'The enemy is at the gate':1 - · PDF fileThe phrase is from Vladimir Surkov, ... The Chechen...

'The Enemy Is at the Gate': Russia after BeslanAuthor(s): Dov LynchSource: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 81, No. 1(Jan., 2005), pp. 141-161Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International AffairsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569192 .

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'The enemy is at the gate':1

Russia after Beslan

DOV LYNCH

The terrorist attacks on Russia in August and September 2004 were relentless and varied. On 24 August two planes that had taken off from the Moscow airport of Domodedovo exploded in flight. One crashed near Tula and the other near Rostov; 89 passengers died. On 30 August a suicide bomber detonated a bomb in the Moscow metro, killing io and wounding 50. On i September a group of 32 terrorists took hostage School Number One in the North Ossetian town of Beslan, holding prisoner over one thousand children, parents and teachers who had gathered to celebrate the first day of term. The hostage- taking ended two days later in a confused firefight that left 326 dead, including 159 children, and some 540 wounded.

Vladimir Putin's reaction has been as swift as it has been baffling. On 4 September, the president declared that 'Our country is under attack', and argued that the terrorist attacks were part of a coordinated assault by international terrorism.2 Putin also tied international terrorism to an outside force that sought to weaken and, in his words, 'remove the threat of Russia as a major nuclear power'. In his view, Russia's weakness after a decade of transition had left the country vulnerable in the face of a 'total, cruel and full scale war'. Now, he said, the situation called for a strengthening of the country's unity, a new approach to the North Caucasus and an effective crisis management system. The declaration gave rise to more questions than it provided answers. What was the link between the attacks and the Chechen conflict? How did Putin propose to strengthen Russia's unity?

Putin gave some answers on I3 September, speaking before the Russian government.3 In response to the threat of international terrorism, he called for the election of federal governors by local legislative assemblies upon recom- mendation from the president, and proposed that elections to the Duma be

The phrase is from Vladimir Surkov, deputy chief of the Presidential Administration, in an interview with Komsomolskaya pravda, 29 Sept. 2004.

2 Putin's address of 4 Sept. 2004 on the presidential website: www.kremlin.ru, last accessed 23 Nov. 2004. 3 Putin's official speech is reproduced on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information and

Press Department (IPD), Moscow, I4 Sept. 2004, www.mid.ru, last accessed 23 Nov. 2004.

International Affairs 81, I (2005) 141-161



Dov Lynch

conducted entirely on the basis of proportional representation. Putin mentioned a Public Chamber that would provide public oversight of government activities. He also vowed to recreate the previously abolished Ministry for Regions and Ethnicities. With regard to the so-called 'power ministries', Putin called for an integrated security system to combat terrorism.4 He recognized the need for a 'fundamental revision of all policies' in the North Caucasus. Admitting that terrorism drew strength from desperate living standards, Putin proposed the creation of a Special Federal Commission (SFC) on the North Caucasus, to be led by a new plenipotentiary envoy to the Southern Federal District, who would coordinate federal activities and focus on redressing the socio-economic situation. Putin nominated Dmitry Kozak, chief of staff of the Russian government, to the position.

Again, however, Putin's words produced more puzzlement than clarity. What was the link between the war on terrorism and new procedures for electing governors? What would be the nature of the integrated security system? What lay ahead for the North Caucasus? What did this mean for Russia as a partner of the Euro-Atlantic community? Already Russia's foreign posture, if not yet its policy, has been affected by the attacks. Colonel-General Yury Baluyevsky, chief of the Russian General Staff, announced a few days after Beslan that 'We will take all measures to liquidate terrorists in any region of the world.'5 Russian relations with the EU reached an unprecedented low after the Dutch foreign minister, Bernard Bot, in the name of the Netherlands EU presidency, queried what had happened on 3 September. Valery Loschinin, Russia's deputy foreign minister, stated that Bot's question was not only inappropriate but 'odious' and 'offensive'.6 In sum, the terrorist attacks have left Russians reeling. The condition of Putin's Russia at the start of his second presidential term strikes many observers as deeply worrying.7

This article will not provide an overview of the changes occurring in domestic and external policy, as this would be premature. Nor will the discussion examine in detail the evolution of the Beslan crisis and government responses. Instead, the objective is to sketch the context before the terrorist attacks in several policy areas before discussing the changes that have occurred since. The impact of Beslan is best viewed through a wide lens that focuses on four levels: first, Russian thinking about threats and international trends, which throws light on how Moscow has interpreted the challenges, including the terrorist threat, that it faces; second, policy in the Chechen war and the North Caucasus; third, the reform of the armed forces and other security structures; and fourth, the counterterrorist dimension of Russian foreign policy.

4 For additional comments made by Putin on 13 September see RTR Russia TV, Moscow, reproduced in Johnson's Russia List (JRL) (Washington DC; Center for Defense Information), no. 8365, 2004.

5 Cited by Andrei Lebedev, Izvestiya, 9 Sept. 2004. 6 Valery Loschinin, IPD, Moscow, 4 Sept. 2004, www.mid.ru, last accessed 23 Nov. 2004. 7 See the 'Open Letter to the Heads of State and Government of the EU and NATO', 28 Sept. 2004,

signed by over one hundred former officials and experts to express their concern with developments and their impact on Russian foreign policy.

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'The enemy is at the gate'

A central theme running through Putin's policy since 2000 is recognizing Russia's weakness and diminishing its impact on domestic and foreign policy. If it had seemed to Putin that Russia had consolidated its position internally and externally by 2004, the Beslan attack demonstrated that the country remained under fundamental threat. Since 3 September Putin has been reacting to this challenge. Far from derailing his vision of how to strengthen Russia, Beslan reinforced Putin's conviction that the policies undertaken since 2000 were correct. A circular logic is at work, where terrorist attacks produce greater efforts by the government to strengthen Russia but with measures that do little to prevent further attacks, which, in turn, stimulate the greater securitization of policy. This logic sits uneasily with the second element of Putin's vision since 2000: the imperative of domestic modernization to revitalize the country and external engagement to create a predictable international setting.

The context before Beslan

Perceptions of weakness

In I999 Putin inherited Russia at its weakest. The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, approved in December I999, recognized the country's difficulties. A decade of inconclusive reform, the document argued, had resulted in 'inadequate organization of state power and civil society, socio- political polarization of Russian society ... the weakening of the system of state regulation and control, [an] inadequate legal base and the absence of a strong state policy in the social sphere'.8 At the start of the twenty-first century Russia faced a crisis on many levels: social, economic, demographic, health and political.

Events in Chechnya were seen to exacerbate Russian weakness. The incursion of groups into Dagestan, followed by terrorist bombs laid in Russian cities, were striking signals. Newly arrived in power, Putin took the view that the Chechen problem could no longer be contained. The threat had to be uprooted and destroyed, and the price paid in doing so would be no greater than the threat that separatist Chechnya posed to the state. In Putin's words: 'If we retreat today, they will come back tomorrow ... By localizing the conflict, we will drive them into caves. That is exactly where they belong. And we will destroy them in those caves.'9 The second Chechen war was more than a ticket to win the presidential elections in March 2000. Russia never looked so weak as it did in August I999; for Putin, Russia's rebirth was to start in Chechnya.

