained workforce leading to greater socialinclusion and cohesion. Businesses must look firstly to the well-being and creativityof their own workforce. These concerns are reflected in the now establishedprovisions for health and safety at work, but also now in the new concerns for the‘quality of work’ – as highlighted at the Stockholm Summit – and in the requirementsfor life-long, in-work learning of new skills, and in-work entrepreneurship andcreativity.

Over the last century, ensuring workers’ health and safety has become recognisedas ‘good business’, underpinned by legislation. Increasing the ‘quality of work’ alongwith skills and creativity is now also increasingly recognised as ‘good business’,especially in the ICT sector where skills are still in short supply and need to becontinually renewed.

For environmentally sustainable development, the diversity of business activitiespresents considerable difficulty – the Global Reporting Initiative has identified 36


potential indicators of environmental impact. However, for the knowledge-based ‘e-economy’, a number of simplifications and priorities can be identified:

• Firstly, and because a substantial part of activities and services are knowledge-based and immaterial, a holistic view of a company’s activities must be taken,rather than a product-based view. The ‘office-based’ activities of research,design, administration and customer-service have often more impact thanmanufacturing and product use themselves. This is well illustrated by theEricsson Report for 2000: twice as much energy and nearly twice as much(585/335 ktons) of CO2 were associated with office work as with production.Opportunities for more efficient use of energy and office space (and for greatercreativity and added-value) exist in new office designs, more energy-efficientbuildings, and greater use of telework arrangements. Greater value can beadded to services with the same resources.

• Secondly, a company’s impact does not stop at the factory gate or office door.‘Office work’ includes business travel, by car and air: ‘Air-miles’ can represent asignificant contribution total energy use, CO2 emissions and congestion. Thesecan be significantly cut by eWork and video-conferencing. Similarly, the totalperson car-kms associated with commuting and inter-office travel can besignificantly cut by telework arrangements. Supply chains and distributionchains can be rationalised, notably through e-commerce developments:Warehousing and inventories can be minimised, and total transport tonne-kms or‘truck-kms’ can be cut, cutting costs, improving efficiencies and reducingenvironmental impact and congestion;

• Finally, no absolute standards or targets exist against which companies cancompare their performance. Benchmarking between companies can also bedifficult. Incremental and continuous improvement must therefore be sought, withyear-by-year comparison on a ‘per-unit turnover’ basis. Successful companygrowth in turnover and profitability is then factored out of impact measures,removing any apparent conflict between growth and environmental impact.

Leadership is being taken by the ICT sector itself: This sector best masters its owntechnology and must pioneer both the transition to a networked knowledgeeconomy and sustainable development in it. This sector can also help to re-buildcommon ground between the EU and US through a business-led approach tosustainable development. The global eSustainablitiy Initiative is the firstmanifestation of this leadership.


References1 OECD (1998), OECD jobs strategy: Technology, productivity and job creation:

best policy practices, Paris: OECD.

2 ICEL (1999), Career Space: A report by the top European IT and telecomscompanies, ICEL.

3 EcaTT survey for the European Commission: www.ecatt.com.

4 Status Report on e-Work Development: European Commission.

5 COM(2001)264 Final: 15/5/01.

6 The Interim Report on the OECD Three-Year Project on SustainableDevelopment: OECD, May 1999.

7 GDP grew 10-times more than total material use since 1950 in the USA, andincreased by 35% with no change in total energy use from 1970 to 1990 (USEIA).

8 Cool-companies.org: eCommerce report 2000.

9 Case Studies of the Information Society and Sustainable Development;Information Society DG-Unit C1, May 2000.

10 Perspectives for Advanced Communications in Europe: PACE 93: DG-XIII,European Commission 1993.

11 Yuri Dikhanov and Michael Ward, Measuring the distribution of global income2001. http://poverty.worldbank.org/library/view/13254

12 From $1300 to $2500 at 1985 PPP-US: UNDP Human development report 2001:www.undp.org

13 Creating a development dynamic: Final report of the Digital Opportunity Initiative,July 2001: UNDP, Accenture and the Markle Foundation, with the collaborationof the ITU, OECD and UNESCO.

14 Digital Opportunities for all: Meeting the challenge. Report of the G8 DigitalOpportunity Task Force – 11th May 2001.


15 The Eurobarometer figures on Internet penetration refer to the question "Do youuse the Internet?" (sample: population above 15 years). The results of othersurveys may deviate according to different definitions.

16 IDC 2001 –http://www.nua.ie/surveys/index.cgi?f=VS&art_id=905356721&rel=true

17 http://www.nua.ie/surveys/index.cgi?f=VS&art_id=905356572&rel=true

18 Understanding the digital divide – OECD 2001.

19 Green Futures May/June 2000.

The Political Internet:between dogma and reality

Andrea Ricci

The third wave?

Schemes or subjective definitions are often used to detect the start, the end andthe most important phases of complex social dynamics. Schemes and definitionsserve the purpose of easing access to knowledge. They may sometimes constraintknowledge development too.

In the futurists’ parlance, after tele-democracy (in the eighties) and e-democracy(in the nineties), Internet voting (from the year 2000 onwards) should beconsidered the ‘third wave’ of a long and dogmatic debate on the role of IT and theInternet in political communication and participation.

If one observes this debate retrospectively, it’s easy to note that the structure ofthe arguments, the overall rhetoric and many of the proponents, have not changed,notwithstanding the change in technologies, the criticisms raised against theirfaithful approach and the worsening of political participation levels in the UnitedStates and abroadi.

Christopher Arterton (1985) in Teledemocracy reconsidered had already dismissedthe arguments of Naisbitt (1982), Toffler (1980), and Becker (1981), three pivotal‘wave’ generators (then, and still to date). After examining 13 tele-democracyprojects, Arterton had concluded that the key to explain the success of certainpolitical participation experiences was the overall campaign strategy, more thanthe individual role played by digital media:“Among the projects examined, competition for the attention of potential voters hasbeen the most persistent problem encountered by project organizers, especially bythose who have sought to conduct plebiscites. The plethora of media is the singlemost difficult institutional barrier they face…[those who have chosen broadcast television because that medium has the mostextensive reach to the citizenry, have discovered that] despite the capabilities ofthe medium, repetition and the use of multiple channels (my italics) are necessary


to involve anything approaching all the people. The most successful of theseplebiscitarian projects, the Des Moines Health Vote, relied upon frequent publicservice advertisements, newspaper articles, radio talk shows, and even billboardsand bus placards in addition to top public affairs broadcast programming… Theproject amply demonstrated the capacity of technology to involve citizens in policydiscussion, but it also documented how costly and extensive are the exertionsneeded to achieve even a 25% rate of involvement.”

Arterton has pointed to the detrimental impact of channel/content multiplication onthe effectiveness of IT-based political campaigns. Both cable TV, videotex, andcomputer conferencing systems exhibit “limitations as vehicles of politicaldiscourse”. Then, and today, new media are elite resources, which may dividedigitally, as much as they can connect:“As a medium of dialogue, each of these vehicles may be conveniently used bymodest numbers of communicators; the emerging technologies do not promisethat everyone can have his or her individual say in a national dialogue.Another major problem, shared with cable television, is that videotex and computercarry material pertaining to a wide variety of human activity. As a result, in a singlemedium, politics comes into direct competition with these other facets of life for theattention of citizens.”

E-democracy

Ten years on, the explosion of the World Wide Web, the Clinton-Gore Presidency,and the elevation of ‘Information Society policy’ to the status of planetary priorityfor both developing and developed countries, all become factors that induced asecond, much more powerful wave of (strictly) the same debate.

The novelty of the E-democracy debate is without doubt the widespreadconsciousness that the World Wide Web is indeed to offer – thanks to its flexibleservice platform – a much larger palette of options for those interested in using thenew medium for political communication. The ‘Bias of the Internet’, its specificity,its signature as mass medium, is to confer on political communication some new,rather unique, features: hyper-textuality, multimediality, ubiquity.

The second major new fact is indeed the endorsement of an entire political class ofa mass communication medium (the Internet) as vehicle for social change. Nothingquite like that occurred since decades. Today, through the various mechanisms ofglobal governance (G7/G8, the ITU, the World Wide Web consortium, ICANN,OECD, Unesco, World Bank, the numerous regional political cooperation fora)

The Political Internet 179

talking about ‘Internet and politics’ or the ‘politics of the Internet’ has becomemainstream habit of politicians worldwide.

A corollary of this dynamic is the emergence, within a few years, of a PoliticalInternet, a specialised sub-set of the entire network geography, generated andmaintained by the formal and informal actors of the political system.

Four meta-sites or Web directories offer an idea of the size (in links)ii of certainsubsections of the political Internet. These sub-sections correspond to what wecan call the formal actors of the political system online (governmental sites, mediasites, political parties web sites):

PoliticalResourceson the Net

Managed by former Italian MP and MEPRoberto Cicciomessere in Rome the site wascreated in the mid-90s as an e-democracyproject. The platform which gathers politicalparties, movement sites, political initiativessites, media and government sites is thelargest (also in terms of themes/genrescovered) collection of all four. Severalcontributors participate to the site update.

5 levelsiii

28172 Links21933 externallinks (77% of thesite) 20% offailed linksTraffick ranksAvg. TrafficRank: 80,443* Other sitesthat link to thissite: 1,174

RichardKimber’sPoliticalScienceResources

Managed by Dr Richard Kimber at the KeeleUniversity the site aims at providing, in additionto numerous political parties’ web sites a wholelist of political science resourcesiv

8 Levels12643 links10310 external(81% of the site)12% of failedlinksAvg. TrafficRank: 41,480* Other sitesthat link to thissite: 971

Governments on theWWW

Managed by Gunnar Anzinger the site ispresented as “Comprehensive database ofgovernmental institutions on the World WideWeb: parliaments, ministries, offices, lawcourts, embassies, city councils, publicbroadcasting corporations, central banks,

4 levels22366 links22101 ext. 98%of the site16% of the linksare broken


multi-governmental institutions etc. Includesalso political parties. Online since June 1995.Contains more than 17000 entries from morethan 220 countries and territories as of July2001”.

Avg. TrafficRank: 40,984* Other sitesthat link to thissite: 3,042

ElectionWorld

“Electionworld.org focuses worldwide electionson a country basis. Documentation, edition anddesign are exclusively worked byelectionworld.org and its editor.Electionworld.org is edited by Wilfried Derksen.He studied law at the Nijmegen University andpracticizes law in the Netherlands. He is theinternational secretary of the Dutch social-liberal party Democraten 66 (Democrats 66)and president of the Foundation InternationalDemocratic Initiative D66, the foundationrelated to D66 which supports like-mindedparties in Central and Eastern Europe andoutside Europe.Elections around the world depends on itsregular contributors. Contributions wereregularily made by: Mourad Ben Abdallah,Gunnar Antzinger, Hubert Descans, FrancoFerrari, Roberto Ortiz de Zarate, Juan JorgeSchäffer, Gary Selikow, Alejandro Solá, theeditors of Klipsan Press and the editor ofRulers”.

6 levels4209 links3549 ext. 84%of the site12% brokenAvg. TrafficRank: 97,118* Other sitesthat link to thissite: 511

Although the definition of what is a political web site remains to be agreed, thesedirectories are among the biggest collections of relevant political material on theWebv. Regardless how extraordinary and laudable in nature, these directoriesremain (quite like Yahoo and other Web Directories) man-made, endemicallyincomplete and outdated. Panta rei, Everything flows on the Internet, andmoreover, taxonomically, there is much more to be studied than the actors at thecore of the political systemvi: the deep political web of those political actors whichare at the periphery or completely outside the formal political system.

Supported by the same Naisbitt, Toffler and Becker the e-democracy waverevealed new specialists. One of them, Mark Bonchek (1997), author at MIT of asignificant and timely dissertation, summarised in ten points the theological corpuson the Internet as a political medium.


Bonchek’s ten points were constructed much like the rhetoric of ten years before:the main emphasis was on highlighting how the Internet (the Web) bias was tochange the mechanics of traditional politics:

Bonchek’s 10 Hypotheses on the effects of the Internet on the flow of politicalinformation1- All channel structure of political communication in which all political agent aredirectly connected to each other2- Disintermediation, i.e. bypassing of traditional intermediaries, and a shift fromgatekeeping to brokering for these intermediaries3- Formation of virtual organizations based on shared interests rather than sharedgeography4- Integration of social and issue networks, such that personal relationship formmore easily around political issues and personal relationships are enhanced inexisting issue-oriented networks5- Greater propagation of political information through duplication and re-transmission between social networks across weak-tie relationships6- Increased volume of political information7- Integration of personal, broadcast and network media either simultaneoustransmission, repackaging, and rebroadcast8- Resource bias in who uses the Internet for political communication towardsthose with higher income and education9- Heterogeneity of source for political information, expanding the diversity ofopinion which citizens have access and may be exposed to10- Narrowcasting of customized and targeted messages to specific communitiesof interest

The overall atmosphere of widespread enthusiasm for the multiplication of newcases of adoption of the Internet by traditional political actors, was not – in the mid-nineties -- conducive to critical thinking.The fact that all the political agents were not and still are not directly connected toeach other could not counteract the general impression that Being Digital was botha right and an obligation.The idea of disintermediation simultaneously seduced political and businessanalysts; thus producing in both environments a rhetoric which promoted, onceagain, the idea of a revolution instead of relative change.The endemically disorganised and anarchic nature of political newsgroups was toreveal itself progressively; in the mid-nineties the idea that groups of activists coulddiscuss more than 60,000 topics online conditioned much of the early scholarlyworks. It was indeed urgent – at that time – to scrutinise the few known cases.


While many academics somehow ceded to these ‘research constraints’, much ofthe informed opinion started to mimic the conclusions of the proponents of e-democracy.

A very large corpus of articles on e-democracy developed between 1992 and2000, blurring the distinction between e-democracy and e-government:In 1992 Clinton and Perotvii dominate much of the coverage for their keen interestin promoting e-democracy: the idea of the electronic town-hall emerges and thefirst online Presidential debates are organised on GEnie first, and then on otheronline systems. Few years later, with the second and third Presidential elections(1996–2000) electronic democracy becomes ‘part of the electioneeringbandwagon’ (Clenaghan, 1997).In 1994 Vice President Al Gore states, together with powerful members of theCongress that ‘the Infobahn must promote electronic democracy’ (Henderson,1994). Peter Lewis, from the New York Times, titles his articles on the 1994Congressional Campaign ‘Internet emerges as a vital link in political arena’ (Lewis,1994).During the election G. Scott Aikens, a Minnesota graduate student, moderates thecyberspace debate for the Minnesota Electronic Democracy project. The projectcreates two significant spin-offs in the following years: the www.e-democracy.orgweb site and Democracies Online (www.e-democracy.org/do) an annexed sitecreated by Steven Clift, an e-democracy evangelist bound to become one of themost visible proponents of e-democracy.The same year another well-known consultant, Esther Dyson, declares to thepress “Computers create a community and give power…the electronic democracyis inevitable” (Higgins, 1994). New political debates online, all re-using the BulletinBoard System model, proliferate in the States. The House Speaker, Newt Gingrich,launches Thomasviii, the interactive computer program supposed to open theCongress’s work to the US population at large.In 1995 public protest against French nuclear testing at Mururoa Atoll drives NewZealand’s first experiments in electronic democracy (McDonald, 1995).In 1996 the Canadian Calgary Herald reports: “Electronic democracy is going to bea huge thing between now and the end of the millennium. Those politicians whoare with it quickest have the most to gain” (Alberts, 1996).In 1997 the British press notes the country’s first steps into the Political Internet(McGoobin, 1997); Altavista pulls up more than 2000 pages related to ‘electronicdemocracy’ (Futrelle, 1997).In 1998 more than two thirds of the 1998 US congressional candidates, hadoperating web sites. For the Senate, 75%, or 51 candidates, had web sites (Dulio,1999). The posting of the Starr Report on the Web is described as historic(Harmon, 1998), even if as the press covering the event adds “while some 70


million Americans now have access to the Web, nearly 200 million others don’t”.The same year, Roza Tsagarousianu, Damian Tambini and Cathy Brian editCyberdemocracy (Routledge 1998). Presented by the press as a truly internationalbook (Grossman, 1998), the work describes the experiments in cyberdemocracy inSanta Monica (PEN system), Amsterdam’s Digital City, and Manchester’sInformation City initiative.

