The enemy at_his_back-elizabeth_churchill_brown-1956-263pgs-pol

TheEnemy at His Back

by

ELIZABETH CHURCHILL BROWN

The BOOKMAILERNew York

Copyright 1956By Elizabeth Churchill Brown

Printed , in the United States of America

To

my mother, Kathryn Churchillwho has always been an inspiration to me.

THE BOOKMAILER, INC .Box 101, MURRAY HILL STATION

NEW YORK 16, N. Y .

Distributed by THE BOOKMAILER INC .

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Publishers

The Enemy at His Back

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CONTENTS

Chapter I

Chapter II

Early battles of the Pacific-First peacefeelers

How Communist propaganda affects our for-eign policy

I

13Chapter III Yalta and the advisers 43Chapter IV Okinawa-Suzuki-Eugene Dooman testifies 83Chapter V The "resignation" of Mr . Grew 122Chapter VI Potsdam and the advisers 137Chapter VII The atomic bomb and surrender 162Chapter VIII The MacArthur hearings iggAppendix 223

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

"Liz" Brown landed her first job in the newspaperbusiness as a society editor on the "New York EveningJournal," under the watchful eye of the original ChollyKnickerbocker, Maury Paul .

In 1942, she invaded Washington as a representa-tive for "Town and Country," and later wrote a societycolumn for the "Washington Post" before joining anews bureau representing several Texas newspapers .

She married Washington Evening Star syndicatedcolumnist Constantine Brown in 1949 and settled downto be a housewife-but not for long . She was tootroubled by the things she heard, and read, and saw .

"Connie" complains that since she "discovered" thevoluminous congressional hearings, and all the wartimememoirs, she's been sitting up all night, every night,with her nose in some book about communism .

And from the amount of research evident in thisbook-it must be true .

She has proved herself a perceptive reader andwriter .

THE PUBLISHERS

FOREWORD

ON the National Archives Building in the Nation'sCapital, is etched the inscription, "What is past isprologue ."

In the Atomic Age in which we now live, it is im-portant that Americans understand the past so thatwe may better plan for the future.

At the time of Yalta, eleven years ago, there weretwo hundred million people behind the Communist IronCurtain. Now there are approximately nine hundredmillion who have lost their freedom to the most god-less tyranny the world has ever known .

Elizabeth Brown has done a great deal of researchand with insight has developed additional facts inhelping to explain the strange course of our foreignpolicy during the past eleven years .

Not until all of the documents are published onTeheran and Potsdam, will we have sufficient informa-tion on which to base final judgments on that crucialperiod .

In the meantime, however, THE ENEMY AT HISBACK will be of value to all individuals anxious for afree world of free men . We must recognize that indealing with the Kremlin, the road to appeasement isnot the road to peace . It is only surrender on theinstallment plan .

WILLIAM F. KNOWLANDUnited States Senator

THIS IS WHAT YOU CALLAcknowledgments

I MUST say "thanks a million" to a number of people.First, Edna Fluegel who not only challenged everyword I wrote and checked and triple checked, but alsotaught me a few professional tricks . I have come tothink of her as "good old Edna" even though she isn'told at all but a pretty professor of political science atTrinity College in Washington. Formally speaking, sheis "Dr. Edna Fluegel," but I share the sentiments ofAdmiral Turner joy who once said to her, "femaleDoctors overawe me ." So does her vast knowledge ofpolitical history .

Edna is dedicated to the cause of truth and noamount of time or trouble can deter her from diggingit out. Her faithfulness in working with me in the lasthectic days of getting out this book, while at the sametime we were selling our apartment, buying a house andmoving, is a story in itself .

Then, of course, I have to say "thanks a million" tomy sweet husband who put up with all this . For monthshe had to step over books on the floor, eat on a diningroom table full of papers and documents, and miss alot of nice Sunday afternoon bridge games so we couldget through with the reference books before they werepacked for storage . And it wasn't until this stage ofthe game that I discovered that both my husband andEdna thought I'd get tired of writing and never finishthe book. It was two years before I could persuadeeither of them to read it! Then came the red-letter-day. It was while my husband was running a pencilthrough one of my "didactic" statements and exclaim-ing that virgin was spelled with an "i" and not with an"e," that he suddenly said, "This is getting to be a good

ix

x

This Is What You Call Acknowledgmentsbook!" That was at 2 :30 in the afternoon. He repeatedthe statement at 4 :32, and it was then that I felt thatmaybe my two and a half years of work had bornesome fruit.

I mustn't forget to say "thanks a million" to MaudeWood. Maude is our maid whose lineage is of the mostdistinguished African ancestry . I'm sure they were dis-tinguished because my Maude is an aristocrat and abit of Victorian as well . She fussed and fumed at whatEdna and I did to her dining room and parlor . (Wemade the "snore room" out-of-bounds so my husbandcould have some place to escape .) But Maude tookpity on us hard working girls and provided delectabletrays of goodies in our hours of drudgery . If companywas expected, Maude was outraged at my unhouse-wifely demeanor and cleaned up in a most ingeniousway. Afterwards, Edna and I would have to playEaster-egg-hunt to find our books again . Once, after24 hours of hunting for Owen Lattimore, Edna ex-claimed, "why, he's behind the electric fan!"

These were the three who put up with me and mybook day in and day out .

I row come to the large group of people who helpedin other ways . There were a number of distinguishedmen and women who read my manuscript and werekind enough to make very helpful suggestions, andto provide important items of information. Some haveasked that I not use their names, and so I will sorrow-fully omit them all . But to these people I am more andever grateful .

And whatever would I have done without the aid Ireceived from the staffs of the senators who suppliedme with all kinds of help . Without their know-how ofresearch, I'd still be looking! To their kindnesses Irespectfully bow my head in thanks .

I must not forget the many workers in the Libraryof Congress who dug out a lot of documentation. Theydeserve a great deal of thanks because I didn't alwaysknow exactly what I was looking for which made extrawork for them. It is their work and dedication to re-

This Is What You Call Acknowledgments xisearch that makes the Library of Congress the mostwonderful library in the world .

And last, but most important, are the publishers andauthors of the books from which I have gleaned somuch information. The political memoir writers are byfar the greatest contributors to history. Let us havemore and more of them .

For permission to quote, a "million" thanks to thepublishers and authors listed in the bibliography .

INTRODUCTION

THIS book is the result of a woman's curiosity . It is notthe work of a student of history nor even the work ofa student. Neither is it written for students but ratherfor ordinary people like myself who would like to know"who killed Cock Robin?"

All of those closely acquainted with my story whohave so generously given their time to read my manu-script have said : "But you left this out" or "you leftthat out." I have had to resist almost all of them, andto discipline myself as well . The temptation to prove mystory over and over again, as well as to include startlingfacts on related matters, was hard to overcome. Any-one who wishes to make a thorough study may pickup the threads, and go on from there, but this is a storywhich ought to be told without too many detailed de-tours .

I came to live in Washington in 1942 . I had comefrom New York City where indignant Republicanswere voicing wild and irresponsible charges against theNew Deal. I considered their accusations so wild thatI deserted the Republican ranks and campaigned forthe Democrats. Had not President Roosevelt spokenabout the "lunatic fringe"? But the day was to comewhen I would realize that many of these "wild charges"made by the "lunatic fringe" were indeed understate-ments .

All during the War I tried to figure out what wasgoing on in our. government. I read the WashingtonTimes-Herald published by that late, lamented femaledynamite, Cissy Patterson . She wrote her editorialswith a battle axe for a pen, and, like Simon Legree,whipped her reporters into a white heat of righteous in-dignation . What I read in the Times-Herald I thoughtwas exaggerated . Nothing could be as bad as that!

xui

xiv

IntroductionAnd then I read the Washington Post with its calm

and persuasive editorials. The paper assumed a "con-servative" tone, and its reporting seemed, on the sur-face at least, factual. Still I felt there was somethingwrong there too .

I was equally confused by the various radio com-mentators . For instance, should I believe Fulton Lewis,Jr. who sounded mad all the time, or should I followthe honeyed words of Raymond Gram Swing?

But one thing I never could reconcile . Why did theUnited States have to be SO friendly to Soviet Russia?"Why do we have to kiss them on the mouth?", I usedto ask. It seemed to me that, since circumstances hadforced us to accept such an ally, we naturally wouldtreat that murderous nation with cold reality .

I recall that it was the "sound" editorials of theWashington Post which convinced me that the ChineseCommunists were not like Russian Communists . Theywere an entirely different breed of cat, I thought, of amild stripe and entirely harmless. In that case, whybother to help the "corrupt" Chiang? I so expressedmyself whenever the issue came up in social gatherings .

In those days I was not aware that many facts wereavailable to anyone who would take the trouble to dis-cover them. I did not know how valuable the Con-gressional Record was (how dull it looked!), nor thatthe printed hearings of the Dies Committee couldeasily be obtained. It never occurred to me to go tothe public hearings and listen for myself .

But always there was that uneasy feeling that some-thing was wrong . And as the years went by my curi-osity became stronger and eventually prodded me intodoing a little digging. The more I learned the morefrightened I became . How many other people inAmerica were still as confused as I had been? In 1956there are too few who have been awakened to theformidable danger confronting our nation .

In 1949 I married Constantine Brown who writesa syndicated column about national and foreign af-fairs-subjects most women in the past, especially be-

Introduction

xv

fore so many had lost their men in the fury of modernwars, had found of little concern.

One day he told me an interesting story about themysterious "They." The first time he heard about"They" was in 1939 on the eve of World War II, whena Frenchman recently arrived in this country paid hima visit. The Frenchman explained that he had decidedto become an American citizen, and had brought withhim his family and his fortune. They had bid adieuto France for all time . The reason, he said, was thathe had discovered that a great war was to be launchedin Europe, and that "They" would maneuver Franceinto losing it. His conversation was so well seasonedwith references to "They" that my husband askedhim who "They" were. The Frenchman replied that hedid not know-he only felt sure of their existence .Constantine Brown was convinced the "bonhomme"was slightly off his rocker and dropped the incidentinto his mental wastebasket. But only a few years later,the inexorable logic of events bearing out the French-man's prediction caused him to recall the strange inter-view with ever increasing wonder .

As great national emergencies succeeded each otherwith bewildering regularity, the Frenchman's mysteri-ous "They" seemed to appear more and more fre-quently in the vocabulary of the bewildered public .In 1954, Senator William E . Jenner, Indiana Republi-can and chairman of the Senate Internal Security Sub-committee, held a series of hearings concerning theKorean War. The real enemy, the Senator felt, was notthe Red soldiers confronting our boys, but men hiddenmany thousands of miles behind the combat lines-in Washington, Moscow, London, Paris, and NewDelhi .

" . . . victory in Korea was denied" us "by an un-identified 'they,"' Senator Jenner said . In his remarksto General James A . Van Fleet, appearing as a witness,he continued, " . . . some of our questions today willcover these border-line areas of policy in the hope thatyour answers may serve to pinpoint areas of decision

InterlockingSubversionin Govt.Depts.

Part 242019-20

xvi

Introductionwhere the mystery of `why' may lead to further identi-fication of the mysterious `they' . . ."

General Mark Clark, also a witness before the Sub-committee, wrote a book called "From the Danube tothe Yalu" in which he expressed a fearful suspicion,

Pt. 21

setting a precedent for American generals :1654

Wash. Even-ing Star A8

"The nagging fear was that perhaps Communists hadwormed their way so deeply into our Government on boththe working and planning levels that they were able toexercise an inordinate degree of power in shaping the courseof America in the dangerous post-war era .

"I could not help wondering and worrying whether we werefaced with open enemies across the conference table andhidden enemies who sat with us in our most secret councils ."

The initial inspiration to write this book, however,came from a different quarter and at an earlier date . Ihad decided to look up some of my husband's columnsof the past ten years, and went to the Library of Con-gress to search through his writings of 1945 . Within anhour I found two startling examples of reporting . OnJanuary 30, 1945, a week before the Yalta Conference,he revealed part of the most carefully guarded secretof the entire war . He published in his column the mostimportant points of the Yalta agreement concerningChina and Japan which were known at the time toonly a few and kept apart from the full agreement .This contract, signed at Yalta by Roosevelt, Stalin andChurchill, was deposited in Admiral Leahy's privatesafe in the White House and was not made public untila year later, February I1, 1946. it was published ayear to the day upon which it was signed .

Here is what my husband wrote :

" . . . the Soviet leader will require a certain price for inter-vention against the Japanese . Russia is likely to require therestoration of her power in the East to the position it heldbefore the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and possibly alittle more . . . it is believed that Premier Stalin will re-quire that Manchuria . . . be taken from Japanese tutelage

Introduction

xviiand made into an independent republic with a government,friendly to the U .S .S.R .

"The same request is expected to be made in regard toKorea, with Port Arthur . . . restored to Russian control."

Although Korea was not a part of the Yalta agree-ment, its northern half did become a "governmentfriendly to the U.S.S.R." But the manner in which thiscame about provides proof of the existence of "They"-men without faces or names .

Shortly after VJ-day a round-robin telephone con-versation took place between the War Department andthe White n--Housee n of the ci ants in this un-usual "conference" told me that those in the en agondid not know to whom they were talking in the WhiteHouse-,and, that it was the White House parties whoordered the n rt~-on oL_Korea at the now ii amous38th parallel .__

After a study of the map of China it is easy torealize that, without Russian control of the areas de-manded and obtained in the Yalta agreement, Chinawould not have been lost to the Reds . And withoutRed control of China and the Dartitkin-of Korea, theKorean War would neverhave harm.Led

The second column I came across appeared Feb . x x,1945, and disclosed that the Japanese had been of-fering unconditional surrender since "about 3 monthsago." That is, since November 1944 . It also containedwhat was to be the history of the Pacific as it happenedfrom that day onward . This is what he wrote :

"The Tokyo government may be forced into surrendersooner than most optimistic observers believed possible. . . This unexpected turn is not due so much to the ex-haustion of Japan's ability to continue to fight as to thedesire of a large and heretofore unheard group of Japanesewho want to save something out of the wreck. This groupbelieves the . . . overthrow of the clique which has de-veloped the idea of Greater East Asia under the dominationof Japan, might be accepted as unconditional surrender inthe United States.

Wash. Eve .Star C t

xviii

Introduction" . . . the Japanese believe the American people would

not be opposed to the maintenance of the dynasty . TheEmperor of Japan would form a government, choosing ashis advisers those remaining liberals who have not beenpurged but have gone underground since the outbreak ofthe war. Such a government would agree to a withdrawalfrom the ill gained possessions in China and the SouthPacific, agree to whatever military terms might be exactedby the United States and throw Japan at the mercy of thiscountry.

"Little has been revealed about the devious approachesof some of the Japanese `liberals' who have suggested thatAmerica's own future defense in the Far East will have todepend on a friendly Japan in the same way Russia'ssecurity and power in Europe depends on `friendly' bordergovernments in Poland, the Balkans and, in all likelihood,Germany. In plain English, some of the Japanese `liberals'who did their utmost to avoid war with America suggest thatJapan become a `puppet' of the United States. And theyargue that in self-defense America should accept this sug-gestion, particularly if it is clothed in humility .

"The form of this humility would be the acceptance ofall the unconditional surrender demands with the tacitunderstanding that they will be no harsher than thoseimposed on Italy . . . The possibility that Russia soon mayenter the Far Eastern arena with a strong force fromSiberia has hastened the efforts of the `negotiators' . . .The reported approaches started about three months agowhen the Japanese gained the definite impression that assoon as the Germans were defeated the Russians would turntheir forces to the Far East . . . The Japanese became fear-ful of Russia's intervention when their agents in Siberiabegan to report a significant concentration of Russiantroops, planes and war materials at strategic points northof Manchukuo. They were equally suspicious of Russia'sintentions when a little publicized Free Korean govern-ment was organized in Siberia .

"In a nutshell, the individuals who say they are speakingwith the consent of Emperor Hirohito assert that Russia'sintervention in the Far Eastern war will result in theestablishment of a Free Korea and Manchuria and thesetting up of a `friendly' government dominated by theCommunists in Northwestern China. They point out that

Introduction

xixthe Free Korean and Manchurian governments will beequally dominated by individuals who have been coachedrecently in Moscow and will direct their activities toward afull political co-operation with the U .S.S.R. They admit thatunder such circumstances Japan will perish . . . This willbe still easier, if Russia, after the collapse of Japan, is suc-cessful in forming `friendly' governments in Korea, Man-churia and northwestern Chinese provinces .

"Does America want to see totalitarian governments inAsia as well as Europe? . . . They admit that Japan canbe crushed forever . But, they ask, how will the Americanpeople who must think in long range political terms benefitby the total destruction of the Japanese Empire . . . TheChinese will certainly accept the outstretched hand of theUnited States. But will America have a free hand to helpChina in the manner she desires if Chiang Kai-shek is com-pelled to knuckle down to his Communist opponents andthey have a free reign throughout that vast country? . . .

`But these intermediaries, whose names and nationalityare only known to a very few, are willing to interpret ourown position in the world today and draw the conclusionthat it would be to the advantage of the United States toaccept a `negotiated unconditional surrender' from Japan,possibly before Russia became a co-belligerent . . . Weare being told that Japan is quite prepared to hand over allthese war criminals regardless of rank or position . . . .Japan, we are also told, is willing to accept the strictestAmerican control over her armaments and industries. Sheproceeds on the theory that world politics is elastic and thatthe time may come in the distant future when the UnitedStates might be glad to have a potentially strong Japan inthe Far East .

"Russia they say unquestionably will be the dominatingpower in Europe. In the Middle East the British prestigeand power are on the wane . The Moslem world, from Af-ghanistan to Arabia and Egypt and possibly even as far asMorocco on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean, now believethat the long pan-Islamic dream may come true, thanks tothe support they expect to obtain from Russia .

"In the Far East, the influence of Generalissimo ChiangKai-shek hangs on a thin thread. The representatives ofsome 6o,ooo,ooo Chinese Communists schooled in Moscoware now attempting to impose themselves on the Chungliing

xx

Introductiongovernment, and the American officials themselves are urgingChiang to reach a compromise . The Generalissimo knows aswell as any one else that a compromise with the Com-munists, even if they have no direct ties with Russia, willmean his eventual disappearance from China's political life .Any compromise with the Moscow-trained Communistsmust end in their dominating the political scene . Hence theUnited States which is now gently pressing the General-issimo to cooperate with the Chinese Communists, mustknow that sooner or later it is this group which will takeover the government of China ."

I found a war calendar and looked at the war'sevents in the Pacific from November 1944 on, the timewhen the Japanese desired to surrender . It reads likethis

From our library shelves I began to search throughthe books whose pages I had never turned before . Themore I read the more curious I became . In all of themI found a sentence here and a paragraph there, which,placed in sequence, told a remarkable story. In themany memoirs written about World War II there wererecounted a surprising number of tragic blunders causedby what the authors usually explained as "errors injudgment" or "bad intelligence ." Perhaps because Iam not a military or political strategist I ask ques-tions no such specialist would ask . I wanted to knowwhy there were so many "errors in judgment," andwho made them. And the inevitable next question was,"Who had benefited from our blunders? The incontro-vertible and shocking answer was Soviet Russia .

Nov. 24, 1944 First B-29 raids on TokyoJan . 9, 1945 Americans land on LuzonFeb. 19, 1945 Marines land on Iwo JimaApril 1, 1945 Americans land on OkinawaJune 21, 1945 Okinawa takenAug . 6, 1945 Atomic bomb dropped on HiroshimaAug . 8, 1945 Russia declares war on JapanAug . 9, 1945 Atomic bomb dropped on NagasakiAug. 1 O, 1945 Japan sues for peace

Introduction

xxiI determined to discover what influences in high

places had perhaps "inspired" the decisions made byour leaders, and also to check our policies with thoseof the Communists as set forth in their publications .The similarity of these policies and the Communistaims was startling.

I had already become acquainted, to a degree, withthe Communist conspiracy in America by closely fol-lowing the hearings of the Congressional investigationsand avidly reading the published transcripts-far morefrightening than the "who-dunnits" that had "lulled"me to sleep in the past. So it was that I learned howSoviet Russia had placed her agents in high places inour government-agents who not only stole top secrets,but, most important of all, influenced the policy makersof this nation. Agents in key government posts, Ilearned, also worked hand in hand with agents whosejob it was to influence and condition the public mindin order that public opinion would accept the policiesas they were made .

With this knowledge at hand, I quickly began to seewhy the war with Japan was unprecedented in allhistory. Herea was an enemy who had been trying tosurrender for almost a year before tie conflict ended .And in June of1945, when the experts on Japan in theState Department proposed a way in which the warcould be brou h end it was considered by Gen-era George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, as "pre-mature I`Tn tfie course of my research and talks with men whowere no longer "under wraps," I found that all finaland absolute decisions of the war were taken by thePresident and "the Army." Who "the Army" was, Idiscovered by a process of elimination and a closestudy of the war . The Joint Chiefs of Staff consistedof Admiral Ernest J . King, Chief of Naval Operations ;General U. H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Force ;General George C . Marshall, Army Chief of Staff ; andAdmiral William D. Leahy, President Roosevelt's andlater President Truman's Chief of Staff who presided

xxii

Introductionover the meetings . Although the recommendations ofthe joint Chiefs were always unanimous, ,more oftenthan not the two admirals disagreedwith neral

Arnold sot Marshall inprivate. And General Arnold, according ohis memoirs, also quite often did not go along withGeneral Marshall's views . Secretary of War HenryStimson was so seldom consulted that he, too, must beeliminated. Finally I discovered a passage in GeneralArnold's book, "Global Mission" which summed upthe picture. He wrote-"Usually, he (Marshall) wasspokesman at our conferences ." Arnold referred toAdmiral Leahy as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,but to Marshall as the spokesman . I therefore cameto the inescapable conclusion that, when I read that"the Army" or "the joint Chiefs" had decided uponsuch-and-such strategy, the decision was invariably

Lthat of General Marshall .The next question was, "Who were the advisers of

President Roosevelt, President Truman and GeneralMarshall?" We shall come to that answer as we goalong in our story.

Chapter 1

EARLY BATTLES OF THE PACIFIC ;FIRST PEACE FEELERS

U.S. Navy wins initiative from Japan 6 months afterPearl Harbor .

U.S. Air Force wins superiority over Japanese in 1943 .Loss of Saipan is loss of war for Japanese ."Peace Party" comes to life and maneuvers the fall of

Tojo cabinet .Peace feelers are sent to China .Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 1944, dooms Japan .Chiang shows peace offers to General Wedemeyer.

THE Pacific war, from Pearl Harbor to Vi-day, wasdramatic in its swiftness of action. The recovery ofour forces from the disaster of Pearl Harbor, and thespeed with which the defensive was transferred intothe offensive, has no precedent .

But even more remarkable was the fact that thisquick succession of victories was won with an acuteshortage of men and supplies . The Pacific war wasWashington's step-child . No sooner had it begun thanhigh officials established the policy that the defeat ofHitler, who had not attacked the United States, hadfirst priority. The commanders in the Pacific wouldhave to get along on what was left over from men andmaterials to be sent to Russia and England . Four-stargeneral, George C . Kenney, commander of the Alliedair forces in the Southwest Pacific, labeled it "theshoestring war ." General MacArthur, one of the firston record to use the word "They," was quoted in areport as saying, " `they' were guilty of `treason andsabotage' in not adequately supporting the Pacific . . ."

Admiral Leahy, employing his usual restrained lan-guage, wrote in his book, "I Was There" :

31

Forrestal x8

2

The Enemy at His BackLeahy io8

"The Navy generally and the Army in the Far East underDouglas MacArthur would have preferred to employ suf-ficient forces in the Pacific to move more aggressively againstJapan, but they loyally adhered to the general strategyprescribed by President Roosevelt ."

By the Admiral's precise statement, "the Army inthe Far East under Douglas MacArthur," I assumedthat the Army Chief of Staff in Washington, George C .Marshall, must have concurred with President Roose-velt against the advice of the naval officers. AdmiralLeahy confirmed this to me .

It was also known that Harry Hopkins "sometimesLea and had the last word in military matters," whjch leads usHenschel 1148 to believe t

u .. r hall and Ho kins were the _..taromen on whom the President relied most for militaryadv cc

It was not until MacArthur arrived in Australia afterhis dramatic escape from Bataan in early March 1942,that he was informed he was "low man on the totempole" as far as priorities were concerned. Lea andHenschel in their book, "Douglas MacArthur" quote

Lea and

the General as saying "It was the greatest shock andHenschel 116o surprise of the whole damn war." MacArthur had been

promised help from Washington and expected to findvast American forces assembled for the relief of thePhilippines, but instead found that Australia itselfwas about to become "another Bataan ."

MacArthur's shock came from the fact that he hadreceived numerous messages on Bataan that help of allkinds was being sent to him. A fact he did not knowwas reported by General John R. Deane in "StrangeAlliance." General Deane wrote that President Roose-velt sent a letter to all United States war agencies,dated March 7, 1942, stating that he wished all ma-terial promised to the Soviet Union to be shipped "at

Deane 89 the earliest possible date regardless of the effect ofthese shipments on any other part of the war program ."Strange to say, the American officials in Moscow atthat early period were having a hard time forcing our

Battles of the Pacific ; First Peace Feelers

3help down the Soviet comrades' throats . The Russianswere insulting, evasive, and hard-to-give-to . General Deane 97Deane in the same book candidly expressed his feelingabout this outrageous situation. "When it was 'Kick-Americans-in-the-pants' week," he wrote, "even the(Russian) charwomen would be sour ."

By Washington's decision to give aid to Russia first,General MacArthur was given only 20 percent of themen and supplies which were sent to Europe . This,together with the fact that our Naval commanders inthe Pacific had to wage war with a seriously damagedfleet makes it almost a miracle that victories came soquickly in the early stages .

Yet on May 8, 1942, exactly five months and oneday after the debacle of Pearl Harbor, the UnitedStates Navy won its first victory at the Battle of CoralSea. This was made possible by the heroic delayingaction of our soldiers on Bataan. Admiral King writes King 379in his book, "Fleet Admiral King" that this battle"marked the first reverse and serious loss which theJapanese had had in carrying out their plan for war inthe Pacific ."

Six months after Pearl Harbor, June 7, 1942, theBattle of Midway was the second score for the U .S .Navy. The importance of this battle to both theUnited States and the Japanese was expressed byAdmiral King when he wrote that it "was the first de- Kingcisive defeat suffered by the Japanese Navy in 350years" and that it "restored the balance of naval powerin the Pacific."

Incredibly, the Japanese war plans left no marginfor error. Their initial strike was to be sudden, and USSBS-victory was to be won in March 1943, one year and Pacific Naval

Analysis Div.four months from Pearl Harbor . They had arranged The Cam-their schedule down to the last man, the last mile and Paigns ofthe last minute . Since there was to be no setback or 4e Pacific

error, no provision was made for such an event .Flushed with early victories, their greed was un-bounded and they gobbled up miles of the Pacific likea hungry monster-far beyond their intended goals .

The JapaneseStory of theBattle ofMidway .U.S. office ofNaval Intel-ligenceOPNAV P32-1002, 5

4

The Enemy at His BackOnce they met in serious battle with the Americanfleet, the Japanese fell apart like a house of cards .Here is a translated excerpt from a captured Japanesereport written by the Commander-in-Chief of the FirstAir Fleet, Admiral Nagumo. It is contained in "TheJapanese Story of the Battle of Midway," published bythe U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence . You will see thatthe Japanese Navy was having real trouble as early asMay and June 1942 .

"Although the flight training program (in preparation forthe battle) was conducted without any major incident . . .practically no one got beyond the point of basic training .Inexperienced fliers barely got to the point where theycould make daytime landings on carriers . It was found thateven some of the more seasoned fliers had lost some oftheir skill. No opportunity was available to carry out jointtraining, which, of course made impossible any coordinatedaction between contact units, illumination units, and attackunits. The likelihood of obtaining any satisfactory resultsfrom night attacks, therefore, was practically nil . . . Therecords during these tests (mock torpedo attacks) wereso disappointing that some were moved to comment that itwas almost a mystery how men with such poor abilitycould have obtained such brilliant results as they had inthe Coral Sea ."

From this time on, the Japanese took a poundingfrom the Americans far beyond their worst fears . InAugust 1942, only eight months after Pearl Harbor,American Marines and the Navy began their first bigamphibious operations on Guadalcanal . Three monthslater, on the 14th of November, the Battle of Guadal-canal was won. But even this important victory had adifficult time in getting its start, hitting a snag in thePentagon. The preceding February, Admiral Kingwrote to General Marshall informing him of his planfor taking "stepping stone" islands preliminary to theproposed landing on Guadalcanal, and asking for hisapproval of the use of Army troops in the operation .In reply, General Marshall wrote :


5"In general, it would seem to appear that our effort in Guadalcanal

the Southwest Pacific must for several reasons be limited to 4the strategic defensive for air and ground troops ."

Here we see that Marshall was strictly adhering tothe policy of "defensive" warfare in the Pacific. ButAdmiral King, a tough "salt," immediately challengedMarshall's letter and wrote back that defense was notenough-that we should set up strong points in prep-aration for an offensive .

The Admiral won his first crucial skirmish in Wash-ington. He got his troops . And by February 1943 theAmericans were securely established in Guadalcanaland the Buna area . " . . . it gained for the UnitedStates a strategic initiative which was never relin-quished ."

Postwar accounts reveal that the prospects for acomparatively quick defeat of Japan became ob-vious to informed officials both in the United Statesand in Japan at a surprisingly early date. AdmiralKing in 1942 noted that President Roosevelt himselfwas aware of the possibility of early victory .

Mentioned in a footnote of his book is the following :

GuadalcanalMarines 165

"The President's observation-'defeat of Germany means King 400the defeat of Japan, probably without firing a shot or losinga life'-indicated in a simplified form his understandingthat by the application of sea power, Japan could be forcedto surrender without an invasion of her home islands."(Emphasis is their's .)

It is interesting that the author of the footnoteemphasized the phrase "without an invasion of" herhome islands. This was to be another of the issues onwhich "the Army" and the Naval officers were todisagree .

One of the most revealing books written from theJapanese view is that of Toshikasu Kase, a formermember of the Japanese Foreign Office, at one time amember of their embassy staff in Washington, andlater Ambassador awaiting admission of Japan to the

Kase 183

6

The Enemy at His BackUnited Nations . In "Journey to the Missouri," Mr .Kase penned an astonishing paragraph. He and theBritish Ambassador to Tokyo were good friends and,after the war had started, the Japanese diplomatsecretly visited the interned Sir Robert Craigi onseveral occasions . Mr. Kase wrote that in July 1942-

". . . On my last visit to the British embassy, however, Iwas entrusted by Foreign Minister Togo with a highlyconfidential message . I was instructed to give Sir Roberta discreet hint regarding the eventual restoration of peace .After a friendly chat I introduced the subject with all thetact at my command and said, `Should it happen thatthe British Government became desirous of discussing ornegotiating peace they would find the Japanese Governmentready to be helpful . . .'

o

"I desire to state the fact that even as early as the summerfd we few in the Foreign Office were endeavoringo

lay foundations for future negotiations with England ."

The outlook for Japan indeed was extremely serious,although at that time Japan expected it would bepossible to negotiate for less stringent terms thanwere later accepted . The year 1943 brought a star-studded row of victories for the United States :

Although the Japanese people were being told of"great • victories," Japanese brass was thoroughlyalarmed. The Japanese strategists saw by 1943 thatthe odds were growing hopelessly long. The UnitedStates Strategic Bombing Survey stated in its post-war Report that

March 1-3, 11943 Battle of Bismarck SeaJune 30, 1943 Americans land on Rendova (Solomon

Islands)Aug . 15, 11943 Allies land at Kiska and find Japanese

departedSep . , 6, 11943 Americans take Lae in New GuineaNov. I, 1943 Marines land at BougainvilleNov. 21, 1943 Americans land on Tarawa and Makin

in the Gilbert Islands

Battles of the Pacific; First Peace Feelers

7"Beginning in the early part of 1944 the Allies possessed

an ever increasing numerical superiority in all types ofweapons . . .

. . . While the Allied air sorties were numbered in thethousands those of the Japanese were numbered in tens, andwhile the Allies roamed the sea areas off the coast of NewGuinea with large forces of carriers, cruisers, destroyersand merchant ships the Japanese had none ."

The loss of Saipan in early July was the first com-pletely decisive blow the Japanese received . As Am-bassador Kase said : "Yet no matter what the costto us we could not afford to lose this highly strategicisland. Once in the enemy's hands it would disrupt ouroverseas communications to the occupied regions inthe south ."

Moreover, the island was only 1,350 miles fromTokyo, making an excellent base from which Americanbombers could batter the Japanese home islands .

There were a number of Japanese statesmen whohad made every effort to prevent war between Japanand the United States . In this they had the aid ofEmperor Hirohito. For their efforts most of them weresent into retirement . But as the war news grew blackerwith each passing day, these outcasts, who becameknown as the "peace party," began to consult secretlyon ways and means of ousting Tojo. This was the firstnecessary step toward bringing the war to an end . Theyhad sympathetic confederates in the Navy and in theEmperor himself . The Army, with Tojo at its head,was considered "the war party," and as disaster fol-

USSBS Cam-paigns of thePacific War186

Kase 73

State Dept ."War andPeace" 1931-1941

The year 1944 brought more of the same .

Jan . 3', 1944 Americans land in the Marshall IslandsApril 22, 1944 Americans land at Hollandia in Dutch

New GuineaMay 17, 1944 Myitkyina airstrip capturedJune 15, 1944 Americans land on .Saipan in the Mariana

Islands

8

The Enemy at His Backlowed disaster, the relationship between the two serv-ices became increasingly hostile .

While the battle of Saipan was still in progress, evensome of the Japanese cabinet realized that their nationhad lost and were eager to join the "peace party ."

Kase 73 Mr . Kase writes that on June 26th, 1944, Baron Kido,a close adviser to the Emperor and Lord Keeper of thePrivy Seal, "sent for Foreign Minister Shigemitsu andasked him if he would work out some plan looking.toward an eventual diplomatic settlement of the war ."

These two statesmen, Shigemitsu and Kido, pledgedthemselves at this meeting to work toward the resto-ration of peace. On June 29, 1944, another secret andimportant meeting took place . Present were Mr . Kase,Prince Takamatsu, the younger brother of the Emperor,and Shigemitsu . Mr. Kase reports that the Princestated emphatically that when Saipan fell, as he was

Kase 77 sure it would, "the war was as good as lost ." "Conse-quently," he told Shigemitsu that he "felt it highlyadvisable to seek the termination of hostilities withoutdelay, provided in the process the imperial house wasleft intact ."

Here we find the first mention of what was to becomethe main issue of the war with Japan. The Prince madeonly one stipulation for surrender, and that was theretention of "the imperial house ." Without assurancefrom the United States that the Emperor would beallowed to remain on the throne, the Japanese wouldfight to the end. This assurance we never gave .Mr. Kase goes on with the story :

Kase 78 "Politically the fall of Saipan opened an avenue for peace,however dim and distant, for it facilitated the ousting ofTojo from the premiership ; as the author of the war hewould never have consented to abandon the struggle ."

The Tojo cabinet fell on July 8th and Koiso becamepremier in his stead, a direct result of the loss ofSaipan. Shortly thereafter President Roosevelt, ac-companied by his dog Fala, took his historic trip to the


9Pacific (in July 1944) where he met with GeneralMacArthur and Admiral Nimitz . Nimitz and Mac-Arthur briefed the President on the untenable situationthe Japanese found themselves in, and convinced himthat Japan could be forced to surrender without aninvasion of her home islands . Lea and Henschel wrotethat MacArthur "pointed out proudly that in two yearsof fighting in his area, fewer Americans had beenkilled than in the single battle of Anzio . He insistedthe Philippines were the key to the stolen conqueredJapanese empire . . . Once defeated (there) they wouldsoon be forced to surrender without the necessity ofan invasion by land forces ; air and naval power alonewould bring her to her knees ." Admiral Leahy, alwaysat the President's side at such briefings, told this writerthat at this Pacific meeting there was never any con-sideration given to an invasion of the Tokyo plainduring the conversations . Yet an invasion was insistedupon by General Marshall at the Quebec Conferencetwo months later .

In the fall of 1944, the Emperor took a desperatestep that underscored Japan's increasing certainty ofdisaster. He attempted to make peace with Japan'soldest enemy of the war, China .

Postwar disclosures reveal that he sent TadamaroMiyakawa, brother of Prince Konoye, to Shanghai inthe fall of 1944 to inform Ho Shih-chen, chief of theChungking government's intelligence service in Shang-hai, that the Emperor desired the speedy terminationof hostilities and would dismiss the Tojo cabinet with aview to naming a new cabinet charged with obtaininga negotiated peace .

The Chungking government did not at first take thepeace offers seriously . But when the Tojo cabinet sud-denly fell, the Chinese officials sprang into action . Theyimmediately convened a meeting of the Military Coun-cil which came to the unanimous decision that theremust first be an understanding with Great Britain andthe United States .

Prince Miyakawa made several trips between Tokyo

Lea andHenschel170-1

MacA 3-2432-3

ro


and Chungking and, and his last trip in March of 1945,his arguments to the Chinese were that the UnitedStates was offering Soviet Russia a part of Manchuriain return for Russian entry into the war a ainstJ pang that in order to prevent such an occurrence, theEmperor wished to offer an unconditional surrenderto China, the United States and Great Britain. It isstrange that the Japanese themsegot wind of theterms of the Yalta agreement when it was acarefullykept secret rom even American officials. But whatPrince Miya awa told fhe ChineseinMarch 1945 waspart of the Yalta agreement which had not been com-municated by us to the Chinese Government, allegedlyfor fear of a leak to Japan!

The transmission of these highly secret messagescame to the notice of an underground Chinese Com-munist in the Chungking intelligence service . ThisCommunist immediately leaked the information tothe chief of the Japanese forces in China who at-tempted to arrest Prince Miyakawa and his group .Fortunately they escaped and returned to Japan. Thisstory is stashed away in the dusty files of the Pentagon .It was reported by American officers at the time .

However, no fast footwork on the part of the hiddenChinese Communists could prevent the peace offersfrom reaching Chiang Kai-shek who in turn relayedthem to General Albert C . Wedemeyer, stationed inChina at that time. General Wedemeyer related hisexperience when he appeared before the so-called Mac-Arthur hearings in 1951 . He told the committee thatGeneralissimo Chiang Kai-shek showed him two notes,one in "the winter of 1944-45 . . . and then about Juneor May, maybe a few months later, I saw a note ."The General also said that "the terms of the surrenderwere very favorable to the Chinese Nationalist Govern-ment ; and the Generalissimo stated to me that he wasgoing to fight alongside his traditional friends, theAmericans, to the end ."

I inquired of General Wedemeyer about this testi-mony and asked him if he had sent reports to this

Battles o f the Pacific ; First Peace Feelers i 1effect to Washington, and to whom . He replied thatall of his reports were sent to the OPD (OperationsPlans Division, sometimes called War Plans Division)in the Pentagon . He said if his reports concernedpolicy, and these did, they were given to Gen . JohnEdwin Hull and Gen . Thomas T. Handy who passedthem on to the chief of staff, General Marshall .

The loss of Saipan in July 1944 gave the "peaceparty" their first strong foothold . With the fall ofthe Tojo cabinet, the "war party" steadily lost power .There was no possible cover-up of the fact that Japan's Kase 98losses had been so severe that she was no longer ableto bring raw materials to the home islands for manu-facture .

There was more and even greater disaster to come .The Battle of Leyte Gulf which followed a few monthsafter Saipan, was Japan's Waterloo, and should haveended the war . In this largest naval battle in history,from October 22 to 27, the Japanese lost almost theirentire fleet . The amazing tally of 21 ship losses for theUnited States as against 68 for the Japanese is asfollows

Japanese Losses3 large carriers3 light carriersr escort carrier4 battleships14 cruisers32 destroyersr i submarinesnonenone

United States Lossesnonei light carrier3 escort carriersnonenone6 destroyers7 submarines3 destroyer escortsi high speed transport

Most of the surviving Japanese fleet units weredamaged beyond effective operations, and those notdamaged, along with the few remaining planes, werewithout fuel. It must be added that, while the AmericanNavy as well as private yards were working aroundthe clock on new naval construction, increasing the

12

The Enemy at His Backfleet every day, the Japanese lacked the necessary rawmaterials to even build replacements for their losses .

Leahy 274 Five days after MacArthur landed four divisions onthe island of Leyte, Admiral Halsey cabled Washing-ton: "It can be announced with assurance that theJapanese Navy has been beaten, routed, and brokenby the United States Fleets ."

Kenney i77 The last desperate Japanese effort to stave off theinevitable through the use of suicide Kamikases, wasdramatic, costly and futile .

It was immediately following the Battle of LeyteGulf that Hirohito and the Japanese peace party madecontact with a group of Siamese who relayed another

Washington

unconditional surrender (with the exception of retain-Evening

ing their Emperor) to Washington, again warningStar CTagainst Russian expansion into Asia . This was themessage "leaked" to Constantine Brown three monthslater.

`-- Japan's navy might be compared to her spinal cord .Without it she was paralyzed-she could not transporther army nor could she supply her isolated garrisonswith food and ammunition and she could not fly herplanes without fuel . Most of her merchant fleet was atthe bottom of the Pacific, and her home islands wereow suffering sharply from lack of food and clothings well as raw materials essential to her war industry .apan was starving to death .But "the Army" in Washington under General

Marshall would not concede her defeat. The war was togo on for almost another year . Why?

Chapter II

HOW COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA AFFECTSOUR FOREIGN POLICY

How Communist propaganda works .Sumner Welles is maneuvered into carrying out Di-

mitrov's edict .Communist policy for China and Japan.Unconditional Surrender is the key .The part played by Roth, Lattimore and Bisson.Mr. Grew gets into trouble .

Russia was determined that the war in the Pacificwould not end until she had gathered all her chickensin the coop. A premature surrender would lose herboth Japanese "loot" and the Red Chinese rooster .Before the Japanese were allowed to throw in thesponge, certain territories of China and Japan had tobe delivered into Soviet hands . In order to get theseterritories three things had to happen : First she mustobtain her "rights" from China at the conferencetable ; second, she had to be a participant in the war ;and third, her troops had to be ready to march intoChina as liberators before the surrender . Sufficientforces had not yet been mobilized on the Chineseborder, nor had they yet received all the supplies fromthe United States .

Russia had a weapon more powerful than military .With Japan at the breaking point, she mobilized cleverpropaganda to boost the fighting morale of the Nip-ponese. Let us see how this was managed .

First we must learn how Russia's propaganda ma-chine words . Making use of the news and informationmedia in America-press, radio, magazines, lectures,and books-as conveyer belts of propaganda has beenone of the most skillfully attained projects of the Com-munist Party. Plainly, of course, the great majority ofAmerican newspapermen, radio commentators, authors

z3

Sherwood643

Daily WorkerJuly 19, 1955sC

MoscowNews Sup-plement Feb .i6, 195520

14

The Enemy at His Backand lecturers, are not Communists . Few are even pro-Communists. But all too often they do the Kremlin'swork by following the policy that "we must be so help-ful and friendly" to Russia that she will "willinglyjoin with us in establishing a sound peace ."

This was the policy which was followed in our "RE-recognition" of the Soviets at the Geneva "summit"conference in July 1955 . And it was on the basis ofsuch thinking that President Eisenhower opened theGeneva Conference with the statement : "It is timethat all curtains, whether of guns, or laws or regu-lations, should begin to come down ." And to provethat the United States would follow "words" with"deeds" we concurred with the Declaration of the Su-preme Soviet of the U .S.S.R. (the Russian "congress")of Feb. 9, 1955 which suggested-

" . . . the establishment of direct contact between parlia-ments, exchange of parliamentary delegations . . ."

and some of our senators and congressmen fell overthemselves in their rush for passports and visas to visitRussia.

(As a footnote, it is interesting that in this sameDeclaration of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S .R ., itwas also advocated that " . . . addresses (be) deliveredin Parliament by delegations from the parliaments ofother countries . . ." Are we now to see the spectacleof Khrushchev, Bulganin and company addressing ajoint session of Congress! )

We continued to get into "the spirit of Geneva"when our State Department relaxed the "Achesonregulations" to refuse passports to Communists andknown fellow travelers ; our scientists were bid to offertheir latest discoveries to the world "including Russia" ;and farmers and students were urged to trail after thePied Piper members of Congress and "tour" theU.S.S.R .

The Communists select their propaganda programwith care and cloak it in acceptable bromides with the

Communist Propaganda Affects Foreign Policy 1 5implication that "this is good for America ." Then,through their agents in strategic places, they "sell"their bromides to the men who put out the information,more often than not, unwitting tools .

For example : It is pretty well understood in thelight of recent history that, when well-intentioned andpatriotic commentators and columnists urged thatChiang Kai-shek cooperate with the Communist Chi-nese, they were helping to lay the ground for the Redconquest of China. Likewise, if these same newscastershad not helped to build up an unprecedented fear ofRussia, our forces in Korea would have won a quickand decisive victory rather than a "substitute ."

Louis F. Budenz' book, "The Techniques of Com-munism," just about covers the water front for thestudent of Communism . The former managing editorof the Daily Worker reveals in simple language theimpact Communist propaganda has made and is mak-ing today on our lives as well as on world history .Budenz says in a few lines what this chapter is about :

" . . . the concealed Communist . . . is following the lineset down in the Red official press, in accordance with hisown readings and the directives he gets from the functionaryin charge of his work . . . Through this one person, placedin a strategic position on a newspaper, the Communist linecan be insinuated into the thinking of thousands of non-Communists .

"So, also, with the concealed Communists or their allies,who have means of working upon the petty political biasorpersonal weaknesses of men in high public office ."

Mr. Budenz offers a word of advice for those whowant to know how to combat Communism when he!says

"They can oppose the `line' in their communities, in Budenz 139local organizations, through letters to the newspapers andtheir representatives in Congress ."

But gf course, the, "line" must first be recognized.;nd identified. Let us see how the apparatus works .

Budenz '37-sTechniquesof Com-munism

i6

The Enemy at His BackThe Communists have an entirely different meaning

for certain words and phrases than the average Ameri-can does. It is an instinctive trait of our people to "helpthe poor ." There is no country in the world where thecitizenry, from the multi-millionaire to the familyearning a mere living, contributes so whole-heartedlyfor charitable purposes. Nowhere in the world, forinstance, is there the equivalent of our CommunityChest. But in Communist language, to "help the poor"is another way of saying "divide the wealth ." To at-tain this they advocate lavish expenditures of the tax-payers' money on state ownership, a huge bureaucracy,and "from cradle to grave" plans . Throughout Ameri-can history there has been a continual and successfuleffort to raise our standard of living . But in exaggeratedform-the aim of the Communists-it would ruineverybody, rich and poor alike . Anyone who proteststhese plans however, is labeled a flint-hearted reaction-ary bent on the exploitation of human misery. Whatbetter way to confuse the public?

In the Communists' vocabulary "peace" is a com-panion to "help the poor ." When the Communistsspeak of peace they mean "friendship," that is to say,kowtowing to the Kremlin. Friendship with Russiamakes it a "must" to leave our doors wide open tothe Red spies and propaganda agents entering ourcountry whose dedicated work is to slip drug-likeslogans into our cup of consciousness . They want usto be doped and helpless when the time comes to over-throw our government.

The recent slogan of "peaceful co-existence" (whichproduced the Geneva Conference) came to prominencein the Daily Worker, in utterances of some gulliblestatesmen, and in a large section of the press . Thosewho warn against belief in Russia's proffered friendshipand peace, are also tabbed "reactionaries" and some-times "super patriots." The accusations do not alwayscome directly from Communists but from those whohave taken the bait and swallowed the hook . Without

Communist Propaganda Affects Foreign Policy 17the bait-takers, the Communists could make no head-way in the United States of America .

There is one other way of influencing public opinionnot mentioned by Louis Budenz . A single Communistin one of our government agencies can work wonderswith men who not think for themselves . In the earlythirties a method- was set up, whereby the public was"conditioned" to accept a policy which was about tbbe launched_ A longtime career diplomat in our StateDepartment, John Hickerson, explains this method Yalta Papersvery clearly .

94On Jan. 8, 1945, Mr. Hickerson wrote a memo-

randum to the Secretary of State with recommenda-tions for the coming Yalta Conference . He specifiedthat, although he did "not like it," he would recom-mend that the United States not argue with the Rus-sians over their demands for the Baltic States, EastPrussia, Bessarabia and the Curzon line in Polandbecause we needed the Soviet's help so desperatelyagainst Japan .