In circumstances of acute internal weakness, transnational threats were seen as a fundamental challenge. In October 2003 defence minister Sergei Ivanov presented the 'Urgent Tasks for the Development of the Armed Forces of the

8 'National Security Concept of the Russian Federation', decree no. I300 of 17 Dec. I999, Rossiskaya gazeta, i8 Jan. 2000. See author's discussion in Russia faces Europe (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004).

9 Interview in Vremya MN, reported by Federal News Service, 27 Sept. I999, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/365I, B/I-3.

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Russian Federation'.I? In addition to internal and external threats, the document examined a new category of'trans-border threats'. These included criminal activities, the existence of extremist groups and, not least, international terrorism. The Chechen problem was seen to encompass the full range of threats and challenges facing Russia.

At the wider level, international affairs were seen as deeply threatening. For Moscow, the Cold War ended finally with NATO's actions in Kosovo. This campaign undermined the respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the limitations on the use of force, that lie at the heart of the UN Charter. NATO operations also shattered the post-I989 consensus on the need to forge agreement in the Security Council on questions of peace and security. In the words of one analyst, NATO actions left 'lying in ruins the foundations of international law and political trust which seemed so firm only yesterday'. I

Left standing were certain new realities. The first was the rise of the United States as the 'new goliath'.I2 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, approved by Putin in 2000, was unequivocal. A new challenge to Russia, it noted, was 'a growing trend towards the establishment of a unipolar structure of the world with the economic and power domination of the United States'.13 The Concept also claimed Russia's rejection of new approaches and principles that belittled the role of the sovereign state and violated the UN Charter, such as that of 'humanitarian intervention'. Russia's isolation during the Kosovo crisis had magnified the wider reality that the country now stood on the sidelines of international affairs. The 'revolution in military affairs', economic globalization, deepening regional integration processes-in all these trends, Russia was not subject but object. In The new Russian diplomacy, Igor Ivanov argued that 'the international community has crossed the threshold into a new millennium on the wave of a veritable explosion that is transforming all facets of life and human endeavor'.14 This uncertainty combined with a sense of lack of control to produce deep anxiety in Moscow.

Acute awareness of domestic weakness and international uncertainty framed Putin's policies during his first term. Inside Russia, these perceptions dictated an emphasis on the consolidation of state power, including the forceful stabilization of Chechnya. Externally, in Putin's words, 'from a country that used to be an antagonist or enemy of most of the world's industrialized nations, Russia should become a partner'.I5

10 'Urgent Tasks for the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation', RIA Novosti, 3 Oct. 2003, www.rian.ru, last accessed 25 Sept. 2004.

i See Aleksandr Matveyev, 'Washington's claims to world leadership', International Affairs (Moscow), no. 5, 1999. I2 Ibid. 13 'The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation', 28 June 2000, www.mid.ru, last accessed 23

Nov. 2004. 14 I. Ivanov, The new Russian diplomacy (Washington DC: Nixon Center/Brookings Institution Press,

2002), p. 5. I5 Putin speaking on 24 June 2002, IPD, Moscow, 25 June 2002, www.mid.ru, last accessed 23 Nov. 2004.

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Domestic consolidation

Putin achieved much in his first presidential term. Increased production and export of oil and natural gas at a time of high prices lent buoyancy to the economy and bolstered state revenue. Putin also launched a reform programme that encompassed changes to the structure of the federation and simplification of the tax code, as well as some movement on land ownership and the labour code.'6 Federal reforms had several dimensions. First, the creation of seven federal districts, directed by plenipotentiary envoys, was designed to strengthen central control. Second, Putin reorganized the process by which members of the Federation Council, the upper parliamentary chamber, were appointed. He also strengthened Russia's legal standing by instituting penalties against violations of the federal constitution by local legislatures.'7

In Chechnya, Russian policy was driven by three objectives: to contain the problem within manageable proportions; to divide Chechen elites and isolate extremist elements; and to restore central control over the North Caucasus. In pursuit of these objectives, Moscow sought first to eliminate the armed threat posed by separatist forces and terrorist groups. Russian military performance was more effective in the second war than in the first. At the operational level, the creation of a joint grouping of Russian forces in the North Caucasus enhanced coordination.'8 Moscow also drew forces from permanent readiness units, and built the 42nd Motor Rifle Division as a contract-based group per- manently garrisoned in Chechnya.'9 On the whole, federal operations offset rebel strengths through the extensive use of air power.

As the need for large operations receded, command was transferred from the Defence Ministry to the Ministry of the Interior (MVD) in 2002 and then to the Federal Security Services (FSB) in September 2003. Since 2003 operations have been based on garrisoning major towns and eliminating separatist leaders in special operations. In February 2004, for example, military intelligence forces killed the field commander Khamzat Tozabayev.20 Moscow also sought to develop specially trained forces to meet new needs. Two weeks before the Beslan attack, Defence Minister, Sergei Ivanov announced the planned deployment of two mountain brigades in Chechnya and Ingushetia.2' In parallel, Moscow I6 On these and other reforms see Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia's choice (London and New York:

Routledge, 2004); Nikolai Petrov, Politicization versus democratization: 20 months of Putin's federal' reform (Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS) policy memo no. 241, 25 Jan. 2002); Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Soviet solutions to post-Soviet problems (PONARS policy memo no. 283, Oct. 2003). 17 According to Justice Minister Yury Chaika, some 40 per cent of local laws violated the Russian constitution in 2000; this percentage has been reduced to I per cent by 2004. See RFE/RL Newsline 8: 203, 26 Oct. 2004.

I8 For a discussion comparing the first and second wars, see Michael J. Orr, Better or just not so bad? An evaluation of Russian combat effectiveness in the second Chechen war, P31 (Camberley: UK Defence Academy, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 28 Aug. 2003).

i9 See Roy Allison, 'Russia, regional conflict and the use of military power', in Steven E. Miller and Dmitri V. Trenin, eds, The Russian military: power and policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 121-56. On the 42nd Division, see Roger McDermott, 'Russia's use of contract soldiers shows mixed results in Chechnya', Eurasia Daily Monitor I: 39, 25 June 2004.

20 Sergei Shapoval and Viktor Vodalozhsky, Rodnaya gazeta, no. I9, May 2004. 2I Reported by Chechnya Weekly 5: 32, 25 Aug. 2004.

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Dov Lynch

strengthened its position in neighbouring republics.22 Military deployments were accompanied by greater political control over the region. The reversal of Yeltsin's accommodation to strong local leaders was clear when Ruslan Aushev, Ingushetia's popular president, resigned in 200I and was replaced by Murat Ziazikov, a former FSB general.