In the public discourse, a very thin line separates e-democracy from e-government,electoral-political participation and participative democracy at local government’slevel. The headlines explicit the new conceptual framework as follows:“Government makes online connection; Electronic democracy”. One of the mostquoted features of the Internet becomes its ability “to cut red tape” (Nisperos,1998). “Electronic democracy” – commentators say – “is inspired by twooverlapping dislikes – of bureaucrats and of politicians – and by two ideas formaking these groups more likeable” (The Economist, 1992).In 1999 The Times (Gould, 1999) suggests : “The formal political process, withfive-year election cycles and little formal opportunity to participate in the meantime,seems antiquated. Caught between competing trajectories, one towards globalforces, the other to fast and responsive local choices, the British Parliamentappears, to many people, both impotent and irrelevant. It is here that the electronicrevolution can be decisive, either further increasing the sense of a Parliament thatis out of touch and disconnected, or helping to harness the enormous potential ofthe new electronic technologies, if not quite to build a new electronic democracy, atleast to help to give Parliament new relevance and new connection in a worldchanging so fast it sometimes seems to be spinning out of control. Electronicmodernisation can be the key to greater democracy. If change is shaped andguided, if the State enables rather than abdicates, the modern world can be bothfairer and more democratic”.The same year other sources (Rust, 1999) propose the next conceptual transition:from e-democracy/e-government to e-voting: “Though political participation on theInternet is still developing, many proponents of e-politics advocate an emergingform of government known as electronic democracy, or voting online. Still inpreliminary stages, proponents hope the concept will increase political participationand voter turnout. Although no government system is based on electronicdemocracy, the concept has been put to the test on smaller scales”.

The dissenting opinions (Varn, 1993, Bimber, 1998) on e-democracy and itsvariants, albeit sound and relatively numerous, do not reach adequate visibility.New anecdotal evidence is about to prepare the next ‘wave’.


Internet Voting

The third wave, the American debate on Internet Voting, is fuelled in the US by thewidespread concern generated by the contested outcome of the 2000 USPresidential elections.The launch of Internet based voting was, according to the authors of a HarvardPIRP/Booz Allen & Hamilton (PIRP/B.A.H.) recent work (Butcher, 2001) in thisfield, a response to a paradox: “The most technologically advanced nation, fails toprovide its citizens a new president because of an outdated analogue votingtechnology”. In the year 2000 Internet voting represents for many –this is really notnew at all -- the ‘next logical step’ in the saga of ‘new uses for the Internet’.

Proponents of Internet-based voting suggest that several factors explain thegrowing interest shown by a wide range of ‘stakeholders’ in corporations, researchinstitutions and (local) government. These factors are once again the same onesthat were – mutatis mutandis – promoted almost 20 years ago: Internet is cheap,Internet eases access to voting process, Internet provides access to usefulinformation, etc.

If one analyses the size and scope of the cases quoted in the PIRP/B.A.H. paper,it is difficult to agree that they represent ‘significant voting initiatives’.The Arizona experience (during the Democratic Primaries in March 2000) is thesole exception. This said, the lawsuit (which concerns equal access to minorityvoters) promoted against the proponents of the trial by the Voting Integrity Projectis – alone – such a serious attack to the entire edifice of the so-called ‘Internetvoting enthusiasts’, that one can expect a difficult future for this kind of projects.

In parallel to constitutional issues, Internet voting is slowed (if not blocked) by verysignificant security problems: it is virtually impossible to give the highest degree ofprotection to information that travels on public networks, and is produced (in adistributed way) by a vast number of un-checkable sites. Technically it is possible,like many other things. Practically, it means building thousands of military-quality-Infosec/I-voting sites.Although the study recognises many of the existing issues, it is hard for theauthors to resist to rhetoric of transformation/revolution: “The information age hasbegun to transform many cherished democratic traditions and practices”, “theinternet has changed the way citizens interact with one another and with theirelected representatives” and “the internet has demonstrated a capacity to informvoters as never before possible” (p. 6).


Why ‘has changed’ and not ‘can’ change, ‘could’ change, ‘may’ change? Andmoreover, who really absorbs all this information? And ultimately, is thisinformation really useful to determine the final vote?

New contexts, classic questions

Voting via the Internet (regardless of the type of solution) remains highlyconditioned by at least three factors: (a) strong security, (b) the development of atrust mechanism among users, and (c) a strong State intervention to fund theprovision of strong security, ‘minitel-like’ equipment at the level of the end voter.(Large) Internet penetration, per se, is not enough to become a causal factor forInternet voting from home. In other words, the fact that Internet usership isincreasing does not mean that I-voting is ‘inevitable’.

Even if Internet voting was to become a reality tomorrow, it would only providevoters ‘another’ opportunity to vote (unless, of course, it was made mandatory tovote by this mean). It would be almost comparable to allowing people to vote onSunday, or to vote late at night, or to get a day off to go to vote etc. It would beinstrumental, but not enough to be a structural cause for a (political participation)process.

Between dogma and reality

Again, like decades ago, proponents of internet voting continue to produceaphorisms, while the scientific community at large is aware that non consumptionof media is a quantifiable phenomenon everywhere, both in developed and indeveloping countries.Interestingly, next to financial, cultural or skills gaps, which are the typical causesof the digital divide in developing countries, there is also an emerging phenomenonof media avoidance in developed countries. In other terms: former media (over)consumers who deliberately decide to ‘un-plug’ and stop watching the TV orreading newspapers.

Tele-democracy, e-democracy and finally internet voting are three facets of thesame intellectual drive, which appears to be the result of two simultaneouspressures:• One exerted by the political science community at first, then by political analystsat large, to identify a likely remedy to the crisis of post-war mass political parties,and the decline of public confidence in the political elite.


• The other by the industry which tends to support the idea that part of its businesshas become a political priority.

Even before tele-democracy, elements of the same debate started to appear in thelate sixties, when numerous political scientists started to note that, with PresidentKennedy’s campaign, techniques had started to modernise through theintroduction of a marketing approach, the first campaign databases andgeographical information systems. According to some observer this was the birthof the New Politics (Penn, 1968), a phenomenon, which was later, re-defined asimage politics or personality politics (Boorstin, 1964).Strangely enough, this historical context seems to be out of sight for most of thecontemporary proponents of the ‘new’ Internet-based politics. The binomialInternet and politics seems to capture the attention of a very specific scientificcommunity. Research associations (or networks) in the field of sociology andpolitical science do not seem to have developed a specific, autonomous researchstrategy in this fieldix.

The majority of those who actually got interested in these phenomena had an ITbackground or were elected officials at local or national level; most of them goteasily conditioned by the rhythm of the ‘revelations’ concerning the newopportunities provided by the Internet. Many got also engaged in what seems to bea shift from a laudable inductive approach, into a form of dogma, a loss of historicperspective.

Other research questions, the same old questions

This debate could find a new course if the attention of political science or sociologyscholars – for example – increased. Political Internet specialists should raise few ofthe oldest and most relevant questions in political science to understand the realityof this phenomenon.

The first question is, of course, ‘why do people vote?’.What explains that in “the country that has both the highest media and technologydensity per capita”, one finds 84 million ‘non voters’ in 1992 and 100 million ‘nonvoters’ (more than the actual number of voters) in 1996? (Doppelt, 1999).Deepening this question (why people vote) equals digging into the relationshipsbetween the ‘personal sphere’ and the ‘public sphere’ in the psychologicaldimension of the potential voter. The point is understanding what makes him/her‘care’ enough to do something. What is ‘close’ and what is ‘far away’. What affectshim/her and what doesn’t.


The Internet could be the tool to increase proximity with things which are in realitymuch further away. But it is yet to be confirmed whether the political contentvehicled by the Internet today, really ‘affects’ potential voters.The factors which explain the variance ‘vote’ are ideological, psychological,personal, in a word. Environmental questions (like the possibility of voting fromhome or from an electronic boot) are only marginally relevant to the end voter. Many other factors are capable of explaining the same amount of variance. Inother words, (from a voter’s perspective) being motivated explains a lot of votes;being ‘supported’ by the Internet (in whichever way) explains fewer votes.The second question is “what people actually do with the Internet” (instead of whatthey ‘could’ do).This intellectual approach is, at least with regard to the e-democracy or I-votingdebate, capable of modifying the course of research. Political TV studies haveshowed that what really matters in this type of political communication is the‘emotional potential’ of the medium; to a lesser extent its accuracy, speed orrichness in content.The key point is ‘how much and what’ comes out from the ‘Internet filter’ when theInternet is used to motivate people to vote.If voters have to choose between two charismatic leaders, can they perceive betterthe ‘person behind the personal’ through Internet based political communication ordo other media outperform political web sites? If compared to the TV or the radio,what is the degree of ‘high fidelity’ provided by the Internet- based re-production ofpolitical reality?

A functional/operational approach to the study of thePolitical Internet

The Political Internet must be framed in a truly systemic/cybernetic perspective: it’sa sub-system of the Internet which responds to a specific function; it doescontribute to the homeostasis of the whole system and it does serve the interestsof a given community.

The Political Internet must also be analysed operationally: this means reachingdeeper levels of understanding on how the Web works, how its ‘voice’, its‘signature’, its bias --as Innis said-- affects political communication.

A good starting point for this type of research is the enumeration of the materialpre-conditions for a successful online political presence.The following seem to be the most obvious ones:a) political information must exist online


b) users must have accessc) users must have timed) users must be politically motivated (civic culture/political socialisation)e) users must have motivation to search and retrieve online and not in any

other way (cross-media competition)f) users must find political information onlineg) users must overcome the biases of the Web (lack of the rhetoric of arrival)

– publishers must use the Web biases (hypertextuality, mutimediality,ubiquity) to increase the effectiveness of their sites

h) users must be affected, convinced, gratified in some way by what is foundon the Web

i) users must consider that what is found on the Web either integratesprevious knowledge or replaces previous knowledge (the Web mediumoutperforms other media).

Let’s try now to scrutinise the relevance of each one of them.As mentioned above, there is little doubt that something we can call the PoliticalInternet exists today. It is not clear how big this is, since there is no widespreadagreement on who participates to this online version of the political system andwho doesn’t. If we consider the political system as inclusive of the informal andantagonist (anti-regime) actors, then the Political Internet is certainly larger thanwhat accounted by the four major political meta-sites mentioned above.With regard to access online, we know that – in OECD countries – end-user costs(including learning curve), age, sex, do constitute divisive elements within society(Ricci, 1998, 2000). This happens to the Internet and to many other information(or, better, knowledge intensive) technologies.Both in developed and in developing countries, digital divide can be quantified.Alone, it represents, by far, the most important ‘reality test’ for e-democracy or I-voting proponents.

With regard to time management numerous surveys have already indicated thatthe Internet clashes with TV. But there is more than this. Time budget conditionsnot only the mere act of consuming media (I do or do not have the time to read,watch TV etc.), but also the type of medium finally chosen. Each media presents a‘ratio’ between:

time to consume/ Q of embedded information-knowledge / C access costs

As Arterton already noted in his works in the eighties, the proliferation of mediachannels further increases the comparative edge acquired by certain media andfurther marginalizes others. From a broadcasters (or campaigner) perspective it


may result more economic to invest in a media mix which excludes the Internet,just because the cost/contact ratio is not interesting enough to mobilise financialresources.There is also another economic dimension which plays a role for the PoliticalInternet: the attention budget of the addressees of the given online communication.

Why should the potential voter choose for ‘political’ content when consumingmedia? What drives the hierarchy of content consumption? Is Politics at the top orbottom of priorities in media consumption?And even if it was at the top, why choosing the net instead of other more trusted,cheaper, faster, ‘compelling’ media such as TV, radio, weekly magazines, ornewspapers?Even if recent studies tend show that the time spent on the Internet is greater thanthe time spent on the television, the Television and the Newspaper have a greaterrole than the Internet as sources of trusted newsx.

‘Attention’ – like time – is a scarce resource. The attention budget creates (or not)the basic conditions for media consumption. Users/voters may have time, but notenough attention to deal with non-entertainment content online; unless, of course,politics online becomes as entertaining and as compelling as other, competing,knowledge/information objects.

Attention conditions in its own way the choice of media. In this case the TQi/kCratio becomes:

Time/Cost/Clarity

In other words, there is a ‘confusion factor’ which may be higher in certain newsmedia (for example text centric media) and lower in others (multimedia newsplatforms such as All-News-TV Channels or Rich Content Sites). Informationoverloadxi and boredom increase the importance of the TCC ratio and tend toradicalise (and therefore simplify) the competition between news media.

Aside from media related issues, without a keen interest in politics there is nosearch for political information online at all, and no any other type of politicallyrelevant action (voting would the ultimate type of politically relevant action). Thequestion then is: do media (including the internet) participate in politicalsocialization? The answer is clearly yes, even for the Internet, which could beconsidered a likely co-factor of political socialization for the generation of thoseaged 15-18 years old in the mid-nineties.


This said, the question is whether this type of political socialisation online happensonce, for a given period of time, or it is a repetitive, on-going, lifelong exercise ofreinforcement of one’s political convictions.

In case a form of reinforcement practice was indeed practised through the PoliticalInternet, a facilitated access to political culture online would be pivotal to the wholeprocess. Let’s assume that voters can access the Internet, and are motivated tofind political information online: is it that easy? Not really.

Either voters have prior and clear knowledge of the existence of a party siteonlinexii or the endeavour could be difficult. This is partly due to the so-called DNShighjacking, partly because of the non-unequivocal nature of certain partydomains. For example more than 10% of the web sites observed in our empiricalresearch are freely hosted by a third partyxiii. In many cases the party addresslooks like this:

http://members.aol.com/AlgFis/ribat/a.htm

Further evidence to this statement comes from the search patterns of online users.A WordTracker Top500Report activated between 17.11.2001 and 28.02.2002shows that none of the following keywords appears to rank anywhere in the 500most used keywords in the main search engines:

Party, Politics, Republican, Democrat, Elections

Finally, in addition to the so-called ‘Linkrot’ phenomenon (Nielsen, 1998), currentresearch shows that the effectiveness of search engines is relative: much of theso-called deep web remains unavailable to the end userxiv.If one then tries to see whether the most logical starting point of an internetbrowsing session (a portal, a search engine) refers somehow to parties, one maydiscover that this happens very rarely. The survey of 82 major portals anddirectories visited in March 2002, both in the US and in Europe, shows that aminority (23.1%) showed the theme/subject ‘politics’ on its home page (one onlypointed to ‘parties’, many had as alternative entries ‘society’, ‘government’, ‘law’).

