The effects of social media on crisis communication: A...

The effects of social media on crisis communication: A case study of the response strategy performed by Research in Motion

By Sidsel Hilding-Hamann

Supervisor: Tomasz FediukMarketing and Management CommunicationDepartment of Language and Business CommunicationAarhus University

Submission: 3rd of May 2012Exam no.: 300609Characters excluding blanks: 55.010

BA thesis in Marketing and Management Communication Sidsel Hilding-Hamann

Table of Contents

Summary 2

Introduction 2

Problem statement 3

Delimitations 3

Literature review 4What defines a crisis? 4Crisis types 4Wrongdoings 6Benoit’s Image Restoration Strategy 6Situational Crisis Communication Theory 8Crisis history 9Defining social media 10How is social media affecting crisis communication? 11Social media as a tool 11Social media as two-way communication 12

Method 12

Research in Motion 13Introduction to RIM 13The crisis history of RIM 13The October Outage 14

Analysis of RIM’s crisis strategy 15Introduction to RIM’s social media strategy 15The news media response 15Characterizing the crisis 16

Rhetorical analysis of RIM’s response strategy on Facebook 18The preliminary strategy 18As the crisis deepens 19Restoring conditions 20

Rhetorical analysis of RIM’s response strategy on Youtube 21

Discussion 23

Conclusion 24

References 25

Appendix 1 29

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SummaryThis thesis explores how social media can be used as a tool in crisis communication. Employing

theory on crises put forth by Coombs and Fediuk among others as foundation together with

Benoit’s image restoration strategy, the ideas are juxtaposed social media theory presented by e.g.

Wigley and Zhang. Using this literature as a framework, the study examines the online crisis

strategy performed by the mobile company Research in Motion during a four-day network outage.

The analysis takes material from Facebook and Youtube as its starting point. The findings of the

thesis suggest that social media can be used as a beneficial tool when utilized effectively but also

correspondingly harmful when not used accordingly. The factor of immediacy seems to be

paramount to consider when navigating crises in an online world as well as the fact that

stakeholders expect faster, more efficient communication when communicating through these

conduits. Recommendations include assigning more value to crisis history and attribution of

responsibility, as well as tailoring response strategies to the traits of social media to a higher

degree.

Characters excluding blanks: 55.010

IntroductionFrom live updates on the Haiti earthquake in 2010 to the image of US Airways emergency landing

on the Hudson River, it is no longer unusual for world wide news stories to be broken through

social media channels such as Twitter, Youtube and Facebook, rather than being distributed by

Reuters etc (CrisisBlogger, 2011, August 11; Auer, 2011). This development has given way to an

entirely new way of communicating, one that is highly viral and characterized by immediacy

(Wigley & Zhang, 2011). According to Coombs and Holladay, what this means is that

“Stakeholders have greater expectations of near immediate communication about events, including

crisis communication.” (p. 379). If this is true, companies need to optimize their ability to handle

crises in the social media world. Currently, two thirds of companies worldwide have started

utilizing social media (McCorkindale, 2009). Unfortunately, few of the companies are able to

incorporate them into their crisis communication strategies successfully. Therefore it is necessary

to gain a better understanding of the characteristics of the world that crisis departments are now

navigating in, as well as which beneficial strategies to adopt and how to administer them. There

exists a scarce amount of theory-grounded research on effective handling of a crisis within the

online world (Jin, Liu & Austin 2011). Many scholars highlight effects-based results, which

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include reception analysis and qualitative surveys in order to determine the consequences of

specific communicative decisions (e.g. Coombs & Holladay, 2009). Other examples include form-

based research on various media types, and, finally, papers conducting content-based research on

specific communication efforts performed by companies (e.g. Wigley & Fontenot, 2010). This

thesis will focus on the latter, examining the October BlackBerry crisis. The study will include an

analysis of the crisis and RIM’s response strategy. Furthermore, the analysis will look at social

media and which possibilities, as well as limitations, they provide companies with in times of

crisis. The study will take into account that the world of social media is a highly discussed one, and

that some communicators doubt its credibility, as well as the tools it can provide.

Problem statementHow do companies navigate crises in an online world?

DelimitationsThe case study will examine RIM’s use of Facebook and Youtube specifically, although it could

have been interesting to also look at use of other social media platforms such as Twitter. It seems a

valid argument that including a study of Twitter would have provided a more nuanced analysis of

RIM’s rhetorical strategies on the social media platform. RIM was also fairly active on this

medium. Unfortunately, due to limitations of the thesis length this aspect has been omitted. Also,

the rapid speed of news coverage on the Internet means that e.g. tweets quickly become outdated

and difficult to backtrack compared to Facebook, which now includes the “Timeline” device, as

well as Youtube, which functions more as a database than a daily notice board. Another factor that

has been given less weight is the response of stakeholders and the news media. Naturally, articles

from the period of the crisis have been studied and quotes pulled out in order to portray their stance

towards RIM but a concrete paragraph on reception analysis has not been included. The thesis

seeks to investigate how social media has changed crisis communication and in particular how

RIM has chosen to navigate its most recent crisis, rather than explore the audience reception of it.

Literature review

What defines a crisis?In The Handbook of Crisis Communication Coombs defines a crisis as “the perception of an event

that threatens important experiences of stakeholders and can impact the organization’s

performances” (2010, p. 100). In other words, a crisis occurs when a company’s reputation is in

jeopardy. A reputation is an evaluation of an organization formed by its stakeholders, who in turn

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are the people who are affected by or can affect an organization (Mitchell et al, 2007). The

stakeholders evaluate how well an organization is meeting their expectations based on prior

behavior. Reputation is therefore a valuable asset and important to protect. A tarnished reputation

may drive away customers and as a direct effect the company will suffer the consequences often

made blatant by the bottom line (Coombs, 2007).

Although there is no one accepted definition of a crisis, a few generic things can be said about the

concept. Firstly, a crisis is perceptual. This means that a crisis is defined by the perceptions held

about it. Stakeholders perceive crises in a certain way and it is the organization’s job to adjust its

crisis communication to their beliefs. Secondly, a crisis is unpredictable. This is nevertheless not

the same as being unexpected. A crisis can be anticipated, and intelligent companies are aware of

the potential crises in the offing. Thirdly, crises disturb stakeholder expectations. It is expected that

a company complies with the rules and regulations of society but also that it delivers products as

promised (Coombs, 1999). Stakeholders put a great deal of faith in the hands of a company when

buying its product, and it is the company’s responsibly to make sure that e.g. car tires don’t

explode or capsules aren’t poisoned with deadly toxins (Laufer & Coombs, 2006). Finally, it is

important to distinguish between crises and incidents. An incident is “a minor, localized

disruption”. A crisis “disrupts the entire organization” (Coombs, 1999, p. 3). In other words, the

difference between the two has to do with how much damage they cause. A crisis will always have

serious impact and should naturally be taken more seriously than an incident (Coombs, 1999).