Moscow also sought to restore political control over Chechnya. In early 2003, spurred on by the hostage crisis at the Dubrovka Theatre, Putin launched a process to create new institutions. The referendum on a Chechen constitution in March 2003 was a first step towards creating a two-chamber legislature and a president. The election of former separatist commander and Chechnya's mufti (Islamic spiritual leader), Ahmed Kadyrov, as president in October 2003 marked a second step. Kadyrov made swift progress towards establishing a local administration with objectives that did not necessarily coincide with those of Moscow.23 By the time of his assassination on 9 May 2004, Kadyrov was a feared man in Chechnya and a figure of central importance for Putin's policy of normalization. That normalization included the allocation of significant federal resources to Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia. Most recently, in August 2004, the Economics Ministry agreed to a development programme for Chechnya that guaranteed the republic no less than 6 billion roubles a year.24

Chechenization was a third policy line. Kadyrov's credibility led Moscow to make allowances for his desire for greater autonomy. If some saw him playing a double game, Kadyrov was viewed by Moscow as the centrepiece of a strategy by which responsibility would be transferred to Moscow-anointed figures. A key element of Chechenization was the surrender and transfer of allegiance of separatist fighters to Kadyrov (and especially to the Presidential Security Service, commanded by his son, Ramzan). The surrender of the former defence minister, Magomed Khambiyev, from the government of the former separatist Chechen president, Aslan Maskhadov, in early 2004 marked a major success (after the systematic targeting of Khambiyev's family).25 A Medecins Sans Frontieres report in August 2004 summed up the impact of Chechenization: 'The conflict appears to have become more an internal civil war between rival Chechen factions, instead of a war for independence.'26 Moscow was shifting the burden of responsibility to the local Chechen administration, thereby changing the nature of the conflict.

22 See Charles W. Blandy, North Caucasus: escalation of terrorism into Ingushetia, 04/17 (Camberley: UK Defence Academy, Conflict Studies Research Centre, June 2004); Enver Kisirev, 'Dagestan: power in the balance', in Anna Matveeva and Duncan Hiscock, eds, The Caucasus: armed and divided (London: Saferworld, April 2003).

23 Kadyrov, for example, argued that command over anti-terrorist activities should be transferred to him and that Moscow should allow the Chechen government to retain all revenue from oil production in the republic. Moscow rejected both requests.

24 Liz Fuller, 'Will Moscow's man be elected Chechnya's new leader?', RFE/RL, Caucasus Report 7: 33, 27 Aug. 2004.

25 See Charles Blandy, Chechnya: centre of unabated instability and conflict, 04/I I (Camberley: UK Defence Academy, Conflict Studies Research Centre, May 2004).

26 Kaz de Jong et al., The trauma of ongoing war in Chechnya (Medecins Sans Frontieres, Aug. 2004).

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A last policy line was to isolate and contain Chechen separatism. A special border regime, for example, was set up in three mountain regions of Karachaevo- Cherkessiya's border with Georgia because of the reported presence of Islamic extremist bases.27 Moscow also sought cooperation from Georgia and Azerbaijan to prevent the use of their territory by terrorists. While Baku agreed to close down a Chechen office, Russian-Georgian relations soured on the question of Georgia's Pankisi Gorge, where a long-settled Chechen population had welcomed refugees after the start of the second Chechen war, including a number of Chechen and foreign terrorists. Relations plummeted in August 2002, when Russian planes bombed a village in Pankisi. At the international level, Moscow also sought the cooperation of other states, especially Britain and the United States, in extraditing former members of Maskhadov's now defunct government.

Military reform was another part of Putin's programme to strengthen the state. The most important changes occurred at the conceptual level. The 2003 document on 'Urgent Tasks' stated: 'Russia has been compelled to adjust its vision of the role and place of military policy and military instruments ... It is becoming impossible to guarantee Russian Federation security using only political capabilities.'28 Evidently, Gorbachev's 'new political thinking'-that political tools would be sufficient to defend the Soviet Union-has been abandoned. Military force was once more seen as vital for ensuring that Russia remained a subject in international relations: 'The presence of modem and effective armed forces in Russia is becoming one of the conditions of its suc- cessful and healthy integration into the system of international relations being formed.' Moreover, Moscow admitted the possibility of launching preventive strikes against terrorist groups outside its borders. In Putin's words, 'if, in the practice of international life, the principle of the preventive use of force is going to be asserted, then Russia reserves the right to act similarly to defend its national interests'.29 These statements marked a radical shift away from the thinking of Gorbachev and Yeltsin on the utility of force. Military power was back.

In a practical situation far removed from conceptual developments, however, Putin still struggled with a Soviet military inheritance of difficult service conditions, poor equipment base, and low levels of training.30 The legacy included also a deeply conservative mindset in the General Staff on the importance, for example, of maintaining conscription.3' The second Chechen war created a stormy climate for launching reform, not least because of the existence of a corps of senior officers implicated with the wars, embodied in General Anatoly Kvashnin, former Chief of General Staff. Putin was forced to seize on particular events in the war as a pretext to remove the so-called 'Chechen generals'. In 2002, for example, Putin exploited the crash of a

27 Blandy, North Caucasus: escalation of terrorism. 28 'Urgent Tasks', 3 Oct. 2003. 29 Putin, interview with Italian media, IPD, Moscow, 3 Nov. 2003, www.mid.ru, last accessed 23 Nov. 2004. 30 See Miller and Trenin, eds, The Russian military. 31 See e.g. Lt.-Gen. V. V. Smirnov, 'A contract-based military for Russia: problems and solutions',

Voyennaya mysl', Jan.-Feb. 2003.

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Dov Lynch

military helicopter and the Moscow hostage crisis to remove Colonel-General Gennady Troshev from the North Caucasus Military District. The removal of Kvashnin and the trimming of the General Staffs role occurred only in July 2004-four years into Putin's leadership. The delay highlights the difficulty Putin faced in establishing civilian control over the armed forces.32

Military reform progressed by fits and starts. Initially, Moscow rationalized the military district system and reorganized the structure of the armed forces into three services (ground, air and navy).33 After an inconclusive experiment in transferring the 76th Airborne Division to contract service, the Defence Ministry launched a federal programme in 2004 to shift 80 formations and units (some I47,500 troops), to contract service by 2007.34 In conjunction with these

changes, Ivanov sought to improve the conditions of service. The increase in the ministry's budget for 2005 to just over 383 billion roubles was partly explained by the need for higher allowances and the launch of a mortgage system to provide more housing.35 The government also decided to increase provision of modern equipment to units. The current proportion of modem weapons stands at around 20 per cent; this is to rise to 35 per cent by 20I0.36 Finally, Ivanov placed emphasis on combat training and exercises. In June 2004 the General Staff ran an exercise in the Far East that featured the airlift of three units across the country.37

Putin also focused on the other 'power ministries'. Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin explained that between 2000 and 2004 allocations to the MVD had been increased by two and a half times, allocations to the Federal Border Services doubled, and those to the FSB tripled.38 Lines of command were reorganized in 2003, with the Federal Taxation Police transferred to the MVD, and the Federal Border Service and the Federal Agency for Government Communication and Information to the FSB.39 Presidential decrees in July 2004 targeted the FSB and the Ministry of Emergency Situations (Emercom).4? Overall, these decrees rationalized structures rather than transforming them. The main lines of MVD reform were more ambitious, including the creation of anti-terrorist centres in the ministry and in the federal districts, more special

32 On these changes see Alexandr Dubovoi, 'What is the case for staff reshuffles in the security ministries?', Defence and Security (Moscow: WPS Agency), no. 304, 24July 2004.

33 See e.g. interview with Sergei Ivanov in Krasnaya zvezda, 10 Aug. 2001, IPD, Moscow, I9 Aug. 2001, www.mid.ru, last accessed 23 Nov. 2004.

34 For details of the federal programme see the 'Urgent Tasks', 3 Oct. 2003. On the Pskov division see Pavel Pushkin, 'Transition to professional armed forces began with problems', Defence and Security (Moscow: WPS Agency), no. 212, 2 Aug. 2002.