When, finally, the potential voter has reached the site the very nature of the Webcan further minimise – notably when the content is not cogent – the impact of theInternet as a tool for political communication: (a) on the Web people spend littletime on each site, (b) reading web sites is different from deep reading of traditionalprinted publication, (c) sites are browsed in parallel using two or more openwindows on the screen, (d) web sites structure can influence negatively the


viewing experience: too many levels, or a bad management of the space andcolour worsen, like in other traditional media, the quality of the overall readingexperience

Let’s summarize. In order to identify who votes for a given party, one has toengage in a reduction process: from the population at large, to those having thelegal right to vote, to those who actually get into the voting lists and actually go tovote; to those that make that given political preference.If we start to analyse how operationally the Internet affects a given vote, oneshould reduce the population at large to those that have a PC, then those thathave access to the Internet, then those that find time and attention to look forpolitical information online, then those who find it, then, and this is the key factor,those whose attitude is changed or reinforced by the content seen online.The very few studies on the actual usage of political sites during regular electionssuggest that only a sub-site of the internet population actually visited those sitesduring the campaign. The average visit duration is between 5 and 10 minuteslongxv. The bulk of the visitors was either 25-34 years old (17.45% of the samplefor algore2000.com and 21.87% for georgewbush.com) or 35-49 years old(28.13% of the sample for algore2000.com and 27.76% for georgewbush.com).Traditional media do remain much more relevant if compared to the PoliticalInternet.This, however, does not tell us what effects do these sites induce on end users.

A taxonomy of the early actors

The preliminary results of our researchxvi for the development of a Taxonomy of theEarly actors of Political Communication online indicate that most of party web siteswork at least according to two main dimensions: identity reinforcement and serviceprovision.Almost in every site there is a reference to the party’s history; the party keyleaders, anthems, logos, house organs, flags, merchandising objects are displayedas variants of the same identity definition. The programme or platform, pivotal forthe definition of the ‘party essence’, is often ‘declined’ in a wide range or ‘variants’(single document, list of white papers, FAQ, of lists of sections in the web sitewhich deal with specific policy issues).Almost every site offers some degree of service to the Internet community: frombasic (subscription to a party mailing list) to advanced one, like: paying party feesusing a secure server; giving access to political speeches or campaign materialusing streaming audio and video; providing ‘the activists package’ to support thecampaign (the package often includes banners, animated Gifs, electronic copies ofthe manifestos, campaign brochures etc.); sending complete affiliation; requests


online; giving access to the party’s intranet; or providing a mail account with theparty domain.

Party web sites around the world are not developed equally. In our taxonomy wedistinguish three macro-genres (Proto-sitesxvii, Meso-sites and Neo-sitesxviii); onefor each major development step. Development is essentially conditioned byexternal factors: funding and leadership to play a major role, so do few externalfactors, such as competition at national level. Neosites – creative sites with asophisticated space and colour management -- are a minority.Interactivity does exist in several alternative degrees: from the basic mail box, tothe provision of the entire directory of addresses of the party organisation, to theimplementation of chats and for a for party activists.Therefore, contrary to the core ideas of the promoters of e-democracy, the largestmajority of the observed cases shows very poor interactivity solutions (unless weconsider an e-mail address to be the best political party web sites can do to createa virtuous circle with their constituencies).The partial analysis of our research data finds that:33,9% of the scanned party sites have only a ‘mail to webmaster’ feature;3.4% of them allow user to mail to precise people;2.6 % of them provide a partial or full directory to the party origanisation (phoneand e-mail address, for example);8,2% have implemented some sort of ‘forms’ to mail generic or specific question tothe party;8,2% of the scanned sites have an online forum in addition to one of the optionsabove.This structural content analysis (of sites in English, French and Spanish) suggeststhat sites are often conceived to talk with people sharing the same politicalorientation: newcomers are seldom addressed, the opposition is either notmentioned at all or is attacked. This unilateral mode of communication is one of theindicators which separate persuasion (where two parties enter into a transactionalprocess) from propaganda (Jowett, 1996).

Because of this lack of interactivity, the unilateralist nature of this communicationmode, most of the party sites online engage in Digital Propaganda: they really donot promote exchange, according to the often quoted model of the Greek agora,but essentially work – in a very traditional fashion – using a digital push mode.


Known success stories?

Contrary to what happens to trendy expressions such e-politics, I-voting, e-democracy, the activities of specific parties online make fewer headlines. Evenless appears on public media on current political Web ‘success-stories’.

Who does succeed online, then? The key feature for online performancemeasurement is the analysis of the so-called ‘server log files’, which record thetype of traffic generated by the site. Log files are considered highly sensitiveinformation by all webmasters. Very often, political webmasters refuse to publishtheir results given that their site statistics can be used by the opposition to provethat ‘that party does not meet the public expectations’.

In our research we have found only a minority of political web sites which dopublish their statistics online (7.1% of the observed universe). If we analyse theircontent we notice that political web sites often have a very modest audience, asignificant part of which (ranging between 10-20% of the hits received by theserver) of unclear origin: a good percentage of the hits comes from outside thegiven country or from .com .net .org TLDs.However, if we correlate these findings with the structural analysis of web sites, wecould formulate several working hypotheses on the real conditions which favouronline effectiveness of political web sites:• the most technically and aesthetically developed sites have greater chances tosucceed. If, according to our hypothesis, the Political Web must win the multi-channel competition, only compelling, multi-media, personalised sites can acquirea comparative advantage vis-à-vis the same political content available on TV, radioand press;• sites with a coherent and simple structure have greater chances to succeed sincethey match the current, widespread Web usage pattern (very short visits);• sites which benefit from multiple referrals (such a constellation of friendly sites)sending traffic from local (the provincial site points to the national one) or thematicsites (the youth organisation pointing to the main party site; an ‘event/conferencesite’ or an ‘issue/policy’ site pointing to the party site etc.);• sites with deep content (lots of internal links and multiple levels generated out ofsheer content or through an active online discussion group) tend to capture andretain strong, engaged Internet activists..

Charismatic leaders sites [the ‘Daily Him’ or ‘Daily Her’, to re-use Negroponte’sconcept] have – comparatively – greater success online since they often happen tohave many of the characters noted above (depth, ‘personal’/multimedia content).This observation fits with the political science contemporary theories that depict


parties and ideologies as declining entities and the individual leader and issuebased politics as emerging phenomena.Original, unique, hard to find content sites definitely outperform others. In thecurrent Internet economics, this type of content has greater value and suffers lessfrom environmental noise, and channel competition.

There are many reasons why Internet users may badly want to access a certaincontent online. Some of these reasons, such as reconnecting to one’s own countryand culture, may be laudable: it’s the case of the numerous online diasporasxix.

Other reasons may, on the contrary, be illegal or antagonistic vis-à-vis theestablished order in a given country. Anti-regime, insurgency, violent or militantpropaganda sites are the eponyms of this model of political information: they arebuilt to serve other ‘initiated’ users, their content is unique (un-published stories orphotos, films and other evidence of massacres, reports from hard to reach battlezones, statements from insurgents or terrorist groups), and hard to find elsewhere.The information services provided by these sites are critical to the group’s survival:without the Web, the scattered, unlawful community could not probably work in thesame way, and probably would not survive. In other words, the Internet is pivotal tothis communication mode (illegal – sensitive content to few, initiated users); theInternet, in this communication mode, responds also to the uses and gratificationssought by many Web usersxx.

In our hypothesis when illegal sites also adopt few or all of the techniques thatmake traditional, formal political actors succeed, they really achieve somethingthey could hardly replicate using other media.

Conclusions

Some proponents of E-democracy view Internet-based political communication aspart of a program to reform the way democracy works in many western societies.For these authors, ‘Improved democracy’ is the result of a reform of campaigncontributions, the modification of electoral rules (more proportional or moremajority rule according to the context) and new, more efficient ways to expresspeople’s choices.

Others, often starting from the same premises, make a further conceptual step andadvocate E-democracy or I-voting as the most concrete, effective way to introducedeliberative forms of direct democracy (voters decide all major political issues on aregular basis). This type of proponent of strong e-democracy (Citizens Power asTed Becker calls it) tends to get inspiration and legitimacy from both Jefferson


(The will of the people is the only legitimate foundation of any government and toprotect its free expression should be our first object) and Alvin Toffler (You don’thave to be an expert to know what you want). For these authors, the discourse ofthe waves is instrumental to prove that changes in politics is indeed happening andprogress is inevitable.

Sartori labelled this call for deliberative forms of direct democracy, theexasperation of activism (in political participation); the attitude of those that do notsuggest a path to participate better, but simply ask “to participate more,…. with theview to learn how to participate”.Sartori (1993) reminds that sheer size of contemporary political issues makes itimpossible to follow the model of ancient Greece. The problems are too complex,and often out of the community’s reach, out of the community’s sight. Thecommunity itself does not succeed in relating with its parts; it’s simply incapable ofperceiving itself; it’s therefore an illusion to achieve, electronically, directrelationships between all the members of our (contemporary) communities. Thepublic debate that would result from this, would be partial, amputated, and senseof direct relationship between all the members of the demos would simply vanish.At the same time, with this type of direct e-democracy, a large, non-expertaudience (always a sub-set of the universe of those having the right to choose),would be called to decide on urgent, serious and even dangerous matters withoutany form of preparation. As Sartori (1993) puts it, we should pray God to preserveus from this push-button democracy (or the ‘triumph of the inexperienced’).

This said, media interest in e-democracy shows no sign of declining. During therecent French and American presidential elections, for example, mainstreammedia, once again intrigued, covered extensively the online exploits of thecandidates and the experiments of vote-swapping between Gore’s and Nader’ssupporters (Eudes, 2000). Recent research papers by Foot and Schneider (2002),contest the normalization hypothesis (politics on the Internet resembles closelypolitics offline) and, once again, favorably reviews the US 2000 Elections onlineexperience (Margolis, 2000).

It is clear that there is interest worldwide in favour of discussing the relationshipbetween Internet and politics; both inside and outside scholarly circles. The subjectlooks appealing for media and political science scholars, for industry andgovernments both at local and national level. When one scrutinizes the evidencethat supports the idea that e-democracy or I-voting are driving the new politics,there are maybe a dozen cases (in the US or across Europe) that are worthstudying. The scholars that have engaged in critical reviews have concluded that


only the synergy between traditional and modern political media can increasepolitical participation. It’s the overall campaign strategy that matters.Through our research we have understood that hundreds of political party websites around the world have only basic e-mail to empower citizens. This is probablydue to the fact that political webcasters consider the act of setting up a web site asa communication end in itself. E-mail alone, however, is far from being capable ofdelivering the kind of compelling, motivating political participation, sought by e-democracy proponents.The Bias of the Web, the way it works, hinders furthermore the activities oftraditional parties online. By using, the same bias, legions of illegal and potentiallydangerous groups are making the best use possible of the Political Internet. One ofInnis’ greatest conceptual contributions was to demonstrate that communicationmedia have historically had an impact on the character of knowledge (the Web, forexample, offers greater command over space than over time).Innis (1999) also suggested that monopolies or oligopolies of knowledge (andpower) are built by media ‘up to the point that equilibrium is disturbed’. In today’sPolitical Internet the knowledge oligopoly being created, seems to provide acomparative advantage to the antagonistic actors to the established politicalsystem than to traditional mass parties.

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Notes i « Overall participation in competitive elections across the globe rose steadilybetween 1945 and 1990. Between 1945-1950 the number of voters turning out tovote at each election represented 61% of the voting age population (i.e. all citizensold enough to vote). That turnout figure rose to 62% in the 1950s, 65% in the1960s, 67% in the 1970s, and 68% in the 1980s. But in the 1990s, with the influxof a host of competitive elections in newly democratising states, the average forelections held since 1990 has dipped back to 64%. Interestingly the same turnoutfigures expressed as a percentage of the number of people registered to voteremained more constant throughout the 1940s to 1980s but then dipped moresuddenly in the 1990s. In other words, while the participation rate of all eligiblevoters has dropped only marginally, the drop in the participation rate of thoseactually registered to vote has been more pronounced » International IDEA, Voter


Turnout : a global survey « Turnout over time: Advances and retreats in electoralparticipation » URL http://www.idea.int/vt/survey/voter_turnout1.cfmii The table shows statistics obtained using WebAnalyzer in March 2002. Alexaserver ranks sites according to the usage of the “Alexa Bar”, a search add-onproduct of the company of the same name. For a technical description of thisproprietary ranking method consult:http://pages.alexa.com/prod_serv/traffic_learn_more.html?p=Det_W_t_40_M2For a larger list of directories consult the list of specialised WebRingshttp://dir.webring.com/rw?d=Government___Politics/Politics orhttp://S.webring.com/hub?sid=&ring=europolitics&id=&listOther relevant lists – notably covering (charismatic) political leadership – include:Zarate’s Political Collections http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/;WORLDWIDE GUIDE TO WOMEN IN LEADERSHIPhttp://www.guide2womenleaders.com/; Regents of the world http://www.info-regenten.de/regent/regent-e/index.htm; World Statesmenhttp://www.worldstatesmen.org/index.html; Rulers http://www.rulers.org/; Statesand regents of the worldhttp://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Rotunda/2209/index.htmliii Levels in web sites are defined by the number of mouse clicks which arenecessary to reach the informationiv The site is conceived as a support to a political science course: it includespointers to Area studies; Local & regional British politics; News and journalsConstitutions; Other politics websites; Data archives; Politicalparties Elections; Political platforms Government websites; Politicaltheory; International Relations; Political thoughtv Some are arguably the most complete of their kind: for example, with regard toelectorally active political parties, ElectionWorld is the only site which gathers bothofficial election results and the lists of existing (known) political parties online.vi Beyond parties, the most obvious agents of e-democracy, research should studythe submerged part of the political Internet, the deep political web: the web of themovements, of the rebel groups, of the anti-regime sites, of the radical or violentgroups, of the political diasporas and persecuted minorities.This part of the political web, notwithstanding the various successive waves ofinterest for the political Internet, remains entirely out of reach and mostly unknownboth to the scholar community and the public at large.vii « Nobody has figured out what it means exactly, but the concept of electronicdemocracy – or an electronic town hall – captured the public immagination thisyear after Ross Perot announced the concept in this abortive presidentialcampaign » , J. Ubois, We the people : electronic bulletin boards and the politicalprocess , Midrange systems Oct 13, 1992 Vol 5 N.° 19 Pg. 49