The last paragraph of his memorandum explains howthe propaganda apparatus of our government works :

"If the proposals set forth in the foregoing para- Yalta Papersgraphs should be adopted as the policy of the United 9sStates Government, a program should be undertakenimmediately to prepare public opinion for them. Thiswould involve off-the-record discussions with Congress,with outstanding newspaper editors and writers, colum-nists and radio commentators .":

Naturally, this idea did not originate with JohnHickerson. It was the standard practice then as itcontinues to be today . What he implied was that, sincethe American people took seriously the AtlanticCharter and the Four Freedoms, they might raise aruckus unless they were told in narcotic words that thesell-out of these small countries was really "peaceinsurance."

The Communist "line" of any given moment isdecided at the highest level . Once decided upon, it

18

The Enemy at His Backbecomes law. The official line is published in Moscow .Currently their main vehicle on foreign affairs is theperiodical New Times, and it is published in manylanguages and mailed to non-Red countries . From thisthe local Communist publications pick up the line onforeign affairs . Not only active comrades but anyoneso desiring may subscribe to it . Sometimes local, orurgent decisions are sent out in a form letter viathe "drop box," or may first appear in official Com-munist publications-in the United States, for example,the Daily Worker, Masses and Mainstream, PoliticalAffairs, etc. Underground Communists pick up theline, pass it along in normal conversation with sympa-thizers or receptive dupes, knowing they in turn willpass it on to others . With this system even one hiddenCommunist in a periodical or radio station is oftensufficient to influence the policy of the whole organiza-tion. The Party line becomes a slogan in no timeand non-Communists are pushing it l

A perfect example of this is shown in a group ofitems which I tore from the Daily Worker at randomover a period of a few months . They plainly show howthe comrades exploited the fact that non-Communistswere plugging their slogan of "peaceful co-existence ."And these non-Communists were, of course, uncon-sciously parroting a statement made by Stali ackon April 2,iQc when he told a group of Americaneditors "Peaceful co-existence of capitalism and com-munism is quite possible if there is a mutual desire forcooperation . . ."

Headlines from the Daily Worker, November 1954 toMarch r955

Nov. 3, 1954 Rabbi Silver Urges Courageous Policyof World Coexistence

Nov. 8, 1954 Salisbury Says Coexistence is PossibleNov. 11, 1954 Coexistence Urged by AFL Meat Cud

ters' Leaders

`Nov. 12, 1954 Laborite Cites Malenkov Faith in Long

Co-existence

Communist Propaganda Affects Foreign Policy 19Nov. 12,

Nov. 12, 1954

Nov .

Nov. 24,

Dec . 23,March r,

1954

13, 1954

1954

19541955

UNESCO Executive Board OKs Peace-ful CoexistenceCoexistence Will Be Keynote at SovietAmity Rally TuesdayCoast Missionary, Back fromUrges Co-existence"Co-Existence or No-Existence," Mr .MnvStevenson Urges Co-Existence ~'-

China,

Justice Douglas Asks Co-Existence inAsia

This is the "normal" transmission belt . There areexceptions. When a matter of great importance andurgency arises, a special agent is employed . Forexample, Mr. Budenz describes in his book how, in1932, a man by the name of Sergei Ivanovitch Gussev,who had served as Comintern agent and Stalin'spersonal representative in the United States, "corn- Budenz 162manded the Communists in the United States to takeup four tasks." Two of them were the "defense of theSoviet Union," and the "furtherance of Red conquestof China ." In 1933 the now notorious Gerhart Eisler,"was secretly sent into the United States by Moscow" Budenz 163to make sure these orders were carried out .

The two mentioned tasks have been executed . In1933, the United States recognized Soviet Russia, andChina fell to the Communists in 1949 •

Just as Hitler made known his aims in "Mein Kampf,"Russia likewise has never kept secret her plans andmethods for the domination of the world. Anyonewishing to become a student of Communism has notrouble in making himself acquainted with Moscow'smanifestoes . The Russian plans for the conquest ofChina were again set forth in 1936 and, for the purposeof this story, they are of utmost importance becausethey played a key role in our war against Japan .

In that year, Georgi Dimitrov, a Bulgarian Com-muni who was General Secretary of the Comintern(the international organization of the CommunistParty), spoke at the 15th Anniversary of the Com-

China: TheMarch To-ward Unity,

' address "The15th Anni-versary ofthe Com-t iunist Partyof-China" by1Geoi mm-xtrOh83-87

)3udenz r6o

20

The Enemy at His Backmunist Party of China, laying down the "line" to thefollowers . Three small excerpts tell a big story :

" . as a real Bolshevik_.Party, the Communist Party ofChina realizes that however great the successes it hasachieved, they are only the first serious steps on the roadto the liberation of the Chinese people . . .

"The Party . . . is faced with tThe task of carrying on asystematic struggle to establish a united national frontwith the Kuomintang." (This is the government of ChiangKai-shek.) (Emphasis mine .)

And-

"It is necessary that energetic measures be taken to exertpressure on public opinion and the government . rst aforemost in England, France and the U.S.A.. . .T .et thecelebration of the Fifteenth Anniversary of the CommunistParty of China become a real impulse for mobilizing theforces o f the whole o f the international proletariat to renderhelp to the Chinese people." (Emphasis mine .)

There is, of course, a "translation" to these excerpts-from Dimitrov's speech . He first pronounced theaim of "liberating" ALL China-and it is not necessaryto be a student of Communism to understand what aRed means by "li erat." The tragic drama of Russian"liberation" of Polan , Rumania, Czechoslovakia, andothers, is a living example of the Red interpretation .The more recent threats to "liberate" Formosa,,Quemoy and the Matsus, is understood by all .

The second statement has more meaning than atfirst meets the eye. Only the year before, at theSeventh World Congress of the Communist Inter-national, Dimitrov had specifically defined the " nitedo . " as "a `Trojan horse'

i " In advocating a'united national rout' with Chiang Kai-shek's govern-ment, Dimitrov was giving a direct order to infiltrateand eventually take over control .

The third plainly says in effect, "It is necessary toinfluence the government and thinking of the peoplest_

Communist Propaganda Affects Foreign Policy 21

o France,England and the United States so thatwe Reds will have their cooperation in all ourplans .

In i o Earl Browder, former head of the Com-munist Party of t e rotea es, es e• •e ore theso-called Tydings committee and explained just how

imitrov s eman s were carried out. The languagehe used was extraordinarily frank .

" . . . the term `transmission belts" . . . simply means the Tydings x-utilizattiion_of every agency reaching the minds of the 6 7 2masses.77_'_'I-used information which I received from Mao Tze- z-68ztung, the head of the Communist Party in China-of China-to inform the President of the United States about themilitary situation inside of China . . .

"It was our purpose to stir up all sorts of political ex- 682pressions of opinion in support of the Communists in Chinand

supportfunityin Z;hina: to influence the Government

in every possible way. (Emphasis mine.)' "We based our efforts to influence the Government, in 2-683terms of changing the attitude of the policymakers."

Seven years after Dimitrov's speech, in 1942 whenwe had been a part of the great war for nearly a year,Earl Browder was able to bring about the first andmost important step toward the Russian goal in China .It is a remarkable story. Both Earl Browder andLouis Budenz in separate testimony, told of theextraordinary manner in which the United States cameto change its long and historical policy in the FarEast .

In October of ~1 2,Browder delivered a messagetothe Young Communist League, which Budenzpublished in the Daily Worker . The message was pre-pared by arrangement with Lauchlin Curries personaladviser to President Roosevelt on Far Eastern affairs,and was designed, amon other thin s "for the ur ose

smoking out t e anti-Soviet elements in the Stateepar men is speech and its publication was

t& ' -first step in this plan concocted by Browder andBudenz. Immediately after, Brow

ceived an in-

22

a vitation from Undersecretary of State Sumner Wellesand Lauchlin Currie to come to Washington for a con-ference .

- -Browder's interview with Welles was also publishedin the Daily Worker and reported in the daily press .The Under Secretary was quoted as saying, "TheUnited States favors `complete unity' among the Chi-nese people and all groups or organizations thereof ."(Emphasis mine.)

Tydings s_

Browder told the Tydings committee, "This change675 in policy was given to me as a matter of information

by the Under Secretary of State . . . I simultane-ously transmitted that statement of United StatesGovernment policy on China to Madam Sun Yat Sen,in Chungking, by cable ." (Note : Madam Sun Yat-sen became a member of the Chinese CommunistParty and lives in Peiping . )

Budenz finished his testimony on this subject byIPR 2-6oo saying that the Welles statement was "used throughout

the country as an indication that American policy wasseeing eye to eye with Soviet policy in the Far East,"and that "Browder said it was as important as anagreement between nations . . . representing what heconsidered to be f1 great gain for the Communistcause."

To follow the current and localized Communist lineis not always easy, not even for the comrades them-selves. So subtle and intricate is the strategy that onoccasion there is one line for the average Party worker,another for the high echelon, and still another for thesympathizer or dupe . Also, the "line" may be reversedvernight.For example, one Party line during the war was that

the Allies must "abolish" _the Japanese Emperor,either by exile, or through his conviction as a war

iminal. The Redaim_obscure to most people at theme ut clear in view of postwar events, was toee t e Japanese fi tin FOR their Emperorevenw

eat was inevitable. Actually, the Kremlin


Communist Propaganda Affects Foreign Policy 23did not want to do away with the Emperor until sometime after the war. The Communists expected thento be aabbetocTange public sentiment so that theJapanese "liberals" (mainly Communists) would getrid of him themselves . It was something like the planused in Italy when the King was successfully ousted .Stalin, in late May 1945, felt that the Japanese SherwoodEmperor would guarantee an orderly surrender after 904which the victors could "give them the works," or soHarry Hopkins interpreted Stalin's views . While theLeftist press in the West kept up a steady barrageagainst the Emperor, which reacted on the Japanesepeople, the hidden Communists and their allies in highgovernment circles in Washington kept the issue in- IPR 4-ror6decisive .

The American and British public got the "line" inthe following manner . American State Departmentofficers in China swapped information with newspaperpeople and unofficial observers stationed there . All ofthem had a grand time obtaining interviews with Roth 270Communist leaders, both Chinese and refugee Jap-anese. Needless to say the Communists were mostcharming and most accessible. And, they were news lThe result was a flood of colorful, favorable propa-ganda, with the reports sent to the State Departmentoften containing the same information as appeared inthe current American and British press . It seemedtrue because everybody was saying it .

The American State Department officials were JohnS . Service, John K. Emmerson, Raymond Ludden andJohn Paton Davies, Jr. Some of the press and un-official observers were such important writers as OwenLattimore, re-instated professor at Johns HopkinsUniversity ; Theodore White, then representing Timemagazine and more recently with the Reporter andColliers magazines ; Edgar Snow, for a long time onthe staff of the Saturday Evening Post ; Gue`-'ther

IPR 2-680Stein, correspondent for the Christian Science ; Monitor IPR 2-635who wainvolved in the Sorge spy ring ; Israel

tin IPR 2-435a correspondent for the New York Times ; and ar-

635

24


rison Forman correspondent for the New York HeraldTribune .

There were many others who, whether consciouslyor not, picked up the line and sent it home in theirwritten dispatches .

That the press reports and books written by thisgroup were pleasing to the Communists can be as-certained by the following item in the Daily Workerof June 18, 1947

IPR 2-46o "We have had many excellent books about China in thepast few years, books by topflight reporters like HarrisonForman, Guenther Stein A nes Smedle , Theodore~White,an Anna ee acoby. At the top of this list belongs a bookpublished today, Israel Epstein's Unfinished Revolution inChina."

American correspondents and American officialsreceived one Communist line in regard to the Emperorand whooped it up for the liquidation of Hirohitoright on through 1944 to August 1945. This was theline the Soviets used to prevent premature surrender .

Meanwhile, another Communist line was being pre-pared for Soviet use (and they were sure the Allieswould adopt it) when it would serve the Red purposeto have the war end quickly . This was done by SusumoOkano, the Japanese Communist leader who had fledfrom Japan in 1931 and who became a member of theComintern in 1935 .

This important Japanese Communist began to workhard on "re-educating" Japanese prisoners capturedby the Red hinese in 1 8 and b i s • i he hadestablished a "school" in Yenan . This provided him theideal way to learn what the Japanese people werethinking back home. He began to see that, while someof the Japanese prisoners were swallowing the Com-munist philosophy all right, they balked at any ridiculeaimed at their Emperor . Okano realized how importantthis "emperor worship" was . So in the summer of1944, he "tried for size" the new Communist line on

Communist Propaganda Affects Foreign Policy 25a group of reporters . For instance he told Guenther Roth 270Stein that " . . . a President elected by the people"ought to replace the Emperor . But to Harrison Formanhe said that "The Emperor is still too much of agodlike figure" and suggested that he not be attackedat the moment but should subsequently be tried as awar criminal .

Right after that, in October (during the battle ofLeyte Gulf) Wataru Kaji, a "leftist writer," who was N.Y. Timesto be reported by the New York Times in 1952 as Dec . i8, 1952

being involved in a Communist spy ring in Tokyo,gave the follow-up to Okano's tentative line . He gavea lecture in the Nationalist capital of Chungking, ofall places, under the auspices of a "front" organization FBIS Chung-called the Sino-American Institute of Cultural Re- X944 Oct .

lations . In this lecture he demoted the Emperor froma "war criminal" to a "puppet of the military whichmust, therefore, be overthrown." This was the change-over phase of the Emperor question which took theemotion out of the issue . As we have noted, Stalin'himself told Hopkins and others that what happened Sherwoodto the Emperor was a matter of expediency and it 904

might serve the allied purposes to keep the Emperoruntil after the surrender .

This, of course, was not known at the time except inthe inner circle. From this distance you can see howthe strange two-headed Communist propaganda ap ;paratus worked . While the angry anti-Emperor com-munist propaganda was going full force in the UnitedStates, Stalin himself was preparing the great reversal .It required careful timing .

The line which was to be given officially to thesmall pumpkin comrades was prepared some monthslater-May of 1945 . Again it was Susumo Okano whogave the word . He made a speech before the NationalCongress of the Chinese Communist Party at Yenan,the Red capital, and all the Communist leaders of theAsiatic countries flocked to hear his words . It wascalled "Building Up Democratic Japan." This im-portant address was reprinted in full in the Communist

26

The Enemy at His BackEmancipation Daily at Yenan on May 29th, but itsdistribution in America was withheld until the "righttime." The "right time" would be when Russia wasin the war against Japan and Japan had surrendered .The Soviets declared war on August 8, 1945, Japanthrew in the sponge on August io, 1945, and theeditors of the Daily Worker put their prepared reporton the Okano speech "in the works" the same day.It appeared in that Red paper Augus . r 94 5 . Thiswas the careful timing end, it had a strange dateline-"Yenan, China, June io, (delayed) ." (Emphasis

mine .)

V-The pertinent parts of Okano's dicta are the follow-

-ing :

. . . "The emperor as head of a despotic political systemor emperor's prerogatives, must be immediately abolished. . . But we must take a considerate attitude . . . " ( Em-phasis mine.)

And here Okano explains why such violent actionas trying the Emperor as a war criminal was a badidea-

"Faith in the emperor, implanted in the mind of thegeneral public for the past 70 years, is considerable andprofound."

So here follows the new line-

"Therefore we propose to decide by a people's referendumafter the war the problems of dethroning or retaining theemperor."

Thanks to General MacArthur this referendumnever came off .

To make sure the comrades understood, and to helpthe "progressive Americans" (the third echelon) saveface, Joseph Starobin, who was then foreign editorof the Daily Worker, wrote an article which appeared

Communist Propaganda Affects Foreign Policy 27

on the same page as the report of Okano's speech . Inpart he said :

"It is understandable, of course, that progressive Ameri-cans are alarmed at any possible special position for theEmperor . . .

"Once Japan is occupied and once the major industrialcenters of Manchuria are in United Nations hands, it willbe the actual evolution of Japanese politics, under Alliedcontrol, that will count."

The second and equally important program theKremlin proposed for Asia was also relayed to theState Department by our officials . We learn by wayof these reports that in the Fall of 1944, Ch'in PoKu (Ch'in Pang-hsien), who was in charge of ChineseCommunist propaganda, put out the following mani-festo: "Colonies and all conquered territory must betaken away from Japan . Formosa and all Manchuriamust come back to China."

You will see later on, how similar this was to theCairo Declaration of December 1943 . But the Com-munists know so well how to use double talk. Theyknew that any paper in the United States or GreatBritain publishing the statement that Manchuria andFormosa should be returned to China, would mean toAmerican and British readers, Nationalist China ; whileto Russia and Communists, it meant eventually RedChina because they had long planned it that way .These orders have been partially carried out . Halfof the Sakhalin island and all the Kuriles islands weregiven to Russia. Manchuria fell to the CommunistChinese by the arrangements of the Yalta and Potsdamagreements, and in 1954, 1955 and 1956 the drive forthe fall of Formosa into Red hands has been repeatedlyannounced from the Red capital of Peiping .

It is almost uncanny with what precision the com-ra(Te-scarry out their orders . But taking into considera-tion the po i ic' ai thinkingof some of our foreignservice officers at that time, the picture becomes moreclear. When you realize that "John K . Emmerson

FBIS 1944

28

The Enemy at His Backrecommended in a report to the State Department thatthe civilian government of Japan be made up onlyof Communists, since the Red group was the only`democratic' force there" ; when you have RaymondLudden reporting that "the so-called Communists (inChina) are agrarian reformers of a mild democraticstripe," you realize what strong American confederatesthe Communists had .

But let us see how the seemingly contradictory lineconcerning the Emperor applied to the war in thePacific .When Churchill and Roosevelt met at Casablanca

in January 1943, they made a joint announcementto the effect that the Allies would accept nothing lessthan"unennrlitionalsurrender." To those understand-ing something of psychological warfare, this was anelectrif i andincendiary statement to of sidesof the firing line . To the enemy it was an inspiration tofight even harder, andhe homefront it had greatpatriotSi Ale21 .

There are several stories on how the policy came tobe adopted . The most widely circulated is that Roose-velt, without having informed anyone, announced itduring the press conference at the conclusion of theCasablanca meeting. Robert Sherwood in his book,

Sherwood

"Roosevelt and Hopkins," quotes a later notation made696 by President Roosevelt saying that he remembered

"that they had called Grant `Old Unconditional Sur-render' and the next thing I knew, I had said it ."Churchill's story was that he was taken by surpriseand had to quickly improvise a like statement . (Helater said he made an error in this .) However, Sher-wood contradicted FDR when he went on to say thatRoosevelt had a prepared statement in his lap .

Sherwood's hint that the "unconditional surrender"statement was planned beforehand is confirmed byGeneral Albert C . Wedemeyer who was present at theCasablanca conference . - e eneral relates t acheand General Marshall shared the same villa, andtheir bedrooms were adjoining . Before they went to

Budenz 177-8They CryPeace

Cong. RecordJune 5,1951 page6298

Communist Propaganda Affects Foreign Policy 29bed, they chatted about each day's happenings. Onthe eve of the press conference, General Marshalldined with Roosevelt and Churchill. When he returnedto the villa, he went to General Wedemeyer's room andsat down to tell him of the evening's events. He toldWedemeyer that the President and the Prime Ministerhad agreed to announce the following day that un-conditional surrender would be the only terms ac-ceptable to the United Nations for the surrender oftheir common enemies .

Why then, did both Churchill and Roosevelt publiclystate that it was NOT discussed before the press con-ference?

It is known that the phrase was discussed long beforethe Casablanca conference took place . In late Aprilor early May of 1942, Norman Davis, chairman ofthe Security Subcommittee of the President's AdvisoryCommittee, proposed that unconditional surrender beconsidered as a basis for post-war policy . His proposalwas immediately opposed by all other members in-cluding the representatives of the military establish-ment. The proposal was never mentioned again . Is itany wonder that those who participated in this discus-sion were startled, to say the least, to read the an-nouncement in the press that unconditional surrenderhad become a United Nations policy!

Who persuaded Roosevelt to change this decision?Unconditional surrender meant the complete destruc-tion of Italy, Germany and Japan, and the only nationbenefiting from such a destruction would be Russia .

From then on, this phrase became the key to bothwars-in Europe and in the Pacific . During the follow-ing years there were numerous requests that the termbe clarified . Many people realized that if it was notexplained to the enemy, they would never give up thefight until the last man had been struck down, anentirely unnecessary tragedy for both our boys andtheirs. But until the day before VJ-day no explanationwas forthcoming. And the extraordinary punishmentwe imposed on the defeated Germans in May of 1945,

30

The Enemy at His Backgave the Japanese a frightening bird's-eye view of whatthey could expect from the American conquerors .

The implications of "unconditional surrender" hada different effect in Germany and Japan . The Germanpeople, whatever their loyalty to Hitler, nourished agreat love for their fatherland . They would fight tothe last rather than see their "Heimat" completelydestroyed. The Japanese people, on the other hand,centered their love of country on the person of theirEmperor. If unconditional surrender meant a humiliat-ing destruction of their national symbol, there was nodoubt that every patriotic Japanese would be willingto die fighting.

Leahy 145 Admiral Leahy who was not at Casablanca regret-fully commented in his book that "Before the war wasover, there were occasions when it might have beenadvantageous to accept conditional surrender in someareas, but we were not permitted to do it."

It is odd, however, that conditional surrender waspermitted the Italians. Why was it a rigid policy forGermany and Japan?

N.Y. Times,Dec. 5, 1943A, 30 :2

No one expected the war in the Pacific to progressso swiftly and so victoriously for the Americans . Bylate 1943 a victorious end of the war was plainly insight, and this had an effect among "certain elements ."

To bring another event into focus, in December11943, the State Department published a book entitled,"Peace and War,1931-1941 ." This was a selected recordof our foreign policy towards Japan and Germany inthose years and became known as the "White Paper"(This is not to be confused with the later White Paperof 1949 put together by the "China Boys .") In itspages was found the statement to the effect thatHirohito had forbidden the Japanese Army and Navyto attack the United States and Great Britain . Thiscaused a chain reaction in the press beginning withsuch headlines as "Hirohito War Ban Revealed byHull," "Hirohito Plea for '41 Peace May Save Him,""Allies May Let Him Remain on Throne." But im-

Communist Propaganda Affects Foreign Policy 31mediately the leftist press protested in a violentmanner, and from that time on the future of theJapanese Emperor became a highly controversialsubject .

Deeply embroiled in the drama was Joseph C . Grew,our ambassador to Japan at the time of Pearl Harbor .He returned on an exchange ship in August 1942, andwas assigned by the State Department to make aspeaking tour of the country to explain the war in thePacific to the American people . Mr. Grew had livedin Japan for ten years and knew his subject well . Hetoured the country for 18 months during which timehe emphasized in every speech the same theme. Thisis important because it was this theme which was tomake him temporarily acceptable to the Communists .He told his audiences that the American people shouldbe warned against any peace offers from Japan andthe "dangers of a false, treacherous peace ." He said to Grew 1397the Foreign Affairs Council of Cleveland on Feb . 5,1943 that the clue would come when some formerliberal Japanese statesmen were brought back intopublic office to replace some of the military. "This Grew 1397step," he said, "would be heralded as representing theoverthrow of military dictatorship in favor of liberal-ism. The scene would then be set for a peace move ."

Later on you will see how accurate Mr . Grew wasin all his predictions, and in particular, this one . Hewent on to emphasize that "'Unconditional surrender' 1398is the complete summary of the terms which we of theUnited Nations shall and must offer the aggressorpowers ."

Who was helping Mr . Grew write his speeches?In time, he was to completely reverse himself . But

he did not deviate from this first theme until December29, 1943, shortly after the State Department publishedthe White Paper on Japan and Germany . On that datehe touched a- high-voltage nerve in the Communistapparatus which had the effect of a weasel making anunexpected call on a hen house.What Grew said was anathema to the Reds because Roth 62

Roth 64

32

The Enemy at His Backhe pointed out that Hirohito was a "peace-loving"ruler, and once he got out from under control of themilitary, he would be "an asset and not a liability"after the war. This statement set off a concentratedattack on Mr. Grew by the press which was evenechoed in far off China . Dr. Sun Fo (son of the lateDr. Sun Yat-sen), well-known as a "liberal" favoringChinese friendship with Russia, wrote an article pro-testing Mr . Grew's statement .

In the United States the attack was so forceful thatin February 1944, Mr. Grew was compelled to givean interview to the New York Times, which hadseverely criticized him, in which he tried to extricatehimself. He told the newspaper categorically that hehad never "either publicly or privately" expressed anopinion either way about the Emperor's retention onthe throne after the war .

Notwithstanding this statement to the New YorkTimes in February, the following April Mr . Grew didtake a stand in a memorandum to Secretary Hull, thefull text of which appears in volume II of his book,"Turbulent Era." In this memorandum Mr . Grewadvised the Secretary that, in considering the questionof dethroning the Emperor, the State Departmentshould not be led by current public opinion since thepublic did not know all the facts . He pointed out-

Grew 1411-

"The prejudice in our country today against the Emperor13 of Japan is intense . . . I can see only chaos emerging

from such a decision . . . I therefore say, without quali-fication, that the Emperor can be used equally well-indeedfar more easily-to justify and to consecrate, if you will, anew order of peaceful international co-operation ."

It is no wonder that when President Roosevelt, thefollowing November, appointed Mr . Grew to be Under-secretary of State, there was an explosive eruption fromthe leftists. At this period the battle of Leyte Gulfwas over (Oct . 27, 1944) and the Japanese were

Communist Propaganda Affects Foreign Policy 33obviously staggering. By the time Mr. Grew was toappear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,the issue had become so heated that the now famousCaucus Room in the Senate Office Building was filledto capacity .

Just prior to the hearing, the now defunct New YorkPM seemed to appoint itself the leader of the attackon Mr. Grew and the Emperor. On the succeedingdays of Dec. 3, 4, and 5, one of their best writers,Ramon Lavalle, devoted three lead articles to thesubject. And on Dec. 13th, James Wechsler, the PM'snational editor and now editor of the New York Post,wrote an entire page in PM attacking Grew. Twodays later, an article by I . F. Stone, also on PM's staff,entitled "An Appeal to the U .S. Senate" blasted Grewas an appeaser .

The reaction of high level Communists to the PMdiatribes was quite unexpected . It becomes clear onlywith an understanding of Communist techniques andof the different lines for different circles which I havejust described. In this instance the brakes were appliedby Frederick Vanderbilt Field, an offspring of thewealthy Vanderbilt family who, in time, became aprominent fixture in the Communist front window .Although named a number of times under oath as a Tydings qnCommunist, he had repeatedly taken the Fifth Amend-ment in answer to the "$64 million question ." Butalso, according to testimony given under oath, whatField wrote and spoke was Communist gospel.

IPR 2-539

1On , ecember 9, 1944, four days after the Lavalle

attacks, Fre ie was a "guest columnist" for theDaily Worker. ou can a sure a article was rea'th car an followed to the letter by the Party

"boys" inside and outside of government . It was notan editorial in the sense we know it, since everythingof this sort published in the Daily Worker is directinstructions to the comrades . The piece is so full of"meat" that I shall quote it entirely . While reading it,bear in mind the speeches Mr. Grew had made across

34


J the country at an earlier date warning the Americanpeople against a "compromise peace ." Here is theField column :

"The telephone has just rung and I have had the followingconversation with a good friend of mine whom I shall desig-

~~ nate as X. Before getting to the conversation itself, let meassure you that X is a person for whom I have great respectand admiration, a person who has done more for the peopleof China than I ever hope to do in my life .

After the preliminary greetings our talk was somethingJ

like this :X: "What do you think of the nomination of Grew asUndersecretary of State?"F : "I can think of several people who would have beenbetter. What do you think?"X: "I think it stinks . And I want to know what you'regoing to do about it ."

"~~F: "Well, my plans are to support Grew's nomination asy well as that of Cla ton Rockefeller and MacLeish ."

X : "But my God, Fred, don't you know that he is workingfor a strong Japan after the war headed by Hirohito? Don'tyou know that Chinese progressives hate him?"

~~ F: "Just a minute, X, let's get some perspective on thisthing. Certainly Grew is a conservative, but I wouldn't callhim a reactionary, because I associate the word reactionarywith semi-fascists and anti-war people and I know thatGrew isn't that."X: "Isn't it true, Fred, that Grew has spoken in favor ofretaining the Emperor and that he's for a strong Japanafter the war?"F: "O.K., maybe he did make some speeches exoneratingthe Emperor when he first came back from Japan, but I'mmore impressed with what he's been saying lately about thedangers of our falling for some of the moderates now beingbrought back into public life in Tokyo . Grew has beenwarning us not to fall into their trap for a negotiated peace .That makes sense to me."X: "Well, what about China? Just as Chungking is puttingsome recent men like T. V. Soong into big positions weelevate a man whom progressive Chinese don't trust becauseof his long record of appeasement in Japan ."F: "I think you're strictly wrong there, X, President Roose-

Communist Propaganda Affects Foreign Policy 35velt's policy on China is very progressive, it may even bethe decisive force that will rebuild China . I doubt whetherGrew or anybody else in the State Department is going toreverse that policy. It's been developed over the bodies ofmighty tough babies in the Department, some of whomaren't there any more. The President and public opinionare going to see that there is no change toward China .

"The point where you go haywire, X, is in believing thatwe're fighting for some kind of socialism, and that thereforeonly progressive liberals can run the government . This is acapitalist country, and that's the kind of country that'sfighting this war . It's not only natural, but it's vital to haveconservatives and business men in the government . With-out them how can we possibly have national unity?

"Now if it had been Berle or Long (note : Adolf Berle whotook Chambers' information on Hiss to Roosevelt; andBreckenridge Long) or one of the other fancy boys with along pro-Franco, anti-Soviet record behind them who hadbeen nominated, Undersecretary, I'd be all for protesting .But in the case of Grew we're dealing with a genuinely anti-fascist conservative and I, for one, am perfectly willing towork with him . If he makes mistakes on policy we'll raisehell. But let's not protest simply because he's a conserva-tive." (Emphasis mine .)X: "I disagree and as a matter of fact, I was thinking ofsending a letter of protest to the White House this after-noon."F : "Well, I'm not, and what's more, I'm afraid you'd findyourself associated with a bunch of semi-fascist reaction-aries and crackpot Social Democrats, and by joining withthem all what you'd accomplish will be to strengthen theirdisruptive campaign."X: "If that's the score, I guess I'd better think againbefore I mail that letter ."

Who was "X"? Was he a real person-one of themany who had direct access to the President? Or was"X" a device? Perhaps "he" was really the vast armyof letter writers, reporters and commentators whoneeded to be alerted that the destruction of Mr. Grewwas to be postponed .

Grew's nomination quickly won Senate approval .But the issue of the Emperor was not to be dropped

IPR 9-2917

36

The Enemy at His Backby the left. The next attack came "unofficially" fromanother quarter, and in the following manner.

The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, headedby the late Sen . Pat McCarran, Democrat from Nevada,devoted more than a year, 1951-1952, to the investiga-tion of the fascinating organization called the Instituteof Pacific Relations .

The Institute was organized initially for the benefitof students, professional and otherwise, who wantedto increase their knowledge of the Pacific area . Itsaims were to publish the writings of experts on thesecountries, and many worthy authorities on the FarEast joined as contributors . But shortly after the In-stitute got a start in 1925, the Communists began toinfiltrate it .

As the years went by, the members began to note achange in policy apparent in the writings of thecontributors and the staff . Although many IPR mem-bers did not realize this was Communist propaganda,they were unable to go along with this "blindness"and resigned. With the advent of World War II theimportance of the Institute increased . The State De-partment was obliged to refer to the IPR publicationsto get information on the Far East because, as OwenLattimore said, they were the only publications that"not only specialized on the Far East but wereconfined to the Far East ." And by the time the warstarted the IPR had come under the guidance ofFrederick Vanderbilt Field, Owen Lattimore andothers less well known .

The McCarran subcommittee's hearings brought outthat often, when the organization hit the bottom of thebarrel financially, it was Fred Field who came to therescue, contributing in all, $6o,ooo . However, morethan half the support for a period of more than 20years was supplied by Carnegie and Rockefeller Founda-Boris and Corporations. Of_the other half, part camefrom individuals, and part from oil companies, banks,etc .

I

Communist Propaganda Affects Foreign Policy 37The money from the foundations was contributed

to the authors who made extensive trips to the FarEast an into Communist controlled territory. Fromthese experiences and contacts they were able towrite their books .

One of the two publications of the Institutes wasPacific Affairs, a "front" periodical for the unsus- IPR I4-pecting. On occasion, a rightwing author was invited 55o6

to contribute as window-dressing . But in the followingissue a criticism of that article was sure to appear .Pacific Affairs for December 1944, published anarticle by T. A . Bisson. Bisson has been named under IPR 2-535oath as a Communist, and has denied it . After servingin the government during World War II he became aprofessor at the University of California .

This article, "Japan as a Political Organism," setsforth what the author recommended as the UnitedStates postwar policy for Japan . It was lengthy, and ingreat detail ; Bisson's article reads in part : "Before theoccupation force leaves Japan, it should have enforcedthe following measures." Let us look at points No. 6and No. 14

No. 6 Punishment of war criminals, including the Em-peror.

No . 14 Abolition of the Emperor system by the constitu-tional convention, with accompanying warning thatthis will be a key factor in determining the futureattitude of the United Nations toward Japan .(See appendix for full text .)

The IPR had other vehicles of influence besides itsmagazines. The books published under its sponsorshipplayed an important part in conditioning the thinkingof the American public . A check of published worksat that time leaves little doubt that leftwingers, pro-Communists and Communists, produced and reviewedmost of the books on the Far East published duringthe critical years when the United States policy in thePacific was being formed . These books found theirway into the libraries of universities and were given

Lattimore 29

IPR 3-725

38

The Enemy at His Backcareful study by professors of contemporary history,and by newspaper and magazine writers who specializein foreign and military affairs . They were also placedopportunely in the hands of members of Congress, andhigh ranking officials in the War and State Depart-ments and the war-time agencies where so many ofthe IPR members were employed .

These combined literary trickles began like ap-parently innocent snow, falling on remote mountaintops, melting into mountain streams, and tumblingswiftly to the valley where they meet hundreds ofother streams, becoming mighty rivers and reservoirsaffecting the lives of thousands of people .

Two books published during 1945 merit specialattention. The first was "Solution in Asia" by OwenLattimore, an Atlantic Monthly Press Book publishedby Little, Brown and Company, which concentrated onChina with few but important references to Japan . Theother which appeared in the late summer of that yearwas "Dilemma in Japan," and was also published byLittle, Brown and Company. The author was Lieuten-ant Andrew Roth of the United States Naval Intel-ligence Reserve who was to become involved in thenotorious "Amerasia Case."

With the help of Lattimore, a small crew of leftistAsian specialists had cornered the book market, afact confirmed by Lattimore himself when he stated inthe New York Times on June 22, 1947, "It is note-worthy that the recent and current trend of good booksabout China, well documented and well-written, hasbeen well to the left of center ."

In "Solution in Asia," the Johns Hopkins professorpeppered his pages with anti-Hirohito jibes and evenwent so far as to suggest that the Japanese peoplegive the Emperor the same dose as the English gaveCharles I of England who got his head chopped off .

In more serious language he advised that the "Jap-anese people are likely to overturn the throne unlesswe prevent them," and by "we" he meant certainpeople in our State Department . He then said that the

Communist Propaganda Affects Foreign Policy 39Emperor and "all males eligible to the throne . . . beinterned, preferably in China." Could Mr. Lattimorehave had Red China in mind?

His book was of great interest to the Communistsin the United States and was advertised in Communistnewspapers alongside a book by the head of theCommunist Party USA, William Z . Foster. Both were IPR 9-3073sold at the Communist International Book Store, andwhat the International Book Store sells is "must"reading to the comrades .

Lattimore's explanation of this was that he' hadnever heard of the International Book Store and didn'tknow anything about the Communists' interest in hisbook.

IPR 9-3o7iOn this, Mr. Budenz's testimony is interesting. The

following question was asked by Robert Morris,Counsel for the McCarran subcommittee investigatingthe IPR .

Mr. Morris . . . . Did the Communist Party make use of IPR 2-624-5Owen Lattimore or Owen Lattimore's writings with respectto Japan?Mr. Budenz . Oh, yes, we see that with respect to Japanpolicy and others . . . His book, Solution in Asia, was itnot?-was used by the Communists and other writings ofhis .

Roth's "Dilemma in Japan" came into fleetingprominence during the Tydings hearings in 1950 whenLattimore testified that Roth had brought the galleyproofs to his house for him to read . Two commentsconcerning this book deserve attention here . The DailyWorker, which did not begin its campaign against theEmperor until early spring, 1945, reported on June26, 1945 : "Dilemma in Japan . . . exposes UnderSecretary of State Joseph Grew's predilection forJapanese Emperor Hirohito ."

IPR 2-609And Louis Budenz, appearing before the McCarran

IPR hearings, had this to say in answer to the ques-tions by Counsel Morris :

40 The Enemy at His BackIPR 2-625

Mr. Budenz . . . . Dilemma in Japan was not only advancedby the Communists but it was submitted to the Politburobefore publication. (Emphasis mine .)Mr. Morris . Was Andrew Roth a Communist?Mr. Budenz . Yes, sir, from many official reports he was aCommunist . .Mr. Morris . Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony that AndrewRoth's book was used to supplement this Communist cam-paign?Mr. Budenz . Most decidedly .

Roth selected several subjects which were importantto the "Party line ." On each he elaborated until hehad squeezed the lemon dry, trying to impress thereader with his vast knowledge of Japan and her menof destiny. He used venom and vitriol with extravagantabandon in the chapters concerning the Zaibatzu (thebig industrialists of Japan), Joseph C . Grew, andEmperor Hirohito. The tone of the book is, to borrowan expression from Walter Lippmann, "sophisticatedviolence ."

An interesting item is found on page 234 whereRoth recommends the use of Okano and Kaji by ourgovernment in the making of a "democratic" Japan .He apparently agreed with the State Department'sJohn K. Emmerson that the Japanese Communistswere the only ones on whom we could rely to ac-complish this objective . (T. A. Bisson had alsorecommended the above mentioned Communists aspotential aids to our postwar occupation in another

IPR 12-4184 article published in Pacific Affairs in September 1944 .)Roth left no reasonable doubt that Joseph Grew was

an important enemy to Russia's plans for Japan .Although Mr. Grew had for 41 years faithfully andloyally represented United States policy as an officialof the State Department, he was totally unconsciousof the new influences forming reverse policies in Wash-ington. Roth bluntly stated that "The general pattern

Roth 35

of the attack was that Mr. Grew was a gullible aristo-crat . . ."

Roth mentioned "three complementary thrusts" and

Communist Propaganda Affects Foreign Policy 41you will notice how unusually similar they are toOkano's trial balloon in the summer of 1944 as wellas his authoritative statement of policy in May 1945 .The first "thrust," he says, should be to weaken the Roth zx8sources of the Emperor's strength ; the second shoulddiscredit the Emperor system, and the third shouldsupport the "democratic forces" in Japan which even-tually would do away with the Emperor .Then he warned against the wrong strategy in Roth zzg-6

getting rid of the Emperor . He wrote that there is realdanger in a "premature, frontal attack" on Hirohito ."THE DANGER," he emphasized, "ARISES NOTFROM THE OBJECTIVE BUT FROM THE IN-CORRECT STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING THECORRECT OBJECTIVE."

He explained this new line by saying that Okano,the leading Japanese Communist, came to this conclu-sion after having discussed it with the Communistunderground in Japan. In other words, Okano warnedthat the average Japanese would never stand for anattack on their Emperor . They had to be persuadedfirst that the Emperor system was not a good one .

Roth ended his lecture on the new line by puttinginto words the clever method the Communists use inall their programs to defeat America-whether it's anattack on the Secretary of State, stirring up racialhatreds or tearing down our traditions .

"In politics, as in war, when a frontal attack is too costly, Roth nsit is frequently advisable and no less effective to utilize aflank attack. This is undoubtedly the strategy which shouldbe used in this case . . ."

An unusual chronology of dates occurs here . Youwill notice that the Daily Worker quoted from Roth'sbook in June 1945-before it was even finishedl Itwas not published until September 1945 and containsreferences to events taking place in July at Potsdam .One can only guess that it was felt that the new "line"on the Emperor should be given by a person supposed

42

The Enemy at His Backnot to belong to the Communist conspiracy. And itwas passed out to the second echelon comrades and"progressive Americans" through a lieutenant in theUnited States Naval Intelligence . But it was passedout in slow stages. Until Russia entered the war,articles like Field's "Appeasement of Japan" (NewMasses, July 3 r, 1945) and editorials like "A Ver-sailles for Japan," (Daily Worker, July ; 9, 1945)continued the old "liquidate the Emperor" line .

That the Communist aim of insinuating their propa-ganda against the Emperor in our press was highlysuccessful and had a telling effect on Japan, is told byMr. Kase in his "Journey to the Missouri ." He wrotethat some newspapers in the United States implied thatthe Emperor was the source of the Japanese aim at .world conquest, and that-

Kase 250 "Men like Owen Lattimore were known to be advocatingthe internment in China of the Emperor and of all maleseligible for the throne . Such statements in Allied countriesunfortunately strengthened the hands of those in Japan whomistrusted the intentions of the Allied powers ."

In plain language, Mr . Kase was saying that theattacks on the Emperor prolonged the war .

Chapter III

YALTA AND THE ADVISERS

The Yalta Conference .Harry Hopkins and the advisers.Roosevelt's view of Stalin and Churchill .U.S. Policy toward Russia set forth by Gen . Burns andHopkins .

The controversy over Russian entry into the Pacificwar .

The press continues its attack on Hirohito .Bohlen explains the Yalta agreements .

THIRTEEN million young Americans were taken frompeaceful pursuits and hauled into the tortuous cauldronof World War II . In three and one half fateful yearsthey had fought one of the most brutal wars in historyand laid before the feet of a grateful nation an amazingrecord of victories . Yet the United States was to gofar in losing the fruits of victory at a quiet conferencetable six months before the war ended. This was Yaltawhere, among other tragic errors, Chinese territorywas traded for Russia's entry into the war againstJapan .

Gathered at this conference in February of 1945were the most powerful leaders in the world ; Roose-velt, Churchill and Stalin. The most powerful of themall was President Roosevelt, but it was to be his teamwhich lost the battle of political wits . The question is,"why"? The only way to find out is to look as closelyas possible at the experts and advisers accompanyinghim ; to carefully scrutinize their political thinking .What went on in Roosevelt's mind during the

course of the wartime alliance with Russia has puzzledeven the closest and best informed observers . As anoutsider who has had the privilege of listening to manyinformed discussions, I have been unable to reachany conclusions myself . One reasonable and plausible

43

U.S. Newsand WorldReport Aug .o . 1954

44

The Enemy at His Backexplanation of the late President's attitude comes fromone who had access to many official documents in-cluding Roosevelt's personal correspondence withChurchill and Stalin. His careful analysis strongly sup-ports the conclusion that, until 1943, Roosevelt re-garded Russia with a patronizing attitude, and that heassumed it would be the United States and GreatBritain who would settle the postwar problems . Butbeginning with mid-1943, American policy seemed tochange to "fear" of postwar Russia . And the corre-spondence indicated that FDR's attitude changed toone of wishful thinking-that Roosevelt the aristocratcould charm Stalin the peasant . The President putgreat faith in his theory that if the United Statesproved its honest intentions with honest action, Stalinwould react likewise . But such a policy was no moresuccessful then than it was in 1955 .Perhaps Mr . Roosevelt's early views are explained

by a statement of Martin Dies when he quoted thePresident as saying to him : "Several of the best friendsI've got are Communists . You're all wrong about thisthing . . . I'm not defending the Communists as such,but I'm telling you it represents a tremendous advanceover what existed in Russia."

Martin Dies' statement also sheds some light onRoosevelt's reaction as described by Whittaker Cham-bers in his book "Witness." Mr. Chambers relates thatwhen, in 1939, Adolf Berle, Assistant Secretary ofState, had brought Chambers' exposure of Alger Hissand others to FDR-

Chambers

"The President had laughed . When Berle was insistent, he470

had been told in words which it is necessary to paraphrase,to `go jump in a lake.'"

Roosevelt was considered by his admirers andcritics alike as a brilliant statesman, which makes iteven more difficult to understand his disbelief in thedevious working and evil intentions of the Communistconspiracy. Some explain his naivete by pointing out

Yalta and the Advisers

45that he was also an intellectual dilettante, a collectorof novel ideas, and eccentric friends whom he firmlybelieved he could control .

Many have attributed the actions and attitudes ofPresident Roosevelt to his advisers . There is no doubtthat the political thinking of the official family of anyPresident is reflected in his official statements anddeeds. Although their names are not always familiarto the public, they are a real power in the White House .It is these people who read all incoming reports-andoften summarize them for Presidential reading . Whatthey omit or insert can mislead a President in manymatters .

As I glance over the list of men who accompaniedMr. Roosevelt to Yalta, they seem to me to fall intotwo groups of opposite opinions . Those who receivedadvice, reports and opinions from these advisers werePresident Roosevelt, Secretary of State Edward R .Stettinius, Jr., and the Director of War Mobilizationand "assistant President," James F . Byrnes .

The opposing teams of advisers are as follows :

Those who believed

Those who believedRussia our friend .

Russia a questionableHarry Hopkins

ally .General Marshall

Admiral LeahyW. Averell Harriman

Admiral KingAlger HissH. Freeman MatthewsCharles E. Bohlen

(Harriman frequently warned of Russia's dubiousintentions in various memos, but loyally carried outHopkins' orders without protest . His guiding mottoseems to have been, "Harry knows best.")

The two able naval officers were naturally moremilitary in their thinking than political which meanta constant alertness to even the least suspicion ofdanger to the nation. Admiral Leahy had served asour ambassador to Vichy, France, during the occupa-tion of Paris by the Nazis, and had proven to be both

46

The Enemy at His Backa nimble and a blunt diplomat. Both King and Leahyhad the simple opinion that having Russia as an allywas tantamount to fighting side by side with anoctopus, and that we'd better keep one eye on ourenemy and the other on our doubtful ally . But theywere an isolated pair in the circle of Presidentialadvisers. Moreover, being military men, they obeyedorders .

The larger of the two groups included some of themost influential men in the United States. Harry Hop-kins, the President's most trusted adviser, was for along time a White House "boarder" and was in thePresident's confidence even more than was his family.A quick perusal of the press reports of those days willvividly recall the political heat this strange, untidy andsickly man generated. From the beginning of his careeruntil his death he surrounded himself with men whoseloyalty to the United States was questionable, andsome of whom were more than on the Communistborder-line . Hopkins' strange friendships did notbother the President, Neither did they shake his con-fidence in his adviser . When Hopkins made his firstvisit to Moscow in July 1941, the President providedhim with a most unusual introduction to Stalin . Itsaid ; "I ask you to treat him with the identical confi-

Sherwood 4

dence you would feel if you were talking directly tome."

A retired Army officer once said to me in an ex-plosion of retrospective heat that "Hopkins ran thewhole damn war." I took his statement lightly until Ihad studied Robert Sherwood's book, "Roosevelt andHopkins" and understood what he meant . There wasno phase of the war in which Harry Hopkins did nothave the last word. Although he was universally knownas having been "Roosevelt's personal adviser," he hadmany other official as well as unofficial assignments .He was chief of Lend-Lease, Chairman of the Mu-nitions Assignment Board, member of the War Pro-

Sherwood

duction Board, Chairman of the President's Soviet917

Protocol Committee, and member of the Pacific War


47Council. Those agencies of which he was only a mem-ber were headed by his chief aides .

There are many references concerning Hopkins' in-fluence with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in planning battlestrategy in both theaters of war . And in diplomacy,"Hopkins was now more than ever `Roosevelt's own,personal Foreign Office,' " by-passing Secretary of SherwoodState Hull, and his successor, Stettinius . Added to this : 640it was on his initiative and under his sponsorship thatthe project for the development of the atomic bomb Sherwoodgot its start . He was "associated with this develop- 9'7ment since the very inception of the National DefenseResearch Council ."

Admiral Leahy confirms :

"The range of his activities covered all manner of civilian Leahy 138affairs, politics, war production, diplomatic matters, and, onmany occasions, military affairs ."