35 See discussion in Pavel Pushkin, 'Military expenditures increased significantly', Defense and Security (WPS Agency), no. 308, 28 Aug. 2004, and budget details in Viktor Ivanov, Nezavisimaya gazeta, Io Sept. 2004.

36 See Viktor Litovkin, 'La doctrine militaire russe', Defense Nationale (Paris), Jan. 2004, pp. 55-71. 37 Pavel Baev, 'Kremlin launches military exercises in the Russian Far East', Eurasia Daily Monitor I: 28, I0

June 2004. 38 Alexei Kudrin was speaking on NTV, Moscow, reported by AFP, I9 Sept. 2004. 39 See Alexandr Dubovoi, 'Why the President has decided to abolish certain security structures', Defense

and Security (Moscow: WPS Agency), no. 243, 14 March 2003. 40 See Simon Saradzhyan, Moscow Times, I 5 July 2004.

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force units, a federal police structure separate from municipal militias, and the eventual creation of an MVD National Guard.41

Counterterrorism in foreign policy

During his first term Putin pursued three objectives in the external dimension of counterterrorism. First, Moscow sought to fold developments in Chechnya into the wider struggle against international terrorism to ensure that negative aspects of the Chechen situation-in essence, human rights violations-were not used against Russia in international fora. Second, after the wars in Afghan- istan and Iraq, Moscow sought to ensure that interpretations of self-defence in counterterrorism would be formulated within an international legal framework supervised by the UN. Finally, Russia advanced specific concerns to reduce international sources of support for extremist groups in Russia.

A first area of focus was the former Soviet Union, with the development of anti-terrorist structures in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the strengthening of the counterterrorist activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), bringing together Russia and China with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.42 In April 2003 members of the CIS Collective Security Treaty (Armenia, Russia, Tajikistan, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) created the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Russia has agreed to provide the CSTO with military equipment at domestic prices and to cover 50 per cent of running costs.43 In December 2003 Putin stated that priorities over the next decade were to create rapid reaction forces and air defence structures.44 While one should not take these plans at face value, they indicate a renewed strategic focus on the former Soviet Union, and especially Central Asia. Forward basing is part of this strategy. In 2003 Russia and Kyrgyzstan agreed that a Russian air base should be opened in Kant, and in 2004 Moscow and Dushanbe agreed to transform the 20ist Division into a Russian base.45 More widely, Moscow received support from most CIS states in adher- ing to its view of the Chechen war and cutting off external sources of support.

Putin also used counterterrorism to align Russia within the Euro-Atlantic community.46 The task was difficult with the European Union (EU). Russia-EU relations under Putin began in a climate of recrimination after the beginning of the second Chechen war. In January 2000 the EU condemned the bombing of

4' For a discussion of MVD reform, see Mark Smith, Russian perspectives on terrorism (Camberley: UK Defence Academy, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Jan. 2004); Pavel Pushkin, 'Main steps for reforming national security agencies', Defense and Security (WPS Agency), no. 230, 6 Dec. 2002.

42 For the most recent discussion of these developments, see International Affairs 80: 3, May 2004, special edition edited by Roy Allison, Edmund Herzig and Annette Bohr.

43 Interview given to Nezavismoye voennoye obozreniye, I9 Sept. 2003. 44 IPD, Moscow, ii Dec. 2003, www.mid.ru. 45 On Russia's deployments see 'Russian contingents abroad', in Former Soviet Union: Security and Policy-

Fifteen Nations, 5, Moscow, May 2003, pp. 2-4. 46 See interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Safonov, RIA Novosti, 20 Jan. 2004, IPD,

Moscow, 20 Jan. 2004, www.mid.ru, last accessed 23 Nov. 2004.

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Dov Lynch

cities and threats made against civilians, and called for Russia to allow international humanitarian agencies into Chechnya and to launch a dialogue with Chechen authorities.47 Failing this, the European Council pledged to 'draw the consequences from this situation', setting forth a series of quasi-sanctions. After six months of these, Brussels retreated from sanctions against Russia in 2000. Nonetheless, the EU continued to raise Chechnya at every level of the dialogue. From the Russian viewpoint, some EU member states were lax in their treatment of those Russia considered terrorists. Moscow never missed an opportunity to berate European states for perceived double standards in distin- guishing between terrorism and separatism in Chechnya. When a London Magistrates' Court rejected its request to extradite Ahmed Zakayev, the former Chechen foreign minister, Moscow declared this a 'serious blow to [the Russia- UK] partnership, especially with regard to real counterterrorist interaction'.48 Moscow portrayed EU calls for talks in Chechnya as another example of double standards. In the words of Sergei Ivanov, 'on the one hand, European countries at EU summits issue a declaration on cooperation in fighting terrorism; on the other hand, they are pushing Russia to start negotiations with terrorists in Chechnya'.49 Sergei Lavrov summed up Russia's position on talks with Maskhadov in May 2004: 'While rejecting a deal with the world's number one terrorist, the EU is urging us enter into negotiations with his disciples ... We can only shrug.'50

After September I I counterterrorism became quickly-and far less problem- atically-a prominent element of Russia's relationship with the United States. Based on a similar vision of threats and countermeasures, US-Russian relations progressed quickly, as George W. Bush's early concerns about Chechnya and the development of Russian democracy dissipated. To Moscow's pleasure, relations became strategically driven, based on perceived common interests. Russian intelligence services and military forces played a supporting role in Afghanistan. After the Afghan war, the Russia-US Working Group on Afghanistan was transformed into a Working Group on Terrorism, with high-level direction from both sides and regular meetings.

Counterterrorism was also part of Russia-NATO relations. The NATO- Russia Council (NRC) was created in May 2002 to allow the two parties to 'work as equal partners in areas of common interest'.5' In many respects, NATO and Russia speak a similar language on the nature of the terrorist threat. The NRC organized unprecedented joint assessments of the terrorist threat to peace support operations in the Balkans.52 The Russian view of cooperation

47 'Presidency conclusions, Helsinki European Council, o0/II Dec. I999', no. 00300/1/99 (Brussels, I Dec. I999).

48 Reported by IPD, Moscow, 13 Nov. 2003, wrww.mid.ru, last accessed 23 Nov. 2004. 49 Sergei Ivanov, 'Russia-NATO: strategic partners in response to emerging threats', speech to the

International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, I3 July 2004. s5 Interview with Vremya novostei, IPD, Moscow, I8 May 2004, www.mid.ru, last accessed 23 Nov. 2004. 51 See 'NATO-Russia relations: a new quality', Rome, 28 May 2002, www.nato.int, last accessed 20 Sept. 2004. 52 See 'Key areas of NRC cooperation', 30 Aug. 2004, www.nato.int, last accessed 20 Sept. 2004.