Crisis typesWithin crisis communication it is important to determine the cause of the crisis and more

specifically the crisis type (Lin, 2007). Several theories have been presented within this field e.g.

crisis clusters within the Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) framework grouping

crises into victim, accidental and preventable clusters (Coombs, 2007). Coombs also put forth a

crises classification scheme in 1995, which will serve as primary source in defining crisis types.

The scheme distinguishes between four crisis types: faux pas, terrorism, accidents and

transgressions. The different types fit into a matrix where they are further categorized by

external/internal and unintentional/intentional dimensions. A faux pas crisis occurs when an

external agent transforms an unintentional action into a crisis. This implies that the company

considers the action appropriate. The outcome of the crisis depends on which definition the

stakeholders choose to believe. An accident is usually impossible to predict and can happen during

an ordinary day within an organization. This type of crisis leads to minimal organizational

responsibility due to its random nature. Among accident examples human induced incidents such

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as workplace injuries and product flaws can be mentioned, as well as force majeure incidents such

as natural disasters and epidemics. Both types of crises can be equally unintentional however

studies show that stakeholders have a tendency to attribute less blame to a crisis caused by nature

than by human accidents (Egelhoff & Sen, 1992, Cho & Gower, 2006). Although the amount of

blame can vary the organization cannot escape responsibility entirely. Stakeholders expect

organizations to be able to cope with the crisis and therefore a level of accountability always exists

(Coombs, 1995). The third crisis type, terrorism, refers to intentional actions designed to damage

the reputation of an organization. External actors take the actions and therefore the blame also lies

externally. Sabotage, product destruction and violence are examples of terrorism. They all bear

traits of uncontrollability and hostility. In connection with this crisis type it is natural to also talk

about the role of the organization as the suffering victim. This is especially relevant for the

external crises (faux pas and terrorism), seeing as the internal (and especially the intentional) crises

always involve a moderate to high rate of responsibility (Cho & Gower, 2006, Coombs, 1995).

Victimage is an essential part of the reinforcing response strategies of the SCCT. The concept

refers to a situation where the organization claims to be the victim of a crisis. Whether or not the

claim is sincere is subordinate to the perception held by the stakeholders and media (Liu et al,

2011). If they believe in the claim of innocence it becomes easier for the organization to carry out

a victim-based, mortification response strategy and equally harder if the public dismisses the

victim claim (Coombs, 1995).

Finally, transgressions as a crisis type will be described. According to Fediuk et al, transgressions

are “crises that are believed to be due to intentional organizational misconduct” (2010, p. 635).

What this means is that an organization knowingly commits a wrongdoing and therefore becomes

the sole offender. Some examples of transgressions include safety breaches, withholding

compromising information and lying about faulty products. Transgression-based crises are linked

with negative perceptions held by stakeholders about an organization’s actions and behavior.

These perceptions are what eventually harm the reputation of an organization (Fediuk et al, 2010,

p. 635-638). Of the four crisis types transgression, if the evidence of the wrongdoing is true,

requires the highest level of atonement. There is no doubt that the organization is to blame and that

the stakeholders have been upset or harmed in some way by the crisis. A distanced and callous

response is therefore futile (Coombs, 1995).

WrongdoingsThe prior paragraph distinguished between whether a crisis was intentional or unintentional,

internal or external. Benoit operates with the term “perceived wrong-doings” (1995, vii), which

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covers alleged misbehaviors performed by people. He distinguishes between four types of

wrongdoing. The first type has to do with the scarce resources available in terms of e.g. time,

money or equipment, and that some individuals will always have wanted a different distribution of

the resources available (with anger as a possible outcome). The second type has to do with the

people, environment and events surrounding the accused, which can change circumstances and

sometimes prevent people from fulfilling their responsibilities. The third type occurs simply

because humans are imperfect and occasionally make mistakes. A mistake can happen for several

reasons, both physical conditions such as sleep deprivation or alcohol poisoning and psychological

conditions such as selfishness can cloud judgment and foster a mistake. The fourth and final type

regards the fact that a population is made up of individuals, and everyone has different priorities. A

clash of priorities can often cultivate a conflict (1995). These four types of misbehavior require

some kind of response from the wrongdoer, also known as an image restoration strategy (Benoit,

1997).

Benoit’s Image Restoration StrategyWilliam L. Benoit talks about the concept Image Restoration Strategies. According to him “human

beings engage in recurrent patterns of communicative behavior designed to reduce, redress, or

avoid damage to their reputation” (1995, vii). Being able to rectify a wrongdoing is crucial for

private persons as well as companies. The ability to repair a reputation is important not only for the

sake of ourselves, but also the people surrounding us, seeing as most people care about whether

others think positively about them and recognize a reputation as a valuable asset (Coombs, 2007).

A bad reputation can interfere with our interaction with others. Image restoration saturates our

everyday life, and it is therefore important to explore the concept (1995, vii).

After having defined the different types of offense that can start a crisis, it is now natural to talk

about response. When people feel the risk of losing face or having their image tarnished, the

trigger response is to offer some sort of response to save reputation. The response can take many

forms. Benoit recognizes several types, three of which are: accounts, apologies and excuses

(1995). An account can both admit and evade guilt according to how it is constructed. The account

in itself is merely a description of the events. Depending on how much weight is given to making

the wrongdoing look more or less severe the audience can decide how to interpret the account.

This strategy may evoke misinterpretations, and is therefore dangerous to use. The second type of

response, the apology, is often used and may at first glance look like the most harmless strategy

given its air of benevolence. Benoit states “it is possible for those who commit wrongful acts to

attempt to repair their reputation with a sincere apology” (1995, p. 4). A number of studies applied

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to e.g. the Exxon Valdez and Bhopal crises suggest evidence that this strategy has potential

(Benoit, 1997; Mitchell, 2007). However, the strategy does have drawbacks. Giving an apology is

not necessarily the same as taking responsibility. Sometimes an organization apologizes as an act

to show stakeholders sympathy but not to take the blame (Pace, Fediuk & Botero, 2010).

Determining whether the apology attributes responsibility or not is often seen in the use of active

(responsible) or passive (sympathetic) voice (2010). Some even claim that a direct expression of

taking responsibility must be visible in an apology for it not to be counted as partial (Lazare, 2004

as seen in Pace et al, 2010). Another potential drawback by admitting fault is the invitation of

lawsuits from victims, which can cause a major economical setback if the wrongdoing is connected

to a company (Benoit, 1997, p. 182). In connection with the apology, Benoit’s strategy “corrective

action” should be mentioned. This strategy is connected to apologizing, seeing as the accused in

this instance also admits the wrongdoing. The difference is that the accused through this strategy

attempts to reduce the offense by taking action to correct the wrongdoing. This can be done by e.g.

reimbursing victims financially or compensating whichever goods are in question. Another

possibility, which companies often choose, is to attempt to restore the state of affairs before the

offense occurred (Benoit, 1997, p. 181; Benoit, 1995, p. 6).