It was true that "Hopkins ran the whole damn war ."Holding the life-line between defeat and victory for

each of our allies, Hopkins placed Russia's needs aboveall others, even our own . In June of 1942 when hespoke before the Russian Aid Rally at Madison SquareGarden in New York City, on the anniversary of theGerman attack on Russia, he pledged to the Soviets"We are determined that nothing shall stop us fromsharing with you all that we have . . ."

General John R. Deane who worked with Ambas- Deane 90-2

sador Harriman in Moscow on Lend-Lease, providesstill another view on Hopkins' "Russia first" policy .He commented in his book, "Strange Alliance," thatthe "mission was carried out with a zeal which ap-proached fanaticism," and that "Faymonville had hadinstructions from the President that no strings were tobe attached to our aid to Russia and that the programwas not to be used as a lever to obtain informationabout and from the Russians ."

In General Phillip R . Faymonville, Hopkins had alieutenant completely devoted to the "cause ." There

48

The Enemy at His Backcan be found in the volumes of the hearings on theInstitute of Pacific Relations, many references to theGeneral in the correspondence of Edward C . Carter,who was named under oath as a Communist. The late

Tydings 627

Mr. Carter, according to his letters, saw to it thatIPR x-x5x Faymonville made contact with many Russians and

Russian sympathizers because, as he testified, "He waseager to meet all sorts of Russians who could bringhim up to date ."

Others on Hopkins' team were all firm believers inthe theory that if we played more than fair with Russiaand overlooked bad faith on their part, a "permanentpeace" would be the ultimate result .

In reading the memoirs of the men present at Yalta-Stettinius, Leahy, Byrnes, King and Hopkins-I findthat, although Hiss was of equal importance to theother State Department advisers, he is mentioned notat all in Admiral King's book, nor Sherwood's biog-raphy of "Roosevelt and Hopkins," nor by Byrnes .Admiral Leahy mentions him once in passing, but Stet-tinius generously gives him credit for his advice andhelp throughout his some 300 pages, even producing afull page picture of himself with Hiss . For this, futurehistorians should be grateful . Stettinius apparently feltduty bound to help a man in trouble, although the bookwas being written after the historic hearings before theUn-American Activities Committee, and publishedduring 1949 when the two Hiss trials occurred . TheSecretary of State wrote early in his book, which heentitled, "Roosevelt and the Russians"

Stettinius 31

"Hiss performed brilliantly throughout the DumbartonOaks conversations, the Yalta Conference, the San Fran-cisco Conference, and the first meeting of the UnitedNations Assembly in London . I always had reason to be-lieve that Hiss acted honorably and patriotically in theperformance of his duties at these conferences . The follow-ing pages of this book reveal his contribution at the YaltaConference."


49On a later page, the Secretary relates his prescribed

routine at Yalta saying that he conferred with " . . .Matthews, Bohlen and Hiss just after I got up in themorning." After the usual diplomatic dinners eachnight, Stettinius again consulted "with Matthews, Boh-len, and Hiss . . . often as late as two in the morning ."

To amplify how closely the team worked with thePresident, Admiral Leahy writes in "I Was There"concerning the first meeting of the Chiefs of Staff withRoosevelt, Stettinius, and Harriman :

Stettinius 83

"The Secretary of State outlined the political questions Leahy 298. . . Then two of his assistants, H. F. Matthews andCharles E. Bohlen, elaborated on several of the more acuteof these problems."

Charles Bohlen held an even more unique positionthan his colleagues . He spoke Russian fluently andacted as interpreter for the President. When Stalin andMolotov called on Roosevelt, Admiral Leahy tells us,"the only other American present" was "Bohlen, who Leahy 299acted as interpreter ." Which makes President Eisen-hower's ambassador to Russia the only living mantoday who is personally familiar with certain top levelconversations . And he added to his laurels when he wasEisenhower's adviser and interpreter at Geneva inJuly 1955 .

Admiral Leahy was a conservative writer (he hadno ghost writer and wrote the entire book longhand)who occasionally permitted himself a salty remark .But he omitted several of the more "juicy" tidbits .Privately he has told the story that at Yalta one ofthe security officers approached him with the warningthat it would not be a good idea to mention high levelsecrets in the presense of Alger Hiss . Astonished, theAdmiral snorted the obvious question : "What'd theybring him here for?" The security officer shrugged andreplied that the selection of the Presidential adviserswas not in his province ; he could only inform theExecutive of their security status .

Sherwood866

Roosevelt176

50

The Enemy at His BackAt this writing in the fourth year of the Eisenhower

Administration, Hiss has ended his prison term ;"Chip" Bohlen is our ambassador to Russia afterhaving hurdled a fierce fight in the Senate with theconservative wing of the Republicans, and Matthewsis our ambassador to Holland . Averell Harriman isgovernor of New York and has unofficially thrown hishat in the ring for presidential nomination, and GeneralMarshall, retired in Virginia, remains the senior states-man and soldier whose advice is sought by both Presi-dent Eisenhower and his advisers .

Another plausible argument heard for the "errors injudgment" is that at Yalta, in 1945, Roosevelt was al-ready a dying man and that the reins had slipped fromhis fingers. In poring over the Yalta documents youwill find that this is true to a certain extent . Rooseveltwas able to "handle" Churchill, but he was too wearyto buck Stalin. However, Robert Sherwood points outthat Roosevelt "had been prepared even before theTeheran Conference in 1943 to agree to the legitimacyof most if not all of the Soviet claims in the FarEast . . ."

At Teheran, Roosevelt was not a dying man and hisson Elliott, who was his father's aide at that meeting,endeavors to give the President's thoughts at the time .In his flip manner Elliott gives an important bird's-eyeview of his father's personal feelings towards the twomen he had to deal with throughout all the Big Threeconferences-Stalin and Churchill .

Elliott asks his father what he thought of Stalin :

"Oh . . . he's got a kind of massive rumble, talks de-liberately, seems very confident, very sure of himself, movesslowly-altogether quite impressive, I'd say ."

"You like him?"He nodded an emphatic affirmative ."

Then we come to Roosevelt's comparison of Stalinwith the Prime Minister of England, Winston Church-ill


51"I'm sure we'll hit it off, Stalin and I," Father said . "A Roosevelt

great deal of the misunderstandings and the mistrusts of 1176- 7the past are going to get cleared up during the next fewdays-I hope once and for all . As for Uncle Joe andWinston, well . . ."

"Not so good, eh?""I'll have my work cut out for me, in between those two .

They're SO different . . ."Father told me of the dinner . . . (that) the diametri-

cally opposed views of Stalin and Churchill (were) a greatbarrier."

At another Teheran meeting between Roosevelt,Stalin and Molotov, at which Elliott was present, theauthor recounts some of the most important conversa-tions. It leads directly back to the testimony of Browderand Budenz, in the preceding chapter, and the mani-festo of Dimitrov :

"Father went on to the other aspects of his conversation rsowith Chiang, the promise that the Chinese Communistswould be taken into the Government BEFORE any nationalChinese elections . . . Stalin punctuated his remarks, asthey were translated, with nods: he seemed in completeagreement." (Emphasis his .)

Remembering the Russian demands for the "unity"of the Red Chinese with Chiang's government, is itany wonder that Stalin was nodding his head in agree-ment 1

But Roosevelt's statement could not have come asa surprise to Stalin . He had his agents well planted inour American government and they did their work well .The President had obviously been well-briefed by oneof Russia's helpful friends in the State Department .Although the Teheran papers have not yet been pub-lished, we find in the Yalta Papers a briefing paperwhich surely must have been a duplication of aTeheran briefing in 1943. This unsigned paper recom-mended a "united, progressive China" as against a"divided, and reactionary China," pointing out that Yalta Papers

353

IPR R-152

IPR-R-i8i

52

The Enemy at His Back"Communist China is growing in material and popularstrength." The recommendation was "that we assumethe leadership in assisting China to develop a strong,stable and unified government . . ." (Emphasismine.)

Many have said our State Department was . and isriddled with Communists . The facts do not bear thisout. A few, powerful conspirators in key positions areall that is needed to steer our policy into Russian chan-nels. The rest of the personnel consists of leftwingerseasily led by their Communist colleagues, and a largegroup of good Americans who keep their mouths shutfor expediency's sake . Too many have lost their jobswhen they objected to certain policies, or attempted toinform Congressional committees and the FBI aboutthese policies and those who carry them out . A perfectexample of this was shown in a press story appearingin the Washington Evening Star on Oct . 20, 1955,which began :

"Prof. Donald M . Dozer, fired as assistant chief of theState Department's Historical Policy Research Division, hasasked the Civil Service Commission to find he was im-properly discharged because he objected to a `partial anddistorted compilation' of the Yalta Conference documents ."

Who were Roosevelt's expert advisers on China priorto Yalta? There were two powerful men. In the WhiteHouse the President's closest adviser on the Far East-was Lauchlin Currie, of whom the McCarran Commit-tee Report on the Institute of Pacific Relations com-ments

Currie, Lauchlin . . . Collaborated with agents of the So-viet intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony .Out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena .

The sworn testimony also shows that Currie was inconstant communication with Owen Lattimore . And fora short time, Lattimore shared Currie's office .


53In the State Department we find that John Carter

Vincent was Chief of the Office of Chinese Affairs from1944 to 1945 . The same IPR Report states :

Vincent, John Carter . . . Identified as a member of the IPR R-159Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses .Denied .

We then come to what the Communists call the"fascist group." And it goes without saying, the ad-vice of these people was constantly ignored . Theirpresence was never required at the big conferences .At that time Joseph Grew was Director of the Officeof Far Eastern Affairs and then Undersecretary ofState. Working closely as Grew's assistant was EugeneH. Dooman. Neither of these men trusted the Rus-sians .

We should also bear in mind that "in the field" inChina were the aforementioned John S . Service, JohnP. Davies, John K. Emmerson and Raymond Ludden .The importance of their reports to Washington cannotbe emphasized too much, and their favoritism towardthe Chinese Communists was accepted by many un-informed and naive men in the State Department . Asof this writing, Emmerson and Ludden still remain inour foreign service .Added to these State Department men, information

was coming in from other government agencies such asTreasury where Harry Dexter White was all powerful,the Foreign Economic Administration, the Office ofStrategic Services, and the Office of War Information .

The trend of Roosevelt's talks with Stalin are under-standable in the light of the character of his FarEastern experts. It was with authority that Earl Tydings 1-Browder testified in 1950 that our China policy from 6811942 to 1945, the year he was ousted as head of theParty, undeviatingly followed the Communist line .Although Winston Churchill warned that it would

be catastrophic if Russia were to be left the dominantpower in Europe after the war, he got nowhere with

54

The Enemy at His BackRoosevelt. Strangely enough he had never seen thedanger of Communist domination in Asia . One of myhelpful friends who read this manuscript for me, madea note in the margin which I will incorporate righthere. He scribbled, "Churchill was an unmitigatedfool when it came to Far East policy-and continuesto be!"

But a United States policy was set at Teheran whichhas been carefully watched by all our allies both inAsia and Europe ever since . That is, we "view withgrave concern" the progress of Russia in the act ofabsorbing territories, and then call it "peace" after theact is done!

But whatever the P.M.'s shortsightedness in Asia, hisone undenied virtue remains "Britain first ." Our ownstatesmen have not adopted an "America first" mottoin many, many years . Roosevelt seemed to feel (ac-cording to Elliott) that the Prime Minister was aselfish man whose only concern was England, and thathe was a stubborn man in his distrust of the Russians .

Roosevelt

Elliott quotes his father as saying, "Trouble is, the185 P.M. is thinking too much of the POST-war, and

where England will be . He's scared of letting theRussians get too strong."

In discussing the Yalta Conference Elliott relates241

that "Harry Hopkins is my witness . . . (that) He(Roosevelt) dominated Winston Churchill more com-pletely than before . . ."

Hopkins knew whereof he spoke . A classic exampleof this "domination" can be found in the minutes of a

Yalta Papers meeting of the President and the Prime Minister with826 the Combined Chiefs, Feb . 9, 1945, at Livadia Palace .

It was here that "The Prime Minister expressed theopinion that it would be of great value if Russia couldbe persuaded to join with the United States, theBritish Empire, and China in the issue of a four-power ultimatum calling upon Japan to surrender un-conditionally . . . there was no doubt that some miti-gation would be worth while if it led to the saving of ayear or a year and a half of a war in which so much


55blood and treasure would be poured out . Great Britainwould not press for any mitigation but would be con-tent to abide by the judgment of the United States ."

President Roosevelt replied that he thought thematter might be taken up with Stalin, but "He doubted Yalta 826whether the ultimatum would have much effect on theJapanese . . . " And there the subject was dropped .There is no record that it ever was "mentioned toMarshal Stalin ."

The minutes of the Yalta conferences (and therewere two or three every day) make it obvious thatPresident Roosevelt was tired. This comes out in hisinability to retain the many vital details which werediscussed . For instance : At a meeting on February4th we find this interesting sentence in the minutes"In reply to the President's question as to whether the Yalta 565British troops released from Burma would go intoChina, General Marshall said that the British had notraised this point ." Roosevelt had forgotten that onlytwo days earlier Churchill had proposed just that .Perhaps General Marshall had too, but we find in theminutes of a meeting on February and that "ThePrime Minister repeated that if the Americans made Yalta 545any request for British troops to go into China hewould certainly be prepared to consider it ."

A fateful stroke of the pen at Yalta, Feb . 11, 1945,signed the death warrant of many of the soldiers todie until August io, 1945, and all who died in Korea ;it condemned to slavery the Iron Curtain countries,East Germany, half of Korea, and all of China. Noone was permitted to know the content of this im-portant document, not even the countries involved . Sosecret was the "Agreement Regarding Japan" thatStettinius wrote it "did not appear in the protocol of Stettinius 94

the Yalta Conference . . . Few of the President'sclosest advisers knew of its existence ." And AdmiralLeahy remarked that "The actual agreement signedby the President and Stalin was entrusted to my care Leahy 318

and kept in my secret files at the White House ."But even after the partial release of the Yalta

56

The Enemy at His Backagreements, the average citizen still did not compre-hend their appalling intent. Although Senators, Con-gressmen and a handful of newspapermen explainedthe meaning of the agreements, it was only severalyears later, when the results became tragically clearthat the public began to understand them . I rememberhearing many people protest in anger and outrage ofthe "Yalta betrayal" without realizing what theymeant. I had no idea where Yalta was, nor what tookplace there other than a "Big Three" meeting .

My husband tells the story that in late 1944 he wastalking with Admiral Leahy when the Admiral hap-pened to remark that no one had come up with anylikely suggestions as to where the coming meeting ofthe Big Three should take place . My husband, whohad travelled in Russia when he was a correspondentin World War I, suggested a place called Yalta .

"Never heard of it," rumbled the Admiral . "Whereis it?"

My husband explained that it was formerly thesummer resort of the Tsars on the Black Sea. TheRussian royal family and noblemen had had theirmagnificent summer palaces there . It was as warm aspot as could be found in all Russia in February(Stalin refused to leave Russia), although Churchillgrumbled from beginning to end at the chilly climateand inconveniences. The approach from the airportwas 8o miles of snowy, mountainous roads, andChurchill's palace was 12 miles from Livadia Palacewhere Roosevelt was `staying and where most of theconferences were held .

Forgetting about his chat with the President's Chiefof Staff, my husband was genuinely surprised when themeeting of the Conference was set for the southernRussian resort.

It was only when I started this book that I hadenough curiosity to take the World Almanac from ourbook shelf and read the agreements on Asia for my-self. I was surprised at the simple language in which it


57is written, and even more shocked than I expected tobe .

I checked with the State Department Yalta Publi-cation and found it to be a true copy . Let us read the"price" the United States paid Russia for her collabo-ration in the Pacific War, a war that was already won .

AGREEMENT REGARDING JAPANThe leaders of the three Great Powers-the Soviet Union,

the United States of America and Great Britain-haveagreed that in two or three months after Germany hassurrendered and the war in Europe has terminated theSoviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on theside of the Allies on condition that :

(r) The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The MongolianPeople's Republic) shall be preserved ;

(2) The former rights of Russia violated by the treach-erous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz :

(a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islandsadjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,(b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internation-alized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union inthis port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthuras a naval base of the U .S.S.R. restored,(c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Man-churian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shallbe jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguardedand that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria ;

(3) The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the SovietUnion.

It is understood, that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above willrequire concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek . ThePresident will take measures in order to obtain this con-currence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The heads of the three Great Powers have agreed thatthese claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionablyfulfilled after Japan has been defeated .

Yalta Papers826-7, alsoDecade ofAmericanForeign Pol-icy, StateDept . P. 33-4

58

The Enemy at His BackFor its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to

conclude with the National Government of China a pact offriendship and alliance between the U .S.S.R. and China inorder to render assistance to China with its armed forces forthe purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke .

Joseph V. StalinFranklin D . RooseveltWinston S . Churchill

If you belong to that vast number of citizens who arenot in the habit of reading international treaties, thentake a little extra time to weigh the above words andfollow them with the accompanying map .

The third paragraph from the bottom is particularlysignificant :

The President will take measures in order to obtain thisconcurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin .

This diplomatic gobbledegook, translated into plainEnglish means

President Roosevelt will force Chiang to accept this agree-ment when Marshal Stalin tells him he is ready .

All negotiations for this agreement were handled byHarriman and Molotov. The published Yalta Paperspermit us to have a small peek at what went on behindscenes. They published Stalin's original draft for the"political conditions," which Molotov handed to Har-riman; the suggested changes by Harriman, and thefinal document .

You will notice that, in the first place, the Russiandraft had loopholes which were corrected in the finaldraft. And secondly, that Harriman attempted to re-mind the "Two Great Powers" that Chiang Kai-shekshould be considered somehow .

The Russians drew up the final draft, ignored Harri-man's changes, and plugged up the loopholes with thewords "Take measures," and "unquestionably ful-filled ."


59The meetings at which this agreement was discussed

reveal very clearly the strategy of "deflection ofthought." There were very many important matters onthe mind of the ailing and weary President, and it waseasy enough to "rush things along." At a meeting heldat Yalta on February 4th at which Roosevelt, the Joint Yalta PapersChiefs and Harriman were present, the topic of China 5or-s

came up. "The President said he wished to have theviews of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek before dis-cussing the STATUS QUO in Mongolia . . ." and thesubject was postponed .

There was obviously no time for the President todiscuss anything with Chiang who was thousands ofmiles away .

Six days later at a meeting between Roosevelt, Yalta papersStalin and Harriman, Stalin discussed his "price" for 894- 5entering the Pacific war, just as though Roosevelt hadnever expressed a desire to talk it over first withChiang. According to Harriman's minutes, he, Harri-man, never reminded his Chief of his aforementioneddesire. Roosevelt's mind seemed to have been con-fused and, after he had agreed to Stalin's proposedrevisions of a draft agreement, he asked the Marshal"when the subject should be discussed with the Gen-eralissimo . . ."

And the Marshal's reply was incorporated in thefinal agreement-"Marshal Stalin said he would let Yalta 895

the President know when he was prepared to have thisdone."

Harriman then noted that "At that moment thePrime Minister interrupted the discussion . I had anopportunity later, however, to ask Marshal Stalinwhether he would undertake to draft the further re-visions, to which he replied in the affirmative ." Stalin'srevision was signed the next day by Stalin, Rooseveltand Churchill, the latter never having seen any of thedrafts until he was presented with the final one and a Churchill

Triumph &pen with which to sign it .

Tragedy 388-If you examine the first Soviet draft which follows, 9

and Mr. Harriman's proposed changes, and then turn

6o

The Enemy at His Backto Stalin's final draft on page 57 which became theagreement adopted, you will notice Stalin got evenmore than he initially asked for .

FIRST DRAFT OF MARSHAL STALIN'S POLITICALCONDITIONS FOR RUSSIA'S ENTRY IN

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

(Translation)The leaders of the three Great Powers-the Soviet Union,

Yalta Papers the United States of America and Great Britain have896 agreed that in two or three months after Germany has sur-

rendered and the war in Europe has ended the Soviet Unionshall enter into the war against Japan on the side of theAllies on condition that :

i. STATUS QUO in the Outer Mongolia (the MongolianPeoples Republic) should be preserved ;

2 . The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherousattack of Japan in 1904 should be restored viz :a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islandsadjacent to this part of Sakhalin should be returned tothe Soviet Union,b) possession of Port-Arthur and Dairen on lease shouldbe restored .c) the rights possessed by Russia before the Russo-Jap-anese war to the operation of the Chinese-Eastern Rail-road and the South-Manchurian railroad providing anoutlet to Dairen should be restored on the understandingthat China should continue to possess full sovereigntyin Manchuria ;

3. The Kurile islands should be handed over to the SovietUnion. The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreedthat these claims of the Soviet Union should be unques-tionably satisfied after Japan has been defeated .

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its willingnessto conclude with the National Government of China apact of friendship and alliance between the USSR andChina in order to render assistance to China with itsarmed forces for the purpose of liberating China fromthe Japanese yoke .


6i

MR. HARRIMAN'S SUGGESTED CHANGES INMARSHAL STALIN'S DRAFT OF RUSSIA'S POLITI-CAL CONDITIONS FOR RUSSIA'S ENTRY IN THE

WAR AGAINST JAPANITEM z. b) :

lease of the port areas of Port Arthur and Dairen should Yalta Papersbe restored, or these areas should become free ports under 76,international control.ITEM 2. C) :

Add the following after the word "Manchuria" ; at theend of the paragraph "or these railroads should be placedunder the operational control of a Chinese-Soviet Com-mission ."ITEM 3 . :

Add final paragraph :"It is understood that the agreement concerning the

ports and railways referred to above requires the con-currence o f Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek ."

(Note : portions italicized are additions to the originaldocument .)

Now, all of this was kept secret from the head ofthe Chinese Government, Chiang Kai-shek . The reasongiven by Dean Acheson when the White Paper waspublished in 1949 is highly astonishing . The officialexplanation for not informing Chiang was : "For rea-sons of military security, and for those only, it wasconsidered too dangerous for the United States to con-sult with the National Government ." This was in-credible) Chiang, not Stalin, was our ally in the Pacific .And there was not a single instance during the warwhen Chiang was not wholeheartedly loyal to theUnited States . It might be added, he was loyal "overand beyond the call of duty." On the other hand,Russia at that time had given ample proof that shewas NOT to be trusted as an ally .

Acheson,goes on to say that "It was felt that therewas grave risk that secret information transmitted tothe Nationalist capital at this time would become avail-able to the Japanese almost immediately ."

White PaperIX1944 - 49

62


Yet, in the Yalta Papers there appears a cablegramfrom Acting Secretary of State Grew in Washington to

Yalta Papers Secretary of State Stettinius in Yalta, dated Feb . 5,952-3 1945, which proves that Chiang was already aware of

the subjects to be discussed at Yalta . The cablegramconcerned a message from Ambassador Patrick Hurleyin China. Here is the pertinent part of Grew's cable :

"Chiang Kai-shek and Soong have informed Hurleythat the Soviet Government has agreed to receive Soong asa personal representative of the Generalissimo . . . Dis-cussions will cover establishment of closer relations, Sovietparticipation in the war against Japan, Soviet-Chineserelation in Korea and Manchuria, post-war economicmatters and the Sino-Soviet border . Hurley invites sug-gestions regarding this agenda for Chiang who desires fullcooperation . . ." (Emphasis mine .)

Perhaps when Mr. Acheson presented his Letter ofTransmittal, he was confident that the Yalta Paperswould never be published .

Why did Stalin want the agreement kept secret? TheSherwood

pretense was this . He told Roosevelt at Yalta that "he866 intended to start the movement of twenty-five Russian

divisions across Siberia to the Far East and thisoperation must be conducted in utmost secrecy . . ."Perhaps FDR did not know that it was physically im-possible for Japan to do anything about such a move-ment of troops. But there is no doubt that his "ad-visers" at Yalta were well aware that Japan was onher last legs .

The proposed reason for Stalin moving twenty-fivedivisions to the border of Manchuria was to helpChina defeat the Japanese . But from a close examina-tion of the Yalta documents, it is obvious that theywere to be used to help the Red Chinese troops against

Yalta 952

Chiang. The Soviets postponed the meeting with SoongYalta 769 to late February or March . And at Yalta, Stalin told

Roosevelt that "when it was possible to . . . movetwenty-five divisions to the Far East it would be pos-sible to speak to Marshal Chiang Kai-shek about these


63matters." "These matters," of course, being the Chi-nese territory Russia was to get. Stalin suggested thetime for the meeting with Soong should be the end ofApril. The implication of these minutes is that withtwenty-five formidable Russian divisions on the Chi-nese border, Chiang would "wholeheartedly" agree togiving up his territory to the Russians .

Meanwhile, Ambassador Hurley in China cabled thatChiang wanted a meeting between himself, Rooseveltand Churchill at Delhi to discuss the Yalta agreements .There is no record in the published documents that thiscable was ever answered . Perhaps it was one of themany which were omitted . But Chiang never got hischance to have a meeting with Churchill and Roose-velt .

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey gives aclear picture of the military situation in the Pacific onthe eve of Yalta :

In June the loss of the Marianas had struck terror into thehearts of responsible Japanese authorities and had convincedmany that the war was lost. By January 1945 Japan wasin fact a defeated nation . The Philippines had been lost,true, but much more important was what had been lost withthem. The Southern Resources Area, the prize for whichthe war had been fought, was gone and American fleetssailed with impunity to the shores of eastern Asia . Allhope of future resistance had depended upon oil and nowthe tankers were sunk and the oil cut off . The surfacefleet was gone, and so were Moo aircraft, expended in fourmonths defense of the last supply line. Suicide attack,bleeding tactics, were now the last best hope of thisshrunken empire and even these economical methods ofdefense suffered from the blockade : pilot training was cutagain to a bare zoo hours and in the Inland Sea thesurviving ships of the Imperial Navy could barely musterenough oil for a last planned one-way trip .

At home the bad news began to be known and mutteringsof negotiated conditional peace arose even in the armedforces. Japan was defeated : it remained only necessaryto persuade her of the fact. (Emphasis mine.)

Yalta 960

USSBS TheCampaigns ofthe PacificWar 1946PP. 289-90

loyal to his alliance and continued to fight an enemywho add--offered great concessions to China in exchangefo

?On the other hand, a hint of things to come wasven the Generalissimo by the Teheran Conferencen December 1943 . The only time Chiang was invitedto a meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill was atCairo, a few days before the Teheran meeting tookplace. It was at Cairo that Roosevelt promised theChinese to carry out a vigorous campaign to recap-

MacA 3-2416 ture Burma, and, according to General Wedemeyer,"Chiang Kai-shek was told there substantially thatthe sovereignty of China over Manchuria would berecognized and Formosa would be returned to China."But "The agreement at Cairo did not stick for more

Sherwood than ten days . . ." because at Teheran, Nov . 28,774

1943, Stalin's statement that Russia would join the war

64


Instead of persuading Japan to accept defeat, how-ever, Roosevelt was persuaded that he must buy Rus-sian help to defeat an already defeated foe . The pricewas high in blood, treasure, honor and in peace itself .

President Roosevelt died the following April, butPresident Truman carried out the word of his pred-ecessor. On August 14, 1945, Chiang's Foreign Minis-ter, Wang Shih-chieh, put his signature to a separatetreaty with Russia in Moscow, the news of which waslost in the excitement of VJ-day . If China had notsigned, it was a foregone conclusion that no further aidwould come from America in China's desperate fightagainst the Chinese Communists .

It must have been a very lonely day for the Gen-eralissimo, who, unknown to the world, had agreed tosign away the freedom of his country and incidentallyworld peace, which that day was so mistakenly cele-brated. And no one knew it better than Chiang .

It is permissible to speculate on what thoughtsflowed through the mind of Chiang Kai-shek. Did herecall the Japanese surrender offer? Did he recall that,when the United States did not respond, he remained


65in the Pacific caused Roosevelt to abandon any "vigor-ous" aid to China. Later, the story goes, certain mem-bers of the State Department staff came to referto the meeting at Teheran as "the corrective con-ference," putting their seal of approval on the changein policy toward China .

From early in the war Franklin Roosevelt was de-termined to help Chiang as much as possible . Helooked upon the Generalissimo as one of the UnitedStates' stanchest allies . But strangely, he abandonedhis friend on the instalment plan, finally ending withhis signature to the Yalta Agreement .

As a footnote, Robert Sherwood writes that "asidefrom the declaration assuring the freedom and inde-pendence of Korea, the effect of these meetings (atCairo) on the progress of the war or on history wasnegligible ."

According to recent history it would seem that thedeclaration concerning Korea was also "negligible ."

Perhaps Chiang was also reflecting on the generalatmosphere at Cairo and the following "corrective con-ference" at Teheran as he pondered the treaty signingat Moscow .

One must remember that Harry Truman, who hadbeen President for only a few months prior to Potsdam,had to rely on the briefing of his inherited adviserswho were familiar with the Yalta Conference . Through-out his short term as vice-president, Mr . Truman hadbeen treated as another "Throttlebottom" and knewless about what the Chief Executive was doing than themost humble White House attache . But it is impossibleto believe that our American officials were merelynaive in forcing Chiang to sign the Russo-ChineseTreaty on V J-day .

It has been said by a number of apologists for Yaltathat Chiang was pleased with the Russo-ChineseTreaty. Charles Bohlen told a Congressional commit-tee in 1953 that "I know that at the time the Chinese-Soviet treaty was generally regarded as a victory for

Sherwood800

Sherwood771

Senate For-eign Rela-tions 124-5

66

The Enemy at His BackChiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Government, andit was so considered by him, if you can judge by hispublic statements."

This was a strange statement to be made by a manwho later became our ambassador to Russia as well asone of the chief advisers of President Eisenhower andSecretary of State Dulles at the 1955 conferences inGeneva. Bohlen knew, as well as anyone, you can'tjudge by public statements) Chiang still hoped wewould keep the Red Wolf from his door-and also, hehad to maintain the morale of the Chinese people . Howcould he tell them there was a good chance the Redhordes would take over?

General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who went withGeneral Patrick Hurley on June 15, 1945 when thelatter informed the Generalissimo of the Yalta Agree-ment, tells a different story . Chiang was stunned. Gen-

MacA 3-2417 eral Wedemeyer told a Congressional committee thatafter General Hurley had recited the agreement toChiang: "He did not ask a question . He just was silentfor about a minute . And then he asked AmbassadorHurley through the interpreter to please repeat that. . . And then he just said that he was terribly disap-pointed, or words to that effect ."

Premier T. V. Soong was sent to Moscow immedi-ately to negotiate the treaty. The insults and arro-gance he received from the Russians, plus the time hewas kept cooling his heels, caused him to return toChungking, leaving the negotiations to be carried onby Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh. General Wede-meyer testified that Soong felt so strongly about thetreaty that he "told me he would not sign such an

MacA 3-2432 agreement . . . ceding territory whose sovereigntyhad been recognized," and "he didn't ." Wang Shih-chieh signed in his stead .

However, Russia did not bother very much with thetreaty. It had merely given the Communists the keyrailways and ports they needed without the necessityof fighting for them . Moreover, Russia had other plans .The treaty was the last necessary step before the Red


67Chinese could begin their big push to take over all ofChina, eventually forcing Chiang and the Nationalisttroops to seek refuge on Formosa . Russia waited from1936 (Dimitrov's speech) to 1949 for this vitally im-portant territorial gain toward world domination . InFebruary 1950 the Soviets signed a "thirty-year friend-ship and mutual defense pact" with Mao Tse-tung,the Red leader . With the fall of China and this pactthe Korean war was all set to go four months later .

The story of Yalta his strange and shocking . Futurehistorians will always wonder why President Roosevelt,speaking before a joint session of the Congress of theUnited States, March 1, 1945, said, "Quite naturally,this conference concerned itself only with the Europeanwar and with the political problems of Europe andnot with the Pacific war ."

But these revelations we learned in later years . Atthat time only a few men in Congress saw the follyof secret conferences and secret agreements . However,their lonely voices were shouted down with hints oftreason, and their personal characters were ridiculedbefore the public in every possible way .

The late Robert A . Taft was a "blackguard" playinginto the hands of the Nazis ; Martin Dies was smearedto high heaven for daring to expose the evil intentionsof Russia; the late Senator Kenneth Wherry was thedarkest of rascals ; and Senator Styles Bridges was acontemptible "reactionary" for boldly stating on theSenate floor and in newspaper interviews that "theAmerican people want to know" if our gallant allieshave been sold out by secret "commitments ."

In order to understand American policy during thewar years it is necessary to become familiar with amost extraordinary memorandum . It was prepared forHarryHopkins by General James H . Burns, Execu-tive Director of Lend-Lease who reported directly toHopkins. Like all of Hopkins' aides, Burns felt freeto ignore all top-ranking officials, and in dealing withthe Russians his power was subordinate only to his

Standle

Sherwood641

Sherwood641 -3

Sherwood544

68

The Enemy at His Backboss. The subject of the memo was the absolute needto have Russia as a friend . It was, in fact, the basis forour wartime foreign policy, and has remained so eventoday. Indeed, it seems to have replaced the Decla-ration of Independence.

For an official memo it smacks of fanaticism . RobertSherwood published it in its entirety because he said," . . . it was an excellent statement of Hopkins' ownviews . . ."

The following selected items explain many actionsby our government heretofore unexplainable .

6. WITH REFERENCE TO OUR NEED FOR RUSSIAAS A REAL FRIEND AND CUSTOMER IN THEPOST-WAR PERIOD.

8. (c) Do everything possible in a generous but not lavishway to help Russia by sending supplies to the limit ofshipping possibilities and by sending forces to Russiato join with her in the fight against Germany . (Emphasismine. See appendix for additional text .)

Item (c) provides the background for a remarkableaction taken by President Roosevelt during the stickyand tragic problem of the "Murmansk run ." Our shipscarrying supplies and munitions to Russia through thenarrow Arctic waters met such terrible disasters at thehands of the German fleet that our losses amounted to

~' one out of every three ships . Hopkins was distressedover • • •ures lcrcause it meant our ships were_being sunk faster than we cou d build them .

"At one time," writes Sherwood, "there were fifteenships in Iceland that had turned back from the Murmansk run ; . . . there were twenty-one more Rus-sian-bound ships halfway to Iceland that had to bererouted to Loch Ewe in Scotland because of the con-gestion at Reykjavik . . . In order to free some ofthese idle ships for some useful service their cargoeswere unloaded in Scotland, which led to all manner ofacrimonious charges from Moscow that the British


69

were `stealing' Lend-Lease material assigned to them .There was consequently an increasing effort to get theships through at whatever cost-and the cost wasawful."

For a short time the Murmansk run was abandoned .Although Stalin was well informed of our untenablelosses, neither Hopkins nor Roosevelt could get up hisnerve to tell him the last convoy had been cancelled.Finally on Oct . 5, 1942, Roosevelt sent a cable toChurchill in which he "indicated he had reconsideredthe question of cancelling the convoy PQ 19." He pro-posed that the ships sail in twos and threes " . . . atintervals of twenty-four to forty-eight hours, supportedby two or three escorts ." He emphasized to the PrimeMinister :

"I think it is better under any circumstances that we Sherwoodrun this risk rather than endanger our whole relations with 639Russia at this time ."

The words of Alfred Lord Tennyson-"Theirs notto reason why, Theirs but to do and die," more ade-quately commemorate the sailors and seamen on theMurmansk run than the heroes of Balaclava. The"Noble six hundred" at least, were dying because"some one had blundered" on the battle field . Our boys,on the other hand, were being extravagantly sacrificedby a carefully considered decision made in Washing-ton .

The next item of the Burns' memorandum revealsmore than anything else the difficulty CongressmanMartin Dies had as chairman of the Un-American Ac-tivities Committee in exposing Communists in govern-ment agencies . The problem is still with us, and maybethe memorandum is too .

8 . (g) Establish the general policy throughout all U.S .departments and agencies that Russia must be con-sidered as a real friend and be treated accordinglyand that personnel must be assigned to Russian con-

Sherwood638 -9

Sherwood643

Yalta Papers396

70

The Enemy at His Backtacts that are loyal to this concept . (Emphasismine.)

This extraordinary paragraph implies that only pro-Russian Americans in our government service were tobe selected to make contacts with Russian officials, thelatter, of course, being trained spies .

A curious follow-up on this is to be found in amemorandum from the joint Chiefs of Staff to thePresident dated 23 January 1945 . It was signed, not bythe Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Leahy, but byGeneral George C. Marshall. The subject concerned"the status to date of negotiations with the Russians ."The last paragraph enumerated the many delays in thewar effort caused by the Russians . Marshall said theJCS suggested that Stalin be . asked to clear up thesedifficulties, "and that he also be asked to state whatinefficiencies and delays his own people have experi-enced in working with the U.S. in order that we maymake necessary corrections on our side ."

In other words, Marshall wanted the Russians totattle on Americans whom the Soviets considered re-sponsible for delay in our aid to Russia so he could"make necessary corrections!"

The final item in the Burns' memo was the basis forour policy at Yalta :

With this memorandum as a background it is under-standable that diplomats who disagreed with the ap-peasement of the Russians were shunted off to remoteposts where they were too far away to create inter-ference. And it also explains why military officers whoput America's interests first at all times were de-moted or transferred to non-sensitive outfits andeventually retired .

A classic though little publicized example is the fol-

Sherwood 8 (j) Agree to assist, in every proper and friendly way,643 to formulate a peace that will meet Russia's legiti-

mate aspirations .


71lowing story. Former Governor George H . Earle ofPennsylvania was a Lieutenant Commander in theNavy serving as assistant naval attache in Turkeywhen he sent frantic dispatches to Washington of thealarming situation in that country in regard to Russia .Frustrated when he received no replies, he became con-vinced that his messages were being pigeonholed bylower echelon officers . He flew to Washington and hada personal interview with President Roosevelt . ThePresident assumed a fatherly and sympathetic attitude,and noted that the strain of work in Turkey was"telling" on the former governor . He suggested a newpost where the work was light and the weather pleas-ant. With amazing speed, Commander Earle becameGovernor of Samoa, a remote island in the Pacific .There he literally was forgotten until after the warwhen it took the personal intervention of a Pennsyl-vania Congressman with President Truman to releaseGovernor Earle from his Samoan exile .

At the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Moscow inOctober 1943, Stalin promised Secretary of StateCordell Hull that Russia would enter the war againstJapan. At Teheran, two months later, the details werespelled out to President Roosevelt . Stalin announcedthat Russia would enter the Pacific war three monthsafter the defeat of Germany. He explained that hewould need three 'months to transfer his troops fromEurope to Siberia on the Manchurian border .

However, the Japanese foreign service officer, Mr .Kase, writes (and our intelligence as well as theJapanese and Chinese knew) that Stalin did not waitfor the fall of Germany to start moving his troops . Kase 165-6Kase points out that the Japanese military position wasrapidly deteriorating and that, in order to reinforce thehome defense, Japan transferred the bulk of its highlytrained Manchurian army to Japan. This left Man-churia "thinly defended ." Mr. Kase then goes on tosay that "Beginning about March 1945, trainload aftertrainload of Russian soldiers and equipment was sent

Stattinius 9o

Stettinius 97

7 The Enemy at His Backeastward from the European theater where the waragainst Germany was drawing to a close ."

Again we remember that the only stated reason forkeeping the Yalta agreement secret from Chiang wasthat, if the Chinese knew, they might leak the news ofthese troop movements to the Japanese . How suchlarge troop movements could NOT be detected by theenemy and allied agents and observers is difficult tounderstand. And the Japanese did know it. Mr. Ache-son made no mention of this fact in his Letter of Trans-mittal in the White Paper .

It was not to be expected that Philip Jessup, incharge of writing the 1949 White Paper for Acheson,would make known the fact that a number of thePresident's advisers not only did not believe it wasnecessary to get Russia into the Pacific war, but onthe contrary were fearful of the consequences if shedid . The one-sided White Paper contained only thoseviews which would give support to the Yalta agree-ments. But all through the memoirs written of thosedays we find polite and restrained references to thedisagreements when "the Army" in the person of Gen-eral Marshall differed with the Naval officers andcivilian statesmen. The latter protested that the warhad already been won. To quote Stettinius

"I knew at Yalta, for instance, of the immense pressureput on the President by our military leaders to bringRussia into the Far Eastern war . . ."

This pressure persisted, according to Stettinius, upto the San Francisco United Nations meeting . He com-ments in his book about a discussion he had with Presi-dent Truman shortly before the conference, April 25,1945, about the Soviet violations of the Yalta agree-ments

" . . . the United States military representatives pleaded forpatience with the Soviet Union because they feared that acrack-down would endanger Russian entry into the FarEastern war."

Yalta and the Advisers 73In commenting on his own advice en route to Yalta,

Admiral Leahy recorded :

"I was of the firm opinion that our war against Japanhad progressed to the point where her defeat was only amatter of time and attrition . Therefore, we did not needStalin's help to defeat our enemy in the Pacific . The Armydid not agree with me . . ."

James F. Byrnes borrows Admiral Leahy's "jaun-diced" view in "Speaking Frankly"

"I must frankly admit that in view of what we know ofSoviet actions in eastern Germany and the violations ofthe Yalta agreements in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria,I would have been satisfied had the Russians determinednot to enter the war . . . I feared what would happenwhen the Red Army entered Manchuria. Before it leftManchuria my fears were realized ."

Commander Whitehill, ghosting for Admiral King,reflects the Admiral's opinion on the subject :

"To King, Leahy, Nimitz, and naval officers in general,it had always seemed that the defeat of Japan could beaccomplished by sea and air power alone without thenecessity of actual invasion of the Japanese home islandsby ground troops . From the time of the TeheranConference there had been the political consideration ofSoviet intervention in the war against Japan, and theArmy had been convinced that the use of ground troopswould be necessary. Upon Marshall's insistence, whichalso reflected MacArthur's views, the joint Chiefs hadprepared plans for landing in Kyushu and eventually inthe Tokyo plain . King and Leahy did not like the idea,but as unanimous decisions were necessary in the JointChiefs meetings, they reluctantly acquiesced, feeling thatin the end sea power would accomplish the defeat ofJapan, as proved to be the case ."

I have purposely italicized the words above be-cause the readers of various memoirs and Congres-

Leahy 293

Bvrnes 208

King 598

Willoughby285

74

The Enemy at His Backsional hearings can be seriously misled by the oftenrepeated statements that "such-and-such was the unani-mous opinion of the joint Chiefs of Staff ." This leavesthe implication that "therefore if everyone agreed, itmust have been the best opinion ."

General MacArthur, however, did not join his Armycolleagues in Washington in the belief that Russian aidin the Pacific was a necessity. John Chamberlain whocollaborated with Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby inthe book, "MacArthur," quotes the General's com-ment :

"From the viewpoint of my Headquarters, Russianparticipation was not required . I had urged Russian inter-vention back in 1941 to draw the Japanese from theirsouthward march and keep them pinned down in Siberia .By 1 945 such intervention had become superfluous ."

General MacArthur's views on the Pacific war werenot asked for before or during Yalta. In fact he wasonly told after the Conference about the military de-

Pentagon

cisions and not about the "price" we paid . Yet whopapers 5o

would know better whether it was necessary to obtainRussia's help against Japan?

Added to these points of view, the joint Chiefs ofStaff, according to the "Pentagon papers" published in

Pentagon

October 1955, recommended as early as Novemberpapers 39 23, 1944, that "Soviet participation, while desirable to

hasten the unconditional surrender of Japan, was notessential. Therefore, support should not be given theSoviets at the expense of the main United States effortin the Pacific."

The most curious aspect of all this was that Stalinwas afraid that we would not need Russia to defeatJapan! Ambassador Harriman sent a report to Presi-

34-5 dent Roosevelt on a meeting he had with Stalin Sept .23, 1944 in which he said that "Stalin inquired whetherwe wished to bring Japan to her knees without Russianassistance or whether you wished as you suggested inTeheran Russian participation ." Roosevelt sent a hasty

Yalta and the Advisers 75assurance to Stalin, and then sent a message to Church-ill saying "Stalin is at the present time sensitive aboutany doubt as to his intention to help us in the Orient."

While the American public did not have access tothis inside information, the daily papers had been con-sistently reporting the series of defeats suffered by theJapanese. Along with this was a sprinkling of propa-ganda against the Emperor . The following are a fewitems reported directly after Yalta :

N.Y. TIMES, FEB. 13, 1945London, Feb . 12 .-The Chinese delegation to the WorldTrade Union conference demanded today the Emperor ofJapan be brought to trial as a war criminal .

WASHINGTON EVENING STAR, FEB . 14, 1945Feb . 14-A Tokyo radio commentator told the world ina broadcast heard in London today that it is Japan'spolicy "not to reject any hand which offers peace ."(Quoting Shigemitzu .)

WASHINGTON EVENING STAR, FEB . 15, 1945Pacific Fleet Headquarters, Guam, Feb . 16, AP . . . Thegreatest Naval fleet ever assembled hunted for a fightwithin 300 miles of Japan's shores .

WASHINGTON EVENING STAR, FEB . 19, 1945Feb. 19, AP . . . Admiral Halsey said today . . . they(the Japanese) have got very little left to fight with andwhat they have is not good enough ."

On March 23rd the New York Times reported Brig .Gen. Carlos P . Romulo, Resident Commissioner tothe Philippines, as calling "for Congressional actionagainst war criminals, including the Japanese Mikado ."On March 12, a dispatch from Guam told that the

Japanese had lost at least 17 warships, including a45,000 ton super battleship and 8 aircraft carriers . OnMarch 31st, American carrier planes sank 18 Japaneseships, probably sunk 13 others and damaged 15 . Theamazing total was 56 .

Roth in his "Dilemma in Japan" reflects the fears ofthe Communists that the war was coming to an end

76

The Enemy at His Backsooner than they had expected. He warned that in the

Roth z4 first months of 31945, that is, at the time of Yalta, itwas realized that Japan, being on the rocks for allpractical reasons, might make offers of peace . This ac-counts for the almost frantic propaganda the Com-munists began to manufacture against the Emperor,stepping up the "line" in a faster acceleration .

To understand fully the attitude of the controllingpowers in Washington, it is helpful to read the com-ments of those authors who favored the policies atYalta. Robert Sherwood was a close associate of theWhite House group and had intimate knowledge ofthose who made our policies . In his book he reveals thefact that MacArthur's reports to Washington did notalways reach the President. This was also suspected byHanson Baldwin, military editor of the New York

Baldwin 8o-r Times, who contended in his book, "Great Mistakes ofthe War," that much information and military intelli-gence concerning the Pacific never reached the top atthe Yalta Conference .

Sherwood writes :

Sherwood

On March 24 (1945), I went to see the President in his878 office . . . I said that . . . victory in the Pacific appeared

a great deal nearer than I had imagined before I made thistrip. I told the President what I had heard MacArthur sayon this subject, and Roosevelt observed, rather wistfully, "Iwish that he would sometimes tell some of these things toME." He then asked me to put my observations in the formof a short memorandum, and I did so as follows :i . General MacArthur's intelligence service on the enemyand enemy-held territory is superb, due largely to theFilipino guerilla organization which was organized anddirected under his command .2 . On the other hand I was shocked by the inaccuracy ofthe information held by General MacArthur and his im-mediate entourage about the formulation of high policy inWashington . There are unmistakable evidences of an acutepersecution complex at work. To hear some of the staffofficers talk, one would think that the War Department, theState Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff-and, possibly,even the White House itself-are under the domination of

Yalta and the Advisers 77"Communists and British Imperialists." This strange mis-apprehension produces an obviously unhealthy state ofmind, and also the most unfortunate public relations policythat I have seen in any theater of war . . .3 . . . . Following is a brief summary of General Mac-Arthur's views on the future handling of Japan which heexpressed to me at considerable length and with great posi-tiveness and eloquence :. . . The total destruction of Japanese military power,therefore, can involve (for the Japanese civil population)destruction of the concept of Hirohito's divinity. This willresult in a spiritual vacuum and an opportunity for theintroduction of new concepts . . .

A note from General Willoughby, General Mac-Arthur's chief of intelligence, states that "MacArthurwas opposed to the removal of the Emperor ." (Empha-sis his .)

Some years later, in March 1953, when CharlesBohlen appeared before the Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee for confirmation on his appointment byPresident Eisenhower as United States Ambassador toRussia, he shed further light on the Yalta Agreements .Having served as adviser and interpreter at the Mos-cow Foreign Ministers meeting in 1943, and subse-quently at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam, he is morefamiliar with the story of World War II than mostliving persons . Unfortunately he has not seen fit towrite his memoirs .