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was so positive that Sergei Ivanov proposed renaming the organization the 'New Anti-Terrorist Organization'.53

Finally, in the wake of UN Security Council Resolution 1373, Russia became an active participant in the Security Council's Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC). The CTC was created to monitor adherence to international con- ventions and protocols in the counterterrorist struggle.54 Russian objectives in joining this forum were threefold. First, Moscow sought to ensure the centrality of the UN in the formation of a new order, the old one having been shattered by the Kosovo crisis, September I I and the Iraq war. Contrary to the conservative position on legal innovation it had held during the late I99os, Russia was now more open to rethinking the scope of self-defence and the preventive use of force. However, Moscow insisted on the centrality of the UN to ensure that 'there should be no legal vacuum in the process'.55 Inter- national law can and should adapt, but Russia was to retain a voice over its development. Second, Moscow sought to prevent states from using UN mechanisms to berate Russia for violating international norms. In March 2004 Russia was relieved by the rejection of an EU-sponsored resolution in the UN Committee on Human Rights that criticized human rights violations in Chechnya.56 Finally, Russia sought to channel the development of new counterterrorist norms according to its interests. For example, it sponsored a General Assembly resolution on human rights and terrorism in November 2003 stating that terrorism could never be justified and tightening rules constraining states from providing asylum to suspected terrorists.

Confidence and weakness

Addressing the Federal Assembly in May 2004, Putin described the situation he inherited in 2000: 'Russia found itself having to simultaneously restore its statehood [and] create what was a new kind of economy, a market economy. Furthermore, it also had to defend its territorial integrity in the fight against international terrorism.'57 Only now, in 2004, Putin argued, could Russia look beyond these immediate challenges to new opportunities. Sergei Ivanov's 'Urgent Tasks' of October 2003 displayed a similar confidence based on 'Russia's recent emergence from a state of political and economic crisis and the substantial strengthening of its positions in the world arena'.58 The perception of strength extended to Chechnya. In May 2004 Putin declared: 'Through our common efforts, we have managed to seriously stabilize the situation in the

53 Sergei Ivanov, 'Russia-NATO', speech given at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 13 July 2004.

54 UNSCR 1373, UN Security Council press release 7158, 28 Sept. 2001. 55 Igor Ivanov, 'In the face of common challenges', Vremya novostei, 24 Nov. 2003. 56 Deputy Foreign Minister Yury Fedotov stated: 'I cannot imagine a more inopportune and untimely step

on the part of the EU': IPD, Moscow, 13 March 2004, www.mid.ru, last accessed 23 Nov. 2004. 57 'Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation', 26 May 2004, www.kremlin.ru, last

accessed 23 Nov. 2004. 58 'Urgent Tasks', 3 Oct. 2003.

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North Caucasus ... In Chechnya, peace is becoming irreversible.'59 After four years of difficult policy choices, Putin believed that Russia had largely put its past behind it. In 2004, Russia had never seemed so strong.60

And yet, in each policy area discussed above, the limits of what Putin had achieved were visible before Beslan. By 2004 the buoyancy produced by high energy prices had become a concern, as export revenues disguised the absence of real reform. Federal changes had created more uniformity in some areas of the federal structure, but Moscow's central power was not necessarily stronger. Separatist and terrorist actions were escalating inside Chechnya, throughout the North Caucasus and across Russia. In June, most notably, armed groups undertook a stunning attack in Ingushetia that left 98 members of the security forces dead. After four years of normalization, Chechnya remained derelict. A visit in May by German Gref, accompanied by 35 officials from 26 different ministries and departments, to review Chechen reconstruction was a striking admission of this failure.6I The assassination of Kadyrov in May eliminated the centrepiece of Chechenization. Outside Chechnya, politics were increasingly volatile in Dagestan and Ingushetia, with deep tensions rising to the surface.

Little fundamental change had occurred in security sector reform. The Defence Ministry remained locked in the grip of Soviet-era thinking. The FSB and MVD were strengthened and attributed new functions with little review, let alone any substantial transformation. Increased allocations to the 'power ministries' created more problems than solutions. As Konstantin Remchukov, aide to German Gref, stated in August, 'there is little sense in increasing spend- ing without providing for transparency to control how the money is used'.62 The allocation of more money reflected effective lobbying by the 'power ministries' rather than objective need.

In foreign policy, counterterrorism had not acted as a foundation stone for a nascent world order in which Russia would become closely aligned with the Euro-Atlantic community while retaining its independence. The EU rejected Russia's definition of events in Chechnya. Cooperation with NATO was important, but scepticism in Moscow about the overall future of the alliance cast doubt over joint efforts. Russian-US relations remained based largely on the personal connection between Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush.

In sum, perceptions of strength in 2004 belied a reality that was still driven by weakness. The terrorist attacks brought this reality to light.

59 Putin to the Public Forum of the Caucasus and Southern Russia, IPD, Moscow, 26 May 2004, www.mid.ru, last accessed 23 Nov. 2004.

60 Sergei Lavrov, in an interview to Kommersant, i April 2004, stated: 'It is not the first time that world public opinion is asking itself: whither Russia? ... Until recently, the debate was about a country weakened by internal crisis and frightening in its unpredictability. Today, some may be scared of another, stronger and more confident Russia.'

61 See Chechnya Weekly Report 5: 20, 19 May 2004. 62 Interviewed on Radio Russia, 30 Aug. 2004, reproduced inJRL, no. 8348, 2004.

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'Moment of truth' Putin's understanding of Beslan

The Beslan attack had two effects in Moscow. It shook new convictions of strength; and it strengthened old convictions on how to increase Russia's power. Grasping how the Russian leadership has understood recent events is vital for understanding policy changes since the terrorist attacks.

Putin's choice of metaphor is revealing. His statement of 13 September is worth transcribing:

When a man is born, some disease-causing germs, some viruses appear almost immediately in his organism endangering his health. But if the organism grows strong and powerful then its immunity suppresses all these disease-causing germs and viruses. As soon as the organism weakens, they all flare up in a life-threatening disease. This is the way it happened with us ... We need to put right the system of power in the country, we need to create an efficient economy, we need to revitalize the entire organism of Russian statehood and the political system.63

Five points may be drawn from Putin's response to Beslan. First, despite four years of work, Russia was still not a single organism with a unity of power. In Putin's words, 'there really hasn't been a unified system, and there still is none'. This image was used also by Vladimir Surkov, Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration: 'The virus of terrorism attacked the state precisely at a time when the regions were preoccupied with trivial concerns regarding sovereignty and the sickly transitory parties were in no condition to combat the pervasive chaos in the country.'64 As Putin declared the day after Beslan, 'We showed our- selves to be weak and the weak get beaten.'65 Russia's past was not yet behind it.

Second, international terrorism was 'life-threatening'. Terrorism is seen as a weakness-multiplier, crystallizing and exacerbating points of weakness. In the words of Sergei Ivanov, 'the latest series of attacks indicates this war is becoming a system, and we are facing a powerful adversary'.66 For Moscow, international terrorism is the spearhead of a systemic attack against Russian sovereignty.

Third, external conditions supported international terrorism. On a number of occasions after Beslan, Putin pointed to foreign non-Islamic support to extremist groups: 'Some would like to tear from us a juicy piece of pie. Others help them.' Jonathan Steele cites Putin on 6 September declaring: 'There are certain people who want us to be focused on our internal problems and they pull strings here so that we don't raise our head internationally.'67 Putin was more evocative on 24 September: 'Imagine a lion that falls into a trap and jackals run around and bark maybe from fear, or maybe from joy.'68 Even after

63 Reported on Russia TV, I3 Sept. 2004. 64 Surkov, Komsomolskaya pravda, 29 Sept. 2004. 65 Putin's address of 4 Sept. 2004 on the presidential website: www.kremlin.ru, last accessed 23 Nov. 2004. 66 Sergei Ivanov, cited by Sonia Oxley, Reuters, I2 Sept. 2004, reproduced inJRL, no. 8362, 2004. 67 Jonathan Steele, Guardian, 8 Sept. 2004. 68 Putin speaking to the World Congress of News Agencies, 24 Sept. 2004, www.kremlin.ru, last accessed

23 Nov. 2004.

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four years of more effective foreign policy, Russia was still not an equal partner of the Euro-Atlantic community. European calls for 'peace talks' in Chechnya showed this, according to Sergei Lavrov: 'For some reason, it is thought unethical to address such calls to the US, Spain, Italy or France. It appears that Russia can be treated whatever which way'.69 Russia is seen as the victim of a hostile information campaign.