viii Electronic democracy : hot wires to Washington The Herald Sun Aug 28 1995 ;E. Schmitt Congress caught in Tangled Web , The Palm Beach Post July 10 1996« No lawmaker is more responsible for pushing Congress into the on-line realm ofthe World WideWeb and electronic democracy than House Speaker NewtGingrich.. »ix Few of the most relevant events in the field of Internet and Politics have beenorganised without a specific reference to the major Sociological or Politicalresearch organisations (ISA and IPSA). This is the case for recent Europeanevents such as: Séminaire sur la démocratie eletronique, Senat Francais, Paris1995; modernizing Democracy through the Electronic Media InternationalConference of the Academy of the Third Millennium http://www.akademie3000.de1997; Political Change for the Information Society, Romehttp://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/policy/developments/e_comm/e_comm02_en.html 1999; Politics & Internet, http://www.kolumbus.fi/pi99/ Oulu and Tampere1999; 1er 2e 3e Forum Mondial de la démocratie electronique Issy les MoulineauxFrance etc.x See Gallup’s Media Use and Evaluation : Gallup Poll Topics : A – Z – Media Useand Evaluation on. refhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/indicators/indmedia.asp#RelatedAnalyses (data 2000accessed 22.07.2001) ; Polix (IT) Pollhttp://www.polix.it/home/sondaggi/isongdaggiispo/polix/2027.htmxi For a recent and comprehensive analysis of the role of Information Overload inindividuals and organisations see the Eurescom study ‘Impacts of InformationOverload’ Study n. P947 1999 online ref.http://www.eurescom.de/public/projectresults/P900-series/947d1.aspThe recent PEOPLE & THE PRESS BIENNIAL MEDIA CONSUMPTION SURVEYhas also addressed the issue. QUESTION89: Some people say they feeloverloaded with information these days, considering all the television news shows,magazines, newspapers, and computer information services. Others say they likehaving so much information to choose from. How about you...do you feeloverloaded, or do you like having so much information available? Results:Overloaded -†26% Like it -†66 Other (vol.) -††6 Don't know/Refused -††2The phenomenon of Information Overload is becoming an issue also for marketingresearch companies although recent studies show that experiences Internet usersdo not suffer from it: TechNews.com: Information overload not a serious issue Jun08 2001: « Experienced Internet users do not generally suffer from informationoverload, according to a new study. For the study, which was published in theonline journal The Next Big Thing, almost 3,000 mostly experienced Internet userswere asked how they cope with the current glut of information and types ofcommunication devices. Eighty percent of the respondents said their ability to cope


with information overload was “better than most” or “excellent”. The study foundthat those who dealt with the most information were most able to cope, while thosereceiving the least data were the most overwhelmed. » online referencehttp://www.nua.com/surveys/index.cgi?f=VS&art_id=905356849&rel=true;ZDNet: Search engines cause ire among Net users Jan 03 2001: « According to anew survey, poor search engines and information overload are causing web-rageamong Internet users. The survey by Roper Starch Worldwide found that onaverage, users get angry and frustrated after 12 minutes of fruitless searching. For7% of respondents, it only takes 3 minutes before web-rage strikes » onlinereferencehttp://www.nua.com/surveys/index.cgi?f=VS&art_id=905356304&rel=true;Newsfactor Network: Net users' patience only lasts 12 minutes« Information overload on the Internet causes users to feel frustrated and stressed,and can even lead to “Internet rage”, according to a new study.The study from UK firm WebTop found that 71 percent of British Internet usershave suffered from Internet rage at least once. »Online reference http://www.nua.com/surveys/index.cgi?f=VS&art_id=905356650&rel=truexii Notably if the campaign strategy implies that the party or the candidatesengages in a process of mutual reinforcement of the messages channelled byeach medium (for example the radio ads point to the web site, the press ads pointto the web site, the site reproduces the radio and press campaign).xiii A great number of pages are made available by the internet service providerwww.angelfire.com or www.geocities.com later acquired by Yahoo see on.ref.,http://pages.yahoo.com/nhp/government___politics/politics/parties_and_groupsxiv The Deep Web : Surfacing Hidden Value Bright planet White Paper on.ref.http://beta.brightplanet.com/deepcontent/tutorials/DeepWeb/index.asp; P. Bailey,N. Craswell, D. Hawking Dark Matter on the Web Proceeding of the W3Conference on.ref. http://www9.org/final-posters/poster30.html; J. Bar-Ilan Tendays in the life of HotBot and Snap – a case study . http://www9.org/final-posters/5/poster5.html; The GVU’ Tenth WWW User survey (1998) also providesinteresting and, albeit not new, still relevant data about the « Problems Using theWeb » : 9% of the responses (57,1% of the cases) indicate that « Broken Links »are a major issue, together with « finding new info » (7,1% and 45,4% of thecases) and « find known info » (4,7% and 30% of the cases). On. Ref.http://www.gvu.gatech.edu/user_surveys/survey-1998-10/graphs/use/q11.htmxv Only Gore in the week ending October 8 had an audience on n179.000 with naverage time spent of 15 minutes ad 27 seconds. Ibidemhttp://209.249.142.22/press_releases/pr_001031.htm


xvi The research aim is to describe the nature, the methods and the identifiableachievements of the early actors of web-based political communication . The bulkof the analysis is carried out by scanning the « visible » part of the political Internet(more than 600 party web sites listed by two of the four inventories quoted in thispaper). Ethnographic notes have been collected on those sites, and the researchresults have been collected in a database. The structural elements for a firsttaxonomy have been defined and applied to what observed so far. The datareported here are relative to two successive explorations of this vast amount ofdata online. The research will be completed with the structural (software based)analysis of the observed universe.xvii Proto-sites have poor control over Form and Function – they also provideminimal Interactivityxviii To an even greater extend than Meso-sites Neo-Sites have a very sophisticatedspace management , same applief for Color Management ; they often use soundand movement (through animated Gifs, Java ; Shockwave/Flash, QuickTime andother multimedia solutions). It’s in Neo-Sites that one can find the greatest amountof Innovation and creativity : Neo-Sites are often conceived with Trans-mediaapproach : they try to merge in a single platform the best that press, radio and TVcan offer in terms of content management.xix Several sites have played or still play the role of hub for numerous virtualcommunities online: http://www.ethioworld.com (Ethiopian diaspora)http://www.armeniadiaspora.com/ (Armenian Diaspora) http://diaspora-net.org/(American-Greek, Canadian-Greek communities diaspora)http://news.asmarino.com/ (Eritrean diaspora) http://www.kurdistan.org/ (KurdishDiaspora) http://www.afghanradio.com/ (Afghan Diaspora). See also J. W.Anderson Cybernauts of the Arab Diaspora: Electronic Mediation in TransnationalCultural Identities http://www.bsos.umd.edu/CSS97/papers/anderson.html; K.Altintas, F. Alimoglu, M. Batu Altan, K. Cagiltay, K. Seitveliyev, e-TATARS: VirtualCommunity Of The Crimean Tatar Diaspora http://www.iccrimea.org/scholarly/e-tatars.html; D. Mezzana Internet/The strength of the online bonds: Networking,themes, services, politics and culturehttp://www.africansocieties.org/eng_giugno2002/eng_rubricadiasporaonline.htm;(Map) Virtual Jerusalem – Jewish Communities of the Worldhttp://www.wjc.org.il/wjcbook/chartmap.htm; I. Williams Downloading Heritage:Vietnamese Diaspora Online http://cms.mit.edu/conf/mit2/Abstracts/IWilliams.pdf;M. Georgiou Diasporic Communities On-Line: A Bottom Up Experience ofTransnationalism – Paper to be Published in the journal Hommes et Migrations,Oct. 2002 London School of Economicswww.lse.ac.uk/Depts/Media/EMTEL/Minorities/ papers/hommesmigrations.doc; A.K. Sahoo, From Diaspora to Transnational Networks: A Comparative Study of


Gujarati, Punjabi and Telugu Diasporahttp://www.geocities.com/husociology/trans.htm

xx Social escapism, transaction-based security and privacy, information gathering,non-transactional privacy concerns. See P. Korgaonkar, L. Wolin A multivariateAnalysis of Web usage in Journal of Advertising Research 1999 Vol . 39 (March,April ) 53-68

New roles for users in online

news media?

Exploring the application of interactivity

through European case studies

Brian Trench

In discussions of the information society, technological developments and socialrelations are often intertwined. Hence the ‘wired society’ or the ‘networked society’becomes both a statement about the telecommunications infrastructure and ametaphor for a society that is more equitable and more open. The notion of ‘digitaldemocracy’ implies some necessary connection between the provision andadoption of certain technologies and the transparency of political systems.Much discussion of the impacts on news media and on journalism of developmentsin Internet technologies is marked by a similar elision. The technologies are‘interactive’, so, it is argued, the provision and consumption of information will alsobe, in some sense, interactive. It has even been argued that mass media aredisintegrating, giving way to user-based media without professional intermediation.

Before the Internet became available to large user bases, The Daily Me – the‘newspaper’ geared to the individual consumer’s needs or wants – had beenproposed as a futuristic project. With the roll-out of the World Wide Web as amedium of commercial publishing, the Daily Me found a possible platform. A smallbut influential group of media professionals became new media advocates, arguingthat the function of online media was to give readers what they wanted, throughthe harnessing means of information retrieval software.Leah Gentry, who had long experience in newspaper publishing, suggested thatthe assassination of the [US] president was a story that should properly be madeavailable to all, but that, short of such extreme cases, the attention of news mediain the online environment had to be focused on giving the readers ‘what they want’


(Harper, 1997). From outside the media professions, Nicholas Negroponteproposed the notion of the newspaper ‘in an edition of one’ (Negroponte, 1995).This represented the achievement of the perfect marketplace, in which theindividual consumer is directly linked to the production process.

Daily Me as a non-starter

It is a reminder of how weak the technology community’s understanding of socialand psychological factors in technology adoption often is that the Daily Me in itsvarious forms has proved to be a non-starter. Even in the highly attenuated form ofpersonalization services, as found on many Web news sites, the user- orconsumer-generated news product has remained a marginal phenomenon. In thediscussion in Europe of opportunities for news publishing arising from Internet andrelated developments, the market-based model of user-driven news has not founda strong echo.There are, however, many possible intermediate positions between anunquestioning reliance on the broadcast or transmission model of mass media anda reversal of relations to put the consumer in control. The opportunities presentedby Internet technologies, and many practices that have grown up in the Internetenvironment, contain an implicit challenge to much received professional wisdomand theoretical understandings. They draw attention, for example, to how vaguethe role and image of the news audience are in the theory, professional textbooksand history-writing of journalism.

It is one of the very many valuable contributions of digital media studies to mediastudies in general that they highlight weaknesses and gaps in established theoriesand models. Mass media have traditionally relied on their own judgement of whatstories are worth telling, on a very largely one-way mode of communication and onan internalized image of their publics. It represents a significant challenge both toreceived images of journalism within the professional sphere, and to the closelyrelated academic studies of journalism, to put the user/reader/viewer/audience(and the terminology presents its own problems) at the center of the picture.Largely independently of technological developments, there has been a vigorousadvocacy in the United States of new forms of ‘public journalism’ or ‘civicjournalism’, in which the journalist’s relationship with the community he or sheostensibly serves has been redefined (see, for example, Rosen, 1999; Kovach andRosenstiel, 2001). Similarly, notions of communication as conversation have beenexplored in the context of journalism theory and practice. In a rare application ofsuch ideas in a European context, Kunelius (2001) has reported an interesting

New roles for users in online news media? 207

experiment in applying the conversational mode in the reporting and analysis ofpublic affairs in a Finnish town.In certain circumstances, however, conversation has already become more than atheoretical notion or experiment. It became a reality, for example, in theheightened publishing activity that followed the events of September 11th 2001.Not only did demand for online information, for multiple sources of information and,indeed, for all media surge in the hours, days and weeks after the September 11thattacks, but the ‘audience’ became part of the stories. The recycling of victims’ andobservers’ e-mails into the pages of newspapers, of their mobile phone messagesinto radio, and of amateur video recordings on to television news, brought usersinto the making of news in remarkable ways.

These experiences raise interesting and challenging questions about thedefinitions and demarcations of journalism as a professional and social practice,and about the boundaries of news. They hardly support the notion that journalismis redundant, because, as has been claimed, “everyone becomes a journalist”(M. F. Wilson, executive editor of The San Francisco Chronicle, quoted in Bardoel,1996). But they do give some force to the criticism of journalists for failing to seethat they are no longer the exclusive gatekeepers. Steve Yelvington, of CoxInteractive Media, insists that the content of community sites like slashdot.combased on users’ contributions should be seen as news (Yelvington, 1999).These experiences also give new force to the analyses, based on consideration ofthe possible impacts of the Internet, that received theoretical models of journalismbased on models of gatekeeping and agenda-setting need to be ‘synthesized’ witha “theoretical approach that explores the role of journalism as a community builder”(Singer, 1998), that the traditional ‘vertical’ model of journalism is challenged bythe development of ‘horizontal’ means of mass communication through the Internet(Bardoel, 1996), or that journalists are “losing their importance in communicationas authoritative and autonomous producers of messages” (Demers, 1996).

This kind of largely speculative analysis accounts for a significant part of thetheoretical commentary on trends in media practice that has grown alongside theemergence of new media forms. A more active field of professional commentary,however, focuses on the ways in which media professionals exploit the interactivefeatures of the World Wide Web to build new relations with users. In his earlier,more optimistic commentaries on new media developments, John Pavlik (1997)foresaw a renaissance of journalism through the adoption and adaptation ofInternet-based technologies. By using features of the Internet that allowinformation to be presented in personally engaging manner – thus, in a new kind ofrelationship between producer and consumer – journalism would be transformed.Pavlik offered a view of online journalism’s development in several phases, with


increasing innovation, and increasing responsiveness to users’ interests andinputs. His more recent analyses are rather less optimistic about the capacity ofnew media, as he once put it, to “transform journalism” but he claims to see “theemergence of … a two-way symmetric model of communication in 21st centurynews operations” (Pavlik, 2000).

The challenges of online news media

Online news media have to face the challenge of a changed informationenvironment. Many of the sources used in journalism are themselves active asdirect publishers. Many individuals within the publics addressed by journalism areactive as information-seekers, some too as information-providers. Users may haveaccess to the source material from which news reports published in newspapers,magazines, and broadcast on television and radio are generated. On this basis, itmay be argued that journalists need to give greater emphasis to the task oforienting readers within a sea of available information than to that of re-telling thestories. The most valuable contribution a journalist can make in manycircumstances is to provide a map of the various positions with appropriatesignposts to relevant material. Users may work different routes through newsmaterial, according to their own previous knowledge of the topic or their level ofinterest, assembling multiple meanings. The space in online news media to addcontext and explanation is, for all practical purposes, unlimited. Allied to discussionforums, this may be seen as redefining news as an open process, rather than as aclosed product.

Richer forms of communication between author and reader are made possible inthe online environment. The reader can have access to the reporter's original data,can set the reporter's conclusions alongside their own or the reporter's own pointof departure, and can submit their own comments to the authors and to otherusers. These possibilities and practices give added value to news material, butalso facilitate diverse user experiences and producer-user interchanges. News thatis made transparent in this manner is sometimes referred to as ‘open-source’ (see,e.g. Katz, 1999), in a conscious echo of the terms in which the technologies of theInternet have been developed.

The Internet as a medium for journalism is culturally charged; it is not a neutral,technical space on to which the relative latecomers of online news publishing caninscribe whatever they choose. The values inscribed in the Internet as a culturalspace influence the practice, or at least the context, of online journalism. On thebasis of the possibilities for a more dialogical practice, we can identify certain


professional values as potentially more important in online journalism than in moretraditional forms. These values find concrete expression in the application ofspecific Web features. They speak to a changed relationship between producerand user.Arising from the consideration of the forms of online journalism, Jay Black hassuggested (1998) that a new model of journalism may be emerging in whichstories are presented as "data that are full, rich, textured and comprehensive", or"hypotheses tested and retested from multiple perspectives". Journalists'conclusions should be "publicly verifiable and replicable". Black also urged thatjournalists be more willing to accept feedback, give expression to more voices and,overall, be more accountable in their work practices.This was reflected in the 1996 revision of the professional code of the Society ofProfessional Journalists, in the United States. The revision was "motivated in partby a sense that new technologies for gathering and distributing information weresubtly changing the nature of doing journalism" (Black, 1998). The revised codeshifts the emphasis from that on objectivity to one on seeking deep truth frommultiple sources, to ‘diversity’, ‘avoid imposing values’, and ‘dialogue with thepublic’ (Society of Professional Journalists, 1996).The greater accountability that Black proposes can be achieved through clearidentification of the people and interests behind a site and of the sources used incompiling it. Visitors to a site can then make their own judgement about the validityor likely veracity of the information. The application of accountability can go further:where the source material of a news item – press release, official report, speech inparliament – is available on the Web, as it very often is, journalists can provide alink to that material, allowing the reader to see how it has been used. Active Netusers are accustomed to looking at topics from various sources and viewpoints.On the assumption that increasing numbers of users will become ever moreproficient in the medium, news stories could be presented as versions, allowingreaders to see how they have been assembled. The construction of news could inthis way be made transparent.