Former Senator Homer Ferguson, Republican ofMichigan, and a member of the committee, interro-gated Mr. Bohlen extensively . Discussing the wordingof the agreement he asked-

Senator Ferguson . (reading) " . . . the President will take Bohlen hear-measures in order to obtain the concurrence on advice from ings 22-23

Marshal Stalin."Now, is it not true that he is going to "take measures,"

and not just request them?Mr. Bohlen. I understood that the words "take measures"in that sense means that he will use his influence withChiang Kai-shek to that effect .

page go

page 39

78

The Enemy at His BackSenator Ferguson . Was it not more than influence ; was itnot meant that measures would be taken?Mr. Bohlen . I have understood, sir, that the word "meas-ures" meant that you were not going to do anything exceptto urge upon the Chinese acceptance of this .

*

*

*

Senator Ferguson. We were going to force China to do this .Mr. Bohlen . This is the question. The question did notarise because it was not necessary to use any force or pres-sure on them . In fact, quite the contrary .Senator Ferguson. Chiang Kai-shek had to have help fromus. There isn't any doubt about it, to fight Red China .

*

*

*

Senator Ferguson . Do you know whose words I read to youthis morning : "Take measures to obtain `the concurrence ofChiang Kai-shek with the provisions ."' Do you know whosewords those are?Mr. Bohlen. No, sir ; I don't . . .Senator Ferguson . You don't know who even suggested that?Mr. Bohlen. No .

The text of the agreement, Mr . Bohlen testified, waspage 47 drawn up by Harriman and Molotov with only a

Russian interpreter present . At the two meetings atwhich the terms were discussed and agreed upon byRoosevelt and Stalin, those others present were Molo-tov, Harriman, Bohlen and a Soviet interpreter .

Senator Ferguson interrogated the witness concern-ing the moral meaning of the agreement . He asked Mr.Bohlen :

page 22 Senator Ferguson. . . . what I want to know is whether ornot the giving of this land of another power, another na-tion, was not in violation of the Atlantic Charter . . . ?Mr. Bohlen. Well, sir, I do not think that the AtlanticCharter was against any territorial adjustments betweencountries . . . .

page 24 Senator Ferguson. . . . Was it not true in the Nine PowerPact that we agreed to respect the sovereignty, the inde-pendence, and the territorial and administrative integrityof China?


79Mr. Bohlen . Yes, as I understand it ; I am not too familiarwith the text of it .Senator Ferguson. Do you believe that what was done atYalta breached and repudiated that part of the Nine PowerPact that I read to you?Mr. Bohlen . Senator, that is a matter of opinion . . . .

Senator Ferguson. Then you come to the conclusion that Bohlen 23the only wrong that you can find in these agreements atYalta, Teheran, or any of the others that we made withRussia, was in the interpretation?Mr. Bohlen . No, sir ; I think that the chief thing that waswrong was the violation of them afterward . (By the Rus-sians.) (Emphasis mine .)

Many good Republicans would not have voted toconfirm Mr. Bohlen's appointment as ambassador toRussia if he had been appointed by a Democratic ad-ministration. But they, as well as the now ex-SenatorFerguson, remained loyal to the new Eisenhower ad-ministration and supported the candidate even thoughthey were thoroughly familiar with Bohlen's politicalphilosophy exposed in his testimony before the ForeignRelations Committee .

Averell Harriman is a "photo-finish" second toBohlen in his knowledge of our wartime dealings withRussia. Bohlen's role as interpreter and adviser be-tween Roosevelt and Stalin when the two met alone isall that puts him first . Otherwise Harriman was presentat almost every important meeting, "Big Three" andotherwise .

Governor Harriman could, if he would, throw greatlight on past U .S.-Soviet relations . But his only con-tribution to historians has been his statement "Re-garding our Wartime Relations with the Soviet Union"which he drew up for the MacArthur hearings in 1951 .Bohlen fell back on this statement during his own hear-ings in 1953 .

In this statement Harriman begins by condemningall those who have criticized the Yalta agreements, MacA 5-3228

8o

The Enemy at His Backsaying some of these people "have profited from hind-sight." (And "hindsight" is the excuse we have beenhearing all along .) "Still others," he said, " . . . havedistorted and perverted the facts to a point where theirstatements have little or no basis in reality ."

But if an interested party should ask if there hadbeen any "foresight" information before Yalta, I wouldunhesitatingly direct them to a memorandum found

Yalta Papers in the Yalta Papers, written by none other than Am-450-5 bassador to Russia W. Averell Harriman, Jan. io,

1945, and received by the Secretary of State, Stettinius,exactly one month before the Yalta agreements weresigned! If the United States delegation to the YaltaConference had made this document, written by Harri-man, the basis for their policies, the world would havebeen a different place today .

One of the most interesting passages is the followingobservation. Mr. Harriman wrote that the SovietUnion was incorporating into their Union all alliedcountries on their borders by the use of a "widevariety of means ." Let us look carefully at the list of"means" he gave .

Yalta Papers450

occupation troopssecret policelocal communist partieslabor unionssympathetic leftist organizationssponsored cultural societieseconomic pressure

Except for "occupation troops," Soviet Russia hasbeen using these same "means" in the United Statestoday. Why hasn't Averell Harriman dedicated himselfover the past ten years to warning America that Russiauses these "dupes and allies" in an attempt to over-throw our government?

"It is particularly noteworthy," he wrote in 1945,"that no practical distinction seems to be made in thisconnection between members of the United Nations


81whose territory is liberated (from the Nazis) by Soviettroops and ex-enemy countries which have been oc-cupied . . . The Soviet conception of `security' does Yalta Papersnot appear cognizant of the similar needs or rights of 451other countries . . ."

I have found in my research a number of othermemos from Harriman warning that Russia's actionsmake her an untrustworthy ally . And because of thesememos, Mr. Harriman must have been aware that the"Agreement Regarding Japan," which Stalin dreamedup and Harriman and Molotov negotiated, was boundto throw all of Asia into the Red orbit.

How is it possible for him to say in his 1951 state-ment that, "The postwar problems have resulted not MacA 5-33z8from the understandings reached at Yalta but from thefact that Stalin failed to carry out those understand-ings and from aggressive actions by the Kremlin"?

What made him change his mind in postwar years?Mr. Harriman, as well as everyone else in our gov-

ernment at the time of Yalta had ample proof thatRussia was not likely to keep her promises or stand byher treaties . The Yalta Papers contain some warningmemoranda-but omit others . The Yalta Papers donot include any documents showing Japanese offers tosurrender. Could there have been telephone conver-sations such as Harry Truman had with WinstonChurchill when they discussed the German offer tosurrender in April 1945? Did either Roosevelt orTruman know that Japan had been offering to sur-render?

Until another more enlightening memoir is written,or Congressional committees ask more questions ofthose responsible, much information on Yalta will diewith this generation . When the Papers were finallypublished-after a nine year delay-the State Depart-ment admitted they were incomplete . Some of theomissions were of the Department's own making, andmany were not. For instance, the Stettinius estate,Governor James F. Byrnes and Governor W . AverellHarriman refused to contribute their own notes and

82

The Enemy at His Backdocuments. And, although the Roosevelt and Hopkinspapers kept in the Hyde Park Library were madeavailable on request, a full search of those documentswas never requested . What are these heavy secrets stillso carefully kept from the American public?

Yalta has become a new word with a new meaningbecause it was a turning point in world history . Itproduced death instead of life, war instead of peace,hate instead of friendship, lies instead of truth .

Chapter IV

OKINAWA-SUZUKI-EUGENE DOOMANTESTIFIES

Okinawa, April r to June 21, 1945 .Hirohito sends up a "smoke signal."Press reports.Peace feelers .Eugene Dooman testifies.

ON April Fool's Day 1945, a United States Army,Navy and Marine force under Admiral Raymond A .Spruance, launched another D-day which was to beone of the bloodiest battles in history-Okinawa . Itwas the beginning of nearly three months of warfarewith which only Tarawa and Iwo Jima compared incruelty. It was here that an ordinary American kid,who should have been worried about college exams anddates, now grasped a flame thrower and watched aman's face drop to the ground like a slab of butter .

Although the Japanese Air Force and battle fleet hadbeen so depleted that they were able to give only tokensupport to their large land force on Okinawa, theJapanese fought stubbornly and without hope . An APdispatch from Guam on April 3rd 1945 reflected thefighting ability of our own men when it reported that"Almost io days ahead of schedule, the 25th Corpsinfantrymen today were on the eastern shore of Oki-nawa."

But it was only the beginning of the weary, bloodydays which followed one after another with repetitiousterror and GI's called the gain of a yard a victory.

Had normal reactions been allowed to carry throughand the surrender of Japan been accepted, the battlesof Iwo Jima and Okinawa would never have takenplace. And there is good reason to believe that theenormous casualties suffered by our youths in thosebattles greatly influenced our new President, Harry

83

Kase rob

rr6 alsoUSSBS,Japan'sStruggle toEnd theWar 6

D.C. StarApril 6, 145

84

The Enemy at His BackTruman, in his desire to obtain aid from Russia in thePacific war .

That Okinawa was a lost battle, and that its lossmeant utter disaster, was known to the Japanese mili-tary and recognized by the "moderates" and "liberals"of the peace party . The situation called for drastic anddesperate steps to end the war . "On April 4th," Mr .Kase writes, "the Koiso cabinet (which followed theTojo cabinet) died an ignominious death ." Koiso wasa "snow man melting away into water under the raysof the sun," Mr . Kase went on, and "The sun was therising sentiment of the people at large for peace-peace at any price."

It was at this time that the Emperor sent up his"smoke signal," a signal that rose so high the wholeworld would see it and understand it for what it was-the white flag of truce . The "signal" was the appoint-ment of Admiral Baron Kantaro Suzuki as the newpremier. He had belonged to the "moderates" all hislife and had always been an avowed pacifist. Thosewho have followed the political history of Japan willremember that Suzuki had been one of the targets ofthe "young militarists" uprising in 1936 and at thattime he had been shot and left for dead . His appoint-ment in April 1945 was a signal to the Allies that theEmperor had won a victory over the militarist leaders,and that Japan was willing to talk surrender .

The significance of the appointment of Baron Suzukiwas recognized by diplomats, statesmen and news-papermen from continent to continent . But to those inWashington who had power to take action, it appar-ently carried no serious meaning . An enterprising andanalytical reporter for the Associated Press wrote a dis-patch on April 5th 1945 which should have at leastgiven the public and Congress a hint . "Admiral BaronKantaro Suzuki," he wrote, "may be the front man fora Japanese peace offensive . . . which the Japanesemight hope could gain a hearing for peace tenders toAmerica and her allies ."

The Communist Party recognized fully the signifi-

Okinawa-Suzuki-Eugene Dooman Testifies

85cance of Suzuki and we can find testimony to this inRoth's "Dilemma in Japan." He wrote that all that wasneeded to make the Suzuki Cabinet a complete peacecabinet was for them to get rid of the "militarists orGumbatsu."

For several days the press in America emphasizedthe peace signal but, like the seeds that fell on barrenground instead of fertile soil, Suzuki's appointment metwith official eyes that were "blind" and ears that were"deaf."

An editorial in the Washington Evening Star onApril 6 notes

This might be the first move toward a bid for a compro-mise peace with the western powers before Russia enteredthe picture .

On the same page Major George Fielding Eliot alsocaught the meaning, although he took the oppositetack :

The point for Americans to keep firmly in mind is that wemust not be deceived by the appointment of Suzuki . . .All Americans will welcome Russian collaboration in thetask of bringing that surrender to pass .

This, of course, was the policy of our government,and more than likely was given Major Eliot in an inter-view with the often quoted "high official source ."

Another to take notice of this important Japanesestep was former President Hoover . He considered it ofsuch great importance that he requested an appoint-ment with President Truman to discuss the matter, andcame to Washington for that purpose .

To those well acquainted with the personalities andpolitical character of Japanese statesmen, it was alsosignificant that Suzuki's Foreign Minister, Togo, be-longed to the "peace party" as did Admiral Yonai,the Navy Minister, who "was an avowed supporterof the peace movement and was widely acknowledged

Kase r43

Kase xgx

USSBSJapan'sStruggle toEnd theWar p . 6

86

The Enemy at His Backas such." These facts were all brought out by Mr .Hoover in talking with President Truman . While thelatter listened with apparent interest, his closing re-mark, asking Mr . Hoover to make a memo on the sub-ject, threw a wet rag on Mr . Hoover's hopes for peace .It is not out of the way to wonder why Mr . Truman'sreaction was so negative . Could it be possible that, inpreparation for the former Republican President's visitto the White House, Truman's advisers had briefedhim in advance and convinced him that the Suzuki ap-pointment was unimportant? With a sense of futility,Mr. Hoover went back to New York and sent thememo.

World wide political effects so often depend onwhether a man has a quick mind or a slow one ;whether he is strong or weak . As we shall see, AdmiralSuzuki pulled one or two boners himself . It was hisfirst venture in political affairs for many years, and,not being aware of all the current factors, he was moreoptimistically inclined than his colleagues. WhenSuzuki became premier, he told his people that "Thereis but one way for our nation to follow, and that isto fight to the very end . . . The unconditional sur-render voiced by the enemy means the death of ourpeople. We have no way but to fight ." This speechhelped the Left clique in America to ignore the "smokesignal."

Suzuki's problem, of course, was "On the one handhe had instructions from the Emperor to arrange anend to the war" but he had to, do it without alertingthe remnants of the "war party" who might assassinatehim 1

Unconditional surrender was as irrevocable as the16th Amendment on income tax, and the Pentagonpapers very plainly point out that, as long as this policystood, the invasion of the Japanese islands was anecessity. On April 24, 1945, the joint Chiefs againreviewed the Pacific picture . The report on this meet-ing is one of the most important documents of thewar, yet I have not found any extensive reference to


87it in any of the memoirs I have read . The JCS saidthat "In no case to date in this war have organizedJapanese units surrendered . The concept of 'uncon-ditional surrender' is foreign to the Japanese nature"and that "Unless a definition of unconditional sur-render can be given which is acceptable to the Jap-anese, there is no alternative to annihilation and noprospect that the threat of absolute defeat will bringcapitulation ."

"Annihilation," of course, was the desire of Russia .The JCS report went on to recommend that the def-

inition of unconditional surrender be made on a "gov-ernmental level." " . . . it is possible that a governmentcould be formed in Japan that would sign and couldenforce a surrender instrument ."

Was this suggestion made in rocognition of AdmiralSuzuki's new position as premier a couple of weeksearlier? There is no mention in the Pentagon papersthat this suggestion was considered . Who ignored it?As silence across the Pacific greeted the Suzuki

"smoke signal," the Emperor and the "peace party"experienced another frustration in a long series offrantic appeals for peace. And so Japan, like so manysubsequent nations in the years to come, lost hope inthe policies of the United States and sought an under-standing with Japan's historic enemy, Russia .Mr. Kase tells us that "By the middle of May, 1945,

the six top men of the Supreme War Council finallyagreed upon a course of policy toward the SovietUnion." They decided former ambassador to Moscow,Hirota, would approach the Soviet Ambassador inTokyo for the purpose of "improving Russo-Japaneserelations ." Hirota was to conduct the conversationsin three stages. If one and two didn't work he wasto try the third. This was-"If the worst became un-avoidable, request the Soviet government to use itsgood offices with the United States and Great Britainfor the restoration of peace ."

Hirota called on the Soviet Ambassador to Tokyo,the since famous, or infamous, Mr. Malik of the

The Entryof theSoviet Unioninto the WarAgainstJapan: Mili-tary Plans,1941-45P. 63

Kase 17o alsoUSSBSJapan'sStruggle toEnd the Warp. 6

88

The Enemy at His BackUnited Nations whose role as Soviet representativeon the Security Council during the Korean War needs

Kase 171

no recalling. Hirota had two talks with Malik, theSoviet playing "cat" to the Japanese's "mouse," andwhen Hirota asked for a third meeting, Malik declined"pleading `indisposition .' "

Back home, the American press gave a clear in-dication of Japan's ultimate defeat as catastrophestruck day after day while Japan's enemies weredemanding the death of the Emperor, striking evenmore terror in their souls :

NEW YORK TIMES, MAY 7, 1945Chungking, China, May 6, UP-Death for Emperor Hiro-hito, termed the No. i Japanese war criminal, was askedtoday by Chinese newspapers.

WASHINGTON EVENING STAR, MAY 22, 1945May 22, AP (headlines) Agitation for Peace Growing inJapan, High Official Admits

NEW YORK TIMES, MAY 25, 1945Chungking, China, May 24, AP-A communique of theUnited States 14th Air Force : Fighters and bombers ofthe Fourteenth Air Force swept Japanese operated rail-roads in the Yellow River area on May 23 without airopposition . . . From all these missions all our aircraftreturned.

NEW YORK TIMES, MAY 26, 1945Guam, Sat., May 26, AP-Pacific Fleet communique 373. . . One enemy bomber attempted a wheels-up landingon the Yontan field, but all occupants of the plane werekilled when they attempted to attack our installationswith hand grenades .

A discordant note is struck by another AP dispatchappearing in the Washington Evening Star, May 27,1945, which appears to have been inspired by thefamiliar "handout" from a government agency :


89AP-Japan still is capable of waging a long war despitedestructive air attacks and naval defeats which have cutoff almost entirely her stolen sources of rubber, oil andtin, the Foreign Economics Administration said last night .

"A large portion of the war industry she had at PearlHarbor is intact," said a report by the Enemy Branch ofthe agency. (Chief of the Enemy Branch was Henry N .Fowler .)

During this time Harry Hopkins was in Moscowhaving a series of highly important meetings withMarshal Stalin, cabling his reports to Washingtonevery day. And while Hopkins was in Moscow, therebegan, among the policy makers, one of the moststrange and heated episodes . Undersecretary Grewpresented Mr. Truman with a surrender paper whichhe had had drawn up for announcement to the Jap-anese, firmly believing that, if an inducement werepresented to Tokyo explaining our terms, there wasmore than a fair chance it would bring the war to anend. This, of course, was the same idea the JCS hadon April 24th. The President accepted the proposition,but asked that Mr . Grew first take it up with theWar Department before it was acted upon . The meet-ing took place in the Pentagon on May 29, 1945,and all those present agreed that the anouncementshould be made . However, General Marshall expressedthe opinion that the paper was "premature" and theproject was pigeonholed. (You will read details ofthis incident further in this chapter .) The question is,"why?"Perhaps a clue may be found in Harry Hopkins'

cabled reports of the conferences he had with MarshalStalin on the day before the "premature" Pentagonmeeting was held . His Kremlin conference took placeat 6 P.M . (io A.M . our time) on May 28th . The reportsent by Hopkins to President Truman and the StateDepartment is as follows : (The Pentagon papers givethe date of the Conference and the cable as May 29th.However, I am inclined to trust Robert Sherwood'sdate of May 28th.)

go

The Enemy at His BackSherwood

i. By August 8 the Soviet Army will be properly deployed9O 2

on the Manchurian positions.2 . The Marshal (Stalin) repeated his statement made at

Yalta that the Russian people must have a good reason forgoing to war and that depended on China's willingness toagree to the proposals made at Yalta .3 . For the first time he stated that he was willing to take

these proposals up directly with Soong when he comes toMoscow. He wants to see Soong not later than July i andexpects us to take the matter up at the same time withChiang Kai-shek. This procedure seems from our point ofview most desirable in light of Stalin's statements about theFar East which follow .4. Stalin left no doubt in our mind that he intends to at-

tack during August . It is therefore important that Soongcome here not later than July i . Stalin is ready to see himany time now .s . He made categorical statement that he would do every-

thing he could to promote unification of China under theleadership of Chiang Kai-shek. He further stated that thisleadership should continue after the war because no one elsewas strong enough . He specifically stated that no Communistleader was strong enough to unify China . In spite of thereservations he expressed about him, he proposes to backthe Generalissimo .6. Stalin repeated all of his statements made at Yalta that

he wanted a united and stable China and wanted China tocontrol all of Manchuria as part of a United China . Hestated categorically that he had no territorial claims againstChina and mentioned specifically Manchuria and Sinkiangand that in all areas his troops entered to fight the Japanesehe would respect Chinese sovereignty. (Emphasis mine .)7. The Marshal stated that he would welcome representa-

tives of the Generalissimo to be with his troops enteringManchuria in order to facilitate the organization in Man-churia of Chinese administration .8. He agreed with America's "Open Door" policy and went

out of his way to indicate that the United States was theonly power with the resources to aid China economicallyafter the war. He observed that for many years to comeRussia would have all it could do to provide for the internaleconomy of the Soviet Union .9. He agreed that there should be a trusteeship for Korea

Okinawa-Suzuki--Eugene Dooman Testifies

91under the United States, China, Great Britain and theSoviet Union .io. We were very encouraged by the conference on the FarEast .

It is more than likely that this report was in thePresident's hands by May 29th, the day of thePentagon meeting . Had General Marshall seen it? Thereport states that the Red Army would not be ready tomarch into Manchuria before August 8 . And it saysalso that the Yalta agreements must be accepted byChiang Kai-shek as Russia's price . Again we ask,was this cabled report kept from the other membersof the Pentagon conference? In James Forrestal'sdiaries he says that McCloy had told him about itscontents some time later .

It is not likely that our generation will ever knowthe answers to these questions . Perhaps no generationwill .

Hopkins sent a second cable on the same meeting withStalin which indicates that Hopkins was familiar withJapan's desire for peace . It also indicates that Stalin'sfear that the United States might accept surrender wasuppermost in Hopkins' mind :

i. Japan is doomed and the Japanese know it .

Sherwood2 . Peace feelers are being put out by certain elements in 903Japan and we should therefore consider together our jointattitude and act in concert about the surrender of Japan .Stalin expressed the fear that the Japanese will try to splitthe allies . The following are his statements about the sur-render :A. The Soviet Union prefers to go through with uncondi-tional surrender and destroy once and for all the militarymight and forces of Japan . Stalin thinks this is particularlyto our interest because the Japanese have a deep seatedantipathy to the United States and if the war lords, theindustrial leaders and the politicians are permitted towithdraw to Japan with their armies undefeated, their navynot totally destroyed and their industrial machine partiallyintact, they will start at once to plan a war of revenge .

92

The Enemy at His BackStalin made it quite clear that the Soviet Union wants togo through with unconditional surrender and all that isimplied in it.B . However, he feels that if we stick to unconditional sur-render the Japs will not give up and we will have to destroythem as we did Germany .C. The Japanese may offer to surrender and seek softerterms. While consideration of this has certain dangers ascompared with (A) it nevertheless cannot be ruled out .Should the Allies depart from the announced policy of un-conditional surrender and be prepared to accept a modifiedsurrender, Stalin visualizes imposing our will through ouroccupying forces and thereby gaining substantially the sameresults as under (A) . In other words, it seemed to us that heproposes under this heading to agree to milder peace termsbut once we get into Japan to give them the works .3. The Marshal expects that Russia will share in the actualoccupation of Japan and wants an agreement with theBritish and us as to occupation zones .4. He also wants an understanding between the Allies asto areas of operation in China and Manchuria .

Nowhere could one find better expressed one of theimportant aims of Soviet Russia and the reason for un-conditional surrender. Germany had already been dev-astated and her army pulverized into non-existence, thusremoving one of Russia's greatest barriers to worlddomination. And since that time, Russian propagandaand Russian infiltration into "free world" governments,have seen to it that the German army remains non-existent or too small to be a "danger ." In May of1945 Stalin expressed his determination to HarryHopkins that Japan's army would receive the samefate. What he didn't say was that he hoped suchtotal destruction of Japan would also invite Japanesehatred of the United States .

The full detailed story of "premature," one of thebiggest mysteries of the war, was given in testimonyby the former State Department officer, EugeneDooman on September 14, 1951 . Instead of attemptingto tell you about it, I shall let you read portions ofthe text for yourself. It will also help to make you ac-


93quainted with those people working in the StateDepartment, and the constant battle between the"reactionaries" and the "Leftists ." This testimony ofMr. Dooman's was perhaps the most sensational tohave come from the so-called McCarran Committee'sinvestigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations in1951-52 . And, although there were some thirty, orforty reporters present, very little appeared in mostpapers .

Friday, September 14, 1951

IPR 3pages 703-

The subcommittee met at io a.m .

754Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, and Smith of North

Carolina .Also present : J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel ; Robert

Morris, subcommittee counsel ; Benjamin Mandel, di-rector of research .

Mr. Dooman began by giving his name and address,and previous occupations in the State Departmentwhich he entered in I9I2 . His last position, before heresigned Aug . 31, 1945, was Chairman of the FarEast Subcommittee of the State, War, and NavyCoordinating Committee, the top interdepartmentalpolitical and military policy committee . The title ofthis committee was such a jawbreaker that it wasnicknamed SWINK which you will find used in thetestimony .

He told the Senate Subcommittee that the purposeof the SWINK subcommittee was to formulate policies,both military and political, primarily for Japan .

The testimony begins with the attempt to bringOwen Lattimore into the State Department as a con-sultant

Mr. Morris. Well, Mr . Dooman, can you recall that Owen 704-5Lattimore was proposed at one time as a consultant to thechief of the China desk of the Department of State?Mr. Dooman. I can ; yes.Mr. Morris. Will you tell us your recollection with respectto that particular incident, Mr. Dooman .

705

94

The Enemy at His BackMr. Dooman . At that time, which must have been early in1945, I was, as I have just said, acting as Chairman of thisFar Eastern Subcommittee of SWINK . . . but one of themen in the office told me that papers were going through theState Department calling for the appointment of Dr . Latti-more as adviser to the China Division, the papers havingbeen initiated by the Chief of the China Division .Mr. Morris. Who was that?Mr. Dooman . That was Mr . John Carter Vincent .

I discussed the matter with Mr . Ballantine, who was thenDirector of the Far Eastern Division, and pointed out thatLattimore at that time, and for several months previously,had been using every opportunity to discredit the thenActing Secretary of State, Mr . Grew .

And I pointed out that it would be incongruous for a manwho had expressed himself so freely on Mr . Grew to beoccupying a position under Mr . Grew.

With that I reported the matter to Mr . Grew, and hethen called up the administrative people who had charge ofappointments and ordered that the papers be quashed .Senator Eastland . What did Mr. Lattimore have to sayagainst Mr . Grew? What was the complaint against him?

Mr. Dooman . The principal cause of complaint was that Mr .Grew had advocated an attitude on the part of the UnitedStates of noninterference with the Japanese themselves inthe form of government which they wanted to institute .

In other words, if they wanted to keep the Emperor, byall means let them keep it . If they wanted to disestablishthe monarchy, by all means let them disestablish it .

*

*

*Senator Eastland . His (Lattimore's) opposition to Grew wasthat Mr. Grew was favoring a policy after the war was wonthat would prevent the Communists from getting Japan.That is it in a nutshell, is it not? . . .Mr. Dooman . That is my judgment .Sen. Eastland. And Mr. John Carter Vincent was urging theappointment of Mr. Lattimore? . . .Mr. Dooman . Yes.

At this point Counsel Robert Morris placed in therecord excerpts from a resolution of the national


95board of the Communist Political Association as ap-proved on June 20, 1945 . The excerpts concern Japan,and it was this resolution that also launched the sloganto remove the "reactionaries" and "fascists" fromthe State Department . One important and significantpoint is that this slogan was adopted directly after the"premature" meeting in the Pentagon on May 29that which time the "reactionary" Mr . Grew's surrenderpaper to Japan had been discussed . These orders tothe comrades appeared in the July 1945 issue ofPolitical A fairs, an official Communist magazine

This growing reactionary opposition to a truly demo-cratic and anti-Fascist Europe in which the people will havethe right to freely choose their own forms of governmentand social system has been reflected in many of the recentactions of the $tate Department . This explains why . .they bolster up the reactionary, incompetent Chiang Kai-shek regime and why they harbor the idea of coming toterms with the Mikado in the hope of maintaining Japan asa reactionary bulwark in the Far East .

In the vital struggle to crush feudal-Fascist-militaristJapan, it is necessary that American labor collaborate inthe prosecution of the anti-Japanese war with all demo-cratic forces who favor and support victory over Japaneseimperialism . . . . some in the State Department, who areseeking a compromise peace which will preserve the powerof the Mikado after the war, at the expense of China andthe other Far East peoples, and directed against the SovietUnion . . .

In the opinion of the Communist Policy Association, sucha program should be based on the following slogans ofaction :

*

*Remove from the State Department all pro-Fascist and

reactionary officials .

After this was read into the record, Mr . Doomanreturned to his initial testimony .

Mr. Dooman . I just recall now that about 2 weeks after this 707-9episode Dr. Isaiah Bowman, president of the Johns Hopkins

714-15

96 The Enemy at His BackUniversity, came to see the President . . . . He came to seethe President and asked the President to intervene on behalfof Dr. Lattimore with the State Department. And the matterwas brought to the attention then of the State Departmentand no further action was taken .

May I correct it again? This must have been about Aprilof 1945 .Mr. Morris . What position did John Carter Vincent hold atthat time, Mr. Dooman, at the time these papers foremploying Mr . Lattimore as consultant were submitted?Mr. Dooman . He was Chief of the China Division .Mr. Morris . Did he hold any other position in the StateDepartment?Mr. Dooman. Not at that time .Mr. Morris . Was he associated with one of the area commit-tees?Mr. Dooman. Well, yes. The far-eastern area was an intra-departmental committee at which there was an attemptmade to get a consensus of opinion about various policiesconcerning the Far East . . .Mr. Morris . Could you say this was a policy-making com-mittee, Mr. Dooman?Mr. Dooman . It was a policy-developing committee .Mr. Morris . Was John Carter Vincent a member of thatcommittee?Mr. Dooman . Yes; he could come in whenever he wantedto. As a matter of fact, he chose not to come very often . Hewas usually represented by a man from his office calledJulian Friedman . . .The Chairman. . . . Who was Julian Friedman?

(Author's note : In the Subcommittee Report of the IPRon page 164, Julian Friedman is reported as : "Identified asa member of the Communist Party by one or more dulysworn witnesses . Denied.")Mr. Dooman . Julian Friedman was a member of the ChinaDivision of the State Department .

In the following testimony Mr . Dooman tells usa little of the manner in which Leftist propaganda isfunneled from certain individuals in governmentservice to the Leftist press .Mr. Dooman . . . . I said I had not made any charges


9?(against Julian Friedman) because that implied that I hadcomplained to some higher authority .

The fact was that a very short time after statements hadbeen made in secret meetings of this Far East Area Com-mittee, the proceedings and the statements made by variousindividuals immediately were quoted in various left-wingperiodicals and newspapers. There were literally dozens ofsuch occasions.Senator Eastland. Such as PM?Mr. Dooman . That would include PM .

It so happens that among all these instances that actuallyoccurred, I happened to keep one, and that was in TheNation of February 3, 1945, where there appears an articleby one Pacificus, entitled "Dangerous Experts ."

Among other things here is the following paragraphwhich I would like to read, if I may . I might say thatDangerous Experts refers among others to myself .

"Mr. Dooman not only believes in retaining the em-porist system minus some of the more militaristic forms ofemperor worship, but also thinks that the only elementswe can rely on in Japan are the business leaders, courtcircle aristocrats, and bureaucrats ."

. . . Now, I did make that statement. This is a garbledversion of what I said. But the important thing is that itappeared a few days later in The Nation .

Well, by a process of elimination in a number of in-stances of this kind, I found that outside of those who weremore or less standing members of the committee who ap-peared every time and who were completely reliable, thatFriedman was the constant element .

I therefore went to Friedman and I taxed him with beingthe source of information for these articles that appearedin Amerasia, in PM, The Nation, New Republic, and so on .He denied that he had given any of this information to un-authorized persons .

He said that he reported only to his chief, who was thenMr. Vincent .

The interrogation of Mr . Dooman then returns toOwen Lattimore

98

The Enemy at His Back715-i6

Mr. Morris . Mr. Dooman, would you tell us to the best ofyour ability the position that Owen Lattimore took at thattime with respect to Japan? This is in 1945 .Mr. Dooman. Well, there is a whole library that could bemade up of statements made by Mr . Lattimore during thatperiod. I suppose the best known, the one most frequentlyquoted . . . is a book called Solution in Asia, which waspublished, I think, in about February 1945, and was verywidely circulated during the spring and early summer, infact until the surrender of Japan .

In general, he took the position that the Japanese people,when they were defeated, would rise in rebellion against thesystem and overthrow the monarchy ; that there were ele-ments in the State Department, the so-called reactionaryFascist elements, who knew nothing whatever about Japan. . . and that these elements were intended to use theprestige and the force of the influence of the United Statesto keep the Emperor in power against the will of theJapanese people .

Another point which he made was that the chief mili-tarists were not the war lords, General Tojo and others, butthe big industrial leaders. That these, the army and thenavy, were merely puppets and instruments of the big in-dustrialists.

Therefore, his position was that - we should allow theJapanese people to have their revolt and disestablish themonarchy and that we should then try these industrialistsas war criminals and put them out of the way so that theywould never be in a position of influence .

And, third, that the Japanese system, economic system,should be completely broken up and a highly developedcompetitive economic system should be instituted .

Now, as I say, these statements can be found in a greatmany places .Mr. Morris. Will you give us whatever documentation youcan?Mr. Dooman. I have here, for example, a radio discussion,a round-table discussion that was carried out, I believe,under the auspices of the University of Chicago . It wasalong about July 8, 1945 .

Now, I notice that the press recently quoted Dr . Latti-more as having said that his position had been consistentlyone of urging that we do not interfere in the event that the


99Japanese wanted to disestablish the monarchy . That is notthe whole story.

In Solution in Asia, he makes this statement, which Icannot quote textually, but it runs somewhat along theselines. He says :

I will venture the political prophecy that the Japanesepeople will themselves revolt and disestablish the mon-arch .

Now, the suggestion at the same time, at that time-thatis, before the surrender-that people like Mr . Grew andmyself were intending to keep the Emperor in power im-plied, then, that we proposed to use the influence and theposition of the United States to prevent the exercise by theJapanese people of their own will.

Well, let me say at this point that this whole discussionabout the Emperor carried on by the leftist press at thattime was a piece of sheer lunacy. If the Japanese peoplewanted to get rid of the Emperor there was obviouslynothing we could do to keep him in ; if, on the other hand,the Japanese people wanted to keep the Emperor it wouldhave been a piece of folly on our part to have disestablisheda monarchy .

It shifts from Lattimore to Vincent again :

Senator Eastland. When Mr. Grew resigned, what place inthe Department did Mr. Vincent get?Mr. Dooman . Mr. Grew retired, or at least presented hisresignation on or about the 14th of August . (Note : It wasAugust 16th) I may be off a matter of a few days or so .But the day he retired, or presented his resignation, it wasannounced in the papers that Mr . Dean Acheson has beenappointed as Under Secretary of State . . . And the dayafter he returned there he announced that I would be re-placed as chairman of the Far Eastern Subcommittee ofSWINK by Mr . Vincent.Senator Eastland . I would like also to know . . . The dif-ference in what was advocated by John Carter Vincent forJapan and the policies that the Communists put over inEastern Europe . . .Mr. Dooman. My judgment is it is the same .

Mioo

The Enemy at His BackMr. Dooman begins here to tell an unusual story .

The SWINK subcommittee had been working forabout 7 or 8 months on a paper called "The UnitedStates Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan ." Itspelled out exactly what the Uniteded States proposed todo with our defeated enemy. On August 16, 1945, Mr.Grew retired and was replaced by Dean Acheson asUndersecretary of State. Mr. Dooman then askedAssistant Secretary of State, James C . Dunn, chairmanof the full SWINK committee, to call a meeting ofthe SWINK subcommittee on August 29, 1945 forthe purpose of passing on this paper. This they did,and on that same day it was cabled to General Mac-Arthur as "a firm United States policy for Japan ."

Two days later, August 31st, Mr . Dooman retiredand Acheson immediately promoted John Carter Vin-cent to Mr. Dooman's former position as chairman ofthe SWINK subcommittee .A few weeks later, September 22, 1945, the White

House made' public the official directive on postwarpolicy for Japan. Out of curiosity, the retired Mr .Dooman read the released paper to see if, it wasdifferent from the one which had already been sentto General MacArthur .

Mr. Dooman. . . . These were among the changes that hadbeen made in the paper after it had been adopted on the29th of August (reading) :

"Policies shall be favored whici permit the wide dis-tribution of income and of the ownership of the means ofproduction and trade. To this end it shall be the policyof the Supreme Commander-

(a) to prohibit the retention in or selection for places ofimportance in the economic field of individuals who donot direct future Japanese economic effort solely towardpeaceful ends ."

Please do not ask me to explain what that means .

"(b) To favor a program for the dissolution of the largeindustrial and banking combinations which have exer-


ioxcised control of a large part of Japan's trade and in-dustry."

It is on the basis of these two clauses that work wasundertaken to destroy, first of all, to eliminate the capitalistclass in Japan .

Senator Eastland. Who attempted to eliminate it?Mr. Dooman . These were the instructions sent from Wash-ington .Senator Eastland. That was the American State Depart-ment?Mr. Dooman . With the concurrence of the Navy Depart-ment and the War Department .

These were the instructions sent to General MacArthurthrough the Joint Chiefs of Staff .Senator Eastland . That was the work of John Carter Vin-cent, was it not?Mr. Dooman . He was chairman at that time of this FarEast subcommittee . . .Senator Eastland. That was the Acheson-Vincent programthere?Mr. Dooman . Yes, sir .Senator Eastland . What did they attempt to put over underthat program?Mr. Dooman . The first thing that was done, and this wasin 1946, was to levy a capital tax of from 6o to go percenton all property in excess of $i,ooo . . . You can imaginewhat that meant . That is, a capital tax of from 6o to gopercent of all property above $1,ooo. That almost at onestroke wiped out the capitalist class . . .

The next thing was to expropriate all land in excess of 5acres held by any one owner .Senator Eastland. That was a Communist system, was itnot?Mr. Dooman . Well, Senator, in Poland I think they put thelimit at zoo acres at that time . . .

There was an ostensible effort to pay them compensationfor this land (in Japan), but by this time they were payingfor land in yen which had depreciated to one one-hundred-and-eightieth of the nominal value of the land . . . In otherwords, if a man had $i,ooo in land, he was paid one one-hundred-and-eightieth .

There was virtually confiscation of all land above 5 acres .

718-19

102

The Enemy at His BackSenator Eastland. Go ahead and describe what else therewas .Mr. Dooman . Then all holdings by any one individual inany large corporation in excess of 3 percent were con-fiscated. There were more polite terms used . That is, theywere transferred to a government pool .And then the Japanese Government was ordered to sell

those shares in a certain order of priority to farmers' co-operatives, labor unions, and shopkeepers, at whateverprice might be offered .And, furthermore, the Japanese Government was ordered

to disregard any relationship between the price offered andthe real value ; and furthermore, the Japanese Governmentwas ordered to finance any bids for the shares by farmers'cooperatives and labor unions . . .

The net result was then to replace people who hadtraditionally had property with these black marketeers andthugs and blackguards of various kinds .

Although all during the war General MacArthur hadclashed with Washington officials on military strategy,particularly with their "Europe first" policy, it wasnot until he became Supreme Commander of theoccupation of Japan that he clashed head-on withthe State Department and, in particular, with thenew Undersecretary, Dean Acheson . Acheson at thattime was Acting Secretary for Byrnes who had toleave the capital for important conferences . Mr.Dooman recalled a bit of this story when he remindedthe subcommittee of the General's first set-to withMr. Acheson. Briefly, the facts were the following : Afew days after his arrival in Tokyo, General Mac-Arthur announced to the Japanese people that helooked forward to the time when the American occupa-tion forces in Japan could be reduced to some figurebelow 200,000 soldiers. The Daily Worker was alreadyleading a vicious attack on the General, charging"fascism" and "soft policy" toward Japan, when DeanAcheson, Acting Secretary of State, placed Mac-Arthur in the position of losing face with his orientalwards. Acheson publicly announced that General


103

MacArthur was not in Japan to make policy, but tocarry out orders ; policy for Japan would be made bythe President and the State Department, he said. This"repudiation" coming in the first month of the oc-cupation boomeranged because it led to the publica-tion of the SWINK directive. MacArthur could not,thereafter, be blamed for executing orders!

In continuing his testimony on the relationshipbetween MacArthur and the State Department, Mr.Dooman sharply pinpoints the United States policytoward Russia and Communism. It would be interest-ing to learn one day what the Japanese were thinkingwhen their American Supreme Commander was sooften repudiated by Washington officials, and oftenin favor of Russia . That he remained their idol underthese circumstances is testimony to the character ofGeneral MacArthur .

Mr. Morris . Mr. Dooman, are there any other documentsthat you care to introduce into the record at this time . . . ?Mr. Dooman . Well, I refer to a statement made by GeneralMacArthur, I think it was on the 1st of September, inwhich-Mr. Morris. What year?Mr. Dooman. 1946, excuse me. This was the first anni-versary of the setting up of the occupation in Japan. Atthat time, he issued a statement to the Japanese peoplewarning them of the dangers from the left as well as fromthe right .

In other words, he was warning them of the dangers ofcommunism. As a matter of fact, a short time after that, inFebruary 1947, the Communists tried to take over thecountry by means of a general strike which was pre-vented only by General MacArthur preventing it. How-ever, the Herald Tribune, as of September 3, 1946, publisheda dispatch from Mr . John C. Metcalfe, its correspondent inWashington, stating that there was in effect, that there wasconsiderable unfavorable reaction in the State Departmentto General MacArthur's pronouncement to the Japanesepeople.

It quoted at that time, this article quoted, as follows; ifI may read :

744

720-s

104

The Enemy at His BackState Department sources said no directives had been

sent to General MacArthur indicating any desire on thepart of the administration here to raise the cry of "com-munism" in Japan. The source said they were takencompletely by surprise by comments in the MacArthurstatement, such as that the Japanese islands might becomeeither "a powerful bulwark for peace or a dangerous spring-board for war."

The incident was considered here as particularly irritatingsince it came in the midst of delicate American-Soviet re-lations elsewhere in the world .

The aim of American foreign policy in the Far East isestablishment of a just and durable peace, the State De-partment sources said. It is aimed at "building a bridge offriendship to Soviet Russia" and is not intended to set up"a bulwark against communism" or to inspire anti-Sovietfeeling, the sources added .

If we may interrupt Mr. Dooman a moment-thestatement of General MacArthur warning againstCommunism apparently upset the Communist apple-cart .

Senator Eastland continues his interrogation of Mr.Dooman

Senator Eastland . What other policies were there?Mr. Dooman. Well, in the draft of this initial policy paper,which had been prepared under my chairmanship, withregard to people who were suspected of being war criminalsor being militarists, it was provided that they should bepurged ; that is, removed from any position of authority,in the light of their own personal record, as brought outby some form of judicial investigation .

In other words, a man would stand or fall on his ownpersonal record .

As you will see from that statement that I just read out,the people were removed from office on the basis of theiroccupation. Practically the whole executive branch of Japa-nese business, from chairmen of boards down to sectionchiefs, practically the whole white-collar element in Japa-nese big business was removed at one stroke . Not becausethere was any record against them, but because they occu-pied certain positions. They destroyed it.

Okinawa--Suzuki-Eugene Dooman Testifies

105Senator Eastland . Was it not an attempt to destroy Japa-nese capitalism?Mr. Dooman . It was an attempt to destroy and eliminatethe brains of Japanese business .

*

*

*

Senator Eastland . All right .What else did they attempt to put over?

Mr. Dooman. Just following that question, following thatpoint, I want to quote from this round-table discussion ofthe University of Chicago on July 8, this statement at-tributed to Mr. Lattimore (reading)

That includes a lot of economic and political action aswell because we cannot forget that the civilian war-makers, that is the big industrialists and financiers ofJapan, are really primarily even more responsible rJapan's going to war than the military and the na ,since the army and navy are only the striking instrumentsand the tools .

Now, after the occupation about 12 of the leading Japa-nese industrialists were put in prison, and they were heldin prison for 18 months while every effort was made to digup evidence which would warrant their being put to trial,just as the military and political people were put on trialand later condemned .

They were held, as I say, for 18 months, and releasedbecause there was no evidence .

Now, if we are then to follow Mr. Lattimore, we ob-viously did a great injustice to General Tojo in hanginghim, because according to Mr. Lattimore, we released hislords and masters and hung the tool and the instrument .Senator Eastland . What other things were in the policy forJapan?Mr. Dooman. I have with me a copy of a paper known asFar East Commission 23o . This is a paper of considerablelength, Senator, in which all of the principles are laid outfor the atomizing of Japanese industry .Senator Eastland . The what? I did not understand?Mr. Dooman. The atomizing, the fragmentation of Japa-nese industry . It is a very long paper .

The general purport was to see to it that the Japaneseeconomy, not only in industry but in banking and in every

io6

The Enemy at His Backother field, should be reduced to the smallest possibleelement.The Chairman . How is that tied in here? Who is the articleby?Mr. Dooman. Well, it was a paper. It was introduced asfollows : To the Far Eastern Commission by the SecretaryGeneral, Mr. Nelson T . Jonathan (sicl ), under a paperwhich reads as follows (reading) :

The enclosure, a statement of proposed policy withrespect to excessive concentrations of economic power inJapan, submitted by the United States, is circulatedherewith for the consideration of the Far East Com-mission and is referred to Committee No . 2, economic andfinancial affairs.

Who prepared this paper, I have no means of know-ing . . .Mr. Morris . Where did you obtain that, Mr. Dooman?Mr. Dooman. This was obtained, and given to me by afriend of mine, Mr . James Lee Kaufman, an Americanlawyer in New York, who went out to Japan and discoveredthe existence of this paper, and he had it privately printedand distributed among his friends, and he also had a copyof it reproduced, or summarized in an issue for Newsweek2 years ago .Senator Eastland . Where did he get the paper in Japan?Mr. Dooman. He was told of the existence of this paper,and was told if he went to a certain office he could find it .So he went to this-I don't know where-some repositoryof documents and asked a young lady-Senator Eastland . It was there to guide the occupationforces, was it not? It was a policy to guide our occupation,was it not?Mr. Dooman . I was getting around to that in just a second,Senator, if I may . I am answering the question .The Chairman . The question has been propounded to you .Was it or was it not there to guide our occupation forces?Mr. Dooman. This paper was submitted through the FarEastern Commission for consideration, and it was neveradopted by the Far Eastern Commission .

However, in draft form, it was sent out to Tokyo to theoccupation authorities in the economic section and theyacted on it.


107

Senator Eastland. It was sent by our State Department?Mr. Dooman . Sent by whom, I do not know . But it was sentto the occupation authorities and they acted on it .

And when the disclosure was made by my friend, Kauf-man, that this paper had been acted on, it was then dis-avowed as merely being a draft and merely presented to theFar Eastern Commission for consideration .

But the point I want to emphasize was that it was, forall practical purposes, an official document, because it wason the basis of this that the various instructions were sentto the Japanese government.Senator Eastland. As a matter of fact, to put it very mildly,there is a striking similarity between the American policytoward Japan and the policies laid down by Russia to thesatellite states in Eastern Europe, is there not?Mr. Dooman. I think that would be a fair statement tostate . . . when it came to the question of Japan, therewere those elements who, knowing what the Russians wantedin Germany, assumed that they would be satisfied withparallel policies in Japan.Senator Eastland . Of course, what Russia wanted was to setup a chaos and a system by which they could move in ;was that not it?Mr. Dooman. I think so . . .Senator Smith. Are there now in positions of power andtrust in the American Government any of the men who wereresponsible for the enunciation of this policy you have de-scribed to us?Mr. Dooman. Oh, yes.Senator Smith . Who are they?Mr. Dooman. Some, I say are responsible, from the chain ofcommand .Senator Eastland. Name them, please.Mr. Dooman. In 1945 when this initial post surrender policywas promulgated, the responsible people were, from thetop, Mr. Byrnes, Secretary of State .Senator Smith. Mr . Byrnes?Mr. Dooman . Mr. Byrnes, Secretary of State ; Mr. Acheson,Under Secretary of State ; John Carter Vincent, as chair-man of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWINK, and alsoDirector of the Far Eastern Division ; Mr. Edward Barton(Edward Martin?), who is still an economist, I believe : heis the economist in charge of economic affairs for the occu-pation of this area ; James Pennfield, and then-

xo8

The Enemy at His BackSenator Smith. What position is he in now?Mr. Dooman. I believe he is in Yugoslavia as counselor ofthe Embassy, I believe .Mr. Morris. What was his position at that time?Mr. Dooman . He had just returned from the Far East andwas assigned as deputy to Mr . Vincent in the Far EastSubcommittee of SWINK . .