Finally, there is the response in the form of an excuse. The excuse can take form as e.g.

defeasibility, where the accused claims to have had a lack of information about or control over

important elements of the situation. Another possibility is to try and convince the audience that the

wrongdoing was a result of good intentions and not inflicted intentionally. What the excuses all

have in common is that they are an expression of evasion of responsibility. This strategy should

naturally only be employed, if in fact the excuse is truthful and the accused was not directly at fault

(Benoit, 1997, p. 180). Nevertheless, it is not a favorable strategy in general. Stephens et al call it

“the distance strategy”, which seeks to sever linkages between the accused and the crisis (2005). It

is difficult to form an excuse that follows the advice Benoit found to be effective in image

restoration discourse: “avoid making false claims; provide adequate support for claims, develop

themes throughout a campaign; avoid arguments that may backfire.” (Benoit, 1997, p. 183).

Especially the advice regarding adequate support and avoiding arguments that may backfire can

prove to be difficult to fulfill, for companies particularly, as it would require the accused to have a

complete view of prior conflict history and be aware of every pitfall that could occur in connection

with the accusation.

In addition to these three strategies, there is the strategy of denial. This strategy has been isolated

due to the fact that, although it is a probable response, it is not an attempt at explanation or

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justification. Denying a wrongdoing entirely leaves the blame to be placed elsewhere. This

strategy, if used profoundly, can eradicate the risk of the accused’s reputation being damaged.

Nevertheless, if used dishonestly, the consequences can be very grave, seeing as the accused will

then be deemed both guilty of the wrongdoing and lying about it. “Denial can be supplemented

with explanations of apparently damaging facts and scapegoating.” says Benoit, and is usually an

easy strategy to spot because of e.g. omitted actions or blame placing (1995, p. 2-3). A response

type that can be viewed as an active alternative to denial is the attack. Sometimes the accused

chooses to point towards a new target to place blame on, in other examples the attack directs itself

to the accusation in itself and attempts to undermine its validity. The attack often employs negative

commentary and adjectives in order to damage credibility and induce doubt (1995, p. 3).

There exists no one correct response to all crises. The response is entirely dependable on the earlier

mentioned crisis types and how key facets of the situation influence attributions and reputations

perceived by stakeholders. In turn, understanding the situation type can inform the post-crisis

communication. The aforementioned SCCT provides a framework for this (Coombs, 2007).

Situational Crisis Communication TheorySituational crisis communication theory is one of the most dominant and recognized theories

within the field of crisis management. The theory “provides an evidence-based framework for

understanding how to maximize the reputational protection afforded by post-crisis

communication” (Coombs, 2007, p. 163). It evolves around the examination of a crisis situation

and how certain factors determine the level of reputational threat existing in an organizational

crisis. There are three factors that shape the level of threat: initial crisis responsibility, crisis history

and prior relational reputation. Initial crisis responsibility is one of the central concepts within

crisis communication research. The theory posits that stakeholders attribute responsibility for the

crisis and thereby how it is framed. This idea is closely connected to crisis origin, which refers to

whether a crisis commenced from an internal organizational issue or an external source. The

different types of crisis origin affect the attribution of responsibility and, thus, the available crisis

communication strategies (Jin et al, 2011). The level of responsibility attributed to the organization

is especially important, as it will determine the role it has in a crisis. Another variable is the actor

in the crisis. Depending on whether the central actor is human or nature, internal or external,

individual or grouped the crisis can be predicted to develop in certain ways and communication

strategies can be designed accordingly (Jin et al, 2011; Coombs et al, 2010; Cho & Gower, 2006).

Research also shows that the more responsibility an organization is attributed during a crisis, the

higher the reputational threat will be (Cho & Gower 2006; Coombs 2007).

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Crisis historyA widespread belief within crisis communication is that crises are specific incidents. This is not

always the case. People sometimes overlook the continuous mistakes a company can make, their

so-called crisis history. Therefore, a “crisis can be an isolated event or part of a larger pattern of

organizational performance” (Coombs, 2010, p. 2-3). This distinction is important to make when

analyzing how a company chooses to navigate in times of crisis, as well as when assessing the

consequences of a crisis. The greater the reputational threat becomes, the more accommodative the

response strategy should become (2012, p. 158). Coombs argues that the history and prior

reputation of a company is essential when assessing the reputational threat of a crisis, and later

which image restoration strategy the company chooses to employ. This idea is known as “the

Velcro effect” (Coombs, 2004, p. 272). The idea plays on the metaphor of Velcro attracting lint; in

the same way organizations with a history of crises attract additional reputational harm. Coombs

goes on to say that the effect also exists in terms of reputation. A negative prior reputation will

increase the risk of tarnishing the present reputation. The Velcro effect therefore has a serious

impact on how crisis management is tackled (Coombs, 2004; Coombs & Holladay, 2006). Finally,

prior relational reputation can be seen as an extension of this idea. The concept covers “how well

or poorly an organization has or is perceived to have treated stakeholders in other contexts”

(Coombs, 2007, p. 67). Depending whether the organization’s prior relational reputation is viewed

as positive or negative it can have an either favorable or unfavorable effect on a crisis. The concept

can reveal how considerate an organization is towards its stakeholders both in a crisis situation and

in other areas (Coombs, 1999).

These three factors, together with the crisis type, make up the main issues to consider when

choosing a response strategy as well as designing a specific rhetorical communication effort after a

crisis.

Defining social media The prior paragraph laid out the ground of crises and how they can be responded to. This thesis

seeks to determine if social media has had an effect on the theory and eventually how

organizations manage to navigate crises under these new circumstances. Therefore the following

paragraph will seek to define social media and how it can be used as a tool and form of two-way

communication.