New Media ethics

In accommodating to the greater responsiveness that ‘new media’ ethicsapparently require, journalists can facilitate responses from and discussion amongthe readers, giving active encouragement in the form of propositions or questionson which contributions are invited, not merely as reactions to a piece of formaljournalism but as elements of public discussion of the issue. The users'contributions might then be the basis of further professional-journalist inquiries andinterviews with the ‘authoritative’ sources.


Journalists who have grown up in the new media, or who have grown over intothem, have become accustomed to treat answering such e-mails as an integralpart of their job. However, journalists grounded in ‘old media’ tend to see it as animposition, or a change of employment conditions to be compensated.Don Siegel, editor-in-chief of the magazine, The Onion, said: “We do feel more intouch with our readers on the Web, just because we get feedback from them,whereas our print version readers don’t really write” (Mackintosh, 2000). Long-established music journalist Karl Dallas declared: “During 25 years writing forMelody Maker comment on my articles was fairly limited, and usually appeared, atthe earliest, three weeks after publication. When I started writing about music onthe Web, I immediately experienced a completely different timescale andrelationship with my readers” (Dallas, 2001). David Talbot, pioneer Web magazineeditor, described his publication Salon as part of a constant feedback loop: “Wereceive e-mails from around the world that challenge us and provide us withcorrections and criticisms. It keeps us honest” (Power, 1999).

An International Labour Organization report on information technologies in themedia and entertainment industries reported a BBC News Online executive saying,“We’re now getting much greater involvement from the people in the story itself.The journalist’s business is becoming much more closely connected to its subjects,and this makes for better reporting and a better relationship between the newsorganization and its readers. Right now there are four people just sorting throughreaders’ e-mails, so every day we have this immense interaction with our readers.This is fundamentally changing journalism” (International Labor Organization,2000).This acknowledgement of the importance of users’ contributions represents ahigher degree of reflexivity than is usually apparent in traditional media. Internetpublishers for whom the interactivity of the Web is more than a means of gatheringmarketing information and hosting opinion polls cannot avoid beginning to seethemselves as others see them and, thereby, to question their own values andassumptions. This encourages journalism that is more open to self-questioningthan is typically the case for print and broadcast journalism. Using multiple anddiverse sources of information to construct stories, as the Web allows and as goodpractice indicates, also promotes continuous reflection on the manner of doingjournalism.

Further, Web journalists have the possibility of tracking the usage of the productsthey provide, how users move from one part to another, what are theirpreferences, and so on, through web site user logs. Such information can bevaluable guidance in developing editorial policies and layout for a site.


These, then, are sketched some of the possibilities of a changed orientation tousers from the producer point of view. But what proportion of users want to followthese paths to additional information or to exchanges with producers and sources?Some studies suggest that enhancements are not wanted, that users prefer morepredictable, sequential forms, or even that the demand for ‘interactivity’ has beenover-stated (Poynter, 2000). Whether it is for such reasons, or for reasons ofeconomy, the potential of new narrative forms and of various forms of interactivityhas been weakly realized in online news services, particularly those attached toestablished media enterprises.A study of English-language Asian newspapers’ online editions noted that “scantuse was made generally of the Net’s capacity for … allowing readers to add theircontent. Options for interpersonal interactivity were virtually nonexistent.Responsiveness to the user was spare as well, on average” (Massey and Levy,1999). A 1997 survey of users of New York Times online forums showed that theycontributed on average twice a week to those forums, but 74 per cent could notremember receiving any feedback from newspaper staff to their messages to staffor to forums (Schultz, 2000). Another US-based survey reported that 33 of 100newspaper sites ran discussion forums – or, perhaps more significantly, that 67per cent did not (Schultz, 1999).

Clues as to the attitudes of European media professionals to feedback andinteractivity can be found in surveys of Dutch and Flemish online journalists(Deuze and Paulussen, 2002; Deuze and Dimoudi, 2002). Interactivity comessecond to speed and immediacy in their ranking of four key concepts but overthree quarters of Flemish respondents rated interaction with readers important orvery important. Over two thirds of Dutch respondents agreed with the statementthat online journalists must sustain a strong interactive relationship with theirreaders. Nearly three quarters of Flemish and Dutch respondents rate providingplatforms for discussion as an important or very important journalistic task. Thefindings are not unambiguous, however; when compared with Dutch journalistsacross all media, Dutch online journalists gave significantly less emphasis to givingthe public a chance to voice their opinions.Acknowledgement of the user’s importance is an increasing part of media industrydiscourse. Responding to the invitation of a trade magazine to “name the biggestchallenges facing journalists in 2002”, the editor of The Guardian, Alan Rusbridger,said: “The readers are in the driving seat: if they want their news on a PersonalDigital Assistant rather than newsprint, that’s what we had better give them” (UKPress Gazette, 2002). Does Rusbridger’s statement reflect a real shift inprofessional attitudes that is reflected in a new accommodation of users’contributions and demands? Or is it a form of demagogy that masks a marketingagenda?


Case studies

For some possible answers to those questions we turn now to case studiesundertaken as part of the European Union-funded MUDIA project1. We looked atthe roles assigned to users of web news sites in four EU member states, Denmark(DK), France (FR), Ireland (IE) and the United Kingdom (UK). Our approach was toselect a sample of case studies in each country – 24 in total – that represented amix of types, according to the character of the enterprise (‘traditional media’ or‘Net-native’), the target group or groups, and the visible presence, at first view, ofsome of the usual interactive features of web sites, such as e-mail alerts,discussion groups and hyperlinks to external sites.

The mix of traditional media and Net-native organizations was skewed somewhatby the need to take account of the activities of other partners in the MUDIA project.Thus, the French and UK samples comprised exclusively Net-native sites, becausenewspaper publishers and broadcasters in those countries were being surveyedfor other purposes in the project. The Danish and Irish samples comprised a mix oftraditional media and Net-native enterprises. In the overall sample of 24 casestudies, 18 sites were classified as Net-native and six as belonging to traditionalmedia.The country samples each included general news providers, and sites with morenarrowly defined missions to provide news and information exchange on suchtopic areas as human rights, sport, health, technology or women’s issues. It shouldbe noted that the 24 sites were all businesses in the common understanding of theterm. Thus, amateur enthusiasts’ Web logs and community sites were notincluded; nor were participatory sites such as the various national versions ofIndymedia.The case studies were conducted during the period between October 2001 andMay 2002 and involved reviews of the 24 sites, semi-structured interviews witheditorial personnel in each of the organizations, and a survey of editorial staffworking for those organizations, together with a control survey of communities ofonline journalists in each of the four states.

The review of the sites was conducted on the basis of a matrix developed for thisstudy, and in which ten interactive functions were rated as representing low,moderate, or high levels of interactivity and assigned a score of 1, 2 or 3,respectively. The principal criterion for this rating as low, moderate or high was theextent to which the site user was facilitated and encouraged to participate in thesite’s overall activity.The scoring system allowed for a maximum score of 20 points; the initial selectionprocess ensured that the minimum would be more than zero. As it turned out the


case studies fell into two larger groups, with ten rated at 13-15 points, one sitealone in middle position at 11 points, and the balance of 13 sites rated at 3-9points. It should be understood that the lower ratings reflected in some cases agenerally weak interest in facilitating user involvement, but in other cases, a highlyfocused use of specific user-oriented services such as discussion boards. The topten included at least two sites from each of the four countries, tending to confirmthat we had achieved reasonably comparable sub-samples. Eight of the top tenwere classified as Net-native, reflecting closely (80 per cent) the weight of thissector within the overall sample of case studies (75 per cent). It is alreadyrevealing of a difference between countries to which we shall return that the twotraditional media organizations represented in the top ten are based in Denmark.

All but two of the interviews with senior editorial personnel were conducted overapproximately 40 minutes in their places of work. The two exceptions wereinterviews with representatives of French sites that were conducted by e-mail,because of practical difficulties in arranging face-to-face interviews. The interviewguide referred to the respondent’s knowledge of their site users’ profile, thestrategies used to build user loyalty, the means provided for the user to givefeedback, the use made of the feedback information, the facilities for users tocontribute to news content, the weight attached to user contributions in the overallpublishing strategy, and related questions.

The analysis of the interviews yielded dominant themes that were grouped underthree broad headings – Delivery, Contribution and Editorial Integration.Under the first heading, Delivery, respondents described how they wereresponding to user demand by delivering services through a range of mediaalongside the Web, including, and specifically, e-mail and SMS (short messagingservice) on mobile phones. Of the 24 case studies, all were rated as having madea commitment to multi-platform delivery.In some cases, this multi-platform delivery was represented as a form ofpersonalization. The editor of Ananova (UK) coupled personalization and providing‘breaking news quickly’ – but on topics that users have previously indicated are ofparticular interest. Ireland.com (IE) emphasized the ‘elective’ character ofpersonalized news and, in this context referred to the use of databases as ameans of storing news so that it can be ‘pulled down’.

A common thread of most of the responses was the emphasis on the value of e-mail to maintain regular communication with users. All sites surveyed offered anumber of e-mail-based news products that required subscription. Irish Abroad (IE)and Enduring Freedoms (FR) stated that 80 per cent of their users had signed upfor e-mail products, and Oneworld (UK) described e-mail as ‘the killer application’.


Several sites offered e-mail alerts based on keywords that users have selected.Electric News (IE) referred to this as matching the users’ needs – “they can rely onus to filter a lot of the noise out”.By contrast with this heavy reliance on the older technology of e-mail for buildingrelations with users, the sites surveyed were rather hesitant about committing tonewer technologies such as delivery to PDAs (personal digital assistants). Perhapsreflecting the negative experience with WAP (wireless application protocol), inwhich services are little used, or have been discontinued, the respondentsindicated they were waiting for a business model for delivery to PDAs to emergebefore moving firmly in that direction. Many stated that they already had thetechnical capacity to provide such a service. According to Ingenioren (DK), “if thereis user demand or if there was a business model for payment for fast news [viaPDA] then we could prioritize it”.

Under Contribution, the interview respondents discussed a range of means bywhich users could interact directly with the site, with the editors and journalists,and with other users. Fifteen of the 24 case studies were rated as providing achannel for user contributions, but the degree of emphasis on this aspect of theservice differed much more across the case studies than in relation to the deliverytheme. For Ananova (UK), promoting user contributions is explicit policy – “we likethem to tell us their news”. So too for Football365 (UK), which started by providingnews rather in the manner of popular newspaper but responded to user demandby increasingly emphasizing the users’ comments. Sport.fr (FR) defines itsdistinctiveness in terms of the possibilities for users to communicate with, andleave their mark on, the site. Irishhealth (IE) presents itself as a source of hardnews but publishes all stories with a request for comment, as well as havingdiscussion facilities around individual health themes. Oneworld (UK) hasdiscussion boards on all subject areas and, at the time of our survey, waspreparing to start an online collaborative broadcasting service, in which “film-makers, activists, interested people and students” contribute video or audio clips tostories.

However, several of the sites insisted strongly on the limits of such usercontributions. Ireland.com (IE) was concerned that its activities should not affectperception of the newspaper, The Irish Times, whose resources, brand and ethoslie behind the site – “people know what The Irish Times is. We don’t want totamper with that”. Similarly, the focus of the online edition of the daily newspaper,Jyllands-posten (DK), is on supporting the print edition and the web site does notinclude strategies for having users shape news content. One Net-native site,Electric News (IE), explained its choice not to include discussion boards ongrounds of ‘what journalism should be’. But this site, like others who had also


chosen not to provide discussion boards, acknowledged that such services arepopular and can build relations.One form of user contribution found on many of the sites is the regularly updateduser poll, on which the users are asked to click on buttons to indicate their ‘yes’ or‘no’ to a given question. Although this is a very limited form of user contribution,operated under strict control by the service provider, it was reported to be popularwith users. In some cases, several thousand votes were recorded daily. This maybe taken as an indication of users’ wish to participate. However, this opportunity forparticipation is built on a model of journalism that largely obscures the users – forexample, Jyllands-posten (DK) admitted that their journalists rarely checked theresults of these polls.We found significant differences between online news services of existingtraditional news providers (print or broadcast) and Net-native providers in thestrategies adopted towards users. Net-native sites appeared to be attempting moreactively to integrate user contributions in their services; they were readier to breakaway from traditional news structures in responding to user demand.Editorial Integration arose as a strong theme because it was partly in order toensure greater user responsiveness and better cohesion between the severalparts of media enterprises – particularly those with both online and print orbroadcast services – that some of the sites surveyed set about integrating theiroperations in a single newsroom structure. This aspect of convergence wasexamined more closely in another of the MUDIA studies (see The EuropeanMultimedia News Landscape, posted at www.mudia.org). It presented itself forconsideration here, under the study of user roles, because respondents saweditorial integration as a means of providing more differentiated content and thus abetter, more user-oriented service.

In the early days of online publishing within larger media enterprises, the onlinedivisions were often physically removed from established newsrooms, andpopulated by staffs of different experience, age, qualifications and culture fromthose of the established journalists. Following widely reported examples in theUnited States, but also based on their own specific experiences of thedisadvantages of separation, some of the case studies have brought theiroperations together. Onside (DK), which is the online sports service of the Danishbroadcaster TV3, implemented a rotation system under which broadcast journalistsspend some of their time in the online service, This was explained as a means ofensuring that the quality of content published online was equivalent to that of thebroadcast service.Ingenioren (DK), a weekly technology newspaper with an online service,established through user surveys that they could meet user demand moreeffectively through integration of their services, and through the combination of the


print journalists’ subject expertise and the online journalists’ user responsiveness.Jyllands-posten (DK) reported that the news editor of the online service hadbecome “the most central person in our [combined] newsroom”. That respondenthad taken integration a step further by retraining print journalists to think of theaudio-visual aspects or possibilities of their stories in order to guide the productionof multimedia content for the online service.One of the general features emerging from the case study interviews was the lackof detailed information held by the respondents on user demand and user profile.Only a small number of the 24 news organizations had conducted recent usersurveys. The others were relying on older surveys many of which had beenconducted by the marketing department and so were focused on the businessmodel and not on identifying user demand for news content. Also, due to a generalreluctance to implement mandatory registration sites tended not to be gatheringinformation from their Web servers about user profile.The third part of the empirical study of user roles in online news comprised asurvey of media professionals working in the 24 sites selected as case studiesand, more broadly, in online journalism in the four countries in which those casestudies were located.