Now, subsequently-and this is hearsay-the people whohave been busy on Japanese affairs, Japanese policies, inaddition to those I have named would include Mr. JohnAllison, and-what is his name now-an economist, Barnett .I don't know what his first name is. (Robert?) Barnett .

I think those are the principal ones .Senator Smith . Well, now, is there any indication of any ac-tivity by the top two men you mentioned in the furtheranceof this policy, Mr. Byrnes or Mr . Acheson? Is there anyevidence at all, indication of activity on their part towardfavoring the carrying out of that policy?Mr. Dooman . Well, in my personal knowledge, and this re-quires-well, my personal knowledge, I can recite one case .

In the spring of 1945 there was a meeting of the fullcommittee of SWINK, the chairman at that time for thatday being Mr. McCloy, John McCloy, who was then As-sistant Secretary of War . And the committee as a wholehad been discussing some European matter with which I wasnot concerned, and, therefore, I came into the room whenthey had completed their discussion of this European prob-lem .

And I noticed among the people present was Mr . DeanAcheson . Now, he had been called in, apparently, for con-sultation on the European problem, and he had nothingwhatever to do with the problem that I was to discuss,which was the question of the Japanese political system .

However, he stayed on . He was then Assistant Secretaryof State for Congressional Relations . He had nothing to dowith this officially .

And I made my report to the committee, and at the endof that report Mr . McCloy said, turning to Mr. Acheson :

Dean, you are a great authority on far eastern matters .What do you think of what we have just heard?

And the reply was :I have discovered that far eastern experts are a penny

4


loga dozen. And you can find some experts which will sup-port any point of view that you care to have . And I, my-self, do not go along with what we have just heard . Iprefer to be guided by experts who think more along mypoint of view . . .

This brings a thought to mind. Since Mr. Acheson,according to this testimony, preferred to be guidedby experts who thought as he did, it is not surprisingthat during the Korean War he rejected the adviceof military experts who said that the strategic city ofRashin could be bombed without hitting Red territory)And it was not bombed until General MacArthur wonthe argument a year or two later .

Mr. Dooman. From then on he (Acheson) quoted almosttextually from "Solution in Asia" written by Owen Latti-more .Senator Smith . Do you mean he quoted from this paperthat you mentioned?Mr. Dooman . Where Dr. Lattimore had said that the Japa-nese people, he predicted that the Japanese people wouldrebel and disestablish the monarchy, and that if the mon-archy existed it would be only because there are certainFascist groups in the State Department who used theprestige of the United States .Senator Smith . Did he approve of this policy that was enun-ciated about practically confiscation of property?Mr. Dooman . Oh, yes ; he was Under Secretary of State . . .Senator Smith. Is there any indication that Mr . Byrnes, 724the Secretary of State, knew about this at all?Mr. Dooman. No ; there is no indication . . .Mr. Morris. Were you thoroughly conversant with OwenLattimore's Solution in Asia at that time?Mr. Dooman . Thoroughly.Mr. Morris . When you heard Mr. Acheson enunciate hisviews on Japan, is it your testimony that they coincidedwith the views expressed by Owen Lattimore in Solution inAsia?Mr. Dooman . Exactly.Mr. Morris . Did his view on experts being a dime a dozencoincide with the views of Owen Lattimore at that time?Mr. Dooman. Yes . . .

725

xio

The Enemy at His BackMr. Morris . . . . I also offer you just by way of assistancein connection with that extract from Mr . Lattimore'sSolution in Asia that may aid you in answering the questionI have just put to you .Mr. Dooman. Here is a very reminiscent phrase . . .(reading)

Washington is full of experts who will tell you thatthe Japanese are mysterious, fanatical, and not to beunderstood by any ordinary use of the intellect. Thesame experts are also addicted to citing bits of lorewhich, they tell you condescendingly, explain why theJapanese always do this or never do that .

Here is an example of the attempts on the part of Dr .Lattimore to put into ridicule people who did not agreewith his point of view .

*

*

*

Mr. Morris. . . . Will you proceed with your documenta-tion of views of Owen Lattimore which you have testifiedto here today . . . ?Mr. Dooman . Yes ; on page i89, I quote as follows (read-ing)

If the Japanese themselves decide to do without anEmperor, well and good . If not, we should show thatmilitarism has been so catastrophically defeated that we,the victors, do not need to use the Emperor . He andall males eligible for the throne by Japanese rules ofsuccession and adoption should be interned, preferablyin China, but under the supervision of United NationsCommission to emphasize united responsibility. His es-tates, and estates belonging to members of Zaibatzufamilies and important militarists, should be made overto an agrarian reform program, conspicuously withouthis sanction and by order of the United Nations . Eventu-ally, after his death and after a new civil service and anew management of finance and industry have taken hold,the remaining members of the imperial line can beallowed to go where they like. New vested interestswill by that time be able to prevent the restoration ofa monarchy.


III

Perhaps that is a little dull reading, but whatLattimore's suggestions would have meant to Japan isVERY clear in 19561 American Korean War prisonersheld in Red China have been barbarically and shame-fully used as political hostages to great advantage tothe Communists. If the Japanese Emperor had beenheld in Red China as a hostage, the demands Russiaand the Chinese Reds could have made on Japan wouldhave been endless!Mr. Dooman now begins to tell of the important

part the status of Emperor Hirohito played, and thengoes into the extraordinary story of "premature"referred to briefly in this chapter .

Mr. Dooman. You will notice that all through my testimony 727-8I have referred constantly to this question of the Emperor .

In March or April of 1945, Colonel Dana Johnson,who was Chief of Psychological Warfare in Hawaii, cameto Washington and saw Mr. Grew and myself. His con-clusion, drawn from interrogating high-ranking Japaneseprisoners of war, was that the Japanese were ready tosurrender but that the various statements and the trendof public opinion with regard to the question of themonarchy was such that so long as the Japanese wereleft with the impression that the Emperor was personallyto be tried as a war criminal and punished, that themonarchial system would be disestablished, so long asthose ideas were assumed to be public opinion and wouldbe implemented as American policy after Japan's sur-render, that the Japanese would not surrender . .

(Note : An AP dispatch from Tokyo dated August6, 1955, quotes the Tokyo newspaper, Yomiuri, asstating that "it was largely on the insistence of Gen . D.C . EveningDouglas MacArthur that Emperor Hirohito was not star

tried as a war criminal.")

Mr. Sourwine . Did he tell you that was his opinion?Mr. Dooman. He did, sir .

On April 17, there was a change of government (Note :the Koiso Government fell on April 4), a general retired

112

The Enemy at His Backas Prime Minister and there was a reconstitution of theGovernment at the head of which was Admiral Suzuki,who was then Chamberlain to the Emperor and who hadbeen throughout his career a moderate . He (Col . Johnson)took that as a very clear signal that the Japanese wereready to surrender, ready to talk about this matter .

Furthermore, we had the advantage of reading messagesbetween the Japanese Government and their Ambassadorin Moscow, and it was clear from these and other indicationsthat the Japanese were ready to surrender if only it weremade clear that this trend of opinion that had been de-veloped by the leftist press in the United States, namely,that the Emperor would be tried as a war criminal andthe monarchial system disestablished, it was made clearthat those were not policies of the United States .We then started on preparing a document . About the

middle of May, Mr . Henry Luce came back from a visit tothe Pacific, and he was very much aroused. He saidthat the failure of the American Government to persuadethe Japanese to surrender was causing, was doing, greatdamage to the morale of the American forces who hadfought through Saipan and Tarawa, and who were antici-pating then the assault on Japan and were fearful of thelosses that would have to be paid there .Mr. Grew, who saw Henry Luce, explained to him that

we were working on that effort, we were working on a planalong those lines .

It was, I think, on the 24th of May, if that happens tobe, if my recollection is correct .Mr. - Morris. 1945?Mr. Dooman. 1945 . It was on a Saturday that Mr . Grewcalled me in and instructed me to have ready Mondaymorning a paper which he would then present to thePresident outlining the policies that the United Stateswould follow if Japan surrendered .

I then prepared that paper and took it to Mr . Grew onMonday morning.

So far as the portion relating to the Emperor is concerned,my original draft reads as follows-this was paragraph 12(reading) :

The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawnfrom Japan as soon as these objectives-namely, those previously enumerated-


1113

have been accomplished and there has been establishedbeyond doubt a peacefully inclined, responsible govern-ment of a character representative of the Japanese people .This may include a constitutional monarchy under thepresent dynasty if the peace-loving nations can be con-vinced of the genuine determination of such a govern-ment to follow policies of peace which will renderimpossible the future development of aggressive milita-rism in Japan .

(Note: Paragraph 12 was rewritten at Potsdam to readas follows :

The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawnfrom Japan as soon as these objectives have been ac-complished and there has been established in accordancewith the freely expressed will of the Japanese people apeacefully inclined and responsible government .)

Mr. Grew approved the draft and called a meeting ofthe Policy Committee of the State Department . The PolicyCommittee of the State Department at that time consistedof the Assistant Secretaries of State and the Legal Adviser .He read this document to them, and there was no dissentuntil he came to that paragraph which I have just read .There was then a violent reaction on the part of Mr .Acheson and Mr. MacLeish .Mr. Morris . What position did both of those gentlemen holdat that time?

Mr. Dooman did not answer the question . In Mayof 1945 Acheson was Assistant Secretary of State,and Archibald MacLeish was Assistant Secretary incharge of public relations . It should also be noted thatothers besides Assistant Secretaries attended thesepolicy meetings . Senior officers such as Leo Pasvolskyand Alger Hiss were generally present unless they wereout of town. At this meeting Mr . Dooman speaks of,Pasvolsky, Hiss and Secretary of State Stettinius werein San Francisco attending the United Nations meet-ing. The official name of this policy committee wasthe Secretary's Staff Committee . This had been calledThe Policy Committee the previous year .

The testimony continues

Decade ofAmericanForeignPolicy p. 50

729

114

The Enemy at His Back729 Mr. Dooman . I was not present at the meeting but the

whole idea of allowing the monarchy to remain was dis-tasteful .Mr. Morris . To Messrs. Acheson and MacLeish?Mr. Dooman. Yes.Mr. Sourwine . Mr. Dooman. if you were not present atthe meeting, I think you ought to explain how you knewwhat took place .Mr. Dooman. This was immediately told to me by Mr.Grew after the meeting.Mr. Sourwine . What you are describing, then, is Mr . Grew'sdescription of what took place at the meeting?Mr. Dooman. That is correct. Mr. Grew said that thiscommittee was, after all, advisory to him, and that hewas ultimately responsible, and that he would take theresponsibility for presenting that document to the Presidentwith the recommendation that he include that documentwithin a speech which he was to deliver at some appropriateoccasion .

On the 28th of May, with judge Rosenman, he went into see the President. The President read it over and hesaid that he would approve, accept, the document, providedthat it was agreeable to the armed services .

On the 29th of May, Mr. Grew, Judge Rosenman, andmyself attended a meeting in Mr . Stimson's office.The Chairman . Whose office?Mr. Dooman . Mr. Stimson, who was then Secretary of War .

This was at the Pentagon . There were present SecretaryForrestal, Mr . McCloy, Mr. Elmer Davis, who was thenDirector of the Office of War Information, Mr. Grew,myself, General Marshall, and I should say in additionabout ro to 12 of the highest military and naval officers-who they were I do not remember at this time .

We had prepared copies of this paper for distribution sothat each member present would have a copy .Mr. Stimson, who was in the chair at the meeting, said

then he approved the document right along, he went rightalong with the paper . In fact, he thought, as a matter offact, that we did not give sufficient allowance to theJapanese for their capacity to produce as they had in thepast such progressive men as Baron Shidihara, Hamaguchi,and Wakatsuki, and others . These are former JapanesePrime Ministers.


115

Mr. Forrestal read it over and he agreed . Mr. McCloyagreed also.The Chairman . Agreed, or approved?Mr. Dooman . Approved. Mr. Elmer Davis reacted veryviolently and would have none of it .Mr. Morris . What position did he hold at this time?Mr. Dooman . He was, as I said, Director of the Office ofWar Information . Various other officers approved of it, butthere was a feeling that the publication of that document-Mr. Morris . Vincent was not present?Mr. Dooman . No. As a matter of fact, information on thiswas restricted to a very small number of people, thosepeople that I have just indicated .Mr. Sourwine . You were present at this conference?Mr. Dooman. I was present .Mr. Sourwine . When you speak of Mr. Davis havingreacted violently, you were there and saw the reaction?Mr. Dooman. Yes .Mr. Sourwine . How did Mr. Davis react, what was thenature of his violent reaction?Mr. Dooman . He did not approve, he did not approve ofanything which might be construed in any way as forminga basis for a negotiated surrender .Mr. Sourwine. Is that what he said?Mr. Dooman . Yes ; that was, in effect, what he said. How-ever, the thing was pigeonholed because of the view amongthe military people that the publication of this document atthat time would be premature .Mr. Morris . What military people?Mr. Dooman . Well, principally, General Marshall .Mr. Morris . Did not General Marshall express disagree-ment?Mr. Dooman . No ; he went along with the paper but hisstatement was that the publication of the document atthat time would be, and this word I remember textually,"premature." With that, the paper was set aside for thetime being .

We must interrupt Mr. Dooman again at this timein order to point out an important factor . Richard N .Current in his book, "Secretary Stimson," writes thatGeneral Marshall's judgment that the document was

730

Current225

116

The Enemy at His Back"premature" did not convince the Secretary of Warbecause he immediately requested the Operations PlansDivision of the War Department to prepare two studieson the subject which they did :

In the first of these the OPD concluded that the enemy'sprotracted resistance was based on the hope of obtaininga conditional surrender, and in the second, that a publicdeclaration of war aims, amounting to a definition ofunconditional surrender, would be advisable as a meansof "political and psychological pressure" supplementingmilitary preparations . A month or so later (July 12) theOPD recommended holding to the invasion plans, butadded : "There is much to be gained by defining, as com-pletely as possible, the detailed U.S . war aims in Japan ."

It is obvious that the OPD did not think that thedocument for surrender was "premature." However,since they had had reports from General Wedemeyerthat the Japanese were attempting to surrenderthrough Chiang Kai-shek, and also at that time, theUnited States was "listening in" on the conversationsbetween Moscow and Tokyo and knew the Japanesewere trying to surrender through Russia, why was notthis also in the "studies" given Mr. Stimson? Is itpossible that Stimson was so advised, but this part ofthe report was not published?

That the surrender paper was not immediately actedupon shows that, although General Marshall wasunanimously outvoted, he carried the "motion."Mr. Dooman continues :

IPR 730

Mr. Dooman. . . . However, a very short time after that,it was a matter of 2 or 3 weeks-Mr. Morris. Will you tell us the time again, the week andmonth, if possible .Mr. Dooman . The 29th of May 1945, that this meetingtook place in Secretary Stimson's office . Within a veryshort time, I should say a matter of a fortnight, informationwas available in the State Department that Dr. Lattimorehad called on the President and had remonstrated very


117strongly against any position or decision taken by thisGovernment which would enable the monarchy to remainin Japan .

(Note: Lattimore drew up a memorandum for President IPR 9-3086Truman dated June io, 1945, and a special memorandum IPR 10-3387-for his interview with the President dated July 3, 1945.) 9Mr. Sourwine . What do you mean "information was avail-able in the State Department," Mr . Dooman? . . .Mr. Dooman . It was Mr. Grew who told me

. . .Now, 731

Mr. Lattimore had been using every opportunity for aperiod of a year or more to propound the doctrine thatthe Japanese people would overturn the monarchy andthat there were a group of people in the State Department,Fascists and reactionaries, who were going to keep theEmperor in power against the will of the Japanese people .But, to me, it was very queer-now,

mind you, up to that time, there had been no decisionwithin the State Department on the question of theEmperor. There was a trend of thinking but there wasno decision until the recommendation was made to thePresident. To me, it was very queer that immediately,well, within a matter of weeks, 2 or 3 weeks after thatdecision was made, that Mr. Lattimore went to the Presidentand remonstrated with this decision . . .Mr. Dooman . I would like to identify this document that Ihave been talking about if I may . . . This paper, then,was taken by Mr . Stimson to Potsdam. I arrived myselfat Potsdam on the 13th of July, and I was told by Mr .McCloy, who was then there, that Mr . Stimson was inactive discussion with Mr . Churchill with regard to thatdocument and I heard later, I believe also from Mr .McCloy, that there was an agreement between Mr . Stimsonand Mr. Churchill, and that they had then gone to Mr .Truman and Mr. Byrnes and had received an acceptance ofthe document . It was then telegraphed to General ChiangKai-shek, and on May 29 (Note : he means July 26th)it was promulgated then as the Potsdam Proclamation toJapan, and it was on the basis of that document that Japansurrendered .

Forrest Davis, writing in the Freeman magazine,Nov. 19, r95r, makes an interesting observation .

1118

The Enemy at His Back"Why," he asks, "was the proclamation of July 26th`premature' on May 29th? Upon what did Marshallbase his decision?"

Grew 1424 Mr. Grew wrote that the reason given was becausethe battle for Okinawa was still going on and it mightappear to the enemy as a show of weakness if we pre-sented them with a peace overture . But, he also pointsout that the Americans had already reached the "mop-ping up" stages on Okinawa by that time .

IPR 746 We now come to a passage in the testimony whichpresents a good example of how American State De-partment officers worked closely with the Chinese andJapanese Communists, some of whom were employedby our very "hush, hush" and "cloak and dagger"organization, the OSS . This testimony concerns JohnK. Emmerson, and the story would indicate thatEmmerson was confident that the United States wouldeventually use Japanese Communists to build a newgovernment for .defeated Japan as he had previouslyrecommended. The success of the Yenan program(mentioned in the following testimony) in manufactur-ing Japanese Communists out of Japanese prisoners,

Wi loughby

is described in General Willoughby's "MacArthur,316-327 1941-512' This process of brain-washing was later used

on American prisoners in Korea . But the man who,in 1945, recommended that _'OUR Japanese prisonersbe "reeducated" by the Communists, is as of thiswriting, Counsellor of Embassy at Karachi, Pakistan I

IPR 3

Mr. Morris . Mr. Dooman, do you know what the attitudeP. 746 of the State Department, or 'any individuals in the State

Department, was with respect toward Japanese Com-munists?Mr. Dooman . Yes.Mr. Morris. Did you have any personal experience withJapanese Communists?Mr. Dooman. Yes . . . Well sometime in May I believeit was, May or June, I think it was May, there returned-Mr. Morris. 1945?Mr. Dooman. 1945 .There returned from China a Foreign Service officer


119

named John K. Emmerson, who, before the war, had beenone of my subordinates at the American Embassy inTokyo. I understood that he had been sent to Yenan .Yenan in China then was the capital of the ChineseCommunists. There were present at that time in Yenana Nosaka, the leading Japanese Communist, and otherleading Communists .Mr. Morris. Is Nosaka the same as Susumo Okano, headof the Japanese Communist Party?Mr. Dooman. I believe the latter is a pseudonym . I believethat Emmerson had been sent to Yenan to study methodsused by the Japanese Communists in Yenan in indoctrinat-ing Japanese prisoners of war taken by the Chinese . AsI said, he returned to Washington in about May of 1945 .The Chairman. Who did?Mr. Dooman . Emmerson. He brought back a report describ-ing at considerable length the method used by the JapaneseCommunists with respect to Japanese prisoners of war, andas I recall, he recommended that Japanese prisoners inAmerican stockades be then turned over to JapaneseCommunists in the United States for indoctrination alongmethods used by the Japanese Communists in Yenan .

At that time he was also invited to come over to OSS,the Office of Strategic Services, where I was helping withmy own services in the field of psychological warfare toaddress a group on what he had found in Yenan . At thattime he displayed a large number of posters and papers ofvarious kinds and he also showed me a number of lettersthat he had brought from Yenan . These letters were writtenby Japanese Communists in Yenan to certain JapaneseCommunists who were then employed by OSS in psychologi-cal warfare against-the Japanese . (Emphasis mine .)Mr. Morris. That was the episode, Mr. Dooman?Mr. Dooman . Yes .

Mr. Dooman, continuing, now gives us an insidepicture of how Communist propaganda was pushedthrough various government agencies . It concerns JohnK. Fairbank, Harvard professor, who worked duringthe war for the Office of War Information of whichElmer Davis was the Director . According to severalCongressional hearings, the OWI employed an unusualnumber of Communists. When Mr. Davis appeared

120

The Enemy at His Backbefore a House committee investigating the KatynForest massacre in Poland, he brushed aside all queries

Katyn 1993

concerning Polish Communists working for OWI inthe following manner : "If I had taken seriously all ofthe stories about agents of the Communists in theOffice of War Information I would have had nothingelse to do but to fire the whole staff."

IpR 3

Mr. Morris . Mr. Chairman, we have had John K . Fairbank'sP. 75 ,

association with the Institute of Pacific Relations set forthin the record at great detail .

We have also had testimony on the part of three witnessesin connection with his association in connection with theCommunist Party .I am asking Mr . Dooman if he had encountered at all Mr .

John K. Fairbank in his associations .The Chairman . All right .Mr. Dooman. I understood Mr. Fairbank was in that sectionof the Office of War Information which dealt with psycho-logical warfare against Japan .

Now, the practice was that-I believe it was-once amonth a group would come over from the Office of WarInformation with a draft program of the propaganda thatwas to be directed against Japan for the ensuing month,and the various targets and subjects which were to bedealt with were set forth on a piece of paper, and thepurpose of their visit to the State Department was to getclearance on these targets .As I say, my contacts with Mr . Fairbank were limited

primarily to those visits to the State Department whenhe brought over these programs of proposed psychologicalwelfare.Mr. Morris . From your association, what was his viewtoward these-Mr. Dooman. I don't know what responsibility or what partMr. Fairbank played in the formulation of these programs-that is, the setting up of the targets-but I found thatinvariably in these programs there would be found an itemdirecting the psychological warfare toward creating in theminds of the Japanese an attitude of resentment and op-position to the Emperor and to the monarchial system .

At that time we had not come to any decisions as to whatour policy should be in that respect, and I invariably red-


121

penciled these items referring to the Emperor . However,they would always appear either overtly or covertly in thenext program that would be presented .

There was, in other words, a persistent effort on thepart of the Office of War Information to get our approvaltoward psychological warfare directed at the relationshipbetween the Japanese people and the Emperor .

Mr. Morris . Have we neglected anything that we should 754know, Mr. Dooman? . . .Mr. Dooman . Well, my purpose, Mr. Morris, has not beento give you any evidence as to whether this, that, or theother man was a Communist or not, because I am in noposition to give you any such evidence .

My purpose in testifying here was to indicate in generalthat policies put forward by the left-wing press, from theDaily Worker right down through the line, were in effectsubstantially translated into United States policies and toindicate from personal knowledge how that operation wascarried out .Mr. Morris. That is right.

May the record show, Mr . Chairman, that at no timewas Mr. Dooman asked whether or not any particularperson was a Communist.The Chairman. The record will speak for itself in thatregard .

Chapter V

THE "RESIGNATION" OF MR. GREW

THE spring of 1945 was the year and the season whichsealed the fate of Undersecretary of State Joseph C .Grew and the group of "reactionaries" working underhim. On June loth, as you have read in Mr . Dooman'stestimony in the previous chapter, the CommunistPolitical Association transmitted the "Party directive"to the CPA and to the readers of Political Affairs (July1945), that all people of Grew's stripe be eliminatedfrom the Department of State . This action was pro-voked by a number of acts on the part of Mr . Grew.He had not turned out to be the "genuinely anti-fascistconservative" Fred Field had at first labeled him . (See,Chapter II: "If he makes mistakes in policy," Fieldpromised, "we'll raise hell.") Although Andrew Roth

Roth 3g dubbed him a "gullible aristocrat," Roth overlookedthe fact that Mr . Grew was also stubborn. If JoeGrew had seen a green Buick parked in front of hishome, no one was going to make him believe it was ablack Pontiac in back of the house . What he saw,he saw; and what he knew, he knew ; and all theeloquent persuasion in the-most adept hands couldn'tchange his mind . There were times when he wasinduced to "sway" a little for political expediency,such as his interview given the New York Times inwhich he stated he had never spoken one way, or theother about the Emperor. But in the privacy of theState Department circles he would not compromise .And what Mr. Grew would or would not do waspotentially important at this time because Mr . Stet-tinius was absent in San Francisco and Mr . Grew wasActing Secretary of State .

Yet, Joe Grew had one basic failing-the samefailing of so many people which even today endangersthe security of our nation-he was unable to see the

122

The "Resignation" of Mr. Grew

123conspiracy going on around him . In his eyes, all menwere honest, if somewhat blind to facts. Being unableto realize he had enemies, there was of course noprogram on his part to outwit them . And so, in thespring of 1945, he made a number of serious errorsin the view of his alert antagonists . In his book,"Turbulent Era" he naively writes of these "errors"without any realization of their connection with his"resignation" from State . The first was the incident ofMay 19, 1 945 .

On that date he spent a restless and sleepless night,his mind in a turmoil of deep concern for the nationin the light of our "floundering" diplomacy . In des-peration he arose at five in the morning, determinedthat, if he put his worries on paper, it would calm hismind, at least for the moment . The memo had no otherpurpose .

But so great was his anxiety that he was unableto keep it to himself . The following day-"I read mymemorandum to two high American officials competentin Russian affairs, W. Averell Harriman and CharlesE. Bohlen."

This is the memo in part :

Washington, May r9, 1945" . . . But as `a war to end wars,' the war will have beenfutile, for the result will be merely the transfer of totalitariandictatorship and power from Germany and Japan to SovietRussia which will constitute in future as grave a dangerto us as did the Axis . . . Once Russia is in the war againstJapan, then Mongolia, Manchuria, and Korea will graduallyslip into Russia's orbit, to be followed in due course byChina and eventually Japan . . . A future war withSoviet Russia is as certain as anything in this world canbe certain. It may come within a very few years . Weshall therefore do well to keep up our fighting strengthand to do everjrthing in our power to strengthen ourrelations with the free world . . .

"As soon as the San Francisco Conference is over, ourpolicy toward Soviet Russia should immediately stiffen,all along the line . . ."

Grew x445

124

The Enemy at His BackThe tragedy is that this analysis came in 1945 . It

should have come as a commentary on the Burns'estimate in 1942 and policy should have "stiffened"thenl Even in 1945, however, much could still havebeen done .

see Chap . II Without error, Grew had predicted the outcome ofthe war in Europe and the fate of China and Korea ;as of this writing, Japan is beginning to slip down theways into "Russia's orbit." Mr. Grew gives us nohint that he had read the edict of Georgi Dimitrovand the Communists' plans for Asia, but he saw andread the signs . When he advocated that "We shalltherefore do well to keep up our fighting strength,"

Grew 1445 he was of course completely unaware that at that verytime, two weeks after the fall of Germany, the Com-munists were putting on a concentrated and successfulcampaign to "bring our boys home" in order to pulver-ize our armed forces . Nor did he appear to realizethat the "over-selling" of the United Nations as apeace organization would strengthen this demand todemobilize .This memo of May 1945 was indeed "dangerous

thinking." Not only that, but Grew made the grievouserror of showing the memo to two of Hopkins' mostloyal "aides" who were chiefly responsible for the ter-ritorial agreements made with Stalin at Yalta-Har-riman and Bohlen .

Acting Secretary Grew went on from there, and onMay 28th began his long and anguished campaign topersuade the President to make a realistic proposal

Grew 1428 to Japan. "At 12 :35" on that date, he went to seeTruman "accompanied by judge Samuel Rosenman"who was one of the President's special counsels andadvisers. Joe Grew pleaded that "If some indicationcan now be given the Japanese that they . . . willbe permitted to determine their own future politicalstructure, they will be afforded a method of saving facewithout which surrender will be highly unlikely . . .The President said that he was interested in what I

The "Resignation" o f Mr . Grew

125said because his own thoughts had been following the Grew r43rsame line."

Error No. 3 was perhaps the most "unforgivable"of them all . He unknowingly urged the arrest of twomen important to the Communist Party, John S.Service and Andrew Roth . Service, working in theFar East Division, had recently returned from Chinaand had been suspected for some time for followingthe Communist "line." In this event he had beendiscovered giving secret documents to the editor ofthe magazine, "Amerasia ." Roth was a lieutenant inthe Naval Intelligence Reserve who was guilty of thesame offense, and was at that very moment in theprocess of writing his book in which Mr . Grew camein for most unfavorable comment . This was thenotorious "Amerasia Case ." "Amerasia" had a smallcirculation (mostly among our foreign service officers),and was a mouthpiece for the Communist Party . Thecase involved six persons and was piloted as far as agrand jury, at which time some fast footwork by theUnited States prosecuting attorneys ended the affairin what could be called a "white wash ." The fines were IPR r3-4842small for two of the defendants, the case against Roth IPR R-71was dropped, and Service and the others escapedscot free. Service was later reinstated in the Depart-ment of State with a letter of apology, ironicallyenough from Mr. Grew .

Acting Secretary Grew became involved because one Grew 1452of the defendants was a State Department officer . Inthe spring of 1945 Assistant Secretary of State,General Julius Holmes, told Grew that the FBI hadevidence on six persons, one a foreign service officer,for the theft of confidential documents from the Stateand Navy Departments. Grew did not ask the namesof the six, but before his own subordinate could beprosecuted the .Acting Secretary of State had to giveconsent. This he did .

Some time later, General Holmes informed Grewthat there had been a hitch-that the prosecution had

Grew 1452-3

Grew 1453

Grew 1455

126

The Enemy at His Backbeen held up allegedly by the White House . GeneralHolmes and Mr. Grew immediately went to see Presi-dent Truman to find out why. But the Chief Executiveknew nothing about it . In fact he was so outragedthat Mr. Grew writes, "I have seldom seen a manmore angry . . . The President had the telephone offthe hook while we were still with him and he toldJustice (Department) in no uncertain terms that hewished nothing whatever to interfere with the promptand thorough prosecution of the cases."Mr. Grew later discovered that the "hold-up" was

caused by the same policy that exists even today .It seems the President was having "current conversa-tions with the Soviet Government," and the inevitableconsequence of the prosecution would "greatly embar-rass the President." White House advisers had giventhe "hold-up" order assuming the President wouldagree to it .

Four months after Service had been reinstated withapologies from Mr. Grew, he was appointed to theStaff of the Political Advisor in Tokyo embassy .Seven years later, Service was dropped from theState Department for security reasons .

Error No. 4 had initiated the series of "errors ." OnMay 12, 1945 Mr. Grew made the tactical blunder ofsuggesting that, in view of the fact that Russia wasalready breaking the Yalta agreements concerningEurope, perhaps the agreement pertaining to Asiashould be reassessed before the next Big Three meet-ing at Potsdam. In identical memoranda to the Secre-taries of War and Navy, he asked :

In order to determine the policy of the United StatesGovernment in the Far East in connection with the politicaleffects of the expected Soviet entry into the Pacific Warand the relationship of the Yalta Agreement on this subject,I would appreciate receiving from you the views of theWar Department (Navy) on the following questions :

, . Is the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacificwar at the earliest possible moment of such vital interest

The "Resignation" o f Mr. Grew

127to the United States as to preclude any attempt by theUnited States Government to obtain Soviet agreement tocertain desirable political objectives in the Far East priorto such entry?

2 . Should the Yalta decision in regard to Soviet politicaldesires in the Far East be reconsidered or carried into effectin whole or in part?

3. Should a Soviet demand, if made, for participationin the military occupation of the Japanese home islandsbe granted or would such occupation adversely affect ourlong term policy for the future treatment of Japan?

In the opinion of the Department of State it would bedesirable politically to obtain from the Soviet Governmentthe following commitments and clarifications regardingthe Far East prior to any implementation on our part ofthe Yalta Agreement :

i . The Soviet Government should agree to use its in-fluence with the Chinese Communists to assist this Govern-ment in its endeavors to bring about the unification ofChina under the National Government headed by ChiangKai-shek . The achievement of Chinese unity on the basisconsidered most desirable by the United States Govern-ment should be agreed to by the Soviet Union before theUnited States Government should make any approach to theChinese Government on the basis of the Yalta Agreement .The difficulties in regard to Sinkiang should be settled byamicable agreement between the Soviet and Chinese Govern-ments .

2 . Unequivocal adherence of the Soviet Government tothe Cairo Declaration regarding the return of Manchuriato Chinese sovereignty and the future status of Korea.

3 . Definite agreement of the Soviet Government that whenKorea is liberated, whether before final capitulation ofJapan or after, it be placed immediately under the trustee-ship of the United States, Great Britain, China and theSoviet Union. This agreement should make clear that thefour trustees are to be the sole authority for the selectionof a temporary Korean Government.4. Before giving final approval to the annexation by the

Soviet Union of the Kurile Islands it might be desirable toreceive from the Soviet Government emergency landingrights for commercial planes on certain of these islands .

Grew 1456-7

PentagonPapers 71

Grew 1458-9

128

The Enemy at His BackThe reply to this from the War Department con-

curred in by Secretary Forrestal (Navy) was datedMay 21, 1945 and was over Stimson's name . It wasa sharp reply to the man who would suggest thatwe obtain "certain desirable political objectives" fromSoviet Russia . And it is astonishing, to say the least,in the light of American military tradition . The memois long, but every sentence is so provocative, I can'tfeel justified in omitting any of them :

i . The War Department considers that Russian entryinto the war against- Japan will be decided by the Russianson their own military and political basis with little regardto any political action taken by the United States . TheWar Department's view is that while the U .S .S.R. willseek and will accept any political inducement proffered bythe United States as a condition to her entry into the waragainst Japan, such political inducements will not in factaffect the Russian decision as to when, if ever, she willenter the war . Russian entry will have a profound militaryeffect in that almost certainly it will materially shorten thewar and thus save American lives .

Military considerations therefore do not preclude anattempt by the United States Government to obtain Sovietagreement to desirable political objectives in the Far Eastprior to the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific war .

-2 . The concessions to Russia on Far Eastern matterswhich were made at Yalta are generally matters which arewithin the military power of Russia to obtain regardlessof U.S. military action short of war . (Emphasis mine.)The War Department believes that Russia is militarilycapable of defeating the Japanese and occupying Karafuto,Manchuria, Korea and Northern China before it would bepossible for the U .S. military forces to occupy these areas.Only in the Kuriles is the United States in a position tocircumvent Russian initiative. If the United States wereto occupy these islands to forestall Russian designs, itwould be at the direct expense of the campaign to defeatJapan and would involve an unacceptable cost in Americanlives. Furthermore, the Russians can, if they choose, awaitthe time when the U .S. efforts will have practically com-pleted the destruction of Japanese military power and can

The "Resignation" of Mr . Grew

129then seize the objectives they desire at a cost to themrelatively much less than would be occasioned by their entryinto the war at an early date .

From the foregoing, it appears we can bring little, ifany, military leverage to bear on the Russians in so faras the Far East is concerned, unless we choose to use force .From the military point of view it would be desirable tohave a complete understanding and agreement with theRussians concerning the Far East . If it is believed thatthe reconsideration of the Yalta agreement will assist sucha complete understanding and agreement, then the WarDepartment would favor it, but it is not believed thatmuch good will come of a rediscussion at this time .

3. With regard to Soviet participation in the militaryoccupation of the Japanese homeland, the War Depart-ment considers this to be a matter for political . decision .From one military standpoint, this participation appearsdesirable, since it would reduce the military requirements ofthe U.S. for occupation purposes . On the other hand, ourexperiences with the Russians in the occupation of Germanymay in the future lead to considerations which wouldpoint to the wisdom of exclusive occupation by our ownforces. The discussion of this subject prior to Russianentry into the Japanese war does not appear necessary atthis time .

The War Department concurs in the desirability ofobtaining the four commitments and clarifications desiredof the Soviet Government by the Department of State .If the present schism in China continues and, at the sametime, Russian forces advance to areas giving them closecontact with the Chinese Communists, our present problemsin China will become more complicated, unless a priorsatisfactory understanding has been reached with theRussians . However, as a preliminary, some sort of under-standing between the Chinese Communists and the Gen-eralissimo seems to be in order as of first importance .

As to emergency landing rights for commercial planesin the Kuriles, it would probably be best to make a specificproposal on this matter to the Russians in case it is desiredto discuss the subject with them. However, Russia has themilitary capability of implementing unilaterally the YaltaAgreement (except possibly the Kuriles) . Hence, as pointedout above, measures other than U.S. military assistance

Grew 1406-7

130

The Enemy at His Backmust be found to persuade the Russians to give their agree-ment to the four points listed in the State Departmentmemorandum .

So you see, away back in 1945, the United Statespolicy was "fear" of Russian might . And at that timewe had the largest navy, and the greatest standingarmy in the world

Our obstreperous "boy," Mr . Grew, got his feet ineven more hot water when, as Acting Secretary ofState, he dipped his fingers into the propagandamachine and gummed up the works for a short minute .He emphasized in his memoirs that throughout thewar he took the position "that propaganda by anybranch of our Government against the Emperor ofJapan, or any effort to bomb the Emperor's palace,should be withheld . . ."

As Acting Secretary of State I was fortunately able toinfluence this situation at home in the face of considerabledifficulty with certain agencies of our Government andcertain sections of the press and with certain radio com-mentators who charged me with desiring to preserve theold feudal system in Japan.

The last mistake was to take place on June 16, 1945when Mr. Grew sent another memo to Samuel Rosen-man, again harping on the necessity of a statement bythe President to Japan . Grew did not know how totake "no" for an answer, or rather, he did not under-stand the motive behind the "no." On May 29, 1 945,General Marshall had said that such a statement wouldbe "premature" and Grew had gathered this wasbecause the battle of Okinawa was still going on andsuch a statement might appear to be a sign of weak-ness. But when Joe Grew wrote his last memo it wasonly five days before the victory of Okinawa, whichhad been raging for two and a half months, was an-nounced. In order to reach the President, he had togo through judge Rosenman

The "Resignation" o f Mr . Grew

131

To Samuel I. Rosenman, June 16, 1945

Grew 1438The campaign in Okinawa is likely to be finished in the

not distant future and I am wondering whether, with theannouncement of its fall, a suitable opportunity would notbe presented for us to make some sort of public statementagain calling upon the Japanese to surrender . . . morelives of Americans may ultimately be saved.

But this, too, was to meet defeat. The President, onJune 18, 1945, said " . . that while he liked the Grew 1437idea he had decided to hold this up until it could bediscussed at the Big Three meeting ." That same dayTruman held a briefing session with Stimson, For-restal, McCloy and his joint Chiefs in preparation forthe Potsdam Conference . The Pentagon papers pub-lished the minutes which make very unusual reading .Admiral Leahy suggested that ". . . our insistence Pentagonon unconditional surrender would result only in making papers 84

the Japanese desperate and thereby increase ourcasualty list . He did not think that this was at allnecessary."

President Truman's reply, according to these pub-lished minutes, is extraordinary if not "what onearthl" What on earth was he talking about? Andwho persuaded him not to take the Admiral's advice .Truman has stated many times that his one concernwas the saving of American lives . Here is the Presi-dent's reply to Admiral Leahy's suggestion :

THE PRESIDENT stated that it was with that thought in Pentagonmind that he had left the door open for Congress to take papers 84appropriate action with reference to unconditional sur-render. However, he did not feel that he could take anyaction at this time to change public opinion on the matter .

One can almost hear a forlorn sigh as Mr. Grewpenned his "amen" : "The President having ruled Grew 1437against the step at this time, there was of coursenothing more to be done . . ."

Two days later, June 20, 1945, the Communists hadhad enough and issued their manifesto . Word was

132

The Enemy at His Backpassed along to their "friends" in the State Depart-ment and in the White House, who knew how tocarry out the orders with great finesse .

The day after that, June 21, 1945, the battle forOkinawa ended. The total casualties were enormous andhorrible. But during the battle, in May and June, theJapanese were trying to persuade the Russians to

USSBS

help them negotiate for peace-first by way of theJapan'sStruggle to Soviet Ambassador to Japan, Malik, and then directlyEnd the War to Moscow. They were asking the Russians to tell7

the United States they wanted to surrender-andcertain of our officials knew this .One might ask the question-why was Mr. Grew

allowed all this time to play "monkey wrench" with"established policies?" There are several answers. Inthe spring of 1945 so many important events werehappening, or about to happen, that all Hell mightbreak loose if the boat were rocked . President Roose-velt died in April just before Stettinius had to leavefor the San Francisco United Nations conference . Thisleft the "reactionary" Mr . Grew as Acting Secretaryof State with a new President who was an unknownquantity; Germany surrendered in the beginning ofMay; the ailing Hopkins went to Moscow for hisimportant talks with Stalin ; and the Potsdam Con-ference, to be held in July, had to be set up .

It was not the time for a change, particularly sinceenough men in high places remained to defer theaction in regard to Japan as "premature ." The datefor Soviet entry into the Pacific war was known, soit was just a matter of stalling for a few short weeks .

It would have been bad strategy to fire the "reac-tionaries" in the closing days of the war . The Com-munists know so well when to stir up a hornet's nestand when not to, a theory borne out by Roth's direction,

Roth 1118 i.e ., "In politics, as in war, when a frontal attack istoo costly, it is frequently advisable and no less ef-fective to utilize a flank attack ."

Their first step was a new Secretary of State, a


133maneuver made easier by the advent of a new Presi-dent. As has been the custom in the past all membersof the Cabinet submitted their resignations whenPresident Truman took office . However, Mr. Trumandid not immediately accept the resignations, askingthe Secretaries to stay on until he got his feet on theground .

It was on July 1st when James F . Byrnes wasappointed to be Secretary of State in place of Stet-tinius. Grew immediately informed President Trumanthat he was going to tell Byrnes that he could takeadvantage of his resignation any time he wanted to,but- " . . . I would certainly not let anyone down,and if Mr . Byrnes should wish me to stay at least for Grew rg21

a time I would not be unwilling." Nothing happened inJuly, since the delay until Potsdam had been achieved .

However, when Grew went to see Mr. Byrnes onAugust 16th, after the surrender of Japan, the Secre-tary frankly told him he would like to have an under-secretary of his own choice although he would likeGrew to remain until September . But Mr. Grew provedunwilling to "stay at least for a time" and resignedthen and there .

Here is an interesting detail about Mr. Grew'sresigning : While Mr. Grew was still in Byrnes' office,Byrnes sent word to his secretary to telephone DeanAcheson who was vacationing in the Adirondacks. Onthe same evening, August 16, it was announced thatAcheson would replace Grew . Surely Mr. Grew musthave realized from such quick action, the subject hadbeen long discussed with his successor .

Even before he had met with this abrupt acceptanceof his "resignation" Mr. Grew had met with anothermaneuver from his enemies (and one quite often usedeven today) . Mr. Grew's publishers make a footnoteof it :

After a month of the Byrnes regime, Mr. Grew later Grew 1522commented, he saw that an inner group was making themajor decisions, and that he was not being consulted .

134

The Enemy at His BackThis was the "writing on the wall" that even a stub-

born "blindness" should have seen .The team of Grew, Ballantine and Dooman found

itself isolated from their usual contacts and con-ferences, and the policies being "put forward" wereentirely against its views and better judgment . Itsoon became apparent to them that their usefulnessto the government had come to an end . After Mr. Grewleft the Department on August 16th, the others,Dooman and Ballantine, soon followed .A number of people in Washington at that time

understood the true nature of this triple "resigning"for what it was, but, of the three, only Mr . Doomanrealized he was, in fact, fired.

The new Undersecretary, Dean Acheson, immedi-ately gave John Carter Vincent the duties of bothDooman and Ballantine .

To this day, Mr. Grew purports to be puzzled andsomewhat hurt by statements that he was fired. Hetried to explain in his book that this was not so . Hepointed out that he had spent 41 years in publicservice and wished to retire ; that he was sufferingfrom gallstones ; and that he had been trying toresign ever since Truman became President . In anotherfootnote, he further explains :

Grew 1523 Charges were made in 1945 and have been repeated since,as, for instance, in the Chicago Tribune, July 14, 1950,that Mr. Grew was forced out of office by "left wing" pres-sure. "Myths have arisen about that point," Mr. Grewstated on July 21, 1950 . "Actually I resigned on my owninitiative and had to exert a little pressure to get myresignation accepted . The left wingers chortled that theyhad pushed me out, but they really had nothing to do withit."In May 1952 Mr. Grew added : " . . . Probably nothing

that I may say or write will stop these myths ."

Mr. Grew is right in his prediction, unless he is"pretending" in the old-fashioned, grand manner . The


135"myth" of August 1945 has been confirmed by events .Mr. Grew had to be fired . Being instinctively andautomatically a loyal American and not understandingour "New Look" toward Russia, he was messing thingsup!

The story of Joseph Grew is important because itexplains a part of the reason why our foreign policiessince 1933 have consistently resulted in disaster, andalso, how the enemy maneuvers . That Mr. Grew didnot-fully sense the betrayal of himself and the UnitedStates was a powerful weapon in the hands of theleftists and Communists then working in our StateDepartment and White House. Strangely enough, Mr .Churchill, in "Triumph and Tragedy" delicately hintsthat he was aware of this "element ." He wrote that"very different ideas were being pressed upon thenew President from influential quarters in Washington .The sort of mood and outlook which had been noticedat Yalta had been strengthened . . . These pressuresmust have been very strong upon Truman . . . Icould only feel the vast manifestation of Soviet andRussian imperialism rolling forward over helpesslands ."

Grew's anguish over the "stone wall" which heconstantly faced during his last months in office, heexpressed in an almost pathetic "cry in the wilder-ness" :

"During this era I felt that the great majority of the Grew 1447American people as well as elements in the Governmentwere woefully blind to the fundamental philosophy anddoctrine of the Soviets. Few had studied or even read thoseSoviet bibles, the works of Marx and Engels, Lenin andStalin himself, on which that philosophy and doctrinewere firmly based . . . They were blind to the Sovietdoctrine that communism and capitalism cannot continue toexist peaceably side by side, and that war between thetwo camps is eventually inevitable . They were blind tothe patent fact that the only language understood by theKremlin is the language of strength, force and power ; that

ChurchillT&T57o

136

The Enemy at His Backfriendly appeasement in any form is regarded as a clearsign of weakness and an invitation to further demands orencroachments ."

But let us see how "blind" Mr . Grew himself was .Did he not know that the American people wereblind because of the misinformation they were receiv-ing from their leaders who "handled" the press andradio channels? If he had stopped to analyse the ma-nipulations of those "elements in government," wouldhe still believe that they were "woefully blind"?Had Mr. Grew read further than the doctrines of

the Communist leaders, and delved into the vol-uminous hearings of the House Un-American ActivitiesCommittee he would have discovered their local andpractical methods of infiltration and deception . If Mr .Grew had been aware of the Communist Manifestofor the domination of Asia, at least he could have rec-ognized that the "elements in Government" werefollowing the Communist line without omitting thedotting of an "I" or the crossing of a "T." It was thetragic case of the blind calling the deceivers blind .

Chapter VI

POTSDAM AND THE ADVISERS

The Potsdam Conference .Forrestal makes a last desperate effort .The Japanese are also desperate .Military Intelligence makes a report on Red China .Surrender is set for Nov . z5, z946 .U.S. rejects aid in the Pacific from other allies .The Potsdam Proclamation.

NOTHING was done to stop the slaughter of youth inthe Pacific until the Potsdam Conference which beganJuly 17th and ended August ist, 1945 . The Conferencehad three purposes : to discuss the problems arisingfrom the defeat of Germany in the preceding May ;to talk about getting Russia into the Pacific War ; andthirdly, to smooth down the bristling fur of the Russianbear which had been accompanied by ominous gruntsand growls ever since Yalta. Harry Truman, nevera timid fellow, was assigned the task to "grin downthe bear." And this he tried to do for, according toJonathan Daniels' "The Man of Independence" : "He Daniels 286kept a grinning admiration of `Old Joe' which somedull patriots in America later decided was strange ifnot somehow disloyal ."

Although a good part of the Conference was takenup by Pacific problems, Chiang Kai-shek was notinvited. If the Chief of the Chinese nation werepresent, it was argued, Japan would then have anexcuse to break her neutrality pact with Russia andlaunch an attack on her!