According to Wigley and Zhang, “social media are changing the way everyone, including

journalists and public relations practitioners, communicate” (2011, p. 1). In the same instance they

go on to state that the definition of social media still is under development. Despite its prevalence

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in society it is still a relatively new phenomenon, which needs to be explored further. Some

scholars have offered an attempt at a definition, among these Kaplan and Haenlein, who define

social media as “a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and

technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated

content” (2010, p. 61). Coombs claims that “one key component found in these newer media is the

capacity to facilitate bi-directional communication, or dialogue” (2010, p. 381). What can be

drawn from these quotes is that a number of technological conquests have made social media

possible, and that the various mediums have indeed facilitated communication. Once this has been

said, an obvious trait of social media ought to be mentioned, namely immediacy (Wigley & Zhang,

2011). It can be argued that traditional media such as the telephone or newspaper also facilitate

communication. What is unique about social media though is that they have enabled near

immediate communication. And this is one of the most dominant factors affecting PR (and crisis

communication in particular), along with the ability to reach large masses without the limitation of

geography (Auer, 2011). Through these two traits social media makes for one powerful game

changer. Gerald Baron, an experienced crisis communication practitioner and blogger

(Crisisblogger), even argues that social media are more than this, that they have in fact changed

everything we do and how we do them (Crisisblogger, January 16, 2012). Crisisblogger also raises

the question of whether social media still exists as a separate concept. In January he wrote a post

stating “the Internet is social media and social media is the Internet, so why do we keep calling it

social media? And continued with an argument about Facebook: “What started out as a college

campus replacement to the pre-teen MySpace is now used by most corporations as their website”

(January 16, 2012, p. 1). In other words, social media have started to overlap, and no longer serve

one sole purpose. They permeate our lives and the Internet, a factor that could point towards there

being some truth to Crisisblogger’s statement.

How is social media affecting crisis communication?In order to put social media into a PR context, it is important to study how they can be used as a

tool i.e. how organizations monitor, communicate and experience crises through them.

Furthermore, it is crucial to understand the effect social media have had on stakeholders seeing as

they, in the final instance, define and assess the crisis (Benoit, 1997). Studying the facilitation of

communication and hereunder two-way communication can provide a picture of how social media

are affecting crisis communication.

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Social media as a tool“A key to successfully handling crises is controlling the flow of information to the media and one’s

publics.” (Wigley & Zhang, 2011, p. 2). If this statement is true the aforementioned traits of social

media, immediacy and the dissolving of geographical boundaries, must have had a substantial

effect on crisis handling. According to Wigley and Zhang, social media have allowed for news to

break almost instantly and once it hits a conduit such as Twitter or Facebook it is only a matter of

minutes before the story is spread virally to thousands or even millions of people (2011). This

means that the old mantra of crisis communication regarding control of information flow has

become almost impossible for companies to perform (Solis & Breakenridge, 2006). Public

relations professionals no longer have time to plan before crises reach social media and the public.

Thus, crisis communicators have been given the reactive role and with that they are forced to begin

reputational damage control once the public has already discovered and evaluated the crisis

(Wigley & Zhang, 2011).

So what does this mean for the way crisis communication is designed today? Naturally, there are

both advantages and drawbacks by this development. However, there is no doubt that social media

can be used as a tool by organizations, and, if used correctly, a very beneficial one (Solis &

Breakenridge, 2009). One of the advantages could be a higher degree of transparency and

interactivity between company and consumer. Coombs posits that before social media “people

were having trouble reaching many of the organizations considered at the heart of the crisis”

(2010, p. 390). Companies now have various channels to communicate from and, more

importantly, they have access to a tool that allows for a message to be delivered without delay

(Auer, 2011). Another advantage is the reduced significance of the so-called “middle-men”, who

until now have served as a form of filter that messages passed through before reaching the public.

An example of this could be censors or editors interfering with communication. When using social

media the message instead goes directly from sender to receiver without delay or modifications,

this has speeded up communication time substantially (Auer, 2011). This development may also

include drawbacks; some argue that social media in terms of credibility fall short (Sunstein, 2006;

Auer, 2011). This is specifically due to the immediate nature, which allows a minimum of proof

reading and accuracy compared to other media tools. This factor can be important for

organizations when trying to convince stakeholders. If credibility of a message does drop when

using social media, this means organizations must take extra care in tailoring communication when

using these conduits (Auer, 2011).

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Social media as two-way communicationAnother important feature of social media are their ability to enable two-way communication

between organization and stakeholder. They provide the opportunity to invite consumers to

respond to a crisis after which the organization can then deal with it in a personal manner. This

being said, these opportunities also foster greater expectations on behalf of the stakeholders. They

now expect near immediate communication that is well planned and answers to their concerns

(Coombs, 2010). These expectations could be a potential drawback, seeing as research at the

moment suggests that companies have yet to embrace social media fully, some still focus on the

threats connected with the concept rather than the potentials (Wigley & Zhang, 2011). Coombs

also talks about how “newer media allow for individual stakeholders to virtually meet, share

information, and potentially band together” (2010, p. 390). This can be a positive development,

seeing as it can give a nuanced discussion of a crisis. It can also become a negative trait if a

collective of stakeholders decide to portray a company as “the villain” and spread this perception

(2010). Ultimately, what can be said about entering such an electronic community is that it is a

place where user opinions and values are shared, a place that can “spawn commentary, sway

views, and spur action” (Auer, 2011, p. 711). In this way, social media become a vital arena for

organizations to navigate in and spread crisis communication through.

MethodIn order to answer the problem statement excerpts from several media outlets will be used.

External sources will include The Guardian and The New York Post, where quotes from articles

published during the October Outage will be highlighted and commented on. Internal sources are

necessary in order to determine and analyse RIM’s online crisis strategy. A number of company

posts and updates from Facebook will be drawn upon as well as a Youtube video speech by the

CEO Mike Lazaridis, which RIM chose to link to from several of its other social media conduits.

Finally, comments from stakeholders (mainly connected to the postings by RIM) will also be

examined, although the main focus will be on organizational strategy rather than audience

response. These reactions will also be needed when describing the progression of the crisis, seeing

as the stakeholders actually broke the news of the outage rather than the organization issuing the

statement.

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Research in Motion

Introduction to RIM Research in Motion (RIM) was founded in 1984. The company resides in Waterloo, Canada but

has several offices in Asia-Pacific, Europe and the US. RIM has become a global leader within

wireless technology and today exports smartphones, tablets and software. Its most popular product

to date, the BlackBerry, was launched in 1999 and is used by millions today (RIM – Company,

2012). The company has always benefited from being known as an innovative front-runner within

its field and in many countries its products were savored by enterprise users over competitors in

the likes of Apple and Samsung. A decline in sales has however started to show as competition

intensifies and RIM’s core capacities no longer offer a solution the majority of consumers are

interested in (Gasseé, April 2, 2012). Combined with experiencing various crises and issues, this is

a tough period in the history of the Canadian company.

The assessment of how the October Outage was handled should not be carried out without having

looked at RIM as an organization. As mentioned earlier Research in Motion is a relatively young

company, its history going back to the mid-eighties. The BlackBerry solution, which the crisis is

connected to, was not introduced until 1999. Noteworthy of RIM, is that it is a company selling

innovative, wireless solutions and therefore deals with complicated technology on a daily basis.

Furthermore, the company operates within the ever-evolving mobile industry and it can therefore

be assumed that RIM has to stay on top of the newest media trends in order to compete with other

competitors. In other words, RIM is a tech savvy brand that is no stranger to social media, as they

have to come up with new media solutions for the BlackBerry continuously. Also, judging from

activity on RIM’s own accounts, the company has incorporated social media largely into its

communication with stakeholders (the BlackBerry Youtube page e.g. features over 1400 posted

videos since its creation in 2006). Based on this characteristic alone, RIM ought to navigate a crisis

within an online platform well. Nonetheless, being tech savvy does not equal being able to handle

a crisis successfully.