Online surveys present several methodological issues that affect theirrepresentativity, and there is little that researchers can do to eliminate thosedifficulties. We are making no claims that the survey responses can be generalizedto online journalists in the four member states, but these responses do providesome comment and counterpoint to the findings of the case study interviews.The survey was conducted among media professionals engaged in producingonline news content in the four member states selected for the case studies. Therewere two samples: online staff working for the news organizations in our casestudies, and a wider group of online professionals working in other newsorganizations. Notice of the survey was sent to contact persons in each of the casestudy enterprises for further distribution to their staffs, and to mailing lists and websites dedicated to discussion of online journalism. The questions under UserProfile, Loyalty, Interactivity and User contribution took the form of statements onwhich respondents were asked to rank their opinion as to whether they: Stronglyagree (coded 5); Agree (4); Mixed feelings (3); Disagree (2); Strongly disagree (1).The response from the sample of professionals working in the case studyenterprises is estimated at about 40 per cent – we did not have a precise count ofthe total numbers involved. Responses came from 20 of the 24 case studyenterprises. The response rate from the wider community of online journalists wasmuch lower, but is impossible to estimate as there are no figures for thispopulation. The response rate varied significantly across the four countries, withresponses from Denmark accounting for nearly half (46 per cent) of all 138


responses received. Responses from France, where the questionnaire wasdistributed in French, accounted for 16 per cent of all responses, with most ofthese coming from the wider journalism community.

It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the survey is representative of views withinthis emerging professional sector, but it can be taken as a useful indicator ofprofessionals’ perceptions of users’ roles in the broader communication process.There were no significant differences between the responses from the casestudies sub-sample and the sub-sample from the wider online journalismcommunity.Of the 22 statements on which respondents were asked to indicate their opinion,the six that attracted the highest level of agreement are listed below. A rating of 5indicated strong agreement, and 1 strong disagreement.

Including hyperlinks can make a news story more valuable to users 4.32Accuracy and reliability in news are the best way to build user loyalty 4.23E-mail alerts about news help encourage users to return to a site 4.09I welcome direct user feedback on my work 4.01Users of our site have more opportunity now to interact with reportersthan they did five years ago

3.92

It is important for editors and writers to read user contributionsto discussion boards and online polls

3.86

From these and further responses a profile of online media professionals mightappear to emerge that is strongly disposed to active engagement with their users.But setting these results alongside the reviews of the case study sites, and theinterviews with those sites’ senior personnel, indicates rather a contradictionbetween perception and practice. The professionals surveyed wanted very muchto ‘do the right thing’ for their users, e.g. include helpful hyperlinks, take account oftheir feedback, and read their views. The evidence from the site reviews and theinterviews suggested that they did not do so to the same degree. A large majorityof the stories published on the case study sites appeared without hyperlinks toexternal sites, and in Jyllands-posten (DK), for example, it was admitted that thejournalists rarely visited the discussion boards or read the results of online polls –and this was in one of the more user-responsive of the case studies.

The survey responses point to further contradictions, in that the statement, “Iwelcome direct user feedback on my work” (rated 4.01, and ranked fourth moststrongly supported of 22 propositions), attracted significantly stronger support thanthe statement, “Users want to interact directly with reports and editors online”(rated 3.47, ranked 15). These responses suggest that professionals see user


feedback as desirable in abstract, but much less so when it implicates themindividually.

Conclusions

Among the conclusions we drew from this series of case studies are the following:• There was little evidence of a ‘new paradigm’ in online journalism, in the

sense that this might refer to disappearing boundaries between producerand user

• The traditional model of journalist story-telling based on authoritativeselection of the salient ‘facts’ survives strongly in the new environment

• The traditional model of a newsroom based on clear hierarchies and roledemarcations also survives strongly in the new environment

• Interactivity in its many and varied forms is being applied at generally lowlevels, but unevenly across the online media sectors

• Facilities for tracking usage of sites are little used; information captured bythese means is not part of a feedback loop to editors, writers and designers

We observed also that there were discernible differences between member statesin the degrees of openness to innovation in producer-user relationships. Thesedifferences may be based in part on national journalism cultures, but also in parton differentiated responses to technological developments in the wider cultures ofeach country. Danish online journalists, whether working in traditional media orNet-native enterprises, were markedly more open to incorporating usercontributions, and to professional and organizational innovation, than theircounterparts in the other countries. French online journalists appeared least user-responsive and least innovative, with the British and Irish professionals inintermediate positions. These differences were reflected even in the levels ofinterest in our research itself, as indicated in the responsiveness to requests forinterview and to the survey questionnaire. The national differences observed hereconform to those observed in other cases, where, for example, EU member stateshave been grouped as light, medium or heavy users of communicationtechnologies (Servaes and Heindderyckx, 2002). A similar pattern of three clusterswas observed in the EU-funded media training project, JetPilot (1998-99), in whichthe present author participated.

However, the strongest conclusion of the present project had to do with a factorthat was not directly on our agenda – economic survival and the business model.Over the period of the interviews and surveys, and in the months immediatelyafterwards, significant changes occurred in the status of several of the enterprises,including the introduction of charges at Ireland.com, cessation or suspension of


publication by Transfert, Infoscience, Central European Review (later to mergewith another online service, Transitions Online), Megastories, and reductions inonline staff at RTE, Ireland.com, and Ingenioren.Reduction in resources tended to mean a reduced effort in developing interactivefeatures of web sites and promoting effective interaction between producers andusers. Already in the late 1990s there were signs of retreat from theexperimentation of the early phase of Web news publishing. In 1997, John Pavlik,a long-time observer of trends and practices in online journalism, set out a possibleevolution of Web journalism from ‘stage one’, where the emphasis was on‘repurposing’ of previously available news content, through ‘stage two’ whereoriginal content with hyperlinks and other interactive features is created, to ‘stagethree’ where content is designed specifically for the Web and involvesexperimentation with new forms of story-telling (Pavlik, 1997). Pavlik posited that“new media can transform journalism”. Two years later, in the same publication, ajournalist who spent two years with the online service of Fox News in the UnitedStates considered that Web journalism increasingly resembled forms thatdeveloped in television and news agencies and that “experiments in story-tellingare on an indefinite hiatus” (Houston, 1999).

It may be, therefore, that the shake-out of 2001 merely accentuated andaccelerated developments already under way. It should be underlined, however,that the boundaries of the research reported here were set down in terms of the‘media industry’. The sites surveyed were those of more or less conventionalbusinesses; higher levels of innovation and, in particular, greater openness tointeraction with users may well be found in the productions of hobbyists andhackers, in community sites and so-called Indymedia.Our assignment was to undertake a ‘prognostic study’ that would offer someguidance to industry players and professionals. For reasons that should by now beclear, we were reluctant to offer any prognoses. We were all too aware that had wedone these studies two years earlier, our conclusions might have been verydifferent and we might have felt greater confidence in pointing to future possibilitiesor probabilities. We might, consequently, have been more dramatically incorrect inour prognoses.Our difficulty in this respect relates to a wider problem of trend-spotting which wecall the problem of past, present and future. The historical, or past, problem hasbeen one of discerning the continuity and the novelty in online journalism. Thedescriptive, or present, problem has been one of determining which of the manystrands of emerging and current practice can be taken as representative. Theprognosis, or future, problem has been one of too often taking hopes as realities.This theoretical and methodological problem has been reflected in the inconsistentuse of ‘will’, ‘may’, ‘should’, ‘can’ in discussion of current and emerging practices.


When, for example, John Pavlik (2000), one of the most prolific US writers ononline news practices, says that the inverted triangle form of news story is“becoming obsolete in the online news world”, what is the status of that statement?Is it an extrapolation from observation of past and present trends? Is it aprediction? Is it a hope?

In the European context, Mark Deuze (2001) has contributed very valuably to theliterature on online journalism. He bases one analysis on ‘ideal-typical’ forms ofonline journalism as elaborated by "an increasing number of professionals andacademics”. Does this reference to increasing numbers give these ideal-typicalforms added weight as identifiable practices or trends?Jim Hall (2001) writes in the introduction to his very useful Online Journalism: acritical primer: “Within five years more people in the developed world will get theirnews from the Internet rather than from a daily paper”. He might have been morequalified in his prediction if he had recalled, that Nicholas Negroponte (1995),looking five years forward from the mid-1990s, had written with the same certainty:“In the year 2000 more people will be entertaining themselves on the Internet thanby looking at what we call the networks today.”These few examples are intended to underline the difficulty of identifying trendsand emerging practices, and, thereby, of offering scenarios and prognoses. Someof this difficulty, as reflected in the published literature, may arise from theprovenance and purpose of research in this field. Kopper and colleagues (2000)noted that most research on online journalism is conducted by media institutionsand most is privately funded. It tends to be ad hoc, seeking to address conjuncturalbusiness or technical issues. From a European perspective, we are also bound tonote that most of the defining studies have come from North America. Kopper et al.wondered, with justification, if public institutions were finding it difficult to “react tothe pace of changes in mass communication”. It may be that companies,professional groups and, indeed, individual researchers are similarly challenged.

References

Bardoel, J. (1996), ‘Beyond Journalism: a profession between information societyand civil society’, European Journal of Communication, 11:3, pp. 283-302.Black, J. (1998), ‘Journalism Nethics’, Convergence, 4:4, pp 10-17.Dallas, K. (2001), ‘Now The Punters Talk Back’, The Journalist , April 2001.Demers, F.(1996), ‘Impacts des nouvelles technologies de l’information etcommunication: déstructuration (et restructuration?) du journalisme’, Technologiesde l’Information et Société, 8:1, pp. 55-70.


Deuze, M. (2001), ‘Online Journalism: Modelling the First Generation of NewsMedia on the World Wide Web’, First Monday, 6:10 (2001), posted athttp://firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_10/deuze/Deuze, M. and C. Dimoudi (2002), ‘Online journalists in the Netherlands – towardsa profile of a new profession’, Journalism, 3:1, pp 85-100.Deuze, M. and S. Paulussen (2002), ‘Research Note: Online Journalism in the LowCountries – basic, occupational and professional characteristics of onlinejournalists in Flanders and the Netherlands’, European Journal of Communication,17:2, pp 237-245.Hall, J (2001)., Online Journalism: a critical primer, London: Pluto Press.Harper, C. (1997), ‘The Daily Me’, American Journalism Review, April 1997Houston, F. (1999)., ‘What I Saw in the Digital Sea’, Columbia Journalism Review,July/August 1999International Labour Organisation (2001), Symposium on Information Technologiesin the Media and Entertainment Industries: Their Impact on Employment, WorkingConditions and Labour-management Relations, Background Document, Geneva:International Labour Organisation.Katz, J. (1999), ‘Jane's open-source breakthrough: model for news media’, postedat http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=11383Kenney, K. (2000), A. Gorelik and S.Mwangi, ‘Interactive Features of OnlineNewspapers’, First Monday, 5:1 (2000), posted athttp://firstmonday.org/issues/issue5_1/kenney/King, E. (1998)., ‘Redefining Relationships: Interactivity between News Producersand Consumers’, Convergence, 4: 4, pp 26-32.Kopper, G., A. Kolthoff and A. Czepek (2000), ‘Research Review: OnlineJournalism – a report on current and continuing research and major questions inthe international discussion’, Journalism Studies, 1:3, pp 499-512, 2000.Kovach, B. and T. Rosenstiel (2001), The Elements of Journalism – whatnewspeople should know and the public should expect, New York: CrownPublishers.Kunelius, R. (2001), ‘Conversation – a metaphor and method for betterjournalism?’, Journalism Studies, 2:1, pp 31-54.Mackintosh, H. (2000), ‘The Revolution will not be Televised’, The Guardian (24February, 2000)Massey, B. L. and M. R. Levy (1999), ‘Interactivity, Online Journalism and English-language Web Newspapers in Asia’, Journalism and Mass CommunicationQuarterly, 76:1, pp 138-151.Negroponte, N. (1995), Being Digital, London: Hodder and Stoughton. Neuberger,C., J. Tonnemacher, M. Biebl and A. Duck (1998), ‘Online – the Future ofNewspapers? Germany’s Dailies on the World Wide Web’, Journal of Computer-


Mediated Communication, 4:1 (1998), posted athttp://www.ascusc.org/jcmc/vol4/issue1/neuberger.htmlPavlik, J. (1997), ‘The Future of Online Journalism: bonanza or black hole?’,Columbia Journalism Review, July/August, pp 30-36.Pavlik, J. (1999), ‘New media and news: implications for the future of journalism’,New Media and Society, 1:1, pp 54-58.Pavlik, J. (2000), ‘The Impact of Technology on Journalism’, Journalism Studies,1:2, pp 229-237.Power, C. (1999), ‘Internet grabs headlines from traditional media’, The Irish Times(22 October 1999)Poynter Institute (2000), Stanford Poynter Project, posted athttp://www.poynter.org/eyetrack2000/Rosen, J. (1999), What Are Journalists For? New Haven: Yale University Press.Schultz, T. (2000), ‘Mass Media and the Concept of Interactivity: an ExploratoryStudy of Online Forums and Reader Email’, Media Culture and Society, 22:2, pp205-221.Schultz, T. (1999), ‘Interactive Options in Online Journalism: A Content Analysis of100 U.S. Newspapers’, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 5:1,posted at http://www.ascusc.org/jcmc/vol5/issue1/schultz.htmlServaes, J. and F. Heinderyckx (2002), ‘The ‘new’ ICT environment in Europe:closing or widening the gaps’, Telematics and Informatics, 19, pp 91-115.Singer, J. (1998), ‘Online Journalists: foundations for research into their changingroles’, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 4:1, posted atwww.ascusc.org/jcmc/vol4/issue1/singer.htmlSociety of Professional Journalists, Code of Ethics (1996), posted atwww.spj.org/ethics_code.aspUK Press Gazette (2002), ‘The challenges ahead’, UK Press Gazette (4 January2002)Yelvington, S. (1999), ‘What Every Editor Should Know about Online Reporting’,presentation to NetMedia conference 1999, posted athttp://www.yelvington.com/netmedia/1999/netmedia.htmlYeshua, D. and Deuze, M. (2000), ‘Online Journalists Face New Ethical Dilemmas:Report from The Netherlands’, posted athttp://home.pscw.uva.nl/deuze/publ15.htm


Notes

1 MUDIA, Multimedia Content in the Digital Age, was funded under the EU’s FifthFramework Programme of Research (Information Society Technologies). Theproject was co-ordinated by Institute of Infonomics, University of Maastricht,Netherlands. For the contribution to the project from the Centre for SocietyTechnology and Media (STeM), Dublin City University, research assistant GaryQuinn undertook the field work.

Social and Human Capital in theKnowledge Society: Policy Implications

Luisella Pawan-Woolfe*

1. The Lisbon Summit of 2000 set very ambitious goals: the EU is to become themost competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy by 2010, with more andbetter jobs and greater social cohesion. These challenges are the key priorities forEuropean Employment and Social Policy. The knowledge society sets a frameworkbut also the means to achieve these goals. Employment and social policy ispursued within the EU Strategy for sustainable development. Again, the knowledgesociety is both an opportunity but can be a threat to social sustainability.

The European Commission Conference ‘Social and Human Capital in theKnowledge Society: Policy Implications’(http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/knowledge_society/conf_en.htm)has shown that there is robust evidence that human capital drives economicgrowth. It has also shown that social capital makes a major contribution. Forexample, the role of strong communities and ties among parents, pupils andteachers in fostering learning.