This was the old reason given for not invitingChiang to Teheran and Yalta, to which was added the"danger" that the Chinese might leak the informationto the enemy. While these excuses might have had ashadow of validity at Teheran and Yalta, there was

137

138

The Enemy at His Backnot even the shadow of a shadow for such excuses atPotsdam in July 1945 .

Why did the new President and his aides rush toPotsdam to confirm the top-secret agreements madeat Yalta? The Soviets had already been breaking theYalta agreements concerning Poland and Rumaniawith mass murder and the spread of terror . Stettiniusmentioned this when he wrote that " . . . the military

stet 97 leaders and I discussed the failure of the Soviet Unionto abide by the Yalta agreement on the Balkans ."But this apparently did not break our faith in Russiaas our "real friend ." However, our officials had evenmore evidence of Russia's contempt for commondecency. They were well acquainted with the inexcus-able treatment of American soldiers whom the Rus-

Sherwood

sians "liberated" from Nazi prison camps, refusing558

even to give information as to their number, identifica-tion or whereabouts. Likewise, in the Pacific area the

Arnold 482 Russians had, throughout the war, spat on our nationalhonor when they confiscated our B 2 9's which wereforced down in Russian territory after bombing raidson Japan. General Arnold wrote in his book, "GlobalMission," that our crews were interned and "treatedalmost like captured enemies" as late as 1944 and1945. Admiral Standley cites an incident in 1942 in

Standley

"Admiral Ambassador to Russia" how these airmen232-4 finally escaped from the prisons of our "ally" and

made their way to Iran . This escape is an example ofthe contempt American fighting men have for Russianthreats because, when Admiral Standley pleaded withMolotov for their release, Molotov replied, "To escapefrom the Soviet Union is impossible ."

But then as now, it had not been the policy of ourgovernment to demand the release of our boys "orelse" from the Red jailors . Our policy seems to havebeen well summed up by General Arnold's plain

Arnold 482

spoken words : "Don't do anything ; it might makesomebody mad at us 1 "Four Americans having much concern with the

war against Japan were not invited to the Potsdam

Potsdam and the Advisers

139Conference : Undersecretary of State Grew, Secretaryof the Navy James Forrestal, General of the ArmyDouglas MacArthur, and Admiral of the Fleet ChesterNimitz .

Grew was obviously in the dog house and had beenfor some time . But his absence from Potsdam couldbe rationalized by the fact that he was obliged to beActing Secretary of State while Byrnes was away atthe Conference . As for MacArthur and Nimitz, themajor conferences were only open to the "Europeanbrass," although Wedemeyer, Chennault and Stilwelldid manage to rate the "bush league" Cairo Conferencein 1943, and Wedemeyer was at the Casablanca meet-ing. Years later, MacArthur's startled "I?," whenasked by Senator Knowland whether he had beeninvited to go to Yalta spoke volumes, as did the MacA 1-128

General's succinct answer, "No, sir ."Forrestal, on the other hand, had been fairly popu-

lar with the elite Washington conference group untilhis patriotism combined with his intelligence forcedMr. Grew to share his dog house with him . Forrestalhad been reading reports, making personal inspections,and had started asking questions . Unlike Mr . Grew,the Secretary of the Navy was not only well acquaintedwith those "certain elements" but he also understoodtheir aims . Naval intelligence was perhaps the bestof our wartime intelligence agencies (excluding theFBI), and Forrestal was reading daily the many inter-cepted messages between Japan and Russia in whichthe former was attempting to negotiate a surrender .Moreover, Forrestal had recently made a complete tourof the Pacific war theater where he saw the war beingfought and talked with the officers and men doing thefighting. He was "dangerous ."

Knowing the territorial loot Truman was intent ongiving the Russians at Potsdam, and realizing thetragic needlessness of such concessions, Forrestal cameto the conclusion he must act, and quickly. He flewto the Conference in a desperate hope of being ableto place a deterring hand on the President's shoulder .

Kase zoo-zalso StateDept. source.

140

The Enemy at His BackBut the day he arrived the conference came to anend and the damage was done.

Forrestal was not alone in his attempt to bring theJapanese cry for peace to official attention . SenatorHomer Capehart, Republican from Indiana, had comeacross the information and publicly announced onJune 28th that the Japanese had made peace offers"within recent weeks which would be acceptable tome personally." The following day Mr. Grew madea short denial. But apparently the Senator's statementto the press attracted public interest which the shortdenial did not pacify. On July loth, Mr . Grew pre-sented a long and detailed statement to the presswhich, in view of his past actions and convictionsagainst unconditional surrender, was extraordinary .In part his statement is as follows :

We have received no peace offer from the JapaneseGovernment, either through official or unofficial channels .Conversations relating to peace have been reported tothe Department from various parts of the world, butin no case has an approach been made to this Govern-ment, directly or indirectly, by a person who could establishhis authority to speak for the Japanese Government . . .The nature of the purported "peace feelers" must be clearto everyone. They are the usual moves in the conduct ofpsychological warfare by a defeated enemy . . . The policyof this Government has been, is, and will continue to beunconditional surrender .

The idea of considering the "peace feelers" astrick psychological warfare apparently came fromhigher authorities than the Undersecretary . FrazierHunt's book, "The Untold Story of Douglas Mac-Arthur," reveals this to be true . In March of 1945

Hunt 375 General George C. Kenney came to Washington on amission for General MacArthur. In a talk with theJoint Chiefs of Staff, he did his best to tell themthat the war in the Pacific was over and that therewas no "necessity for holding back until the Russianscame in." General Marshall said he did not agree with


141

this view. "He insisted that she still had a great armyand was full of fight . Likewise, he made it clear thathe had little faith in the Japanese overtures for peace ."(Emphasis mine .)General Kenney later said he didn't give up hope

and made a bee-line to the White House to talk withPresident Roosevelt . After he'd told his story he met talk withwith another exasperating stone wall. The President, Kenney

he said, merely grinned at him and replied, "That isnot what my Chiefs of Staff tell me."

On July 12, 1945, five days before the PotsdamConference opened, the Emperor of Japan, frustratedby the unproductive talks between Japanese Ambas-sador to the Kremlin and the Soviet officials, ordered Kase 189 alsoPrince Konoye on a mission to Moscow . In Konoye the Japan'sEmperor had a devout pacifist . The Prince on numer- Struggle toous occasions had considered making a dramatic plea End the Warfor peace by flying to the United States unannouncedto "talk personally to President Roosevelt and solicithis personal intervention for peace ."

Kase 192

(Prince Konoye committed suicide in December of Kase 190

1945, the day before he was to be taken to jail asone of the war criminals .)

General Marshall in his Biennial Report to theSecretary of War (July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1 945) Biennialpresents a picture of the situation in the Pacific at this Report 154-5

time. He reported that "From California to the coastof China the vast Pacific abounded with Americanpower . . . The enemy's shipping had been largelysunk or driven from the seas . The few remainingfragments of his once powerful naval force werevirtually harbor bound and the industries and com-munications of Japan were rapidly crumbling under themounting tempo of our aerial bombardment . . . Theday of final reckoning for a treacherous enemy wasat hand."

The campaign inside government circles in Wash-ington to "get Russia into the war," however, wasintense, while the press and radio pushed strenuously

Leahy 385

King 606

142

The Enemy at His Backfor the trial of the Emperor as a war criminal . TheDaily Worker, which heretofore had made few men-tions of Japan, and none of the Emperor, now went"all out ."Increasing alarm filled the minds of many-those

who were trying to get Russia into the war before itwas too late, and those on the opposite side of thefence who dreaded the consequences if this were tooccur. It was early in July when General of the Army,Dwight D . Eisenhower, went to Antwerp to meetPresident Truman and his party on their arrival forthe Potsdam Conference. In his book, "Crusade inEurope," written some years later, General Eisenhowerwrote

Eisenhower

Another item on which I ventured to advise President441-2 Truman involved the Soviets' intention to enter the Japa-

nese war. I told him that since reports indicated the im-minence of Japan's collapse I deprecated the Red Army'sengaging in that war . I foresaw certain difficulties arisingout of such participation and suggested that, at the veryleast, we ought not to put ourselves in the position ofrequesting or begging for Soviet aid. It was my personalopinion that no power on earth could keep the Red Armyout of that war unless victory came before they couldget in .

In this view General Eisenhower had the completeagreement of Admiral Leahy :

I also had told the President of my jaundiced view ofRussia's going into Manchuria . This also was discussed atlength by the Joint Chiefs, but the Army already hadwon that argument and the decision had been confirmed atYalta.

A member of the joint Chiefs, Admiral King, in thediscussions with the President, June 18th, on variousaspects of the Pacific war had-

. . . emphasized the point that, regardless of the desira-bility of the Russians entering the war, they were not, in


143his opinion, indispensable, and he did not think that weshould go so far as to beg them to come in . While thecost of defeating Japan would be greater without Russianaid, there was no question in King's mind but that we .could handle it alone . He thought the realization of this ;fact should greatly strengthen the President's hand irk

the forthcoming conference in Potsdam.

Also the politically naive Mr . Stettinius gave theproposal an incredulous glance when he wrote

Even as late as the Potsdam Conference, after the firstatomic bomb had exploded at Los Alamos (Note : he meansAlamogordo) on July 16th, the military insisted that theSoviet Union had to be brought into the Far Eastern war.

James Forrestal commented in his "Diaries" that onJuly 28th Secretary Byrnes said he was "anxious toget the Japanese affair over with before the Russiansgot in."

So here again we find that "the Army," in the personof General Marshall, won an argument on high strategyagainst the advice of a majority of generals, admiralsand statesmen.

Stet 98

Forrestal 78

In 1945 the administration set a precedent whichhas become common government practice ever since .It suppressed a document embarrassing to its policy .And this one was certainly a hot potato. This was aJuly 5, 1945 summary of a report on "The ChineseCommunist Movement" which was a study made bythe Military Intelligence Service, and presented byGeneral P. E. Peabody, its chief . Several months ofintense research had gone into the project, the staffof military and civilian experts having examined over IPR 7A-23ro2,500 reports, pamphlets, and books covering a periodfrom 1919 to 1945 . The conclusions reached in thereport begin with these words : "The Chinese Com-munists ARE Communists . . . The `democracy' IPR 7A-23xowhich the Chinese Communists sponsor represents`Soviet democracy' . . ."

2315

2317

2317

2308

144

The Enemy at His BackThis was a "dangerous" statement because, as we all

know, the policy of "certain elements" at that timeand up to the Korean war, was that the Red Chinesewere "agrarian reformers ." Also, it was in direct con-tradiction to the following dispatch by an Americanofficial in Chungking which was quoted in the intelli-gence report "it is unfortunate that the present dayCommunist Party (in China) bears that name ." Butthe intelligence report goes on to quote Mao Tse-tung,Chinese Communist leader, in his booklet, "New De-mocracy" (Jan . 1941), who was more candid than theAmerican official when he said, "We (Chinese) cannotseparate ourselves from the assistance of the SovietUnion."

In this same booklet, Mao gives a warning to thefree world-"Whoever prepares to oppose the Com-munists has to prepare to be crushed." (Emphasismine.)

This summary and report put its finger directly onthe heart of the Yalta agreement (although it was stilla secret) when the summary pointed out : "There areindications that Soviet Russia envisages the establish-ment of Soviet domination . . . in the areas of NorthChina adjacent to Soviet Russia : that is in Sinkiang,Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and possibly also thenorthern provinces of China Proper ."

A recommendation and distinct warning can befound in the Fundamental Conclusions . The fifth con-clusion in the summary reads as follows :

2305 In order to prevent the separation of Manchuria andNorth China from China, it is essential that, if SovietRussia participates in the war, China not be divided (likeEurope) into American-British and Russian zones ofmilitary operations .

The story of the summary and report issued by theMilitary Intelligence Division is one of unusual in-terest. The summary was presented in May 1945,three months before the Potsdam Conference, and


145marked "secret." i i o copies of the summary weremade and were distributed in July to ig governmentagencies and overseas military theaters-15 went tothe White House and three to the State Department,Shortly after it was distributed, it was recalled .

The fat got thrown into the fire when on August 5,1949, Secretary of State Acheson made public thefamous one-sided White Paper on China . Everyonewho had been following our "blunders" in China withreal anxiety, read the White Paper carefully, andCongressman Walter H. Judd, Republican of Minne-sota, one of the few who had knowledge of the intelli-gence report, noticed it was never mentioned in theWhite Paper. He gave out a press release in which hecalled on Dean Acheson to tell why he did not includeeither the report or the summary on Red China .

Acheson answered the question by following theformula : "the best defensive is an offensive ." On Au-gust 24, 1949, he declassified the report and made itpublic while at the same time issuing a press statementridiculing Walter Judd . And, in making the report andsummary public, the press had access to only twocopies, each consisting of 450 typewritten pages . Noshort summary was made to help the reporters .

But the story is even stranger. The ONLY memberof the press who made any effort to get the report wasa correspondent for Tass, the Soviet News agency .And the only way in which these documents have be-come available to the average interested citizen wasthrough Alfred Kohlberg, an old-timer in the fightagainst the Chinese Reds who became known as "TheChina Lobby." He borrowed one of the two copiespossessed by the State Department, had it photostated,and presented it to the McCarran committee during itsinvestigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations . Itwas published as volume 7A of the published IPRhearings .

Whoever "They" were who decided that this sum-mary and report should be suppressed undoubtedlyhad knowledge of the secret Yalta agre' ment con-

146

The Enemy at His Backcerning Japan. It's an easy guess that President Tru-man was never shown either the summary or thereport of our Military Intelligence Service . I was notsurprised either when Admiral Leahy told me that hehad never seen or heard of these documents until hehad read the manuscript of this book! The Admiral'soffice was in the White House and 15 copies were sentthere .

I am curious to know what went on in HarryTruman's mind at that time . I wrote him a letter andasked him, but he never replied . Neither do his "Mem-oirs" answer the question I put to him . He had beenPresident only three months, a job for which he hadhad no schooling whatever . Only a year before, he'dbeen a United States Senator, and then vice-presidentfor three months before he was catapulted into theworld's most important office . During the time he wasvice-president he had never been invited to go to anAllied conference, nor even to the important con-ferences in Washington . He was completely unedu-cated in high-powered, international politics . The Pots-dam Conference was the first meeting our new Presi-dent had with Churchill (succeeded midway by Atlee)and Stalin, and again it is important to know what hisattitude was toward these men as he met them with the"cards stacked against him," so to speak . JonathanDaniels in his book, "The Man of Independence," givesus the best insight. And the man of Independence,Missouri, evidently thought the Big League was nodifferent from the Missouri Bush League :

Daniels 278 From the beginning Truman liked Stalin, as he likedChurchill but in a different way . . . "Stalin is as nearlike Tom Pendergast as any man I know" . . . "I got theimpression," Truman said later, "that Stalin would standby his agreements, and also that he had a Politburo onhis hands like the Eightieth Congress . . ."

Again we must take into consideration the adviserswith whom Truman had had no close, 'if any, relation-


147ship. The President was accompanied by his newSecretary of State, Jimmy Byrnes, who had been withRoosevelt at Yalta even though he had played only asmall part in the negotiations. Mr. Byrnes gave agraphic picture of the importance of the advisers inhis book. He said that they had brought along memo-randa covering almost every subject that might bebrought up. "We worked hard on board the Augusta. . . Every morning throughout the trip, Ben Cohen, Byrnes 67H. Freeman (Doc) Matthews, and Charles E . (Chip)Bohlen would meet with me in my cabin to considerthese papers . Anew Secretary of State could not haveasked for a finer trio of advisers ."Ben Cohen, Mr . Byrnes wrote, " . . . has had a

hand in important issues ever since the early days ofthe Roosevelt administration . He was with me throughall my work at the White House . . . I regard hismind as one of the best I have ever encountered . . .Doc . . . is representative of the finest men in ourcareer service and I relied upon him heavily . . .Chip . . . was invaluable to me ."

With few exceptions, they were almost the same ad-visers who went with Roosevelt to Yalta. At this time,of course, Roosevelt was dead, and Hopkins' illnesshad finally forced him to retire . However, "Harry theHop" had already laid the ground work for Potsdamat his meeting with Stalin the preceding May, and thepolicies were faithfully carried out .

Before Truman left for the Conference he had beengiven all kinds of confidential information and con-flicting advice . He had been advised by Admirals King,Leahy and Nimitz that the Japanese Navy and AirForce were liquidated, that "the defeat of Japan could King 598be accomplished by sea and air power alone," and thatthere was "no necessity of actual invasion of the Japa-nese home islands by ground troops ." At the sametime, the Enemy Branch of the Foreign Economic Ad-ministration, headed by Henry N . Fowler, contradictedthis with the statement that the Japanese were stillpowerful. General Marshall agreed. The Office of War

148

The Enemy at His BackInformation, headed by Elmer Davis, backed up by acertain element in the State Department were advisinghim that the Japanese Emperor system should be

IPR 1o-3386 abolished. Owen Lattimore even paid a call on thePresident to convince him of this view. General Mar-shall insisted that it was necessary for Russia to enterthe war in order to "save millions of American lives ."

Surely the drafted paper, which Truman had dis-cussed with Mr. Grew and others, must have pre-sented a puzzle to him while the Army continued withplans for the invasion of the Japanese home islands .This was the question I asked him in my letter . Iwanted to know how he reconciled all this conflictinginformation and advice.

Meanwhile, Russia had not waited until the fall ofGermany to transport her troops from the Europeanwar to Siberia in preparation for the attack on Man-churia. Apparently Stalin believed as early as Marchthat the war in Europe was already won because in

Kase 165

that month Japanese intelligence had noticed Russiantroop movements behind the Manchurian border .

Japan, anticipating the invasion of her home islands,had used the remaining vessels of her merchant marineto transfer the remnants of her highly trained Kwan-

Kase z6g-6

tung army to Japan . In contrast to this, General Mar-shall had estimated that the strength of the Japanese

Baldwin go-, troops on the Asiatic mainland was 2,000,000 first rateand well trained troops . Hanson Baldwin, military af-fairs editor of the New York Times, noted in his book,

Baldwin 8o "Great Mistakes of the War" that the best of theKwantung Army had been shifted in the fall of 1944 tothe fronts where fighting was going on .

Even in the Japanese home islands the situation washopeless . As General MacArthur stated before the

MacA z-g8 "MacArthur hearings" in 1951 : " . . . they had atleast 3,000,000 of as fine ground troops as I have everknown, that laid down their arms because they didn'thave the materials to fight with." I have emphasizedthese words because they state a fact which "theArmy" always chose to ignore .

Potsdam and the Advisers 149And now we come to a very curious incident occurring

at Potsdam. A year before, at the Quebec meeting inSeptember 1944, it was decided that Russia wouldenter the war against Japan (as Stalin had promised atMoscow and Teheran) go days after the surrender ofGermany and that the target date for Japan's sur-render should be 18 months, or a year and 6 monthsfrom the fall of Germany . This was arrived at in thefollowing manner . "While the British Chiefs of Staffproposed an estimate of two years after the defeat ofGermany, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had beenusing a one year period, recommended as a compro-mise an 18-month period, `to be adjusted periodicallyto conform to the course of the war.'"

But no "adjustment" was ever allowed . Since theBritish are brought into this unusual picture by thePentagon papers, it would be more than interesting tosee the British documents on this Quebec 1944 meet-ing .

What makes this estimate curious is the fact thatGeneral MacArthur stated to the press on April 4,1955 that !"On September 21, 1944 (a few days afterthe Quebec meeting) I reported that the campaign was`entering its decisive phase' . . . and that `defeat nowstares her (Japan) in the face.'" This was io monthsbefore Potsdam . Students of history will find thechronology of these dates and the state of affairs asthey existed more than interesting . For in spite of allthat occurred between September 1944 when this de-cision was taken, and the Potsdam Conference ; inspite of the reports from MacArthur and Nimitz of theimminent collapse of Japan ; in spite of the drawn upsurrender papers in Mr . Truman's hypothetical pocket ;and in spite of great progress with the atomic bomb-this decision was reaffirmed at Potsdam 1

Admiral Leahy wrote : "At the Combined Chiefssession on July 19th (1945) the target date for forcingunconditional surrender of Japan was set for Nov . 15,1946." Let me add that when I first read this passageI thought it must be a misprint-surely he meant 1 945 .

Pentagonpapers 31

Leahy 410

150


But other memoirs proved the typesetter not in error .To some of those who witnessed it, this decision

must have seemed most unrealistic . But what was thereaction of President Truman? One of those present atPotsdam has told that, on the day Stalin arrived andhad his first meeting with the President, the formertold the President that he had received a message fromthe Japanese Government expressing an intention tosend Prince Konoye to Moscow to negotiate for sur-render. According to the story, Truman asked, "Whatare you going to do about it?" And Stalin's reply was-with a laugh and a shrug, "Nothing ."

Nowhere in the history book do I find any questionsfrom Truman on the logic of the target date for Nov .15, 1946 .

As the famous Alice once said and so aptly, "Thingsget curiouser and curiouser." Two days after the Com-bined Chiefs decided the war would last more than ayear longer, we find that decisions even more curiouserwere to be made . According to Admiral King's book,

King 611 on July 21st, the American Joint Chiefs sent a dis-patch from Potsdam to MacArthur and Nimitz thatthey might expect the "capitulation" of Japan "withinthe very near future."

The big question is, who gave the signal that it wastime to permit Japan to surrender?

The American press at home reflected about onetenth of the information- that our generals, admiralsand statesmen had. The contrast between the jointChiefs' and later the Combined Chiefs' decision thatthe war would not end for a year and two months, andthe front pages in our press is worth looking over :

July 16, 1945

July 18, 1945

July 23, 1945

July 24, 1945

Tokyo Admits Possibility Japan May Haveto SurrenderUnited States Warships Roam for HoursOff Japan Without OppositionJapanese See Final Fight at Home ; AdmiralSays Fleet and Planes ImpotentJap Envoy to Berlin Reported Planning toUrge Surrender


151

July 26, 1945 Tokyo Radio Suggests Japan Would AcceptEasier Peace Terms

On August 4, 1945 a story appearing on page 4 ofthe Washington Evening Star gave one of the mostimportant news reports of that day, two days beforethe atomic bomb was dropped and ten days before theactual surrender :

AP. with the US 3rd Army in Germany, Aug . 4-Herbert von Dircksen, former German ambassador to Tokyoand London, said yesterday the German Government wasadvised last January that Japan was forming a new govern-ment, with Baron Kantaro Suzuki as Premier to try tocome to an understanding with the United States andGreat Britain . . . "I wish your government had seen fitto explain unconditional surrender to us," he said .

Unfortunately the propaganda in our press againstthe Emperor was having more effect on both our ownand the Japanese public than these signs of peace ap-pearing in the headlines . During the Potsdam Con-ference Mr . Kase wrote that " . . . what interested us Kale 201most deeply was the trend of expression in regard tothe status of the Emperor ."

By this time the American press was "laying it onthick," and the Daily Worker was hot on the Mikado'strail too . It is interesting that on July 19, the DailyWorker reported on an editorial in the New YorkHerald Tribune whose then foreign editor was JosephBarnes, later to be named under oath as a Communist .(He denied the accusation and went with the Simon IPR R-:5 :and Schuster publishing house .)

THE DAILY WORKER, July 19, 1945Tuesday's N.Y. Herald Tribune in a front page story

by its Washington reporter Jack Steele, disclosed . . . thatthe imperial government, together with the Emperor wouldremain in power . . . It should be noted that the HeraldTribune's editorial yesterday takes this seriously and-arguesstrongly against such an approach .

152

The Enemy at His BackPerhaps no paper in the United States carries as

much influence as the New York Times . Its columnist,Arthur Krock, had won the respect and confidence ofthousands of people across the country. And yet we findthe Times' editorials as well as Mr. Krock parrotingthe Communist line . Mr. Krock wrote on July 5, 1 945

"Unless the imperial Japanese power is removed-eventhough it is wielded from behind the throne-no peacewith Japan will be more than an armistice ."

Perhaps Mr. Krock was only following the editorialpolicy of his employers, for a few days later, on July14, 1945, the Times' editorial proposed that the Em-peror as well as the military caste should now beattacked . The Times admitted the Kamikaze pilotswere fighting for the Emperor but somehow arrived atthe queer conclusion that they would stop if we at-tacked the Emperor.

On this note, an interesting sequence of broadcastsKase 2011 to Japan occurred. On July 21st, the U .S. Navy, al-

though unable to explain our meaning of unconditionalsurrender, tried to come as close as was possible tosaying the Japanese could select their own govern-ment, which would naturally mean the inclusion ofthe Emperor. In a broadcast to Japan the Navy's Psy-chological Warfare Department said that "The At-lantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration are thesources of our policy."

This was widely reported in the United States, andthe following day Archibald MacLeish, Assistant Sec-retary of State, rushed to broadcast to Japan that theUnited States would never modify the terms of uncon-ditional surrender, but that the treatment of Japanafter surrender was another matter .

Although the Japanese, grasping at straws, readsome sign of hope in the last phrase of the statement,MacLeish inadvertently let it be known that the At-lantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration would beinterpreted by the United States in its own way .


153From his office in Washington, Secretary of the

Navy Forrestal kept a close watch on both Potsdamand the war in the Pacific . His diaries of those daystell many unusual stories notwithstanding the fact thatthey were carefully "edited" and much was deleted bythe Truman administration after Forrestal's death,and, notwithstanding the fact that one of the compilersof "The Forrestal Diaries" was Walter Millis . Millis'political philosophy can be summed up by the fact thatthe St. Louis Post Dispatch reviewed an article hewrote for the Saturday Review in which he stronglyattacked the Loyalty Security program and called theFBI "secret political police ." (For instance, in the"Diaries" the "premature" meeting of May 29th in thePentagon was mentioned, but NOT the "premature"conversation.) One of the many interesting entries isas follows :

"24 July 1945

Forrestal 76. . . on the first of July, Sato (Ambassador to Moscow)sent a long message outlining what he conceived to beJapan's position . . . He strongly advised accepting anyterms . . . The response to this message was that . . . thewar must be fought with all the vigor and bitterness ofwhich the nation was capable so long as the only alternativewas the unconditional surrender ."

This was one of the messages which inspired Secre-tary Forrestal's dramatic and futile flight to Potsdam .

It is a curious thing that there are not found in theForrestal Diaries the much more important interceptedmessages beginning with July loth when the Japanesewere finally desperate enough to take any terms theycould get . In fact, these later messages between Satoand Tokyo do not appear in any publication or memoirI have found except in the reports of the United StatesStrategic Bombing Survey . Neither are they found inthe recently published Yalta papers or the Pentagonpapers. Here is an extraordinary story as told by theUSSBS"On 1o July .

Sato was again instructed to put

St. LouisPost Dis-patch Sept .20, 1955

154


USSBS

the matter directly to the Vice Commissar for ForeignJapan's

Affairs in Moscow. Russia asked for more details con-Struggle toEnd the War cerning the mission and Sato was directed to explainp• 7 the mission as follows : . . . ( 2) to ask Russia to in-

tercede with the United States in order to stop the war .The Soviets replied on 13 July that since Stalin andMolotov were just leaving for Potsdam no answercould be given until their return to Moscow . On 12July meanwhile the Emperor had called in Konoye andsecretly instructed him to accept any terms he couldget and to wire these terms direct to the Emperor .Konoye also testified that when Sato was sounding outthe Russians he reported the Russians would not con-sider a peace role unless the terms were unconditionalsurrender, and that this reply had a great influence onthe Emperor ." (Emphasis mine .)

Were these other messages kept from Mr . Forrestal,or were they omitted from his published "Diaries"?

The strong argument put up by the Army was thatthe real necessity for getting Russia into the war wasthe enormous number of casualties we anticipated inthe invasion of the Japanese home islands . And theinvasion was a plan the military did not abandon . Thefinal report made by the American and British Com-bined Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Leahy writes, "presumedthat defeat of the Enemy's armed forces in the Japa-nese homeland would be prerequisite to the uncon-

Leahy 414

ditional surrender of the enemy, a premise with whichI did not agree."Everyone who had even second hand knowledge of

the Japanese character and their fanatic ability tofight, realized that, with the Emperor at stake, almostevery patriotic man, woman and child would fight withhis last breath . Mr. Kase tells how they made prepa-rations for their last hopeless defense when he wrote

Kase 141 that "As there were no guns or swords to arm themwith, they were told to improvise spears out of sharp-ened bamboo sticks! Men and women were herdedtogether and compelled to drill with these primitiveweapons morning and evening ."


155

The elderly and trusting Mr . Stimson writes that hewas informed that the grand total of armed mightnecessary for the invasion would be 5,000,000 men, ex- stimson 619clusive of those not directly concerned . They also in-formed him that the casualties expected would be overa million. These figures were presented to the Secre-tary of War by the military and the Interim Committeeon the atom bomb .This estimate was given by General Marshall, and

those who went along with him cited the awful tollof dead and wounded at Okinawa as an example ofwhat could be expected in Japan . The figure of fivemillion men with one million casualties, or 20 percent,in a battle with an already defeated enemy is hard tounderstand . But this was the argument for the neces-sity of Russian participation in the defeat of Japan aspresented to President Truman, Secretary Stimson andthe other joint Chiefs of Staff .

At the end of the Potsdam Conference, GeneralEisenhower again remarked to the President that hehoped he had not had to make any concessions to getthe Russians in, and Secretary Forrestal pungently Forrestal 79concluded that "fifty divisions could not have keptthem OUT . . .11

I came across some very interesting notes in AdmiralLeahy's book and also in the testimony of the Mac-Arthur hearings which place a peculiar light on ourinsistence on Russia's coming to our aid . All during thetalks between ourselves and the Russians-Stalin andhis lieutenants were very insistent that in the eventRussia went to war against Japan, we must supply herwith all the materials necessary to keep an army going .That was not just general talk . As early as Oct . 17, Yalta Papers1944, there was a specific demand for 850,000 tons of 3718, 374Arnold,dry cargo and 206,000 tons of liquid cargo . On May Dean, etc.

30, 1945 Russia requested an additional 1,870,000 Pentagonpapers 94

tons l These and later demands were generously andmagnanimously met . By the time of Potsdam, theRussians were sufficiently equipped and stock-piled to

156

The Enemy at His Backbe a major power in the Pacific-and they still weren'tin the Pacific war 1

So anxious were Russia's "real friends" in Wash-ington to share with them "all that we have," ourfighting forces in the Pacific were beginning to feelthe pinch. Major General Courtney Whitney in his

Whitney 186 book, "MacArthur : His Rendezvous with History"tells about a shocking incident . He wrote that whenthe Japanese were putting up a desperate resistance onLuzon and our boys were having a rough time of it,General MacArthur received orders from Washingtonwhich "at this critical moment" upset MacArthur'stimetable . " . . . one hundred of his transport ships,"General Whitney writes, "were to be withdrawn im-mediately, to be used to carry munitions and suppliesacross the North Pacific to the Soviet forces in Vladi-vostok. He protested bitterly . . ., the abrupt removalof these transport ships jeopardized his entire Philip-pine campaign . . . with the result that tremendousquantities of munitions and supplies of all kinds wererapidly stacked up in Siberia. Later, of course, theywere the basis o f Soviet military support o f NorthKorea and Red China." (Emphasis mine.)

But Russia wasn't the only nation with forces avail-able for the Pacific. China had vast armies whichneeded only equipment to fight, and they were alreadyon the spot . In Admiral Leahy's book we find that wehad several offers from other allies, none of whom de-manded any "territorial adjustments," (to borrow Mr .Bohlen's expression) for their good deeds. The Ad-

Leahy 410

miral tells us that the British, Dutch and French, aswell as Australians and New Zealanders all volunteered

Leahy 413 help. Our excuse to the British was that it "was prettymuch of an American show," while the others pre-sented "language and logistic difficulties ." Apparentlysomeone enjoying White House authority did not an-ticipate logistics and language would present difficultieswith the Russians !

Why were the logistic problems for Russia ignoredand who did the ignoring? Vice Admiral Oscar C.


157Badger testified at the MacArthur hearings in 19951that at the Cairo Conference in 1943, the British andAmerican Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the sub-ject of whether there was a need for Russia's help inthe Pacific . He reminded the committee before whichhe was appearing that the Teheran Conference was tofollow the Cairo meeting within a few days and that"an immediate decision was necessary in order thatthey might advise Mr. Stalin accordingly ."

Admiral Badger went on to explain that the Alliedagencies, after careful study of their evidence andstatistics, concluded that the U .S.S.R. was "so weaklogistically in the Far East" that they were almostcompletely dependent for their supplies coming fromAmerican Pacific coast ports . He also pointed out theimportant fact that once Russia declared war on Japan,Russian ships would no longer be free from Japaneseattack and-

the logistic staff recommended that the U .S .S.R. be advisednot to enter the war against Japan . In other words, weak-ness in the Far East of the Soviet Union was definitelyrecognized, was definitely a fact, and their participationin the war against Japan at that time was undesirable .

But at Yalta and again at Potsdam someone wascalling the plays and giving the signals, and it istempting to guess it was Stalin himself. Who on ourteam was interpreting the signals and putting theminto effect? The extraordinary thing is that the obviouswas always ignored . Apparently Stalin went on thetheory that if you spoke about something of great im-portance in a casual way, the importance would not getacross. The offhand manner in which he told Trumanof the proposed visit of Prince Konoye to Moscowseemed not to have impressed the President. There isno mention that Truman repeated the news to anyone .But three days before the end of the conference, andafter the decision to use the atomic bomb, Stalinformally announced, but without fanfare, that on

MacA 4-2730

MacA 4-2731

Leahy 420

158

The Enemy at His BackJuly 18th he had received a request from Japan tomediate. He explained that the proposals had been"too vague" for him to give an affirmative answer .He also added that on that very day, July 2 8th, he hadreceived another vague proposal and that he wouldmake the same reply .

Now we know from the United States StrategicBombing Survey reports that at the time of Potsdam

USSBS

the Japanese were not at all "vague" but quite definite,JStruggleapan's to

and definitely desperate in their "struggle to end theEnd the War war." What is more, the United States was interceptingP. 7 all the Japanese messages between Moscow and Tokyo .

Obviously Mr . Truman was not aware of this vitallyimportant information. Who kept this from him?

But even without this information, what would theaverage Mr . John Q. Citizen, in Harry Truman's shoes,have done after hearing Stalin's announcement? Withno experience in such high diplomatic affairs but anormal reaction to Russian trickery, Mr . Citizen wouldundoubtedly have smelled a Russian rat . He more thanlikely would have delayed the plans for dropping theatomic bomb and would have sent a hurried messageto our embassy in Moscow to ask a neutral diplomatto check into the story . The Swiss, for instance, couldeasily have contacted the Japanese Embassy and cor-roborated Stalin's statement . But no such thing hap-pened. And nowhere is there recorded any astonish-ment or intelligent interest among our statesmen whowere present . Admiral Leahy later wrote that "It was

Leaky 420 clearly evident that Stalin was at that time determinedto enter the war against Japan, which plainly was tothe advantage of Russia, now that Japan was certain tobe defeated."

Although the Potsdam Proclamation, setting forthour terms for Japanese surrender, has become an im-portant document in the history of World War II, atthe time it was only an afterthought which was finallymade use of on Mr. Stimson's insistence . From its in-ception in late May until President Truman left forPotsdam, Mr. Grew was relentless in his campaign to


159sell the idea that its use would hasten the end of thewar. With a little pathos, Mr . Grew writes in hismemoirs that, when Byrnes became Secretary of State, Grew 1424he tried to see him to tell him how important andurgent the paper was . But Mr. Byrnes was too busypreparing for the coming conference. It was not untilthe day before Byrnes left for Europe that Mr . Grewwas finally able to hand him the draft of the Procla-mation. However it was not Byrnes who acted uponthe paper. Perhaps his advisers on whom he "reliedheavily" advised him against it .

But, even Mr. Stimson was unable to hang on to thefamous Paragraph 12 which provided for the retentionof the Emperor . In its final draft, the paragraph wasrewritten in vague language, by whom we don't know,and broadcast to Tokyo on July 26th, 1 945 .

Strangely enough, although he filled two volumeswith his memoirs of his 41 years in the State Depart-ment, Mr. Grew ended his story without includingsome of his worries over vitally important matters inthe summer of 1945 . It was for others to record theend of Grew's "Turbulent Era ." Secretary Forrestal,for instance, noted in his "Diaries" that on July 6,1 945, he had spent an evening with Mr . Grew and, Forrestal73while talking over the Proclamation, Mr . Grew said"he was afraid it would be ditched on the way over (tothe Conference) by people who accompany the Presi-dent-Bohlen among others . . ."Mr. Grew went on to tell the Secretary of the Navy

that these "people" seemed to believe that we could Fornestal 74not make any clarification of the term "unconditionalsurrender" lest it might appear that we wanted to getthe war over with before Russia could get in itl Inview of this conversation, perhaps it is understandablethat Mr. Grew did not care to include in his memoirsthe contradictory statement to the press he was tomake only four days later . (See page 140.) Indeedthe last two months of his career must have been toocontradictory and too painful to relate .

A good look at the final draft of the Potsdam Procla-

Kase 2ro alsoUSSBSJapan'sStruggle toEnd the Warp. 8

Kase 223

16o

The Enemy at His Backmation raises some questions. It had been constantlyrepeated-and Mr . Grew made the statement in Wash-ington on July loth-that Japan had never madeformal offers to surrender to our Government . So it wasironic if not tragic that the Allies, not only knowingJapan wanted to surrender but also what terms theyhad been giving, never made an official offer to acceptsurrender to their government. In view of our negoti-ations and leniency with Italy, why didn't we do thesame with Japan? Neither the United States Govern-ment nor the Allies jointly, ever sent a direct messageto a Japanese official saying in effect, "If you want tosurrender, here are our terms, among which you maykeep your Emperor." Mr. Kase reminds us that theProclamation sent to Japan by the United States, GreatBritain and China, was not formally addressed to theirgovernment and was received only through their radiomonitoring service. The Japanese were also wonderingwhat Russia's position was regarding it . They were atthat time still anxiously waiting for a reply to theirpeace offer to the Kremlin. Because of these consider-ations, Mr. Kase said, their "hastily convened cabinetdecided to keep silence for a while . . ." Paragraph12, he says, was viewed with grave misgivings bymembers of the peace party as well as by members ofthe. war party.

It seems that "They" did everything possible to de-lay the acceptance of the Proclamation, for when thePotsdam meeting ended there was added one morebrand to the dying fire . The final communique fromPotsdam to the world did not mention Japan at all, butdealt exclusively with the postwar punishment to beaccorded to Germany which, Mr. Kase comments-

" . . . struck us as surprisingly harsh . It was, it looked tous, none other than a Carthaginian peace . This playedinto the hands of the military party, who warned thepeople of the horrible fate of a subjugated nation ."

If there were "errors" by our statesmen, the Japa-nese made an important one which added further delay


161to the surrender. Prime Minister Suzuki made a state- Iase 211,ment to the press that "it was the policy of the gov-ernment to ignore the proclamation entirely." At leastthis was the English translation which the Tokyo radioflashed to America. It has since been argued that thiswas a wrong interpretation of the announcement, butno one in America asked for an explanation nor leftany margin for error . On August 5th, 1945, the atomicbomb was dropped into history and destroyed the cityof Hiroshima.

Chapter VII

THE ATOMIC BOMB AND SURRENDER

Why did we drop the atom bomb?Major Jordan opens a diplomatic suitcase .Mr. Stimson is persuaded to change his mind .Why we share the atom .

THE final acceptance of the Japanese surrender andthe dropping of the atom bombs were events so inter-twined that they must be told together . Of the two,the atom bombs were of the greater consequence.While a war must of itself finally come to an end, themonth of August 1945 marked the birth of the "AtomicAge" which will hover over civilization like an elec-tronic smog for the rest of the world's existence. How-ever, peace in the Pacific set off an emotional holidayacross the country which allowed no time for a carefullook at the newborn monster .

The decisions which make world history and uponwhich depend millions of lives are made by falliblemen of varying types and characters. It's what makesmen of destiny tick that arranges our lives in peace orwar, prosperity or depression . All depends on whethertheir "drive" is motivated by an unselfish love ofcountry, a misunderstanding of the true facts, or byexpediency upon which a personal ambition may berealized. It is this important human element which isso often omitted from the history books .

In this chapter we will try to discover who reallymade the decision to use the atom bomb on an alreadydefeated Japan . The "why" will have to remain amystery until those who really know are inspired totell "the whole truth ." I can only list the "why's" ofthose who protested and whose voices were drowned inthe tumult of the approaching peace .

Most people know the events of the Japanese sur-render. Surely everyone was constantly at the radio

162

The Atomic Bomb and Surrender

163in those final days listening to every word which re-lated to the closing of the war .

But before we go into the great decision of thoseresponsible, a picture of the surrounding conditionsmust first be drawn. Two items found in the 1954World Almanac should be inserted here and borne inmind throughout the rest of the chapter . These itemsare proof that the Russians were getting atomic in-formation from the very beginning of the experiments .

Dr. Klaus J . E. Fuchs, German-born atomic research Worldphysicist at Harwell, Eng ., pleaded guilty March 1 (1950), Almanac

to violating the Official Secrets Act and received 14 years

954 P. 149

in prison. He had communicated valuable atomic informa-tion to Russian agents since 1942 . At one time he workedat Los Alamos, N.M.

Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, convicted atom spies, died rroin the electric chair at Sing Sing Prison, Ossining, N .Y .,June 19 (1953) •

On July 16, 1945, the day before the Potsdam Con-ference met officially, the first atomic bomb experi-ment took place at Alamogordo, New Mexico . Thisimportant event caused Mr. Stimson to remark, "Thenews . . . made it clear to the Americans that furtherdiplomatic efforts to bring the Russian into the Pacific Stimson 637war were largely pointless." But as we know, thiselemental observation was not to be "the order of theday."

The news caused great excitement in the Americandelegation and both Mr. Truman and Mr. Churchillwere quite unreserved in their elation. The next prob-lem was when and how to tell Stalin .

According to Jonathan Daniels, Harry Truman, on Daniels 270becoming President was intent on two things : ( 1) thatthe United States should live up to all its promises, andact honorably in all things, and (2) he would not letthe Russians push us around . In his understanding ofworld affairs, Mr . Truman was far behind the others,but his simple, forthright, and down-to-earth aims werehis and our chief asset until his advisers began to teach

ChurchillT & T 669-70

164


him "expediency." And so at Potsdam Mr . Truman felthe was honor bound to inform Stalin of the successfulexperiment with the A bomb . He discussed the waysand means with Mr. Churchill and finally decided tobreak the news on July 24th, after a round table con-ference. Winston Churchill in his last book, "Triumphand Tragedy," relates this episode in great detail . It isespecially interesting because the P.M. appeared tobe highly puzzled by Stalin's reaction and, though hisbook was published in 1953, after the trial of KlausFuchs, he added no "hindsight" comment :

"Next day, July 24 . . . we all got up from the round table. . . I saw the President go up to Stalin, and the two con-versed alone with only their interpreters . . . What wasvital to measure was its effect on Stalin . . . He seemed tobe delighted. A new bomb! . . . What a bit of luckl Thiswas my impression at the moment, and I was sure that hehad no idea of the significance of what he was being told .Evidently in his intense toils and stresses the atomic bombhad played no part . If he had the slightest idea of therevolution in world affairs which was in progress his re-actions would have been obvious. Nothing would have beeneasier than for him to say, "Thank you so much for tellingme about your new bomb . I of course have no technicalknowledge. May I send my expert in these nuclear sciencesto see your expert tomorrow morning?" But his face re-mained gay and genial and the talk between these twopotentates soon came to an end . As we were waiting for ourcars I found myself near Truman. "How did it go?" Iasked. "He never asked a question," he replied . I wascertain therefore that at that date Stalin had no specialknowledge of the vast process of research upon which theUnited States and Britain had been engaged for so long . . ."

If Mr. Churchill can permit himself to speculate ona normal reaction for Marshal Stalin, let us do thesame for the P .M. Would it not have been morenatural for Mr. Churchill to have thought : "If Stalinshows no surprise at such historic news does that meanhe knows about the atom bomb already? What a bitof BAD luck l The alarm should be communicated to


165our security agents immediately or we are headed fora sticky wicket indeed!"

But neither Mr . Churchill nor Mr. Truman caughtthe dreadful significance of Stalin's indifference . (Theyweren't even suspicious when Stalin arrived at Potsdama day late. The atomic bomb was tested at AlamogordoJuly 16th, the same day the Conference was to havebegun. Did Stalin wait with his alleged "heart at-tack" until he had learned if the test in New Mexicowas a success?) Had Churchill and Truman, on thecontrary, started an intensive investigation they wouldhave discovered not only Klaus Fuchs and the Rosen-bergs, but perhaps it would have brought about theremoval of J . Robert Oppenheimer as a security risksome ten years earlier-at least before 1954 . Such asearch would perhaps have delayed the Russian com-pletion of the atomic bomb-and much concerning thehydrogen bomb . It is even possible that an earlier at-tempt of a certain American Army officer to bring hissuspicion of Russian looting of our atomic secrets andmaterials to high authorities, would have been broughtto their attention .

This link in the chain of events concerns MajorGeorge Racey Jordan who was liaison officer with theRussians at Great Falls, Montana, one of the importantdepots where Lend-Lease supplies took off for theSoviet Union . Several years after the war, in 1952,Major Jordan told his experiences in a book, "FromMajor Jordan's Diaries," one of the most shockingstories to come out of the war .

Great Falls was chosen for the staging base forLend-Lease planes going to Russia after the Murmanskrun had proven so costly . From Great Falls the planesflew to Fairbanks, Alaska, where Russian pilots tookover and went on to the U .S.S.R. Later, these planesbegan carrying loads of Lend-Lease material ratherthan flying empty as they had been . What these planestransported to our "ally" concerns this story .

As we have seen in past chapters, Harry Hopkins,as head of Lend-Lease, chief of the Munitions Assign-

166

The Enemy at His Backment Board, and unofficial head of the atomic bombdevelopment, among others, was intent that Russiashould "share all that we have," regardless of our ownneeds and those of our other allies . And at Fairbanks,

Arnold 471 writes General "Hap" Arnold, "We gave them every-thing it was possible to give them, even turning over tothem the houses of our own officers and enlisted menand their families . . . They never gave us anythanks . . ."

Hopkins explained to Stalin in Moscow that al-though the Lend-Lease Act clearly stated that it ap-plied only to materials "useful in the process of the war

Sherwood

. . . The United States Government, however, had in-896 terpreted this in its broadest sense and had included

in addition to munitions of war foodstuff and othernon-military items ."

This was indeed an "adjustment" of the law. Whenthe British, on the other hand, had asked in 1944 for

Leahy 273

Lend-Lease other than materials "that would actu-ally be used in the war," the joint Chiefs of Staff

Leahy 280 turned them down, and Roosevelt later issued "anorder to the joint Chiefs of Staff that they were not touse lend-lease except to further the progress of thewar."

But Russia was different . And we know now thatthe Soviets were, all during the war, stock-piling warmaterials in preparation for the Red conquest of Chinaand the Korean War. Even "non-strategic" materialswere extremely useful to her .

Russian demands were incontrovertible and on oneoccasion when they refused to give full details con-cerning the absolute need of a request for aluminum,nickel, copper wire and alcohol (items extremely scarce

Deane 97-8 here), General Deane in his "Strange Alliance" relatedan extraordinary conversation he had with the head ofthe Commissariat of Foreign Trade, Anastas Mikoyan .The Russian bluntly "implied that his PurchasingCommission in Washington would have no trouble ob-taining approval of the Russian requests regardless ofwhat action I might take ."


167To General Deane's dismay this proved to be true .

Although General Marshall cabled his approval ofDeane's stand, the order was immediately reversed ina cable from Hopkins to Harriman "to attach nostrings to our aid to Russia." From then on every-thing from aluminum, dress goods, house paint, fryingpans and lipstick went to Russia unchallenged . A care-ful reading of the stories of World War II leaves nodoubt that Hopkins wooed Russia on the allegedground that Soviet "favor" must be assured for thefuture, regardless of the cost in goods, prestige, or ourown security.

It was Major Jordan's job to expedite Lend-Leasegoing to Russia from Alaska . This necessitated hisbeing familiar with the shipping documents, and inthis way he gained detailed knowledge of what wasgoing through. It was just plain luck that he decidedto keep a diary on his daily duties . In those days heknew nothing of the atomic bomb and it was not untilafter the war that he fully understood the real sig-nificance of his voluminous notes . Among the ship-ments he listed in 1942 when our experiments with theatom were in their infancy were :

Graphite ; natural, flake, lump or chip, costing Americantaxpayers $812,437 . Over thirteen million dollars' worth ofaluminum tubes . . . We sent 834,989 pounds of cadmiummetal for rods to control the intensity of an atomic pile ; thecost was $781,472 . The really secret material, thorium,finally showed up and started through immediately .