The crisis history of RIMRIM is a fairly “young” company, therefore its history of crises is not that deep. However, being a

company within the wireless mobile industry RIM has experienced sharp competition from other

tech brands and being constantly pressured to withhold its global leader status RIM naturally has

experienced complications. Firstly, RIM has been involved in lawsuits regarding patent litigation

numerous times. For the most part, the company has filed suits against competitors who have

apparently infringed on patents. On January 22, 2010 Motorola filed a lawsuit against Blackberry

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for five infringements of patent. This caused a long conflict, which was finally settled on June 11,

2010 (Patel, 2010, January 22). RIM was involved in another crisis that occurred shortly after the

October Outage, when Vodafone users started experiencing how their prepaid balances were

getting deducted or reduced without any usage. Vodafone was deemed the culprit in this case but

unfortunately it also rubbed of on RIM (Bafna, 2011, December 9). The company has also

experienced several service failures, one of them happening in September 2011, where the

BlackBerry Messenger service went down for several hours in Canada and Latin America. Outages

have also occurred frequently, some of the most recent in dominant markets such as South Africa

and the UK (Austen, 2011, October 11). Finally, the crisis with by far the most impact was the

four-day network outage in October 2011, which this thesis will analyze. The outage was a result

of a technological error, but happened entirely under the auspices of RIM. Therefore, in the

company’s history of crises, this must be categorized as one of the more grave, if not the worst.

The October OutageDuring October 2011, RIM faced one of its most challenging crises so far. Users of the very

popular Smartphone, BlackBerry, began to experience messaging and browsing delays, which

evolved into a full on network collapse apparently caused by “a core switch failure within RIM’s

infrastructure” (BlackBerry, 2011, October 11th). The outage spread through Europe, the Middle

East, Africa, India and parts of South America. Judging by user posts on Blackberry’s Facebook

page the first signal interruptions began around 10 am on October 10th and lasted until the evening

on October 13th. The first update from RIM was posted on Twitter on October 10th at 4.11 pm

followed by a notification on Facebook almost ten hours later at 01.48 am. The Youtube video

featuring a message from CEO of RIM, Mike Lazaridis, was not publicized until October 13th.

Interestingly, RIM chose not to issue a press release on the company website, however they did

create the “BlackBerry Service Update” page on which short updates from the company were

uploaded. These communicative efforts, along with a press conference carried out on October 12th,

constituted the part of RIM’s crisis response effort that will be analyzed below.

Analysis of RIM’s crisis strategy

Introduction to RIM’s social media strategyAs mentioned earlier, RIM’s Twitter account will not be analyzed due to space limitations but it

seems necessary to note that this was in fact the first medium to communicate the crisis to the

public (Research In Motion, 2011, October 10 4.11pm). Also, this was the medium where

BlackBerry users began a long stream of complaints. The first user generated post on Facebook

15


concerning the crisis was posted on October 12th by Hyacinth Sintiago and was entitled “how to

survive the blackberry meltdown!” (2011, October 12, 11.05pm). It could be assumed that other

users may have contacted RIM via the Facebook chat or message applications but otherwise, until

then, they had expressed their frustration by commenting on the posts authored by RIM. The first

of these was, as aforementioned, posted the day before and was followed by two consecutive posts

as well as several more over the following days as the crisis developed. Another substantial part of

RIM’s crisis strategy was a Youtube video, which to date has reached close to 400.000 views. The

video shows RIM’s CEO, Mike Lazaridis, addressing stakeholders with a message on behalf of the

company and him (BlackBerry, 2011, October 13). The video wasn’t released until two days after

the crisis started. It was then spread virally through Twitter, Facebook and the company website as

a hyperlink at the end of a message. Before beginning the analysis of RIM’s social media response

strategy the thesis will examine how the news media perceived and framed the company and

situation in order to make an assessment of the aforementioned concept attribution of

responsibility.

The news media responseWhen the BlackBerry crisis broke out news media worldwide were not late to comment on it. Two

of the newspapers covering the crisis closely were English The Guardian and American The New

York Times. Both also run globally read digital newspapers online, from where the quotes

mentioned in this paragraph stem. The Guardian released the first online article about the network

outage on the 10th of October describing the situation and crisis under way. The NY Times’ article

followed on October 11th and could report about how far the crisis had spread and what RIM’s

response had been. Especially the article from The Guardian portrays RIM through a negative

angle stating, “The failure will be a huge embarrassment for the company” and pulling out the

employee quote "The attitude was, 'We're going to grow and grow but making sure our

infrastructure can support it isn't a priority.' (Arthur, 2011, October 10). In an article following up

on the restoration of services the missing rights of the stakeholders were also emphasized:

“Consumers are apparently excluded from any guarantee of service by a clause in RIM's terms and

conditions” (Arthur, 2011, October 13). What can be drawn from these quotes is that the

newspaper frames RIM as a rather irresponsible company that is more interested in growth than

delivering reliable and guaranteed service to its stakeholders. The first article also insinuates that

the company has been too slow to react to the crisis through the quote that the outage “was still

affecting users more than four hours later with no time given for when it was expected to be

resolved.” (Arthur, 2011, October 10). This suggests evidence that The Guardian attributes the

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responsibility entirely to RIM and deems the company the villain. Less blatant is the framing in

The NY Times. One of the reasons for this could be the fact that The US was not affected by the

crisis and therefore the American media did not feel the need to lash out. The paper does however

treat the subject critically. The first article includes quotes such as “many people seemed to be

frustrated by the lack of communication from Research in Motion” and also a negative quote from

a stakeholder about RIM being “Arrogant and disrespectful to its customers.” (Austen, 2011,

October 11). These quotes, when juxtaposed against sources from the Guardian, also give an

impression of RIM being attributed responsibility. Furthermore, the perceived neglecting of

stakeholders is also visible through the article. These are some of the similarities. Nevertheless,

when examining articles written later, The NY Times frames RIM much less harshly, seemingly

exercising a form of the aforesaid concept victimage. This can be seen from the following quotes:

“Wednesday’s hit could not have come at a worse time for RIM, which is fending off a growing

crowd of agitated investors”, ” It’s a bloodbath” (Wortham, 2011, October 12). This does not

automatically prove that The NY Times was attributing blame away from RIM but it is indicative

of a more nuanced framing than The Guardian. To sum up, despite different angles both mediums

seem to have attributed more or less full responsibility to RIM.

The following paragraph will map out exactly what was communicated and how it was done i.e.

the rhetorical strategy and then juxtapose these findings with the theory as put forth in the literature

review, hopefully providing an answer to the problem statement.