Human and social capital are associated with a wide range of so-called non-economic benefits. Health, personal satisfaction and low crime rates are threesuch gains.Social and human capital are mutually reinforcing. Human capital plays anincreasingly central role in the economic success of nations and individuals. ICTs,globalisation of economic activity and the trend towards greater personalresponsibility and autonomy have increased the demand for learning.

The key role of competence and knowledge in stimulating economic growth hasbeen widely recognised by economists. However, the non economic returns tolearning can be viewed as at least as important as labour market earnings.Enhanced personal well-being and greater social inclusion both stem from them.


Social networks and learning organisations stimulate informal learning on the joband indeed in everyday life. Social and human capital enable individuals,communities and firms to cope with the demands of rapid change.

2. In the knowledge society new technologies are major drivers of economic andsocial change. Such change is pervasive and diversified. The current socio-economic transformation is based on the massively increased ability of people toobtain and process information. Knowledge creation and utilisation have beenradically altered.The social and human capital perspective permits us to focus on individuals andsocial relations. Such an analysis provides new insights into the nature of thisknowledge revolution.

One key question: are the changes brought about by the knowledge societysustainable? More precisely, is human and social capital increased or diminished?We live more and more in a networked society. Is this society inclusive orexclusive? Is the digital divide inevitable? Will it grow? What should we do toreduce it?ICTs allow people to participate in society, but may also exclude some. The impactof ICTs on civil society, participatory democracy and citizenship is of immenseconcern. Universal access/service does not guarantee equal participation,especially if it is not coupled with digital literacy for all.

3. Employment and social policymakers will certainly need to address howentrepreneurship and innovation will be strengthened by the knowledge society.Intellectual capital must be enhanced as a key complement of human capital. Butthe knowledge society risks being the non-stop work society.Sustainability within the knowledge society is a paramount policy objective. Humanand social capital building bring to the fore economic, environmental, social as wellas cognitive and psychological challenges. Social sustainability requires a qualityof life and social cohesion.

The knowledge society depends on sharing and transferring knowledge.Policymakers have often sought to bring about e-inclusion and other aspects witha top-down approach. We should in the future concentrate on encouraging abottom-up set of initiatives. The local level is particularly important in furthering fullparticipation in the knowledge society.

If we compare the experience of the knowledge society between soon-to-be newMembers and the old Member States in the European Union, we observe verywide divergences within and between the candidate countries, as

Social and Human Capital in the Knowledge Society 227

indeed there are within the existing EU. An enlarged EU will have widerdifferences. But existing Member States and candidate countries can each learnfrom each other. Both have had successful specific initiatives raising human andsocial capital.The candidate countries will have to think and plan very carefully how they are tobe best placed in the knowledge society within an enlarged EU. They will have todecide how to use national and Community programmes and funds to maximisesocial and human capital building. They must choose to what extent the StructuralFunds they receive can and should concentrate on the more immaterialinvestments that underpin the knowledge society. Roads and bridges are of courseimportant. Furthermore, they appear relatively quickly and cannot be missed bylocal electors. But the long-term health and dynamism of the knowledge-basedeconomy depends on a well-qualified, highly skilled workforce, able to adapt tonew technologies and methods of working.

4. I wish to stress the importance of having a national knowledge society strategy.A strong and appropriate educational base and above all the institutions for lifelonglearning are a must. Low-cost access to broadband telecommunications is equallyvital in candidate countries for a knowledge society for all.

At the risk of being repetitive, employment and social policy must pay closeattention to social and human capital building. In the knowledge society this isparticularly vital for more and better jobs and social inclusion.

But what exactly is the role of the Commission and indeed of other stakeholders inensuring that we reach the Lisbon targets?The Structural Funds at this very moment are the subject of an in-depth review.The future orientation of the European Social Fund, as well as the other Funds,must take account of the mutually reinforcing nature of social and human capital.The European Employment Strategy must also do this to maximise the numberand quality of jobs. Member States, both the current but also the future ones, willbe intimately involved in the reformulation of these two related policy areas.Member States also choose the projects for funding by the Structural Funds; theymust choose those which best fit the knowledge society.

The European Social Inclusion Strategy, modeled to some extent on theEmployment Strategy, is still in its first phases. Nevertheless, it too will evolve totake account of the developments within the knowledge society. The digital divide,especially as it is not primarily a technology issue, will be a key focus. Socialcapital building will be a particular challenge in the future.Policymakers need to monitor constantly the social evolution of the knowledge


society. They also have a role in promoting awareness raising activities.

5. The Social Partners are important. The recent framework agreement ontelework is a concrete step increasing human and social capital to the benefit offirms and workers. The social partners are themselves a key element of socialcapital. They increase the amount and the quality of knowledge transmitted to theirmembers and to society as a whole.

Unions will continue to adapt to new forms of work organisation and thus ensurestrong representation of the workers. Worker can thus play an active role in theprocess of change. They can share in the ownership of -- and thus equally benefitfrom -- new ways of working.

Employers have a direct interest in raising the capital of their workforce. They alsohave an interest in high levels of economic and social well-being in society as awhole.

A skilled and motivated workforce needs good schooling. Public authoritiesfinance and direct nearly all education in Member States. They will continue to beencouraged to aim for the highest levels of attainment in schools and universities.Public-private partnerships of all sorts are vital for effective lifelong learning in theknowledge society.

The public authorities have an even greater responsibility to promote social capitalbuilding, in all its forms. Promoting ‘bonding’ social capital, for example, withinfamilies. Fostering ‘bridging’ social capital, for example, among businessassociates. Supporting ‘linking’ social capital, for example, across different socialclasses. Social inclusion policies currently aim at all three and should continue todo so.

Gender is a source of social capital. Men and women have different networks. But,unequal access to employment or other aspects of society reduce the stock ofsocial capital. Policies to promote gender and age equality raise social capital. TheCommission and the Member States, and indeed the Social Partners, shouldcontinue to pursue them.

Local communities spur social innovation and economic development; however,this is not automatic. For local communities to make the most of their ownresources, integrated local development needs to be pursued. Local authorities,enterprises and civil society all have a role to play here.

Social and Human Capital in the Knowledge Society 229

Individuals also have a role. Every person already makes some investment in theirown intellectual capital. In the knowledge society individuals must make more andbetter investments in their own capabilities. Lifelong learning necessitatescontinuous, high-quality self-education. This is not the case just for the intellectualelite. Lifelong learning -- and thus individual investment -- is necessary for allpeople. Blue-collar workers, managers, parents, senior citizens, we all need to belifelong learners.

6. Which areas require further analysis, exploration and research?Social capital and its relationship with economic, social inclusion and employmentpolicies. As we heard, participation is everything.

Measurements must also be pursued. Assessment and evaluation are equallyimportant. Social capital is especially hard to quantify. More work needs doing onwhat to measure and how to measure it. Policymakers need to know if theirpolicies are improving society. Commonly agreed indicators are essential.Benchmarking of strategies will help policymakers optimise social and humancapital enhancement.

What will the future bring? The Commission has already close co-operation withthe OECD and ILO in the areas of social and employment policies. Social andhuman capital questions are clearly worthy of intensified joint work in the future

And last – but by no means least – the links between policymakers and expertsneed to be developed further. New avenues of co-operation need to be explored inorder to build on the social capital that this conference has created.

Note

* This is an edited version of the speech Mrs Pawan-Woolfe held at the end of theEuropean Commission Conference on ‘Social and Human Capital in theKnowledge Society: Policy Implications’, Brussels, October 28-29, 2002. I am grateful to Mr Robert Strauss – Head of the Knowledge Society Unit – and toMrs Lidia Pola for their contribution to the preparation of this text.


Reference

European Commission Conference ‘Social and Human Capital in the KnowledgeSociety: Policy Implications’ – Proceedings onlinehttp://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/knowledge_society/conf_en.htm

Digital citizenship and informationinequalities: Challenges for the future

Jan Servaes

1. Every major innovation in communication related technology, from the printingpress on, has always given rise to a mixture of hopes and fears. As an example,the development of radio in the 1930s, then of television in the 1950s, in a contextof international tension and of escalating propaganda, made observers fear thatlarge populations would become vulnerable to potential manipulators of opinion,attitudes and behaviors. Others, however, saw an unprecedented opportunity formass marketing and the advent of mass consumption. It took functionalist theoriesto turn things around and shift from a vision of vulnerable audiences potentiallymanipulated by all powerful media to critical and organized audiences faced withweak media having no choice but to seduce the audience or disappear. As often, itnow appears that truth lies somewhere in between.

The potential effects of the divided evolution we are witnessing could be ofparticular magnitude for at least two reasons.

Firstly, the trend towards convergence implies that many, if not most or all culturalactivities may, at some point, be deeply affected by innovation.Secondly, while television, for example, was developed and then gradually enteredhouseholds with only continuous innovations (today’s television set is functionallythat of the 50s), the so-called new technologies are being used by an increasingnumber of people, at the same time as these technologies are still evolving rapidlyand indeed barely taking shape.

Any research or indeed thinking in the matter is like predicting the pattern of theflue epidemic: given the constant mutation of the virus, public health authoritiescan only make educated guesses as to its viral profile and how it will propagateand with what effect.

2. Surveys, like those Measuring the Information Society, show that largesegments of European societies are not ‘inside’ the so called ‘knowledge society’but ‘next to it’ or simply ‘outside’ it. This is at the same time a scientific finding anda political issue.


The evolution of the Measuring Information Society survey results show:(a) that a multi-faceted media and communications system is in place in

Europe – this new system is the sum of the traditional and innovative mediaall coexisting and all conflicting with one another to acquire a larger shareof the financial/time budget of Europeans; and

(b) that different kinds of ‘user groups’ coexist today in Europe that use indifferent proportions different clusters of Information and CommunicationsTechnologies (ICTs).

However, for policymakers in the Information Society, the important issue is how tomitigate information inequalities and possibly to prevent them. This becomes avery crucial task when there is some evidence that the prevailing tendency in theEuropean Information Society is exclusive. Therefore, it is very important tounderstand the role of ICTs in relation to people’s ability to participate in society.The observed phenomena of social exclusion in the Information Society are prettyclose to the conjecture that technologically richer media might imply poorerdemocracy, in the sense that the corporate media explosion could result in acorresponding implosion of public life.

Furthermore, socio-political differentiation might be generated by either intended ornon-intended processes of integration. The latter (unintended consequence) isknown as ‘informational Balkanization’. The former is related to the twocontradictory trends of globalization simultaneously producing both fragmentationand integration: In another paradoxical operation of cyberspace, it enlarges thepublic sphere and political action through the virtual world and reduces them in thereal one.

The impact of new ICTs on civil society, participatory democracy and citizenship isof immense contemporary concern. This impact is usually associated with thedemand of universal access. But universal access/service alone does not suffice.The way Stephen Coleman puts it, “if citizenship requires universal access,democracy needs trustworthy channels of information and deliberation if it is toprosper” (2001: 124). In other words, modern European citizenship needs thedemand for and provision of information in order to develop the proper rights andresponsibilities in the conditions and complexities of the Knowledge Society ofeEurope.

3. In spite of the recurrent claims of evermore user-friendliness, information andcommunication technologies use remains strongly subordinated to a set of specificskills. These evolve along with innovation, but tend to grow in importance as thecomplexity of the technologies as well as the scope of their applications extends.

Digital citizenship and information inequalities 233

These set of skills go well beyond managing the interfaces needed to operatethem. Broadly speaking, new media are increasingly associated with new writing,hence of new reading, not to mention new ways to organize, treat, retrieve andcontrol information in its broadest sense.

This so-called new literacy will soon lead developed societies into difficultiescomparable to that of illiteracy in the 19th century. Like the illiterate of those times,the new illiterate will be, as we can clearly see from the diffusion patterns of newtechnologies, of lower social status, with the associated lower income and level ofeducation. Medium term developments may lead to a dichotomized social bodymade of, on the one hand, wealthier, better educated and new literates having theskills and the means to access and use ICTs and, on the other hand, poorer, lesseducated and new illiterates kept out of the new tech scene and deprived of mosttechnologies and hence denied access to an increasing amount of information andculture. Therefore, Francis Bacon’s famous saying – Knowledge is Power – couldbe replaced by ‘the capacity and speed to access, select and reproduceknowledge will determine power in the 21st century’.

4. The question of whether new media will grow at the expense of traditional mediais of particular importance to the industry. Unsurprisingly, the first tangible signs ofdecreased television viewing among Internet heavy users are now showing in theUnited States. Also the MIS 2000 survey shows the impact of Internet browsing onpeople’s time-budget: a 73% reduction in time spent on TV viewing, 46% reductionin book reading, 34% in newspaper reading, 29% in radio listening, 28% lessfamily activities, 27% in sports, and 24% less time spent with friends (INRA, 2000:68). However, at the same time one also notices a rise in television viewingbehaviour among certain socio-demographic groups as well.

One core characteristic of many new technologies makes any kind of predictioneven more audacious: integration. The Internet in its most popular form (the WorldWide Web) seems to hold characteristics, which might grow into true mediaintegration. All forms of media (broadcast) and interpersonal communication arelikely, sooner or later, to be transposed or accessible via a unique interfaceorganized around the Internet. In theory, a device that would be small enough tobe portable, yet large enough to ensure perceptive comfort, could well replaceeverything from personal computer to Walkman, telephone to television and videorecorder, fax and answering machine, newspaper and radio, movie theater andadvertising posters, bookshop and libraries, shopping malls and city halls.Integration of all existing vectors of communication (and much more) would alsogive rise to an endless number of hybrid combinations prompting changes in


behavior of such a magnitude that it would, if accessible to a large population,deeply reorganize social structures, as we know them.

In this sense, the Internet can be considered as emblematic of the newtechnologies. Given that it takes skills (education) and money (equipment andrunning cost), using the Internet is to be viewed as a major landmark in newtechnologies penetration. Internet users have indeed gone over the hurdle that ismost likely to keep people away from technology, and having done that are likelyadopters of downstream technologies, as long as these remain within continuousinnovations.

Surprisingly, however, there is no linear relationship between proportionsof non-users saying they are interested and of those saying they are planning topurchase an Internet connection within six months. Finland shows the highestproportion of interested non-users and near highest proportion of purchasers withinsix months. This is to say that the diffusion pattern of Internet can be seen, at thisstage, as animated by a snowball effect or marketing hype. However, at thecontent side, it remains to be seen whether the Internet will not become anotherdivide comparable to the ‘old’ media. As is usually the case with new technologies,the question is how much ICTs will be used on top of existing devices and/or willgradually replace them.

5. By way of conclusion we would like to present a number of recommendations forconsideration to policymakers and researchers:

New directions for the policy maker

To liberate it and to materialize further growth in Europe policymakers andcorporations should envisage the introduction of a series of new priorities capableof adapting strategically the public choices to the cohesion issues which havebecame clear in the course of the last few years:

First priority should be to increase the social dimension of the policy. Patterns ofbehaviour found in the MIS and in other surveys indicate that usage of electronicmedia is correlated to structural levels of economic development. There is a hugeeconomic deficit that de facto impedes many to take the opportunities offered bythe new technologies. Usage of ICTs can become a constituting element for a newcategorization of social classes. Unless specific policies are put in place to reducethe gender gap, women risk to occupy the lower classes of the new ICT-basedsocial segmentation.


The second priority should be to develop new forms of awareness raisingactivities. Europeans perceive applications as relatively important for their lifebecause their pertinence cannot be immediately perceived through genericpromises. Waving the icon of the Internet does not per se mobilize customers. It isits pertinence to their professional and personal priorities that matters.