On one occasion the Russian colonel in charge be-haved in such a suspicious manner that Major Jordardecided to make an unannounced, unsupervised an'thorough inspection of the "personal luggage" about totake off on one of the planes. He had noticed that eachRussian taking off for the USSR was accompanied by50 suitcases weighing about two tons . Opening a suit-case and inspecting the documents, Jordan discoveredmaps of the Panama Canal Commission, documents

Jordan 33-4

Jordan 69

Jordan 77-81

Jordan 261-z

168

The Enemy at His Backrelating to the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, and folderswith naval shipping intelligence . He writes :

I distinctly remember five or six State Department folders,bound with stout rubber bands . Clipped to each was a tab .The first read : "From Sayre." I took down the words be-cause it ran through my head that someone of that name hadrecently been High Commissioner to the Philippines .

Then I copied the legend: "From Hiss." I had neverheard of Alger Hiss . . . A suitcase opened midway in thesearch appeared to contain nothing but engineering andscientific treatises. They bristled with formulae, calculationsand professional jargon . I was about to close the case andpass on when my eye was caught by a specimen of station-ery such as I had never before seen .

Its letterhead was a magic incantation : "The WhiteHouse, Washington," . . . It was a brief note . . . Thename to which it was addressed, "Mikoyan," was whollynew to me .

(Anastas Mikoyan was described to the Un-Ameri-can Activities Committee in 195o by Victor A . Krav-chenko who had defected to the free world . He testi-fied that Mikoyan was "second assistant to Mr. Stalinduring the war," and that he was also in charge ofLend-Lease. Mr. Kravchenko told the committee thatMikoyan sent orders to the spies under his commandin America to obtain "secret information about the in-dustrial development in the United States, and es-pecially in the military industry ." The final word on theorder, the witness said, was the following back-handedthreat : "We shall appreciate you according to yourability to comply with this order ." This was the sameMikoyan who smilingly played host to a number ofsenators and congressmen visiting Moscow in 1955 .)

Major Jordan goes on with his story of the WhiteHouse note which he said began with "My dear Mr .Minister"

. . . eleven words, in the top line of the second page, im-pressed me enough to merit a scribble on my envelope . That


169excerpt ran thus : "-had a hell of a time getting these away Jordan 79from Groves." (Jordan didn't know if the name was "Oscar"or "Carrie .")

The name "Groves," Jordan explains, referred toMajor General Leslie R . Groves, commander of theManhattan Engineering District, later called the Man-hattan Project . The Major rightly points out that Gen-eral Groves was one of the few Washington high of-ficials who thoroughly disliked the Russians .

Jordan continues :

. . . The first thing I had done, on finding the White Housenote, was to flip over the page to look for a signature. Ipenciled it on my envelope as "H.H." . . . It was tochronicle, on the spot, my identification of the author asHarry Hopkins.

If General Groves and his subordinates resistedorders from Harry Hopkins they were indeed verybrave men!

I remember distinctly having had to remove the letter froma metal clip . It held two other exhibits-obviously the thingswhich Oscar or Carrie, had such difficulty in "getting awayfrom Groves." One was a thick map . When unfolded, itproved to be as wide as the span of my extended arms . Inlarge letters it bore a legend which I recorded: "Oak Ridge,Manhattan Engineering District ."

The other was a carbon of a report, two or three pageslong, which was dated Oak Ridge . If it had a signature, Idid not set it down . At the top of the first page, impressedwith a rubber stamp, or typed, was the legend : "HarryHopkins" followed by the title "Special Asst . Coordinator"or "Administrator ." I gathered that this particular copy hadbeen earmarked for Mr . Hopkins. In the text of the reportwas encountered a series of vocables so outlandish that Imade a memo to look up their meaning . Among them were"cyclotron," "proton" and "deuteron ." There were curiousphrases like "energy produced by fission" and "walls fivefeet thick, of lead and water, to control flying neutrons .". . . For the first time in my life, I met the word"uranium."

Jordan 8o

8o-8r

Jordan 192-3

170

The Enemy at His BackAlthough all of this was "Greek" to him, the Major

felt it was of great importance to our war machine. Theawful realization came over him that what he hadfound in the few "diplomatic" suitcases he had openedwas only a drop in the bucket. Every plane leaving forthe U.S.S.R. was literally loaded with such information .Jordan was a simple American businessman who hadno ideas of politics, spies and subversion, and henaively thought someone ought to stop Harry Hopkinsfrom giving maps of our scientific plants and our sci-entific secrets to the Russians . In January 1944 hemade a trip to Washington to report his unusual andalarming findings . In the Capital he met with a strangeand formidable reception) The juggernaut of con-trolled bureaucracy was poised and ready for "littleDavid."

Jordan's first contact in the Capital was Chief AirInspector, Brigadier General Junius W . Jones. "Gen-eral Jones," he wrote, "afterwards denied that heever met me." He talked to Jones for 15 minutes andthe General promised to send one of his inspectors toGreat Falls, which he did. Then Major Jordan wentto the old State Department building where he hadbeen told to see hn . -baison officfQr Lend-Lease. But Hazard did not see e ajor.Instead a young assistant emerged from Hazard's of-fice, and what he had to say to the caller paints a fairpicture of how carefully the directive to "treat Russiaas a real friend" was followed :

Jordan 193 "Major Jordan," he began, "we know all about you, andwhy you are here. You might as well understand that officerswho get too officious are likely to find themselves on anisland somewhere in the South Seas ." (Emphasis mine.)

After several rebuffs from other officers, MajorJordan returned to Great Falls with the seat of hispants sizzling. He was angry and alarmed .

Our heroic "David" reviewed in his mind the wholeuntenable situation, got out his slingshot and bravely


171

set out once again for Washington and Goliath. Heselected the Army Counter-Intelligence as one agencywhich might listen . This time he struck pay dirt . They Jordan 194made an intensive investigation of his charges, andpresented a report dated March 28, 1944. The reportstrongly recommended further investigation and thatthe State Department be contacted in order that "cor-rective measures be taken."

Jordan writes that "When the report and indorse-ment arrived at the State Department, it was neces- Jordan 195-6sary to make at least a show of activity . The matterwas assigned to Charles E . Bohlen . . ." Bohlenhandled the matter in a correct if not enthusiastic man-ner. He called a proper meeting of the chiefs of all in-telligence agencies as well as agencies having to do withLend-Lease . He then had an interview with a memberof the Soviet Embassy and provided him with the U .S .customs and censorship regulations . He had done hisduty, and from then on the whole matter was ignoredby both the United States authorities and the Rus-sians. And the Russians, Major Jordan said, "foundout everything, from alpha to omega."

Jordan 1o8There can be no doubt that Major Jordan's "dis-

coveries" at Great Falls and Fairbanks never reachedPresident Truman, nor the Prime Minister for thatmatter. Somewhere along the line of command therewas a concrete wall "five feet thick" through whichmuch intelligence could not get. And I wonder if thissituation does not exist even today .

In "Triumph and Tragedy," Mr . Churchill seemshurriedly anxious to "step over" any controversy con-cerning the advisability of the bomb's use and the lossof its secrets . He writes that " . . . there never was a Churchillmoment's discussion as to whether the atomic bomb T & T 639

should be used or not . . . nor have I ever doubtedsince that he (Truman) was right ."

His lack of curiosity is not comprehensible, eitherat the time or in the revealing after-years. KlausFuchs does not even appear as a footnote in his book .

172

The Enemy at His BackThe bloodcurdling debut of the atom bomb on

Japanese cities will be a subject for heated discussionsfor a long time to come. President Truman's decisionhad been based on reports and recommendations fromthe scientists and the joint Chiefs of Staff . The resolvecould not have been his alone .Those who defend the confirmation of the Yalta

agreements at Potsdam explain that the A bomb hadnot been tested by dropping it from a plane and theydidn't know if it would be a dud or not . The scientists,however, apparently were convinced it was a surething. Mr. Byrnes wrote that on July 1, 1945, just

Byrnes 261 before Truman went to Potsdam, " . . . the InterimCommittee unanimously recommended to the Presi-dent that the bomb be used against Japan as soon aspossible. With the exception of Mr . Bard, the commit-tee recommended that it be used without warning ."(Emphasis mine.)

Because this was such an important recommendation,it is well to notice who the members of the InterimCommittee were. They were : Secretary Byrnes rep-

Byrnes 259 resenting the President ; Under Secretary of the NavyRalph Bard ; Assistant Secretary of State William L .Clayton; Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office ofScientific Research and Development ; Dr. James B .Conant, President of Harvard University and laterAmerican Ambassador to Germany in the EisenhowerAdministration . (When President Eisenhower sent hisname to the Senate for confirmation he met with vio-lent opposition from the conservative Republicans) ;Dr. Karl T. Compton, President of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology, who, until his death in 1954,stoutly defended the use of the bomb ; and GeorgeL. Harrison, President of the New York Life InsuranceCompany, special consultant to Secretary Stimson andserving as chairman of the committee in the absenceof Mr. Stimson. The Committee was assisted by Dr .Arthur H. Compton, Dr . Enrico Fermi, Dr . E. O .Lawrence, and Dr . J. Robert Oppenheimer .Mr. Byrnes goes on to say that during this discus-


173sion with the Interim Committee it was ". . . feared Byrnes 26!

that, if the Japanese were told that the bomb would beused on a given locality, they might bring our boyswho were prisoners of war to that area ."

Was there no one present to point out that for sometime the Americans had been dropping leaflets overJapan warning them which cities were to be attackedbefore devastating those cities with "conventional"bombs? If the Japanese wanted to bring our prisonersto those cities, there is no doubt they would have .

According to Mr . Byrnes another excuse for notgiving a warning of the atom bomb was because atAlamogordo the test was on the ground and that". . . would not be conclusive proof that the bomb Byrnes 26!

would explode when dropped from an airplane ."Perhaps this argument justly applies to the decision

made July 1st but, after August 5th when the firstbomb was dropped and proven successful, why did wenot adequately warn the Japanese we would drop thesecond bomb? Although leaflets were dropped, givingthe names of ten target cities, no time was allowed theJapanese to reply . Who was the mastermind who hadsuch control over the thinking of our statesmen?Again Mr. Byrnes relates that he told Mr . Truman

that " . . . we relied on the estimates of the military Byrnes 261

situation presented by the joint Chiefs of Staff ."Thanks to Secretary Byrnes we know that Presi-

dent Truman had it well in his mind to use the bombmore than two weeks before the Potsdam Conference .Strangely enough, Jonathan Daniels does not mentionthe meeting of July 1st in his book. He quotes Trumanas saying "There at Potsdam the decision to use thebomb was made." At this last official meeting were Daniels 28oStimson, Eisenhower, Marshall, Byrnes, Leahy, ". . .and another Naval officer, probably King." It is alsostrange that Harry Truman in his memoirs lumps allhis conferences about the bomb in one sentence, givingno dates .

What apparently tipped the scales for Truman, asrelated by Mr. Daniels, was General Marshall's answer

Daniels 281

Leahy 441

Forrestal 83

King 621

174


to the President's question-"how many Americancasualties a landing on the Tokyo plain would ' in-volve?" The General's reply, according to Mr. Truman,was "It would take a million men for the landing and amillion to hold it and that he thought such a landingwould involve half a million casualties ."Mr. Truman told Mr . Daniels that "all at the con-

ference urged using it." But let us see how historybooks have recorded the opinions of some of Mr.Truman's advisers. Admiral Leahy wrote :

It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weaponat Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance inour war against Japan. The Japanese were already de-feated and ready to surrender . . .

It was my reaction that the scientists and others wantedto make this test because of the vast sums that had beenspent on the project . . . My okm feeling was that in beingthe first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard com-mon to the barbarians of the Dark Ages . I was not taughtto make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won bydestroying women and children .

The Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal, wrote in hisdiary on August ioth, 1945 :

The Secretary of War (Stimson) made the suggestion thatwe should now cease sending our bombers over Japan ; hecited the growing feeling of apprehension and misgiving asto the effect of the atomic bomb even in our own country .I supported his view and said that we must remember thatthis nation would have to bear the focus of the hatred of theJapanese .

From the following paragraphs of Admiral King'sbook, I should gather that, although he did not speakin the negative, he could hardly have "urged using it ."As we know, the Admiral bore in mind that all de-cisions. of the joint Chiefs had to be unanimous :

The President in giving his approval for these attacksappeared to believe that many thousands of American


175troops would be killed in invading Japan, and in this he wasentirely correct ; but King felt, as he had pointed out manytimes, that the dilemma was an unnecessary one . . . TheArmy, however, with its underestimation of sea power, hadinsisted upon a direct invasion and an occupational con-quest of Japan proper. King still believes this was wrong .

General Eisenhower is reported to have been un-enthusiastic about the bomb in Alden Hatch's book,"General Ike ." Hatch wrote that "Eisenhower begged Hatch 274the Secretary (Stimson) to consider the consequencescarefully."

General "Hap" Arnold, Chief of the Air Force, hadlittle to say about . the decision . He cautiously wrotethat "it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or Arnold 598no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on theverge of collapse ."

Among the American wartime hierarchy there weretwo approving voices; those of Byrnes and Stimson.The former wrote that "Certainly, by bringing thewar to an end, the atomic bomb saved the lives of Byrnes 264thousands of American boys." And "Stimson believed. . . the dominant objective was victory . If victory Stimson 629could be speeded by using the bomb, it should beused . . ."

General Marshall takes no credit for his share in Marshall rgqthe decision. In his only recorded "memoir," his Bien- Biennial

nial Report to the Secretary of War, he wrote whatReport

was apparently the mother of the Byrnes echo : " . . .it was decided to use this weapon immediately in aneffort to shorten the war and save thousands ofAmerican lives."

Things were happening fast in the closing days ofthe war. The Japanese were still foolishly hoping thatRussia would help them surrender without any damageto their Emperor. They were grasping at the strawthat Russia had not signed the Potsdam Proclamationand therefore was not at war with Japan . On July3oth Japanese Ambassador Sato again saw Rozovsky Kale 223and repeated to him the difficulty of accepting un-

176

The Enemy at His Backconditional surrender which did not specify its mean-ing. A few days later, and notwithstanding Washing-ton's knowledge of these talks in Moscow, the firstatom bomb was dropped on August 5th. With the"wrath of the gods" raining obliteration on a dev-astated Nippon, a desperate Sato again requestedan interview with Molotov. The answer was to beanother crushing blow . It was at this meeting, August8, 1945, that Molotov announced Russia's declarationof war against Japan effective the next day . TheRussians moved a few hours later .

The Soviets never did consider common courtesyas a part of their agenda . Although Stalin had toldHopkins in May that Russia would be at war with

Pentagon

Japan on August 8th, and told Truman at PotsdamPapers N-92 it would be late in August, Admiral Leahy has told

me that President Truman learned of the declarationof war when it was broadcast on the radio! Truman

Truman 425 wrote in his "Memoirs" : "Without warning . . .Molotov sent for Ambassador Harriman on Aug . 8 andannounced to him that the Soviet Union would consideritself at war with Japan as of Aug . 9 ."

Kase 231

"On August 9, 1945," Mr. Kase writes, "the sixmembers of the Supreme War Council met from110 A.M . to i P.m . All agreed on one point, namely, thepreservation of the imperial house. Should the Alliesrefuse that, we had no choice but to fight on to thebitter end."

At long last the controversy over the question ofthe Emperor came to an end caused by a dispatchwhich Mr. Kase drew up himself in the early hoursof August loth after the 15 hour conference . In it hesaid :

Kase 238-9 The Japanese Government are ready to accept the terms. . . with the understanding that the said declaration doesnot compromise any demand which prejudices the pre-rogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler .

The Japanese message came by way of the SwissLegation in Washington, but the question of the


177Emperor once again brought delay because of thewhim of Secretary Byrnes . "Admiral Leahy urgedthat the Japanese offer be accepted promptly," reportsMr. Byrnes, but "I told the President I would likea little time to think about a reply to the message .'I do not see why we should retreat from our demandfor unconditional surrender' I said ." And so the debateover the Emperor went on for two days more .

The future Governor of South Carolina went off tohis private office to mull over his reply and to solicitthe help of his then trusted aide, Ben Cohen, whosemind he believed to be "one of the best." Cohen,Counselor of the State Department, was one of theso-called brilliant young lawyers brought to Washing-ton as a member of the original White House "braintrust." He progressed to the State Department withByrnes, and later went with the American delegationto the United Nations until 1953 .

(In 1955 President Eisenhower had, at the suggestionof the State Department, decided to appoint BenCohen as U.S. representative to the United Nations .Before the appointment was made public, SenatorStyles Bridges and Senator William F . Knowland toldSecretary of State John Foster Dulles that not onlywould they not defend Cohen, but they would fightthe appointment. Senator Knowland remarked thatRepublicans, including the late Senator Taft, hadswallowed Charles Bohlen in 31953, but they wouldn'tswallow Ben Cohen in 1955 . The President did notsend Cohen's name to the Senate .)Again there occurred a small incident which was

indeed a big hint to Undersecretary Grew that hisusefulness to the Department was about at an end . Ihave been told that Grew, having heard that Byrneswas working on the draft of the surrender paper, wentto the latter's office. Several times he opened the dooronly to find Byrnes busily engaged with Cohen . Eachtime Byrnes indicated that he did not wish to bedisturbed. Finally, Grew told Byrnes that he knewthat they were working on the Japanese note and

Byrnes 209

MacA 3-1917

White Paper1944-49p. 6o1

gale 230

178

The Enemy at His Backthat he thought he could be of some help . Byrnesrather grudgingly invited him in and also allowedGrew to call in James Dunn, Eugene Dooman andJoseph Ballantine . When the draft was handed to thenewcomers for their perusals, they took exception tothe stipulation that the Emperor was to sign thesurrender terms. Mr. Grew said he was certain thatthe British would object . Their exceptions were over-ruled by Byrnes and Cohen but, when the British hadlooked over the draft, they demanded that this stipula-tion be deleted and it was .

The American reply arrived in Tokyo August 13th .This, finally, was the end of the war-at least

officially. Looking at official dates, the Soviets wouldappear to have been at war with Japan just one daybefore the Japanese formally requested terms on Au-gust loth. However, Dean Acheson testified in 1951that the Russians had moved into Manchuria "about3 or 4 days before the first atomic bomb was dropped ."Not only that, but the Soviets were enjoying theirwar so much they were reluctant to stop when thebell rang on August 14th . The Japanese commanderin Manchuria had to appeal to the Soviets by radio onAugust 16th to please stop , their attacks. But theRuskies paid no mind to this and on August 18ththey were unopposed when they took Mukden, andthey didn't let up until they got Kirin and Changchunon August aoth . All in all they had about 18 days,enough to give them a seat at the peace table in 1955 .

The Japanese surrendered on August 14th, 1945,the formal ceremony taking place September and onboard the U.S.S. Missouri. Philosophically Mr . Kasewrote: "The capitulation of Japan, it seems, may notnecessarily be the end of a book but merely the be-ginning of a new chapter ."Lost in the multitudinous reports of VJ-day, a

small item appeared in the New York Times August14th :

Chungking, China, Aug . 11 (delayed) AP-The ChineseArmy newspaper, Sao Tang Pao said today Japan had been


179ready to offer up her war leaders as hara-kiri victims andretreat to her 1931 boundaries as conditions of peace, evenbefore the first atomic bomb fell and the Soviet Union en-tered the Pacific war .

And so it was "the beginning of a new chapter"as the history of the last ten years has proven . Sincethat time eleven small nations who put their hopes inthe Atlantic Charter and their big brother the UnitedStates, have been gobbled up in part or in whole byRussia. The remaining free countries are graduallyturning towards the expedient : the exchange of free-dom for "peaceful coexistence" and trade with SovietRussia. And it was Japan, we know, whose overturesfor peace were ignored by our country back in 1945,and who in desperation had turned to Russia for peace 1

The explosion of the atomic bomb caused a chainof reactions which was not electronic but political .The most immediate reaction came from the Com-munist Party of the United States in its role as afunctionary of the Soviet Government . But before Igo into that, let us take up the discussions of a largenumber of people who were close to the decisionto use this new weapon against Japan.

I have asked the opinion of a few men who wereclose to the picture and whom I happen to knowpersonally. Almost all of them disapproved . PerhapsI have asked only one group of people, or not enoughpeople, but the score is heavily against its use. Somesaid it was their belief that the bomb was used forthe purpose of building up a hatred by the Japanesefor the United States which time could not erase .One person having intimate knowledge of the prosecu-tion of the war gave as his personal opinion thatsince the Russians, via Klaus Fuchs, Hopkins andothers, had detailed information of the bomb's develop-ment, they were anxious to have it tested on a livingcity. And this could only have been done before Japansurrendered . It is possible that it is purely coincidental,but Harry Truman in his "Year of Decisions" pub-

Truman 419

Bulletion ofAtomicScientistsMay 1, 1946P . 3

Bulletin p . 16

180

The Enemy at His Backlished in 1956, added one of the recommendationsof the Interim Committee which is strangely similar tomy friend's conclusion. Truman wrote, "It was their(the Interim Committee) conclusion that no technicaldemonstration they might propose, such as over adeserted island, would be likely to bring the war toan end . It had to be used against an enemy target ."(Emphasis mine.) An "enemy target," of course, isthe same as a "living city ."

Who were some of those who protested the use ofthe bomb in June of 1945? The Metallurgical Labo-ratory in Chicago appointed a seven man "Committeeon Social and Political Implications" for the purposeof studying the proposed use of the new weapon . Andthis group strongly opposed the recommendations ofthe Interim Committee. The chairman of the Chicagogroup was James Franck who presented a report toSecretary Stimson warning that "the military ad-vantages and the saving of American lives . . . maybe outweighed by . . . a wave of horror and repulsionsweeping over the rest of the world . . ."

They went on to suggest that "demonstration of thenew weapon might best be made, before the eyes ofrepresentatives of all the United Nations, on the desertor a barren island . . . After such a demonstration theweapon might perhaps be used against Japan if thesanction of the United Nations (and of public opinionat home) were obtained, perhaps after a preliminaryultimatum to Japan to surrender . . ."

"We believe," the report went on, "that these con-siderations make the use of nuclear bombs for anearly unannounced attack against Japan inadvisable ."

In order to make their recommendations evenstronger, they were supplemented by a petition signedby 64 scientists associated with the MetallurgicalProject which was sent direct to President Truman .

The unanimous opinion of these combined seventy-one scientists was ignored by President Truman andMr. Stimson-if they ever saw the report or petition .Mr. Stimson makes no mention of the Franck Com-


181

mittee in his book, nor for that matter do Byrnes,Forrestal or Leahy, or Truman. Yet, how could suchan important report and petition escape attention?

Apparently someone must have read the reportbecause the recommendation that the bomb be demon-strated before the United Nations and an ultimatum toJapan be made was presented for consideration inthe conferences in Washington. At this time Mr .Byrnes warned that, if the demonstration proved to bea "dud," it would damage our effort to bring the war Byrnes 261to an end, while Henry Stimson had been apparentlysold on the idea of speed because he said "We hadno bombs to waste . It was vital that a sufficienteffect be quickly obtained with the few we had ."

Harper's Feb .Yet what was the hurry? Perhaps it was Mr . Stim- 1947

son's thought that the bomb should be dropped beforeRussia got into the war.

But if Henry Stimson was absorbed in the necessityfor speed, General Marshall, on the other hand, wrotein his Biennial Report that "From Potsdam General BiennialSpaatz received orders to drop the atomic bomb . .

Report 157

any time after the 3rd of August." WHAT was wrongwith dropping it before the 3rd of August? What apple-cart would it have upset? This is one of the mostpuzzling orders in the whole Potsdam episode .

The puzzle goes even further and involves a con-tradiction between Truman's version of events andthat of the Army Air Force records. This is revealedin "The Army Air Forces in World War II," vol . s,pages 713 and 714 where the order to Spaatz isdiscussed

Signed by Handy (Gen. Thomas T.) as Acting Chief ofStaff, and with the approval of Stimson and Marshall, thedirective contained an unqualified order for the 509thComposite Group to "deliver its first special bomb as soon asweather would permit visual bombing after about 3 August ."

Now, ever since the end of the war Mr. Trumanhas insisted the order and decision was made by him-

Army AirForce in WWII, vol 5insert, 912-3

Army AirForce inW W II, vol5 insert 714

182

The Enemy at His Backself, and him alone ; and that the order was sent fromaboard the Augusta which was taking the Presidenthome from Potsdam. This would have been aboutAugust 2 or 3 . One of the authors of the Air Forcebook, Professor James Lea Cate, wrote to the formerPresident in 1953, pointing out that his statementsdid not jibe with the Handy order . It would seem thatHarry Truman didn't catch the significance or thefacts as stated in the professor's letter . On January12, 1953, he replied that-

"In your letter, you raise the fact that the directive toGeneral Spaatz to prepare for delivering the bomb is datedJuly twenty-fifth. It was, of course, necessary to set themilitary wheels in motion, as these orders did, but the finaldecision was in my hands, and was not made until we werereturning from Potsdam." (Emphasis mine .)

Truman obviously thought the order to Spaatz wasonly to "prepare" to drop the bomb . He apparentlydid not realize that, whether he had made up his mindor not, "the Army" had already anticipated him andgiven a direct ORDER. Professor Cate and his col-laborator, Wesley Frank Craven, point out that theorder to Spaatz "is dated 25 July, one day beforethe Potsdam Declaration and two days before Suzuki'srejection of it on the 28th, Tokyo time . There is noreference to the ultimatum and no instruction as toprocedures to be followed should the Japanese offerto surrender before 3 August."

They go on to say thdt "the directive to Spaatzcould be interpreted to mean that the decision to usethe atomic bomb had been made before, and withoutreal regard for, the ultimatum issued at Potsdam ."

And indeed, it would have been an even more fright-ful blot on American history if the bomb had beendropped after Japan had offered to surrender . It seemsour devastated, enemy was going to "get it," afterAugust 3, regardless of his reply to the Potsdam Proc-lamation. Harry Truman's order from the Augusta was


183merely surplus baggage . No records have been foundthat it was ever sent . It didn't need to be 1

Although it was only two years (or more likely less)between the time Mr. Truman had his correspondencewith Professor Cate and the writing of "Year of Deci-sions," he seemed to have forgotten all about theletters when he came to his chapter on the atomicbomb. Not only that, but the story is different . Theformer President inserted General Handy's orderto General Spaatz (which was not a photostat) andit carries the dateline of "24 July 1945 ." The photostatcarries the dateline of July 25th . But, the storyHarry Truman tells would lead one to believe thatthe order to Spaatz was the ONLY one he gave . Hedoes not mention his order from aboard the Augusta .He passes over this and glosses over the implicationsof the Handy order with : "I also instructed Stimsonthat the order would stand unless I notified him thatthe Japanese reply to our ultimatum was acceptable ."It was the only mention of such a qualification I canfind in either official documents or the volumes ofmemoirs .

I should add that nowhere can I discover who sentthe order from Potsdam to General Handy in Washing-ton. If it was Mr . Stimson he does not say so in hisbook. But one can hardly believe that Mr . Stimsonwas capable of omitting the President's words andintentions "to prepare" to drop the bomb .Who was in such a hurry to drop the bomb no

matter what-no matter what the President decided,and no matter if Japan had surrendered? My friend'sspeculation that Russia wanted it tested on a livingcity makes me wonder .

This brings to mind the curious chronology of "set"dates. At Yalta, the Combined Chiefs-that is, theAmerican and the British-adopted on Feb. 9, 1945,a report to the President and the Prime Minister onthe possible surrender of Germany . The Chiefs recom-mended "that the planning dates for the end of thewar against Germany should be as follows :

Truman 420

421

Yalta Papers830

184

The Enemy at His Backa. Earliest date, r July 1 945b. Date beyond which the war is unlikely to con-

tinue-31 December 1945"

This was a procedure which commanding generalshave been following for an eternity . Why was it notdone in regard to the war against Japan? The sur-render time for Japan was first set at the secondQuebec Conference in 1944 on the premise that Russiawould enter the war 3 months after the fall of Ger-many; and Japan would surrender 18 months afterthat event. This was discussed at Yalta in February1945 and reaffirmed at Potsdam in the following July l

Let us look at the chronology

May 8, 1945 Germany surrenders.May 28, 1945 Stalin tells Hopkins Russia will enter the

war on August 8th .May 29, 1945 Proclamation to Japan deferred by General

Marshall as "premature."June 18, 1945 President Truman defers Proclamation to

Japan until it can be discussed at Potsdam.July 13, 1945 Stalin refuses to answer Japanese request

to negotiate peace until after Potsdam .July 16, 1945 Atomic bomb is tested at Alamogordo .July 16, 1945 Potsdam Conference is delayed a day be-

cause of Stalin's alleged heart attack .July 17, 1945 Potsdam Conference begins .July 24, 1945 Truman tells Stalin the U .S. has the A

bomb .July 25, 1945 Orders are sent to General Spaatz to drop

atomic bomb after August 3rd . (After Pots-dam?)

July 26, 1945 Potsdam Proclamation to Japan issued byUnited States, United Kingdom and China .Russia does not sign .

Aug. 2, 1945 Potsdam Conference ends .Aug . 5, 1945 Atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima .Aug . 8, 1945 Russia declares war on Japan .Aug . 9, 1945 Atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki .Aug. 10, 1945 Japan offers to surrender .


i85That everything was delayed until after Potsdam

does seem very strange.Now we have noted that Secretary Byrnes' excuse

for not warning Japan of the A bomb was because "itwas a real possibility" it might be a dud. But thatthis assumption was in error can be found in thehearings which were provoked by General MacArthur'srecall from Japan in 195 1 .

A member of the committee, Senator Bourke B .Hickenlooper, Republican from Iowa, asked permissionto place in the record two telegrams "with regard tothe question of information on the possibility or theprobabilities of the success of the atomic bomb projectprior to the Yalta Conference ." The first telegram MacA 4-3x19was one which he sent to General Groves, head of theManhattan Project, dated June 25, 1951 :

IT HAS BEEN STATED THAT YOU AND THENSECRETARY OF WAR STIMSON INFORMEDPRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AT THE WHITEHOUSE JUST BEFORE HE LEFT FOR THEYALTA CONFERENCE TO THE EFFECT THATIT WAS 99 PERCENT CERTAINTY THAT THEA-BOMB WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL . ALSO THATYOU TOLD HIM THE FIRST BOMBS WOULDPROBABLY BE READY IN AUGUST 1945 ANDTHAT THE BOMBS WOULD BE EXTREMELYPOWERFUL. CAN YOU CONFIRM ABOVE BYWIRE TO ME .

B . B. HICKENLOOPER

The reply was

THE STATEMENT REPORTED IN YOUR TELE-GRAM OF TODAY REFERENCE INFORMA-TION GIVEN TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT ISCORRECT.

LESLIE R. GROVES

Senator Hickenlooper sent a similar telegram toWilliam Considine who was a colonel during the war

MacA 3-1985

USSBSJapan'sStruggle toEnd the War13

186

The Enemy at His Backrepresenting the Manhattan Project, and who had beensent to Malta, just before the Yalta Conference, todeliver papers to Secretary of State Stettinius . Thesepapers were to inform the Secretary of the probablesuccess of the atomic bomb . Colonel Considine alsosent an affirmative telegram to the Senator .

Prior to this testimony, the then Secretary of State,Dean Acheson, who had been Assistant Secretary atthe time of Yalta, was a witness . Senator AlexanderWiley, Republican from Wisconsin, interrogated him :

Senator Wiley . What was the significance of the bomb nothaving been dropped at the time we negotiated at Yalta?Mr. Acheson . Well, I pointed out in my statement, Senator,that when we were discussing the question of bringing theRussians into the Far Eastern war in time to occupy andcontain all these troops, which we did not want broughtback for the fight on the island of Honshu, that the bombhad not been tested, and nobody knew at that time whetherwe had a bomb or whether we hadn't a bomb. It was nottested until some months later, and then it went off .

Since the Japanese had lost almost all their trans-ports, Mr. Acheson does not say if he expected theJapanese troops in Manchuria to swim back to Japan .

But why did we use the bomb at all? The UnitedStates Strategic Bombing Survey report flatly said :" . . . prior to 31 December 1945, and in all proba-bility prior to i November 1945, Japan would havesurrendered even if the atomic bombs had not beendropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, andeven if no invasion had been planned or contemplated ."We come now to one of the most interesting pas-

sages in all the wartime memoirs . It is found in HenryL. Stimson's "On Active Service in Peace and War"written for him by McGeorge Bundy . It is the storyof how one of our highest officials had his mindchanged for him by his advisers.Mr. Stimson was 8o years old when the book was

published in 1947 . He had taken part in many criticaldevelopments in our history, having served as Secre-


187tary of War under Taft and Secretary of State underHoover. He had lived in a world already passed, and,coming from retirement again to take the position ofSecretary of War in 1941, he was not attuned to the"New Deal Era." His appointment had been one ofpolitical strategy-as a Republican, he was the symbolof nonpartisanship in the fight against fascism . Andas devoted and loyal as he was to the cause, the oldgentleman was never fully accepted by the WhiteHouse elite corps. President Roosevelt "relegated himto a distinctly subordinated role" in the high strategy Current 213conferences, and "after Pearl Harbor he was includedin few." Nearly all his communications to the WhiteHouse were made through "go-betweens." His memoirsare filled with lengthy memoranda "To the President"which he hoped Harry Hopkins would place in theChief's hands .

The perpetual habit of the White House clique toignore the Secretary of War left the elder statesmanforever "stewing in his own juice ." His preference forAmerica over Russia was obviously troublesome tohis White House "superiors ." He apparently hadnever seen the directive to "treat Russia as a realfriend," and when he advocated "the Army's need (of Stimson 526Lend-Lease material) against those of the Russians"his "superiors" hit the ceiling . And he had the te-merity to demand of Russian Ambassador Oumanskythat our Attache in Moscow should be allowed to in-spect the Russian front before the United Statesprovided Russia with more arms . Stimson's biographer(Bundy) wrote that "Such posers were more verbalthan practical, however. Whatever the American an-noyance at Russian secretiveness, it was not UnitedStates policy to squabble over details, and Oumanskyand his successors got more than they gave ."

His "low priority" caused the old gentleman suchanxiety that in one instance he finally got through to Stimson 556the President by telephone . He noted in his diary : "Itold him frankly that, if the process of whittling downthe powers of the Secretary of War should continue, I

Stimson 342

188

The Enemy at His Backwould be in a very embarrassing position . . ." Hedid get one of his rare interviews with Roosevelt aday or so later, but it bore no results .

The "work plan" as set up for Mr. Stimson, seemsto have been devised to keep him busy with domesticaffairs, and even then his four advisers took mostof those sticky problems from off his weary shoulders .

His chief advisers, in addition to "the Army," werefour in number : Robert Patterson, Undersecretary ofWar ; Robert A . Lovett, Assistant Secretary for Air ;Harvey H. Bundy who "became the Secretary'spersonal agent in dealing with scientists and educa-tors," and John J . McCloy, Assistant Secretary, wholater became one of President Eisenhower's unofficialadvisers . Stimson's biographer states that the Secretaryof War "often trusted their judgment against his own"and that "very little of what Stimson did was donewithout their advice and help."But Mr. Stimson's devotion to his job was only

surpassed by his love of his country as can be seenfrom his many protesting memos "To the President ."The revelation and awful portent of the atom bombappears to have affected this elderly and gentle manmore than it had anyone else. On April 25, 1945,before the bomb was tested, Stimson wrote a memoto President Truman in which he attempted to visu-alize the "atomic age," and pointed out to the Presidentthat it would be an impossibility to keep the bomb'sproduction a secret forever.

President Truman accepted the Secretary of Waras a member of his official family (although theWhite House advisers still kept him at arms length),and for the first time he was invited to a Big Threeconference when he went to Potsdam . But at Potsdam,his advice was again of little concern to the officialsin charge, and it must have been his inability to holdthe President's attention, even when he was able totalk to him, which caused him to write a memo on thebomb once again . Stimson's fears coincided with thoseof Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, and Stimson ex-


189pressed himself even more clearly and more pointedlythan he did in his first memo .

i . With each international conference that passes and, in Stimson 639-fact, with each month that passes between conferences, it 40becomes clearer that the great basic problem of the futureis the stability of the relations of the Western democracieswith Russia .2 . With each such time that passes it also becomes clearthat that problem arises out of the fundamental differencesbetween a nation of free thought, free speech, free elections,in fact a really free people (and), a nation which is notbasically free but which is systematically controlled fromabove by secret police and in which free speech is not per-mitted .3. It also became clear that no permanently safe inter-national relations can be established between two suchfundamentally different national systems

6. The great problem ahead is how to deal with this basicdifference which exists as a flaw in our desired accord . Ibelieve we must not accept the present situation as perma-nent for the result will then almost inevitably be a new warand the destruction of our civilization .

*

*

*

7. The foregoing has a vital bearing upon the control of thevast and revolutionary discovery of X (atomic energy)which is now confronting us . Upon the successful control ofthat energy depends the future successful development ordestruction of the modern civilized world . The committeeappointed by the War Department which has been con-sidering that control has pointed this out in no uncertainterms and has called for an international organization forthat purpose . After careful reflection I am of the belief thatNO world organization containing as one of its dominantmembers a nation whose people are not possessed of freespeech, but whose governmental action is controlled by theautocratic machinery of a secret political police, can giveeffective control o f this new agency with its devastating pos-sibilities . (Emphasis mine .)

I therefore believe that before we share our new discovery

Igo

The Enemy at His Backwith Russia we should consider carefully whether we can doso safely under any system of control until Russia puts intoeffective action the proposed constitution which I have men-tioned . . . .

And now we come to the most remarkable part ofthe story. No paraphrasing of mine could do justice toMr. Bundy's authorship. But it is here we see themethod of persuasion :

Stimson 641 "Returning from Potsdam, Stimson found himselfnearing the limits of his strength, and after two weeksmade crowded by the atomic attacks and their an-nouncement followed by the surrender negotiations,he retreated from Washington for three weeks of rest .In the quiet of the Adirondacks he thought againabout the atom and Russia . Twice McCloy came fromWashington to talk with him, and at the other end ofthe secret telephone were Harrison and Bundy ; theWar Department civilian staff was thinking long andpainful thoughts about the atomic triumph .

"Stimson was worried. Granting all that could be641 said about the wickedness of Russia, was it not perhaps

true that the atom itself, not the Russians, was thecentral problem? Could civilization survive withatomic energy uncontrolled? And was it practical tohope that the atomic 'secret'-so fragile and short-lived-could be used to win concessions from theRussian leaders as to their cherished, if frightful,police state? A long talk with Ambassador Harrimanpersuaded Stimson that such a hope was unfounded ;the Russians, said Harriman, would regard any Ameri-can effort to bargain for freedom in Russia as a plainlyhostile move. Might it not then be better to reversethe process, to meet Russian suspicion with Americancandor, to discuss the bomb directly with them andtry to reach agreement on control? Might not trustbeget trust; as Russian confidence was earned, mightnot the repressive-and aggressive-tendencies ofStalinism be abated? As he pondered these questions-and above all as he pondered a world of atomic com-


191petition-Stimson modified his earlier opinion and onSeptember i i he sent to the President a memorandumurging immediate and direct negotiations with theRussians looking toward a `covenant' for the controlof the atom ."

And indeed, Mr. Stimson did more than "modify"his previous memo to the President for he completelyreversed himself. The following excerpt from hismemorandum to Truman dated i i September 1945is the kernel of the nut :

. . . unless the Soviets are voluntarily invited into the part-nership upon a basis of co-operation and trust, we are goingto maintain the Anglo-Saxon bloc over against the Sovietin the possession of this weapon . Such a condition will al-most certainly stimulate feverish activity on the part of theSoviet toward the development of this bomb in what willin effect be a secret armament race of a rather desperatecharacter. There is evidence to indicate that such activitymay have already commenced .

The last sentence makes me curious . Who told thisto Mr. Stimson and what "evidence" did they have?What was the hurry for Mr . Stimson's memo to

the President? Since the old gentleman had gone tothe Adirondacks for a badly needed rest (he wasapproaching 78 by then), why could not Mr . McCloy,Mr. Harriman, Mr. Harrison and Mr . Bundy havewaited until he returned to Washington a few weekslater? Had the Secretary's previous memo made suchan impression on President Truman that he was goingto act on it? Who was it who was so anxious that wego into partnership with Russia in the secrets of theatomic bomb?

Since the Eisenhower Administration's policy on thecontrol of atomic energy is of this writing a daily head-line, let us examine the initial reaction of the Com-munist Party at the time the first bombs were dropped .

On August 13, 1945, four days after the secondbomb had devastated Nagasaki, there appeared in

Stimson 643

192

The Enemy at His Backp. 5

the Daily Worker an article written by William Z.Foster, who had been recently made head of the Com-munist Party in the United States . You can be surethat whatever Foster wrote then and continues to writenow is considered by the comrades as the true linecoming from Moscow .

Atomic power, as scientists and engineers confidentlyinform us, is capable not only of unparalleled destruction inwar, but also of far reaching consequences in industry . . .

If . . . the new atomic power which is a product of inter-national science, is to be directed to constructive uses, thegeneral military control o f it will have to be vested in theSecurity Council of the United Nations . . . (Emphasismine.)

The need for democratic control of atomic power isespecially urgent right here and now in the sphere of itsmilitary use . . . We must further realize that the reaction-aries in our own country, who have in their mind's eye theimperialist domination of the world, also would not hesitateto use this devastating weapon recklessly in order to ac-complish their own reactionary purposes .

In this article he mentioned the "reactionaries"with all the intense hatred a Communist can managefor his enemies. And when Foster used the word"democratic" the meaning to the comrades was obvi-ously "Communist ."How well was this "Party line" followed? Let us

have a look .Already we have seen that Mr . Stimson's advisers

had persuaded him to recommend to the Presidentthat the Soviets be invited into a partnership, andeven before that, the Interim Committee had "calledfor an international organization" for the purpose ofcontrol .

Every conceivable kind of influence and pressurewas used to maneuver the United States into sharingour atomic secrets with Russia . Secretary Forrestalwas strongly against it and stated that the bomb and

Forrestal 95 the knowledge that produced it were "the property


193of the American people ." In his "Diaries" we find thereport of a Cabinet meeting on September 21, 1945,ten days after Mr . Stimson's last memo to the Presi-dent. Walter Millis who edited the Forrestal Diariesafter Forrestal's death wrote that "The idea of a soletrusteeship (by the United States) (if that was what Forrestal 96Forrestal had in mind) seems to have got no support,but the idea of submitting the matter for adjustmentunder the machinery of the United Nations, becamebasic to subsequent American policy ." (Emphasismine.)

Forrestal iosAt another meeting held on Oct . 16, 1945, Secretary

Byrnes also strongly advised against giving informa-tion to the Russians, but without results .

The steam roller became a speedy vehicle and itwas no time at all before President Truman madeUnited Nations control our official policy. In Novemberof 1945 the President invited Prime Minister Attleeof England, and Prime Minister Mackenzie King ofCanada to a White House conference, both countrieshaving played a minor role with us in developingthe atomic bomb during the war . After this trio hadsettled on their plan, they invited the late SenatorArthur Vandenberg, Republican from Michigan, andTom Connally, Democrat from Texas, the then rankingmembers of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,to come to the White House. This was Nov . 15, 1945 .After they had explained what they were going toannounce to a press conference which was to followimmediately, "Connally, in blunt Texas fashion, toldthe Secretary (Byrnes) that he and the President were Vandenbergtreating atomic energy as if it were their private 226

possession and that they had no authority to proposesharing atomic energy information with other nationsor to plan its future control without Congressionalconsent ."

Even this "consultation" was perfunctory since, afew minutes after Tom Connally's scorching protest,President Truman announced the plan for "Inter-national Control of Atomic Energy." It was strangely

194

The Enemy at His Backand ominously similar to the words of William Z .Foster written only three months before. Here wasthe kernel of the nut : " . . . at the earliest practicabledate a Commission should be set up under the UnitedNations Organization to prepare recommendationsfor submission to the Organization ." The Commissionwas set up Jan. 24, 1946 .

But there was more than just "control" of the atombomb and atomic energy. The next step was to tryto persuade the United States to destroy every meansfor making the bomb and also the bombs we alreadyhad! Six months after Foster's manifesto, Feb . 13,1946, Dr. Philip Jessup, then professor at ColumbiaUniversity, and later ambassador at large, and Dr .I. I. Rabi, who later succeeded J. Robert Oppen-heimer as chairman of the General Advisory Com-mittee on atomic energy (which includes advice tothe President), were among those who signed a letterappearing in the New York Times . The letter proposedthat production of the atom bomb and atomic materialsbe suspended and that materials produced on a stand-by basis by the United States be dumped in theocean! The letter also indicated destruction of existingstocks should be considered in negotiations .

In later years, Dr . Jessup's close association withknown Communists in the Institute of Pacific Affairswas such that it prevented his being confirmed by theUnited States Senate as a delegate to the UnitedNations in 1951. He later returned to his former posi-tion at Columbia University in New York City .Dr. Rabi held then and still holds important posi-

tions in almost every important atomic developmentgroup. In 1954 he appeared as a character witnessfor Robert Oppenheimer, emphasizing Oppenheimer's

Oppen. hear- "upstanding character" and loyalty. He went on toings 459

say that if the decision were up to him, and havinglearned what the investigating committee alreadyknew, " . . . I would have continued him in his posi-tion as consultant . . ."

The importance of the Jessup-Rabi letter to the

Decade ofAmericanForeignPolicy 1077


195New York Times is punctuated by the fact that fourmonths later, on June 19, 1946, Andrei A. Gromyko,USSR Representative to the Atomic Energy Com-mission of the United Nations, made a proposal for aconvention which is strangely similar . He said, "Theobject of such a convention should be the prohibitionof the production and employment of atomic weapons,the destruction of existing stocks of atomic weapons Decade ofand the condemnation of all activities undertaken in American

Foreignviolation of this convention."

Policy 1088The whole subject of atomic control is still pending,

but where did Jessup and Rabi get their bright ideawhich stony-faced Gromyko liked so much?Former Senator Claude Pepper, Democrat fromh7

Florida, thought it was a good idea too, but he wenteven further in a speech on the Senate floor in Forrestal 154April 1946 . He recommended that the United Statesshould not "gang up" on Russia, and that "before theconference convened" we "destroy every atomic bombwhich we have and smash every facility for theirmanufacture ." (Emphasis mine .)

The Communist plan for the United Nations controlgained headway. Let it be remembered that all thedraft papers with var olic recommendationsor e new United Nationsincluding atomic energy-were consider d in 94 and 1946 by the Officeof Special Political Affairs, the head 6T_ i-'cYwasnone other than Alger Hiss . In March of 194194-~-aState-War-Navy meeting, Forrestal noted in his"Diaries" that " . . . The Secretaries were in general Forrestal 259agreement that Senator Austin should endeavor tobring up as an item of first priority in the AtomicEnergy Committee the matter of establishing a charterfor an international agency for inspection, supervisionand control of atomic energy ." (Emphasis mine .)On September 23, 1949, President Truman an-

nounced that there was evidence that "an atomic Decade ofexplosion occurred in the USSR ." The evidence had Americanbeen noticed in August . The secrets of the atomic Foreign

Policy 1123bomb had slipped through our fingers .

196

The Enemy at His BackIn major policies, you will notice, the Communists

always play "heads I win, tails you lose ." And so itwas in this case . The Communists didn't get everythingat once-the complete sell-out was stalled on thequestion of inspection, as it still is in 1956 . But surelythese long discussions produced much information forthem. You can't talk about how to share your recipefor baking a cake without also sharing some of your"trade secrets" I Furthermore, we know the Russianshad a great deal of information in 1945 . All theyneeded was time, and while they kept us talking andhoping, our program was slowing down .

The manifesto of William Z . Foster of August 13,1945 had been successfully carried out. And theCommunists were assured of further success when in1950, UNESCO, one of the specialized agencies of theUnited Nations, began organizing an InternationalCenter for Nuclear Research to encourage regionalresearch centers, among other things . The proposalwas made by the United States . Four years later, onJanuary 1o, 1954, the following dispatch appeared inthe Los Angeles Examiner

United Nations : Free world governments are keenly in-terested in the experimental project being developed inEurope on research without secrecy in the peaceful uses ofatomic energy. Twelve Western Governments are in theprocess of ratifying a treaty for building collectively alaboratory in Switzerland to be operated under the UNauspices but devoted to non-military keynotes .