Characterizing the crisisIn order to analyze RIM’s response strategy it is necessary to look at the crisis situation and

determine which type the company was dealing with. Very first it seems natural to determine

whether or not the case should in fact be treated as a crisis in order to proceed with the analysis.

The difference between crisis and issue essentially came down to the amount of damage caused

and whether or not the entire organization was affected (Coombs, 1999). Externally, a Facebook

quote posted by RIM summing up how wide spread the network outage was points towards the

situation being more than a mere issue (BlackBerry, 2011, October 11, 10.34pm). Apart from the

US, some of RIM’s largest markets were stricken. In some of the countries affected, such as South

Africa, the BlackBerry is the most dominant smart phone and the outage therefore caused a serious

communication breach qua the large amount of stakeholders (Vermeulen, 2011, November 16).

Internally, the online effort of the company indicates that the situation had indeed disrupted the

entire organization. If the problem had limited itself to e.g. one or two local areas, only regional

departments might be affected due to proximity, hence probably only using regional Facebook

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pages and issuing messages from local managers. Instead, the international Facebook page was

chosen as a tool, and a message was delivered globally from the top leader of the organization.

Now that the situation can be categorized as a crisis with some certainty, the next step is also to

determine the crisis type through Coombs’ and Benoit’s theory. According to Coombs there were

four crisis types each further categorized by intentionality and whether the crisis figured internally

or externally. When taking these axes into account the October Outage can be viewed as an

accident, seeing as the crisis happened internally and, judging from organizational and media

quotes, was not intentional (e.g. BlackBerry, 2011, October 11, 10.34pm; Arthur, 2011, October

13). The initial problem was assigned a malfunctioned fail-over after a core switch failure in the

network system (BlackBerry, October 11th, 10.34pm), and therefore, essentially, not a human error.

However, the phrase “did not function as previously tested.” from the same post shows that

employees had been testing the system and therefore humans were involved in the process. It could

even be assumed that they might have been able to predict the failure. This leads us to Benoit’s

perceptual wrongdoings. He also distinguishes between four different kinds. Common to all of

them is that they are assigned human flaws. The fact that humans were engaged in the RIM crisis

process is the instance that justifies applying Benoit’s theory to the crisis. In the case of

BlackBerry, the malfunction was technical but the system, in which it occurred, was monitored by

humans and therefore the possibility that an employee could have predicted and intervened in the

situation cannot be excluded. The type of wrongdoing that fits the situation most evolves around

the environment surrounding the accused. Benoit claims that certain people, events etc. can prevent

the accused from fulfilling responsibility. In this case the responsibility can be equated with the

goal Lazaridis mentions in his Youtube speech and goes on to say that the goal was not delivered

on during the crisis (appendix 1). The accused could arguably be both the employees in charge of

the network system or the company as a whole. RIM avoids scapegoating internally; therefore it

can be assumed that RIM as a collective of people takes the blame. Finally, the event disrupting

daily order, and creating the perceived wrongdoing, is of course the malfunctioned fail-over.

Before elaborating on and categorizing the response strategy it is necessary to further examine the

attribution of responsibility and provide a picture of how the crisis was perceived and portrayed

externally.

The various media quotes throughout the thesis have pointed towards both stakeholders and the

news media primarily attributing responsibility to RIM. This is important knowledge when

beginning to assess the company’s response strategy, one of the reasons being that a main criterion

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of SCCT is the assessment of organizational responsibility. The theory posits that the degree of

attributed responsibility by stakeholders determines the appropriate response to the crisis (Coombs,

2007). Taking this statement as a point of departure, the best match of strategy for RIM would be

acceptance of responsibility for the crisis. With this knowledge, certain strategies can be deemed

more risky and difficult to carry out than others. Many organizations unfortunately manage to

mismatch a strategy to their current crisis situation despite this, causing even more damage than

anticipated (Benoit, 2007). In this case two of the strategies can be judged as hazardous for RIM.

Firstly, the denial strategy would have been difficult to use, seeing as the public had already judged

the situation and RIM would have a hard time persuading them to reconsider their judgment.

Secondly, an attack strategy would also have been a misplaced response given the circumstances.

This does however not automatically indicate that the company refrained from using the two

strategies. The following analysis will shed light on how RIM chose to handle the response

strategy.

Rhetorical analysis of RIM’s response strategy on Facebook

The preliminary strategyThe very first message delivered on Facebook began with the following sentence “We are pleased

to report that BlackBerry email services have been restored.” and was concluded in this way “We

apologize to our customers for any inconvenience and we’ll continue to update you as new

information becomes available.” (BlackBerry, 2011, October 11, 01.48am). This initial statement

can, in accordance to Benoit, be categorized as an apologetic strategy that includes corrective

action taken by the company. According to Pace et al, the apology lets the stakeholders know that

the company feels guilty and understands the frustration over the error (2010). At first glance this

could seem to be a sufficient solution, seeing as the crisis was deemed an internal and technical

fault that RIM maybe could have predicted. The company therefore shows remorse and begins to

restore conditions. Despite this, at least two things might be problematic with this initial restoration

strategy. Firstly, RIM made the mistake of proclaiming that the crisis was nearly over, when in

fact, at the time, it had just began to gather strength. This move, paired with the previous quote,

could be recognized as arrogant and be an expression of RIM not being in keeping with the

situation. Secondly, an apology is not regarded by all as a means of taking full responsibility for an

error, some merely view it as a way of expressing regret (Pace et al, 2010). This can be

problematic if stakeholders expect RIM to voice an explicit acceptance of responsibility.

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The next message delivered at 5.36pm goes on to inform that some users across the globe are still

experiencing network delays followed by a lengthier message at 10.34pm stating that the delays

“were caused by a core switch failure within RIM’s infrastructure. Although the system is

designed to failover to a back-up switch, the failover did not function as previously tested.”

(BlackBerry, 2011, October 11, 01.48am). These posts can be categorized as account strategies in

which RIM seeks to explain the progress of the crisis, however, they also contain a degree of

evasion of responsibility. The use of passive voice in the quote suggests evidence to this claim, as

it can be used to conceal the doer of an action (Rosenwasser & Stephen, 2012). At no point does

the subject (RIM) perform the action but is rather acted upon. This could indicate that the company

has tried to disguise what is actually an excuse, as a simple informative account. Another

noteworthy feature about the initial communication is that the first four posts have a variant of the

sentence “we apologize for the inconvenience caused” in them. This points to RIM having

assessed the apology to be an important part of the company’s image restoration.