The third priority concerns the support to cross country research. Measuring howmany use a computer is not enough, surveys have to go deeper and mustunderstand whether the ‘neutral’ information society has any chance to evolve in a‘knowledge society’ or whether is going to become foremost an ‘entertainmentsociety’. High PC/Internet penetration means little if PCs are mostly used asentertainment machines (and not as knowledge management or learning tools).

The fourth priority should be the re-formulation of the economic drivers of thedigital growth. Trans-nationality should be the shaping factors of the new policiesfor the development of e-commerce. The digital economy exists, the MIS shows it,but it is located beyond our borders and we need a market offer which is capableof turning the trans-national potential into revenues for local entrepreneurs. TheEuropean integration could find in the ‘digital internal market’ the milestone of theglobalization era.

New directions for research

Conducting research on a fast evolving subject is quite challenging. Yet, decisionmakers at all levels can only make adequate choices based on reliable researchmaterial, so that there is an urgent need for new and on-going research in at leastsix areas.

Firstly, a multi-media approach to the new technologies should understand howthe mutations of the media landscape affects each media, its audience, its content,its interaction with others. Are new media a threat to the established ones, or arethey a unique opportunity for them to (re)gain audiences? Will convergence anddigitalization lead to a new, distinct media, or will it gradually absorb all other formsinto a unique interface?

Secondly, ICTs are to be studied in a time-budget perspective. The time thatpeople have available for communication activities and media consumption islimited. Traces of lower television viewing in heavy Internet-using households arebeginning to be found, leading to essential questioning as to which activities arereduced to free up the necessary time to use the spreading new technologies. Howdoes it affect reading books, magazines or newspapers, watching television,


listening to radio, participation in cultural activities, community involvement, etc.How does the current evolution affect the work/leisure balance in people's time-budget?Thirdly, questions are raised about the content conveyed by these newtechnologies. How much do the new media represent new forms of informationand communication, and how do these new forms affect the public's perception ofthe world? Beyond forms, people using these new technologies tend to haveaccess to content that before was either out of reach, or simply did not exist. Howwill that affect their personality, their interests, their level of information andeducation, their behaviour, etc.? How different are the new forms of writing? Howcan they be improved? What skills need to be developed among audiences so asto make the best of these new forms?

Fourthly, there is an urgent need for large-scale research about the social andcultural implications of the current evolution. While the communication companiestend to merge into worldwide giants, the technology tends to allow forever-smallercommunities to emerge and consolidate. Specialized media, thematic channels,web sites and chat rooms allow individuals with narrow fields of interest to developa particular passion, share it with people sharing that interest, and provide themeans to gather individuals into groups that could not otherwise have existed. Allpersonal investment into these groups (be it time or money) is made at theexpense of other fields of interest, including that of the traditional communities.This might lead to a complete restructuring of social groups as we know them.

Fifthly, the theories of globalization/localization have been challenged, criticized andmodified, but few would deny that they do offer a fertile ground for research. Weadvocate a convergent and integrated approach in studying the complex and intricaterelations between globalization/localization, consumption and identity. Culture is animportant factor, either facilitating the transnationalization of national or local culturalindustries, or impeding further growth of global media. Global media may be largest interms of coverage, however their size shrinks significantly if measured in terms ofviewing rate.While some national programs are successful because of their distinct culturalcharacteristics, others may achieve similar success by promoting foreign values.During a dynamic process of change, it is the interaction of factors that brings aboutendless possibilities.

Finally, and this in fact applies to all above mentioned research areas, there is a needfor more qualitative research on these matters. Karvalics & Molnar (2000), for instance,question: What do we know about the ‘average’ Internet-user, the Netizen? What abouthis personality, his universe of values, his social contacts and future? There are plenty


of fears, reserves and aversions that describe the informatization process as a de-humanizing, Orwellian scenario.The complexity of the phenomena at hand cannot be fully appreciated by sheerquantitative research. There comes a point when the observations need to beexplained and refined, and that can only be achieved by qualitative methodswhich, although more difficult to implement, although less operational inappearance, provide the indispensable level of detail necessary to appreciatebehavioural phenomena of this magnitude.

Let’s start!

References

Coleman, S, (2001), “The Transformation of Citizenship” in Axford, B, andHuggins, R, (eds.), New Media and Politics, London, Sage.

INRA (2000), Measuring Information Society 2000. A Eurobarometer survey carried outfor the European Commission. Analytical report, International Research Associates(INRA), Brussels.

Karvalics L. & Molnar S. (2000) (2000), “Our Netizen: myths and misbeliefs vs realitiesand perspectives”, Telematics and Informatics, vol. 17, no 1/2, pp. 129-140.

List of Acronyms

AMARC: Association Mondiale des RadiodiffuseursCommunautaires (World Association of Community RadioBroadcasters)

CEC: Commission of the European CommunitiesCOE: Council of Europe

EBU: European Broadcasting UnionEC: European CommissionECCR: European Consortium for Communications Research ECOSOC: United Nations Economic and Social CouncilEIS: European Information SocietyEU: European Union

FIEJ: Féderation Internationale des Editeurs de Journeaux etPublications

GATS: General Agreement on Trade in Services

HDTV: High-Definition TV

IAMCR: International Association for Media and CommunicationResearch

ICA: International Communication AssociationICT: Information and Communication TechnologiesIFJ: International Federation of JournalistsIIC: International Institute of CommunicationsILO: International Labor OrganizationIMF: International Monetary FundIPI: International Press InstituteIPS: Inter Press ServiceIS: Information SocietyIT: Information Technology


ITU: International Telecommunication Union

MEDIA: Measures to Encourage the Development of anAudiovisual Industry in Europe

MFN: Most Favoured NationMIS: Measuring the Information Society

NGO: Non-governmental OrganizationNTC: New Communication TechnologiesNWICO: New World Information and Communication Order

OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

R&D: Research and Development

SEA: Single European Act

TDF: Trans-border Data Flow

UN: United NationsUNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentUNDP: United Nations Development ProgrammeUNIDO: United Nations Industrial Development OrganizationUNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization

WARC: World Administrative Radio ConferenceWIPO: World Intellectual Property OrganizationWSIS: World Summit on the Information SocietyWTO: World Trade Organization

Notes on contributors

Jean-Claude Burgelman (PhD) is project leader at IPTS (Institute forprospective technology studies, one of the Joint Research Centres of theEU, in Sevilla, Spain). He is on leave as professor at the Free University ofBrussels (VUB) where he teaches courses on the global informationsociety. He published widely in the area of Belgian and European mediaand communication policy. He is the former director of SMIT, a researchcentre focussing on media, information and telecommunication. He is also amember of several pan-European research networks and boards ofspecialised scientific journals.E-mail: [email protected]

Nico Carpentier (PhD) is a media sociologist working at the Department ofCommunication Studies of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB). He ismember of the research units SMIT and CEMESO. His research interestsare mainly focused on the application of discourse theory in (media)domains as sexuality, conflict, journalism, (political and cultural)participation and democracy. He combines teaching and research for theCultural Policy Research Center 'Steunpunt Re-Creatief Vlaanderen'. Hispublications include the articles Images of prostitutes. The struggle for thesubject position (1999, in Dutch); Management of voices. Power andparticipation in North Belgian audience discussion programmes (2000); Theidentity of the television audience (2000, in Dutch); Managing audienceparticipation (2001); Médias et citoyens sur la même longueur d'onde.Initatives journalistiques favorisantant la participation citoyenne (2002) ; andCommunity media: muting the democratic discourse (2003).E-mail: [email protected]

Cees J. Hamelink (PhD) is Professor of International Communication at theUniversity of Amsterdam, and Professor of Media, Religion and Culture atthe Free University in Amsterdam, The Netherlands.He is the editor-in-chief of the International Journal for CommunicationStudies: Gazette. He is also Honorary President of the InternationalAssociation for Media and Communication Research (IAMCR), founder of


the People's Communication Charter and Board Member of theInternational Communication Association and the international news agencyInter Press Service (IPS).Among the sixteen books he has authored is Cultural Autonomy in GlobalCommunications (1983), Finance and Information (1983), The TechnologyGamble (1988), The Politics of World Communication (1994), WorldCommunication (1995), and The Ethics of Cyberspace (2000).E-mail: [email protected]

François Heinderyckx (PhD) teaches media sociology and politicalcommunication at the University of Brussels (ULB). He is Director of theGroup for the study of the media and ICTs. He is a consultant in surveyresearch and ICTs and a member of the Academic Board of e-Forum(forum of European e-public services). He is the author of L’Europe desmédias' (Brussels: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1998) and of LaMalinformation (Brussels: Labor, 2003) and of numerous contributions toacademic books and journals.E-mail: [email protected]

Peter Johnston (PhD) is responsible for research and development ofinformation society technologies related to new methods of work. He hasworked with the Information Society DG of the European Commission since1988. He has been responsible for the strategic planning of Europeantelecommunications research (the RACE and ACTS programmes), andhelped prepare the 5th Framework Programme. He has also hadresponsibility for EC actions in the area of telework stimulation, electroniccommerce, multi-media access to cultural heritage, and for sustainabledevelopment in a knowledge economy.Dr Johnston has wide experience in international research co-ordination:from 1976 to 1984, he worked at the OECD, and from 1984 to 1988 he wasresponsible for research on pollution control in the UK Department ofEnvironment. He read physics at Oxford University, and was a Fulbright-Hays scholar at Carnegie Mellon University and at Oxford University until1976.E-mail: [email protected]

Caroline Pauwels (PhD) is attached to the Communication Department ofthe Free University of Brussels (VUB) and the present Director of SMIT, a

Notes on contributors 243

research center focusing on media, information and telecommunication.She lectures national and European communication policy. Her maindomain of competence is in the field of European Audiovisual policymaking, entertainment economy and convergence issues. In 1998 she wasappointed to the Flemish Media Council (advisory committee to the Ministerof Culture), in 2001 she became part of the Strategic Digital Forum of theFlemish community.E-mail: [email protected]

Luisella Pavan-Woolfe was born in Trieste, Italy, and graduated in PoliticalScience from the University of Padova. She taught in that university in thefaculty of Anglo-American Law. Official in the European Commission since1975, she has taken on various tasks for the Directorate General ofTransport, Environment and Consumer Protection, and in the SecretariatGeneral of the Commission. She has been with DG EMPL for the last sevenyears as Head of Unit and since 1998 as Acting Director for the EuropeanSocial Fund. She was appointed Director of Horizontal and InternationalIssues in April 2001. In this capacity, she is responsible for ‘mainstreaming’ICTs in employment and social policy.E-mail: [email protected]

Robert G. Picard (PhD), VTTS Professor of Media Economics and managerof the Media Group, Business Research and Development Centre, TurkuSchool of Economics and Business Administration in Finland, is one of theworld's leading academic specialists in media economics and management.Picard is author and editor of sixteen books, including The Economics andFinancing of Media Companies; Media Firms: Structures, Operations, andPerformance; Evolving Media Markets: Effects of Economics and PolicyChanges; Media Economics: Concepts and Issues; The Cable NetworksHandbook; and Press Concentration and Monopoly. He was founding editorof The Journal of Media Economics, which he guided through its first decadeof operation.E-mail: [email protected]

Paschal Preston (PhD) is Professor at the School of Communications andDirector of the Centre for Society Technology and Media (STeM) at the DublinCity University in Ireland.E-mail: [email protected]


Andrea Ricci graduated ‘cum laude’ in Political Science from the LaSapienza University in Rome under the guidance of Prof. Fisichella with athesis on comparative experiences of political marketing. He obtained a MA inEuropean Studies at the College of Europe in Bruges, and is currentlycompleting the PhD-project A comparative analysis on the use of the WorldWide Web in political and social communication at the Catholic University ofBrussels (KUB).Other research fields include history of media, propaganda studies,audience studies, crisis communications, role of media and IT ininternational relations. As contributing editor of "La Repubblica" andseveral specialized IT publications, he was awarded the SMAU nationalprize for IT journalism. In 1995 he joined the European Commission andworked in the International Relations Unit of the Information SocietyDirectorate General. In 2001 he joined the Security Unit of the ExternalRelations Directorate General.E-mail: [email protected]

Jan Servaes (PhD) is President of the European Consortium forCommunications Research (ECCR), Vice-President of the InternationalAssociation of Media and Communication Research (IAMCR), in charge ofResearch and Academic Publications, and Professor and Chair of theDepartment of Communication, at the Katholieke Universiteit Brussel(KUB). He is also director of the Research Center 'Communication forSocial Change' (CSC), and Associate Editor (for Europe) of theInternational Journal Telematics and Informatics. He has been a Professorof International Communication and Development Communication at theUniversities of Cornell (Ithaca, USA), Nijmegen (The Netherlands),Thammasat (Bangkok, Thailand), Brussels (VUB) and Antwerp (Belgium).He has taught, and done research and consultancy work in countries allover the world, including Argentina, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, theDominican Republic, South-Africa, and Thailand.He is the author of journal articles and books on internationalcommunication, media and information policies, developmentcommunication, and critical studies. His most recent books in Englishinclude Participatory Communication for Social Change (Sage, 1996);Media and Politics in Transition. Cultural Identity in the Age of Globalization(Acco, 1997); Communication for Development. One World, Multiple

Notes on contributors 245

Cultures (Hampton, 1999); Theoretical Approaches to ParticipatoryCommunication (Hampton, 1999); Walking on the other side of theinformation highway (Southbound, 2000); The new communicationslandscape. Demystifying media globalization (Routledge, 2000); andApproaches to Development Communication (Unesco, 2002).E-mail: [email protected]

Brian Trench (PhD) is Head of the School of Communications, Dublin CityUniversity, Ireland, and a member of the Center for Society Technology andMedia (STeM) based in the school. Before joining the university he was afull-time journalist for twenty years working for national newspapers andradio, and contributing to a wide range of specialist publications.E-mail: [email protected]

Human knowledge has brought mankind from anoral to a literate culture, thanks to the invention ofthe print media. The development of the electronicmedia in the last century has paved the path for theinformation age, in which spatial and temporalconstraints are lifted.

The consequences of this revolution in humancommunications are multidimensional incharacter, affecting economical, political andsocial life on national, international and locallevels.

This book provides a detailed analysis and critiqueof the European Information Society. It is the firstof a series arising from the intellectual work ofEuropean Consortium for CommunicationsResearch members.

Contents include:• European Union ICT Policies: Neglected Social and Cultural Dimensions• Policy challenges to the creation of a European Information Society: • A critical analysis• Issues in measuring Information Society adoption in Europe• Access and participation in the discourse of the digital divide: • The European perspective at/on the WSIS• Communication Rights and the European Information Society• Business Issues facing New Media• Perspectives for Employment in the Transition to a Knowledge Society• The Political Internet: Between dogma and reality• New roles for users in online news media? • Exploring the application of interactivity through European case • studies

intellectPO Box 862 Bristol BS99 1DE United Kingdomwww.intellectbooks.com

9 781841 501062

ISBN 1-84150-106-9

Jan Servaes (PhD) is President of theEuropean Consortium for CommunicationsResearch (ECCR), Vice-President of theInternational Association ofMedia and CommunicationResearch (IAMCR), incharge of Research andAcademic Publications, andProfessor and Chair of theDepartment ofCommunication, at theKatholieke UniversiteitBrussel (KUB).

The European Information Society: A Reality Check

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