The Western Governments signing the treaty men-tioned in the dispatch consisted of Belgium, Denmark,France, German Federal Republic, Greece, Italy,Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UnitedKingdom and communist Yugoslavia . It is remarkablethat Yugoslavia should be included while the supposedbulwark of freedom, the United States who first madethe proposal to UNESCO in 1950, was not among thosenamed. We, of course, are not part of that regionlWas there no American present who had the natural


197inspiration to say, "Here youl-the United States isthe country that invented the atomic bomb . Where dowe come in on regional centers?"

On March 15, 1954, an Associated Press dispatchinformed us :

The United States plans soon to propose to Russia spe-cific measures for organizing a world pool of atomic energyfor peaceful purposes . United States officials have consultedwith their British and French colleagues, it was reportedSunday, and have decided to carry forward negotiations forSoviet acceptance of President Eisenhower's atomic poolproject a while longer in secret, two-nation talks .

Ever since the United States dropped the atombombs on Japan, the Reds and their faithful parrotshave been crying, "shame on America!" The cam-paign was built up to a crescendo in 1955 when Hiro-

D.C. TimesHerald

And this brings up another entry in Forrestal's Forrestal 259"Diaries"-"Mr. Lilienthal stated that control of pro-duction of atomic energy for industrial purposes couldnot be separated from the control of production ofatomic weapons ."

Can no one see that peaceful use of atomic energymust also provide the "know-how" and some of theequipment and plant facilities for making atomicweapons? Whether you use a match to light a stove, orto burn down a house, it is made by the same factory .A short item from a column of Constantine Brown,dated May 20, 1954, ought to be a warning of thingsto come .

Underground sources in China have sent reports to Wash-ington evaluated as "probable" that by the end of next yearthe Chinese Communists will have about 12 divisions armedand trained with nuclear weapons . There is an around-the-clock activity, these reports say, in the vast area of Sinkiang,where the Communists are establishing military and manu-facturing plants staffed by German, Czechoslovakian, Rus-sian and Polish engineers and scientists .

WashingtonEveningStar May 20,1954

198

The Enemy at His Backshima was held up to the world as a victim of Americanbrutality. The August 4, 1955 issue of Moscow's NewTimes, carried a lead article called "The Spirit ofGeneva" advocating sweetness and light . However, thelast article in the magazine was entitled "Hiroshima"in which the Communist author points his finger andsays, " . . . the atomic blow at the densely populatedpeaceful city was totally unwarranted ."

Chapter VIII

THE MACARTHUR HEARINGS

The MacArthur hearings of 19p,and the testimony of General MacArthur,General Marshall,Secretary Acheson,Admiral Badger,General Wedemeyer,General O'Donnell,and General Hurley.

IN the spring of 1951, when the Korean War wasalmost a year old, the members of Congress began re-ceiving mail from their constituents asking questionsthe lawmakers could not answer. There was a growinguneasiness among the citizens, especially those withboys in Korea. Instinctively they knew that the "policeaction" was turning into a strange kind of war . Theunusual situation of American soldiers suffering froma shortage of ammunition was the complaint in many aGI's letters to mom and dad. And mom and dadclearly remembered that during World War II theUnited States proved to be so powerful industriallythat it was not only able to supply a fighting force of13 million, but also provided the bulk of "steel" for ourallies. How could it be that in a small war, with afighting force of only 300,000, against a "backwardenemy," our boys were short of bullets?

Letters from fighting men also complained of beingimmobile when they should have been advancing. Thehomefront press reported from Washington that ordershad been given General MacArthur not to bomb theenemy's installations, airbases, or strategic bridgesalong and north of the Yalu River . It is no wonder thatthe public began to wonder if there was a reluctance to

199

200

The Enemy at His Backwin, an unprecedented policy in American fighting his-tory .

Speeches were made on the Senate floor delving intothe immediate history of Korea, and a number ofpeople pointed out the significance of Dean Acheson'sspeech before the Washington National Press Club inFebruary of 195o-four months before the start of thewar. As Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson told the mem-bers of the press (and thus Russia as well), that ourline of defense in the Pacific would not include Korea .His statement was as good as a "go ahead" signal tothe Communists-an assurance that if North Koreainvaded South Korea no interference would come fromthe United States .

And again the citizens began to learn that, althoughthe United States Congress voted for $10,230,000 fordefense material to be sent to South Korea and Presi-dent Truman signed the Public Law No . 430 Oct . 28,1 949, someone in our government had seen to it thatSouth Korea was to receive only $200 worth of signalwire. Here is the most blatant defiance of Congress andof the President by someone in the executive branchof our government . Yet no investigation was made andno one fired for insubordination or sabotage . The wordsof Owen Lattimore as they appeared in the New YorkCompass, July 17, 1949 seem uncommonly prophetic :" . . . The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Koreafall but not to let it look as though we pushed it ."

The Korean War, probably more than anything else,caused the public to review the five years elapsing sincethe end of World War II. The sensational AmerasiaCase and the two Hiss trials had convinced them thatRussian spies were in high places. The world mapshowed them that the U.S.S.R. dominated half ofEurope and had just swallowed up China, and forcedthe Nationalist government to flee to Formosa . Nowour boys were dying in Korea. For what?

A number of senators and congressmen delved intothe cause of the Korean war and the trail led themdirectly to the old line of contention-Yalta. It was

The MacArthur Hearings

201plain that what occurred at Yalta was the first in asuccession of steps, the omitting of any one of whichcould have prevented the Korean debacle .

The dismissal of General MacArthur brought thematter to a head, and the result became the well-known"MacArthur hearings ." The investigation by the JointArmed Services and Foreign Relations committees wasan "executive" or secret hearing which prevented thepress from direct reporting . And hereby hangs a littlestub tale l The decision was taken by the committeemembers themselves, the majority of Democrats car-rying the vote. The Republican senators felt that thehearings should be completely open to the public andproceeded to bring the issue to the floor of the Senatefor debate. A vote was called a number of times with-out obtaining the needed majority. On the day of thelast desperate effort to gather absentees and convertothers, I met Senator John McClellan, Democrat fromArkansas, in the Senate dining room. I committed theunpolitic act of asking him why he had not voted foropen hearings. He explained that many questionswould be asked bearing on military secrets and itwould be against national security to have the answersmade in public .

Being an old-time hearing-goer, this was not goodenough for me. I retorted that it had been the customin past Congressional hearings that when such a se-curity question arose, the witness would say so, andthe question was withheld until the committee met inclosed session. Senator McClellan laughed and quicklywalked away .

Senator McClellan is well-known for his patriotism,and his work against communism, but his vote to keepthe hearings in executive or closed session was on astrict party line, the late Senator Pat McCarran ofNevada being the only Democrat who voted againstclosed hearings .

I have brought this incident up for the purpose ofshowing how much our past and recent history hasbeen influenced by men "hewing to the party line."

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The Enemy at His BackWhen the Republican Administration came in in 1953,those Republican members of Congress who had forthe past twenty years been fearless and persistent inexposing wrong doing in government, were suddenlyand strangely silent. Former Secretary of State DeanAcheson frankly told my husband that President Tru-man was afraid to accept the Korean armistice termsof the Reds for fear of impeachment talk . But the newRepublican President was able to accept those sameterms without fear of opposition from members ofCongress .

Senators in both parties vote to protect their ad-ministration from embarrassment. I do not mean thatit is quite as simple as that, because politics in the"dirty" sense of the word enters into it too . An ad-ministration can penalize an "unfaithful" member ofCongress in many ways-by not giving him patronage,withholding campaign funds, or running a candidate ofits own choosing against him in the primaries. It takesan unusually strong-hearted patriot to overlook these"difficulties ." The political reason for having GeneralMacArthur testify in closed hearings was obvious . His"Old Soldiers Never Die" speech before the jointSession of Congress had caused such a revival of oldfashioned patriotism and aroused such mass indigna-tion, that the Democrats couldn't stand several moredays of MacArthur on radio and TV .

The hearings produced five large, printed volumes .In them can be found the discussion of almost everysingle factor pertaining to the Far East as well asextraneous political and military matters . All the issuesin this book were reviewed, and questions designed toresolve the confusion and distortion of informationwere put to the several witnesses . Yet, for some strangereason, many important questions remained unasked .Although the staffs of the two committees lackedproper time for preparation, there was all kinds ofvolunteered help from outside. A number of senatorsinterested in the Far East had their own staffs devotedays and weeks to research, presenting to individual


203senators vastly important and pertinent questions . Atthe same time, China experts all over the country sentquestions to the committee . And all the while, theRepublicans were boasting that they were going to putAcheson and Marshall on the spot . Nothing of the sorthappened, and few of the volunteered questions wereused. Here was the golden time to ask questions ofpeople intimately acquainted with recent events whilethey were still clear in their minds . But General Mac-Arthur was never questioned about the Pacific War,and General Marshall and Secretary Acheson werechallenged with only delicate respect .

Those who had hoped that the mysteries of theKorean and Pacific wars would be cleared. up sufferedfrom the exhaustion of lost hope while they watchedopportunity glide away on the wave of time like apiece of flotsam vanishing on an ocean tide .

On the subjects of the refusal to investigate theJapanese peace offers or feelers ; the alleged neces-sity of the Soviet entry into the war against Japan ;the justification for the Yalta agreements, and the de-cision to drop the atomic bomb, the witnesses ex-pressing their views fell into two opposite groups-there were no middle-of-the-roaders. Those agreeingwith each other are listed as follows :

General MacArthur

General MarshallAdmiral Badger

Secretary AchesonGeneral Wedemeyer

Averill HarrimanGeneral O'Donnell

(Statement, not testi-General Hurley

mony)

(Note: General MacArthur was interrogated onlybriefly and indirectly on the above subjects at thehearings, but his views are known from other sources .)

In reading the following excerpts from the hearingsthe political personalities of the participants stand outvery clearly . Certain members of the committee madeevery effort to prove General Marshall and SecretaryAcheson correct in their views. On occasion the inter-

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The Enemy at His Backrogator attempted to put words in the mouths of thewitnesses in order to make his point . And the testimonyshows in bold relief the personal character of the wit-nesses . Some gave straightforward answers, whileothers were masters of evasion . Some clearly placed theinterest of their country first, even ahead of their per-sonal and professional fortunes .An attempt was made by some members of the com-

mittee to discover who was responsible for the Yaltaagreements on China . Senator William F . Knowland,Republican from California, asked General Marshall,the only witness who had been present at Yalta, if,while at the Conference he had been familiar with theprovisions regarding Manchuria . The General's answerwas vague. "I don't think I was, sir," he said . He addedthat the decision was "entirely separate from the mili-tary."

What a very short memory General Marshall had lEarlier, I mentioned the fact that, according to theYalta papers, President Roosevelt met with his jointChiefs and Ambassador Harriman on February 4th todiscuss these provisions regarding Manchuria . GeneralMarshall was a member of the joint Chiefs! It is hardto understand how such a high ranking general couldforget such an important meeting .

Don't imagine that Harry Hopkins didn't have ahand in this decision too! At Yalta Secretary of StateStettinius, whom Roosevelt impishly called "Junior,"asked the President if he needed any help from theState Department delegation on the Far East ques-tions . "The President stated that, since it was pri-marily a military matter and since Mr . Harriman hadhad many private discussions about it with him andwith representatives of the Soviet Union over a periodof time, he thought it had best remain on a purelymilitary level ." And then, Stettinius went on, the Presi-dent, "Harriman, and Hopkins continued discussingthe Far Eastern question with Stalin and Molotov.""Junior" had been told that he had "heavy burdens"with other matters and need not be concerned .


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Another witness before the committee, GeneralPatrick Hurley, who was ambassador to China in 1945,ripped into Secretary Acheson, and tore apart theagreements concerning Japan and China . He told thecommittee that for the first time in American historyour nation had expressed fear of another nation . Hebegan by quoting from Secretary Acheson's "Letter ofTransmittal" to the President dated July 20, 1949 . Itwas the foreword" to the State Department's infa-mous White Paper on China .

General Hurley . (On) July 20, 1949, Secretary MacA 4-x840Acheson said :

AT YALTA, MARSHAL STALIN NOT ONLYAGREED TO ATTACK JAPAN WITHIN 2 OR 3MONTHS AFTER VE-DAY BUT LIMITED HIS"PRICE"-and I am using the exact language, the price-. . . WE . . . WERE PREPARED TO AND DID PAYTHE REQUISITE PRICE. TWO FACTS MUST NOT,HOWEVER, BE LOST SIGHT OF IN THIS CONNEC-TION. FIRST, THE SOVIET UNION, WHEN SHEFINALLY DID ENTER THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN,COULD IN ANY CASE HAVE SEIZED ALL THE TER-RITORIES IN QUESTION AND CONSIDERABLYMORE REGARDLESS OF WHAT OUR ATTITUDEMIGHT HAVE BEEN . (Emphasis mine .)

Let us examine that statement a moment. Russia hadalready solemnly agreed and finally over the signature ofMarshal Stalin himself to-SEEK NO AGGRANDIZEMENT, TERRITORIAL OROTHER-and it had also agreed-TO RESPECT THE RIGHT OF ALL PEOPLES TOCHOOSE THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT UNDERWHICH THEY WILL LIVE .

*

*

*. . . Mr. Acheson has been telling you . . . that the ter-ritorial integrity and political independence of our ally,

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The Enemy at His BackChina, were given away in secret because our State De-partment was convinced that Russia would not keep hercommitments and was in a position to seize all the propertiesthat we gave her in secret.

MacA 4-2839 . . . America was in a position at Yalta to speak the onlylanguage the Communists understand, the language ofpower. The President of the United States at Yalta was incommand of the greatest land, Navy and Air Force everassembled on earth . . .

When a "hot" subject is before a Congressional hear-ing, the questioning progresses much like a footballgame. The "hot pigskin" in this case was passed, inter-cepted, fumbled, got out of bounds, and time wouldbe called when the play would start all over again .During the MacArthur hearings, Manchuria and theagreement to permit Russia to send troops there,produced plain and fancy football . Senator WayneMorse, the renegade Republican, later Democrat fromOregon, and the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson,"pass" the pigskin back and forth in an attempt tomake a touchdown :

MacA 3-2228 Sen. Morse . One member wants me fo ask you on Yaltaon the question of the Yalta Conference as follows : Didnot the Japanese have a large stock of arms and ammuni-tion in Manchuria in 1945?Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir ; I believe they did .Senator Morse . He points out in a note to his questionthat some have estimated that these arms were sufficientto supply some five hundred thousand to a million troopsfor 5 years. Do you know whether that would be a fairestimate?

This estimate is so fantastic that even Mr . Achesonducks the question .

Secretary Acheson. I don't know about that, sir .Senator Morse . Did not the Japanese have large arsenals in


207Manchuria capable of replacing much of this material asit was used up?Secretary Acheson . There were arsenals in Manchuria .

Secretary Acheson does not say that the arsenalswere practically out of commission because they lackedmaterials for manufacture .

Senator Morse . As a result of the Yalta agreement werenot the Chinese deprived of the use of the two best portsin Manchuria, Port Arthur, and Dairen?Secretary Acheson . I don't think so, Senator .

Senator Morse now put a question to the Secretarywhich would elicit a more definite answer-he hasmade his speech and wants to get the pigskin clearlyover the goal posts :

Senator Morse . . . . Is the reason that you do not thinkso because you feel that the Yalta agreement did notexclude the use of these ports by Chinese ships ; that itwould have been possible under the agreement reached atYalta for a cooperative relationship of use to exist betweenRussia and China in regard to Port Arthur and Dairen?Secretary Acheson . That was true with the Port of Dairen .Port Arthur was a naval base so that is one reason formy statement.

The other one was that the Russians were in a position,regardless of the agreement at Yalta, to get the rights,which they subsequently got through the Sino-Soviet Treatyof 1945 .Senator Morse. Did not the joint Russian control of theManchurian railroads complicate the supply problem of theChinese Nationalists?Secretary Acheson. I do not think so, sir .

And so the touchdown was made . Any speaker orlecturer wishing to impress an audience with the sound-ness of the Yalta agreements needs only to quoteSenator Morse and Dean Acheson from this sworntestimony .

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The Enemy at His BackSenator Morse continues to question Mr . Acheson,

and although the Secretary is essentially a diplomatand not a military man, the Senator asks him questionsconcerning military strategy . And perhaps that is cor-rect, because some people say Acheson was in chargeof the Korean War, and would have known muchabout the military problems in World War II .

Senator Morse . Now, in regard to the questioning as towhy the surrender of the Japanese troops in Manchuriawas not either to the Generalissimo or to the United Statesforces, am I correct in my understanding that the veryphysical aspects of the problem would have made that im-possible, first, because as far as Nationalist troops wereconcerned, they were down in the southwest of Asia ;and this problem of surrender was up in the northwest ofChina-northeast of China-and, second, we did not haveany American forces in that vicinity at all ; did we?Secretary Acheson . No, sir ; we did not . . .

Note that Acheson does not answer the first part ofthe above question .

Senator Morse . Is it not true also, in respect to a militarysurrender, you just don't surrender to an individual ; youjust don't fly someone in, in this case to Manchuria,either the Generalissimo or a deputy of the Generalissimo,or an American officer, or a commission of American officers,and surrender to them ; but that in cases of military sur-render you have to have a sufficient military force presenton the scene to enforce the terms of surrender .Secretary Acheson . That is right .Senator Morse . Is it not true that the only military forcethat existed in Manchuria in any great number capable ofcarrying out the terms of the surrender happened to beRussian forces? (Emphasis mine .)Secretary Acheson . That is right .

In contradiction to the theory of Morse and Ache-son, General Kenney in his book, "The MacArthur IKnow," tells the following remarkable facts about thearrival of General MacArthur in Japan on August 3oth .


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He wrote that "Less than five hundred airborne in- Kenneyfantry were on the ground when MacArthur and all his 18o-1

top generals of the South West Pacific landed . . ."The Generals, he continues, were in the habit of carry-ing pistols in their shoulder holsters . But before thegroup left, MacArthur suggested that this time theyleave them behind. "If the Japs didn't really meanwhat they had said about surrendering, those pistolswouldn't do us much g9od . . ." With good reason-there were about fifteen, fully armed divisions withina few miles of MacArthur and his "five hundred ."

"A number of Japs told me afterwards," GeneralKenney went on, "that' the sight of all those generalsand officers of MacArthur's staff walking around un-armed . . . told them more than anything else thatthey had lost the war ."

Now let us watch Senator John Sparkman, Democratfrom Alabama, get into the act with Secretary Ache-son :

Senator Sparkman . . . . Did I understand correctly you MacA 3-1917to say that the reason was (for the Japanese in Manchuriato surrender to Russia) that at that time the NationalistChinese were far in the Southwest of China?Secretary Acheson . Yes, sir; they were removed by manyhundreds and thousands of miles from the scene of sur-render.

There were also several hundred thousand heavily armed,very effective Japanese troops, and it took a little forceto receive the surrender of that group of armed men . . .

The opposing team got hold of the pigskin earlierwhen Senator Knowland interrogated General GeorgeC. Marshall on the subject .

Senator Knowland. Now at the Yalta Conference . . . MacA 1-562-Could you tell us what the discussions were and what your 3recommendations were relative to the desirability or needfor the Soviet Union to enter the war in the Far East?General Marshall . The Chiefs of Staff were certainly unani-mous, for that was a very essential factor in bringing the

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The Enemy at His Backwar to an early termination, we anticipated a very powerfulinfluence from the Kwantung Army (Japanese Army) inManchuria and probably the portions that were in Korea. . . it was the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff that it washighly important that the Soviets carry out the campaignagainst Manchuria and against Korea .Senator Knowland . Were the Chiefs unanimous in thatviewpoint?General Marshall. I think they were unanimous . We canascertain that, but I am quite certain they were . . .

Both Acheson and Marshall kept talking about thepowerful Kwantung Army, yet intelligence makes itclear that Marshall, at least, knew that this army hadbeen greatly reduced .

And now Senator Morse has trouble with a fullbackfrom the opposing team. He is leading General AlbertC. Wedemeyer over the same course of questions, andit is apparent that he does not like the answers he isgetting. His footwork is worth watching as he tries toget an answer from the General which is to his liking :

Senator Morse . . . . Now it has been brought out in thesehearings, General, that of course the surrender of theJapanese in Manchuria was to the Russians . Is not thatbecause there was not anybody in Manchuria to whomthey could surrender with forces enough to enforce thesurrender other than the Russians?General Wedemeyer . No, sir. The Russians came into thewar, as I recall it, on August 8, sir, and their forces ad-vanced south, quickly overrunning the Japanese Manchurianforce.

Your statement, in my judgment, is correct as far asyou went: however, the Russians were directed to receivethe surrender by this general order No . i, and directed toreceive the equipment, take over the equipment, and-Senator Morse . But my point : We did not have otherAllied forces up in Manchuria at the time to take thesurrender and enforce it. %That is, it does not do muchgood, does it, to fly-suppose you had flown some Americanofficer in there to take the surrender, you would have to


211back up the surrender with enforcement. Otherwise, itwould have been an empty gesture, and the only forcesyou had there to enforce the surrender were the Russianforces.General Wedemeyer. No, sir. That is the part I did disagreewith you about because of my personal experience there,Senator.Senator Morse . That is what I wanted to clear up .General Wedemeyer. The Japanese were completely co-operative as soon as they got their order to lay down theirarms. We had no trouble with them whatsoever, sir . Itwasn't necessary-one person could go and take chargeof thousands of them . There was no resistance whatsoever ;they became docile and cooperative .

General Wedemeyer's testimony clearly agrees withthe opinion Admiral Leahy made at Potsdam . He wrotein his book, that "It was estimated that once the Leahy 414forces in the homeland had capitulated, surrender ofJapanese elements elsewhere would not be too difficultto achieve."

Senator Morse continues :

Senator Morse . Well, that is the way it turned out .General Wedemeyer . That was my personal experience inthe theater, sir, though, throughout .Senator Morse . That is the way it turned out . But whenyou are considering the surrender of a large force of enemy,whether it is Japanese or Germans, or Italian, or whoeverit might be, laying your plans for the surrender, youalways take into account do you not, the desirability ofhaving a force in being in the area of the surrender thatcan enforce that surrender in case the enemy should changehis mind?General Wedemeyer . You are absolutely right ; yes sir .

I felt that Senator Morse left a number of questionsunasked, and to satisfy my curiosity, I wrote GeneralWedemeyer for a supplement to his testimony . Here ishis reply :

"I can assure you that the Generalissimo and I were

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The Enemy at His Backperfectly capable of making arrangements to receivethe surrender of enemy troops anywheie in the Thea-ter. We did accept the surrender of the Japanese in thecentral part of China at Nanking although we werelocated 8oo miles to the west in Chungking, the war-time capital. Also we sent appropriate representativesto receive the surrender in southeast China, more than1,500 miles from Chungking . Actually the British sentrepresentatives from Ceylon and India, to receive thesurrender of the Japanese in Hongkong ."

I also asked General Wedemeyer to give his views onthe testimony of Secretary Acheson when he statedthat there were "several hundred thousand heavilyarmed, very effective Japanese troops" in Manchuria .General Wedemeyer's reply was :

"It is true that upon conclusion of the war therewere approximately 1,2oo,ooo armed Japanese con-centrated throughout China but the vast bulk of themwere concentrated south of the Great Wall . Our in-telligence informed us that the Japanese forces in Manchuria were greatly depleted . (Emphasis mine.) How-ever, those that were there had sufficient weapons tofight effectively . I am trusting to memory but I believethat there were only about 200,000 Japanese troopsconcentrated throughout that vast area, Manchuria ."

Another subject which came up for discussion wasa part of the Manchurian question . "The military" in-sisted that if Russia entered the war by sending hextroops into Manchuria, she would be able to keep theJapanese busy . This would prevent the Japanese fromtaking their troops to the mainland to meet our in-vasion troops .

In the following testimony Senator Alexander Wiley,Republican of Wisconsin, insists on an answer fromSecretary Acheson . He asks the question three timesbefore he gets even a partial answer, and Acheson inthe meantime, talks about every other subject :

Senator Wiley . Was there any chance of the Japs evergetting their Japanese from China or from Formosa back to


213Japan at that time? Was there? We had command of thesea .

Secretary Acheson . The general military situation at thetime of Yalta was that in Germany the Rhine had not yetbeen crossed, and it was not crossed until some time inMarch 1 945 .

In the Pacific, American troops had entered Manila onthe first day of the conference ; the battles of Iwo Jimaand Okinawa still lay ahead ; information as to the JapaneseArmy showed an army of approximately 5 million .Senator Wiley . We had command of the sea then, didn't we?Secretary Acheson . The estimates were that these operationswould involve an American force of approximately 5 millionmen. Military estimates were the war would continue atleast through 1946, and it was felt that the casualtieswould be very high, some estimates being as high as amillion .Senator Wiley . I mean, did we have command of the seaat that time?Secretary Acheson . We had command of the seas in general .It would have been perhaps a difficult thing to preventthe transfer back of the people who were only a hundredmiles across, if they went through Korea . . .

Later on, General Hurley reminded the committeeof a well-known fact. He said that "In January, beforethe secret (Yalta) agreement was adopted the fol-lowing February . . A great part of the JapaneseArmy was isolated in the islands and on the mainland.Japan had neither the ships nor the air force to returnthe Japanese Army to the Japanese Islands . The vic-torious American Navy under Admiral Nimitz was ina position to prevent the return of the Japanese Armyto the Japanese Islands . . ."

He continues

Yet, Secretary Acheson tells you that the American peopleand the American Government feared the final assault onJapan would cost more than a million American casualties .

If we believe this statement made by Secretary Acheson,

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The Enemy at His Backwe must also believe that the final conquest of a brokenand beaten Japan would cost more in American casualtiesthan all the battles of the Pacific, all the battles of theislands, all the battles of Burma and China, all the battlesof the Atlantic, all the battles of Africa, all the battles ofthe Mediterranean, all the battles of Italy, all the battlesof England, all the battles of France, all the battles ofHolland, all the battles of Belgium, and all the battles ofGermany. America had less than i,ooo,ooo casualties inall those battles .

(Note: The grand total of World War II casualtiesaccording to the World Almanac was 1,078,674 .)

Vice Admiral Oscar Charles Badger, who had an as-signment in the Pacific during those days, was inter-rogated by Senator Knowland along these same linesand had a substantially different story to tell, fromDean Acheson's version .

Senator Knowland . . . . Might I ask whether during theperiod of 1945, leading up to VJ-day, it was the commonviewpoint of those in the Navy at that time that theJapanese could be brought to surrender without the SovietUnion coming into the war . . . ?Admiral Badger . Oh, yes ; definitely. As an indication Imight give you an incident. Do you remember an expeditionwhere we went into the bombardment of a Japanese city,and particularly in the ordnance and steel plant in Muroran :(May or June 1945) we went in between two narrowstraits and up a bay ; we were a good 6 hours or 5 hours,at least 30 knots, getting to our point of opening fire,and came on out . Well, we were pretty well-there we werewith Japan on three sides of us . . . And during that entirething, inside both shores, not as wide as Chesapeake Bay,no wider, we went in there and did our business, poured,gosh knows, how many projectiles on the target, andcame out and not a single Jap airplane or anything elsecame at us, and the natural answer was, they must bepretty far gone if they are going to let us come in anddo something like this .. . . We were not thinking in terms of the Russianscoming in . We were thinking in terms of the collapse ofJapan . . . both Admiral Halsey, who talked the matter


215over with me at that time, and I thought . . . that thatMuroran thing was all the evidence that we needed thatthey were right flat on their backs .

Major General Emmett O'Donnell, Jr . was ques-tioned by Sen . Bourke Hickenlooper concerning thenecessity for a land invasion of Japan scheduled forNovember 1, 1945

General O'Donnell. . . . once we were in the Marianas MacA 4-3111(Saipan, July 1944) we were convinced it was over ; becausethey were taking the most horrible pounding . . . I thought-we all thought- I thought personally in a couple ofweeks it would be all over.

Senator Hickenlooper. I am just trying to develop what wasthe thinking . . . as to the probability that we couldstarve Japan out or wreck her will to fight short of anactual landing . . .General O'Donnell . . . . I think you will find that theAir Force and Navy thought we could do it and the groundforces did not think we could do it . . .Senator Hickenlooper. And it was known in the winter of1 945 ; and it was known we were sinking their shipping ingreat volume .General O'Donnell . Yes, sir .

In the days when the elderly, wing-collared TomConnally, Democrat from Texas was in the Senate, hebecame famous for his tart, southern-fried language .He typified the "political wheel horse" who defendedhis party, right or wrong . So it was only natural thathe should have tried to defend the Yalta agreements .In the following tit for tat with General Wedemeyer,the General got into "Old Tawm's" flowing silver hair :

Senator Connally . So far as the concessions made at Yaltaare concerned, it is true, is it not, that we believed-hindsight is sometimes better than foresight-that theentry of Russia into the war would help us defeat Japanand save perhaps hundreds of thousands of American lives?

3112

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The Enemy at His BackGeneral Wedemeyer . Yes, sir ; that is true, Senator Connally,and your military leaders must have advised the Presidentthat it was necessary to bring the Russians in in order tosave American lives and to bring about an early victory .

The thing that disturbs me right now as an American isthe fact that the Japanese were trying so hard, as I under-stand it, sir-you could check on this information-tryinghard to accomplish an armistice .

They wanted to use Moscow people as their intermediariesand they couldn't get any response to their efforts tostop the war, this before I think we dropped the atomicweapon .Senator Connally . And we did not know of that at thetime either, did we? We had no knowledge of it?General Wedemeyer. Well, I think we did, sir, because wehad means of knowing what the Japanese were striving todo, that is via the radio, and I think that reports weremade to our Government to that effect. I believe I readwhere Admiral Zacharias or some such name made such astatement .Senator Connally. Yes, I know . He made a lot of statements .

The contradictions in the testimony of witnesseswere extreme. Yet there was no effort on the part ofauthorities to discover who was telling the truth . Highbrass and "high pockets" diplomats are no longer em-barrassed by the justice Department . They are nolonger concerned morally, nor are they particularlyworried over perjury-when cornered they hide behindWhite House orders, or suffer a convenient loss ofmemory .

You will now see an entirely different story fromSecretary Acheson and Secretary of Defense GeorgeC. Marshall, who had been Army Chief of Staff duringthe war

MacA 3-1984 Senator Wiley . What basis in fact exists for the frequentlymade assertions that the Japanese attempted to bring thewar to an end several months before the atomic bombswere dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, prior to theYalta Conference, and certainly prior to the PotsdamConference . . .


217Secretary Acheson . . . . I do not believe that there wasany attempt by the Japanese to bring the war to an endbefore the negotiations which finally led to its being broughtto an end .There was considerable active correspondence between

Japanese in various capitals and Japanese in Tokyo as toproposals which might be made to save for themselvesmore than they were able to save at the time of thesurrender .Earlier, Senator Knowland had asked the same questionsof General Marshall .Senator Knowland . . . . Do you have any knowledge,directly or indirectly, that there had been preliminaryoffers of surrender from Japan?General Marshall . I have no recollection of any that werereceived, with any degree of authenticity with regard tothem . . .

I would say this : That during the early months of 1945,there were a series of communications between JapaneseAmbassadors, or ministers in Europe-I think notablyfrom Berlin, before they closed in on Berlin ; from Moscow,before the Soviets declared war on Japan ; from Madrid-I think it was either Madrid or Lisbon ; and from Stock-holm, I think ; and also, I believe from Switzerland . . .they were appeals largely from those Ambassadors to thePrime Minister of Japan, to proceed immediately to obtaina surrender .

After several weeks of testimony behind closeddoors, the Democrats who were the majority, decidedagainst making a report . It is understandable since atrue report would have placed the Democratic Ad-ministrations (both Truman's and Roosevelt's) in anextremely bad light. Neither Senator Russell, chairmanof the Armed Services Committee and acting chairmanof the joint committees hearing the testimony, norSenator Connally, chairman of the Foreign RelationsCommittee, were capable of making a "doctored" re-port. They could only agree to file no report .

However, a group of Republican senators on thecommittees believed a report should be made . It was

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The Enemy at His Backsigned by an interesting group of Republican senatorsin view of more recent history. They were :

Styles Bridges of New HampshireBourke B. Hickenlooper of IowaHarry P. Cain of WashingtonWilliam F. Knowland of CaliforniaH. Alexander Smith of New JerseyAlexander Wiley of WisconsinRalph E. Flanders of VermontOwen Brewster of Maine

The Republicans who did not sign the report butfiled separate ones of their own were as follows :

Leverett Saltonstall of MassachusettsWayne Morse of OregonHenry Cabot Lodge, Jr . of Massachusetts

The late Charles W. Tobey of New Hampshire didnot take any action at all .

The Report on the war with Japan signed by the Re-publican group was the only conclusion that the testi-mony and facts could extract :

Under questioning, it was established that at the timeof Yalta the Japanese Navy was at the bottom of theocean and American airpower had destroyed the Japaneseindustrial potential. Furthermore, with the economy ofJapan dependent on imports, there was absolutely nodoubt, from a military point of view, that the Japanesehome army would wither on the vine . . .. . . This myth, that the Russian participation in theJapanese war was a military necessity has been refutedadequately . . . The result of Yalta remains a triumphfor Communist diplomacy .

The five published volumes of testimony will beinvaluable to future historians who will find them afrightening expose of American history. But it was only"the end of a chapter." After the Truman Adminis-tration had refused to permit American soldiers to win


219the Korean War and had dismissed their commanderin 1951, this strange history continued . We then settleddown for two years of truce talks, while the Redsfeverishly built up their badly depleted forces and theirdefenses on the China mainland .On April 16, 1953, our new President, Dwight

Eisenhower, assured the American people that " . . .an armistice in Korea that merely releases aggressivearmies to attack elsewhere would be a fraud ." Yet wesigned an armistice which prepared the ground for thefall of Indo-China and released thousands of Redtroops which now are threatening Formosa . We have"viewed with grave concern" the many instances inwhich the Reds have broken the signed armistice .Among the most flagrant of these are the Americanboys kept as political hostages, and the formidablemilitary build-up in North Korea .

In his State of the Union speech in early 1953,President Eisenhower had announced we would un-leash Chiang Kai-shek ; the implication being the Gen-eralissimo would be free to try to liberate his home-land. But on March 2, 1955, the President startledthe public by saying that if Chiang attempted to liber-ate the mainland of China, "The United States is notgoing to be a party to an aggressive war ." This ap-peared to be a reversal of policy, discouraging all cap-tives of the Reds from attempting to free their landsby force .

For almost two years President Eisenhower repeat-edly said that under no circumstances would he par-ticipate in a "Big Four" meeting with the Russiansuntil their leaders had shown by deeds and not words,that they meant to live peaceably with the rest of theworld. And yet, in July 1955, the famous "summit"conference took place, even though Russia had in noway indicated "by deeds" that she had changed herspots .

President Eisenhower's normal, American reactiontowards the Reds has been unerringly reversed in everyinstance. It doesn't take much effort to see that the

220

The Enemy at His Back"proteges" of Harry Hopkins continue to play an im-portant role in our destinies. Sitting by the side ofPresident Eisenhower as his adviser and interpreter atGeneva in 1955 was a man who was "discovered" atCairo in 1943 by Harry Hopkins . For it was duringthat Conference that Hopkins was so impressed withthis young career diplomat he persuaded PresidentRoosevelt to appoint him to a White House post . From

Sherwood

then on, his "star was very much in the ascendent ."775

This was Charles E . Bohlen .I do not mean to imply that Charles Bohlen was the

chief and only adviser at Geneva . There were others .One of the most important, according to the New YorkTimes' Arthur Krock, was Herman Phleger who Mr .

July 28, 2955 Krock describes as "one of the really strong men ofthe Eisenhower administration ." There was also atGeneva, Harold Stassen, Secretary on Disarmamentwhose influence in the White House is not to be over-looked. And within telephone distance from Genevawas brother Milton Eisenhower on a European tour atthe time . The President proudly tells that Milton, along-time New Dealer and former friend of HarryHopkins, is his most trusted adviser . One of severalmagazine articles pointing this up was written byDemaree Bess in the September 17, 1955 issue of theSaturday Evening Post . The title of the article tells thestory ; "When He (Milton) Talks Ike Listens ." ThePresident's young brother has been almost continuallyin government or UNESCO service since he went tothe Department of Agriculture with Henry Wallace inearly New Deal days. Although he now has no officialposition, he is the real power behind the President .

Two other important unofficial advisers in the WhiteHouse are Paul Hoffman, first Chief of the "Mar-shall Plan" and presently intimately associated withthe Ford Foundation ; and John McCloy, former As-sistant Secretary of War in the Roosevelt adminis-tration, and first high Commissioner of Germany underPresident Truman. Never mentioned but not to beforgotten is the late Harry Hopkins' trusted aide, Gen-


221eral James H. Burns, author of the important 1942memorandum . (See appendix .) Like Milton Eisenhower,he has never lost his usefulness in government duringthe last 20 years. An old friend of Milton, GeneralBurns is now retired . But his advice is still sought bythe official family of the Chief Executive .There are many, many others of the New Deal

family still in important positions in our government .Whoever our President and Secretary of State may be,now and in the future, Americans have a right to ask,"Who are your advisers?"

Until Soviet agents and their unwitting tools are re-moved from our midst, the United States of Americacan never win another war, hot or cold . Not until theseinfluences are removed will the American flag againbe the trusted protector of American fighting men .To sum it all up THE ONLY ENEMY THE

AMERICAN SOLDIER NEEDS TO FEAR IS THEENEMY AT HIS BACK .

APPENDIX

Memorandum for Harry Hopkins from Gen. James H. SherwoodBurns, 1942

page 642

6. WITH REFERENCE TO OUR NEED FOR RUSSIAAS A REAL FRIEND AND CUSTOMER IN THEPOST-WAR PERIOD .

If the Allies are victorious, Russia will be one of thethree most powerful countries in the world . For the futurepeace of the world, we should be real friends so that wecan help shape world events in such a way as to providesecurity and prosperity.

Furthermore, Russia's post-war needs for the productsof America will be simply overwhelming . She must notonly rehabilitate her war losses in homes, industries, rawmaterials and farms, but she must provide the resourcesfor the inevitable advances in her standards of living thatwill result from the war .

7. From the above, it seems evident that Soviet relation-ships are the most important to us of .all countries, except-ing only the United Kingdom. It seems also evident thatwe must be so helpful and friendly to her that she willnot only battle through to the defeat of Germany andalso give vital assistance in the defeat of Japan, but inaddition willingly join with us in establishing a soundpeace and mutually beneficial relations in the post-warworld.

8. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING RELATION-SHIPS .

(a) Arrange for a conference between the President andMr. Stalin at some appropriate time and place.

(b) Establish a better spirit of "Comrades-in-arms" bysending General Marshall, Admiral King and GeneralArnold or other appropriate military representatives toconfer with corresponding Russian officials in Moscow orsome other appropriate location and to discuss freely ourplans, our capabilities and our limitations .

(c) Do everything possible in a generous but not lavish

223

224

Appendix

way to kelp Russia by sending supplies to the limit ofshipping possibilities and by sending forces to Russia tojoin with her in the fight against Germany .

*

*

*

(e) Send to Russia an ambassador of top rank as tonational standing, vision, ability and willingness to servethe country first.

(f) In general, treat Russia as one of the three foremostpowers in the world.

(g) Establish the general policy throughout all U .S .departments and agencies that Russia must be considered asa real friend and be treated accordingly and that personnelmust be assigned to Russian contacts that are loyal to thisconcept .

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*

*

(i) Offer Russia very substantial credits on easy termsto finance her post-war rehabilitation and expansion .

(j) Agree to assist, in every proper and friendly way,to formulate a peace that will meet Russia's legitimateaspirations . (All emphasis mine .)

Chapter VII

JAPAN AS A POLITICAL ORGANISM by T . A. Bisson ;Pacific Affairs, Dec. 1944, PP . 399, 400, 418, 419

. . . As to the Emperor's influence with respect to aggres-sion and territorial aggrandizement, no elaboration need bemade. He supplies the tribal ideology which knits thecoalition together, with its unrivalled motivation of the"sacred mission" of a "master race." The aggressive in-stincts of Japan's dominant groups are buttressed by adivine imperative : to extend the "benevolent sway" of theEmperor over previously unfavored regions . Under theseconditions, with an Imperial influence tending invariablyin a given direction, the effort sometimes made to pass offthe Emperor as a puppet without political responsibilityof any kind or as an institution which can be directedtoward good ends hardly merits serious consideration ."To regard the Emperor system as something which is bynature politically neutral and can be used for good or illas if it were some inanimate object like a pistol, in which

Appendix

225inheres no social values but which takes on such significanceonly when it us used, is a gross misunderstanding of itshistory . In the complexities of Japanese social developmentthe institution of the Emperor has inevitably given theJapanese state structure a certain bias which has predis-posed it_ to the side of reaction ! "

Before the occupation force leaves Japan, it should haveenforced the following measures: (i) Destruction of mili-tary, naval, and air armaments . (2) Conversion of muni-tions factories to civilian production, as far as possible ;otherwise destruction . (3) Payment of reparations to Chinaconsisting of industrial equipment produced in Japan, withraw materials supplied by China . (4) Establishment ofimport controls to guarantee continued enforcement of steps(2) and (3) . (5) Abolition of the army and navy, includinginter alia the conscription system . (6) Punishment of warcriminals, including the Emperor; exile or imprisonmentof the middle and higher officers. (7) Dissolution of theEx-Servicemen's Association and of the secret societies ;punishment of the leaders of the secret societies guiltyof criminal acts. (8) Dissolution of the Tokkoka (secretpolice) and the Kempeitai (army gendarmerie) and punish-ment of officials guilty of criminal acts . (9) Preliminary re-organization of the police system, with right of habeascorpus guaranteed. (io) Preliminary reorganization ofthe personnel and curricula of the education system . (ii)Establishment of a free press and opening of Japan tounrestricted news cable, telephone, and radio contact withthe outside world. (12) Recommendation of certain ad-ditional measures in so far as these have not been alreadyaccomplished .

The measures thus recommended, but left to the Japanesefor implementation, would include the following : (13) As-sembly of a freely elected constitutional convention forthe purpose of drafting a new Constitution based on thewill of the people and including a bill of rights . 04)Abolition of the Emperor system by the constitutionalconvention, with accompanying warning that this will bea key factor in determining the future attitude of theUnited Nations toward Japan. 05) Completion of thereorganization of the police system . (16) Completion ofthe reorganization of the educational system . 07) Applica-tion of limitations on the economic power of the monopolies,

USSBSJapan'sStruggle toEnd the WarChairman'sOffice i July1946

226

Appendixeither by government regulation or outright nationalization .(18) Introduction of agrarian reforms.No final peace agreement should be concluded when the

army of occupation withdraws . Relaxation of steps (3) and(4) and (5), conclusion of a final peace agreement, andreadmission of Japan into the community of nationsshould be made contingent on satisfactory progress towardeffectuation of the recommended measures, as well as ade-quate maintenance of those previously enforced .

The steps in this program are interrelated and interde-pendent. The crucial political reforms, included under steps(i3) and (14), may be safely postponed to the post-occupation period only if the provisionally establisheddemocratic leadership gives promise of stability and ef-fectiveness. Otherwise, the occupation must either be pro-longed or the constitutional convention must be assembledunder the aegis of the occupation authorities . Steps (17)and (18) are relegated to the last position, not only becausethese measures are peculiarly unsuitable to enforcementby an alien fiat, but also because steps (2), and (3), and(4) are presumed adequate to curb the monopolists'ability to equip a Japanese military force with heavy arma-ments .

Implicit in this program, and fundamental to its applica-tion, is the assumption that a new and a democratic Jap-anese political leadership is taken to mean what the wordsactually say . They do not mean that the old systemcontinues to operate, with "moderates" holding the Cabinetportfolios. They do assume that the old organs of govern-ment are side-tracked, that the officials heading theseorgans are not recognized as holding power based on cin-sent of the people, and that the entire system is permittedand, if necessary, helped to collapse . They mean that atotally new set of government organs, manned by a totallynew personnel, is encouraged to develop and that only thisnew set of organs and this new personnel will be recognizedas the Japanese government .

APPENDIX A-5. MEMORANDUM OF KONOYE CON-VERSATION WITH HIROHITO, FEBRUARY 1945

Early in February 1945 the Emperor initiated a numberof private interviews with the elder statesmen and hisintimates to solicit their views on Japan's war situation and

Appendix

997advice concerning the immediate future of the Empire.On 14 February 1945 Prince Konoye had such an interview

page zzwith the Emperor. In advance of that, Prince Konoye pre-pared a memorandum of his views which were verballypresented to the Emperor. An English translation of thememorandum, prepared by T . Ushiba, Konoye's long-timeprivate secretary, is reproduced below . . .

Parts of the following translation are not literal rendi-tions of the original Japanese but represent an accuratesummary of salient points . . . .

*

*

*

"I think that there is no longer any doubt about ourdefeat. A defeat is, of course, a serious stain on ourhistory, but we can accept it, so long as we can maintainour Tenno system. Public opinion in America and Britain onthe whole is not yet, at least, so bad as to demand afundamental change in that system . What we have to fear,therefore, is not so much a defeat as a Communist rev-olution which may take place in the event of defeat .

"Conditions,' internal as well as external, point to thedanger of such revolution . In the first place, there has beena notable ascendancy of Soviet Russia in world politics .In the light of her recent activities in Europe, we mustjudge that she has not abandoned the hope of bolshevisingthe whole world . She is prosecuting such a policy vis avis the Far East, and I fear interference in our domesticaffairs .

"With regard to internal affairs, potentially dangerousfactors include the rapid deterioration of the people'sliving conditions, increase in the voice of the laboringclasses, rise of pro-Soviet feelings as enmity against Americaand Britain increases, attempts by an extremist group inthe military to achieve radical changes in internal politics,activities of younger bureaucrats sympathetic with thatgroup, and disguised activities of the . Communists behindboth the military and bureaucrats .

"A majority of younger officers seems to think that thepresent form of the Japanese Government is compatiblewith Communism-a conception which, in any opinion,constitutes the basis of the radical thought of themilitary . The Communists are influencing them with thetheory that, even under communism, Japan can maintain

228

Appendixthe Tenno system. I have now come to seriously doubtwhether the whole series of events from the ManchurianIncident to the present war have not been what they havepurposefully planned . It is a well-known fact that theyopenly declared the aim of the Manchurian war was toachieve drastic reforms in domestic affairs . A central figureof theirs also declared that the longer the China Incidentcontinues, the better, for otherwise, the intended reformwould not be accomplished . Of course, the "reform" aimedat by the military may not necessarily be a Communistrevolution, but the group of bureaucrats and civilians (bothleft and right) who are in a close collaboration with themilitary are definitely intending to bring about such arevolution . In the light of this conclusion, I now realizethat I have, during the last ten years, come across manyevents the meaning of which I did not then fully appreciate .(As) Prime Minister twice during that period, and over-eager to bring about national unity by accepting as much aspossible of the doctrine advocated by those radical elements,I failed to perceive the true intentions hidden behind theirarguments. I do not pretend to find any excuse for myshort-sightedness, but I feel responsible for it ."In the last few months, the slogan `Hundred Million

Die Together' has become increasingly louder, seeminglyamong the right-wing people but has its real basis in theactivities of the Communists .

"Under such circumstances, the longer we continue thewar, the greater will be the danger of revolution. We shouldtherefore stop the war as soon as possible .

"The greatest obstacle to ending the war is the existenceof the military group which has been "propelling" the coun-try into the present state ever since the Manchurian Inci-dent-the group which, having already lost all hope ofsuccessfully concluding the war, nevertheless insists onits continuation in order to save face . If we try to stopthe war abruptly, these military extremists together withboth the right and left wings might attempt anything-even a bloody internal revolt, and thereby nullify ourefforts . The prerequisite to the conclusion of the war, there-fore, is to wipe out the influence of these dangerous peopleand reform the Army and Navy. I must urge Your Majestyto make a serious decision to that end ."

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The enemy at_his_back-elizabeth_churchill_brown-1956-263pgs-pol

Education

Transcript of The enemy at_his_back-elizabeth_churchill_brown-1956-263pgs-pol