Fourth, delinked from Chechen separatism, the objective of the terrorist attacks is seen to be Russia's destruction. On 17 September the president said: 'I urge you to remember the lessons of history, the amicable deal [with Adolf Hitler] in Munich in I938.'7? For Putin, such lessons show the inanity of nego- tiating with international terrorists, to whom making concessions is simply not reasonable. In this sense, the terrorist threat is beyond Russia's control: there is little Moscow can do directly that would induce the threat to disappear. In fact, like the viruses that all healthy bodies carry, terrorism will never vanish.

Finally, given that international terrorism is an independent variable, the only solution to the threat is seen to reside in strengthening the state. If the terrorist threat cannot be eradicated, it can be withstood by strengthening the state 'organism'. A strong immune system will allow Russia to control the threat and maintain the consequences of inevitable future attacks at manageable levels. Putin admitted that 'there is only one wish, to make our country an effectively functioning economic and political organism'.7I

Beslan has been interpreted as a moment of truth showing Russia's fragmented power system and weak international position. Although the circumstances are different from those of I999, Russia's existence as a sovereign state and a subject in world affairs is seen again to be in the balance. Putin's response flows from the logic set in motion from 2000. On the domestic front, he seeks to strengthen the organism of the state: a systemic threat requires an equally systemic defence. As such, Russian counterterrorism measures encompass policies that may not seem directly relevant but are vital, in his view, to reinforce state power. Putin aims to build immunity against inevitable 'future Beslans'. Inside Chechnya, this implies not a change of policy but its more efficient continuation.72 On the foreign front, Moscow seeks to create a vacuum for terrorists and to gain at least tacit support for its counterterrorist strategy.

Building immunity inside Russia

Thus far, there are four dimensions to building immunity within Russia. First, there are measures designed, in Putin's view, to create a unified system of executive power. Federal reform and the shift to proportional representation in

69 Sergei Lavrov, interview in Vremya novostei, 5 Sept. 2004, IPD, Moscow, 5 Sept. 2004, www.mid.ru. 70 Putin before the Third International Conference of Mayors of World Centres in Moscow, I7 Sept.

2004, reproduced inJRL, no. 8372, 2004. 71 Reported on Russia TV, I3 Sept. 2004, reproduced inJRL, no. 8365, 2004. 72 This point is made also by Bobo Lo, 'A people's trauma', World Today, Oct. 2004.

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voting for the Duma fall into this category. Proportional representation has been justified as a way to strengthen the development of national parties and the link between the society and state in a time of war. The reasoning behind federal reform is threefold. First, Boris Gryzlov, Speaker of the Duma, spoke for the government when he stated: 'The country is not quite controllable so far. Control arrangements must be reliable and we must spare no effort to improve them.'73 Having the president put forward names is designed to strengthen the control arrangement. The impact may be indirect, as Vladimir Surkov admitted, but 'it will strengthen [Russia's] political system considerably by adapting the machinery of the state to cope with the extraordinary conditions of an undeclared war'.74 Second, federal reform is seen as justified by Russia's peculiar make-up, with ethnically defined republics. In republics where ethnic tensions loom large, as they do within Dagestan and Kabardino- Cherkessia and between North Ossetia and Ingushetia, a strong handle on local political structures is designed to prevent clashes that might be triggered by Chechen spillover. Finally, in Moscow's view, the reform will put in place more professional governors. The pressures of competitive local elections, the government has argued, brought forward undesirable candidates.

A second dimension concerns Chechnya and the North Caucasus. The North Caucasus is a first target of the federal reform. For example, it will have a direct impact on Dagestan, where tensions have emerged between the chairman of the State Council, Magomedali Magomedov (a Dargin), and the mayor of Khasavyurt, Saygidpasha Umakhanov (an Avar). Dagestan's 2.1 million population includes 14 ethnic groups whose representation is delicately balanced in the State Council (the Avar are the largest group, representing 27 per cent of the population, followed by the Dargin at 15.5 per cent).75 The prospect of a direct election to the State Council chairmanship in 2006 is the subtext beneath these tensions; from Moscow's view, a leadership race in one of Russia's poorest and most ethnically mixed republics could be perilous.

On 13 September Putin referred to the region's deep poverty, mass unemployment, low incomes, high infant mortality rates, and lack of educational opportunities as constituting the 'roots of terrorism'. The creation of the SFC led by Dmitry Kozak is designed to 'liquidate' these sources. Upon arriving at his headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, Kozak described his two priorities as socio- economic development and improving security in and around Chechnya.76 In his first visit to Grozny, Kozak stressed the need for coordination among different security forces, stating to the assembled officers 'your real opponents are those hiding in the mountains'.77 In Moscow, Putin also created a Com- mission for Coordinating the Federal Bodies of Executive Power in the Southern

73 Boris Gryzlov, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 Sept. 2004. 74 Surkov, Komsomolskaya pravda, 29 Sept. 2004. 75 See Liz Fuller, 'Power struggle looms in Dagestan', RFE Caucasus Report, I6 Aug. 2004. 76 See Maria Bondarenko, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 Sept. 2004. 77 Reproduced in RFE/RL Newsline 8: I82, 23 Sept. 2004.

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Federal District, comprising the finance minister, education minister, economics minister, and minister for social development, as well as the first deputies from the Defence Ministry, the FSB and the MVD.78

Vladimir Surkov painted a picture of ambitious objectives in the region: 'It entails the socialization of the North Caucasus, gradual establishment of demo- cratic institutions and the base for civil society, an effective law enforcement system, production facilities and a social infrastructure, eradication of mass unemployment, corruption and the cultural and educational gap.'79 In the short term, however, Kozak will focus on improving the efficiency of existing efforts through, in particular, a crackdown on official corruption. Another immediate focus is to strengthen the position of Alu Alkhanov, elected Chechen president days before the Beslan attack. Kozak has already allowed a further devolution of power to Alkhanov. Staking out independent positions will be an important way of bolstering Alkhanov's flimsy legitimacy.8? The reconstruction programme partly revealed on i November, focusing in the first instance on hospitals and compensation for housing destroyed in fighting, then on wider infrastructural rebuilding and the creation of new jobs, represented no new departure for Russian policy.8' Evidently, Kozak has been tasked to make better use of resources already dedicated to the region.