As the crisis deepensAfter the first 24 hours of the crisis RIM seems to have realized that the problem is bigger than

initially expected. This can e.g. be seen from the first message posted on Facebook on October 12th

“We're aware many BlackBerry customers are experiencing intermittent service delays. Restoring

full service is our number one priority” (BlackBerry, 2011, October 12, 4.45pm). It is probable that

this message serves as an answer to the many angry comments made by stakeholders the day

before. At the end of the message RIM provides a hyperlink to a “service update” page, which the

company has chosen to create as an extra monitoring service. The link is shared on Facebook both

on the 12th and 13th of October. Apart from this, the company’s communicative efforts begin to

shift focus in the postings on its Facebook page. Where each message earlier contained an apology,

they begin to contain a “thank you” to the stakeholders together with updated accounts of the crisis

progress. Thanking can be placed in the same category as apologizing, as both actions are

expressions of mortification. Hereby RIM humbles itself and can hope for forgiveness (Benoit,

1997). This strategy provides no active explanation or justification and in RIM’s case the

frustration of the stakeholders begins to grow as an effect. Judging from many of their comments,

they are feeling overlooked and their need for information disparaged: “Wow, 1 day fair enough, 2

days mildly annoying, 3, ridiculous, sort it out!” (Joe Thompson, 2011, October 13, 12.36am), “I

like the way you just completely ignore all your customers’ comments and just palm us off with a

half hearted attempt at an apology!” (Sean Eaton, 2011, October 13, 1.15am).

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RIM chose not to answer any of the threads and comments made by its stakeholders, which could

point towards the company having chosen a generic and less personal strategy. This choice has

consequences as seen in the quotes above. Naturally, it is understandable that the company may

have difficulty in answering thousands of comments each day, nevertheless several sources stress

“that openness, transparency, and two-way communication are key element of successful crisis

managements” and therefore that rendering sincere, individualized communication can reduce the

wrongdoing and cultivate a sense of understanding (Wigley&Zhang, 2011, p. 5; Macnamara,

2010). Two-way communication was also emphasized as one of the beneficial possibilities earlier

when utilizing social media in crisis communication, and it can therefore seem puzzling why RIM,

in the crisis situation, did not take more advantage of this tool.

Restoring conditionsOctober 13th 6.46pm RIM once again announces on Facebook that full service has been restored

followed by a lengthier message thanking stakeholders for their patience. The mortification

strategy continues as a red thread in the company’s communication to the stakeholders. This time

the problem has in fact been solved and RIM can begin restoring conditions to their previous state.

The second message posted that day contains a link enabling users of the BlackBerry to confirm

that they once again are able to receive emails. This can be analyzed as an attempt at further

corrective action. Finally, RIM refers to a Twitter account for further help (BlackBerry, 2011,

October 14, 4.31pm).

The final message on Facebook solely regarding the crisis is posted on October 17th. This message

can be seen as an attempt to make amends. RIM is aware of the fact that its stakeholders are angry

and feel as if something has been wrongfully taken from them the previous week, which needs to

be compensated. “To show our appreciation, BlackBerry subscribers will receive a selection of

premium apps (worth a total value of more than US $100) free of charge from BlackBerry App

World” (BlackBerry, 2011, October 17, 10.35am). This response strategy was not touched upon in

the literary review but is mentioned in the SCCT as simply a “compensation strategy”. The

strategy serves, like the apology, as a positive, rebuilding strategy and can ideally be used by

companies in accidental crises coupled with crisis history (Coombs, 2007). Thus, theory supports

RIM’s choice to reimburse customers at the end of the crisis.

Rhetorical analysis of RIM’s response strategy on YoutubeAs mentioned in the introduction to RIM’s social media strategy the company also chose to

publish a video on Youtube showing CEO Mike Lazaridis presenting a speech directed at the

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stakeholders affected during the crisis. Before delving into the content of the speech, it seems

necessary firstly to analyze what significance including this medium and message altogether did

have for the response strategy.

A study put forth by Wright and Hinson examined the actual importance attributed various social

media in PR together with the importance they ought to be attributed. The study showed that both

Youtube and Facebook generally were less recognized conduits than they ought to be (as seen in

Macnamara, 2010). This claim could indicate that RIM made a wise choice when employing these

media, although the actual outcome of course rests on the content of the strategy also. In terms of

combining Facebook and Youtube, there can be obvious complementing benefits by being able to

utilize both a medium allowing immediate, two-way written communication and one allowing

video and audio content. RIM must have considered this yet somehow did not provide the

communicative content stakeholders expected. This claim will be elaborated on in the following

paragraph.

In the speech Lazaridis begins by quoting RIM’s main goal throughout the years of delivering

“reliable real-time communications around the world” with emphasis on the word “reliable”. He

follows up by admitting that they “did not deliver on that goal this week. Not even close.”

(Appendix 1). This is the first time RIM actively admits to having failed to deliver what

stakeholders expected. Although this is not an explicit expression of taking responsibility for the

crisis, it does show that RIM feels responsible for failing to deliver its service as promised. The

initial statement is followed by a personal apology from Lazaridis: “I apologise for the service

outages this week. We’ve let many of you down.” (Appendix 1). This leads back to the

mortification strategy initially identified in the Facebook messages. RIM continues to humble itself

towards the stakeholders. The next few sentences provide an account of what RIM is doing to fix

the problem. Again, this is a strategy that the company also employed on Facebook, although the

account is longer and more descriptive in the Youtube video. The next noteworthy sentence

addresses the problem regarding lack of communication: “We know that you want to hear more

from us, and we’re working to update you more frequently through our websites and social media

channels”. Hereby RIM answers to the news media and stakeholders, who have accused the

company of slow and insufficient communication to the public. Unfortunately, this message was

not delivered until the final day of the network outage, which was probably too late to redeem any

sort of goodwill. The idea of addressing the demands of the stakeholders is a reasonable one given

e.g Benoit’s rationale for restoring a reputation, stating, “perceptions are more important than

reality” (1997, p. 178). In other words that RIM should strive to satisfy stakeholders regardless of

22


what the company makes of its own strategy. If they point to a problem, RIM should address it, as

they did in the sentence described above. The drawback in this case being that the message should

have been delivered when it was essentially still relevant, rather than on the day the crisis was

pronounced resolved.

The final part of the speech is a plea to the stakeholders to restore their trust in the company and

have confidence in the fact that RIM are doing whatever possible to restore previous conditions.

Lazaridis finishes with a “thank you” (appendix 1). This section also bears resemblance to some of

the messages posted on Facebook by the company. The fact that the Youtube message to such a

high degree echoes what has already been communicated on Facebook can both be seen as an

advantage and a drawback. The advantage lies in consistency. Showing consistency in crisis

communication can be an important way to build credibility. Inconsistency exhibits the

organization’s incompetency with crisis management (Coombs, 2010). However, as mentioned

earlier, failing to meet expectations can also cause increased damage to a company’s reputation.

The drawback being that stakeholders presumably were expecting something more than what had

already been communicated on Facebook, when RIM decided to use an entirely new medium

featuring the CEO.