At the regional level, Putin asked the MVD to strengthen counterterrorist coordination across the Southern Federal District. According to Interior Minister Rashid Nurgadiev, 'anti-terrorist groups' will be created in each of the district's entities, directed by a senior MVD officer and bringing together the FSB, the Defence Ministry and Emercom.82 Moreover, Russia has instituted special regimes on its borders with Georgia and Azerbaijan and within the North Caucasus. North Ossetia's border with Ingushetia is now being monitored as a preventive measure against renewed clashes on lines similar to the conflict in 1992.83

Third, Putin has called for more efficient counterterrorist measures and a comprehensive counterterrorist system. The government has moved in a number of specific policy areas. For example, a single air safety programme is to be instituted for Russia's airports, and there will be increased penalties against official corruption. Putin decreed more control by the 'power ministries' over the process of issuing visas to foreigners.84 A working group has been created to consider the use of new technologies in internal and external passports. The Duma is to review some 40 counterterrorist measures by December 2004, covering security at schools, a threat alert system, and the use of machinery to

78 Interview with Kudrin on NTV, 19 Sept. 2004, reproduced inJRL, no. 8379, 2004. 79 Surkov, Komsomolskaya pravda, 29 Sept. 2004. 80 For example, Alkhanov set loose conditions to amnesty any field commander of the opposition. 81 See Itar-Tass and Interfax reports in RFE/RL Newsline 8: 207, 2 Nov. 2004. 82 Reported in RFE/RL Newsline 8: 173, I0 Sept. 2004. 83 The clashes in October 1992 between Ingush returning to the Prigorodny Rayon and local Ossetians

were brief but intense, with over 600 casualties, forcing Moscow to declare a state of emergency. Tensions have remained latent since 1992.

84 Reported in RFE/RL Newsline 8: 175, 14 Sept. 2004.

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protect public places and facilities. The president has also proposed changes in the law for registering religious groups to prevent extremist groups from using the cover of religion as protection.

At the wider level, Putin evoked a 'national security system ... that is able not only to prevent acts of terrorism and deal with the consequences but also to work on preventing terrorist incursions, sabotage and man-made disasters'.85 Putin called on the 'power ministries' to propose measures in this direction. As a first step, the government has increased allocations to counterterrorism in the 2005 budget by 158.4 billion roubles: 50 billion will be allocated to the MVD, FSB and Foreign Intelligence Services for equipment purchases and anti- terrorist training, 107 billion will go to the Defence Ministry to accelerate its rearmament programme and the transfer to contract service, and some 1.4 billion will be used to implement additional security measures in the under- ground railway networks of Moscow and other cities.86

By all accounts, Russian responses during the Beslan attack displayed problems of coordination among different kinds of troops, a lack of preparation and planning, and a failure to secure the area to prevent the escape of terrorists or interference by local vigilantes.87 Sergei Ivanov admitted as much when he called for the reform of the 'power ministries' with a special emphasis on intelligence and coordination.88 As secretary of the Security Council, Igor Ivanov has announced the redrafting of the National Security Concept and the elaboration of a country-wide counterterrorist mobilization plan. However, uncertainty remains over the future counterterrorist system, compounded by the attempt of each power ministry to ensure that it does not receive blame for Beslan from the parliamentary investigation committee. The Defence Ministry and the FSB have been most on the defensive.89 Given the deep-rooted interests of each 'power ministry', the scope of the new counterterrorist service remains un- clear. It is not certain that a new service will be created at all.

A final dimension is moral and psychological. Putin has made the stakes clear: 'Terrorism is also a war for people's minds, perhaps above all a war for peoples' minds to put up a moral barrier against this.'90 Anti-terror rallies occurred in several cities on 6 September, organized by pro-government trade unions and advertised on government-controlled media outlets. A new civic organization called Russia Anti-Terror has been registered to channel popular mobilization. Moscow has called for the engagement of every Russian in a war where 'the battlefront runs through every city, every street and every building'.9'

85 Reported on Russia TV, I3 Sept. 2004, reproduced inJRL, no. 8365, 2004. 86 Alexei Kudrin, reported on RFE/RL Newsline 8: 176, 15 Sept. 2004. 87 See e.g. Pavel Felgengauer, Moscow Times, 28 Sept. 2004; Anatoly Sudoplatov, Nezavisimoye voennoye

obozreniye, no. 34, 10 Sept. 2004. 88 S. Ivanov, interview on NTV, Moscow, 12 Sept. 2004, reproduced inJRL, no. 8363, 2004. 89 S. Ivanov on NTV, Moscow, 12 Sept. 2004. 90 Putin speaking to the Presidential Council for the Coordination of Religious Organizations, 29 Sept.

2004, www.kremlin.ru, last accessed 23 Nov. 2004. 9i Surkov, Komsomolskaya pravda, 29 Sept. 2004.

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Dov Lynch

This mobilization is designed to foster the birth of a 'moral majority'-the term is Surkov's-that will withstand future terrorist attacks and provide buoyancy to government policy by closing down unwanted options, such as negotiations in Chechnya. The dark side of this policy has involved painting government opponents as a 'fifth column' of external enemies.92 Popular mobilization is intended also to build moral barriers within citizens against providing support to extremist groups. This mechanism of self-censorship is targeted especially towards the media and Russia's vast army of officials, who are seen to have helped create a permissive climate for terrorism.

Bolstering external immunity The external dimension of Russia's counterterrorist campaign has developed at three levels.

First, Moscow has sought to inject a moral dimension into its counterterrorist profile, presenting Beslan as Russia's September I I. This equivalency creates a black or white situation, in which it becomes more difficult to utter any criticism of Russian actions and terrorists benefit from fewer safe havens. Russia's objective is to deprive international terrorist groups of oxygen. Such a moral climate also allows Moscow to insist on its internal sovereignty in responding to the terrorist threat. Speaking to the UN General Assembly, Sergei Lavrov was clear: 'We will not let anybody encroach on the sovereignty of our state.'93 The point was directed as much to terrorists as to foreign states and organizations. While Russian reactions to Dutch Foreign Minister Bot's query about Beslan were genuine, they were also crafted as a 'scare tactic' to deter the EU and its member states from taking similar positions in the future. The results of this moral polarization are noticeable. For example, after first refusing to do so, the Lithuanian government has closed down the server of the Chechen website Kavkaztsentr. Overall, Moscow seeks to ensure that Russia is not treated as a second-rate partner in the war on terrorism.

Second, Moscow seeks to embed its counterterrorist strategy within international organizations. The CIS is significant in so much as its members share Russia's approach to counterterrorism. Also, Russia has used CIS unity to spearhead concerns in other international organizations, such as the OSCE, which, in Russia's view, should develop a stronger counterterrorist profile. The UN takes pride of place for Russia, because, in Lavrov's words, the organization provides 'stability in confusion'.94 The UN is seen as limiting the destabilizing impact of emerging new international norms and ensuring that Russia has a voice in their development. Beslan also confirmed Russia's position as legal reformer in the UN with regard to the right to self-defence in the terrorist age. Moscow deems it permissible to take preventive action to eliminate an

92 Again, the term is Surkov's. 93 Statement to the UN General Assembly, 23 Sept. 2004. 94 Interview on Russia Radio, IPD, Moscow, 9 Sept. 2004, www.mid.ru, last accessed 23 Nov. 2004.

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immediate or lingering terrorist threat.95 Also, Moscow has sought to use the UN to advance its concerns over the granting of asylum in some countries to terrorists wanted in others. Following Beslan, the Foreign Ministry seeks an overall reinforcement of the Counter-Terrorism Committee.

Finally, Beslan has reinforced the bilateral drive in Russian foreign policy. As Lavrov declared to the UN General Assembly, 'readiness for honest cooperation in fighting terror' has become the criterion for determining relations with other states.96 In Europe, the importance of sympathetic partners has been reinforced, with France and Germany viewed as especially significant given their role in the EU and more widely. Most dramatically, Moscow has sought a marked rapprochement with the United States, driven by a similarity of views on terrorism and Washington's readiness to accept Moscow's policies in this area. The initial reactions from Washington to Putin's political reforms noted American concerns about their impact on Russian democracy. However, in late September Alexander Vershbow, US ambassador to Moscow, stated that Washington had never called on Russia to negotiate with figures associated with terrorism. Specifically, Vershbow declared that 'we have not called on the Russian government to have talks with Maskhadov'.97 On I8 October US Secretary of State Colin Powell declared: 'I do not see Russia sliding back to the abyss of the Soviet Union.'98 The contrast with the statement by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European commissioner for external relations, in her hearing before the European Parliament in October is striking.99 Where the US administration has focused on shared interests with Moscow, the EU remains concerned by divergent values.

The limits of power Beslan sharpened the lineaments of policies whose limits were already clear before the attack. Measures since September highlight these hlimits ever more distinctly.

First, federal reform may be counterproductive in the North Caucasus. Developments in Ingushetia could be a harbinger of future trends. A Moscow- imposed president, Murat Ziazikov, runs the impoverished republic, and is deeply unpopular for failing to stem its socio-economic collapse. Ziazikov has done nothing to isolate Ingushetia from spillover from Chechnya; on the contrary, the similarities between the two republics are troubling in terms of 'disappear- ances', abductions and assassinations. 00 Vladimir Ryzhkov, the staunchly independent Duma deputy, noted this danger: 'The Beslan tragedy made clear

95 Lavrov, interview on Al-Jazeera, io Sept. 2004, IPD, Moscow, Io Sept. 2004, www.mid.ru, last accessed 23 Nov. 2004.

96 Statement to the UN General Assembly, 23 Sept. 2004. 97 Interview reported on Interfax, Moscow, 28 Sept. 2004, reproduced inJRL, no. 8384, 2004. 98 Colin Powell, cited in USA Today, 19 Oct. 2004. 99 Reported by Agence Europe, Brussels, 5 Oct. 2004. I00 See analysis by Ingushetia's mufti M. Albagachiev, who resigned from his position in July, in Charles

Gurin, 'Maskhadov calls for talks; Ziazikov says he's game', Eurasia Daily Monitor I: 46, 7 July 2004.

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that the Kremlin-appointed leaders in Chechnya and Ingushetia have no connection with the people and therefore are utterly impotent.'I?0 According to Caucasus expert Robert Bruce Ware, the imposition of more central control in the region is dangerous, as it frustrates local aspirations for representation and restricts access to power by local elites, who may turn to more radical forms of politics.102 Putin's federal reform could give rise to serious movements for regional and republican autonomy from Moscow.

Trends in Russia's security sector are also worrying. Mikhail Zadornov of the Duma Budget Committee notes correctly: 'If we just give more money and don't systematically change the way the security services work, this will not produce any result; Beslan demonstrated this very well.'"03 Throwing more money at the 'power ministries' without enforcing their reform to ensure better intelligence and coordination will entrench these institutions further in secretive and ineffective procedures. Over the medium term, the confusion and improvisation witnessed on 3 September are unlikely to be remedied. Even in operations not linked to crisis situations, Russian security forces will remain unable to respond to the particular challenge of counterterrorist warfare.104

Moreover, there are doubts about the ability of Dmitry Kozak and the SFC to spearhead Chechnya's reconstruction and the improvement of the region's socio-economic situation. German Gref admitted as much: 'If all of the government agencies, both regional and federal, work well and in a coordinated manner, I think that life in the republic [of Chechnya] may be put on a more effective economic footing within the next ten years.'`?5 Given the scale of immediate needs, ten years might as well as be a hundred. While one of Putin's most trusted and professional advisers, Kozak has no experience of the North Caucasus. His appointment underlines another weakness of Putin's reforms: the limited number of reliable personnel in Moscow who are 'appointable'. Moreover, building a 'moral majority' across Russia will be a tall order. Public opinion polls in October seemed to indicate that most Russians did not believe that international terrorism had declared war on the country, and that most were preoccupied with economic rather than security concerns.I?6

Prospects were no rosier externally. The EU is unlikely to cease its criticism of human rights violations in Russia. Nor is Russia likely to succeed in enshrin- ing its views on asylum and terrorism in international norms. The Russian- sponsored Security Council Resolution I566 of 8 October 2004 had dropped Moscow's proposals on a single 'blacklist' for international terrorists and a stricter approach to granting asylum to suspected terrorists. A more positive development, given Moscow's view of the key position of the United States,

Io' Vladimir Ryzhkov, Moscow Times, 5 Oct. 2004. 102 See interview by Peter Lavelle, UPI, 7 Sept. 2004. 103 Cited on Ekho Moskvy, Moscow, 2I Aug. 2004, reproduced inJRL, no. 8378, 2004. I04 See Pavel Felgengauer's comparison with British and Israeli counterterrorist forces in Novaya gazeta, 6

Sept. 2004. I05 Interview with Itogi Weekly, no. 36, 7 Sept. 2004, reproduced inJRL, no. 8368, 2004. 106 See analysis of various polls on Ria Novosti, 27 Oct. 2004, reproduced inJRL, no. 843 I, 2004.

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was George W. Bush's victory in the presidential elections. A change of power in Washington would immediately have distanced Russia from the United States.

When he came to power, Putin founded his vision for Russia on two pillars: strengthening the state, and creating a favourable external environment, mainly by aligning Russia with the Euro-Atlantic community. Before Beslan, even if Putin was lulled into believing the contrary, the limits of both policy lines were evident. They are all the more so after the attack. In his first term, Putin's policies rested uneasily on two contradictions. The first involved balancing the requirements of modernization and the needs of security. Between 2000 and 2004, high oil prices and greater governmental concentration softened this contradiction. The intensity of Moscow's current focus on security will bring the problem to the fore, especially given the absence of deep economic reform. The second contradiction concerned the link between domestic developments and Russia's external position. For much of his first term, Putin was able to balance the two, creating a more predictable foreign climate for internal reform and aligning Russia more closely with the Euro-Atlantic community. After Beslan, finding this balance will be more difficult. Moscow's insistence on absolute internal sovereignty and the securitization of domestic policy will certainly make the task of alignment arduous.

In the end, the key question about Russia's future is internal. How will the Russian public react to future terrorist attacks? Vladimir Ryzhkov has argued that most Russians entered into a tacit 'contract' with Putin during his first term to accept limits on domestic freedom in exchange for security.?07 How long will this contract hold in the face of new attacks? The logic of the system created by Putin is that further attacks will occur and will be followed by additional measures to strengthen state power; but such measures patently do not achieve this objective. Ominous calls for Russia to undertake a 'total war' are already being heard in the Russian media; this is the direction in which Putin is leading Russia. Russia is caught in a vicious circle of an increasingly brittle state struggling to offset multiple sources of weakness with ever less control and ever more frustration. This is a perilous time for the Russian body of state. Far from being the start to Russia's rebirth, as Putin initially wanted, Chechnya has become a swamp in which all movement seems only to sink Russia deeper.

o07 Vladimir Ryzhkov, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 6 Sept. 2004.

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