When evaluating the speech as a whole it is relevant to study what has been included and what has

been omitted. As in the Facebook messages there once again is given an apology and once again

there is an account of what the company is now reactively doing. One thing that has been omitted

is the account of how the crisis happened, i.e. what went wrong. And still there is no mention of

responsibility. RIM comes closer in the video by using active sentences instead of passive, and

having either Lazaridis or the company as the main actor in the message, but an explicit expression

of fault is never given. In this video RIM focuses entirely on the repercussions and resolving of the

crisis. The message can be categorized as an extension of what was already being posted on

Facebook but with a more personal angle qua having Lazaridis be the spokesperson and drawing

advantage of non-linguistic tools such as facial expressions and tone of voice. The same

reputational rebuild strategies were used in both mediums in the form of apology, thanking and

accounts.

DiscussionThe primary purpose of this thesis was to examine how companies navigate crises in an online

world, taking departure in the RIM crisis. Consistent with prior research within the field of social

media and crisis communication, the results of the case study indicate that immediacy and

23


elimination of geographical barriers have had an effect on how crises are handled. Stakeholders

expect immediate response and a higher degree of coverage from a company involved in a crisis

being communicated online. In keeping with the SCCT framework, the stakeholder assessment of

responsibility is still vital for companies when designing a crisis response. Now more than ever it

seems important to communicate responsibility. The findings illustrate that RIM was too late in

responding and when the company finally did, the response was marked with vagueness in terms

of who was to blame and when the crisis would actually be solved.

Pace et al suggested that issuing an apology not necessarily lead to the perception that an

organization was taking blame for a crisis. Instead, explicitly voicing acceptance of responsibility

could lead to greater reputational protection (2010). RIM chose not to do the latter and suffered

reputational damage among stakeholders and the news media as an effect. A reason for acting as

they did could be the fact that accepting responsibility is more costly than apologizing, with

possible lawsuits in the offing. Perhaps RIM had hoped that offering a simple apology would have

sufficed, as it does in some cases. Unfortunately for them, many stakeholders were not convinced

by this approach. A recommendation for the company might be in the future to continuously use a

response where accommodative and compensating strategies are still used but instead utilize the

apology more carefully, hopefully framing it more sincerely. Also, focus could be on constructing

messages with active sentences rather than passive, of course depending on the degree of

responsibility assigned to RIM in future crises. Nevertheless, research points to the active voice

being more transparent and credible than the passive, indicating that this would be the wise choice

when attempting to conduct honest crisis communication (Rosenwasser & Stephen, 2012). When

comparing this factor with the aforementioned critique of messages on social media lacking

credibility, active rhetoric also seems to be a valid approach. An entirely different response

strategy that RIM could have chosen to use is the excuse. The company’s strategy for the October

outage did have elements from this response strategy but it could have been carried out more

consistently. RIM might then have denied the intent to do harm and claimed incapacity to control

the events that triggered the crisis. If stakeholders where lead to believe this claim, it would

minimize the organizational responsibility (Coombs, 2007).

An essential constituent of crisis communication theory was the history of crises, the so-called

Velcro effect. In RIM a history of network outages was determined, having caused crisis-like

situations previously and with probability eroding the stakeholders’ confidence in the brand. Also,

a number of other issues in the history of the company were described. It seems probable that this

crisis history has affected how the October outage was perceived. In coherence with theory this

24


crisis posed a large threat to the reputation of RIM and judging from the framing in the news media

and response from stakeholders it was a matter of time before the network incidents developed into

a full-blown crisis. This continuous string of problems could also be one of the explanations for the

anger and frustration visible in customer comments. Since this was not an isolated crisis people

had expected more from the company in terms of ready information about the situation and

perhaps that RIM had been better prepared for the outage. In future crises the company should

make sure to take its crisis history into account when designing a response strategy.

Conclusion Currently, more and more research is showing the potential social media have to become a vital

tool in crisis communication. Interestingly, this has still not motivated many companies to avail

them of these new conduits. And many of those that have, fail to use them in a way that ends up

contributing to a successful crisis strategy. Naturally, a lot more scholarly research needs to be

conducted on the field, before the mechanics of social media are fully understood (this might not

even be possible), however, studies for a company such as RIM to gain knowledge about how they

should be communicating online do exist.

The findings of this thesis show that there is still some way to be covered before RIM grasps the

consequences of utilizing social media. Theory shows that it can be a powerful instrument but only

when used efficiently. For RIM the challenge, among other things, lies in combining ideas from

the SCCT framework, crisis communication theory and response strategies with the advantageous

traits of social media. Especially the factor of immediacy needs to be taken more seriously. It is no

longer sufficient for a company to follow up on a crisis several hours after the outbreak. Online

communication should be monitored closely and when a problem occurs stakeholders ought to be

provided with a message instantly. This does not mean that weight not longer should be put on

content of crisis communication, merely that the progress of the communication effort could be

designed differently.

Future research should continue to examine the traits of social media and how they might be

beneficial in a crisis communication context. The tools provided with this new technology are still

relatively unexplored. With a better understanding of the technology crisis strategies could be

tailored to be more efficient and precise. It could also be relevant to explore further how

companies draw more advantage of two-way communication. Whether communication could be

made more proficient and individually directed. Also, research should study further the

accommodative reputational response strategies and investigate whether expressions of

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responsibility could and ought to be utilized more and whether it would have an effect on the

success of a strategy. Finally, theory on how organizations navigate online ought still to be

extended. Possibly exploring the ideas of Crisisblogger further and providing a scholarly

discussion of social media as an ever evolving concept, and if it can even be boxed and categorized

as till now.

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Appendix 1Transcription of speech performed by Mike Lazaridis as seen on Youtube

Hi, I’m Mike Lazaridis, since launching BlackBerry in 1999, it’s been my goal to provide reliable

real-time communications around the world. We did not deliver on that goal this week. Not even

close. I apologise for the service outages this week. We’ve let many of you down. But let me

assure you that we’re working round the clock to fix this. You expect better from us, and I expect

better from us. It’s too soon to say this issue is fully resolved. But let me give you more detail

about what’s happening. We’re now approaching normal BlackBerry service levels in Europe, the

Middle East, India and Africa. We continue to monitor the system very closely. We’re working

very hard to continue to stabilize the system, and we’re seeing steady improvements. We expect to

see continued progress, and possibly some instability, as the system comes back to normal service

levels everywhere. We know that you want to hear more from us, and we’re working to update you

more frequently through our websites and social media channels as we gather more information.

I’d like to give you an estimated time of full recovery around the world – but I cannot do this with

certainty at this time. For those of you affected, I know this is very frustrating. We’re doing

everything in our power to restore regular service levels, and we’re working tirelessly to restore

your trust in us. We’ll update you again soon. Thank you.

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